CI in World War II
End Notes

1. This is a continuation of the article by S/A Wayne Goldstein, the first part appeared in Volume I.


6. Cited in memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 10/16/40.

7. Memorandum from Stimson to the Attorney General, 8/26/40.

8. It is not clear whether Hoover may have had in mind the secret arrangements with British intelligence established at that time at President Roosevelt’s instructions. These arrangements have recently been made public in a book based on previously classified British records. (William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovianovich, 1976.)


14. Memorandum from Hoover to Field Offices, 4/30/41.

15. Memorandum from Ladd to the Director, 2/27/46.


17. Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1944, pp. 17, 234-247. From 1940 to 1943, a National Defense Section on the Criminal Division had supervised espionage and Selective Service prosecutions. It was renamed the Internal Security Section in 1943.

18. Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to Assistant Attorney General Cox and Hoover, Director, FBI, 7/6/43.

19. Director Hoover interpreted the Attorney General’s order as applying only to the list maintained by the Justice Department’s special unit. (Memorandum from Hoover to FBI Field Offices, Re: Dangerousness Classification, 8/14/43.

20. Memorandum from Hoover to FBI Field Offices, Re: Dangerousness Classification, 8/14/43.


22. In early 1946 there were 10,763 Security Index cards on “communists and members of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.” (Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to the Director, re: Investigations of Communists, 2/27/46.

23. Memorandum from Ladd to the Director, 8/30/45.


25. Although censorship is often regarded as being solely a counterintelligence step, it also constitutes a fruitful source of information in connection with intelligence production. For example, see: H.R. Rept. 1229, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., The Shameful Years, 30 Dec. 1951, p. 50. Described therein is an Office of Censorship intercept of ciphered messages written in invisible ink on letters between Mexico City and New York City concerning a conspiracy to free Trotsky’s assassin from prison.

27. Letter, TAG to all CG’s, AG 230 (6-18-41) MC-B-M, 24 June 1941, sub: Control of Subversive Civil Service Personnel. DRB, TAG.


29. Annex to Organizational Chart, General Staff (G-2), 5 December 1941, MID 321.19 G-2, ACSI Rec Sec. Chief of the CI Branch in MID on 7 December 1941 was Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) John T. Bissell. Censorship planning at that time was still being conducted by a small Information Control Branch under Maj. (later Maj. Gen.) W. Preston Corderman.

30. Letter Hoover to General Lee, 1 February 1942, MID 310.11 (5 August 1941). ACSI Rec Sec. The JAG seems to have agreed in general with Hoover’s interpretation of this complicated subject, except for a belief that the FBI chief should formally direct his Honolulu office to continue performing its usual duties under the designated Military Governor. See: Directive, G-2 WD to G-2’s all Corps Areas and Departments and PMG, 19 February 1942, MID 310.11 (5 August 1941). ACSI Rec Sec.

31. Letter, G-2 WDC to Chief CI Branch, MID, 10 January 1942, MID 323.3, 10 January 1942 (20 December 1941). ACSI Rec Sec.

32. Agreement for Coordination of the FBI, ONI, and MID, 9 February 1942, MID 310.11 (5 August 1941). ACSI Rec Sec.

33. Ibid. Note that the FBI reserved primary investigative responsibility for the more populous regions of Alaska and MID was not given any specific mission in respect to uncovering Japanese espionage, counter espionage, subversion or sabotage. This latter function, long a bone of contention between ONI and FBI, was now accepted as being a joint responsibility for these two agencies to share.


35. Issued 15 February 1940, this BFM prescribed military censorship procedures largely as utilized by the AEF during WWI. The AEF, in turn, had copied most of these same procedures from the British.

36. Executive Order 8985, 19 December 1941. Following the establishment of OWI in June 1942, the Director of OWI replaced the Directors of the Office of Government Reports and the Office of Facts and Figures on this policy board.


38. Letter TAG to major commanders, 14 June 1942, AG 381 (6-12-42) MS-B-M, copy in; G-2 350.092, 14 June 1942 (w 6 November 1943). ACSI Rec Sec.

39. Ibid.

40. MIS Documents, tab CPI to G-2.

41. Ibid., Memo, Chief CIG to Chief MIS, 2 June 1942.

42. Ibid.


48. MID 321.19 G-2 CI, 2 December 1944 (24 January 1942). ACSI Rec Sec. In later reporting on the results
of this 26 November 1942 directive, Gen. Kroner estimated that it did achieve an initial economy of 8 officers and 59 civilians.

49. “Special Information Branch,” MID 020. G-2 Spec Inf Br, pt. 1. ACSI Rec Sec. Many of these telephone conversations had to be monitored in a foreign language.

50. Memo, Chief Visa and Passport Branch to Chief Counterintelligence Group, MIS, 5 May 1942, MID 321.19 MIS CI, 5 May 1942 (24 January 1942). ACSI Rec Sec.

51. MIS Documents. Letter from Secretary of War to the Attorney General, 17 August 1942, tab Visa and Passport Branch. ACSI Rec Sec.


53. MIS Documents, tab Visa and Passport Branch. ACSI Rec Sec.

54. Ibid., tab CPI to G-2.

55. MIS Documents, tab Evaluation Branch, ACSI Rec Sec.

56. Headquarters AGF had organized a Military Intelligence Section but, in respect to military security, it remained mostly concerned with checking on unit counterintelligence training. See MID 020 AGF, 8 July 1942 (9 March 1942). DRB, TAG. On the other hand, Headquarters AAF formed a large Counterintelligence Division under the ACoFS A-2, which became increasingly active in such operations as the war progressed. See: Chart, Training and Intelligence Organizations Army Air Forces, 30 November 1942, in Report of Intelligence Conference at Camp Richie, Md., undated, G-2 Sec AGF Files, and Memo, CoFS Air Staff to CoFS (Attn: ACoFS), 28 March 1943, 350.09 CI, 28 March 1943 (14 Apr 1942). DRB, TAG.

57. Hist ASF, ch. II, pp. 1-3. The Security Control Group was mainly an inspection element for internal security purposes.

58. Col. Forney assumed charge of the Counterintelligence Group on 29 March 1943 but was formally designated to be Group Chief until 20 April 1943, the effective date of Col. Bissell’s departure.

59. See MID 321.19, Wash Field Office, 8-25 June 1943 (8 June 1943) and Memo, 300.6, 7 July 1943, Administration Memos 1943. ACSI Rec Sec.

60. Although the true subversive nature of the international Communist conspiracy had long been understood by the military intelligence authorities, it was not until 19 March 1943, that Communists were actually mentioned as such by name in official War Department instructions. See: File, Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel, Tab “D”, G-2 000.24, December 1944 (f/w 16 December 1946). ACSI Rec Sec.

61. One of these special units was the 620th Eng Gen Serv Co, constituted at Ft. Meade, South Dakota, on 1 November 1942 but subsequently moved to Camp Hale, Colorado, which also served as an interment center for POW’s. A disaffected member of this special Co named Dale Maple, of wealthy parents and a Harvard graduate, aided the successful escape of two German POW’s from their nearby barracks and then joined them in fleeing to Mexico. Apprehended by the Mexican authorities and returned to U.S. control early in 1944, he was convicted of violating both the 58th and 81st Articles of War and sentenced to be hanged. Although his conviction was confirmed under Presidential review, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. See: 201 Maple, Dale, cent Rec Off, Ft. Holabird, Md.


63. Memo, Lansdale to Crist, 14 October 1942, MID 200.3, 14 October 1942 (28 May 1941). ACSI Rec Sec. Also being handled in this same manner were the commissions awarded at Aviation Cadet Schools and certain others directly approved by the Surgeon General for the Medical or Medical Administrative Corps.

64. Letter, G-2 to DI’s all Service Commands and ACoFS G-2 WDC and Fourth Army, 10 November 1942, MID 200.31, 10 November 1942 (28 May 1941). ACSI Rec Sec.

65. Memo, ACoFS G-2 for ACoFS G-3, 13 February 1943, sub: Disposition of Communists, Enlisted Men, MID 200.3, 13 February 1943 (28 May 1941). ACSI Rec Sec. By this time about 100 Communists had been disposed of under the segregation policy, while it was estimated that not more than another 150 would be so-classified in the future.


68. History of the Communist Question in the Army, initials L.R.F. (Col. Forney), undated 44, ACSI 000.244 (15 April 1943). ACSI Rec Sec.

69. Hearings before the Special Committee on Subversive Influences in the Army of the Committee on Military Affairs, H.R. 79th Cong., 1st sess., pursuant to H. Res 20, 18 July 1945, p. 7.

70. File, Communists in the Army, Tab A, copy of Memo for the Deputy Chief of Staff, signed Malin Craig, 12 August 1943, ACSI 000.244, undated March 1944 (15 April 1943). ACSI Rec Sec. Two of the three individuals involved in this particular refusal had served in Spain with the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.

71. Memo, IG to Deputy CoFS, 6 November 1943, MID 350.092, 6 November 1943 (6 November 1943). DRB, TAG.

72. Ibid.

73. This distinct emphasis on CIC activities at the expense of other specified phases of the investigation did not escape notice by the CIC officials at that time. See: Comments on Chapters II and VIII, Part V, 10 October 1957, Lt. Col. Franklin E. Jordan, USAIB. Author’s file.

74. Memo, IG to Deputy CoFS, 6 November 1943, MID 350.092, 6 November 1943 (6 November 1943). DRB, TAG. The CIC Branch of MIS, which was actually functioning as a CIC Headquarters, had been transferred to Baltimore in February 1943.

75. Ibid. According to the then Chief of the CI Group, only an incomplete copy of the IG’s report was forwarded to MID after its approval. With much of the body of the report missing, there was still enough data remaining to indicate that the IG may have held a serious misconception of the real state of affairs in regard to G-2 control over service command counterintelligence operations. See Specific Comments on Chapter II, attached to letter from Col. L.R. Forney, USA Ret. to Maj. Gen. R.W. Stephens, Chief Mil Hist, 14 October 1957. Author’s file.

76. WD Cir 324, 14 December 1943. The indicated changes were to become effective on 1 January 1944.

77. See CIC School Text, WWII, pp. 7-8.

78. As actually implemented the entire CIC establishment at Fort Holabird, including an extensive training center and the preparatory CIC school in Chicago were eliminated.

79. Memo, IG to Deputy CoFS, 6 November 1943, MID 350.092, 6 November 1943. DRB, TAG.

80. MID Memo No. 43-M, 3 June 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.

81. Hist MIS, War History of Source Control, Part III, p. 3. ACSI Rec Sec.


83. Ibid., pp. 2-7.

84. History MID, WW II, pp. 242-43.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Memo, ACoS G-2 for the Deputy CoFS, 17 April 1944, G-2 000.244, 17 April 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.

88. Memo, Forney to Chief CI Div AAF, 27 April 1944, MID 200.3, 27 April 1944 and Memo for the Record, signed by L.R. Forney, 19 June 1944, G-2 000.244, 19 June 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.

89. Memo for the CoFS, prepared during May 1944 for General Bissell’s signature, G-2 000.244, 1 May 1944, Tab B. ACSI Rec Sec.

90. Ibid., p. 2. This bow to expediency was occasioned mostly by the fact that a heated political campaign devoted to gaining an unprecedented fourth term for President Roosevelt was already in full swing.

91. Memo for the Record, signed by L.R. Forney, 19 June 1944, G-2 000.244, 19 June 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.

92. Ibid.

93. See Inter-Office Memo, Chief Policy Staff to ACoS G-2, 16 November 1944, MID 000.244, 16 November 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.
94. Memo, Bissell to McCloy, 23 November 1944, sub: Communism in the Army, MID 000.244, 23 November 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.

95. Memo, McCloy to ACofS G-2, 28 November 1944, MID 000.244, 28 November 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.

96. Memo, Bissell for McCloy, 5 December 1944, MID 000.244, 5 December 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.

97. Memo, McCloy for ACofS G-2, 23 December 1944, MID 000.244, 23 December 1944, in comparison with para 2b, Letter, AG 014.311 (28 December 1944) OB-S-B-M, 30 December 1944, to all major commanders, sub: Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel, copy in; C1 File, G-2 200.3, 30 December 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.


99. Ibid. and “History of the Communist Question in the Army,” initialed L.R.F., ACSI 000.244, undated 44. ACSI Rec Sec.


103. See Report on CIA and FBI Mail Opening; Memorandum From FBI to Select Committee, 9/23/75.


105. Hoover memorandum, enclosed with letter from Cummings to the President, 10/20/38.

106. Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division, 2/9/42.

107. Memorandum from Colonel Churchill, Counter Intelligence Branch, MID, to E.A. Tamm, FBI, 5/16/39, and enclosure, “Subject: Essential Items of Domestic Intelligence Information.”

108. Victor J. Johnson, “The Role of the Army in the Civilian Arena, 1920-1970.” U.S. Army Intelligence Command Study (1971). The scope of wartime Army intelligence has been summarized as follows: “It reported on radical labor groups, communists, Nazi sympathizers, and ‘semi-radical’ groups concerned with civil liberties and pacifism. The latter, well intentioned but impractical groups as one corps area intelligence officer labeled them, were playing into the hands of the more extreme and realistic radical elements, G-2 still believed that it had a right to investigate ‘semi-radicals’ because they undermined adherence to the established order by propaganda through newspapers, periodicals, schools, and churches.” (Joan M. Jensen, “Military Surveillance of Civilians, 1917-1967,” in Military Intelligence, 1974 Hearings, pp. 174-175).


111. Smith, OSS, p. 277.


116. Memorandum from Ladd to Hoover, 2/27/46.

117. Personal and Confidential Memorandum from Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/8/46.

118. Memorandum from Ladd to Hoover, 2/27/46.


121. Report of the Royal Commission. 6/27/46, pp. 82-83, 686-689. The report described how “a number of young Canadian, public servants and others who begin with a desire to advance causes which they consider worthy, have been inducted into joining study groups of the Communist Party. They are persuaded to keep this
adherence secret. They have then been led step by step along the ingenious psychological development course . . . until under the influence of sophisticated and unscrupulous leaders they have been persuaded to engage in illegal activities directed against the safety and interests of their own society.”


123 Memorandum from Hoover to Clark, 7/25/46 (Harry S. Truman Library).

124 Minutes of the President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 1/17/46. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

125 Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Mr. Vaneck, Chairman, President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 2/14/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

126 Memorandum from S. J. Spingarn to Mr. Foley, 1/19/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

127 Memorandum from the FBI Director to the President’s Temporary Commission, 1/3/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

128 President’s Commission on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights (1947), p. 52.

129 Executive Order 9835, part I, section 2; cf. Executive Order 10450, section 8(a) (5).

130 In 1960, for instance, the Justice Department advised the FBI to continue investigating an organization not on the Attorney General’s list in order to secure “additional information … relative to the criteria” of the employee security order. (Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Hoover, 5/17/60.)

131 Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Clark, Re: President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 1/29/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

132 Report of the President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 2/20/47, pp. 31-32.

133 Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/19/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

134 Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/31/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

135 Memorandum of George M. Elsey, 5/2/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

136 Clifford advised, “Insomuch as ‘undercover’ and ‘infiltration’ tactics may become necessary, duplication will be costly and would jeopardize the success of both the FBI and Civil Service.” He added that the FBI “has a highly trained, efficiently organized corps of investigators. There are approximately 4,800 FBI agents now, 1,600 of whom are investigating Atomic Energy Commission employees. FBI expects to begin releasing these 1,600 shortly… Civil Service, on the other hand, has few than 100 investigators, none of whom is especially trained in the techniques required in loyalty investigations…. It is precisely because of the dangers that I believe the FBI is a better agency than Civil Service to conduct loyalty investigations for new employees; the more highly trained, organized and administered an agency is, the higher should be its standards.” (Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the President, 5/7/47.) (Harry S. Truman Library.)

137 Memorandum from Clifford to the President, 5/8/47. Letter from President Truman to H. B. Mitchell, United States Civil Service Commission, 5/9/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

138 Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Clark, Re: Executive Order 9835, 5/12/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

139 Memorandum from Clifford to the President, 5/23/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)


141 Memorandum from J. R. Steelman, Assistant to the President, to the Attorney General, 11/3/47.

142 FBI “name checks” are authorized as one of the “national agencies checks” required by Executive Order 10450, section 3(a).


144 The FBI official in charge of the Internal Security Section of the Intelligence Division in the fifties and early sixties testified that the primary purpose of FBI
investigations of Communist “infiltration” was to advise the Attorney General so that he could determine whether a group should go on the “Attorney General’s list,” and that investigations for this purpose continued after the Attorney General ceased adding names of groups to the list. (F. J. Baumgardner testimony, 10/8/75, pp. 48, 49.)

Memoranda from the Attorney General to Heads of Departments and agencies, 4/29/53; 7/15/73; 9/28/53; 1/22/54.

Executive Order 10450, section 8 (a) (5).

The FBI’s field offices were supplied with such “thumbnail sketches” or characterizations to supplement the Attorney General’s list and the reports of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. e.g., SAC Letter No. 60-34, 7/12/60. (The SAC Letter is a formal regular communication from the FBI Director to all Bureau field offices.)


This article was taken from the series, United States Army in World War II, Special Studies, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, written by Vincent C. Jones. Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1985.

Knowledge of the progress of the Germans, or the other Axis states, in atomic research and development was not based upon precise and accurate intelligence information, for such was not available to the Allies. Nevertheless, because the Allies lacked specific information to the contrary, they had to assume that at least Germany would make a serious attempt to develop atomic weapons. See Rpt to President, sub: Status of the tube Alloys Development, 9 Mar 42, Incl to Ltr, Bush to President, same date, HB Files, Fldr 58, MDR; DSM Chronology, 26 Sep 42, Sec. 2(e), OROO; MDH, Bk.1, Vol. 14, “Intelligence & Security,” p. 1, DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, 140-41; MPCrpt, 7 Aug 44, Incl to Memo, Groves to Chief of Staff, same date, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab K, MDR.

Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War, pp. 27-31 and 246-55.

Ibid. pp. 246-47; Ltr Compton to Conan 8 Dec 42 Admrl Files Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Rpts) MAR. Compton’s letter to Comlan complained that the security-inspired policy of compartmentalization was delaying determination of the purity standards that must be met for the plutonium to be employed in an atomic weapon. This well illustrates the recurring conflict in the Manhattan Project between the demands of the program and the requirements of security.


An organization formerly called a corps area, serving as a field agency of the Army Service Forces in a specified area. Under the reorganization of the War Department on 9 Mar 42, there were nine geographical service commands throughout the United States, each providing services (including administrative, financial, legal, statistical, medical, welfare, etc., for Army elements), constructing facilities, furnishing fixed communication services, and procuring, storing, maintaining, and distributing supplies and equipment for Army use. See WD ‘I’M 20-205, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 1944, p. 249.

MDH, Bk. 1, vol. 14, p. 7.1-7.2, DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 138-39; Marshall Diary, 20 July 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Misc Tec Sec, behind Fldr 5, MDR; Ltr Lansdale to Col. R.W. Argo Jr. (Dep Chief of Mil Hist), 3 Jan 75, CMH.


MDH, Bk. 1, Vol 14, pp. 7.2-7.4, DASA.

Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 15 Aug and 1 Nov 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 020 (MED-ORG), MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 139.

160. Ltr. Lansdale to Argo, 3 Jan 75, CMH, Testimony of Lansdale in Oppenheimer Hearing, pp. 259-60.


162. MDH, Bk. 1, Vol.14, pp.7.2-7.13 and Aoo, A7 (Org Chart), DASA; Memo, Col Elmer E. Kirkpatrick, Jr. (Dep Dist Engr) to Groves, sub: Insp of Intel Div, Oak Ridge, 15 Dec 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Insp of Intel Div), MDR.

163. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp.141-42. See also MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp.2.1-2.2, DASA.

164. Discussion of Oppenheimer security clearance based on Oppenheimer Hearing, especially testimony of Oppenheimer, Groves, Pash, and Bush; Memo, Groves to Secy War, sub: Loyalty Clearance of J.R. Oppenheimer, 24 Mar 47, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 333.5 (Clearance Ltrs), MDR; Groves, Comments on Draft Ms “Now It Can Be Told,” LRG; Interv, British writer Hailey with creoves, 13 Dec 57, LRG.


167. Memo, Groves to Secy War, sub: Loyalty Clearance of J. R. Oppenheimer, 24 Mar 47, MDR.

168. Details on appointment of special agents and surveillance squads based on MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 2.3-2.4, DASA; Ltr, Lansdale to Agro, 3 Jan 75, CMH; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 139; MPC rtp, 21 Aug 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Fls, Fldr 25, Tab E, MDR. The section on Russian activities, which deals with espionage incidents at Berkeley, provides a good example of Grove’s reports to the Top Policy Group on intelligence developments.

169. Ms, ASF, “Hist Intel Div,” I(7):8-10, NARS.

170. MPC Rpt, 21 Aug 43, MDR; MPC Min, 29 Dec 44, Exhibit F (summary of U.S.-based counterintelligence developments affecting the Manhattan Proj), OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Fls, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR; Rpt, sub: Summary [of] Russian Situation, Incl to Memo, Groves to Secy State James F. Byrnes, 13 May 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Fls, Fldr 12, Tab D, MDR.

171. In 1954, Oppenheimer testified before the AEC’s Personnel Security Board, which was holding hearings to consider serious charges against the former director of the Los Alamos Laboratory that would lead ultimately to the withdrawal of his government security clearance. Oppenheimer admitted that he had fabricated the story about Chevalier’s espionage activities; however, he never adequately explained why he had done so. Oppenheimer’s testimony in 1954 and documents relating to it are in Oppenheimer Hearing, passim. For fuller accounts of the Oppenheimer case see Strauss, Men and Decisions, pp. 267-95, and Phillip M. Stern, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). For further details on espionage activities at the Radiation Laboratory and the Oppenheimer case see MPC Rpt, 4 Feb 44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Fls, Fldr 25, Tab C, MDR; Mpt, sub: Summary [of] Russian Situation, Incl to Memo, Groves to Byrnes, 13 May 45, MDR; Interv, Author with Lt Col Peer de Silva (former CIC staff member, G-2, West Def Cmd, with special assistant to Rad Lab), 8 Apr 75, CMH; Diary of Lt Col E.H. Mardsen (hereafter cited as Mardsen Diary), 20 Jul 43, ORRO. Mardsen was the District’s executive officer.
172. MPC Min, 10 May 44, MDR; MPC Rpt, 7 Aug 44, MDR; Rpt, sub: Summary [of] Russian Situation, Incl to Memo, Groves to Byrnes, 13 May 45, MDR.

173. Rpt, sub: Summary [of] Russian Situation, Incl to Memo, Groves to Byrnes, 13 May 45, MDR.


175. MPC Rpt, 4 Feb 44, MDR.


179. MPC Min, 24 Feb 45, MDR; Memo, Matthias to Groves, sub: 10 Mar 45 Power Outage, 29 Mar 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675, MDR; Matthias Diary, 25 Feb and 10-11 Mar 45, OROO.

180. MDH, Bk. 1 Vol. 14, pp. 2.10-2.11, DASA; Mardsen Diary, 20 Jul 43, OROO; Nichols, Comments on Draft Hist “Manhattan,” Incl to Ltr, Nichols to Chief of Mil Hist, 25 Mar 74, CMH; Compton, *Atomic Quest*, pp. 183-84.

181. Ar 380-5, 28 Sep 42. The War Department issued a substantially revised version of AR 380-5 on 15 Mar 44, adding the category Top Secret to the previously existing categories Secret, Confidential, and Restricted.

182. *Ibid.*, Sec 1, Par. 9.

183. Quotations from MD, Intel Bull 5, Safeguarding Mil Infro Regs, 27 Nov 43 (revised 1 Sep 44), Sec. 3, reproduced in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, App. B7, DASA.


185. Memo, Groves to Compton and Oenheimer, sub: Interchange of Infbr Between Chicago and Los Alamos, 17 Jun 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Tolman), MDR.

186. Excerpts from Szilard’s statements before Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy given in memo, Nichols to Groves, 12 Jan 46, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Szilard), MDR.

187. Memo for File, William S. Shurcliff, sub: Transcript of Notes Taken on 8-11 Oct 44 trip to Chicago, 14 Oct 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 001 (mtgs), MDR. Shurcliff, a liaison official with the OSRD, talked to Szilard about security measures and recorded his comments in this memorandum.

188. Ltr, Condon to Oppenheimer, 26 Apr 43, Investigation Files, Gen Corresp, Personnel Scty Investigations (Condon), MDR.

189. Ltr, Compton to Conant, 8 Dec 42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 719.1, MDR.

190. Ltr, Tolman to Groves, 11 Jun 43, Adm Files, Gen Corresp, 00.71 (Releasing Info), MDR. See also Ltr, Teller to Urey, Incl to Memo, Nichols to Groves, 11 Aug 43, and Ltr, Oppenheimer to Groves, sub: Liaison With Site X, 4 Oct 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 001, MDR.


194. Ibid. (source of first quotation), p. 360; MD, Intel Bull 5, Safeguarding Mil Info Regs (source of second quotation), 27 Nov 43 (revised 1 Sep 44), Sec. 3, DASA.

195. MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, “Auxiliary Activities,” Ch. 1, pp. 2.4-2.5, DASA; Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, pp. 360-62; Stimson Diary, 14-15 Feb 44, HLS.

196. Memo, Bush to Bundy, 24 Feb 44, OCG Files, Gen corresp, MP Files, Fldr14, Tab A, MDR; Stimson Diary, 18 Feb 44, HLS.

197. Stimson Diary (source of quotation), 10 Jun 44, HLS; Memo for File, Bus, 10 Jun 44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 14, tab A, MDR; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, Ch. 1, pp. 2.8-2.11, DASA.

198. Stimson Diary, 26 (source of quoted words) and 28 Feb 45, HLS; Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p.363; MDH, Bk.1, Vol. 4, Ch 1 pp. 2.5-2.6, DASA.

199. Stimson Diary, 31 Mar 45, HLS.


202. MD, Intel bull 5, Safeguarding Mil Info Regs, 27 Nov 43 (revised 1 Sep 44), Sec. 3, DASA.


204. MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, p. 6.7-6.8, DASA.

205. Memo, Matthias to Grove, sub: Public Mts in Which Du Pont Participated, 23 Apr 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 001 (Mts), MDR: Matthias Diary, 20 and 28 Apr 43, OROR.