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The
Evolving Role of the NRO
The
NRO Mission
National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite systems collect raw data
that are processed into a usable product by the NRO and provided
to one of its mission partners for exploitation, analysis and
dissemination of the final intelligence product to the customers
that originally requested the information.
The National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) develops, acquires, and operates our
nation's most sensitive space reconnaissance satellite systems.
These systems collect imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence
(SIGINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) of
great value to the U.S. Government.
Until 1992,
the existence of the NRO was classified and even its name was
not officially acknowledged by the government. Access to the data
collected by its satellites was confined to a limited set of customers
within highly classified intelligence channels. Today, the existence
of the NRO is openly acknowledged and several aspects of its activities
have been declassified. Additionally, the data collected by NRO
satellites are now available to a wide variety of users in many
U.S. Government agencies.
The NRO collects
data via its satellites in response to requirements that are established
by its customers--the end users of its products. Those requirements
are screened through Intelligence Community processes that adjudicate
competing requirements and set the priorities for collection.
The prioritized requirements are then passed to the NRO for collection
by its satellite systems.
NRO satellites
collect raw data that are processed by the NRO and then provided
to one of its mission partners: the National Security Agency (NSA)
for SIGINT, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) for
IMINT, or to the Central MASINT Organization (CMO) for MASINT.
These entities are responsible for exploitation, analysis and
dissemination of the final intelligence product to the customers
that originally requested the information. (See graphic "Today's
Intelligence Process," which highlights the responsibilities
of the NRO in relation to its mission partners.)
Organizational
Change
The
significant degree of change in a relatively short period of time
has put great strain on the NRO and its personnel and has presented
a continuing series of challenges to senior NRO managers.
During its
early years, the NRO was primarily involved in developing first-of-a-kind
satellite systems for a limited number of strategic intelligence
and military customers, and for the most part focused against
a single intelligence target--the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact. At the outset, the NRO was small and agile. It also had
the flexibility and authority to make rapid decisions to pursue
high-risk technologies in response to objectives established by
the national leadership. As a result, the NRO was able to develop
airborne and satellite reconnaissance systems that provided a
decisive edge to the United States in its decades-long confrontation
with the Soviet Union.
Today's NRO,
by contrast, has evolved into a large organization with three
main responsibilities:
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operating
the mainstay satellite reconnaissance systems that now serve
a large number of tactical customers as well as strategic or
"national" customers;
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acquiring
new satellite collection systems that maintain continuity in
the data provided to customers and include evolutionary improvements
in technology; and
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conducting
leading edge research and technology innovation for future satellite
systems that will guarantee global information superiority and
continued access to denied areas.
A decision
was made in 1992 to consolidate the original NRO programs (Programs
A, B and C) into an organization divided along functional lines,
e.g., imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT),
etc. The intent was to gain efficiencies, eliminate redundancies
and develop a more centralized and more "corporate"
structure for the NRO.
The consolidation
was followed by a period of significant upheaval at the NRO. In
1996, a controversy concerning the financial management of the
organization led to the replacement of the NRO Director. The increased
congressional, DoD and Intelligence Community oversight that resulted
inevitably influenced the NRO's organizational practices and management
structure. The end result was a larger organizational structure
with additional administrative and support functions.
In response
to the management challenges presented by the functional consolidation
of the NRO and the financial management controversy that had led
to the removal of his predecessor, then-Acting NRO Director Keith
Hall established a Blue Ribbon group--known as the Jeremiah Panel
after its Chairman, Admiral David Jeremiah, a former Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its role was to review the NRO's
practices and organization and make recommendations concerning
how the NRO should position itself for the future.
After being
confirmed by the Senate, NRO Director Hall began to implement
the recommendations of the Jeremiah Panel by:
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restructuring
the NRO's internal organization in an attempt to increase its
responsiveness to its customers;
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establishing
collaborative relationships with the NRO's mission partners--NIMA
and NSA--and its customers throughout the U.S. Government;
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increasing
and stabilizing the level of research and development funding
and concentrating those activities in a single, more independent
Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate;
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making
NRO systems more tactically relevant by involving DoD in the
development of requirements for the next generation NRO imagery
satellite system, known as the Future Imagery Architecture;
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facilitating
more effective means for processing and disseminating data derived
from NRO systems;
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placing
increased emphasis on information superiority; and
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changing
the NRO's acquisition processes.
In addition
to these reform efforts, the NRO was under congressional direction
to tighten its internal budgetary controls and strengthen internal
oversight mechanisms such as the Office of Inspector General.
As mentioned earlier, the end result was a larger organizational
structure with added administrative and support functions.
Furthermore,
the NRO must now operate in the changed environment that includes
many diverse customers and mission partners that have the responsibility
for tasking NRO systems and exploiting and disseminating the intelligence
data they produce. This significant degree of change in a relatively
short period of time has put great strain on the NRO and its personnel
and has presented a continuing series of challenges to senior
NRO managers.
Finally,
and most unfortunately, the NRO no longer commands the personal
attention of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the DCI,
or senior White House officials with regard to its technology
and system acquisition decisions. This reduced attention from
the national leadership has come at a time when the challenges
to U.S. national security are as threatening and unpredictable
as they have ever been. The nation's future security will require
decisive leadership, clear direction and attention to detail to
ensure the NRO and Intelligence Community are positioned to meet
the intelligence challenges facing the United States in the 21st
Century.
Changing
NRO Responsibilities
Today's
NRO must ensure the operation of its large mainstay systems, while
simultaneously acquiring evolutionary upgraded systems and developing
future technologies.
Throughout
its history, the NRO has met the challenge of providing innovative,
space-based reconnaissance solutions to difficult intelligence
problems. Since the earliest days of the Corona spy satellites
when the NRO developed the first space-based photographic capability,
the NRO has remained on the leading edge of space technology.
As explained
earlier, today's NRO has three parallel responsibilities. It must
ensure the operation of its large mainstay systems, while simultaneously
acquiring evolutionary upgraded systems and developing future
technologies. It must do all of this in a new environment that
includes many more customers and mission partners.
The NRO has
rendered extremely valuable non-space-related services over the
years by providing terrestrial communications systems, visualization
tools, imagery exploitation systems, and technical problem-solving
skills to U.S. combatant commands and military departments when
no other entity was willing, capable, or agile enough to do so.
However, such activities have tended to divert the NRO's attention
from what it is best suited to do: design, acquire and launch
reconnaissance satellites that can help resolve the most difficult
intelligence collection problems.
The Commission
reviewed three types of proposals for altering the NRO's activities
in order to focus the NRO on pursuing and applying advanced space-based
or space-related technologies:
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transferring
systems;
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transferring
functions; and
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limiting
the NRO's role in tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination.
Proposed
Transfer of Systems. The Commission received testimony advocating
the transfer of some NRO activities and operations to DoD. Such
an approach was advocated in order to:
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enable
the NRO to focus on developing unique space-based collection
systems to solve difficult intelligence problems; and
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allow
DoD to be responsible for developing and operating those space
systems that are better suited to satisfying the needs of
its military commanders.
Combatant
Commanders and military departments now have specific validated
requirements for space collection systems. Moreover, the military
departments are charged by statute to "organize, train
and equip" U.S. military forces and may be better positioned
to accept responsibility for the space systems that are increasingly
relied upon by the military and integrated into its weapons
systems.
As discussed
elsewhere in this Report, tensions have been heightened regarding
the use of NRO systems to support both strategic and tactical
customers. Transferring development or operational responsibilities
for these systems to DoD would place an enormous burden on DoD
to demonstrate that it could satisfy both sets of requirements.
Further,
NRO satellites are substantially more complex than DoD satellites,
so that the associated expertise would also have to be transferred
in conjunction with any transfer of operational responsibilities.
DoD's ability to operate space systems may be more advanced
now than in the past, but any such transfer would require that
such activities be staffed with an adequate force of contractors
and military engineering personnel sufficiently proficient to
understand the more complex NRO systems. In this regard, the
Commission notes that the Air Force's Space Based Infrared System
satellite program offers an opportunity for the Air Force to
demonstrate the capability to acquire, operate and maintain
an actively tasked collection system similar in complexity to
NRO systems.
On balance,
the Commission is not persuaded that such transfers are warranted
at this time, and notes that the minimum criteria that should
be satisfied before such transfers of responsibility could be
considered include:
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demonstrated
clear and discrete benefits to all military, intelligence
and other customers;
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creation
of additional opportunities for the NRO to focus its resources
and intellectual capital on critical technology development
activities; and
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guarantees
that the necessary expertise is readily available within or
transferred to the receiving entity to operate or develop
these systems effectively in light of their unique complexities.
Proposed
Transfer of Functions. Current divisions of responsibility
for the production of imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals
intelligence (SIGINT) and measurement and signature (MASINT)
intelligence, as well as budget and mission distinctions among
the NRO and its mission partners, are not as clear as they should
be. To deal with these issues, it was suggested in testimony
that NRO SIGINT and IMINT research and development activities,
or the entirety of the NRO's SIGINT and IMINT organizations,
be assigned to NSA and NIMA, respectively.
The Commission
believes transfers of SIGINT and IMINT responsibilities from
the NRO to NSA and NIMA could be destructive of U.S. capabilities
to collect intelligence from space in the long run. NSA and
NIMA are directly responsible for providing SIGINT and IMINT
to U.S. Government officials and military forces. They face
voracious current and near-term demands for these products.
Thus, budget and program pressures would tempt these agencies
to take resources from the development of future space-based
capabilities and devote them instead to current collection,
analysis and production programs.
The
NRO's Role in Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination
(TPED). Serious questions have been raised by the NRO's
customers and mission partners regarding the appropriate nature
and scope of the NRO's role in tasking, processing, exploitation,
and dissemination (TPED) functions. The TPED area is an example
of the type of problems associated with NRO participation in
activities that can be accommodated within the terms of the
NRO's current Mission Statement because they are related to
intelligence, yet are not space-related.
The NRO
has often approached its mission from an "end-to-end"
perspective. Not only did the NRO build satellites to collect
information, it built capabilities to task the satellites, process
the information they collected and disseminate it to its primary
users. By taking this comprehensive approach, the NRO was able
to develop advanced satellite systems and associated capabilities
that better served its customers' needs.
However,
the structure of the Intelligence Community has changed. New
organizations exist and many intelligence functions are now
shared. Tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination
functions are dispersed throughout the Intelligence Community.
Some officials are concerned the NRO is duplicating efforts
in areas for which other agencies now have primary responsibility.
The National
Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and
the Central MASINT Organization bear primary responsibility
for tasking NRO systems, processing the data they collect and
disseminating the information. At the same time, the NRO is
responsible for ensuring its satellites operate efficiently
and effectively.
In developing
TPED processes in connection with its own systems, the NRO often
has found innovative solutions to difficult problems in these
areas. The Commission recognizes the NRO has expertise that
can be applied profitably to developing future TPED processes.
However, the basic role of the NRO should be to support its
mission partners who have primary responsibility for the TPED
mission.
To ensure
the design and acquisition of future satellite collection systems
fully incorporates TPED processes, the Commission believes it
important that the responsibilities for TPED be carefully delineated.
The Secretary of Defense and DCI should carefully review the
assignment of TPED responsibilities and ensure that satellite
collection capabilities do not outstrip TPED capacities and
that future NRO satellite acquisitions address the responsibility
and funding for end-to-end integration of TPED functions.
Recommendations
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The
Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence
must direct that the NRO mission be updated and focused as
a first priority on the development, acquisition and operation
of highly advanced technology for space reconnaissance systems
and supporting space-related intelligence activities, in accordance
with current law.
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The Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence
should determine the proper roles for the NRO, National Security
Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and Central MASINT
Organization in tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination
activities.
NRO
Technological Innovation
The
key to future space-based access and to future capability in
the face of actions by those who would conceal their own capability,
intent and will is technology.
From the
NRO's inception, its core function has been the acquisition
and application of new, advanced and synergistic technologies.
Indeed, one key reason for creating it was in part to facilitate
the process of conducting focused research and development (R&D)
and the development of plans, policies, procedures, and other
mechanisms to integrate "leap ahead" and "revolutionary"
technologies into the space reconnaissance effort.
The NRO
gained a well-deserved reputation, over time, as the preeminent
research, development and acquisition (RD&A) organization
in the Intelligence Community and in DoD. This reputation spread
into the commercial and private RD&A and production communities,
and to this day the NRO enjoys a reputation among the contractor
community as the easiest and most effective element of the U.S.
Government to deal with in these endeavors.
However,
increasing bureaucracy and other changes in the NRO's organizational
and operating structure have begun to take their toll. Some
critics, commercial and governmental, who appeared before the
Commission, speculated or asserted that the NRO had lost its
streamlined acquisition and integration capability, and had
lost its edge with regard to the development and application
of new technologies.
The Commission
believes that the NRO is clearly embracing its role in RD&A,
in accepting new ideas, concepts and base technologies from
any source, and in applying these "leap ahead" and
"revolutionary" technologies to its work. The NRO
has several programs for outreach to the private, individual
and commercial communities, to laboratories and to academia.
However, it must then evaluate and assess the "next great
idea" or the "best technology anyone ever heard of"
in the harsh light of science and engineering and in the cold
context of resource limitations.
It is apparent
that the NRO is working on innovative and synergistic technologies.
Its focus is as it should be--on technologies that will enhance,
improve, or even fundamentally change the way in which the United
States engages in space-based reconnaissance. In order to find
and develop the required technologies, the NRO has few limits.
It is true that a variety of rules and regulations have been
inserted into its "streamlined" acquisition process,
with good reason, to ensure that tax dollars are spent effectively
and efficiently. It is still apparent, however, that the NRO
can and does get things done as fast as any agency in the U.S.
Government, especially with regard to the insertion of "change"
technologies.
One key
shortcoming in the current NRO process for "operationalizing"
technology is the decision-making process following the research
and development phase to acquire and apply the technology. Much
of what the NRO does in operationalizing technology is now viewed
by critics and supporters alike as evolutionary rather than
revolutionary. This is an accurate perception. It reflects the
reality of the current decision process. That process has devolved
over the years from an examination of the technologies and an
appraisal of their merits, to the budget process, in which technologies
are evaluated largely according to resource considerations.
Not only
is the budget mechanism ill-suited to be the most influential
decision-making element in the review of new technologies, but
the people in that process are seldom equipped to make good
technology judgments. In fact, general knowledge about what
the NRO does and how it does it, and for what reasons, is sadly
lacking outside the NRO. Even inside the NRO, some personnel
are not fully aware of organizational goals with regard to technology
applications. Decision-makers and leaders must somehow be equipped
with the information and understanding they need to make good
decisions.
As the
nation moves into the future, the traditional strength of NRO
systems to transcend geopolitical limits and to look into restricted
or denied areas in any conditions will become more important
than ever. Many, if not most, of our adversaries know this
all too well. They have taken extraordinary steps to harden
and protect their capabilities and to deny access. The key to
future space-based access and to future capability in the face
of actions by those who would conceal their own capability,
intent and will is technology.
This simple
concept is all-important. It sums up the reason for the Commission's
view that technology is a vital component of ensuring U.S. preeminence
in knowledge about developments worldwide. The Commission urges
the NRO to ensure that we remain on or ahead of the leading
edge of the technology revolution.
Recommendations
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The
President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense and
the Director of Central Intelligence must pay close attention
to the level of funding and support for the NRO Director's
research, development and acquisition effort.
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The Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence
should ensure common understanding of the NRO's current and
future capabilities and the application of its technology
to satisfy the needs of its mission partners and customers
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