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Appendix
D
Historical
Development of
The Secretary of Defense--Director of Central Intelligence Relationship
With The NRO
Background.
The Director of the NRO is responsible for reporting to both
the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI). He is the head of a major component of the Intelligence
Community that is also an agency of DoD. At the same time, he
serves as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space.
This tri-cornered arrangement has resulted in some of the greatest
historical strength of the NRO because it has allowed the NRO
Director to draw on the resources and benefit from the advocacy
of the two major forces in the Intelligence Community and the
Department of Defense.
It has also been however, the source of some of the current
tensions regarding the NRO because of the ambiguity in command
and accountability that is the natural consequence of the arrangement.
Further, some would argue that the uncertain situation in which
the NRO finds itself today--with requirements rising and budgets
flat or falling--can be traced in part to that ambiguity and
the resulting inadequacy of the Secretary of Defense-DCI relationship
as a means for dispute resolution. On the other hand, one prominent
witness testified to the Commission that the Secretary of Defense
and the DCI were appropriately "stuck with" the problem
of running the NRO and simply had to make it work no matter
how difficult it was, simply because of the NRO's importance
to national security.
The current Secretary of Defense-DCI relationship regarding
the NRO is significantly different than it was before 1990.
This is due primarily to dynamic changes that have affected
the NRO's traditional missions and its relationship with the
various agencies it supports, and to Congressional actions that
were taken in the 1990s.
1960
- 1970: The Drift Toward DoD. The relationship between the
Secretary of Defense and the DCI regarding the NRO was originally
described in four agreements that were consummated in the 1960s
by a series of Deputy Secretaries of Defense and DCIs. According
to the NRO General Counsel, these four agreements are all considered
by the NRO to still be in effect, although a series of Executive
Orders and Congressional amendments to the National Security
Act of 1947 have had a significant impact on the relationship.
The first agreement is dated September 6, 1961 and was focused
on the creation of a National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) within
the Department of Defense to include all overt and covert satellite
and over-flight reconnaissance projects. The agreement also
recorded the creation of the NRO to manage the NRP under the
joint direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and
the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans who were to see to the implementation
of NRO decisions within their respective organizations. The
NRO was to respond to collection requirements and priorities
established by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).
The NRO "Directors" were to establish procedures to
ensure that "the particular talents, experience and capabilities"
of DoD and the CIA were used fully and effectively in the NRP.
Major NRP program elements and operations were to be subject
to regular review by a National Security Council group.
The second agreement was signed by the parties on May 2, 1962
and contained policy guidance to ensure that, as had been urged
in the prior agreement, "the particular talents, experience
and capabilities" of DoD and the CIA were used fully and
effectively in the NRP. It provided that there would be an NRO
Director designated by the DCI and Secretary of Defense and
responsible directly to them both for the management and conduct
of the NRP. Further, personnel from DoD and CIA were to be assigned
on a full-time basis to the NRO to take advantage of available
capabilities and resources and DoD and CIA were to provide funds
for the projects for which each had responsibility. The agreement
also established technical and financial management, security
and operational policies for the NRO Director to follow in sorting
out the DoD and CIA interests in the NRP. It also stated that
operational control of individual NRP projects would be assigned
to the DoD or CIA by the NRO Director in accordance with policy
guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. Finally,
the second agreement provided that the NRO Director would be
responsible for future NRP planning, but that all such planning
would be coordinated with the DCI because of the DCI's major
responsibility for all intelligence programs.
The third agreement was dated March 13, 1963 and stated that
it superseded the May 2, 1962 agreement. This agreement began
to shift NRO management authority to DoD. Again in the name
of ensuring effective utilization of DoD and CIA capabilities,
it announced that the Secretary of Defense was the Executive
Agent for the NRP. To carry out this responsibility, the Secretary
was to establish the NRO as a separate operating agency within
DoD. The NRO Director was to be appointed by the Secretary,
with the concurrence of the DCI, and a Deputy NRO Director was
to be appointed by the DCI, with the concurrence of the Secretary.
The NRO Director was to receive guidance from the Secretary
and collection requirements and priorities from the USIB. The
NRO Director was responsible for the management of the NRP,
"subject to the direction, authority and control"
of the Secretary of Defense. NRO budget requests were to be
presented and substantiated by the NRO Director to the Secretary
and DCI, the Bureau of the Budget and Congressional committees.
The NRO Director was to report directly to the Secretary of
Defense, while keeping the DCI currently informed.
The fourth agreement was completed on August 11, 1965 and was
the most comprehensive. It furthered the swing of authority
over the NRO to DoD and the Secretary of Defense. The agreement
repeated that the Secretary was to establish the NRO as a separate
agency of DoD, but made clear that he had "ultimate responsibility"
for its management and operation. It also eliminated the requirement
for DCI concurrence in the Secretary's selection of the NRO
Director. The DCI retained authority for appointing the Deputy
NRO Director, but with the concurrence of the Secretary. The
agreement also provided that the Secretary had "the final
power" to approve the NRP budget and established the Secretary
as the final decision-maker on all NRP issues. It also created
an NRP Executive Committee (EXCOM) that consisted of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, DCI and the Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology. The EXCOM was empowered to "guide
and participate in the formulation of the NRP" in both
budget and operational detail, but the Secretary of Defense
was to be responsible to decide any EXCOM disagreement on any
issue. The NRO was to be staffed to reflect the best talent
available from CIA, DoD and other agencies, and this staff was
to "maintain no allegiance to the originating agency."
Collection requirements and priorities were still to be provided
by the USIB.
The Commission heard testimony that there was extreme turbulence
in the DCI/Secretary of Defense relationship in the early days
of the NRO. These early disagreements were centered around which
agencies would be responsible for building and operating NRO
systems rather than budgetary issues.
1970
- 1978: A Swing Back to the DCI. In November 1971, President
Nixon issued a memorandum that increased the responsibility
and authority of the DCI regarding the entire NFIP budget. This
resulted, in early 1972, in the revision of a National Security
Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) that implemented the
policy decisions contained in the presidential memorandum. The
NSCID called for the DCI to chair and staff all intelligence
committees and advisory boards, establish and reconcile all
intelligence requirements and priorities, and submit a consolidated
intelligence program and budget to the Office of Management
and Budget. A few months later, the Intelligence Community Staff
was created by DCI Richard Helms to support these additional
functions.
In February 1973, James Schlesinger was confirmed as DCI. He
had accepted the assignment based on a pledge from President
Nixon that he would chair all of the intelligence committees,
including the NRO EXCOM, as was now prescribed by the revised
NSCID. With the DCI as EXCOM Chairman, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense ceased attending meetings--he outranked the DCI at
the time, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
began to attend in his place. President Nixon, meanwhile, dismissed
the Science Advisor and dissolved the President's Science Advisory
Council. This eliminated the NRO EXCOM's direct link to the
President.
President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11905 in February
1976 to provide a public description of the structure and activities
of the Intelligence Community. That Order stated that the NRO,
euphemistically identified as an office within DoD that collected
intelligence through reconnaissance programs, was part of the
Intelligence Community. It also established a Committee on Foreign
Intelligence (CFI), which was composed of the DCI as Chairman,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Deputy
Assistant to the President for National Security Affair. The
CFI reported to the National Security Council and was responsible
for reprogramming NFIP funds and setting priorities for collection
and production of national intelligence. As a result, the NRO
EXCOM was disbanded. Control of NRP funds was now in the hands
of the DCI instead of the Secretary of Defense.
The Ford Order also charged DoD with, among other things, directing,
funding and operating national, defense and military intelligence
and reconnaissance activities. The NRO was not specifically
mentioned since its existence was still classified at this time.
Also in the mid-1970s, Congress created substantial additional
Congressional oversight mechanisms as a result of its investigations
of excesses by the Intelligence Community. In May 1976, the
U.S. Senate established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI). In July 1977, the U.S. House of Representatives established
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. As a result,
Congressional staffs became heavily involved in review of the
NRP and its current and proposed programs.
In January 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order
12036, which replaced the Ford Order. It abolished the CFI and
gave "full and exclusive authority" over the preparation
of the NFIP budget to the DCI. The Order also established the
Policy Review Committee to assess the NFIP budget and U.S. Intelligence
priorities.
By the end of 1978, the NRO Director was reporting to the DCI
on matters of NRP funding and requirements, and to the Secretary
of Defense on operational matters associated with strategic
and tactical overhead reconnaissance. The DCI continued, as
had been the case from the outset, to delegate to the NRO the
special acquisition authority that the National Security Act
of 1947 had provided to the CIA. Congressional involvement in
the NRP had increased to the point that it began to direct the
initiation of specific new programs.
Fiscal
Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act: Restriking the Balance.
Between 1978 and 1997, the formal written framework for the
Secretary of Defense-DCI relationship remained unchanged. During
that time, however, a disparity developed between the specified
and the actual authorities of the DCI regarding the Intelligence
Community. In 1992, Congress had enacted amendments to the National
Security Act that provided a statutory basis for many of the
DCI responsibilities that had been adopted previously by Executive
Order. As noted in the March 1996 report of the Aspin-Brown
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence
Community, however:
Taking
these together, the DCI appears to have considerable authority
vis-à-vis other elements of the Intelligence Community.
In practice, however, this authority must be exercised consistent
with the authority of the department heads to whom these elements
are subordinate.
Notwithstanding
his statutory authorities vis-à-vis the elements of the
Intelligence Community, which on their face appear substantial,
the DCI is left in a relatively weak position. It is not surprising,
therefore, that most DCIs have chosen to spend the bulk of their
time on other major functions, serving as the principal intelligence
adviser to the President and head of the CIA [instead of pursuing
the role of head of the Intelligence Community].
Thus, the Secretary of Defense retained substantial real authority
over the activities of the NRO, despite the titular responsibilities
of the DCI. In recognition of this fact, the Aspin-Brown Commission
recommended strengthening the authorities of the DCI, including
his authorities over the NRO.
Acting on recommendations of the 1996 Aspin-Brown Commission
Report, Congress enacted provisions of law that substantially
changed the overall relationship between the Secretary of Defense
and the DCI regarding the NRO and the other DoD agencies that
are part of the Intelligence Community. These provisions, particularly
Section 807 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization
Act, were designed to enhance the authority of the DCI to influence
the budget, personnel and activities of the Intelligence Community.
Specifically, the DCI was given specific statutory responsibility
to develop the annual National Foreign Intelligence Program
budget and also to participate in the development by the Secretary
of Defense of the annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP) and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
Program. In addition, the DCI was given statutory authority
to approve any reprogramming of funds within the NFIP and to
be consulted with regard to reprogramming within the JMIP by
the Secretary of Defense.
However, the DCI's actual authority to manage the NFIP budget
continues to be limited substantially by his lack of authority
to be involved in the execution of that budget after it is approved
by Congress. In addition, Section 104 (d)(2) of the National
Security Act, which was added by the FY 1992 Intelligence Authorization
Act, limits the DCI's ability to move funds or personnel within
the NFIP to situations where the transfer is to an activity
that is a higher priority intelligence activity, is based on
unforeseen requirements, is not to the CIA Reserve for Contingencies
or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the head of
the entity that contains the affected element or elements does
not object. Section 105 of the FY 2001 Intelligence Authorization
Act provides that only the head of an agency has authority to
object to a transfer of funds within the National Foreign Intelligence
Program, except that the Deputy Secretary of Defense may object
for DoD agencies and the DCI's authority to transfer funds may
be delegated to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for Community Management.
Other
Authorities Affecting the Secretary of Defense-DCI Relationship
Regarding the NRO. The NRO is a member of the "Intelligence
Community" as that term is defined in the National Security
Act and Executive Order 12333. Section 105 of the National Security
Act includes the NRO--along with NSA, NIMA, and DIA--among the
entities that the Secretary of Defense is responsible for drawing
upon to accomplish the NFIP. Under that Section, the Secretary
is required to act through the NRO to ensure, consistent with
the statutory responsibilities and authorities of the DCI, "the
continued operation of an effective unified organization for
the research and development, acquisition, and operation of
overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to satisfy all elements
of the intelligence community." Also, under Section 106,
the Secretary is required to seek DCI concurrence in the recommendation
to the President of an NRO Director and to advise the President
if the DCI does not concur.
The Act also provides that the DCI is to consult with the Secretary
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff in
the development of an annual evaluation of the performance and
responsiveness of the NRO, DIA, and NIMA in meeting their national
missions. This Report is to be submitted to the National Security
Council's Committee on Foreign Intelligence, which was also
created by the 1997 amendments to the National Security Act,
and to the Intelligence, Appropriations and Armed Services Committees
of Congress.
As explained earlier, Executive Order 12333, "United States
Intelligence Activities," was promulgated in 1981, prior
to the 1992 public acknowledgment of the NRO's existence and
the 1997 FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act amendments.
The Order provides that the Secretary of Defense will direct,
operate, control and provide fiscal management for, among other
things, national reconnaissance entities. It also alludes to
the NRO euphemistically in the category of "Offices for
the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance
programs" in a section entitled "Intelligence Components
Utilized by the Secretary of Defense." According to the
Executive Order, such offices are responsible for carrying out
consolidated reconnaissance programs, responding to tasking
in accordance with procedures established by the DCI and delegating
authority to other departments and agencies for research, development,
procurement, and operations of designated means of collection.
The transition of the relationship regarding the NRO from a
hierarchical one in 1961 to 1976 to a consensus-based relationship
since 1976 probably was inevitable considering the general turbulence
in the Intelligence Community during the 1970s and the increasing
Congressional oversight of the NRP since 1976. There was considerably
less stress on the relationship during periods of generally
higher Intelligence Community and DoD funding, although this
also was probably due to the close personal relationship between
the Secretary of Defense and DCI during the same periods.
There has been no direct White House role in NRO activities
since the President's Science Advisor was removed from the process
in the 1970s. Some White House Science Advisors are no longer
as well versed in national security issues as was formerly the
case. In the absence of such focused expertise and interest,
NRO issues have tended to be relegated to the lower working
levels of the NSC. The Commission heard testimony that, because
the President's interest in the NRO cannot be presumed, the
Secretary of Defense and DCI have even more reason to attend
to their relationship concerning the NRO.
No matter what form the Secretary of Defense-DCI relationship
regarding the NRO should take, it is not self-executing and
requires the active participation of both in order to best effect
the basic mission of the NRO. This basic point was made again
and again to the Commission by past and present senior officials.
Because the work of the NRO continues even during periods of
Secretary of Defense or DCI lack of interest or participation
in the relationship, the result is that successively lower levels
of officials may be left to "manage" the NRO on behalf
of the two principals. Friction among the NRO and other agencies
has developed in such periods. Two former senior officials who
served in different Administrations, strongly believed that
the NRO should be the subject of at least a weekly discussion
between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI.
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