CHAPTER 1 CONTINUED

The Counter Intelligence Corps During World War II

As a result of the Delimitations Agreement of 1939, the counterintelligence system was centralized under three agencies. The task assigned to the US Army covered both the Military Establishment and a large percentage of the munitions industry. The primary counterintelligence effort was the organization of a security system, which would prevent access of hostile agents to our facilities.

Countless security surveys were made. Safeguards were developed, and identification systems were established. Thousands of personnel investigations were conducted, and, as these proceeded, steps were taken to place persons whose loyalty was in question on work where they could not injure our war effort.

There were individual cases of sabotage and these, of course, became the immediate subject of intensive investigation. A few saboteurs and spies were captured and convicted. Even in cases where investigation failed to uncover the perpetrator, exhaustive investigation resulted in the development of better security measures.

A special effort was made to safeguard military information. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel operated the security system for the headquarters that planned the North African campaign. In many cases where the Counter Intelligence Corps found improper safeguarding of military information, strategic plans were changed or revoked.

The outbreak of World War II called for an immediate increase in the authorized strength of the Corps of Intelligence Police. The total strength of the Corps was set at 1,026 noncommissioned officers, and all its members then in the Enlisted Reserve Corps were ordered to active duty "with the least practical delay." The War Department then set out to produce a well-staffed and well-trained organization for this branch of intelligence work.

On 13 December 1941, a letter from the office of the Adjutant General officially changed the name of the Corps of Intelligence Police to the Counter Intelligence Corps, to be effective 1 January 1942. This was a change in name only. However, many organizational changes were made during the first two years of existence of the Counter Intelligence Corps on the basis of lessons learned from field experience.

At the outset of the war, there were many Military Intelligence Division officers supervising the Corps of Intelligence Police who were not experienced in their duties. The War Department early recognized this deficiency, and constructive steps were taken immediately. All officers selected for duty with the Counter Intelligence Corps had to be cleared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, before serving with the Corps. Furthermore, commanders of all Corps Areas, Departments (except the Philippine and Hawaiian Departments), and Base Defense Commands were directed to submit without delay to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, a roster of all commissioned personnel on duty with the Corps of Intelligence Police.

In order to provide the most proficient and experienced counterintelligence commissioned personnel to supervise the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps, it was recommended that "a complement of commissioned officers be specifically authorized for the Counter Intelligence Corps." It was also deemed advisable to increase the commissioned strength of the Corps to 543 in field and company grades and to bring the total non-commissioned strength to 4,431.

A tentative plan of organization for Counter Intelligence Corps detachments to serve with tactical and headquarters units down to and including divisions was also drawn up. In outline, the detachments were to be composed in the following manner:

In addition, Counter Intelligence Corps Head-quarters, the Training School, the Washington Field Office, and the Replacement Pool were authorized officer and enlisted vacancies.

At this time, each service command was given a temporary and permanent allotment by the Adjutant General. The temporary allotment was to cover procurement when an overseas detachment was to be activated, the men therein to be transferred from the service commands. When men were transferred from the service commands for this purpose, the temporary allotment for the new detachment was reduced by the Adjutant General and the new detachment simultaneously set up.

In October 1942, the system of temporary allotments to the service commands was discontinued, and all such allotments were transferred to the War Department Reserve Pool. This Reserve Pool was then apportioned among the service commands for procurement purposes. When a tactical detachment was activated, an allotment was provided from the service commands as before, and the apportionment of the War Department Reserve Pool decreased by the grades of the men transferred.

It was anticipated early in 1942 that the constant loss of men in service commands, because of the demands of overseas units, would seriously hamper operations. Consequently, on 14 May, the corps areas (service commands) were directed by Military Intelligence Section to submit a list of special agents considered "key personnel" with a brief explanation of the positions these men held. Because of a tendency on the part of the corps areas to include a large number of men on such listings, it soon became necessary to limit "key personnel" in the corps areas to 10 percent of the total personnel in each command.

German Agents with their radio equipment captured by the
Army Counter Intelligence Corps in France during the second World War.
PHOTO

In April 1943, it was determined that since all Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were chargeable to War Department overhead, they should be assigned to the War Department and attached to the various service commands for administrative purposes. Consequently, the allotments to the service commands were rescinded, and two months later the allotments to the theaters of operations were rescinded. In September 1943, TM 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps," set forth a T/O (table of organization) basis for assignment of personnel to the theaters of operations. The balance of the Counter Intelligence Corps personnel was to be assigned to Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, and other utilizing units.

The increase in personnel made it necessary to expand the Counter Intelligence Corps administrative machinery to meet the new demands. In December 1942, the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, was divided into six sections: Supply, Operations, Fiscal, Plans and Training, Personnel, and Army Air Forces Liaison.

The procurement and training of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel for overseas duty became the primary mission of the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps. Demands for assignment of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments, both to units scheduled for immediate departure to overseas duty and for units already in combat in the theaters of operations, were steadily increasing. To meet these demands and to facilitate training, the War Department, on 29 October, 1942, instructed all Bases, Departments, and Service Commands (except the Ninth) to establish preliminary Counter Intelligence Corps training schools in their respective commands.

CIC trainees in a class to learn to identify Japanese insignia rank in 1942.
PHOTO

During the years 1942-1943, agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps made thousands of loyalty investigations on military personnel and civilians assigned to duties requiring access to classified material. The transfer of certain investigative functions from the Military Intelligence Division to the Provost Marshal General in October, 1941, did not relieve the Corps of the duty of investigating personnel already in military service who were working with classified material. Typical examples of such personnel were cryptographers; certain Signal Corps personnel in other types of work; Military Intelligence personnel (civilian and military); and, of course, as a large part of the last mentioned category, potential Counter Intelligence Corps personnel.

The forms used and the extent of the investigations varied in accordance with War Department and Service Command policy. Investigations of prospective Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were always exhaustive.

Loyalty investigations, which involved no suspicion of disloyalty, consisted of an examination of personal history, education, employment, and associations. Each subject of a personnel investigation was required to complete a Personal History Statement. In each personnel investigation, a check was made of the local police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division Files. Copies of each memorandum report were sent to the Service Commands interested, the Military Intelligence Division, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Investigations of military personnel suspected of disaffection, espionage, treason, sedition, sabotage, or of violations of AR 380-5, "Safeguarding Military Information," were reported on War Department Form CIR 1 (Counter Intelligence Report No. 1). This form contained a summarization by the investigating agent, a detailed outline of the subject's personal background, and a recommendation for disposition of the subject in accordance with the purpose of the investigation.

The Service Command Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were divided into several field offices, each having investigative responsibility for a certain geographic area of the Service Command. In certain less populated areas, single representatives were used and designated as resident agents. In metropolitan field offices with many agents, the personnel operated in separate sections and squads under the direction of special agents of proved experience and ability. These sections performed specific types of investigations. Agents became specialists in one type of investigation, developed local contacts of value in their particular field, and accumulated a general knowledge of organizations and individuals in the area considered subversive or of questionable loyalty.

CIC arrested thousands of Nazis after the allied occupation of Germany.
In this photo, German leaders are being tried at Nuremberg.
PHOTO

Exclusive of background investigations, the largest volume of investigations consisted of disaffection cases. Disaffection has been defined as a state of mind indicating a lack of affection for the US Government. Such cases usually concerned persons with German, Italian, or Japanese backgrounds.

In the field of suspected sabotage and espionage, the Counter Intelligence Corps performed investigations, which often employed the use of technical investigative equipment. The Counter Intelligence Corps mission in the zone of the interior was not as dramatic as that of federal agencies, which apprehended espionage agents. The efforts of the Counter Intelligence Corps, however, denied access to vital industrial plants and to highly secret military installations to many persons whose loyalty to the United States was dubious. What damage these persons might have wrought on the war effort is only a matter of conjecture.

In the fall of 1943, the Inspector General conducted an extensive examination of Counter Intelligence Corps activities in the Service Commands. The resultant recommendations brought about a reorganization of the Corps both in its activity in the Service Commands, and in foreign theaters. Of special import was the suggestion that Counter Intelligence Corps personnel "…be specifically procured and trained for utilization in theaters of operation; that they be so utilized that Counter Intelligence Corps activities within the Zone of Interior be performed by the Security Intelligence Corps of the Provost Marshal Gen.'s Department."

In an attempt to make the administration of the Counter Intelligence corps more definitive, the Deputy Chief of Staff, on 25 November, 1943, directed that certain recommendations made by the Inspector General be carried out. These included the following:

(1) Two changes in basic policy:

(a) The Counter Intelligence Corps was to be utilized, with certain limited exceptions, in theaters of operations.

(b) Personnel of the Corps were to be released from War Department overhead assignments, distributed on a T/O basis, with G-2 exercising no command function over the Corps.

(2) Three specific continuing responsibilities relative to the Counter Intelligence Corps charged to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department:

(a) The establishment of policies and over-all supervision of counterintelligence activities.

(b) Coordination of the procurement and shipment of Counter Intelligence Corps units.

(c) The administration of specialized training prior to assignment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to theaters of operations.

(3) Certain specific actions relative to the Counter Intelligence Corps:

(a) The Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland and the Counter Intelligence Corps Staging Area were to be eliminated.

(b) G-2, War Department, in collaboration with the three major commands, and G-3, War Department, were to submit for approval a plan for procurement of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel.

(c) Counter Intelligence Corps units were to be organized on a T/O basis included in troop quotas.

(d) Command channels were to be used and command responsibility emphasized.

(e) Shipment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel overseas was to be in accordance with approved requests of theater commanders.

(f) Basic training of counterintelligence personnel was to be provided by Army Service Forces.

(g) Counter Intelligence Corps specialized training was to be given by Military Intelligence Division at Camp Ritchie, Maryland.

(h) Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in permanent detachments of Service Commands were to be transferred for assignment to those Service Commands by 31 December 1943.

Since the future Counter Intelligence Corps mission would be entirely overseas, it was necessary to administer the program of the Counter Intelligence Corps and train and procure the personnel especially for that purpose. The largest source of personnel, the Service Command detachments, was no longer available, thereby necessitating a new method of procurement. The office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, in Baltimore Maryland, was discontinued, and the Counter Intelligence Section of the Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service, handled all administration. The staff of this office was much smaller than it had been in the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps.

CIC photographed captured spies for identification purposes.
PHOTO

After a period of training and reorganization, the Counter Intelligence Corps was sent to the combat zones. It was here that the real value and meaning of the Corps became known to combat commanders. The record and achievements of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel brought added prestige to the Corps and to the Armed Forces of the United States.

On 14 December 1943, War Department Circular No. 324 transferred the counterintelligence functions within the zone of the interior to the Provost Marshal General. The investigative functions hitherto performed by the Counter Intelligence Corps and those of the Provost Marshal General were consolidated, and it was directed that these functions be performed by a single staff agency under each Service Command. This agency was later designated the Security and Intelligence Division.

Since the Counter Intelligence Corps was no longer to be the organization conducting investigations of espionage and sabotage cases of the Military Intelligence Division in the continental United States, it was necessary that the responsibility for discharging these functions be placed with the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and designated areas. The assignment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to the Service Commands, where they became part of the newly formed Security and Intelligence Division under the jurisdiction of the Provost Marshal General, was also provided in War Department Circular 324. The assignment of personnel from War Department overhead to the using commands with instructions to activate under T/O&E 30-500 was an entirely new concept for the Counter Intelligence Corps, and great administrative difficulties attended this change of activity.

On 22 May 1944 an organization within the Military Intelligence Section replaced the office formerly known as the Counter Intelligence Corps branch of the Military Intelligence Section with the title of the Counter Intelligence Corps Section. A G2, War Department Policy Staff was created. This staff was responsible for policy decisions on intelligence functions, including the Counter Intelligence Corps. No important alterations in policy or duties accompanied this redesignation. However, since the function of the Counter Intelligence Corps Section was considered to be of an administrative and operational nature rather than a true staff function, on 1 August 1944 the Section was transferred from the control of the General Staff, War Department, to the Army Service Forces.

By this time the Counter Intelligence Corps had operated successfully overseas in every combat area and had obtained a troop basis of 4,308. These were allocated in the following manner:

The overseas allotments increased as additional Army Ground Forces units were trained and shipped to combat. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were assigned to their respective units and became an integral part of divisions, corps, armies, overseas administrative commands, theater headquarters, and of the A-2 Sections of the Air Force commands and installations.

On 1 December 1944 the Counter Intelligence Corps became a separate branch of the Intelligence Division of the Army Service Forces. Under the Army Service Forces the policy of assigning all Counter Intelligence Corps detachments to using units was continued. The only Counter Intelligence Corps detachments working within the zone of the interior were those units specifically allowed to do so by the War Department.

The administrative difficulties that were met in the early days of the Counter Intelligence Corps were paralleled by an equally difficult task of procuring desired personnel. On 21 October 1942 the power to initiate Counter Intelligence Corps personnel investigations was placed within the Service Commands. The commands were also empowered to assign and transfer personnel as Counter Intelligence Corps agents in the grade of corporal, and as Counter Intelligence Corps clerks in the grade of private first class. Control over the assignment and transfer of Counter Intelligence Corps special agents, the promotion of personnel from the rank of agent to special agent, and all matters concerning the assignment or transfer of commissioned personnel remained with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

A backlog of investigations to be conducted on prospective Counter Intelligence Corps personnel developed during this period. Until June 1943, Counter Intelligence Corps agents and clerks had been recruited by the theater commanders in overseas areas on the same basis as in the Service Commands. However, on 26 June, the allotments to theaters were discontinued. TM 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps," published 22 September 1943, limited the responsibility for procurement and assignment of officers and special agents to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, and of agents and clerks to the Director of Intelligence in the Service Commands within the zone of the interior. All Counter Intelligence Corps personnel procured in theaters of operations were to be approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

As an aid in spotting potential Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, the classification "301 Investigator" was introduced into the Army classification system early in 1942. The names of all men under this classification were referred to the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, for review and selection of prospective personnel. Men who were given the classification of "312 Stenographers" were also brought to the attention of this office so that from this group suitable clerks might be procured. When the procurement of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel was decentralized to the Service Commands in October, 1942, the names of men in the 301 and 213 classification were reported directly to the Service Commands by the reception centers. During 1942 and 1943, the office of the Adjutant General furnished the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, extracts from qualification cards on all linguists inducted into the Army.

The largest percentage of Counter Intelligence Corps agents was obtained from personnel already in the Army. At the reception centers newly inducted personnel with basic Counter Intelligence Corps qualifications were interviewed by Counter Intelligence Corps agents to determine their suitability for assignment to Counter Intelligence Corps duty. Civilian and government organizations, which employed investigators, were requested to submit information concerning former investigators in their employ who had been inducted into the military service. In the early days of the organization of the Counter Intelligence Corps, men occasionally applied for admission to the Corps prior to their induction into the Army. If application was approved, they were immediately "tabbed" and shortly thereafter transferred to the Counter Intelligence Corps. This method was not widely used because it resulted in personnel being transferred into the Corps without basic military training. Lack of basic training later proved to be a handicap to those agents when they were assigned to tactical detachments.

To meet the demands for qualified men, recommen-dations were accepted from Army post intelligence officers, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, and any other military personnel who knew of men with basic Counter Intelligence Corps qualifications. All commanding officers throughout the Army were encouraged to submit names of men with the basic qualifications for Counter Intelligence Corps duty.

In the early recruitment, emphasis was placed on investigative or legal experience. Later, men with adequate education, good character, and loyalty were accepted even though they had neither legal nor investigative experience. Some linguists were procured, but this qualification was not an exclusive one. Men were drawn from all types of civilian occupations, and the Counter Intelligence Corps became an organization that included representatives of virtually every profession and nationality. In spite of the fact that most of these men worked as corporals or sergeants, the organization obtained outstanding men. The lure of the word "intelligence" and the prospect of working in civilian clothes was tempting bait; but, if the men of the Corps had not been carefully selected, their records in the war would have been less impressive. Counter Intelligence Corps men have always relied upon their own initiative. This has been borne out by the nature of their work in the United States and, to an even greater extent, by the record they have made in overseas operations.

For the most part, men selected for the Counter Intelligence Corps were well suited for their tasks, but one major weakness in the recruiting program was very noticeable; not enough emphasis was given to procuring and training linguists. The problem of obtaining men fluent in French, German, Italian, Japanese, and other foreign languages was made more difficult because of War Department policy, which directed that no persons of close foreign background would be assigned to or retained in the Counter Intelligence Corps. Many naturalized Americans, both in and out of the Army, were fluent in several languages, but the Counter Intelligence Corps was unable to use this source of language personnel because of this strict policy. When the war in Europe came to an end, the Army was faced with the overwhelming task of procuring a large number of men fluent in foreign languages. These necessities brought a quick reversal of policy, and, thereafter, close foreign relations alone ceased to be considered sufficient to disqualify a man for the Corps.

The rank of the agent was at best a partial secret within the Army. Counter Intelligence Corps men were instructed to conceal their actual rank by using the term "agent" or "special agent." Concealment of rank in the zone of the interior was not too great a problem since agents worked in civilian clothes. The average civilian respected Counter Intelligence Corps credentials and was not concerned with the actual rank of the bearer.

When his mission was changed from the zone of the interior to foreign theaters of operations, the Counter Intelligence Corps agent, in some cases, wore the military uniform indicting his status. This factor was a disadvantage in dealing with officers of the US Army and officers of the Allied Forces. The low rank of the leaders of some detachments often had a hampering effect, especially in their relationships with allied services in the theaters and with coordinate agencies of the United States. In many theaters this difficulty of rank was overcome by the adoption of a uniform similar to that of war correspondence which showed no rank.

Duquesne Spy Ring

On January 2, 1942, 33 members of a Nazi spy ring headed by Frederick Joubert Duquesne were sentenced to serve a total of over 300 years in prison. The FBI brought them to justice after a lengthy espionage investigation. William Sebold, who had been recruited as a spy for Germany, was a major factor in the FBI's successful resolution of this case through his work as a double agent for the United States.

A native of Germany, William Sebold served in the German Army during World War I. After leaving Germany in 1921, he worked in industrial and aircraft plants throughout the United States and South America. On February 10, 1936, he became a naturalized citizen of the United States.

Sebold returned to Germany in February 1939, to visit his mother in Mulheim. Upon his arrival in Hamburg, Germany, he was approached by a member of the Gestapo who said that Sebold would be contacted in the near future. Sebold proceeded to Mulheim where he obtained employment.

In September 1939, a Dr. Gassner visited Sebold in Mulheim and interrogated him regarding military planes and equipment in the United States. He also asked Sebold to return to the United States as an espionage agent for Germany. Subsequent visits by Dr. Gassner and a "Dr. Renken," later identified as Maj. Nickolas Ritter of the German Secret Service, persuaded Sebold to cooperate with the Reich because he feared reprisals against family members still living in Germany.

Since Sebold's passport had been stolen shortly after his first visit from Dr. Gassner, Sebold went to the American Consulate in Cologne, Germany, to obtain a new one. While doing so, Sebold secretly told personnel of the American Consulate about his future role as a German agent and expressed his wish to cooperate with the FBI upon his return to America.

Sebold reported to Hamburg, Germany, where he was instructed in such areas as preparing codes messages and microphotographs. Upon completion of training, he was given five microphotographs containing instructions for preparing a code and detailing the type of information he was to transmit to Germany from the United States. Sebold was told to retain two of the microphotographs and to deliver the other three to German operatives in the United States. After receiving final instructions, including using the assumed name of "Harry Sawyer," he sailed from Genoa, Italy, and arrived in New York City on February 8, 1940.

The FBI previously had been advised of Sebold's expected arrival, his mission, and his intentions to assist them in identifying German agents in the United States. Under the guidance of Special Agents, Sebold established residence in New York City as Harry Sawyer. Also, an office was established for him as a consultant diesel engineer, to be used as a cover in establishing contacts with members of the spy ring. In selecting this office for Sebold, FBI Agents ensured that they could observe any meetings taking place there.

In May 1940, a shortwave radio transmitting station operated by FBI agents on Long Island established contact with the German shortwave station abroad. This radio station served as a main channel of communications between German spies in New York City and their superiors in Germany for 16 months. During this time, the FBI's radio station transmitted over 300 messages to Germany and received 200 messages from Germany.

The successful prosecution of the 33 German agents in New York demonstrates Sebold's success as a counterespionage agent against Nazi spies in the United States. Of those arrested on charges of espionage, 19 pleaded guilty. The 14 men who entered pleas of not guilty were brought to trial in Federal District Court, Brooklyn, New York, on September 3, 1941, and they were all found guilty by a jury on December 13, 1941.

The activities of each of these convicted spies and Sebold's role in uncovering their espionage activities for the Reich follow.

Frederick Joubert Duquesne
Born in Cape Colony, South Africa, on September 21, 1877, Frederick Joubert Duquesne emigrated from Hamilton, Bermuda, to the United States in 1902 and became a naturalized United States citizen on December 4, 1913. Duquesne was implicated in fraudulent insurance claims, including one that resulted from a fire aboard the British steamship Tennyson that caused the vessel to sink on February 18, 1916. When he was arrested on November 17, 1917, he had in his possession a large file of news clippings concerning bomb explosions on ships, as well as a letter from the Assistant German Vice Consul at Managua, Nicaragua. The letter indicated that "Capt. Duquesne" was "one who has rendered considerable service to the German cause."

When Sebold returned to the United States in February 1940, Duquesne was operating a business known as the "Air Terminals Company" in New York City. After establishing his first contact with Duquesne by letter, Sebold met with him in Duquesne's office. During their initial meeting, Duquesne, who was extremely concerned about the possibility of electronic surveillance devices being present in his office, gave Sebold a note stating that they should talk elsewhere. After relocating to an Automat, the two men exchanged information about members of the German espionage system with whom they had been in contact.

Duquesne provided Sebold with information for transmittal to Germany during subsequent meetings, and the meeting which occurred in Sebold's office was filmed by FBI Agents. Duquesne, who was vehemently anti-British, submitted information dealing with national defense in America, the sailing of ships to British ports, and technology. He also regularly received money from Germany in payment for his services.

On one occasion, Duquesne provided Sebold with photographs and specifications of a new type of bomb being produced in the United States. He claimed that he secured that material by secretly entering the Dupont plant in Wilmington, Delaware. Duquesne also explained how fires could be started in industrial plants. Much of the information Duquesne obtained was the result of his correspondence with industrial concerns. Representing himself as a student, he requested data concerning their products and manufacturing conditions.

Duquesne was brought to trial and was convicted. He was sentenced to serve 18 years in prison on espionage charges, as well as a 2-year concurrent sentence and payment of a $2,000 fine for violation of the Registration Act.

Paul Bante
A native of Germany, Paul Bante served in the German Army during World War I. He came to the United States in 1930 and became a naturalized United States citizen in 1938.

Bante, formerly a member of the German-American Bund, claimed that Germany put him in contact with one of their operatives, Paul Fehse, because of Bante's previous association with a Dr. Ignatz T. Griebl. Before fleeing to Germany to escape prosecution, Dr. Griebl had been implicated in a Nazi spy ring with Guenther Gustave Rumrich, who was tried on espionage charges in 1938.

Bante assisted Paul Fehse in obtaining information about ships bound for Britain with war materials and supplies. Bante claimed that as a member of the Gestapo, his function was to create discontent among union workers, stating that every strike would assist Germany.

Sebold met Bante at the Little Casino Restaurant, which was frequented by several members of this spy ring. During one such meeting, Bante advised that he was preparing a fuse bomb, and he sub-sequently delivered dynamite and detonation caps to Sebold.

After entering a guilty plea to violation of the Registration Act, Bante was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment and was fined $1,000.

Max Blank
Max Blank came to the United States from Germany in 1928. Although he never became a US citizen, Blank had been employed in New York City at a German library and at a book store, which catered to German trade.

Paul Fehse, a major figure in this case, informed Germany that Blank, who was acquainted with several members of the spy ring, could secure some valuable information but lacked the funds to do so. Later Fehse and Blank met with Sebold in his office. They told Sebold that Blank could obtain details about rubberized self-sealing airplane gasoline tanks, as well as a new braking device for airplanes, from a friend who worked in a shipyard. However, he needed money to get the information.

Blank plead guilty to violation of the Registration Act. He received a sentence of 18 months' imprison-ment and a $1,000 fine.

Alfred E. Brokhoff
Alfred E. Brokhoff, a native of Germany, came to the United States in 1923 and became a naturalized citizen in 1929. He was a mechanic for the US Lines in New York City for 17 years prior to his arrest. Because of his employment on the docks, he knew almost all of the other agents in this group who were working as seamen on various ships.

Brokhoff helped Fehse secure information about the sailing dates and cargoes of vessels destined for England. He also assisted Fehse in transmitting this information to Germany. Also, another German agent, George V. Leo Waalen, reported that he had received information from Brokhoff for transmittal to Germany.

Upon conviction, Brokhoff was sentenced to serve a five-year prison term for violation of the espionage statutes and to serve a two-year concurrent sentence for violation of the Registration Act.

Heinrich Clausing
In September 1934, German-born Heinrich Clausing came to the Unite States, where he became a naturalized citizen in 1938. Having served on various ships sailing from New York Harbor since his arrival in the country, he was employed as a cook on the SS Argentine at the time of his arrest.

Loosely associated with Franz Stigler, one of the principal contact men for the spy ring, Clausing operated as a courier. He transported micro-photographs and other material from the United States to South American ports, from which the information was sent to Germany via Italian airlines. He also established a mail drop in South America for expeditious transmittal of information to Germany by mail.

Clausing was convicted and was sentenced to serve eight years for violation of espionage statutes. He also received a two-year concurrent sentence for violation of the Registration Act.

Conradin Otto Dold
Conradin Otto Dold came to the United States from Germany in 1926. He became a US citizen in 1934 under the Seamen's Act. Prior to his arrest, he was Chief Steward aboard the SS Siboney of the American Export Lines.

Dold was related to people holding high positions in Germany and was closely associated with other members of the espionage group who worked on ships sailing from New York Harbor. As a courier, Dold carried information from Nazi agents in the Untied States to contacts in neutral ports abroad for transmittal to Germany.

Dold was sentenced to serve ten years in prison on espionage charges and received a two-year concurrent sentence and a fine of $1,000 for violation of the Registration Act.

Rudolf Ebeling
After leaving Germany for the United States in 1925, Rudolf Ebeling became an American citizen in

1933. He was employed as a foreman in the Shipping Department of Harper and Brothers in New York City when he was arrested.

Ebeling obtained information regarding ship sailings and cargoes, which he provided to Paul Fehse for transmittal to Germany. He also furnished such information to Leo Waalen, who delivered the material to Sebold for transmittal.

Upon conviction, Ebeling was sentenced to five years in prison on espionage charges. He also received a two-year concurrent sentence and a $1,000 fine for violating the Registration Act.

Richard Eichenlaub
Richard Eichenlaub, who came to the United States in 1930 and became a citizen in 1936, operated the Little Casino Restaurant in the Yorkville Section of New York City. This restaurant was a rendezvous for many members of this spy ring, and Eichenlaub introduced several new members into the group.

Eichenlaub reported to the German Gestapo and often obtained information from his customers who were engaged in national defense production. Through Eichenlaub, dynamite was delivered to Sebold from Bante.

Having entered a plea of guilty for violation of the Registration Act, Eichenlaub was sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to serve 18 months in prison.

Heinrich Carl Eilers
A native of Germany, Heinrich Carl Eilers came to the United States in 1923 and became a citizen in 1932. From 1933 until his arrest, he served as a steward on ships sailing from New York City.

Eilers made a trip from New York to Washington, D.C. to obtain information for Germany from the Civil Aeronautics Authority. His mission, however, was unsuccessful.

At the time of his arrest in New York City by Customs authorities in June 1940, he had in his possession 20 letters addressed to people throughout Europe. He also had books relating to magnesium and aluminum alloys, which had been sent to him by Edmund Carl Heine, one of the principal espionage agents in this group.

Upon conviction, Eilers received a five-year prison sentence on espionage charges and a concurrent sentence of two years' imprisonment and a $1,000 fine under the Registration Act.

Paul Fehse
In 1934, Paul Fehse left Germany for the United States, where he became a citizen in 1938. Since his arrival in this country, he had been employed as a cook aboard ships sailing from New York Harbor.

Fehse was one of the directing forces in this espionage group. He arranged meetings, directed members' activities, correlated information that had been developed, and arranged for its transmittal to Germany, chiefly through Sebold. Fehse, who was trained for espionage work in Hamburg, Germany, claimed he headed the Marine Division of the German espionage system in the United States.

Having become quite apprehensive and nervous, Fehse made plans to leave the country. He obtained a position on the SS Siboney, which was scheduled to sail from Hoboken, New Jersey, for Lisbon, Portugal, on March 29, 1941. He planned to desert ship in Lisbon and return to Germany.

However, before he could leave the United States, FBI agents arrested Fehse. Upon arrest, he admitted sending letters to Italy for transmittal to Germany, as well as reporting the movement of British ships.

On April 1, 1941, Fehse was sentenced on a plea of guilty to serve one year and one day in prison for violation of the Registration Act. He subsequently pleaded guilty to espionage and received a prison sentence of 15 years.

Edmund Carl Heine
A native of Germany, Edmund Carl Heine came to the United States in 1914 and became a naturalized citizen in 1920. Until 1938, he held various positions in the foreign sales and service departments of Ford Motor Company and Chrysler Motor Corporation. His employment took him to the West Indies, South America, Spain, and Berlin, Germany. Heine was closely associated with Dr. Hans Luther, former German Ambassador in Washington, D.C. and Prince Louis Ferdinand of Berlin.

Heine sent letters from Detroit, Michigan, to Lilly Stein, one of the German spies Sebold was instructed to contact. The letters contained detailed technical data regarding the military, aircraft construction, and various industries. He also wrote to aircraft companies to obtain information about their produc-tion, number of employees, and the time required to construct military planes.

After obtaining technical books relating to magnesium and aluminum alloys, Heine sent the materials to Heinrich Eilers. To ensure safe delivery of the books to Germany in case they did not reach Eilers, Heine indicated the return address on the package as the address of Lilly Stein.

Upon conviction of violating the Registration Act, Heine received a $5,000 fine and a two-year prison sentence.

Felix Jahnke
In 1924, Felix Jahnke left Germany for the United States, where he became a naturalized citizen in 1930. Jahnke had attended military school in Germany and had served in the German Army as a radio operator.

Jahnke and Alex Wheeler-Hill secured the services of Josef Klein, a radio technician, in building a portable radio set for Jahnke's apartment in the Bronx. Jahnke used this radio to transmit messages, which were intercepted by the FBI, to Germany. He also visited the docks in New York Harbor to obtain information about any vessels bound for England.

After pleading guilty to violation of the Registration Act, Jahnke was sentenced to serve 20 months in prison and to pay a $1,000 fine.

Gustav Wilhelm Kaercher
Gustav Wilhelm Kaercher came to the United States in 1923, becoming a citizen in 1931. He served in the German Army during World War I and was a former leader of the German Bund in New York. During visits to Germany, he was seen to have worn a German Army officer's uniform. At the time of his arrest, he was engaged in designing power plants for American Gas and Electric Company in New York City.

Kaercher was arrested with Paul Scholtz, who had just handed Kaercher a table of call letters and frequencies for transmitting information to Germany by radio.

As a result of his guilty plea to charges of violating the Registration Act, Kaercher received a $2,000 fine and a prison sentence of 22 months.

Josef Klein
A native of Germany, Josef Klein came to the United States in 1925; he did not become a citizen. Klein, a photographer and lithographer, had been interested in the building and operation of shortwave radio transmitters.

Klein constructed a portable shortwave radio transmitting and receiving set for Felix Jahnke and Axel Wheeler-Hill. When he built the radio set, Klein knew it would be used for transmitting messages to Germany.

Upon conviction, Klein received a sentence of five years' imprisonment on espionage charges and a concurrent sentence of two years' imprisonment under the Registration Act.

Hartwig Richard Kleiss
Born in Germany, Hartwig Richard Kleiss came to this country in 1925 and became a naturalized citizen six years later. Following his arrival in the United States, he was employed as a cook on various ships.

Kleiss obtained information for Germany, including blueprints of the SS America that showed the locations of newly installed gun emplacements. He included information about how guns would be brought into position for firing. Kleiss also obtained details on the construction and performance of new patrol torpedo boats being developed by the US Navy, which he submitted to Sebold for transmittal to Germany.

Kleiss had originally chosen to stand trial. However, after cross-examination, he changed his plea to guilty on charge of espionage and received an eight-year prison sentence.

Herman W. Lang
Herman W. Lang came to the United States from Germany in 1927 and became a citizen in 1939. He was one of four people Sebold had been told to contact in the United States.

Until his arrest, a company manufacturing highly confidential materials essential to the national defense of the United States had employed Lang. During a visit to Germany in 1938, Lang conferred with German military authorities and reconstructed plans of the Norden bomb sight from memory.

Upon conviction, Lang received a sentence of 18 years in prison on espionage charges and a 2-year concurrent sentence under the Registration Act.

Evelyn Clayton Lewis
A native of Arkansas, Evelyn Clayton Lewis had been living with Frederick Joubert Duquesne in New York City. Miss Lewis had expressed her anti-British and anti-Semitic feelings during her relationships with Duquesne. She was aware of his espionage activities and condoned them. While she was not active in obtaining information for Germany, she helped Duquesne prepare material for transmittal abroad.

Upon a guilty plea, Miss Lewis was sentenced to serve one year and one day in prison for violation of the Registration Act.

Rene Emanuel Mezenen
Rene Emanuel Mezenen, a Frenchman, claimed US citizenship through the naturalization of his father. Prior to his arrest, he was employed as a steward in the transatlantic clipper service.

The German Intelligence Service in Lisbon, Portugal, asked Mezenen to act as a courier, transmitting information between the United States and Portugal on his regular trips on the clipper. He accepted this offer for financial gain. In the course of flights across the Atlantic, Mezenen also reported his observance of convoys sailing for England. He also became involved in smuggling platinum from the United States to Portugal.

Following a plea of guilty, Mezenen received an eight-year prison term for espionage and two concurrent years for registration violations.

Carl Reuper
Having come to the United States from Germany in 1929, Carl Reuper became a citizen in 1936. Prior to his arrest, he served as an inspector for the Westinghouse Electric Company in Newark, New Jersey.

Reuper obtained photographs for Germany relating to national defense materials and construction, which he obtained from his employment. He arranged radio contact with Germany through the station established by Felix Jahnke. On one occasion, he conferred with Sebold regarding Sebold's facilities for communicating with German authorities.

Upon conviction, Reuper was sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment on espionage charges and 2 years' concurrent sentence under the Registration Act.

Evertt Minster Roeder
Born in the Bronx, New York, Roeder was a draftsman and designer of confidential material for the US Army and Navy.

Sebold had delivered micro-photograph instructions to Roeder, as ordered by German authorities. Roeder and Sebold met in public places and proceeded to spots where they could talk privately.

In 1936, Roeder had visited Germany and was requested by German authorities to act as an espionage agent. Primarily due to monetary rewards he would receive, Roeder agreed.

Roeder entered a guilty plea to the charge of espionage and was sentenced to 16 years in prison.

Paul Alfred W. Scholz
A German native, Paul Scholz came to the United States in 1926 but never attained citizenship. He had been employed in German book stores in New York City, where he disseminated Nazi propaganda.

Scholz had arranged for Josef Klein to construct the radio set used by Felix Jahnke and Axel Wheeler-Hill. At the time of is arrest, Scholz had just given Gustav Wilhelm Kaercher a list of radio call letters and frequencies. He also encouraged members of this spy ring to secure data for Germany and arranged contacts between various German agents.

Upon conviction, Scholz was sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment for espionage with 2 years' concurrent sentence under the Registration Act.

George Gottlob Schuh
George Schuh, a native of Germany, came to the United States in 1923. He became a citizen in 1939 and was employed as a carpenter.

As a German agent, he sent information directly to the Gestapo in Hamburg, Germany, from this country. Schuh had provided Alfred Brokhoff information that Winston Churchill had arrived in the United States on the HMS George V. He also furnished information to Germany concerning the movement of ships carrying materials and supplies to Britain.

Having pleaded guilty to violation of the Registration Act, Schuh received a sentence of 18 months in prison and a $1,000 fine.

Erwin Wilhelm Siegler
Erwin Siegler came to the United States from Germany in 1929 and attained citizenship in 1936. He had served as chief butcher on the SS America until it was taken over by the US Navy.

A courier, Siegler brought microphotography instructions to Sebold from German authorities on one occasion. He also had brought $2,900 from German contacts abroad to pay Lilly Stein, Duquesne, and Roeder for their services and to buy a bomb sight. He served the espionage group as an organizer and contact man, and he also obtained information about the movement of ships and military defense preparations at the Panama Canal.

Subsequent to his conviction, Siegler was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment on espionage charges and a concurrent 2-year term for violation of the Registration Act.

Oscar Richard Stabler
Born in Germany, Oscar Stabler came to this country in 1923 and became a citizen in 1933. He had been employed primarily as a barber aboard transoceanic ships.

In December 1940, British authorities in Bermuda found a map of Gibraltar in his possession. He was detained for a short period before being released.

A close associate of Conradin Otto Dold, Stabler served as a courier, transmitting information between German agents in the United States and contacts abroad.

Stabler was convicted and sentenced to serve five years in prison for espionage and a two-year concurrent term under the Registration Act.

Heinrich Stade
Heinrich Stade came to the United States from Germany in 1922 and became a citizen in 1929. Stade had arranged for Paul Bante's contact with Sebold and had transmitted data to Germany regarding points of rendezvous for convoys carrying supplies to England.

Following a guilty plea to violation of the Registration Act, Stade was fined $1,000 and received a 15-month prison sentence.

Lilly Barbara Carola Stein
Born in Vienna, Austria, Lilly Stein met Hugo Sebold, the espionage instructor who had trained William Sebold (the two men were not related) in Hamburg, Germany. She enrolled in this school and was sent to the United States in 1939.

Lilly Stein was one of the people to whom Sebold had been instructed to deliver microphoto-graph instructions upon his arrival in this country. She frequently met with Sebold to give him information for transmittal to Germany, and her address was used as a return address by other agents in mailing data for Germany.

Miss Stein pleaded guilty and received sentences of 10 years' and 2 concurrent years' imprisonment for violations of espionage and restriction statutes, respectively.

Franz Joseph Stigler
In 1931, Franz Stigler left Germany for the United States, where he became a citizen in 1939. He had been employed as a crew member aboard United States ships until discharge from the SS America when the US Navy converted that ship into the USS West Point.

His constant companion was Erwin Siegler, and they operated as couriers in transmitting information between US and German agents abroad. Stigler sought to recruit amateur radio operators in the United States as channels of communication to German radio stations. He had also observed and reported defense preparations in the Canal Zone and had met with other German agents to advise them in their espionage pursuits.

Upon conviction, Stigler was sentenced to serve 16 years in prison on espionage charges with 2 concurrent years for registration violations.

Erich Strunck
A seaman aboard ships of the United States Lines since his arrival in this country, Erich Strunck came to the United States from Germany in 1927. He became a naturalized citizen in 1935.

As a courier, Strunck carried messages between German agents in the United States and Europe. He requested authority to steal the diplomatic bag of a British officer traveling aboard his ship and to dispose of the officer by pushing him overboard. Sebold convinced him that it would be too risky to do so.

Strunck was convicted and sentenced to serve 10 years in prison on espionage charges. He also was sentenced to serve a two-year concurrent term under the Registration Act.

Leo Waalen
Waalen was born in Danzig while that city was under German domination. He entered the United States by "jumping ship" in about 1935. He was a painter for a small boat company, which was constructing small craft for the US Navy.

Waalen gathered information about ships sailing for England. He also obtained a confidential booklet issued by the FBI, which contained precautions to the taken by industrial plans to safeguard national defense materials from sabotage. Waalen also secured government contracts listing specifications for materials and equipment, as well as detailed sea charters of the US Atlantic coastline.

Following his conviction, Waalen was sentenced to 12 years in prison for espionage and a concurrent 2-year term for violation of the Registration Act.

Adolf Henry August Walischewski
A German native, Walischewski had been a seaman since maturity. He became a naturalized citizen in 1935. He became connected with the German espionage system through Paul Fehse. His duties were confined to those of courier, carrying data from agents in the United States to contacts abroad.

Upon conviction, Walischewski received a five-year prison sentence on espionage charges, as well as a two-year concurrent sentence under the Registration Act.

Else Weustenfeld
Else Weustenfeld arrived in the United States from Germany in 1927 and became a citizen 10 years later. From 1935 until her arrest, she was a secretary for a law firm representing the German Consulate in New York City.

Miss Weustenfeld was thoroughly acquainted with the German espionage system and delivered funds to Duquesne, which she had received, from Lilly Stein, her close friend.

She lived in New York City with Hans W. Ritter, a principal in the German espionage system. Her brother, Nickolas Ritter, was the "Dr. Renken" who had enlisted Sebold as a German agent. In 1940, Weustenfeld visited Hans Ritter in Mexico, where he was serving as a paymaster for the German Intelligence Service.

After pleading guilty, Else Weustenfeld was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on charge of espionage and two concurrent years on charge of registration violations.

Axel Wheeler-Hill
Axel Wheeler-Hill came to the United States in 1923 from his native land of Russia. He was naturalized as a citizen in 1929 and was employed as a truck driver.

Wheeler-Hill obtained information for Germany regarding ships sailing to Britain from New York Harbor. With Felix Jahnke, he enlisted the aid of Paul Scholz in building a radio set for sending codes messages to Germany.

Following conviction, Wheeler-Hill was sentenced to serve 15 years in prison for espionage and 2 concurrent years under the Registration Act.

Bertram Wolfgang Zenzinger
Born in Germany, Zenzinger came to the United States in 1940 as a naturalized citizen of the Union of South Africa. His reported reason for coming to this country was to study mechanical dentistry in Los Angeles, California.

In July 1940, Zenzinger received a pencil for preparing invisible messages for Germany in the mail from Siegler. He sent several letters to Germany through a mail drop in Sweden outlining details of national defense materials.

FBI agents arrested Zenzinger on April 16, 1941. Pleading guilty, he received 18 months in prison for violation of the Registration Act and 8 years' imprisonment for espionage.

CONTINUE CHAPTER 1