Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers
Selig S. Harrison 1 : "Missile Capabilities in Northeast Asia: Japan, South
Korea and North Korea"
My presentation will deal with the missile capabilities of Japan, South
Korea and North Korea, emphasizing the triangular interaction between
Tokyo, Seoul, and Pyongyang and the implications for American policy of a
Japan and unified Korea armed with long-range missiles. I will focus on the
three themes:
1. Japan has developed rocket capabilities in its civilian space programs
that could quickly be converted to the development of intercontinental
ballistic missiles rivaling those of the United States. The Japanese
civilian nuclear power program is producing accumulations not only of
reactor-grade plutonium but also of supergrade plutonium, which would
be especially suited for the miniaturization of warheads and thus for
MIRV-type ICBMs.
2. With its technological superiority, a more sophisticated industrial
base, and a nascent missile program of its own, South Korea could
quickly outstrip North Korea's missile potential if it sought to do
so. A unified Korea could draw on the technological achievements of
the South as well as of the North and would be likely to seek an
independent nuclear and missile potential comparable to that of Japan,
starting with the acquisition of reprocessing technology.
3. North Korea's missile development programs are primarily motivated by
a desire on the part of the military factions in control of this
program to earn foreign exchange through exports for their own profit
and for the perpetuation of their power internally. Thus, in order to
curb these programs, the United States would have to buy off the
factions involved as part of a larger strategy of economic engagement,
including the gradual phasing out of Korean War economic sanctions on
non-strategic trade and investment. Negotiating meaningful restraints
on missile development would require direct U.S. military contacts
with the North Korean armed forces, which were proposed to me in
Pyongyang in September, 1995; to Kenneth Quinones of the State
Department in July, 1996; to former Senator Sam Nunn and former
Ambassador James Laney in their August, 1997 visit; and to Senator
Carl Levin in his December, 1997 visit. 2
Japan
The fact that Japan already possesses, or could readily produce,
substantial amounts of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium does not, in
itself, mean that it could develop a significant nuclear-weapons
capability. It is the sophisticated character of the Japanese space
program, with its convertibility to missile development, that makes Japan's
potential as a nuclear power so formidable.
Japanese space agencies have successfully tested solid-fueled rocket
systems that could be directly converted to intercontinental-range
missiles. Both of these systems, the J-1 and the M-5, have a payload and a
thrust comparable to that of U.S. ICBMs. If converted to ballistic missile
applications, the M-5 would give Japan an ICBM roughly equivalent to the MX
Peacekeeper, the largest currently operational U.S. ICBM, and the J-1 would
give Japan an ICBM surpassing the performance of a Minuteman 3. The range
of the Minuteman 3 is about 8,000 miles, and that of the Peacekeeper, some
7,400. The J-1 was developed by marrying a solid-propellant motor from
another successfully-tested liquid-fueled rocket, the H-2, to the upper
stages of the MS 32, a precursor of the M-5.
By firing their existing launch vehicles at long trajectories not suitable
for space launches but appropriate for missiles, Japan could greatly
increase the throw-weight of a missile relative to the space launch
payload. For example, an intermediate-range missile capable of covering
China might have a throw-weight as much as three to five times that of the
satellite payload of the space launch vehicle from which it is derived.
Japan's missile capabilities should be assessed in the context of its
civilian nuclear power program. Official projections indicate that buffer
stocks of five tons of reactor-grade plutonium are likely at any one time.
Non-official critics of the nuclear program contend that plutonium
accumulations will range from 11 to 25 tons within five years and as high
as 50 tons by the year 2010. (For elaboration of this issue, see my work,
Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996.)
While there is little doubt that reactor-grade plutonium could be used for
nuclear weapons, Japan could also pursue five other avenues to a nuclear
weapons program:
* Producing weapon-grade plutonium in reactors now used exclusively for
generating electricity by shutting them down more frequently for
refueling, thereby reducing the irradiation level ("burnup") of the
fuel to weapon-grade;
* Upgrading reactor-grade plutonium to weapon-grade, or producing highly
enriched uranium, through use of a laser-isotope process now under
experimental development;
* Converting the centrifuges in its uranium-enrichment facilities at
Rokasshomura from the production of low-enriched uranium (4.5 percent
U-235) to highly enriched uranium usable in compact nuclear weapons
(grater than 80 percent U-235);
* Separating the supergrade plutonium produced in the natural uranium
"blankets" of its Joyo and Monju fast-breeder reactors, which has a
higher degree of purity than the plutonium used in U.S. nuclear
weapons; and
* Producing weapon-grade plutonium in a reactor specifically configured
for the purpose.
Perhaps the most attractive option in the event of a weapons program would
be separating the high-purity supergrade plutonium from the breeder
blankets. The prototype fast-breeder-reactor at Monju, which began
operating in January 1995, had accumulated an estimated 10 kilograms in its
blanket when it was shut down after a sodium leak in 1996. When and if it
is restored to operation, an additional 70 kilograms per year could be
added to this accumulation, depending on the level of production. Even in
the event that it is not restored to full operation, its continued use as a
research or experimental facility would permit further accumulations of
supergrade plutonium. The Joyo experimental fast-breeder reactor had
accumulated 40 kilograms in its blankets when the reactor shifted to a new
design in 1994 that no longer requires blankets. Most estimates indicate
that, even utilizing reactor-grade plutonium, only four kilograms would be
needed to make a relatively simple pure fission weapon with a maximum
probable yield of 20 kilotons.
Supergrade plutonium is especially suited for the miniaturization of
warheads. Since it is a more reliable explosive than grades with less
purity, involving less danger of premature detonation, the other components
of the warhead could be small and light. Thus, if Japan were to make an
ICBM of the MIRV type based on technology drawn from the M-5, each warhead
would weigh about 350 kilograms, and the missile would be able to carry
between five and ten warheads, depending on its range.
The Japanese space effort has entailed the development of guidance and
re-entry technology that could be applied to a missile program. Advanced
guidance techniques were required to place and keep in orbit the unmanned
space platform that was launched by the H-2 in 1995 to collect scientific
data relating to research in the evolution of the universe. Japanese
officials point out that targeting for a ballistic missile would require a
much greater degree of precision in re-entry technology than has yet been
achieved. But the extent of precision required would depend on whether the
missile would be designed for a "counterforce" strategy (i.e., directed at
missile silos or other hard targets) or for a "countervalue" (i.e.,
'city-busting') strategy. The Orex re-entry vehicle developed for the H-2
demonstrates mastery of the techniques that would be needed in targeting
area targets such as cities. The relevant re-entry technology for this
purpose could be perfected in a matter of months. By contrast it would take
three to four years for Japan to develop the precision in re-entry
technology that would be needed for a "counterforce" strategy.
South Korea
South Korea has developed its own short-range (176-256 kilometers) Hyunmoo
missile and also deploys U.S. Honest John tactical surface-to-surface
missiles. Despite U.S. displeasure, the Defense Ministry has been seeking
to develop a long-range missile and has pressed the U.S. to renegotiate a
long-standing MOU that sets a limit on the range of any future South Korean
missiles lower than the MTCR-defined range of a nuclear-capable missile (a
missile able to carry a 500-kilogram payload over a range of 300
kilometers). 3 Under the MOU now in force, Seoul would have to get U.S.
approval before deploying a missile with a range over the MOU ceiling.
South Korean sources say that since the visit of a South Korean delegation
to Washington in 1996, the U.S. has signaled that it will not hold Seoul to
the letter of the MOU but refuses to confirm this formally, since leakage
concerning the South Korean program would undermine U.S. missile
negotiations with Pyongyang.
Seoul desires membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime as a
means of raising the ceiling on the range of its missiles and of acquiring
dual-use technology that would further its missile ambitions. 4 In my view,
the United States should not grant MTCR status to Seoul and should not
raise the MTCR issue with Pyongyang. The most effective way to curb North
Korean missiles exports and to achieve a freeze on North Korean missile
testing is to provide economic incentives to Pyongyang commensurate with
the surrender of foreign exchange earnings and military freedom of action
that would result from North Korean compliance with U.S. demands. (See pp.
9-10).
In my view the U.S. should remain firm on this issue and should avoid
transferring any technology to Seoul in support of its nominally civilian
space launch program that could be used to further its missile ambitions.
Ultimately, the missile capabilities of North and South alike will be
utilized by a unified Korea.
In assessing the implications of South Korea's nascent missile program, it
is important to bear in mind past efforts by Seoul to develop an
independent nuclear capability. Park Chung Hee initiated a secret nuclear
program in 1971 and was able to carry it forward without detection for
three years until the United States, armed with conclusive intelligence
findings, pressured Park in 1975 to stop the program or face the
termination of U.S. military support for the South. The program was revived
during the Roh Tae Woo regime in 1991 but discontinued once again under
U.S. pressure. 5
It is fear of a nuclear-armed Japan, more than a nuclear-armed North Korea,
that underlies the South Korean desire to acquire the nuclear option. Many
nationalist intellectuals, political leaders and nuclear industry spokesmen
in the South argue that President Roh should never have concluded his 1991
denuclearization agreement with Pyongyang, which prohibits reprocessing by
both North and South. In this view, it would have been enough to get
safeguards barring the diversion of plutonium for military
purposes--leaving both North and South alike free to pursue reprocessing
for civilian use, just as Japan is doing, while at the same time acquiring
the option of a weapons program.
Defenders of the 1991 agreement argue that the ban of reprocessing was an
unavoidable necessity in the context of a divided Korea in which North
Korea was perceived to be developing a nuclear weapons capability.
Significantly, both defenders and critics serve notice that a unified Korea
will demand the same treatment enjoyed by Japan and will seek a new
understanding with the United States and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) superseding the 1991 accord. President Kim Dae Jung, then an
opposition leader, told me in May, 1992, that "when Korea is reunified, we
will ask the IAEA for permission to build reprocessing facilities so that
we are not dependent for nuclear materials on Japan." Roh had to give up
reprocessing, he declared, "as a response to circumstances, because we are
still divided, but it was opposed by our nuclear scientists and unification
would present us with a new situation."
The South's ambitious civilian nuclear power program embraces ten nuclear
power plants and is projected to expand to 14 unless financial constraints
slow it down. Choi Young-Myung, director of research at the Korea Atomic
Energy Research Institute, has made no secret of his view that the South
should be permitted to reprocess. Choi served as chairman of the Science
and Technology Subcommittee of President Roh's Commission on the 21st
Century. Addressing a meeting of the Commission on February 27, 1991, he
declared that "the nuclear fuel cycle is one area that we must carefully
consider, and all possible diplomatic efforts must be used to obtain
self-sufficiency in the area of reprocessing technology, since it is an
aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle essential to our furnace-style strategy
and nuclear fuel development." 6
North Korea
In contrast to the absolute centralized control exercised by the late Kim
Il Sung, Kim Jong Il presides over a less cohesive regime marked by
ideological, personality and turf conflicts. There is growing evidence of
such conflicts between the armed forces, the internal security services,
the Workers Party, an assortment of economic bureaucracies and the Foreign
Ministry, and within each of these key components of the power structure.
Much of this conflict arises over the control of opportunities to profit
from foreign economic contacts that are encouraged by Kim Jong Il as part
of his effort to open up a controlled induction of foreign capital and
technology, primarily in localized free trade zones. Thus, the armed
forces, aware of the economic benefits obtained by military factions in
China, Thailand, and Indonesia through foreign trade and investment
contacts have demanded an increasingly prominent economic role under Kim
Jong Il, who is dependent on military support to sustain his position in
the face of hostile Old Guard Workers Party elements.
For example, anthracite coal exports are controlled by Mabong, a
military-controlled conglomerate, while zinc and gold exports are
controlled by Rungra, another military enterprise. Even before the death of
Kim Il Sung, missile development and missile exports were under the control
of several allied military enterprises. Thus, the cessation of exports and
freeze of further testing and development sought by the United States in
its two rounds of abortive missile negotiations with Pyongyang would
require (a) some form of payoff that would directly compensate these
enterprises for their lost income and (b) provide broader economic and
political incentives for North Korea commensurate with what would be a
fundamental change in its military posture.
In the first round, the United States offered no specific quid pro quo to
Pyongyang. In the second, it offered a selective relaxation of sanctions,
relating primarily to mining, that were relevant to North Korean needs but
did not concede enough to interest the North Korean military commissars
involved. A more realistic approach was adopted by Israel when it
discovered in 1993 that Iran was seeking to purchase missiles from
Pyongyang. Israel opened talks with North Korean diplomats in January,
1993, offering to establish diplomatic relations and to provide $1 billion
in investment and technical assistance in return for calling off the sale.
In June, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was about to go to Pyongyang to
close the deal until the U.S. stepped in to block it.
In American eyes, it is puzzling why North Korea, given its severe economic
problems, has not leaped at U.S. offers to trade a relaxation of economic
sanctions for North Korean restraint in missile exports and development,
and more recently, why it has also refused to make military tension
reduction concessions at the four-power peace talks in Geneva in exchange
for selective sanctions relief. One key factor in the explanation is that
in North Korean eyes, the United States is seeking to move the goal posts,
since it agreed unconditionally in Article Two of the 1994 nuclear freeze
agreement to "relax barriers to trade and investment" in exchange for North
Korea's freeze of its nuclear program.
Regarding the threat posed by North Korean missile capabilities, it is
clear that it demonstrated SCUD capabilities would be a significant factor
in the event of a war with South Korea or Japan. In the absence of a
greater disclosure of intelligence information, one outside of the
government cannot make a definitive judgment concerning whether, or to what
extent, North Korean missiles could at some future point constitute a
threat to Alaska, let alone other parts of the United States. Based on my
inquiries at the Pentagon and in the Defense Ministry in Seoul, the last
and only flight test of the Rodong-I was in 1993. As a report by the
Secretary of Defense noted (Proliferation: Threat and Response, November,
1997, p. 8), "both Taepo Dong missiles represent a significant
technological departure from the proven SCUD designs. North Korea has
little experience flight testing its missiles and has no experience testing
multistage ballistic missiles or other related technologies. This lack of
test experience could complicate North Korea's ability to evaluate, improve
or repair flaws in its missile designs."
Taking economic and political as well as military factors into account, my
assessment is that the North Korea missile threat has been greatly
exaggerated. Substantial economic incentives could be used by the United
States, Japan and South Korea to achieve a cessation of exports and a
freeze on future testing and development. The basic issue confronting the
United States in dealing with North Korea was underlined by an exchange I
had with a former senior American diplomat at a seminar in 1993, well
before the conclusion of the nuclear freeze agreement. "They can be
bought," I concluded, "if the price is right." "I don't want to buy them,"
he replied, "I want to destroy them."
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1. Dr. Selig Harrison is a Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars; Fellow, Twentieth Century Fund; and Director of the
Fund's Project on the United Sates and the Future of Korea. Specialized in
South Asia and East Asia for 46 years as a journalist and scholar and is
the author of five books on Asian affairs and U.S. relations with Asia.
2. See Selig S. Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea," Foreign
Policy, Spring, 1997, pp. 68-72.
3. Peter Hayes, "The Two Koreas and the International Missile Trade," in
The International Missile Bazaar, ed. W.C. Potter and Harlan Jencks,
Westview Press, 1994, pp. 141-46.
4. Defense White Paper, 1997-1998, Ministry of National Defense, Republic
of Korea, Seoul, pp. 141-46.
5. Yu Yong-won, "Korea Must Obtain Nuclear Armament Capability," Wolgan
Chosen, Seoul, October 1991, in Joint Publication Research Service,
TND-1-016, October 29, 1991, p. 13. See also Selig S. Harrison, Japan's
Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, pp. 3-4; "North Korea and Nuclear
Weapons: South Korean Responses," prepared for a conference on "The
Regional Implications of Korean Proliferation," sponsored by the Science
Applications International Corporation, McLean, Virginia, May 19, 1992; and
"Seoul Planned Nuclear Weapons Until 1991," Jane's Defense Weekly, April 2,
1994, p.1.
6. Yu Yong-won, op. cit. Choi submitted a memorandum to the International
Atomic Energy Agency in April, 1990, "Long-Term Policy on National Nuclear
Energy Development" stating the same position. He provided a copy of this
memo to a Carnegie Endowment delegation headed by the author on April 20,
1992.