Executive
Summary
Changes
in The National Security Environment
The Commission
found that NRO reconnaissance satellites have had a crucially important
role during the past four decades in providing American Presidents
a decisive advantage in preserving the national security interests
of the United States. These satellites, which can penetrate hostile
and denied areas with no risk to life and rapidly deliver uniquely
valuable information, have allowed a succession of Presidents to
make informed decisions based on critical intelligence and to respond
appropriately to major crises, threats and challenges to U.S. interests.
Without them, America's history and the world's could have been
dramatically different.
For 40 years,
the NRO has pioneered technical marvels in support of space reconnaissance.
Quite literally, the NRO's achievements in space have provided the
nation its "eyes and ears" for: monitoring the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and compliance with arms control
agreements; tracking international terrorists, narcotics traffickers
and others who threaten American lives and interests around the
world; providing operational intelligence and situational awareness
to our armed forces in situations ranging from combat to peacekeeping;
and helping to anticipate and cope with disasters, ranging from
wildfires in the American West to volcanic eruptions in the Pacific
to humanitarian crises in the Balkans.
In many ways,
the risks to the security of the United States from potentially
catastrophic acts of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and
mass disruption are more complex today than those the United States
confronted during the Cold War. The number of extended U.S. military
commitments and other U.S. interests around the globe that require
continuing support is stressing the capacity of NRO reconnaissance
systems and the Intelligence Community to detect critical indications
and warnings of potentially threatening events. Further, the NRO
does more than just build satellites. Integrating all-source intelligence
requires it to produce new technologies. Together, these and other
evolving conditions place an enormous premium on maintaining a strong
space reconnaissance capability.
NRO capabilities
have been available for the past 40 years because President Dwight
Eisenhower and his successors clearly understood the significance
of space reconnaissance to our national security. They had the tenacity
and determination to endure the many risks and failures inherent
in space technology, and they personally directed and sustained
the investment needed for its development. The United States is
far more secure today because of this prior investment, commitment
and level of personal attention.
However, the
clarity of mission and sense of urgency that led past Presidents
and Congresses to invest in the future of space reconnaissance dissipated
with the Cold War's end. The disappearance of a single large threat
has provided a false sense of security, diverting our attention
from national security issues and, for the NRO, resulting in under-investment.
Unfortunately, this false sense of security has been accompanied
by a particularly ill-timed lack of policy direction to the NRO
from senior officials. This comes at a time when the array of threats
facing the United States has never been more complex and the demands
on the NRO from new customers have never been more intense.
Users of the
intelligence provided by the NRO's satellites have long competed
for priority. But now, the number of these customers has expanded
dramatically. Advances in military technology have led military
customers to develop a voracious appetite for NRO data. At the same
time, non-military customers increasingly demand more information
from the NRO regarding a broad array of intelligence targets. Also,
dynamic changes throughout the Intelligence Community and enormous
growth in information technology are significantly affecting the
NRO. In the absence of additional resources, the NRO is being stretched
thin trying to meet all its customers' essential requirements.
We believe the
American people may assume that space-based intelligence collection
matters less today than it did during the Cold War at a time when,
paradoxically, the demand for the NRO's data has never been greater.
This Report
stresses the need for decisive leadership at the highest levels
of the U.S. Government in developing and executing a comprehensive
and overarching national security policy and strategy that sets
the direction and priorities for the NRO. Ensuring that the
United States does not lose its technological "eyes and ears"
will require the personal attention and direction of the President,
the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI).
There has been
and will continue to be understandably heavy pressure to maintain
current, aging capabilities rather than to bear the expense of riskier
modernization and development of advanced technologies. Without
bold and sustained leadership, the United States could find itself
"deaf and blind" and increasingly vulnerable to any of
the potentially devastating threats it may face in the next ten
to twenty years.
Overall
Finding and Conclusion
The
Commission concludes that the National Reconnaissance Office demands
the personal attention of the President of the United States, the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. It
must remain a strong, separate activity, with a focus on innovation,
within the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense.
Failure to understand and support the indispensable nature of the
NRO as the source of innovative new space-based intelligence collection
systems will result in significant intelligence failures. These
failures will have a direct influence on strategic choices facing
the nation and will strongly affect the ability of U.S. military
commanders to win decisively on the battlefield.
Summary
of the Commission's Key Findings and Recommendations
Changing NRO Responsibilities
Throughout its history, the NRO has met the challenge of providing
innovative, space-based reconnaissance solutions to difficult
intelligence problems. Since the earliest days of the Corona spy
satellites, when the NRO developed the first space-based photographic
capability, the NRO has remained on the leading edge of space
technology.
The NRO's
success at innovation has been made possible by:
-
involvement by the President and the joint Secretary of Defense-DCI
responsibility for management of the NRO;
-
its status, under the NRO Director, as the only Government
office responsible for developing space reconnaissance systems;
-
staffing by Department of Defense (DoD) and Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) personnel;
-
adequate funding with sensible reserves;
-
a high degree of secrecy;
-
technological depth focused on developing space reconnaissance
solutions to difficult intelligence problems; and
-
experienced program managers empowered to make decisions and
requiring minimal oversight.
It is important
that the NRO remain focused on its primary space-based reconnaissance
mission. It is equally important that both the NRO's special talents
and the institutional foundation that has facilitated its success
for four decades be carefully preserved.
The NRO has
often approached its mission from an "end-to-end" perspective.
The NRO did more than build satellites to collect information.
It also built capabilities to task the satellites, process the
data collected and disseminate the information to its primary
users. By taking this comprehensive approach, the NRO was able
to develop high-performance satellite systems that better served
its customers' needs.
However,
the structure of the Intelligence Community has changed since
the NRO's earliest days. New organizations exist and many intelligence
functions are now shared. Tasking, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination (TPED) functions are dispersed throughout the Intelligence
Community. In this changed environment, some officials are concerned
that the NRO is duplicating efforts in areas for which other agencies
now have primary responsibility.
The National
Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Security Agency, and
the Central MASINT [measurement and signature intelligence] Organization
bear primary responsibility for managing the tasking and dissemination
of information collected by NRO satellites, and processing of
intelligence data is shared among these same organizations. At
the same time, the NRO is responsible for ensuring its satellites
operate efficiently and effectively.
In developing
TPED processes in connection with its own systems, the NRO often
has developed innovative solutions to difficult problems in these
areas. To encourage development of creative solutions in the future,
the Commission believes it important that the delineation of responsibilities
for TPED be carefully and regularly evaluated by senior officials
in order to avoid duplication and enhance Intelligence Community
efficiency and effectiveness.
The Secretary
of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence must direct that
the NRO mission be updated and focused as a first priority on
the development, acquisition and operation of highly advanced
technology for space reconnaissance systems and supporting space-related
intelligence activities, in accordance with current law.
The Secretary
of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence should determine
the proper roles for the NRO, National Security Agency, National
Imagery and Mapping Agency, and Central MASINT Organization in
tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination activities.
NRO
Technological Innovation
Over time, the NRO has gained a well-deserved reputation as the
preeminent research, development and acquisition (RD&A) organization
in the Intelligence Community and DoD. As a result of changes
in recent years, however, some claim the NRO has lost its streamlined
acquisition and integration capability and its ability to develop
and apply new technologies rapidly.
The Commission
believes NRO leadership is doing its best in emphasizing RD&A;
in accepting new ideas, concepts and base technologies from any
source; and in applying "leap ahead" and "revolutionary"
technologies to its work. The NRO's focus is, as it should be,
on technologies that will enhance, improve, or fundamentally change
the way in which the United States engages in space-based reconnaissance.
The NRO's
development and application of new technologies has sometimes
been limited by a resource-constrained budget process. The budget
process is not well suited to making judgments about the value
of developing new technology. In these circumstances, recommendations
from the Intelligence Community, Office of Management and Budget,
or other budget staffs regarding whether or not to provide resources
for an NRO program should not be made without the benefit of clear
guidance from senior officials based upon the value of the technology
being developed in the NRO program. Decision-makers must ensure
that they are provided personally with the technical understanding
needed to assure that the decisions they make with regard to NRO
technology innovation efforts are informed decisions.
The President
of the United States, the Secretary of Defense and the Director
of Central Intelligence must pay close attention to the level
of funding and support for the NRO Director's research, development
and acquisition effort.
The Secretary
of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence should ensure
common understanding of the NRO's current and future capabilities
and the application of its technology to satisfy the needs of
its mission partners and customers.
Office
of Space Reconnaissance
From its beginning, NRO success has been based upon several special
attributes. Among these have been: the personal attention of the
President; a close partnership between the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of Central Intelligence; a single Director and
organization with technological expertise focused on space reconnaissance
on behalf of the DoD and CIA; experienced CIA and military personnel
and program managers; and a strong cloak of secrecy surrounding
its activities.
Over time,
these attributes have eroded. The Commission observes that one
of the most important changes is that implementation of the Secretary
of Defense-DCI partnership has been delegated to lower-level officials.
Also, the NRO Director is caught in the middle of an intense debate
regarding whether strategic or tactical intelligence requirements
should have higher priority in NRO satellite reconnaissance programs.
The personnel practices of other organizations are discouraging
NRO personnel from seeking repetitive assignments within the NRO.
The NRO has become a publicly acknowledged organization that openly
announces many of its new program initiatives.
These changes
are a direct response to the circumstances described earlier.
While many of the changes have been warranted, they have had a
limiting effect on the NRO's ability to attack the most difficult
intelligence problems quickly with the most advanced space reconnaissance
technology. Perhaps more importantly, they have weakened the foundation
of congressional and presidential support upon which the NRO's
success has been built.
The Commission
believes structural change is needed. A new office should be established
that, by recapturing and operating under the NRO's original attributes,
will respond more effectively to technological challenges in space
reconnaissance. The Commission suggests this office be called
the Office of Space Reconnaissance.
This would
require that the Secretary of Defense grant this Office special
exemptions from standard DoD acquisition regulations. It would
rely heavily upon the DCI's special statutory authorities for
procurement. It would be under the direction of the NRO Director,
but would operate in secure facilities separated from NRO activities.
It would create and defend a separate budget element within the
National Foreign Intelligence Program and have its own security
compartment. It would have a small CIA and military staff and
senior and experienced program managers, and would also rely heavily
upon the creativity of the contractor community for its work.
It would respond, through a special Executive Committee, to direction
from the President, the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. The
new Office would attack the most difficult intelligence problems
by providing advanced technology that will lead to frequent, assured,
global access to protect U.S. national security interests.
The Commission
emphasizes that creation of the Office of Space Reconnaissance
does not diminish the fundamental importance of the NRO and its
mission. Under this approach, the NRO would continue to serve
the broad and growing strategic and tactical customer base. It
would also continue to evaluate and apply leading edge technology
to meet the needs of those customers, and to confront and overcome
the intelligence challenges facing the Intelligence Community
and DoD.
The Secretary
of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence should establish
a new Office of Space Reconnaissance under the direction of the
Director of the NRO. The Office should have special acquisition
authorities, be staffed by experienced military and CIA personnel,
have a budget separate from other agencies and activities within
the National Foreign Intelligence Program, be protected by a special
security compartment, and operate under the personal direction
of the President, Secretary of Defense and Director of Central
Intelligence.
The
Secretary of Defense-Director of Central Intelligence Relationship
The NRO serves both the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. In the
NRO's early days, several agreements established the relationship
between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. Today, the NRO is
operating under agreements between these two officials, all of
which are at least thirty-five years old.
Space has
proven to be the most effective means for gaining frequent, assured
access to denied areas on a global basis. The NRO's history is
filled with successes in answering intelligence questions asked
by military and civilian leaders who faced difficult national
security challenges.
The Commission
evaluated the desirability of recommending the creation of an
"NRO statute." Such a law could firmly secure the NRO's
position in the national security community. After debate, the
Commission concluded that congressional action in this regard
could make the situation worse, rather than better. It believes
senior level Executive Branch attention should be sufficient at
this time.
Therefore,
in order to achieve the most cost-effective means for gaining
global access to denied areas, the President, Secretary of Defense
and Director of Central Intelligence must work closely together
to direct the NRO's efforts.
The President
must take direct responsibility to ensure that the Secretary of
Defense and Director of Central Intelligence relationship regarding
the management of the NRO is functioning effectively.
Balanced
Response to Customer Demands
Developments in information technology have both benefited and
challenged the NRO. Because of these developments, information
the NRO collects is more readily available to tactical military
commanders and plays a significant role in gaining information
dominance. As a result, military theater and tactical commanders
increasingly expect and demand NRO support.
The NRO's
global presence also continues to provide senior strategic decision-makers
with information essential to their understanding of the international
environment. As has been the case since its earliest days, the
NRO's satellites acquire information other intelligence sources
are unable to provide. Its satellites furnish a unilateral, low
profile, zero risk, and secure means of collecting highly sensitive
intelligence. They support diplomacy, prevent war, aid the war
on drugs, monitor the development of weapons of mass destruction,
and help thwart terrorist activities.
Customer
demands, however, exceed the NRO's capabilities. As is the case
with all U.S. national security activities today, the NRO's budget
is constrained and it competes for resources with other intelligence
agencies that are also facing new challenges created by the changing
threat and the explosion in information technology.
Because it
responds to both the Secretary of Defense and the DCI, the NRO
frequently is caught between the competing requirements of both
DoD and non-DoD customers, all of whom expect to be satisfied
by NRO systems. With its systems over-taxed and unable to answer
all demands, yet attempting to be "all things to all agencies,"
the NRO often bears the brunt of criticism from all sides.
Because of
these pressures, the NRO is a strong and persistent advocate for
greater resources in an era of limited Intelligence Community
budgets. However, the Commission's recommendations are focused
on balancing competing needs because it is not possible simply
to "buy" a way out of the problem.
The Secretary
of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence must work
closely together to ensure that proper attention is focused on
achieving the appropriate balance between strategic and tactical
requirements for NRO systems, present and future.
Defense
Space Reconnaissance Program
In response to the long-standing need for the NRO to develop space
reconnaissance assets that respond to both strategic and tactical
requirements, the Defense Support Project Office was established
in 1981. The NRO Director also served as the Director of that
Office.
The Office
was responsible for the annual development of the Defense Reconnaissance
Support Program (DRSP) contained in the DoD Tactical Intelligence
and Related Activities (TIARA) Program. DRSP funds generally were
used to pay for NRO activities that were necessary to satisfy
military-unique space reconnaissance requirements.
In 1994,
DRSP funding was substantially reduced. Responsibility for satellite
acquisition and infrastructure costs was shifted to the National
Reconnaissance Program. The name of the DRSP was changed to the
Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (DSRP), which became focused
on educating military customers on how to use NRO systems more
effectively. These changes ended DoD's direct funding of NRO reconnaissance
systems and took place even as DoD's appetite for NRO information
was growing substantially in response to the military's experiences
in the Gulf War.
The debate
over which customers should have higher priority for NRO space
reconnaissance capabilities is partly the result of the need to
allocate scarce funds. Experience since 1994 suggests that certain
programs to support tactical military requirements have had increasing
difficulty competing for funds within the National Reconnaissance
Program (NRP). This is because NRP spending to address those requirements
consumes resources appropriated to the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP). Some believe those requirements should be supported
by intelligence funding taken from the DoD budget. Thus, the debate
often is not about whether the NRO should undertake an activity,
but rather how the NRO will fund it.
The Commission
believes it is time to re-establish funds within the DoD budget
that will pay for the acquisition of systems and sensors designed
to support tactical commanders. If certain NRO acquisition decisions
were made part of a DSRP budget process in this way, the military's
Unified Commands would be directly involved in setting priorities
for future space reconnaissance systems. Further, budget pressures
on the NFIP would be reduced by such direct DoD funding for NRO
systems.
The Secretary
of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence,
should re-establish the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program as
a means of funding tactical military requirements for NRO systems
and architectures.
Increased
Resource and Budgetary Flexibility
Budget constraints affect the entire National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP). As each Intelligence Community activity strives
to meet new challenges, it competes with other NFIP activities
that have strong claims for resources. The dynamic budgetary environment
and the diffuse national security threats require flexible measures
for shifting resources to meet rapidly changing priorities.
The Director
of Central Intelligence is responsible, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, for the creation of the NFIP. This clear
responsibility, however, is not matched by a similar responsibility
for actual expenditure of the funds after they have been authorized
and appropriated to the NFIP by Congress. Under current law, the
Director may not shift such funds between intelligence activities
if the affected Secretary or department head objects.
The Commission's
principal concern is the potential limit that this provision of
current law places on the DCI's ability to shift resources to
match quickly changing priorities in a dynamic intelligence environment.
While the Commission recognizes this issue extends beyond the
NRO, it believes it is of such significance for the NRO that a
recommendation to remedy the situation is warranted.
The Director
of Central Intelligence should be granted greater latitude to
redirect funds among intelligence collection activities and agencies
in order to respond most effectively to the specific types of
issues that arise in NRO programs.
NRO
Technical Expertise
The NRO's historic success is directly attributable to the high
quality and creativity of its DoD, CIA and contractor workforce.
Until the recent past, many military and civilian Government personnel
served the majority of their careers as part of the NRO. Some
never returned to their parent organizations for any appreciable
length of time. This allowed a highly skilled cadre of personnel
to advance within the NRO structure, gaining relevant experience
in various positions of greater responsibility as they rose in
rank.
New personnel
assignment practices adopted by other organizations, such as the
Air Force, have had the effect of limiting the tenure of personnel
assignments to the NRO. There is a resulting concern that the
NRO could lose its ability to sustain the cadre of highly-skilled
and experienced personnel it needs to guarantee mission success
because rotational assignments back to their parent organizations
appear to be a requirement for career advancement. In some cases,
this cadre of personnel is prevented from obtaining equivalent
broad space-related experience during these rotational assignments.
While it is understandable that a parent organization may want
to exploit the special skills its personnel develop in the NRO,
the cost to NRO space reconnaissance programs may be greater than
the value of broader experience to these other organizations.
The Commission
believes there is a compelling need for a separate NRO career
path and assignment policy that provides an opportunity for selected
highly trained engineers, acquisition professionals and operations
specialists to be assigned to the NRO on a long-term basis and
progress through a broad range of NRO positions. The technical
complexity of NRO systems is unique, and it requires the continuity
of a dedicated cadre. The Commission believes the high quality
and creativity of the NRO's military, CIA and contractor workforce
must be sustained.
The Secretary
of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence should jointly
establish NRO career paths to ensure that a highly skilled and
experienced NRO workforce is continued and sustained.
Increased
Launch Program Risks
The U.S. Government's national security space program is proceeding
along several parallel paths. At the same time the NRO is embarking
upon new satellite acquisition programs, the Air Force is transitioning
its launch program to the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
family of space launch vehicles. The NRO relies upon the Air Force
to provide its launch capability. Thus, all the new NRO satellites
are to be launched on the new EELV.
Historically,
spacecraft and launch vehicle development programs have failed
to meet original estimated delivery dates. In addition, the spacecraft
and launch vehicles that initially emerge from new developmental
programs carry a significantly increased risk of unforeseen difficulties.
In the past, the effects of delays and launch failures could be
mitigated because robust satellite capabilities were on orbit
or sufficient launch vehicles were available as a back-up. Today,
the fragility of the satellite and launch vehicle architectures
offers no margin for error.
The Commission
is alarmed that there appears to be no comprehensive strategy
to address the increased risks presented by simultaneously developing
new reconnaissance satellites and launch vehicles. This contributes
to an already uncertain situation where new satellites will be
launched on new boosters.
The NRO
Director, with the support of the Air Force Materiel Command and
Space and Missile Systems Center, should develop a contingency
plan for each NRO program or set of programs. These plans should
describe risks, contingency options and failure mitigation plans
to minimize satellite system problems that might result from satellite
or launch vehicle failures.
Commercial
Satellite Imagery
Rapid technological developments in the commercial space industry
are yielding capabilities that could usefully supplement U.S.
Government-developed space reconnaissance systems. Although a
National Space Policy exists that promotes the use of the products
and services of the U.S. commercial space industry, the Commission
did not find any executable plan, budget, or strategy that promotes
the use of commercial satellite imagery.
The Commission
supports Government purchases of one meter and one-half meter
resolution commercial imagery, which can meet a large percentage
of U.S. Government imagery requirements. The Commission believes
there is a need for an overall assessment--independent of the
NRO--of the utility of commercial technologies to supplement traditional
NRO missions.
NRO imagery
is provided to Government users "free of charge," while
in many cases those same users have to use current funds to pay
for commercial imagery. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that
they find commercial imagery less attractive even as their demand
constantly increases for the "free" NRO imagery. If
commercial imagery is to achieve its potential to reduce the demands
on NRO systems, decisions regarding the use of commercial imagery
must be made on an even footing with decisions about the use of
NRO-provided imagery.
The Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD-23) that establishes U.S. policy regarding
exports of remote sensing technology and data may be inhibiting
effective U.S. responses to proliferation of such technology internationally.
The Commission urges the next Administration to re-examine this
Directive in light of recent experience.
A clear
national strategy that takes full advantage of the capabilities
of the U.S. commercial satellite imagery industry must be developed
by the President, Secretary of Defense and Director of Central
Intelligence.
The strategy
must contain a realistic execution plan--with timelines, a commitment
of the necessary resources and sound estimates of future funding
levels.
NRO
Airborne Reconnaissance Responsibilities
Until the early 1990's, the NRO also developed high altitude airborne
reconnaissance systems, such as the SR-71 aircraft. In fact, a
1964 DoD Directive that remains in effect assigns responsibility
for strategic airborne reconnaissance to the NRO.
Too often,
space reconnaissance and strategic airborne reconnaissance are
viewed as mutually exclusive capabilities. In fact, they are quite
complementary and contribute unique support to a tiered concept
of intelligence collection.
To achieve
and maintain a proper balance between space-based and airborne
reconnaissance, the Commission believes the NRO needs to restore
its interest in airborne platforms and participate in engineering
studies to select the proper platform for the required mission.
The NRO
should participate jointly with other agencies and departments
in strategic airborne reconnaissance development. Specifically,
the NRO should supply system engineering capabilities and transfer
space system technologies to airborne applications.