FAS Note: The text of the following directive, promulgated in this form in 1994, has been modified by a later revision, dated 2 July 1998, which may be viewed here.

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 1/14

PREFACE TO REVISED DCID 1/14:

DCID 1/14, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on 22 January 1992.

Portions of DCID 1/14 have been revised and a new annex added. A complete copy of DCID 1/14 consists of the basic DCID and Annexes A through D. The annexes are as follows:

Note: On 12 August 1994, the DCI also approved amending Section 10, Periodic Reinvestigations, of DCID 1/14 to eliminate the requirement for technical fingerprint checks as part of the national agency check, if technical fingerprint checks were previously submitted during the initial background investigation.

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 1/14 1

PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND
PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR
ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED
INFORMATION (SCI)

(Effective 22 January 1992)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, the following personnel security standards, procedures, and continuing security programs are hereby established for all US Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, and other individuals who require access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI). Individual departments and agencies may establish such additional security steps as may be deemed necessary and appropriate to resolve issues and/or address employment standards unique to them to ensure that effective security is maintained.

1. Definitions

2. Purpose

The purpose of this directive is to enhance the security protection of SCI through the application of personnel security standards, procedures, and continuing security programs and to facilitate the security certification process among government departments and agencies.

3. Applicability

The provisions of this directive will apply to all persons (other than elected officials of the US Government, Federal judges, and those individuals for whom the Director of Central Intelligence [DCI] makes a specific exception) without regard to a civilian or military status, form of employment, official rank or position, or length of service. This directive does not apply to situations involving the duly authorized disclosure of SCI to representatives of foreign governments and international organizations.

4. General

5. Personnel Security Standards

Criteria for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know basis for access to SCI follow:

6. Exceptions to Personnel Security Standards

Exceptions to paragraph 5.e. and d. above may be granted only by the SOIC of the appropriate organization or his/her designee unless such authority has been specifically delegated to the head of an office or organization as set forth in interdepartmental agreements. All exceptions granted will be common sense determinations based on all available information that the risk to national security is negligible and will be recorded by the organization making the exception. In those eases in which the individual has lived outside of the United States for a substantial period of his or her life, a thorough assessment of the adequacy of the investigation in terms of fulfillment of the investigative requirements and judicious review of the information therein must be made before an exception is considered.

7. Investigative Requirements

8. Standards for the Investigation

a. Scope--Past 10 years or to age 18, whichever is less.

b. Expansion of Investigation--When conditions indicate, and to the extent necessary to permit a determination by the adjudicating agency that the provisions of the SCI personnel security standards are met, the investigation may be expanded to resolve issues and/or address employment standards unique to individual agencies.

c. National Agency Check--Check on subject and spouse/cohabitant of investigative and criminal history files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including submission of subjects fingerprint charts, and such other national agencies (Defense Central Index of Investigations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of PersonnelManagement, Central Intelligence Agency etc.) as appropriate to the individual's background.

d. Subject Interview--A subject interview will be required in all cases and will be conducted by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel to ensure full investigative coverage. An additional personal interview will be conducted when necessary to resolve any significant adverse information and/or inconsistencies developed during the investigation. In departments or agencies with policies sanctioning the use of the polygraph for personnel security purposes, the personal interview may include a polygraph examination conducted by a qualified polygraph examiner.

e. Birth--Independent certification of date and place of birth received directly from appropriate registration authority.

f. Citizenship--Independent verification of citizenship will be accomplished directly from appropriate registration authority. For foreign-born immediate family members, verification of citizenship or legal status is also required.

g. Education--Independent verification of the most recent or significant claimed attendance at an educational institution and/or degree/diploma within the past 10 years will be accomplished via sealed transcript received directly from the institution. If all education is outside of the investigative scope, the last education above high school will be verified.

h. Employment--Direct verification of all periods of employment during the past 10 years or since age 18, whichever is the shorter period, but in any event the most recent two years. Personal interviews with two sources (supervisor/coworker) for each employment of six months or more shall be attempted. In the event no employment exceeds six months, interviews of supervisor/coworker shall be attempted. The investigation conducted on an individual under consideration for access to SCI will be thorough and designed to develop information as to whether the individual clearly meets the SCI personnel security standards.

i. References--Interviews with a sufficient number of knowledgeable sources (a minimum of one listed and three developed) having, to the extent practical, social knowledge of the subject and collectively span the 10 years or scope of the investigation. As appropriate, additional interviews may include cohabitant, ex-spouse(s), and relatives. Interviews with psychological/medical personnel are to be accomplished as required to resolve issues.

j. Neighborhood--Interviews with neighbors in the vicinity of all of subject's residences in excess of six months throughout the most recent five-year period. Confirmation of current residence will be accomplished regardless of length, to include a review of rental records if necessary. In the event no residence exceeds six months, interviews of neighbors should be undertaken.

k. Credit--Verification of the subject's financial status and credit habits through checks of appropriate credit and/or financial institutions where subject has resided, been employed, or attended school for six months or more for the last seven years.

1. Local Agency Checks--A check of appropriate police records covering all locations where the subject has resided, been employed, or attended school for six months or more, to the most recent 10 years or since age 18, whichever is the shorter period. In the event that no residence, employment, or education exceeds six months, local agency checks should be performed.

m. Public Records--All prior Federal/military service and type of discharge(s) shall be verified. Verification of divorce(s), bankruptcy, etc., and any other court (civil or criminal) actions to which the subject has been or is a party within the scope of the investigation, when known or developed.

n. Overseas Verification Procedure--Where employment, education, or residence has occurred in foreign countries (except for periods of less than one year for personnel on US Government assignment and less than 90 days for other purposes) during the past 10 years or since age 18, a cheek of the records will be made at the Department of State and/or other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop sources, generally in the United States, who knew the subject overseas in order to cover significant employment, education, or residence and to attempt to determine if any lasting foreign contacts or connections were established during this period. However, in all cases where the subject has worked or lived outside the US continuously for over one year, the investigation will be expanded to cover fully this period in his or her life through the use of such investigative assets and checks of record sources as may be available to the US Government in the foreign country(ies) in which the subject resided.

o. Transferability--Paragraph 7e. above outlines transferability requirements.

9. Exception to Investigative Requirements

10. Periodic Reinvestigations

11. Outside Activities

Individuals who hold, or are being considered for, SCI access approval will have made available to them for reading, the second and third paragraphs of the "Outside Activities" section of Annex A of this directive and will be instructed to report in writing to their security officer any existing or contemplated outside employment or activity that appears to meet the criteria of those paragraphs. Written reports must be submitted before accepting any outside employment or participating in any activity as defined in Annex A of this directive. In addition, initial or updated personal history statements must include details of outside employment or activities (as defined in Annex A). Investigation must cover the reported outside employment or activities. Information concerning actual or planned outside employment or activities that would create a potential risk to the security of SCI will be evaluated in accordance with the factors specified in Annex A to determine whether the circumstances create an unacceptable risk of unauthorized disclosure.

12. Determinations of Access Eligibility

The evaluation the information developed by investigation of an individual's loyalty and suitability will be accomplished under the cognizance of the SOIC concerned by analysts of broad knowledge, good judgment, and wide experience in personnel security and/or counterintelligence information developed on an individual is favorable , a minor investigative requirement that has not should not preclude favorable adjudication [sic]. In all evaluations, the protection of the national interest is paramount. Any doubt concerning personnel having access to SCI should be resolved in favor of the national security, and the access should be denied or revoked. The ultimate determination of whether the granting of access is clearly consistent with the interest of national security will be an overall commonsense determination based on all available information.

13. Appeals Procedures

Annex B prescribes common appeals procedures to be followed when an individual's SCI access has been denied or revoked.

14. Continuing Security Programs

15. Implementation

Existing directives, regulations, agreements, and other guidance governing access to SCI as defined herein will be revised accordingly.

DCID 1/14
ANNEX A

Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for
Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)

(Effective 12 August 1994)

PURPOSE

The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all U.S. government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors and other individuals who require access to SCI. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to SCI and are to be used by government departments and agencies in all final SCI access determinations.

ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS

The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is an acceptable security risk. Eligibility for access to SCI is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudication process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept. All available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:

Each case must be judged on its own merits and final determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or agency. Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to SCI will be resolved in favor of the national security and considered final.

The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of SCI access eligibility is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall common sense determination based upon careful consideration of the following:

Each of the foregoing should be evaluated in the context of the whole person. Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally unstable behavior. However, notwithstanding the whole person concept, pursuit of further investigation may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse information on.

When information of security concern becomes known about an individual who is currently eligible for access to SCI, the adjudicator should consider whether the person: (1) voluntarily reported the information; (2) sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where appropriate; (3) resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern; (4) has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment; (5) should have his or her SCI access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information.

If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of SCI access, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.

The information in bold print at the beginning of each adjudicative guideline provides a brief explanation of its relevance in determining whether it is clearly consistent with the interest of national security to grant or continue a person's eligibility for access to SCI.

ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES

A. ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES

An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.

Conditions that signal security concern and may be disqualifying include: (1) involvement in any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition, or other act whose aim is to overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of government by unconstitutional means; (2) association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts; (3) association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or subdivision, by force or violence or by other unconstitutional means; (4) involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) the individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these; (2) the individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of such an organization; (3) involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest; (4) the person has had no recent proscribed involvement or association with such activities.

B. FOREIGN INFLUENCE

A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants, and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are: (1) not citizens of the United States or (2) may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.

Conditions that signal security concern and may be disqualifying include: (1) an immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country; (2) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists; (3) relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government; (4) failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals; (5) unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of a foreign intelligence service; (6) conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government; (7) indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure; (8) a substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign influence.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) a determination that the immediate family member(s), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question would not constitute an unacceptable security risk; (2) contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official U.S. Government business; (3) contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent; (4) the individual has promptly reported to proper authorities all contacts, requests, or threats from persons or organizations from a foreign country, as required; (5) foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual's security responsibilities.

C. FOREIGN PREFERENCE

When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate [less than complete loyalty to the United States or] a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.

Conditions that signal security concern and may be disqualifying include: (1) the exercise of dual citizenship; (2) possession and/or use of a foreign passport; (3) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country; (4) accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country; (5) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements; (6) using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in the country; (7) seeking or holding political office in the foreign country; (8) voting in foreign elections; and (9) acting as an agent or representative of a foreign country.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a country; (2) indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship; (3) activity is sanctioned by the United States; (4) individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.

D. SEXUAL BEHAVIOR

Sexual behavior is a security concern if it involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder, subjects the individual to undue influence or coercion, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. *

Conditions that signal security concern and may be disqualifying include: (1) sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted; (2) compulsive or addictive sexual when the person is unable to stop a pattern of self-destructive or high-risk behavior or that which is symptomatic of a personality disorder; (3) sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to undue influence or coercion; (4) sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which lack of discretion or judgment [sic].

Conditions.that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) the behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature; (2) the behavior was not and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature; (3) there is no other evidence of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotional instability; (4) the behavior no longer serves as a basis for undue influence or coercion.

E. PERSONAL CONDUCT

Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified information.

The following will normally result in an unfavorable SCI access action or administrative termination of further processing for access eligibility: (1) Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security processing, including medical and psychological testing; or (2) refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials or other official representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.

Conditions that signal security concern and may be disqualifying also include: (1) reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates, employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other acquaintances; (2) the deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine SCI access eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; (3) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other official representative in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination; (4) personal conduct or concealment of information that increases an individual's vulnerability to coercion, exploitation or pressure; (5) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations*; (6) association with persons involved in criminal activity.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (I ) the information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;(2) the falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and the individual has subsequently provided correct information voluntarily; (3) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the falsification before being confronted with the facts; (4) omission of material facts was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel,and the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided; (5) the individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or pressure; (6) a refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel or over officials that the individual was not required to comply with security processing requirements and, upon being made aware of the requirement, fully and truthfully provided the requested information; (7) association with persons involved in criminal activities has ceased.

F. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.

Conditions that signal security concern and may be disqualifying include: (1) a history of not meeting financial obligations; (2) deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust; (3) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts; (4) unexplained affluence; (5) financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse, alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) the behavior was not recent; (2) it was an isolated incident; (3) the conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation); (4) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control; (5) the affluence resulted from a legal source; and (6) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.

G. ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION

Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to carelessness.

Conditions that signal security concern and may be disqualifying include: (1) alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use; (2) alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job; (3) diagnosis by a credential medical professional* of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence; (4) habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment; (5) consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism by a credentialed medical professional* and following completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) the alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern; (2) the problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no indication of a recent problem; (3) positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety; (4) following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participates frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organization, abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 12 months, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional.*

H. DRUG INVOLVEMENT

Improper or illegal involvement with drugs, raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering: (a) drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens) and (b) inhalants and other similar substances. Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.

Conditions that signal security concern and may be disqualifying include: (1) any drug abuse (see above definition); (2) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; (3) failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a credentialed medical professional. Current drug involvement, especially following the granting of SCI access, or an expressed intent not to discontinue use, will normally result in an unfavorable determination.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) the drug involvement was not recent; (2) the drug involvement was an isolated or infrequent event; (3) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future; (4) satisfactory completion of a drug treatment program prescribed by a crcdentialed medical professional.*

I. EMOTIONAL, MENTAL, AND PERSONALITY DISORDERS

Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social and occupational functioning. These disorders are of security concern because they may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability or stability.

When appropriate, a credentialed mental health professional*, acceptable to or approved by the government, should be consulted so that potentially disqualifying and mitigating information may be fully and properly evaluated.

Conditions that signal security concern and may be disqualifying include: (1) a diagnosis by a credentialed mental health professional* that the individual has a disorder that could result in a defect in psychological, social, or occupational functioning; (2) information that suggests that an individual has failed to follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a diagnosed disorder, e.g. failure to take prescribed medication; (3) a pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, antisocial or emotionally unstable behavior; (4) information that suggests that the individual's current behavior indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) there is no indication of a current problem; (2) recent diagnosis by a credentialed mental health professional* that an individual's previous emotional, mental, or personality disorder is cured or in remission and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation; (3) the past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.

J. CRIMINAL CONDUCT

A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.

Conditions that signal security concern and may be disqualifying include: (1) any criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged; (2) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) the criminal behavior was not recent; (2) the crime was an isolated incident; (3) the person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in that person's life; (4) the person did not voluntarily commit the act and/or the factors leading to the violation are not likely to recur, (5) there is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.

K. SECURITY VIOLATIONS

Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual's ability to safeguard classified information.

Conditions that signal security concern and may be disqualifying include: (1) unauthorized disclosure of classified information; (2) violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to negligence.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include actions that: (1) were inadvertent; (2) were isolated or infrequent; (3) were due to improper or inadequate training; (4) demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of security responsibilities.

L. OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES

Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

Conditions that signal security concern and may be disqualifying include any service, compensated or volunteer, or employment with: (1) a foreign country; (2) any foreign national; (3) a representative of any foreign interest; (4) any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities; (2) the individual terminates the employment or discontinues the activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her security responsibilities.

DCID 1/14
ANNEX B

APPEALS

(Effective 14 April 1994)

POLICY

This annex establishes common appeals procedures for the denial or revocation of access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI) by entities of the Intelligence Community after adjudication pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14. This annex is promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 12333, Executive Order 12356, and Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947. For the purposes of this annex, all references to DCID 1/14 include the basic document and all of its annexes. Any individual who has been considered for initial or continued access to SCI pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14 shall, to the extent provided below, be afforded an opportunity to appeal the denial or revocation of such access. This annex supersedes any and all other practices and procedures for the appeal of the denial or revocation of SCI access. This annex will not be construed to require the disclosure of classified information or information concerning intelligence sources and methods, nor will it be construed to afford an opportunity to appeal before the actual denial or revocation of SCI access. In addition, the provisions of DCID 1/14, or any other document or provision of law, will not be construed to create a property interest of any kind in the access of any individual to SCI. Further, since the denial or revocation of access to SCI cannot by the terms of DCID 1/14 render an individual ineligible for access to other classified information solely for that reason, the denial or revocation of SCI access pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14 will not beconstrued to create a liberty interest of any kind.

APPLICABILITY

This annex applies to all United States Government civilian and military personnel, as well as any other individuals, including contractors and employees of contractors, who are considered for initial or continued access to SCI. This annex does not apply to decisions regarding employment and will not be construed to affect or impair Public Law 88-290 or the authority of any entity to effect applicant or personnel actions pursuant to Public Law 88-290, Public Law 86-36, or other applicable law.

SCI ACCESS DETERMINATION AUTHORITY

Adjudications for access to SCI will be made in accordance with DCID 1/14 by a Determination Authority designated by the Senior Official of the Intelligence Community (SOIC) of each entity. Access to SCI shall be denied or revoked whenever it is determined that a person does not meet the security standards provided for in DCID 1/14.

PROCEDURES

DCID 1/14
ANNEX C

STANDARDS FOR SCI SECURITY AWARENESS
PROGRAMS IN THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

(Effective 22 January 1992)

Consistent with controls and procedures set forth in DCID 1/19 and its supplement, DCI Security Policy Manual for SCI Control Systems, standards are hereby established for the SCI security education programs designed to enhance the security awareness of the US Government civilian and military personnel and private contractors working in the US Intelligence Community. Compliance with these standards is required for all departments/agencies within the Intelligence Community. Existing security awareness programs will be modified to conform with these standards. Departments/agencies will establish a documented program to ensure that training has been presented to all personnel.

All individuals nominated for or holding SCI access approval will be notified initially and annually thereafter of their responsibility to report to their cognizant security officers any outside employment or activities (described in DCID 1/14, Annex A) that could conflict with their duty to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure. Any other outside employment or activities that could create real or apparent conflicts with their responsibility to protect classified information also must be reported. Individuals granted SCI access approvals will be advised:

The security awareness requirements set forth herein are divided into three phases. Phase I concerns the initial indoctrination of individuals, which is normally administered before access to SCI. Phase 2 concerns the continuing security awareness program required to maintain an increased security awareness throughout the period of access. Phase 3 sets forth the final guidelines and instructions when access to SCI is terminated.

1. Initial Indoctrination--As soon as practicable after being approved for access to SCI, personnel will receive an initial security indoctrination that will include:

2. Periodic Awareness--Enhancement Each department/agency will establish a continuing security awareness program that will provide for frequent exposure of personnel to security awareness material. Implementation of a continuing program may include live briefings, audiovisual presentations (e.g., video tapes, films, and slide/tape programs), printed material (e.g., posters, memorandums, pamphlets, fliers), or a combination thereof. It is essential that current information and materials be utilized. Programs should be designed to meet the particular needs of the department/agency.

3. Debriefing--When a department/agency has determined that access to SCI is no longer required, final instructions and guidelines will be provided to the individual. As a minimum these will [include]:

DCID 1/14
ANNEX D

QUALITY CONTROL GUIDELINES
FOR THE
SINGLE SCOPE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION

(Effective 12 August 1994)

GUIDELINES

In accordance with the requirements of DCI Directive 1/14 and National Security Directive 63, this document sets out guidelines to maintain quality standards for the Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI). These guidelines assume the adjudicator's perspective because the adjudicator is the ultimate customer for the SSBI. The guidelines are divided into:

DEFINITION OF QUALITY

A quality investigation is a thorough and comprehensive collection of favorable and unfavorable information from a variety of sources, past and present, that may include employment(s), reference(s), neighborhood(s), credit, police, and the subject. A quality investigative report should provide an adjudicator with a complete set of variables from which she/he can carefully weigh the whole person in determining a person's fitness for access to classified information.

The investigation may include record sources and interviews with the subject of the investigation, supervisors, coworkers, social acquaintances, and neighbors.

CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEW

The quality of the investigation depends on the investigator's ability to elicit information from a source knowledgeable about the subject. This is basic to the conduct of any interview. The investigator should plan and execute each interview so as to obtain the maximum amount of information from a source. Available sources should be selected from each area of coverage to ensure that pertinent information about the subject's entire background is developed.

The investigator should conduct the interview in person and find a suitable location that protects privacy. Telephonic interviews are strongly discouraged; however, occasionally circumstances may dictate that the interviews be conducted by telephone. If a telephonic interview is necessary, the report should always state why the interview was not conducted in person.

The investigator should initially advise the source of the reason/purpose for the investigation and should attempt to establish a degree of confidence in the source(s) that will promote a high level of rapport and cooperation.

The investigator should also advise the source about the Privacy Act of 1974, before completing the interview, since the source needs to understand that the subject of the investigation has the right to review information provided by a source and has the right to know a sources identity, unless the source requests confidentiality.

COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (COVERAGE)

1. FOR ALL SOURCES

Investigators should establish the source's duration and nature of association with the subject, thereby establishing the knowledgability of the source. The investigator should always secure the source's full name and any other appropriate identifying data, particularly in the case of a source with a common name. All derogatory or noteworthy information concerning the subject of the investigation that is provided by a source should be fully explored in the interview, including elicitation of the names of any corroborating sources or record information that will substantiate any derogatory testimony provided by the source.

For all sources, the report should indicate what issue areas were covered and whether the information provided was favorable or unfavorable.

2. FOR REFERENCES AND NEIGHBORS

Depending on the source's degree of association, investigators should ask each reference or neighbor relevant information regarding the subjects:

If a subject has had access to classified information and a source is in a position to know, the investigator should ask whether the subject properly handles classified information or has ever had a security violation. Finally, the investigator should ask if the source can recommend the subject for a position of trust and responsibility with the US Government or, in the case of a contractor, can the subject be trusted with classified information. The investigator should conclude the interview by asking the source to provide names of additional references.

3. FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

If a source provides noteworthy or derogatory information to questions in any of the above areas of consideration, the investigator should ask follow-up questions as necessary to elicit all available information. The investigator should report as fully as possible:

If the subject has ended the questionable conduct, the investigator should attempt to determine the motivation for positive change. The investigator should also attempt to establish whether there may be personal animosity or bias towards the subject on the part of the source(s). The investigator should supply any available documentary evidence relating to the conduct in addition to the report of the source.

4. FOR EMPLOYMENT REFERENCES

The investigator should identify and interview the best source(s) available. These employment references should include, but are not limited to, the subject's immediate supervisor, coworker(s), and other persons with ftequent professional contact. Where appropriate, the investigator should pursue the same line of inquiry as with references and neighbors. In particular, the investigator should inquire regarding:

The investigator should provide any available documentary evidence to support the report of the source(s).

5. FOR SUBJECT INTERVIEW

The subject is the best source of information about himself/herself. Hence, the investigator should explore with the subject the same line of inquiry she/he pursues with a reference, neighborhood, and employment source(s). The investigator should obtain the subject's version of the details surrounding all issues arising either in the course of the interview or in other parts of the investigation that have been completed by the time of the subject interview and report them completely. The investigator should inquire:

Of particular value to the adjudicator is evidence that the subject is being contradictory or dissembling. If the subject claims to have ended the conduct, the investigator should attempt to determine the motivation for positive change. The investigator should report only the facts.

QUALITY CONTROL ACTIVITIES

Quality control activities are designed to ensure adjudicators that a high quality investigation and report has been provided to them. The following management tools for investigative agencies are included but not limited to ensure quality investigations.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency (hardcopy)
Classification: Unclassified
MORI Document ID Number: 123836
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