CHAPTER 1 CONTINUED

Igor Sergeyevich Guzenko

Igor Sergeyevich Guzenko, born 13 January 1919 at Rogachevo, Moscow Oblast, USSR, was a Soviet Army Lt. and cipher clerk in the military attaché's office in Ottawa, Canada. He defected to the Canadians in September 1945. His defection was one of the first in the immediate post World War II period and provided Western intelligence services with an insight into the extent of Soviet espionage in the West during and after the war.

Guzenko grew up in Rostov-on-Don. He was a member of the Komsomol. In 1937 he studied art in Moscow and taught at a school for illiterates to earn money for tuition. Later, he attended the Moscow Architectural Institute, and, at the outbreak of World War II, he entered the Kuybyshev Military Engineering Academy in Moscow. Subsequently, he received special training in ciphers at the higher Red Army Academy in Moscow and became a GRU cipher clerk. In April 1942, he was assigned to GRU Headquarters. Then in June 1943, under cover of translator and secretary, he was posted as a cipher clerk to the office of the Soviet military attaché in Ottawa, Canada.

As a cipher clerk and GRU officer, Guzenko was privy to many of the GRU espionage operations in Canada, USA, and UK. He was familiar with GRU activities directed against US and Canadian atomic projects and military production and the GRU staff officers and their Canadian agents engaged in these activities.

In late August 1945 Guzenko inadvertently misplaced two rough draft copies of dispatches, which were found by a charwoman and handed in by her to the ambassador's office. Guzenko eventually learned that he was to be returned to Moscow for disciplinary action. He therefore decided to break with the Soviets.

On the night of 4 September 1945, Guzenko abstracted a number of GRU operational messages, along with other miscellaneous notes concerning espionage data and three dossiers of agents residing in Canada whose activities were directed by the Soviet military attaché. On 6 September 1945, Guzenko attempted to obtain an audience with the Canadian Minister of Justice to explain his position and furnish him the information in his possession.

Guzenko was referred to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). He was unsuccessful in getting anyone to listen to his story on that day and returned to his apartment. As he neared his apartment, he observed a Soviet security man from the embassy loitering in the neighborhood. That evening there was knock on his door, which he did not answer. When this person departed, Guzenko took his wife and son to a neighbor's apartment and notified the local police. When the police arrived, they found that Guzenko's door had been broken open and four Soviet Embassy employees were inside hiding behind the furniture. These individuals were ejected, and Guzenko and his family went to the RCMP on the morning of 7 September 1945.

In the course of subsequent interrogations, he gave a vast amount of information, supported by documents, which revealed the existence of a Red Army network in Canada. A Royal Commission, which was set up in February 1946 to examine this information, considered him to be a most reliable and informative witness. As a result of his defection, twenty persons, one of them a Canadian Member of Parliament, and many of them holding importance positions in the Canadian Government, were tried for supplying information to a foreign power, and at least one Russian espionage network was entirely broken up.

The Canadian network described by Guzenko was directed by the Intelligence Department of the Red Army. Its head in Canada was Col. Zabotin, the Soviet Military Attaché. Its agents were selected for their access to significant intelligence. A principal assignment given was information on the atomic bomb. His targets generally were military in nature, and concerned US, and even Brazilian, formations and dispositions.

Most of the agents Guzenko uncovered were employed in the Canadian Government; all were persons of intelligence and education. They were recruited through Canadian Communist Party contacts.

The Postwar Expansion of FBI Domestic Intelligence

In February 1946, Assistant Director Ladd of the FBI Intelligence Division recommended recon-sideration of previous restrictive policies and the institution of a broader program aimed at the Communist Party. Ladd advised Director Hoover:

"The Soviet Union is obviously endearing to extend its power and influence in every direction and the history of the Communist movement in this country clearly shows that the Communist Party, USA has consistently acted as the instrumentality in support of the foreign policy of the USSR.

The Communist Party has succeeded in gaining control of, or extensively infiltrating a large number of trade unions, many of which operate in industries vital to the national defense.…

In the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union, it would not be sufficient to disrupt the normal operations of the Communist Party by apprehending only its leaders or more important figures. Any members of the Party occupied in any industry would be in a position to hamper the efforts of the United States by individual action and undoubtedly the great majority of them would do so.…

It is also pointed out that the Russian Government has sent and is sending to this country a number of individuals without proper credentials or travel documents and that in the event of a breach of diplomatic relations there would undoubtedly be a considerable number of these people in the United States."

Therefore, Ladd recommended "re-establishing the original policy of investigating all known members of the Communist Party" and reinstating "the policy of preparing security index cards on all members of the Party."

He observed that "the greatest difficulty" with apprehending all Communists if war broke out was "the necessity of finding legal authorization." While enemy aliens could be interned, the only statutes available for the arrest of citizens were the Smith Act, the rebellion and insurrection statutes, and the seditious conspiracy law. These laws were inadequate because "it might be extremely difficult to prove that members of the Party knew the purpose of the Party to overthrow the Government by force and violence" under the Smith Act and "some overt act would be necessary" before the other statutes could be invoked. Hence, he proposed advising the Attorney General plans and the need for "a study as to the action which could be taken in the event of an emergency."¹¹⁶

Consequently, Director Hoover informed Attorney General Tom C. Clark that the FBI had "found it necessary to intensify its investigation of Communist Party activities and Soviet espionage cases." The FBI was also "taking steps to list all members of the Communist Party and others who would be dangerous in the event of a break in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, or other serious crisis, involving the United States and the USSR" The FBI Director added that it might be necessary in a crisis "to immediately detain a large number of American citizens." He suggested that a study be made "to determine what legislation is available or should be sought to authorize effective action…in the event of a serious emergency."¹¹⁷

Assistant Director Ladd proposed another FBI program, which was not called to the Attorney Gen.'s attention. He told the Director, "Apart from the legal problems involved, another difficulty of considerable proportions which would probably be encountered in the event of extensive arrests of Communists would be a flood of propaganda from Leftist and so-called Liberal sources." To counteract this possibility, he made the following recommendations:

It is believed that an effort should be made now to prepare educational material that can be released through available channels so that in the event of an emergency we will have an informed public opinion.

To a large extent the power and influence of the Communist Party in this country, which is out of all proportion to the actual size of the Party, derives from the support which the Party receives from "Liberal" sources and from its connections in the labor unions. The Party earns its support by championing individual causes, which are also sponsored by the Liberal elements. It is believed, however, that, in truth, Communism is the most reactionary, intolerant and bigoted force in existence and that it would be possible to assemble educational materials which would incontrovertibly establish the truth.

Therefore, material could be assembled for dissemination to show that Communists would abolish or subjugate labor unions and churches if they came to power. Such material would undermine Communist influence in unions and support for the Party from "persons prominent in religious circles." Additional material could be assembled "indicating the basically Russian nature of the Communist party in this country." Ladd proposed a two-day training conference for "Communist supervisors" from eighteen or twenty key field offices so that they might have "a complete understanding…of the Bureau's policies and desires.…" These recommendations were approved by the FBI Executive Conference.¹¹⁸

The Federal Loyalty-Security Program

In 1947, President Truman established by executive order a Federal Employee Loyalty Program.¹¹⁹ Its basic features were retained in the Federal Employee Security Program authorized by President Eisenhower in Executive Order 10450, which is still in effect with some modifications today.¹²⁰ The program originated out of serious and well-founded concern that Soviet intelligence was using the Communist Party as an effective vehicle for the recruitment of espionage agents; however, from the outset, it swept far beyond this counterespionage purpose to satisfy more speculative preventive intelligence objectives. The program was designed as much to protect the government from the "subversive" ideas of federal employees, as it was to detect potential espionage agents.

A Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty developed the basic outlines of the employee security program in 1946-1947. Its understanding of the problem was shaped largely by the report of a Canadian Royal Commission in June 1946. The Royal Commission had investigated an extensive Soviet espionage operation in Canada, which was disclosed by a defector from the Soviet Embassy. Its report described how employees of the Canadian Government had communicated secret information to Soviet intelligence. The report concluded that "membership in Communist organizations or sympathy towards Communist ideologies was the primary force that caused these agents: to work for Soviet intelligence. It explained that "secret members or adherents of the Communist Party," who were attracted to Communism by its propaganda for social reform, had been developed into espionage agents. The Royal Commission recommended additional security measures "to prevent the infiltration into positions of trust under the Government of persons likely to commit" such acts of espionage. ¹²¹ The impact of the report in the United States was that "questions of thought and attitudes took on new importance as factors of safety in the eyes of all those concerned with national security."¹²²

A subcommittee of the House Civil Service Committee recommended shortly after release of the Canadian commission report that the president appoint an interdepartmental committee to study employee security practices. FBI Director Hoover suggested to Attorney General Clark whom he should appoint to such a committee "if it is set up."¹²³ When President Truman appointed a Commission on Employee Loyalty in November 1946, the FBI Director's suggested Justice Department representa-tive was made chairman, and the other members represented the Departments of State, War, Navy, and Treasury, and the Civil Service Commission.

The President's Commission had less success than its Canadian counterpart in discovering the dimensions of the problem in the United States. FBI Assistant Director Ladd told the Commission that there were "a substantial number of disloyal persons in government service" and that the Communist Party "had established a separate group for infiltration of the government." He also called the Commission's attention to "a publication of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce" which had expressed the opinion "that Communists in the government have reached a serious stage." The War Department representative on the Commission then stated that it "should have something more than reports from the Chamber of Commerce, FBI, and Congress, to determine the size of the problem." However, when Assistant Director Ladd was asked later "for the approximate number of names in subversive files…and whether the Bureau had a file of names of persons who could be picked up in the even of a war with Russia," the FBI official "declined to answer because this matter was not within the scope of the Commission." The meeting ended with "general agreement that Mr. Hoover should be asked to appear.…"¹²⁴ Therefore, the Commission prepared a lengthy list of questions for the FBI; but instead of Director Hoover appearing, Attorney General Clark testified in a session where no minutes were taken.

The Attorney General supplemented his "informal" appearance with a memorandum, which stated that the number of subversive persons in the government had "not yet reached serious proportions," but that the possibility of "even one disloyal person" entering government service constituted a "serious threat."¹²⁵ Thus, the President's Commission accepted its foreclosure from conducting any serious evaluation of FBI intelligence operations or FBI intelligence data on the extent of the danger. One commission staff member observed that these were felt to be "matters exclusively for the consideration of the counter-intelligence agencies."¹²⁶

It is impossible to determine fully the effect of the autonomy of FBI counterespionage on the government's ability to formulate appropriate security policies. Nevertheless, the record suggests that executive officials were forced to make decisions without full knowledge. They had to depend on the FBI's estimate of the problem, rather than being able to make their own assessment on the basis of complete information. With respect to the employee loyalty program in 1947, the FBI's view prevailed on three crucial issues__the broad definition of the threat of "subversive influence," the secrecy of FBI informants and electronic surveillance, and the exclusive power of the FBI to investigate allegations of disloyalty.

Although Director Hoover did not testify before the President's Commission, he submitted a general memorandum on the types of activities of "subversive or disloyal persons" in government service which would "constitute a threat" to the nation's security. The danger as he saw it was not limited to espionage or the recruitment of others for espionage. It extended to "influencing" the formation and execution of government policies "so that those policies will either favor the foreign country of their ideological choice or will weaken the United States government domestically or abroad to the ultimate advantage of the…foreign power." Consequently, he urged that attention be given to the association of government employees with "front" organizations. These included not only established "fronts" but also "temporary organizations, `spontaneous' campaigns, and pressure movements so frequently used by subversive groups." If a disloyal employee was affiliated with such "fronts," he could be expected to influence government policy in the direction taken by the group."¹²⁷

The President's Commission accepted Director Hoover's position on the threat, as well as the view endorsed later by a Presidential Commission on Civil Rights that there also was a danger from "those who would subvert our democracy by…destroying the civil right of some groups."¹²⁸ Thus, the standards for determining employee loyalty included a criterion based on membership in or association with groups designated on an "Attorney Gen.'s list" as:

Totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or has having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their right sunder the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.¹²⁹

The executive orders provided a substantive legal basis for the FBI's investigation of allegedly "subversive" organizations, which might fall within these categories.¹³⁰

The FBI also succeeded in protecting the secrecy of its informants and electronic surveillance. The Commission initially recommended that the FBI be required to make available to department heads upon request "all investigative material and information available to the investigative agency on any employee of the requesting department." Director Hoover protested that the FBI had "steadfastly refused to reveal the identities of its confidential informants." He advised the Attorney General that the proposal "would also apparently contemplate the revealing of our techniques, including among others, technical surveillance that are authorized by you." The Director assured the Attorney General that the FBI would make "information available to other agencies to evaluate the reliability of our informants" without divulging their identities.¹³¹ The Commission revised its report to satisfy the FBI.¹³²

Director Hoover was still concerned that the Commission (and President's executive order) did not give the FBI exclusive power to investigate allegedly subversive employees.¹³³ He went so far as to threaten "to withdraw from this field of investigation rather than to engage in a tug of war with the Civil Service Commission."¹³⁴ According to notes of presidential aide George Elsey, President Truman felt "very strongly anti-FBI" on the issue and wanted "to be sure and hold FBI down, afraid of `Gestapo."¹³⁵ Presidential aide Clark Clifford reviewed the situation and came down on the side of the FBI as "better qualified" than the Civil Service Commission.¹³⁶ Nevertheless, the President insisted on a compromise, which gave Civil Service "discretion" to call on the FBI "if it wishes."¹³⁷ The FBI Director objected to this "confusion" as to the FBI's jurisdiction.¹³⁸

Justice Department officials warned the White House that Congress would "find flaws" with this arrangement, and President Truman noted "J. Edgar will in all probability get this backward looking Congress to give him what he wants. It's dangerous."¹³⁹ President Truman was correct. The administration's budget request of $16 million for Civil Service and $8.7 million for the FBI to conduct loyalty investigations was revised in Congress to allocate $7.4 million to the FBI and only $3 million to the Civil Service Commission.¹⁴⁰ The issue was finally resolved to the FBI's satisfaction. President Truman issued a statement to all Department heads declaring that there were "to be no exceptions" to the general rule that the FBI would make all loyalty investigations.¹⁴¹

The rationale for investigating groups under the authority of the loyalty-security program changed over the years. Such investigations supplied a body of intelligence data against which to check the names of prospective federal employees.¹⁴² By the mid-1950s, the Communist Party and other groups fitting the standards for the Attorney Gen.'s list were no longer extensively used by Soviet intelligence for espionage recruitment.¹⁴³ Therefore, FBI investigations of such groups became__in com-bination with the "name check" of Bureau files__almost entirely a means for monitoring the political background of prospective federal employees. They also came to serve a pure intelligence function of keeping the Attorney General informed of "subversive" influence and infiltration.¹⁴⁴

No organizations were formally added to the Attorney Gen.'s list after 1955. Groups designated prior to that time included numerous defunct German and Japanese societies, Communist and Communist "front" organizations the Socialist Workers Party, the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, and several Ku Klux Klan organizations.¹⁴⁵ However, the FBI's "name check" reports on prospective employees were never limited to information about groups on the list. The list's criteria were independent standards for evaluating an employee's background, regardless of whether a group was formally designated by the Attorney General.¹⁴⁶

After 1955, a substitute for designation on the Attorney Gen.'s list was the FBI's "characteri-zation" or "thumbnail sketch" of a group. Thus, if a "name check" uncovered information about a prospective employee's association with a group, which might fall under the categories for the list, the FBI would report the data and attach a "characterization" of the organization setting forth pertinent facts relating to the standards for the list.¹⁴⁷ This procedure made it unnecessary for the Attorney General to add groups to the formal list, since FBI "characterizations" served the same purpose within the executive branch.

FBI-Military Intelligence Jurisdictional Agreement¹⁴⁸

Delimitations Agreement Between the FBI and US Military Intelligence Services With Supplements, February 23, 1949

3-1 Delimitations Agreement
The following agreement was approved and signed on 2-23-49 by the Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigations; Intelligence Division of the Army; Office of Special Investigations, Air Force; and the Chief of Naval Intelligence:

Subject: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army, and the Office of Special Investigations; Inspector General, US Air Force. The Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, Intelligence Division of the Army, and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, US Air Force.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President's Memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitations Agreement of February 9, 1942, and the Presidential Directive of October 30, 1947. In addition cognizance has been taken of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and the specific application of that Act is set forth in Section II hereof. All other provisions of this Agreement are apart from and have no relation to the stated requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. In view of the above, it is now agreed that responsibility for the investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage (hereinafter referred to as `these categories') will be delimited as indicated hereinafter. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with the other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest. When the organization with primary operating responsibility is unable for any reason to produce material in that field desired by the subscribing agencies, such special arrangements as may be legal or desirable will be worked out through negotiation at the national level prior to activity by one agency in another agency's field. It is recognized by the subscribers hereto that the Headquarters Department of the Army has decentralized such functions to its major subordinate commanders. When the major subordinate commanders of the Army cannot effect satisfactory special arrangements, the matter will be referred to the Director of Intelligence for the Army for further negotiations at the national level. Close cooperation and coordination between the four subscribing organizations is a mutually recognized necessity.

II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigations of cases in these categories involving civilian and foreign nationals of all classes in the continental United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, (the State of Hawaii,) and the States of Alaska except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5.

2. All investigations of violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. There are no territorial or personnel limitations on this provision.

3. The coordination of the investigative activities of civilian agencies in the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the State of Alaska except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V. Section 5, which provide information regarding subversive movements and activities in these categories.

4. Keeping the other subscribing organizations advised of important developments in these categories within its cognizance, particularly:

a. Activities of inactive reserves of the armed services, including the National Guard.

b. Developments affecting plants engaged in armed forces contracts.

c. Developments concerning the strength, composition, and intentions of civilian groups within its cognizance which are classed as subversive and whose activities are a potential danger to the security of the United States.

d. Developments affecting those vital facilities and vital utilities which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.

e. Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communication systems which have been designed by the Secretary of Defense.

(For b, d, and e above no protective coverage is contemplated.)

III. ID, Army will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Army.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organization, in where they Army Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

5. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

6. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Army contracts.

IV. ONI will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Navy.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organization, in where the Navy Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations and with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government on Kodiak and Afognak Islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula and Adak Island in the Aleutian Chain.

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Navy contracts.

V. The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, US Air Force will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Air Force.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organization, in where the Air Force Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The investigations the same cases described above in that portion of Alaska described in Section 5, below, with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians, except as described herein above, (1) in that part of the Alaska Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay northwest to the town of Old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to the Kvichak Bay; (2) in the islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula excluding Kodiak and Afognak Islands which are the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; (3) in the Aleutian Islands excluding Adak Island which is the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; and (4) in the Pribilof Islands.

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Air Force contracts.

VI. 1. Where Sections III, IV, and I involve general territorial coverage, responsibility for such coverage will pass from one element of the armed forces to another automatically when a change of command responsibility ensues. This provision is subject to modification by direct agreement between the interested elements of the armed forces.

2. While investigative jurisdiction over the civilian populace in former enemy territories occupied by the armed forces has been provided for in Sections III, IV, and V above, those provisions are subject to direct adjustment with the Department of State if and when that Department assumes governmental direction in such areas of occupation.

VII. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing conditions to modify or amend this Delimitations Agreement. Subject to the exceptions already provided for above, general amendments or modifications involving all of the four subscribing organizations shall be issued in the form of a revised Delimitations Agreement and not as separate instructions.

VIII. During periods of martial law, or periods of predominant armed forces interest not involving martial law, when agreed upon by the subscribing agencies, the provisions of Appendix A or B, hereto attached will additionally apply.

IX. All agreements of a continuing nature and applicable to two or more of the subscribing agencies to the Delimitations Agreement which affect the basic jurisdiction thereof which are not or hereafter mutually entered into by any of the subscribers thereto will be reduced in writing; will thereafter become supplements to the Delimitations Agreement, and distributed only to the extent agreed upon by the co-signers.

(Signed) S. Leroy Irwin
Director of Intelligence
Department of the Army
(Signed) Thomas B. Inglis
Chief of Naval Intelligence
(Signed) J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Signed) Joseph F. Carroll
Director, Office of Special Investigations,
Inspector General, US Air Force

Appendix A—Period Of Martial Law

I. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared by the President, the armed forces commander will assume responsibilities for coverage in these categories. His authority to direct and control the subscribing agencies of the armed forces will be limited only by such instructions as he may receive from the Secretary of Defense. He will have authority to coordinate the intelligence activities of the subscribing agencies in his area of responsibility, within the limits of their available personnel and facilities, by the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies in the area of his responsibility, nor to issue instructions to them beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

II. Personnel of the subscribing agencies in the area of responsibility of the armed forces commander will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. They will render such aid and assistance to the armed forces commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. They will furnish all pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to the armed forces commander by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. Each headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised by its agencies of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the armed forces commander.

Appendix B—Periods of Predominant Military Interests Not Involving Martial Law

I. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theaters of operation. When an armed forces commander of such a potential theater is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the armed forces commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

1. Agents of the FBI: of ONI: ID Army: and the OSI, IG, US Air Force will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of Sections, II, III, IV, and V.

2. In addition thereto, the armed forces commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other subscribing agencies will insure that the armed forces commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other agencies.

3. The armed forces commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the other three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.

II. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When the commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is recognized that he is authorized to augment the coverage with such elements of the subscribing agencies as are under his jurisdiction. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agencies, the armed forces commander should obtain the necessary authority from the Secretary of Defense.

III. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have place the initiative in the hands of the armed forces commander, whenever any of the other services feel that such a survey to determined adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended.

3-2 Instructions
The major differences between the foregoing Delimitations Agreement and previous versions are as follows:

The Director, OSI, USAF, is a party thereto. The Bureau has justification over all civilians insofar as espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage are concerned, regardless of employment.

3-3 Supplemental Agreements to the Delimitations Agreement
On 6-2-49, supplemental agreements to the Delimitations Agreement were approved by the members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and they are set out below. Instructions, where necessary, concerning each of the supplements will be found at the end of that supplement:

a. Supplemental Agreement No. (I) to the Delimitations Agreement:

Cooperation And Coordination Between The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Intelligence Division of the Army, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, US Air Force.

The Director of Intelligence, US Army, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, US Air force, with a view to promoting the closest possible cooperation and coordination between the Field Services of these agencies agree that the following recommendations will be transmitted to their Field installations:

(a) Special Agents in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Divisional Offices, Military Intelligence Officers of the pertinent Armies, District Officers of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, US Air Force, and Naval District Intelligence Officers will maintain close personal liaison between those offices and their representatives, including a meeting of representatives of the four agencies, preferably the offices in charge, at least twice per month, for the purpose of discussing pending and contemplated investigative activities, and any other subject necessary to insure that there is proper coordination of their investigative work.

(b) The close personal liaison to be maintained between representatives of the four agencies at all times should insure that there is no duplication of effort in any field, and that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is maintained. Particular attention should be paid to avoiding any duplication in connection with the use of informers.

(c) A distinction should be recognized

between the investigative interest of individual agencies and to the coverage interest. It is believed that all four agencies should study, from time to time, the coverage of the investigative field in order to insure that all channels of interest and avenues of information are adequately covered by at least one of the participating agencies.

(d) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it should be transmitted to the other agency.

(e) Considerations should be given to the fact that certain classes of information are of general interest to the Military, Naval, and Air Force intelligence services in connection with background and knowledge of espionage and sabotage organizations, even though the Military, Naval, and Air Force intelligence services may have no apparent direct investigative interest.

(f) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature occur, the directors of the four intelligence agencies feel that with proper personal liaison, such differences can be satisfactorily adjusted locally by the officials in charge of the various divisional organizations.

3-3.1 Instructions
This supplement recommends meetings at least two monthly of the interested agencies. Where desirable or necessary, these meeting may be held more often than twice per month and in certain areas, because of the travel distances involved or other factors, meetings are being held once per month by special agreement. It is not necessary that FBIHQ be advised of the business discussed at these meetings, unless there is a particular matter of which FBIHQ should be cognizant. FBIHQ should be promptly informed of any change in the scheduling of these meetings or of any agreement to commence or discontinue meetings in a field office area.

Supplemental Agreement No. II to the Delimitations Agreement: (Rescinded.)

Supplemental Agreement No. III to the Delimitations Agreement: Investigative Jurisdiction on Vessels of Military Sea Transportation Service

1. The investigative jurisdiction of all activities under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage on vessels of the Military Sea Transportation Service is as follows:

a. Investigative jurisdiction on vessels purchased by the Navy will be the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

b. Vessels obtained by the Navy through a `bare boat charter' will be under the investigative jurisdiction of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

c. Vessels allocated to the Military Sea Transportation Service which are manned and supervised by their private owners are under the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

2. When personnel who are subjects of an investigation under a or b above reach a US PORT or a port where the FBI has a field agency, or prior to reaching such a port, if practicable, the Department of the Navy will promptly furnish the FBI all pertinent information concerning the investigation. If personnel who are subjects of an investigation as above remove themselves from the vessel upon arrival of the vessel in port and further surveillance is considered necessary, the Navy will continue surveillance until notified by the FBI at local level that the FBI has taken over full responsibility for the case. However, both the Navy and FBI will make every effort to transfer responsibility upon arrival of the vessel in port.

3. When the FBI opens an investigation under c above or when an FBI investigation in progress develops or is believed about to develop ramifications under a., b. or c. above, the FBI will promptly furnish all pertinent information to the Navy and will thereafter coordinate its actions with the Navy whenever and wherever deemed necessary to insure proper pursuit of the case.

Supplemental Agreement No. (IV) to the Delimitations Agreement: Investigations of Private Contractors of the Armed Forces

It is agreed by the subscribed of the Delimitations Agreement (hereinafter referred to as subscribers) that with reference to investigations of civilian employees, applicants for employment, directors and key personnel of privately owned plants and facilities, working or bidding on contracts important to the Army, Navy or Air Force (hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces) procurement, the following will be followed insofar as practicable. Exceptions thereto will be adjusted by mutual agreement between the subscribers concerned.

(a) The Armed Forces will conduct background investigations of such persons unless there is a particular reason for requesting that an investigation be conducted by the FBI or the FBI has a special interest in a particular case and has notified the Armed Forces of such interest.

(b) The FBI will conduct complaint investigations of such personnel upon specific request in each case by one or more of the Armed Forces. If one of the Armed Forces has no further need for an investigation requested, but not

completed, prompt notification will be made to the FBI.

(c) Investigations conducted by the Armed Forces under (a) above will be terminated and all information passed to the FBI when credible derogatory information of a loyalty nature is uncovered. Upon receipt of such a case, the FBI will proceed as under (b) above if one of the Armed Forces so requests.

(d) When one of the subscribers is aware that another is conducting an investigation on a person or firm identical or closely connected with a person or firm it contemplates investigating, no investigation will be undertaken without the consent of the subscriber which has an investigation in progress. The investigation agency will make available to the other interested agency copies of the reports of the investigation made.

(e) Normally, identity of confidential informants will not be communicated from subscriber to another: however, when such communication occurs, the receiving subscriber will employ the highest possible safeguards to insure that such informants are not compromised. No transmittal of information concerning confidential informants to a third subscriber or to another agency is authorized except by specific consent of the originator.

(f) A subscriber who receives a report of investigation from another subscriber may freely transmit copies of such reports to a third subscriber except as provided in (e) above.

(g) A report of completed investigation received by the Armed Forces from the FBI will not be reopened without the approval of the FBI except to obtain additional background information. In such cases, the FBI will be furnished copies of all information obtained. Other information required by the Armed Forces will be requested of the FBI.

(h) If one of the Armed Forces requests the FBI to conduct an investigation or conduct additional investigations as required under (g) above, and if for any reason the FBI declines or is unable to conduct such investigation or additional investigation, the Armed Forces concerned may proceed with the investigation. The FBI will be furnished copies of the results there if the FBI so requests or if the Armed Forces concerned considers the results to be of FBI interest.

(i) Nothing above is to be construed as altering the basic Delimitations Agreement of 1949 or current agreements concerning subversive organizations.

Investigation of Reserve and Civilian
Components of the Armed Forces
It is agreed by the subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force may conduct background investigations on members of the inactive reserve and National Guard who are anticipated being called back to active duty, or when investigation is undertaken for the purpose of determining whether the individual may be granted access to classified military information. The following procedures shall be pursued in each of the above circumstances:

(1) The intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy or Air Force before undertaking such background investigation will consult the FBI to determined:

(a) if the FBI has an investigation in progress; if so, no investigation will be undertaken by the intelligence agencies except as may be mutually agreeable to the Armed Forces concerned and the FBI; (b) if the FBI already has made an investigation; if so, the results will be made available to the other agencies; (c) if the FBI has information on the individual even though it may not have conducted an investigation.

(2) If, after consulting the FBI, investigation is undertaken by the other agencies, it will be pursued no further than is necessary to make the determination required by the other agencies, and all information developed pertinent to the four categories will be furnished promptly to the FBI.

This supplement has been discussed by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and it was agreed on 9-10-58 that the consultation requirement will be satisfied by the FBI is notified, by means of a statement included in a from request for a name check, that investigation is being initiated concerning the individual.

Supplemental Agreement No. (VI) to the Delimitations Agreement: Investigation in Areas Not Specifically Assigned

It is agreed by the military subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the references therein paragraphs III.4, IV.4, and V.4, to areas where the Army (Navy, Air Force) Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein' shall be interpreted as referring to areas where the Department of the Army (Navy, Air Force) is responsible for the administrative and logistic support of the Headquarters of Commands established by the Secretary of Defense. (Approved by ICC November 4, 1959.)

CONTINUE CHAPTER 1