Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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David C. Isby 1 : "Barriers to Proliferation And Pathways to Transfer: Building Ballistic Missile Capabilities Under MTCR" It was a truth universally acknowledged, that a developing country in possession of a national security problem must be in want of a ballistic missile. At least it was so in the 1980s. Since then, much has changed. Calls to Moscow worldwide no longer lead to re-assuring exports of Scud tactical ballistic missile (TBMs). 2 Colonel Qadaffi no longer publicly laments his lack of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). 3 Many missile development programs have come to an end due to internal political changes and international pressure. 4 Every country that bought a Chinese-built fighter is no longer seen as a likely customer for M-9 TBMs. Bilateral understandings and multilateral agreements, most notably the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), reflect increasing concern about missile proliferation. The 1991 Gulf War revealed the scope of imports for Iraq's missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. While this progress is significant, evidence shows that missile technology suppliers continue to supply and builders continue to build. Most troubling has been the evidence, since 1995, of transfers of technology and components from Russia to Iraq and Iran, in apparent violation of MTCR and other international agreements. 5 The evidence of such continued Russian proliferation of missile technology is so extensive that it is unlikely to be a rogue or criminal enterprise. 6 China has also been identified as proliferating missile technologies despite its promise to adhere to MTCR guidelines. 7 Despite the threat of sanctions for missile, CW, and other proliferators, China continued some exports. 8 China has, in response to US concerns, agreed to limit its exports; the success of this agreement is yet to be demonstrated. 9 The recent Pakistani missile test has highlighted potential Chinese involvement in that program. 10 Ballistic missile programs in North Korea, Iran, India and Pakistan have all progressed. While many missile and WMD programs have ended, the most recent Pakistani missile test - and Pakistani and Indian comments on the limited US response--suggests that the motivations survive. 11 Such programs make use of both domestic and imported capabilities. 12 There have been no published sources reporting what percentage of a North Korean-built Scud-C TBM or Silkworm cruise missile is produced from domestic sources, let alone more advanced designs in that country or Iran. Considering the limitations of each country's industrial base, it is unlikely to be 100%. Recent reports have suggested that North Korea is acting as a conduit for Chinese exports. 13 But no country has had sanctions imposed for supplying these components and technology. North Korea is both a beneficiary of proliferation and a proliferator. Despite the threat of US sanctions on recipients, North Korean export of missile technology remains extensive. This has included Scud technology exports to Egypt. 14 The US has attempted to limit North Korean proliferation, identifying it as among the many actions preventing better relations. 15 The evidence that missile technology continues to proliferate from Russia and China is considerable. That it does so from North Korea is certain. There is less evidence of such proliferation from other developed countries, though the record of sales related to missile or WMD technology to Iraq, Libya, Syria and other potential threats during the 1980s remains disturbing. US response to such proliferation has been characterized as reluctant to impose sanctions or block exports. 16 In part, this represents the potential substantial diplomatic cost of imposing sanctions. US-Russian disputes over the export of MTCR-covered technology have been identified as playing a crucial role in defining Russia's post Cold War foreign policy. 17 Thus, implementing stronger non-proliferation policies, such as following existing laws or halting effective subsidizing or re-negotiating with proliferators may have substantial diplomatic costs. 18 A number of bottom line questions suggest themselves. Will missile technology proliferate despite US policies? Will missile technology lead, if matched with a WMD capability, to a potential ballistic missile threat to the United States that does not exist today? Suppliers and Builders The record suggests that current non-proliferation policies will not halt totally the proliferation of missile technology. Missile technology, unlike that associated with nuclear weapons, is dual use, competitive, and in the international market. Missile technology presents problems more like those that have been raised in conjunction with the Chemical Warfare Convention (CWC) than those presented by the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The emerging cruise missile threat makes the problem of dual-use technology (e.g., GPS guidance) even more difficult. The US has, since 1993, moved to "universalize" MTCR and "make it less discriminatory" while at the same time liberalizing its own trade restraints on rocket and drone technology that is inherently dual use. 19 This led to policies designed to encourage members to give up ballistic missile programs in return for being able to acquire "peaceful" space technologies from the US and other MTCR members, an approach modeled on the NPT's non-nuclear weapons states receiving civilian nuclear technology. 20 The potential for proliferation without the safeguards of the NPT has motivated extensive congressional opposition. 21 Those proliferating dual-use technology are not likely to be limited to Russia or China, or even those countries whose adherence to MTCR is purely economic; even though MTCR explicitly covers such technologies, recent US practice shows a reluctance to apply sanctions to back them up. 22 Founding MTCR members - including the US--find themselves pressured by economic concerns to export dual-use technology. Recent US missile technology exports to China have come under criminal investigation despite government approval of similar exports. 23 The record of the export of dual use technologies such as high performance computers shows the sort of capabilities available on the world market and US reluctance to interfere with their export. 24 Indeed, the US has failed to punish unlicensed exporters of high performance computers, suggesting a gap between those in government and industry concerned with increasing exports and those few primarily concerned with nonproliferation. 25 As MTCR membership has expanded, it has changed from an organization of countries concerned about missile proliferation to one that includes also countries whose adherence is brought by a combination of carrot and stick, and where nonproliferation has to be seen to pay better than proliferation. 26 Countries producing missile technology may wish to become formal MTCR members or at least adhere to the guidelines. But for them, the ability to sell to the increasing number of members and avoid pressure from the US will have to balanced against the desire to continue to make money through non-MTCR compliant exports. MTCR expansion may be counter-productive, eroding MTCR's credibility (especially in the absence of sanctions) and internal consensus, but excluding potential suppliers of missile technology is seen as likely to increase the risk of proliferation. Sources of Technology In the 1980s, missile technology was readily available on the world market for those with enough money and no sanctions. It was estimated that a third world country could develop an SRBM capability in 10 years, six years with outside participation. 27 Iraq's Scud production capability was apparently developed in five years. 28 Iraq was able to go from a zero level of technology and manufacturing capability to being able to produce some Scud type TBMs and producing parts of the multi-stage Al Tammouz SLV, flight tested in 1989. 29 This design was to contribute to the multi-stage Al Aabed IRBM that was projected to have been operational in the mid-1990s were it not for the Gulf War. 30 Today, such transfers of technology are less likely. But the knowledge of missile design and fabrication is "out there" in the form of reports on the shelves of US university libraries or know-how in the brains of unemployed former Soviet engineers. 31 General Bernard Schriever, USAF (rtd), father of the US ICBM program, characterized the design of ICBMs by potential threats as an "engineering exercise, not a research problem"; such countries know what the solution is and can re-create it independently. 32 For example, open source literature ("Most, if not all, of the technology [developed by the US 1945-58] has been published in the open literature") 33 includes details of ICBM-suitable RV heat shielding technology. 34 Space launch requirements will push missile technology increasingly into the forefront of international commerce. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty states that all countries have a right to use space much as they use the high seas and may conflict with MTCR goals. 35 In the near future, increased reliance on space assets for the daily business of communications will provide a continue impetus for access to space, which means access to the space launch vehicle (SLV) technology that is inherently dual use. 36 While It is unlikely that every country that has a money-losing airline for prestige reasons will want a money-losing SLV capability to go with it, in the future, there will likely be more developing countries looking to make money from space (as Tonga recently has tried with geosynchronous satellite allocations). More lawyers may wave the Outer Space treaty. There will be greater need for SLV capability and greater commercial motivation for countries to acquire it. This will feed increased competition between the providers. While MTCR will aim to limit changes in ownership outside of members, SLV technology will likely proliferate, despite the current efforts, because it is inherent in the right to use space. 37 Missile and SLV technology in its many forms will move in international commerce and suppliers wish to avoid the financial and diplomatic costs of restraining trade. 38 Any specific item may be kept secure, but not a whole class of technologies. Other dual-use technologies are likely to be available to future threats on the world market. New low-cost inertial guidance technologies are widely available from the US. 39 Computing resources and engineering knowledge are part of the stream of world commerce. Even a well-enforced MTCR could not reach them all. SLV to ICBM Access to missile technology - through direct proliferation or modification of space technology--makes possible new threats to the United States. Those unable to acquire a nuclear warhead could still acquire at least a terrorist countervalue capability through use of biological or radiological agents. The conversion of an SLV to an ICBM capable of striking the United States has been described as requiring a "modest" effort. 40 A Department of State report asserted "the technology, equipment and facilities used to build SLVs are essentially identical to those required for military ballistic missiles". 41 The trends of space launch being integrated into the world economy and few export controls on dual use technologies suggests that future non-ICBM powers could create such a capability from a baseline of today's TBM technology. 42 SLVs have not yet led to new ICBMs, though with Brazil and Russia both MTCR members, the transfer of converted road-mobile SS-25 ICBMs as SLVs may yet take place, (the US has stressed that inter-member transfer of technology is still subject to review on a case-by-case basis). 43 Even in that case, an RV would have to be added and guidance modified before being used as an ICBM. 44 Without flight tests--readily observable--even the most reckless aggressor may be unwilling to attempt blackmail backed by such a home-brewed ICBM. The cost--both in terms of cost and international pressure--of creating an ICBM through adding SLV technology to the current baseline of TBM technology would be high. Most countries have no need for a capability to strike at another continent. While the know-how to do so is likely to be available even under MTCR, these factors are likely to severely limit the desire to use SLV technology to create ICBMs. 45 According to the well-known 1995 NIE 95-19 "Emerging Missile Threats to North America Within the Next 15 Years", countries with an SLV capability could build ICBMs "within five years. 46 Yet this NIE had as a key assumption that Russia would not egregiously violate MTCR to enable such conversions. In the words of Richard Speier "the Russian behavior I have described blows the NIE's assumptions to smithereens". 47 Other implicit assumptions of that NIE--that no other country currently with an ICBM or SLV capability would transfer it--led to stormy public debate. 48 It has been estimated that, whether based on an indigenous ICBM or a modified SLV, only Brazil, India, Italy, Israel, Japan, Germany and Sweden could have the capability within the next 10 years; the RSA, ROK, and Taiwan in over 10 years. 49 Another report in 1991 identified India, Israel and possibly Taiwan as in the advanced capability, able to produce ICBMs using 1960s technology. 50 Yet another report placed Israel, India, Taiwan, ROK, Brazil and possibly DPRK and RSA as being able to enter this category within 10 years in 1993, 51 while elsewhere the DPRK has been grouped with Iran, Iraq, and Libya as having the motivation to acquire ICBM but not the capability. 52 Conclusion Evidence of the willingness of Russia, China, North Korea and others to proliferate and the US decisions, going back to 1993, not to enforce sanctions suggests that the nonproliferation victories won since the 1980s may be tactical and transient. 53 Most of the technologies that are proliferating--to North Korea, Iran, or Iraq--reflect those of the 1950s. While these may yield threats in the Scud or No Dong class, this does not translate to an ICBM capability. This has been termed the "Scud Barrier" to ICBM development. Some believe that current nonproliferation efforts have ensured it will be strong and lasting. 54 Others have identified this barrier as one reason why land attack cruise missiles may prove to be the weapon of choice. 55 The consensus on nonproliferation is weaker on these technologies than those associated with ballistic missiles. 56 SLV technology and expertise may well provide a potential way around this "Scud barrier" even if the reluctance to impose sanctions does not encourage more direct proliferation. The need for space launch capability in the world economy limits the potential effectiveness of more stringent nonproliferation agreements proposed as follow-ons to MTCR. 57 MTCR members--including the US--wish to expand exports and are reluctant to impose sanctions; though in the case of clear violations, such as flight testing an SLV turned ICBM, there is likely to be stronger action. Then it may be too late. While the "Scud barrier" can still have value a decade in the future, the SLV technologies that could provide the basis for future ICBMs may have the potential to make such barriers less relevant. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. David Isby is a Senior Staff Member, SPARTA Incorporated. Conducts policy analysis and management dealing with national security, foreign policy, and DoD missile defense issues (ABM Treaty); provided input to U.S. Government negotiations (bilateral talks with Russia). Director of the Committee for a Free Afghanistan, a bipartisan educational and charitable organization. 2. There have been no publicly identified new users of former Soviet Scuds outside the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War. Armenia has been the only new user, though the covert nature of the transfer - reminiscent of the covert transfers of SS-23 TBMs to the former East Germany, the former Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in the late 1980s - has raised concerns. 3. "If we had possessed a deterrent - missiles that could reach New York - we would have hit it at the same moment". 4. Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, Oxford, 1996, SIPRI/OUP, P. 154. 5. A recent summary of the effects of these events is: William C. Potter, "The Case Russia Forgot", The New York Times, 3 April, 1998, p. A28. Steven Erlanger, "US Telling Russia to Bar Aid to Iran By Arms Experts", The New York Times, 22 August, 1997, pp. A1, A10. James Hackett, "Moscow's Man in Tehran", The Washington Times, 8 April, 1998, p. A15. 6. For a summary see: Richard H. Speier, testimony before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 5 June, 1997. 7. Richard Larder, "Despite Proliferation Concerns, Report Avoids Harsh Criticism of China", Inside Missile Defense, 17 April, 1996, pp. 1-2. "Search for Common Ground", Arms Control Today, September, 1996, p. 15. 8. Victor Zaborsky, "US Missile Nonproliferation Strategy Toward the NIS and China: How Effective?", The Nonproliferation Review, Fall, 1997, p. 92. 9. Ann Roosevelt, "United States - China Agree on Nonproliferation Issues", BMD Monitor, 14 November, 1997, p. 376. Michael Eisenstadt, "US Policy and Chinese Proliferation to Iran: A Small Leap Forward?", Policywatch, n. 273, 31 October, 1991, pp. 1-2. 10. "Ghauri `Proof' of Sino-Pakistan Collaboration", The Pioneer (Delhi), 7 April, 1998, FBIS-TAC-98-097. "Delhi Claims Ghauri Missile Developed by China", All India Radio, 7 April, 1998, FBIS-NES-98-097. "China: Spokesman Denies Role in Pakistan Missile Test", Hong Kong AFP in English, 7 April, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-097. "Ghauri Missile Not Indigenous", All India Radio, 7 April, 1998, FBIS-NES-98-097. 11. Roshan Zamir, "Unexpected Mild US Reaction on Test", The Nation (Lahore), Internet edn., 8 April, 1998. Dinesh Kumar, "Indian Expert: Implications of Ghauri Test", The Times of India, 7 April, 1998, p. 9, FBIS-TAC-98-097. 12. Barbara Starr "Taepo Dong Set for Delays", Jane's Defense Weekly, 11 December, 1996, p. 10. Wyn Bowen, Tim McCarthy, & Holly Porteous, "Ballistic Missile Shadow Lengthens", IDR Extra, February, 1997, pp. 3-5. 13. "Swiss Blocks N. Korea, China Scud Missile Sales to Egypt", AFP Bern report, 7 April, 1998. 14. Barbara Starr, "CIA Discloses Source of Egyptian `Scud-B' Parts, Jane's Defense Weekly, 9 July, 1997, p. 5. 15. Wyn Q. Bowen, "U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The MTCR's First Decade (1987-1997)", The Nonproliferation Review, Fall, 1997, p. 34. 16. Examples of the reluctance to impose sanctions despite MTCR violation by two different administrations include: Theresa Foley, "Bush, Clinton, Blink at Secret Purchase of Zenit Engines", Space News, 1 November, 1993, p. 17. Elaine Sciolino, "US Lifts Its Sanctions on China Over High-Technology Transfers, The New York Times, 22 February, 1992, p. A1. David Hoffman and R. Jeffrey Smith, "President Waives Sanctions for Israel", The Washington Post, 27 October, 1991, p. A1. 17. Alexander A. Pikayev, Leonard S. Spector, Elina V. Kirichenko, Ryan Gibson, Russia, the US, and the Missile Technology Control Regime, Adelphi Paper 317, London, 1998, IISS, p. 8. 18. These are the top three recommended policies in: Henry Sokolski, "Faking it and Making It", The National Interest, Spring, 1998, pp. 72-73. 19. Henry Sokolski, "Next Century NonProliferation: Victory is Still Possible," The Non Proliferation Review, Fall, 1996, p. 91. 20. Wyn Q. Bowen, "U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The MTCR's First Decade (1987-1997)," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall, 1997, p. 30 21. Bowen, NPR, p. 31. 22. Sokolski, NPR, p. 93. Anne Eisele, "Congress: Clinton Lax on Proliferation", Space News, 22 September, 1997, pp. 4, 20. 23. Jeff Gerth with Raymond Bonner, "Companies Are Investigated For Aid to China on Rockets", The New York Times, 4 April, 1998, pp. A1, A3. 24. Robert Johnston, "U.S. Export Control Policy in the High Performance Computer Sector", The Nonproliferation Review, Winter, 1998, p.56. 25. Johnson, p. 56 26. One example of this is Ukraine. Even pro-MTCR writers stress that financial incentives are the key determinant. Gary Bertsch and Victor Zaborsky, "Bringing Ukraine Into the MTCR: Can US Policy Succeed?", Arms Control Today, April, 1997, pp. 9-14. 27. Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) Infrastructure Requirements for Third World Countries. Report prepared for the CIA. Arnold Engineering Development Center, September, 1991, AEDC-1040S-04-91 p. 13. 28. Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power. Ballistic Missiles In the Third World, Washington, 1991, Brookings , p.38 29. Martin Navais, Going Ballistic. The Build-Up of Missiles In The Middle East, London, 1993, Brassey's, p. 13. 30. Ballistic Missile Proliferation. An Emerging Threat. Report prepared for BMDO, 1992, Washington, SPC, p. 14. 31. There are many sources on the migration of knowledge and technologies from the superpowers, the developed countries, to their current worldwide state. These include: Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, Committee on Government Affairs, US Senate, Hearings on "Missile Proliferation in the Information Age", 22 September, 1997. Prepared statements by Senator Thad Cochran, Dr. Seth Carus, Dr. William Graham, Gen. Bernard Schriever. Dr. David Tanks, ed., Exploring US Missile Defense Requirements in 2010, Philadelphia, 1997, pp. 1-2, 3. 32. Statement by General Schriever, 1994 33. AEDC, p.13 34. Proliferation Study Team (LTG William Odom, USA (rtd) chair), The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, February, 1993. , p. 12 35. Barry J. Hurewitz, "Non-Proliferation and Free Access to Outer Space; the Dual-Use Conflict Between the Outer Space Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime", High Technology Law Review, v. 9, n. 2, 1994, p. 213. 36. CPT Michael Gallegher, "Legal Aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative", Military Law Review, v. 111, Winter, 1986, p. 42. 37. "Missile Programs Masked as Space Launch Efforts Seen As Problem", Aerospace Daily, 24 September, 1997, p. 1. 38. Leitner, pp. 161-184, explains the decision-making that led to this for other, non-MTCR technologies post Cold War, 39. Aaron Karp, "The New Politics of Missile Proliferation", Arms Control Today, October, 1996, p. 12. "Fiber Optic Gyros Now Challenging Laser Gyros", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 July, 1996, p. 62. 40. Odom, p.1 41. Department of State, Annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, February, 1993, p.8 42. On technology transfer in the wake of the end of the Cold War, see: Peter M. Leitner, Decontrolling Strategic Technology, 1990-92, 1995, Lanham, 1995, University Press of America, pp. 37-60. 43. Wyn Bowen and Andrew Koch, "Non Proliferation Is Embraced by Brazil", Jane's Intelligence Review, June, 1996, p, 287. 44. Inside the Pentagon, 29 June, 1995, p. 29. 45. Bowen, NPR, p. 31 46. Quoted in The Washington Times, 29 February, 1996, p. A12. 47. Speier, 5 June 97 testimony, prepared statement. 48. Wyn Q. Bowen. NPR, pp. 21-2. 49. Odom, p. 22. 50. Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and its Control. Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control, November, 1991, p. 153. 51. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Assessing the Risks. Report Prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August, 1993, p. 213. 52. OTA, p. 235. 53. Sokolski, The National Interest, generally presents a short and blunt summary of failures in implementing non-proliferation policy goals. 54. Karp, ACT, p. 11 55. See generally, K. Scott McMahon and Dennis Gormley, Controlling the Spread of Land Attack Cruise Missiles, Marina del Rey, 1995, American Institute for Strategic Cooperation. 56. McMahon & Gormley, p. 82. 57. Richard H. Speier , "A Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty for Missiles", in Henry Sokolski, ed., Fighting Proliferation, Maxwell AFB, 1996, Air University Press, pp. 65-68


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