Russia's Crumbling Tactical Nuclear WeaponsComplex:

An Opportunity for Arms Control

Stephen P. Lambert


David A. Miller

INSS Occasional Paper 12

Regional Series

April 1997

USAF Institute for National Security Studies

US Air Force Academy, Colorado

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors anddo not necessarily reflect the official policy or position ofthe Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense orthe US Government. This report is approved for public releaseby SAF/PAS; distribution is unlimited.



Stephen R. Lambert is an instructor of military arts and sciencesat the US Air Force Academy. A pilot and 1990 graduate of theAcademy, he has flown the KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft. Captain Lambertwas a distinguished graduate of the Naval Postgraduate Schoolin 1996 with an MS in national security affairs and West Europeanarea studies.

David A. Miller also teaches military arts and sciences atthe US Air Force Academy. He graduated from USAFA in 1987, andis a senior pilot with flying experience in the T-38 and C-130.In 1996 Captain Miller graduated with distinction from the NavalPostgraduate School, earning an MS in national security affairsand West European area studies.


This paper is the result of research conducted under the auspicesof an INSS research grant during 1996.


Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwardedto:

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Foreword vii

Executive Summary ix

Introduction 1

A View From the West 3

Current Nuclear Policies 3

Nuclear Disarmament Efforts 4

The View Toward Russia 5

Physical and Technical Security 7

Pre-Delegation and De-Escalation 9

Nuclear Dependency in Conventional Contingencies 10

Stockpile Consolidation and Stewardship Efforts 12

Demoralized Personnel and Internal Security Problems 13

A Possible Solution: An Air-Delivered Nuclear Forces Regime 15

Preconditions for Engagement 18

Multi-Phased Approach 19

Technical Hurdles: Verification, Detection, and Numbers 23

Verified Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 23

Detecting Nuclear Warheads 24

The Original Baseline Warhead Number 25

Political Challenges: France 26

Legal Obstacles: The START Treaties 27

Russian Motives and the 1991 Initiative 28

Conclusion: An ANF Regime and Atlantic Security 31

Endnotes 37


We are pleased to publish this twelfth volume in the OccasionalPaper series of the US Air Force Institute for National SecurityStudies (INSS). This monograph represents the results of researchconducted during fiscal year 1996 under the sponsorship of a grantfrom INSS.

This paper presents a novel response to the many security challengesposed by Russian perceptions of the continuing utility of theirnon-strategic nuclear forces and the related problem of "loosenucs" within the Russian Federation. The authors developan air-delivered nuclear forces arms control regime and arguethat eliminating this class of weapons would be one of the bestways to address these challenges. As the authors point out, despiteits many benefits, such a regime would potentially face strongopposition due to its broad sweep, as well as issues such as therequirement for the United States to eliminate the airbreathingleg of the triad. Significantly, the authors bolster the casefor the political acceptability of such a regime by uncoveringevidence that the Soviets were considering advancing a similarproposal in 1991. However, the Soviet proposal was overtaken bythe August 1991 coup attempt and President George Bush'sunilateral nuclear initiatives that September.

Many readers will no doubt disagree with this proposal and itsimplications for the US nuclear triad. Nonetheless, the authors'suggestions deserve careful scrutiny because they refocus attentionon non-strategic nuclear forces-arguably the largest and mostdangerous dimension of the post-Cold War nuclear overhang. Inthat regard, this paper serves as a logical successor to the discussionin INSS Occasional Paper 10 on the dangers of criminalityand weapons proliferation in Russia. INSS is pleased to offerLambert and Miller's fresh ideas for public debate.

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INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy Division,Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters USAir Force (USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, US Air ForceAcademy. Our other sponsors currently include: the Air Staff'sIntelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI);OSD Net Assessment; the Defense Special Weapons Agency; the ArmyEnvironmental Policy Institute; Army Space Command; and the On-SiteInspection Agency. INSS' mission is to promote national securityresearch for the Department of Defense within the military academiccommunity, and to support the Air Force national security educationprogram. Our research focuses on the areas of greatest interestto our sponsors: international security policy (especially armscontrol and counterproliferation), Air Force planning issues,regional security policy, conflict in the information age (includingthe revolution in military affairs and information warfare), environmentalsecurity, and space policy.

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As politicians and policy makers trumpet the successes of strategicreductions and the achievements of the START agreements, Russiahas increasingly focused on a rhetorical and doctrinal campaignto enhance the credibility of nuclear war-fighting threats bylegitimizing theater or tactical nuclear systems. There is onecertainty about the state of Russian nuclear weapons, both strategicand non-strategic: the Russian Federation is convinced that, ultimately,its security rests upon these weapons, and it has therefore attemptedto shield both the personnel and the hardware from the effectsof the military rollback. In addition, because Russian militaryplanners appreciate the political deterrent value of nuclear weaponsas well as their war-fighting applications, the military and scientificelite continues to invest in their operational future.Yet there seems to be substantial opportunity for security breaches,theft, and system compromise in the nuclear weapons complex ofthe Russian Federation today.

While the motives of strategic arms control advocates may be admirable,the notion that the two largest possessors of nuclear weaponscould speedily draw down their arsenals to under 2000 warheads,as a START III regime suggests, is misguided. Such an idea highlightsa bias toward the apex of the nuclear weapons pyramid-the strategicnuclear forces-and ignores the thousands of so-called tacticalnuclear weapons possessed by both states. The very real threatassociated with Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal-possible operationaluse, loss of central control, and the theft or diversion of intactnuclear weapons-should impel those with genuine concerns to redirecttheir efforts toward the lower end of the nuclear weapons spectrum.Unlike strategic systems which have been the subject of yearsof negotiations, treaties, and transparency regimes, these tacticalsystems have been largely ignored by both the official as wellas the activist community. However, while one can envision theUS and Russia making further reductions to existing strategicarsenals, deep cuts in tactical systems would require a majorredirection in current arms control efforts.

The arms control proposal presented in this paper incorporatesa regime that would address this much larger and potentially moredangerous class of weapons. A regime calling for the eliminationof air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons may prove to be a usefulmodel for reinvigorating the stalled process of nuclear arms reductions,while simultaneously promoting US, European, and Russian nationalsecurity interests. Because this would create a global ban onair delivered nuclear weapons, it would also eliminate one legof the US strategic nuclear triad, and American bombers couldconvert to a strictly conventional role. This proposal, whilecontroversial, is not strictly original; indeed, the Soviet Unionhad a similar proposal ready for delivery to the United Statesin 1991, but the effort was overtaken by President Bush's unilateraltactical nuclear reductions that fall. The authors here presentdetails from that Soviet proposal for the first time.

There are many good reasons why the United States should movetoward a smaller nuclear force posture. This means reducing nuclearweapons in general, and Russian air-delivered nuclear weaponsin particular. It is in the security interests of the democraciesof Europe and North America to address concerns regarding thenuclear weapons program of the Russian Federation. While US nonstrategicnuclear forces still have a role in Europe today, their perceivedvalue and utility are gradually fading, at least in the eyes ofsome observers. In fact, their final utility may be their roleas bargaining chips to induce the Russian Federation to eliminateentirely this category of weapons.


Lieutenant General Paul E. Stein


Brigadier General Ruben A. Cubero

Dean of the Faculty



Major General Thomas H. Neary

Director, Nuclear and Counterproliferation

Colonel Todd A. Bodenhamer

Chief, National Security Policy Division


Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hays


Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Larsen


Major Timothy J. Krein, USAFR


Ms Marsha Taylor

Cover Design


1. Explaining Weapons Proliferation: GoingBeyond the Security Dilemma. GregoryJ. Rattray, July 1994

2. The Ukrainian Military: Instrument forDefense or Domestic Challenge? OlegStrekal, November 1994

3. North Korea's Nuclear Program: The ClintonAdministration's Response. WilliamE. Berry, Jr., March 1995

4. Environmental Assistance as NationalSecurity Policy: Helping the Former Soviet Union Find Solutionsto its Environmental Problems. RobertL. Dunaway, November 1995

5. Economic Power in the Sino-U.S. Relationship.Kevin F. Donovan, December 1995

6. Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat?William H. Kincade, December 1995

7. Nuclear Proliferation: The DiplomaticRole of Non-Weaponized Programs. RosalindR. Reynolds, January 1996

8. Five Minutes Past Midnight: The Clearand Present Danger of Nuclear Weapons Grade Fissile Materials.Guy B. Roberts, February 1996

9. The International Legal Implicationsof Information Warfare. RichardW. Aldrich, April 1996

10. Weapons Proliferation and OrganizedCrime: The Russian Military and Security Force Dimension. GrahamH. Turbiville, Jr., June 1996

11. Melancholy Reunion: A Report from theFuture on the Collapse of Civil-Military Relations in the UnitedStates. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.,October 1996

Russia's Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex:

An Opportunity for Arms Control

The problems of victory are more agreeablethan the problems of defeat, but they are no less difficult.

- Winston Churchill

The United States and Europe are at a crossroads.Despite the apparent reduction in East-West tensions brought aboutby the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the strategic calculus ofNATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries remains unclear. TraditionalCold War arms control efforts between the United States and theformer Soviet Union are at an impasse, in large part due to Russia'sdetermined resistance to the planned enlargement of the AtlanticAlliance. The March 1997 Helsinki Clinton-Yeltsin summit symbolized,to a large degree, the ambivalence in nuclear arms control. Bothsides opted to focus their discussions on further reductions intheir strategic arsenals, characterizing their initiatives to"slash strategic nuclear missiles to a ceiling of 2,500 warheadseach by [the year] 2007" as grand and far-reaching. Meanwhile,Russia threatens to abrogate its 1991 unilateral initiative towithdraw all, and destroy most of, its tactical nuclear arsenal.In essence, both countries have resorted to a stale and safe approach,discussing strategic reductions while steadfastly avoiding thelooming problems presented by Russia's crumbling nuclear weaponscomplex as a whole-specifically the troubling developments inits extensive tactical nuclear arsenal.

However, perpetual avoidance of the real problemswithin Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal is not limited to governmentofficials. In a public statement released on December 4th, 1996,two retired US military officers, General Lee Butler, former commanderof US strategic nuclear forces, and General Andrew Goodpastor,former commander of NATO forces in Europe, called for the UnitedStates and the Russian Federation to take concrete steps towardthe global abolition of nuclear weapons. In a surprisingturn of events, General Butler expressed his apparently new-foundbelief that "nuclear weapons have no defensible role...[and]that broader consequences of their employment transcend any militaryutility." The following day, a group of 61 retired generalsand admirals from 17 countries joined in issuing a statement callingfor:

Among this group's recommendations was a call forthe United States and Russia to continue the START process, and,as soon as practicable, to "cut down to 1000 to 1500 warheadseach and possibly lower." In the judgment of these formermilitary officers, such a move could be taken quickly and withoutany reduction in the military security of either the US or Russia.

While the motives of this group may be admirable,the notion that the two largest possessors of nuclear weaponscould speedily draw down their arsenals to under 2000 warheadsis misguided. Such an idea highlights a bias toward the apex ofthe nuclear weapons pyramid-the strategic nuclear forces-and ignoresthe thousands of so-called tactical nuclear weapons possessedby both states. The very real threats associated with Russia'stactical nuclear arsenal-possible operational use, loss of centralcontrol, and the theft or diversion of intact nuclear weapons-shouldimpel those with genuine concerns to redirect their efforts towardthe lower end of the nuclear weapons spectrum. Unlike strategicsystems which have been the subject of years of negotiations,treaties, and transparency regimes, these tactical systems havebeen largely ignored by both the official as well as the activistcommunity. However, while one could envision the US and Russiamaking further reductions to existing strategic arsenals, deepcuts in tactical systems would require a major redirection incurrent arms control efforts.

Regardless of how daunting such a task may seem,grave doctrinal as well as safety and security concerns regardingRussia's tactical nuclear arsenal make it imperative that stepsfinally be taken toward real, verifiable cuts in tactical warheads.This proposal incorporates an arms control regime that would addressthis much larger and potentially more dangerous class of weapons.A regime calling for the elimination of air-delivered tacticalnuclear weapons, which we propose, may prove to be a useful modelfor reinvigorating the stalled process of nuclear arms reductions,while simultaneously promoting US, European, and Russian nationalsecurity interests.

A View from the West

Current Nuclear Policies.The present US administration openly reaffirmed a reduced, butnonetheless robust, nuclear posture in the 1994 Nuclear PostureReview (NPR). Since then, however, US policy makers have largelyavoided public discussions involving nuclear weapons. In the UnitedStates as well as most NATO European countries, officials haveeschewed nuclear weapons issues out of concern that acrimoniousdebates could result from public discussion of nuclear weaponsor deterrence as a whole. Additionally, as a consequence of theend of the Cold War and efforts to build new political relationshipswith former adversaries, what had been the Alliance's primaryfunction-collective (nuclear) defense-is being de-emphasized.NATO's nuclear weapons are increasingly portrayed as serving "allazimuths" functions, yet their enduring relevance is notas clear as during the Cold War. Instead of emphasizing the Article5 commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO is moving towarda strategy of selective engagement, whereby Alliance members willopt in or out of future operations (e.g., peacekeeping and humanitarianrelief) based on their own national interests. In some ways thismay seem inevitable as the Alliance adapts to the new internationalenvironment.

Nuclear Disarmament Efforts.Traditionally, Western attention on nuclear disarmament has focusedprimarily on intercontinental, strategic weapons. This focus stems,at least in part, from a long-term trend in arms control policy.The United States, which has been beyond the immediate reach ofSoviet and Russian tactical nuclear weapons, has historicallysought to gain limitations and reductions in Russian strategicsystems. However, as nuclear expert Bruce Blair explains, "therisk [of nuclear employment] is being unintentionally driven upby a deep-seated bias in US arms control strategy. The Americanobsession with Soviet counterforce capabilities resulted in thereduction of the forces that happened to have the strongest safeguards(the silo-based missiles) and in greater Russian reliance on weaponswith relatively weak safeguards," especially air-delivered,theater-based nuclear weapons.

Ironically, as politicians and policy makers trumpetthe successes of strategic reductions and the achievements ofthe START agreements, Russia has increasingly focused on a rhetoricaland doctrinal campaign to enhance the credibility of nuclear warfightingthreats by legitimizing theater or tactical nuclear systems. Mostwould agree that while all-out strategic nuclear war is unlikelyto occur, the employment of theater or tactical nuclear weaponsis a much more plausible and, according to some (especially inRussia), legitimate solution to certain military dilemmas. IvoDaalder addresses the heart of the problem when he writes thatan arms control focus on long-range, land-based missiles eventuallycreated a new gray area problem concerning nuclear weapons systems,because air- and sea-based theater or tactical nuclear weaponswere excluded from prior negotiations. In a recent demonstrationof this continual strategic focus, at the March 1997 Helsinkisummit President Clinton attempted to jump-start the arms controlprocess with "START III," proposing further Russianand American reductions to 2000-2500 strategic warheads by theyear 2007. Nevertheless, experts agree that nuclear arms controlwill remain stalled as the Russian Duma continues to hold STARTII hostage to the anticipated enlargement of the Western Alliance.

The View Toward Russia: Tactical NuclearWeapons Issues

and Problems

The Russian Federation continues to place great valueon nuclear weapons both in terms of their war-fighting potentialas well as political weapons for strategic deterrence. Russiannational security planners see their country surrounded by significantrisks in a political atmosphere of ambiguity and fluidity. Moscowtherefore will continue to anchor its national security in nuclearweapons as the ultimate guarantee of Russia's survival. Russianmilitary doctrine prescribes a strong role for nuclear deterrenceand affirms its value in the world today. As Konstantin Sorokin,an expert on these matters states, this "official positionin support of Russia's maintaining its nuclear status is unlikelyto change much with time, whatever the internal political shifts."Russia presently views itself as being in a transitional periodand therefore must avoid "irrevocable marginalization inthe world community." Nuclear weapons help Russia avoid marginalizationbecause they recall Russia's former superpower status and conveya much stronger "hands-off" message than do conventionalweapons.

Tactical nuclear weapons occupy a noteworthy positionwithin Russia's nuclear posture. During the Cold War, the SovietUnion widely deployed and dispersed its tactical nuclear weaponsin order to guard against preemptive strikes and to ensure theirsurvival in the event of hostilities. This operational philosophywas complemented by a high level of pre-delegation with respectto launch authority and local weapons control. In essence, theSoviet tactical nuclear weapons posture reflected a nuclear-warfightingdoctrine. The likelihood of their employment during war was quitehigh. Today these weapons remain an integral part of the Russianarsenal, and the Soviet employment doctrine remains in place.In the event of a crisis or hostilities, tactical nuclear weaponsare probably the least-controlled element of the Russian nucleararsenal-and the ones most likely to be employed.

Disturbingly, the security management of these weaponsdoes not meet NATO standards. Indeed, a recently leaked CIA analysisentitled "Prospects for Unsanctioned Use of Russian NuclearWeapons" reportedly concluded that the "Russian nuclearcommand and control system is being subjected to stresses it wasnot designed to withstand as a result of wrenching social change,economic hardship, and malaise within the armed forces."According to published accounts of the report, Russian controlsover tactical nuclear arms are poor. The report placed these weaponsin the highest risk category for unsanctioned use or sabotage.It is widely recognized that the Russian nuclear weapons and fissilematerials infrastructure has been under unprecedented stress sincethe collapse of the Soviet Union. In this regard, the threat ofproliferation or leakage from tactical nuclear weapons is particularlyacute. Major General Belous, the head of the Military Policy Sectionof the Center for Scientific Research in Moscow, points out that"tactical nuclear weapons are especially vulnerable due tothe fact that they are numerous, relatively compact, and widelydistributed."

In general terms, a modern and capable nuclear safeguardsystem consists of four basic and important elements. A physicalprotection program is designed to deter and repel the forcibleintrusion into nuclear facilities. A material control and accountancysystem is designed to protect nuclear weapons from removalby insiders as well as to monitor movement of warheads and controlinventories. A human reliability program ensures that thosepersonnel that have access to facilities are properly vetted andcontrolled. Finally, an integrated national system includesa centralized support system with regulatory oversight and a nationalcomputerized data base used for tracking purposes. The Russiannuclear infrastructure suffers deficiencies in all of these categories.The threat of operational use, loss of control, or leakage oftactical nuclear weapons in Russia is multi-faceted and can bedivided into five general areas:

Physical and Technical Security.Normally tactical weapons are kept in specially designed storagedepots separate from their delivery systems. According to Russianexpert Oleg Bukharin, "The depots, usually underground bunkers,are located inside heavily guarded exclusion areas, surroundedby several layers of engineering barriers and equipped with accesscontrol systems." While these physical security methodsseem to be quite normal, it is not readily apparent how they weredesigned to operate. The Soviet weapons security system was intendedto thwart an attack by NATO's special operations forces on theeve of a Third World War. The system relied mostly on the strengthof the physical barriers (guard fences, barbed wire, etc.). Today,as in the past, Russian tactical nuclear weapons facilities makeminimal use of electronic protection and surveillance systems.In other words, the security system is oriented toward externalattack and is based on the strength of the protecting force andthe robustness of the physical barriers in place. As one expertexplains, "under these circumstances, [and without the presenceof an electronic monitoring and accountability system] a principalrisk of diversion is a corrupted insider (or group of insiders)in the security force." In his testimony before the US Senateon March 20, 1996, John Deutch, then Director of the Central IntelligenceAgency, indicated that "a knowledgeable Russian has toldus that, in his opinion, accounting procedures are so inadequatethat an officer with access could remove a warhead, replace itwith a readily available training dummy, and authorities mightnot discover the switch for as long as six months."

The size and relative simplicity of tactical nuclearweapons make them easier to use, as well. Bukharin points outthat, "tactical weapons...are easy to hide and transportand, under certain circumstances, are directly usable. Indeed,although tactical weapons are protected by mechanical locks andspecial equipment is required to use them, a state, or even agroup of terrorists, can overcome such difficulties given timeand resources." Experts familiar with Russian locks on tacticalsystems indicate that the technical safeguards found on gravitybombs and cruise missiles deployed with Russian bomber divisionsare the weakest. Locks on the gravity bombs are not sophisticated,and cruise missiles lack adequate technical protection to inhibitunauthorized use. In fact, Russian sources indicate that a capturedcruise missile armed with a nuclear warhead could readily be launchedfrom a variety of aircraft and would produce a nuclear detonation.

Indeed, an acknowledged expert in Russian nuclearweapons control indicates that the blocking devices are really"just gimmicks designed to buy time." In all probability,the Russian ministries in charge of nuclear weapons are stillrelying on old Soviet security methods. According to Bruce Blair,"in the event of a serious breach of safeguards in the field,the Russian military establishment would need to promptly dispatchpersonnel to suppress the disobedience and restore physical control."Moreover, "if social and political circumstances weaken thecohesion of the military, then its ability to deal with such violationswould obviously be diminished." As a matter of comparison,the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review in the United States mandatedthat all US nuclear weapons have Permissive Action Links (PALs)installed on them by 1996. Essentially, this meant that even ifan intruder was able to breach the physical and electronic securityof a US nuclear facility, the weapon would either disable itselfor not function. In Russia this level of protection is limitedto Russian strategic systems. Western estimates indicate thatonly about 45 percent to 65 percent of Russian systems are equippedwith PALs and that Russian tactical weapons lack this type ofmodern security feature.

Pre-Delegation and the Doctrine of De-Escalation.One of the concerns cited by officials involved in nuclear weaponscontrol issues relates to the doctrine of pre-delegation. Thispolicy has its roots in Cold War-era Soviet weapons control strategiesand is tied to long-standing Soviet practices of maintaining vastand dispersed nuclear forces in launch-ready configuration. Thedanger involved with maintaining this type of rapid reaction postureis that nuclear missiles could very well be fired on the basisof a false warning. And as Blair indicates, "the breakupof the former Soviet Union increased this risk by politicallydismembering the missile attack early-warning network."

Even though Russia still operates under a launch-on-warningconcept, the control mechanisms for its strategic systemsare relatively secure. The operational philosophy of pre-delegationnonetheless extends to Russia's tactical weapons. In orderto increase the survivability of the tactical nuclear systems(which are more widely dispersed and suffer from a shortage ofcommunications links), launch authorization codes are pre-delegatedto local commanders during times of increased tension. Thus, thepotential for local use is significantly increased during timesof conflict.

To compensate for Russia's current conventional weakness,Russian strategists have explicitly sought to "extend thethreshold for escalation downward," thereby increasing thelikelihood of tactical nuclear release in the face of hostilities.Thus there are two distinct concepts at work: (1) the procedureof pre-delegating the launch codes; and (2) the operational doctrineof lowering the nuclear threshold. These trends are corroboratedby interviews with Russian officials familiar with nuclear weaponsstrategies. Dr. Nikolai Sokov, an expert on the Soviet delegationto START I as well as other US-Soviet summit meetings, affirmsthat with such a doctrine in place, one "cannot rule outthat a local commander could individually take the authority tolaunch a weapon."

The assumption that the Russian weapons control systemis more stable during peace-time is also suspect. Due to the lackof technical safeguards, especially on air-delivered weapons (cruisemissiles and gravity bombs), individual attempts to acquire theseweapons even during times of peace are possible. Moreover, thelack of adequate locking mechanisms on these weapons would thenmake them deliverable, with a full nuclear yield, even withoutlaunch authorization.

Media attention has been overwhelmingly dedicatedto the apex of the control system; this focus seems to be at leastpartially misplaced. While it is largely true that the absenceof a stable political system and the reliance on a control systemwith the potential for sudden shifts in allegiances could causea breakdown of control, the most important dangers of misuse ofRussia's nuclear weapons are not to be found at the apex, butat the lower echelons of the command system. The Russian practiceof pre-delegation carries with it the dangers of a premature weaponsrelease or the employment of a nuclear weapon because of the judgmentof a local military commander.

Nuclear Dependency in the Face of ConventionalContingencies. Concerns regarding Russia'snuclear policies have been deepened by Russia's increasing relianceon its nuclear forces in the face of dramatically reduced conventionalforce quality and readiness. Igor Khripunov, a former Soviet diplomatand expert on security affairs, recently noted that some Russianmilitary analysts "make a strong case for maintaining andimproving nuclear weapons, air-based weapons in particular,without which Russia cannot adequately protect its security inthe current geostrategic situation." It seems to be clearthat "the demise of the Red Army that formerly protectedRussia shifted the burden of security onto nuclear forces. Russia'snew military doctrine abandons its former pledge of no-first-useof nuclear arms, and widens the conditions under which it mightuse them. By increasing its reliance on these weapons, Russiaalso magnifies the significance of its nuclear strategy."

In order to operationalize this new reliance on nuclearweapons, Russian officials have chosen to emphasize the valueand role of tactical nuclear weapons. They understand that posturingwith strategic nuclear systems is practically useless, since theyperceive there is a very basic state of strategic equilibriumbetween the United States, Russia, and China. Therefore, the solutionto making the nuclear threat more credible is to articulate agreater role for tactical nuclear weapons since these weaponsare viewed as "warfighting weapons." In fact, therehas been evidence that some Russian officials have not ruled outredeploying tactical nuclear weapons in forward locations (suchas land-based systems in Belarus and Kaliningrad and sea-basedsystems on the ships of the Baltic fleet). Sergei Kortunov, amember of the Russian security council and the deputy directorof the Analytic Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation,recently warned that in the face of a mounting unfavorable balancein the correlation of forces, Russia might resolve to re-evaluatethe 1991 unilateral tactical nuclear weapons initiatives. OtherRussian officials have also alluded to potential initiatives regardingtactical nuclear systems. Major General Belous has stated that"there is no doubt that in the present geopolitical situationa number of Russian TNW [theater nuclear weapons], particularlyair-based ones, should be retained...." Belous regards tacticalnuclear weapons as "the equalizer which would deprive NATOof its new-found military superiority." He mentions the possibilitythat Russia may choose to "carry out a 'demonstration' TNWdetonation to prove to an aggressor our resolve to use nuclearweapons," and concludes that, "faced with an economiccrisis and a rather modest ability to equip its army and navy,for the foreseeable future Russia will be forced to rely on nuclearweapons to ensure its security."

Stockpile Consolidation and Stewardship Efforts.Following President Gorbachev's unilateral weapons reduction initiativesin October 1991, the Soviet Union initiated a long-term consolidationand dismantlement program, engaging the entire spectrum of itsnuclear weapons arsenal. While these efforts have, to some degree,reduced the concern about the security of Russian nuclear weapons,they have also, for the foreseeable future, increased the danger.

When the Soviet Union first initiated the processof weapons consolidation (mainly out of fear of the loss of controlas the USSR was collapsing), tactical nuclear weapons were broadlydispersed across the empire. In fact, they were "scatteredthroughout at least nine or ten republics; were kept in hundredsof storage sites, a large number of which were adjacent to theoperational forces that would use the weapons in the event ofa conflict, came in a substantially wide variety of models; andnot all varieties possessed safeguards." Furthermore, theweapons were deployed among four different military organizations(the Red Army, the Soviet Navy, the air defense forces, and theair force); the Russian military owned nearly 15,000 tacticalweapons, of which almost 6,500 were deployed outside of the Russianrepublic; and the system was not prepared for the rapid saturationthat it experienced.

Much to the credit of the General Staff and the Ministryof the Defense, the weapons were withdrawn from outlying regionsrapidly-although not always under the safest of circumstances.Once consolidation efforts were underway, it rapidly became apparentthat the Russian nuclear weapons storage and stewardship capacitywas under serious stress, and was unable to handle safely thelarge number of weapons which were being withdrawn to the RussianFederation. Oleg Bukharin explains that, "although Russiais used to high rates of dismantlement, what is new is the massrelocation of tactical warheads from front-line units to centralstaging bases and assembly plants, unplanned increases in storagerequirements for warheads and weapons components, economic crises,and...the deteriorating security environment that may compromisesafety and security."

Credible studies reveal that storage capacities havebeen sharply reduced. Before the collapse in 1991, the Sovietarmed forces and the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) had approximatelyninety storage sites for nuclear weapons; forty-three of themwere situated beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. Inaddition, three more army missile technical bases were evacuatedfrom the North Caucasus military district after instability andturbulence broke out in that area. Consequently, the Russian Federationnow operates only 38 storage facilities, three of them locatedat disassembly and refurbishment plants. According to knowledgeableexperts, Russian nuclear weapons storage sites are currently operatingat 167 percent capacity. Security and safety measures are likelyto suffer under such levels of overloading and stress on Russia'snuclear weapons management system.

While some Western officials have alleged that MINATOMhas refabricated some of the weapons grade material into new warheads,this is difficult to prove or verify. However, it is well knownthat MINATOM and the Ministry of Defense have taken advantageof the unilateral initiatives and the consolidation process torid themselves of old and obsolete weapons and warheads. Whilethe view that the Russians are dismantling between 2000 and 3000warheads per year has been widely circulated, this should be placedin perspective: (1) many of these weapons were scheduled for dismantlementanyway; (2) the actual dismantlement process is unverified andunobserved; (3) one cannot be sure that new warheads are not beingdesigned and built; and (4) no mechanism exists to encourage accountabilityfor the highly enriched uranium and plutonium that are obtainedthrough the dismantlement process.

Demoralized Personnel and Internal Security Problems.Although problems related to nuclear weapons storage, transportation,dismantlement, and refurbishment are severe, the potential impactfrom a fissured society and a disgruntled military is potentiallyeven worse. In this sense, the overwhelming concern is that theRussian government, weakened as it is, no longer effectively controlsits territory and its people. In the Soviet Union, the nuclearestablishment had no need for extensive and technologically advancedbarriers at its weapons storage facilities because of the government'srigid internal controls. "'Back in the old days," anofficial recently explained, "the lack of physical safeguardsdid not matter. Even if someone had shot off a lock [and seizedmilitary goods], the government would send the KGB after them.The basic assumption was that physical security was backed upby overall control [of society]." The Soviet Union was neverforced to develop a robust materials control and accountabilitysystem because "it had a pervasive central system regulatingthe movements of its citizens and monitoring suspicious activities."

Recently, several disturbing incidents involvingnuclear weapons in the Russian Federation have been reported."In one highly celebrated instance, inspectors from the RussianMinistry of Defense found a battery of nuclear-armed SS-25 mobilemissiles completely deserted-all the operators and guards havingleft to search for food." In another incident, an enlistedman at an ICBM base in the Altai region went berserk in March1994, killing two soldiers and seriously wounding another two.The local Strategic Rocket Forces commander initially tried tocover up the incident, but it leaked to the regional and thenthe national press. In a different case, a navy enlisted man tookseveral sailors hostage on-board a Russian torpedo boat. Threeof the hostages were killed before the attacker was subdued. AsJohn Lepingwell points out, "these dramatic incidents suggestthat if crazed troops can create mayhem in high-security facilities,rather more sane criminals could perhaps wreak even more havoc."

Taken as a whole, there seems to be substantial opportunityfor security breaches, theft, and system compromise in the nuclearweapons complex of the Russian Federation today. In addition,there is one certainty about the state of Russian nuclear weapons,both strategic and non-strategic, as well as the military personnelthat operate these systems: the Russian Federation is convincedthat, ultimately, its security rests upon these weapons, and ithas therefore attempted to shield both the personnel and the hardwarefrom the effects of the military rollback. In addition, becausethe Russian military planners not only appreciate the politicaldeterrent value of nuclear weapons, but also have always beenintrigued by their war-fighting applications, the Russian militaryand scientific elite continues to invest in their operationalfuture.

A Possible Solution: An Air-DeliveredNuclear Forces Regime

In September 1994, Deputy Secretary of Defense JohnDeutch chose to emphasize that "non-strategic nuclear forcesremain one of the central problems we will be facing in managingour nuclear relationships during the coming years." He wenton to hint at a means to address the problem, saying that "notevery initiative with the Russians has to be in the context ofa post-START strategic nuclear agreement. There could be anotherkind of agreement which has to do with security of forces, includingtheir controllability, which we think is so important; improvingthe pace at which they dismantle their nuclear weapons; it couldhave to do with non-strategic nuclear weapons."

The following regime presents a potential solutionto the challenges created by non-strategic nuclear weapons. Itposits an arms control regime beyond START I, START II, or evenSTART III, based on the principles of reciprocity and transparencyand on the control of weapons and warheads (instead of deliverysystems). The emphasis on reciprocity and transparency is deliberate.An air-delivered nuclear forces (ANF) regime could only functionin an environment where both sides could verify, to a high degreeof certainty, that the other side was in compliance with the statedregime. This type of environment requires transparency-in otherwords, a new and heretofore unknown level of openness in mutualverification and inspection. This is likely to be a thorny issue,especially given the history of Russian hedging in this area.

The necessity for a new arms control initiative addressingthis gray area is made even more urgent by: (1) the natureand extent of Russia's nuclear dilemmas, (2) the threat of prematurenuclear use to save Russian conventional forces in a desperateposition, (3) increasing concerns regarding the long-term threatof nuclear proliferation, (4) the efforts of NATO and the UnitedStates to raise the nuclear threshold, and (5) the unique andunprecedented alignment of geo-strategic forces in Eurasia. Thisis not to say that arms control and disarmament initiatives area panacea capable of reliably providing regional and global securityand stability in all circumstances. Arms control cannot existoutside the bounds of national security policy. Arms control anddisarmament regimes are inherently political and involve wide-rangingefforts to create multilateral stability and transparency. Theyare "elements of national security policy [by] which nationsseek to regulate their respective military forces through mutualagreement," but simultaneously, the political context surroundingarms control is not an agenda to be created, but an environmentto be managed. As Hedley Bull once noted, "it is a grosserror, yet not an uncommon one, to believe that the military relationsof nations exist in one compartment and their political relationsin another, and that opposite tendencies can prevail in each compartment."

Arms control for arms control's sake is thereforea misguided notion. "The effectiveness of arms control, likenational military strategy, must be judged according to whetherit increases security." Furthermore, any agreements mustshore up the long-term security of all participants involved.In the words of President Ronald Reagan, "we must seek agreementswhich are verifiable, equitable, and militarily significant. Agreementsthat provide only the appearance of arms control breed dangerousillusions."

The ANF regime proposes a global limit on air-deliverednuclear weapons-that is, any nuclear weapon delivered by any typeof aircraft (the limit is on the weapons themselves, not the deliverysystems). The focus is on air-delivered nuclear weapons becausethese systems, traditionally classified as "tactical,""non-strategic" or "theater" weapons, actuallycan be seen as "strategic" or "pre-strategic"systems. In this sense, a gravity bomb or cruise missile thatis delivered from a bomber or fighter-bomber from thousands ofmiles away (with limited warning) is a more offensive, deep-strikeweapon than, for example, a lower yield nuclear shell fired froman artillery piece. The regime would engage the Russian Federationand the two NATO countries that are expected to retain air-deliverednuclear weapons-the United States and France. In general, it proposesto reduce and canton all weapons in declared sites. In subsequentstages, the numbers of weapons at each of the sites would be furtherreduced, and eventually all these air-deliverable weapons wouldbe destroyed in mutually monitored facilities.

At this point, one may be tempted to ask-if tacticalnuclear weapons are so dangerous, why limit only air-deliveredweapons? The logic behind the narrow focus is two-pronged. First,air-delivered weapons are patently more offensive than any othertype of tactical nuclear weapon. The other types-land mines, torpedoes,surface-to-air missiles, short-range missiles, and artillery rounds-areeither purely defensive or of only limited offensive capability.Air delivered weapons combined with modern fighter or bomber aircraftand air-refueling abilities equate to a nearly unlimited range,providing the user country with a high-yield weapon that couldstrike from thousands of miles away deep into the heartland ofthe targeted country. Additionally, while not all-encompassing,an ANF regime represents an important first attempt at reducingan enormous category of weapons (engaging both sides in a moresubstantial arrangement than the 1991 unilateral and unverifiedpledges). Lessons learned in the process of dealing with air-deliveredtactical nuclear weapons could be applied during future attemptsto address the remaining weapons in this category.

Preconditions for Engagement.While an in-depth discussion of the relative merits of specificproposals is beyond the scope of this article, it would be unwisenot to acknowledge that before any fresh initiatives can go forward,all sides need to reach conclusions about several relevant and,in some cases, controversial policy issues. These include, butare not limited to, START I and II, a fissile materials cutoffagreement, and the development of significant transparency initiatives.

Although the ratification and full implementationof START II is probably not required for an ANF regime to be pursued,these developments would certainly be conducive to the overallacceptance of nuclear arms control within domestic political circles.Furthermore, it would make little sense to carefully limit anddispose of the excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium(Pu) resulting from dismantled warheads from an ANF agreement,if unrestricted and unchecked production of fissile materialswere to continue. Most observers in Western nations agree thatit is in their interest to halt the further production of materialsthat are already present in quantities far in excess of securityneeds (although both the Russians and the Chinese continue toproduce fissile materials). Hence, a fissile materials cutoffis a reasonable prerequisite to implementing an ANF regime. Finally,although there are several transparency programs in place, thescope of these initiatives needs to be significantly expanded.52Recent efforts in this area have not proven very successful, owingin large part to Russian efforts to avoid implementing the May1995 Yeltsin-Clinton agreement on stockpile transparency, as wellas repeated Russian foot-dragging in transparency issues as awhole. Russian hedging in this area comes, to some degree, asa result of the continuing debate about the role of nuclear weaponsas well as the perceived high utility of nuclear weapons generally.Current transparency programs, however, could serve as precursorsto the more extensive programs that would be required for a workableANF regime.

On the other hand, one promising type of interactionis on the lab-to-lab level. Under the auspices of scientific andtechnological exchanges and joint problem-solving, individualsworking directly for the national laboratories have often beenable to achieve more in face to face contacts with their Russiancolleagues in one afternoon than highly placed officials havebeen able to negotiate over several months. An example of thislevel of interaction is the exchange between Sandia National Laboratoriesand the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, during which Sandia technicianshelped to substantially upgrade the Institute's physical securityarrangements and materials control and accounting procedures.In a different case, the Institute for Experimental Physics inArzamas-16 (MINATOM's counterpart to DOE's Los Alamos NationalLaboratory) and Los Alamos National Laboratory have begun to cooperatein the area of fissile materials control and accounting. As Frankvon Hippel, former Assistant Director for National Security inthe Office of Science and Technology Policy, points out, "this'lab-to-lab' program has taken off more quickly than the government-to-governmentapproach, not surprisingly, because it empowers US and Russiantechnical experts to negotiate directly with each other...."This type of interaction is productive and may lead to the levelof transparency required to implement a warhead accounting anddestruction agreement such as the proposed ANF regime.

The Multi-Phased Approach.Arms control can be described not only as an event, but as a process,involving years of tedious work and negotiations. In a similarvein, the ANF regime would not be an event, but a long-term andmulti-staged process. It would require the gradual establishmentof a receptive environment in the highest levels of Russian andWestern governments, since officials would probably be unwillingto move quickly with an unexplored or immature proposal. Therefore,an environment that is built upon long-term and positive interactionsbetween scientists, scholars, and non-governmental organizationswould be likely to yield the basis for higher levels of confidence.

The ANF regime would be divided into several stagesand spread out over a long-term implementation span, as shownin Table 1:

Table 1: ANF Regime Implementation

Stage One - Initial Agreement

1. Declaration of facilities/cantonment sites

2. Declaration of weapons numbers

3. Verification Protocol

4. Asymmetric Reductions to Equal Numbers

Stage Two - Deep Reduction and Elimination Agreement

1. Further Deep Reductions to Lower Thresholds

2. Category Elimination

Stage Three - Linkage to Further Warhead Destruction

Stage One is designed to facilitate the initial ANFAgreement. Undoubtedly there would be problems on both sides withregard to internationally intrusive inspections because of thesensitivity of the weapons and facilities. There would, as well,be questions regarding the exchange of restricted nuclear data.The issue of verification of starting numbers would be a significanthurdle. Thus, Stage One would need to resolve these initial issuesand establish the trust and confidence required to implement theANF regime.

First, the number of cantonment sites would be declaredduring negotiations. For the United States, one of the principalconcerns would be the perspectives of its NATO allies, becauseUS weapons in Europe would fall under the treaty regime. The UnitedStates would probably want to retain several cantonment sitesin NATO Europe. For the Russian Federation, one of the principalconcerns would be to retain weapons in places where they couldbe postured against the troubled strategic areas to the southand south-east.

Second, the numbers of weapons would be declaredand the current arsenal would have to be secured. Although thisshould not be a problem for the United States, many complicationsmust be anticipated on the Russian side at this stage. The weapons,many of which are not under the most satisfactory security andmanagement programs, must be inventoried, centrally monitored,and stored under unimpeachable security conditions. If one cannotestablish a leak-proof system at this point, further effort isnot likely to overcome the dangers of nuclear theft, diversion,and proliferation, to say nothing of possible cheating. Thereforeit is imperative to accomplish this step at an early point.

Third, a Verification Protocol would have to be negotiated.This agreement would cover the following areas: (1) agreementon the types of national technical means or on-site inspectionsto be used for verification of the cantonment sites and the weaponsand warhead destruction process, (2) an agreed-upon cycle of routineon-site surety inspections at declared cantonment sites, and (3)a system for conducting no-notice challenge inspections.

Finally, the initial ANF agreement would involveactual weapons reductions. The US and Russian stockpiles wouldbe reduced to equal numbers at a level slightly lower than thecurrent global US inventory. This anticipates a large, asymmetricRussian drawdown along with a smaller US reduction. Although thisis an unbalanced process, there is ample precedent for it. Duringthe INF treaty implementation, for example, the Soviet Union wasrequired to engage in large, asymmetric reductions in its deployedmissile forces. The remaining weapons would be placed in the declaredcantonment sites.

Several issues must be taken into account duringthis stage:

Whether the ANF regime as a whole could be fullyimplemented would depend on the level of success in carrying outthe initial agreement in Stage One. This initial agreement mightcontain an obligation to seek a linkage to Stage Two, (e.g., furtherdeep reductions and eventual category elimination, pending verifiableimplementation of Stage One).

The initial part of Stage Two would entail furtherand deeper reductions of the weapons systems in addition to possiblereductions in the number of cantonment sites. The final removalof US nuclear weapons from Europe would occur during the secondpart of Stage Two, when all weapons in this category (i.e., allair-delivered nuclear weapons) would be targeted for elimination.During this final phase, France's air-delivered nuclear weaponswould also be eliminated along with those of Russia and the UnitedStates. In this manner, NATO would retain instruments of US nuclearprotection in Europe until all Russian air-delivered nuclear weapons(especially those assigned to the Russian Long-Range Bomber divisionswhich could strike Europe with less warning time) have been withdrawn.

Stage Three might come into being as an extensionof the ANF regime. Aside from the nuclear warheads addressed bythe ANF regime, thousands of other nuclear warheads have beenretained under both the START and INF regimes. These weapons couldalso be targeted for eventual destruction based on the experiencegained from implementing the ANF regime.

Technical Hurdles: Verification, Detection, andNumbers. It is reasonable to expect aseries of challenges and hurdles if this regime were implemented.Three broad questions must be addressed. First, how would theverified elimination of nuclear warheads occur? Second, couldthe verification process detect nuclear weapons that may be hiddenfrom the agreement? Third, how would the initial base-line numberof warheads be determined?

The verified elimination of nuclear warheads.The process of conducting the verified elimination of nuclearwarheads would be complex and involved, but not insurmountable.Its principal focus is "to verify that warheads specifiedby [the] treaty for elimination are, in fact, completely dismantled,their components rendered useless for construction of new warheads,and the contained fissile materials placed under internationalsafeguards or disposed of in such a manner as to make them unusablein weapons."

Each step in the process of eliminating warheadsmust be completely verifiable and has to ensure that (1) all warheadsand associated payload hardware identified by the owner countryand earmarked for elimination are in fact correctly described;(2) all items earmarked for elimination are destroyed, and (3)none of the nuclear material from the dismantled warheads is divertedto unauthorized uses. "These guarantees must be providedwithout the need to disclose sensitive information about the designof the warheads or other associated equipment, such as re-entryvehicles, penetration aids, or shielding against radiation."

Although it will be complex and arduous, the mostcrucial benefit of this process is that warhead dismantlementand elimination are not only verifiable, but the regime can alsobe designed to be resistant to tampering and cheating. Moreover,if one assumes with Taylor that the dismantlement facility employsa "full-time work force of 100 direct labor employees, at$100,000 per person-year (including overhead)," the laborcosts would amount to $10 million per year. In sum, "it istherefore unlikely that the total costs of dismantling...nuclearwarheads, and providing the contained fissile materials for useas nuclear fuel or for direct disposal would exceed a few billiondollars."

Detecting Nuclear Warheads.While it is possible to design a system for the verified destructionof nuclear warheads, the ANF treaty regime must also provide fora mechanism to detect behavior that violates the treaty boundaries(e.g., the withholding and hiding of nuclear warheads). This capabilityis more technologically complex, but is presently being developedin the United States. What follows is a brief summary of the methodscurrently being designed to provide this capability.

Steve Fetter has written that

Fissile materials [HEU and Pu] are radioactive; theyare very dense and absorb certain radiation very well; and theycan be fissioned. Therefore, there are three basic ways to detectfissile material: 'passive' detection of the radiation emittedby its radioactive decay, or 'active' detection involving eitherradio-graphing ('x-raying') an object to detect dense and absorbingmaterials, or irradiating an object with neutrons or high-energyphotons and detecting the particles emitted by the resulting inducedfissions."

The wide-area tracking system (WATS) concept, underdevelopment at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, incorporatesmultiple passive detectors in a sensor network, and can providedetection, some characterization, and monitoring/tracking of nuclear-weaponmaterial for treaty verification. Essentially, WATS incorporatesa series of systems (ground and space-based) that provide for"continuous monitoring of nuclear-material diversion attempts."Most significantly, WATS does not employ intrusive monitoringof only known and declared facilities; instead, "it providescomprehensive oversight of all facilities in the monitored area,even unknown sites." According to an expert familiar withthe system's capabilities, this feature "significantly mitigatesthe material source term initialization problem-the inabilityto confidently know the initial location of all material subjectto monitoring." WATS will incorporate "an easily deployedarray of fixed sensors that can be supplemented with moving sensorsthat can be tailored to a specific need. By correlating the outputof many sensors, the [WATS] system is capable of achieving muchhigher probability of detection and lower false alarm rates thanare obtainable with individual sensors."

Thus WATS provides comprehensive oversight by detectingthe presence and movement of nuclear-weapon materials withouton-site presence-it is non-intrusive and does not require accessto facilities. In other words, the ability to detect and locatethe presence of materials that violate an ANF treaty regime withina monitored area is currently being developed by the nationallaboratories. This, along with other measures, should reduce theincentives to cheat and evade the treaty boundaries, and allowfor the creation of a robust and comprehensive verification regime.

The Original Base-Line Warhead Number.One of the most basic potential obstacles within the ANF regimeis the question of how many warheads each side really has. Whileat first this seems to be quite a significant challenge, in realityit may not be an insurmountable one. Both sides would declarethe base-line numbers early in Stage One. Essentially, the inventoriesof weapons should be mutually declared and transparent. Followingthis exchange, the regime would incorporate a base-line inspectiontimeline, during which all parties could arrange for standardconfidence inspections according to agreed-upon protocols. Atthe conclusion of Stage One all cantonment facilities must bedeclared and all warheads located within these facilities. Therefore,any warheads outside these boundaries would be in violation ofthe treaty regime. At this point, each party could initiate aseries of challenge inspections, during which time all suspectsites would be subject to an on-site review within twenty-fourhours of the request. In addition to this procedure, each partywould be able to rely on national technical means (such as wide-areanuclear detection systems) in order to further enhance confidencein the reliability of the regime. Therefore, under the circumstances,it would be fairly difficult to successfully evade the treatyrestrictions.

Political Challenges: France.Although the ANF regime would deal primarily with US and Russianair-delivered nuclear weapons, France's non-participation wouldleave it as the sole state possessing these weapons in Europe.The Russian Federation would therefore probably not agree to theregime unless French air-delivered nuclear weapons were incorporated.

The French approach to arms control has traditionallyreflected the importance of nuclear weapons as France's ultimateguarantee of security as well as political and strategic autonomyin an uncertain and unstable world. President Jacques Chirac reaffirmedhis confidence in France's current posture in September 1995 whenhe stated, "Our present force is enough of a deterrent, it'sin sufficient working order to take us up to the year 2010."Historically France has declined to participate in nuclear disarmamentnegotiations such as SALT and START by arguing that these effortsshould be pursued first by the superpowers. In 1983 FrançoisMitterrand specified three requirements that must be satisfiedbefore France could consider playing a role in such efforts:

Historically both France and the United States haverejected attempts by Moscow to count French nuclear weapons withUS totals (in the SALT and INF negotiations, for example).

More recently, French experts have indicated thatFrance does not expect to engage in nuclear arms control efforts(other than deliberations related to the Nuclear NonproliferationTreaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the fissile materialcutoff discussions) in the foreseeable future due to enduringdifferences in the force levels of France, the United States,and Russia. However, in his comments on the 1994 French DefenseWhite Paper, Prime Minister Edouard Balladour acknowledgedthat the country's nuclear deterrent should be "constantlyadapted to the evolution of threats." Recent unilateral cutsin France's nuclear forces reflect, among other things, the reductionin the threat as well as the impact of fiscal constraints.

Despite these policies, France might consider participatingin the ANF regime if it believed its security would be enhancedby the elimination of a class of Russian nuclear weapons posturedprimarily against Europe. The reduction of US and Russian nucleararsenals would help to redress long-standing French concerns regardingnumerical imbalances. Additionally, the opportunity to reducethe defense budget might be welcomed in these times of fiscalausterity. Finally, the regime might be attractive to French politicalelites since it would promise France a genuine "seat at thetable" on a par with the United States and Russia regardinga high-profile security issue. Notwithstanding these considerations,it seems likely that France would only participate if it believedthat the ANF regime served its vital national security interests.

Legal Obstacles: The START Treaties.START I and II provide for different sets of constraints on heavybombers and air-delivered nuclear weapons.

The ANF regime would significantly modify these constraintswhile retaining all other elements of the START treaties. Currently,the US Air Force must hold its B-2 bombers in reserve for thenuclear missions and is therefore unable to take full advantageof the aircraft's conventional capabilities. In addition, as theB-52 fleet continues to grow older and a significant number arealso held in reserve for nuclear roles, fewer aircraft are availablefor conventional scenarios (e.g., Desert Storm). Essentially,the ANF Regime would allow the USAF to release these aircraftfrom their nuclear taskings because the ANF regime would ultimatelysupersede all START restrictions on heavy bombers, freeing thesedelivery systems for conventional missions.

It should be noted that the 1994 Nuclear PostureReview concluded that 20 B-2s and 66 B-52s assigned to nuclearmissions would serve as the heavy bomber leg of the nuclear triadfor the foreseeable future. The nuclear warheads assigned to theseaircraft would eventually be eliminated under an ANF regime, thusconfining the mission of strategic deterrence to ICBMs and SLBMs.The ANF regime would not affect START ceilings on ICBMs and SLBMs.However, it might change the composition of the strategic nuclearforce since the warhead numbers initially reserved for air-deliverednuclear weapons would no longer count against the accountablewarhead ceilings. The changes to the strategic triad (i.e., theremoval of the bomber leg) would require extensive deliberationsinvolving numerous government agencies and the executive and legislativebranches. While the outcome of such a process cannot be forecast,it represents a significant potential obstacle to the realizationof an ANF regime.

Russian Motives and the 1991 Initiative.Many officials and experts would question whether the RussianFederation would ever be a willing participant in an ANF regime.For example, a July Russian 1996 report states that

under the conditions of economic crisis and its fairlymodest capabilities to equip the army and navy with new weapons,Russia will have to rely on nuclear weapons to safeguard its securityin the foreseeable future... Because of Russia's geostrategicposition, tactical nuclear weapons are of much greater military-politicalsignificance to Russia than to the United States…. That iswhy Russia can hardly expect the composition of its tactical nuclearweapons to be symmetrical with the US composition."73

Given Russia's current conventional weakness andcorresponding reliance on nuclear weapons for its security, itwill require adroit persuasion to secure its participation insuch a regime. Furthermore, Russia would have to accept largeand asymmetric reductions in its nuclear forces.

Russian officials may seek tradeoffs in other areas-e.g.,stopping or slowing the process of NATO enlargement, economicbenefits, cutbacks in US SLBMs and SLCMs, or an adjustment orchange to CFE or START II. In addressing these issues, the followingshould be considered. First, there are historical precedents forasymmetric weapons reductions (e.g., the INF and CFE treaties).Second, as stated earlier, the ANF regime should not be offeredto Russia as a bargaining chip in conjunction with NATO enlargement(the regime could proceed in a "separate but parallel"mode). Third, NATO and the United States should insist that theANF regime (including its focus on warhead reduction and elimination)be implemented as a testbed agreement before any other arms controltreaties are modified.

While these are all potential complications, someexperts might be surprised to learn that the USSR came close toproposing an arms control treaty regulating, among other systems,air-delivered nuclear weapons in late 1990 and early 1991. Infact, according to Nikolai Sokov, the only reason that the initiativewas not pursued was that President Bush's 1991 unilateral initiativepre-empted the Soviet proposal. The Soviet concept, devised bymembers of the Foreign Ministry's Department of Arms Control andDisarmament and agreed to by the General Staff, advocated a "leapforward" toward the reduction of warheads instead of deliverysystems. The first stage of the proposal involved asymmetric Sovietreductions down to an equal level below the level of either sideat the time. Following stages were designed to further reduce,and eventually eliminate, all theater weapons. The proposal envisionedconcentrating the warheads at designated facilities with portaland perimeter monitoring systems as well as on-site inspectors.In order to increase confidence in the proposal, both base-lineand challenge inspections were incorporated. The warheads wereto be destroyed at jointly-monitored facilities. While foreigninspectors would not have been allowed to observe actual warheaddismantlement, all fissile materials were to be accounted forand all other components were to be destroyed in the presenceof inspectors. The Soviet proposal suggested several layers ofintrusive and non-intrusive inspection and detection systems thatwould ensure that a warhead would be detected even if it was initiallymissed or not accounted for. The projected Soviet initiative envisagedthe eventual establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the centerof Europe and over 1,000 km wide (stretching roughly from theAtlantic to the Urals). In other words, the Soviet proposal wouldhave denuclearized all of Europe, including the European USSR.This zone would have "prevented" the use of tacticalnuclear weapons in the case of an armed conflict.

In the 1991 Soviet proposal

theater weapons were defined to include all ground-basedsystems (such as nuclear artillery, land mines, etc.) as wellas all theater aviation assets. Significantly, however, the projectedSoviet proposal did not include Long Range Aviation assets, andthereby preserved the USSR's ability to strike at Central andWestern Europe, even from beyond the Urals. One of the key differencesbetween the Soviet proposal and the ANF regime is that the ANFregime would limit all air-delivered nuclear weapons.

It is critical to note that the projected Sovietproposal, if carried out, would have achieved a long-standingSoviet objective, namely the removal of US nuclear weapons fromEurope. Simultaneously, it would have preserved the Soviet capabilityto use LRA forces against NATO Europe.

Surprisingly, however, the projected Soviet proposaldoes not seem to have addressed British and French nuclear forces.This is not likely to be the case in any future regime. Althoughthe British will no longer deploy air-delivered weapons by 1998,the French intend to retain this capability for the foreseeablefuture.

The proposal nonetheless provided for an unusuallevel of transparency, and the Foreign Ministry was prepared tomake a formal approach. Indeed, according to Sokov, the negotiatingteams had already been assembled and the personnel assignmentscompleted. Although the motives for such a proposal also involvedthe removal of NATO's European-based US nuclear deterrent forces,the terms of the proposal suggest an openness on the part of Russianpolicy makers to an exceptional degree of transparency. The factthat the proposal envisioned the limitation, reduction, and verifieddestruction of nuclear warheads is surprising, given the normallysecretive and closed nature of the Russian and Soviet governments.

Conclusion: An ANF Regime and AtlanticSecurity

The present global alignment of nuclear weapons betweenEast and West is increasingly being supplanted by a new multi-polardynamic. The uncertainty of this dynamic does not allow for animmediate reduction and withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons inEurope. In the words of Laurence Martin, "even in Europethis is not the time to dismantle deterrence. Rather it is anopportunity to adjust it; make it less expensive, oppressive andintrusive; and retain it as the latent source of stability withinwhich the NATO powers can recast their relationships and Europeas a whole build a new, continental order." While US nonstrategicnuclear forces still have a role in Europe today, their perceivedvalue and utility are gradually fading, at least in the eyes ofsome observers. In fact, their final utility may be their roleas a bargaining chip to induce the Russian Federation to eliminateentirely this category of weapons. It is in the security interestsof the democracies of Europe and North America to address concernsregarding the nuclear weapons program of the Russian Federation.

How would the ANF Regime affect the health of nucleardeterrence for the United States and its NATO allies? One cancertainly argue that the perceived value or validity of nucleardeterrence has been eroding since the collapse of the bipolarworld order, both as a doctrine as well as a publicly articulatedpolicy. The elimination of a major category of nuclear weaponsin conjunction with the gradual withdrawal of remaining US nuclearforces in Europe would be consistent with this trend. The INFtreaty and its zero-zero provisions are proof that NATO governmentsare capable of maintaining the credibility of their deterrentposture, even if the most capable European-based NATO nuclearweapons (i.e., those mounted on Pershing II and GLCM missiles)were completely eliminated.

Assessing the likelihood of a US nuclear responsein the defense of its Allies should not be based on individualweapons systems, but rather on the stakes for US vital interestsin maintaining and honoring Alliance commitments in Europe. Theargument is not a new one; it has been discussed repeatedly since1957, when Sputnik dramatized America's vulnerability toprompt Soviet nuclear retaliation in the event of US employmentof nuclear weapons in defense of its Allies. For the remainderof the Cold War, the United States labored to assure its Alliesthat, vulnerability notwithstanding, US commitments to NATO Europestood firm. Fortunately, the debate between vulnerabilities andenduring interests was never put to the test of nuclear war.

The ANF regime's impact on NATO cohesion is difficultto predict. It seems reasonable to assert that the formula describingUS nuclear weapons as "the glue that binds the Alliance together"could erode along with the perceived credibility of nuclear deterrence.In other words, the value assigned to nuclear weapons as instrumentsfor the preservation of alliance cohesion may be over-emphasized.Therefore, depending in part on the circumstances and associatedAlliance policies, a gradual withdrawal of US nuclear weaponsmight not undermine Alliance cohesion. As Karl-Heinz Kamp andothers have argued in the past, one possible result of such awithdrawal is that NATO would simply redefine its requirementsfor nuclear deterrence and thus preserve Alliance cohesion. Observersfamiliar with NATO nuclear planning indicate that such a withdrawalcould be combined with a restructuring of the NATO nuclear consultationprocess that would link European security more clearly with USstrategic nuclear forces. Intensified nuclear planning with nuclearand non-nuclear allies could be part of this process.

There can be little doubt that the ANF regime wouldcurtail Russian air-delivered nuclear threats in the Eurasianarea. While this regime neither recommends nor endorses the completerenunciation of nuclear deterrence, it does seek to promote raisingthe nuclear threshold and the containment of the threat of "loose"Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials. In fact, the threatof Russian WMD probably does not reside in deliberately plannedemployment against NATO countries, as was the case during theCold War. Rather, today's threat emanates from either (1) theloss of control over nuclear weapons systems or (2) the commitmentof nuclear weapons in what is perceived to be a desperate situationin a conflict on Russia's periphery. Furthermore, the lack ofmodern permissive action links on these systems makes their controleven more questionable. As Igor Khripunov explains, Russia's relianceon nuclear weapons with inadequate permissive action links increases"the likelihood of unauthorized or accidental launchings,as well as misinterpretations and disruptions in communications."

The issue of whether the ANF regime would mitigate"new" WMD threats is less clear. Some might argue thatlower numbers of US nuclear forces would entice others to play"catch up" with the United States and NATO in an effortto gain equal power and prestige. However, as Ivo Daalder pointsout, few countries could actually marshal the resources necessaryto build up a nuclear force strong enough to challenge the nuclearposture of the United States. The United States and its NATO allieswill in the foreseeable future have the ability to stay aheadof the few proliferants who may attempt this. In any event, theperceived value for proliferants of possessing nuclear weaponsand threatening their use, even with only one or two weapons,negates the parity argument, which was valid during the Cold Warwhen NATO faced a multi-dimensional nuclear threat from the SovietUnion. After the late 1960s, US-Soviet nuclear parity was viewedas stabilizing because it undermined the incentives that highernumbers of weapons provided for a preemptive nuclear strike. Proliferantsdo not require nor aim for strategic parity. The possession ofmerely one or two weapons might, in some circumstances, crediblythreaten NATO and the United States because of what is believedto be the completely different cost-benefit calculus of some proliferants.Thus, the ANF regime would probably not lessen the possibilityof proliferant WMD threats.

Regarding proliferation by parties outside the AtlanticAlliance, Daalder writes, "a deliberate strategy to cut nuclearforce levels can help to reduce the perception that nuclear weaponsendow their possessors with power, prestige, and internationalstature-a perception that in itself contributes to proliferation."Daalder goes on to ask,

is it really in the US interest to advertise thecentrality of nuclear weapons to power in international affairsat a time when countries like ... Japan and Brazil aspire to agreater role in, and responsibility for, preserving internationalsecurity? Surely the United States has much to gain and very littleto lose in arguing the opposite-that power and responsibilityreside in the political and economic well-being of nations ratherthan in their nuclear status.

Thus the perceived de-emphasis of nuclear weaponsin the international sphere might provide an impetus for non-proliferation.On the other hand, proliferant states are not likely to definetheir national security strategies based simply on an ANF regime,and it is likely that they may find other factors more compelling-e.g.,their own ambitions and perceived security needs. The drive toacquire nuclear weapons is not likely to decrease simply becausethe major powers have reduced their own nuclear weapons arsenals.Instead, the likelihood for nuclear proliferation will probablybe driven by each state's specific security concerns.

If one accepts that the concept of extended deterrenceremains valid, and that the US membership in the Atlantic Alliancecontinues to further American national security interests, thendeterrence should remain robust under the terms of the ANF regime."This would be true even if the US nuclear force levels continueto decline to still lower levels, provided that the nuclear capabilitiespotentially threatening to the allies (especially Russia) didso as well."80 Stationing American military personneland nuclear weapons in Europe represented the US commitment andassured that stability would be maintained. The ANF regime wouldrequire first an asymmetric reduction, and then an equal and verifiedelimination of this category of weapons. If one accepts that nuclearweapons acquisition is driven primarily by a country's securityconcerns, then the ANF regime should lessen these concerns byintroducing transparency, and by reducing and then eliminatingthese weapons. Unlike other arms control regimes, which have preservedRussia's ability to rapidly strike Western Europe with air-deliverednuclear weapons, this regime would reduce and ultimately eliminatethis capability and would leave Russia with only strategic systems(ICBMs and SLBMs) and short-range tactical nuclear weapons totarget Europe.81

The basic strategic stability between the UnitedStates and Russia (inherent in START I and II), as well as ongoingcommitments by the United States to provide a nuclear umbrellafor its NATO Allies and to further its political and economicinterests throughout Europe would contain the risk of the Russiansusing variable-range ICBMs or SLBMs (or short-range tactical nuclearweapons) against NATO Europe. Nonetheless, one can anticipatethat some European analysts and policy makers might prefer toretain a US nuclear presence in Europe, even if the successfulimplementation of an ANF regime would eliminate all Russian air-deliveredsystems. This political factor would have to be addressed by theAlliance in pursuing an ANF regime.

In order to guarantee the long-term future securityof the European area, NATO must be willing to change. The collapseof the Communist regime in Russia has altered the nuclear dynamicin that state. What once was a tightly controlled and strictlyenforced nuclear archipelago is now a system under great strain,in which some Russians advocate greater operational reliance onnuclear weapons. As Graham Allison indicates, the dimensions ofthis threat will be perfectly clear the day after a catastropheresults from premature Russian nuclear employment or Russian nuclearleakage.82

Experts and officials alike believe that the chancesof an intercontinental nuclear exchange are remote. However, thevery weapons which all parties have sought to exclude from anymutually secured obligations are the same weapons that are perhapsthe most likely to be used by the Russian Federation in a conflict,and are probably the most unsecure and mismanaged and, therefore,most likely to be the source of proliferation and leakage problems.A long-term ANF agreement would address these problems and simultaneouslyestablish multiple fora for transparency and constructive engagementin the future. There are many good reasons why the United Statesshould move toward a smaller nuclear force posture. As Daalderpoints out, "Although a residual need for deterrence willremain, the thrust of US policy toward nuclear weapons shouldnow be to reduce the likelihood that nuclear weapons will everbe used."83 This means reducing nuclear weaponsin general, and Russian air-delivered nuclear weapons in particular.


1 General Lee Butler,USAF (Retired), National Press Club Remarks, Wednesday, December4, 1996, Washington, DC, p. 3.

2 "Statementon Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and Admirals,"Press Release. December 5, 1996, pp. 1-2.

3 Ibid., p.2.

4 The Natural ResourcesDefense Council estimates that Russia possesses some 18,000 tacticalnuclear warheads, while the US possesses approximately 6,500.It should be noted that both numbers are only estimates. Informationon tactical weapons is highly suspect, particularly in Russia.

5 The NPR reaffirmedthe nuclear triad (ICBMs, SLBMs, and manned bombers), and whileit moved to establish US thresholds at START II levels, it advocateda "lead and hedge" strategy, preserving the capabilityto reconstitute warheads if deemed necessary.

6 Article 5 of theNorth Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington DC,states the following: "The Parties agree that an armed attackagainst one or more of them in Europe or North America shall beconsidered an attack against them all; and consequently they agreethat, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them...will assistthe Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individuallyand in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deemsnecessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintainthe security of the North Atlantic area." Cited from NATOHandbook, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels,1995, p. 232.

7 Bruce G. Blair,"Russian Control of Nuclear Weapons," in George Quester,ed., The Nuclear Challenges in Russia and the New States ofEurasia, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 61.

8 Ivo H. Daalder,The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response NATO Strategyand Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967, (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1991), p. 199.

9 Of course, a primarymotive for this move was to allay Russian concerns over NATO enlargement.Richard Beeston, "Russians Attack Yeltsin over NATO concessions,"The Times, March 24, 1997, Internet edition.

10 Konstantin Sorokin,"Russia after the Crisis: The Nuclear Strategy Debate."Orbis, Winter 1994, p. 25.

11 The CIA documentwas reportedly leaked to the press by sources inside the agency.Bill Gertz, "Russian Renegades Pose Nuke Danger: CIA SaysArsenal Lacks Tight Controls," Washington Times, October22, 1996, p. 1.

12 For detailed analysison the depth of this problem, see Graham Allison et al,Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, CSIA Studies in InternationalSecurity No. 12, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), and Quester,The Nuclear Challenges in Russia and the New States of Eurasia,1995).

13 See Vladimir SemenovichBelous, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Half-Forgotten Reality."Segodnya, FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 23 June 1995.

14 For a thoroughdiscussion of these issues, see Oleg Bukharin, "Nuclear Safeguardsand Security in the Former Soviet Union." Survival,Winter 1994-95, p. 56.

15 While most sourcesindicate that weapons and delivery systems are stored separately,there is no evidence that special procedures are undertaken toensure separation and access denial between the troops that guardthe weapons and those that operate the delivery systems.

16 Oleg Bukharin,"Technical Aspects of Proliferation and Non-Proliferation,"in Quester, The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New Statesof Eurasia, p. 46.

17 Bukharin, "NuclearSafeguards and Security in the Former Soviet Union," p. 62.

18 Blair, "RussianControl of Nuclear Weapons," p. 47.

19 Testimony by Dr.John Deutch before the US Senate, as reported in the SecurityIssues Digest, US NATO Wireless File, European Wireless FileNo. 52, Thursday, March 21, 1996, p. 9.

20 Bukharin, "NuclearSafeguards and Security in the Former Soviet Union.," p.61.

21 The informationregarding locks on gravity bombs and cruise missiles is drawnfrom Blair, "Russian Control of Nuclear Weapons," pp.61 and 80.

22 Ibid., p.61.

23 US Department of Defense, NuclearPosture Review, September 1994.

24 Steven Zaloga,"The CIS Nuclear Weapons Industry." Jane's IntelligenceReview, Vol. 4, No. 9, September 1992.

25 Blair, "RussianControl of Nuclear Weapons," p. 59.

26 Ibid.

27 Some Russian officialsexplain that while this is still necessary, it is neither desirablenor planned for a long-term posture. They indicate that due tothe loss of warning and detection infrastructure (Ballistic MissileEarly Warning Systems, missile tracking facilities, communicationlinks, etc.) with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, theRussian capability to reliably detect a strategic strike is presentlyincomplete. Thus, for the time being, they have to opt for a lessoptimal posture until this deficiency can be adequately addressed.

28 John R. Lepingwell,"Is START Stalling?" in The Nuclear Challenge inRussia and the New States of Eurasia, George Quester, ed.,p. 108.

29 The informationis based on an interview conducted by the authors with Dr. NikolaiSokov on August 9, 1996. Dr. Sokov is currently serving as a post-doctoralfellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Instituteof International Studies. He is a member of the Russian ForeignMinistry (Department of Disarmament and Control of Military Technologies)and is currently on an extended leave of absence.

30 Emphasis added.Igor Khripunov, "Russia's Dangerous Weakness," in ArmedForces Journal International, June 1996, p. 40.

31 Bruce G. Blair,"Russian Realities and the Illusion of Arms Control."Lexis-Nexis (The Christian Science Monitor),September 19, 1995.

32 Blair, "Russian Control of NuclearWeapons," p. 61; "NATO Expansion Eastwards Could ThreatenDenmark: Report," Agencee France Presse, International News,Copenhagen, 17 March 1997 (Lexis-Nexis); and Andrei Smirnov, "YeltsinMay Sign Treaty with NATO on May 27," Russian Press Digest,10 April 1997 (Lexis-Nexis).

33 "Press Conferencewith Officials of the Presidential Analytical Directorate RegardingRussia's National Security Policy." Lexis-Nexis (FederalInformation Systems Corporation, Official Kremlin InternationalNews Broadcast), April 26, 1996.

34 While Russian threatsregarding the use of nuclear weapons in the face of NATO enlargementbecame prolific toward the end of 1995 and during the first halfof 1996, many of those statements may have largely been politicalposturing leading up to the June 1996 Presidential elections.The statements above, however, do not represent this type of rhetoric.On the contrary, they are brought forth by seasoned strategistswho are contemplating Russia's new conventional dilemmas. SeeBelous, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Half-Forgotten Reality."

35 Steven E. Miller,"Western Diplomacy and the Soviet Nuclear Legacy." Survival,Autumn 1992, p. 7.

36 Ibid.

37 Oleg Bukharin,"Stored Nuclear Warheads Could Become Unstable." Lexis-Nexis(Newspaper Publishing PLC, The Independent), February 22,1994.

38 The following estimatesare obtained from a detailed report by Anton Surikov and IgorStyagin entitled "The Movement and Storage of Russian NuclearWeapons." Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No.5, May 1994.

39 Anton Surikov and Igor Sutyagin, "TheMovement and Storage of Russian Nuclear Weapons," Jane'sIntelligence Review, May 1994, p. 203.

40 Allison, et al, pp. 180-181.

41 Ibid., p. 190.

42 Seymour M. Hersch,"The Wild East." The Atlantic Monthly. June 1994,p. 69.

43 Frank von Hippel,"Fissile Material Security in the Post-Cold-War World."Physics Today, June 1995, p. 27.

44 The SS-25 Topol,in addition to being currently Russia's premier land-based ICBM,is a strategic system; and strategic weapons are, according toaccepted norms, the best protected and secured weapons in theRussian arsenal! Allison et al, p. 8.

45 These two incidentsare described in John Lepingwell's "Is START Stalling?"chapter in The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New Statesof Eurasia, pp. 102-03.

46 Ibid., p.103.

47 Comments by JohnDeutch, Deputy Secretary of Defense, at the Nuclear Posture Reviewpress conference, news release by the office of the AssistantSecretary of Defense for Public Affairs, September 22, 1994, pp.5-6, 12-13.

48 Schuyler Foersteret al, Defining Stability: Conventional Arms Controlin a Changing Europe. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p.9.

49 Hedley Bull citedin Foerster et al, Defining Stability, p. 9.

50 Ibid., p.45.

51 President RonaldReagan cited in Teena Mayars, Understanding Weapons and ArmsControl. (Washington: Brassey's (US ), Inc., 1991), p. 23.

52 The CooperativeThreat Reduction (CTR) program, under Nunn-Lugar funding (alsoknown as the Safe and Secure Dismantlement Program, funded byDoD under a government-to-government agreement and administeredby the Defense Special Weapons Agency), and the Exchange in theFields of Nuclear Weapon Safety and Security (a government-to-governmentprogram signed under the auspices of the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission)are examples of such programs in place today. See the preparedstatement of Albert Narath, Director of Sandia National Laboratories,before the US House of Representatives Committee on National Security,Subcommittee on Military Procurement, March 29, 1995.

53 Frank von Hippel,"Fissile Material Security in the Post-Cold-War World,"in Physics Today, Vol. 48, No. 6, June 1995, p. 28.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Interview withDr. Amy Sands, formerly a deputy director of the US Arms Controland Disarmament Agency, at the Monterey Institutefor International Studies, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies,August 8, 1996. Dr. Sands attributes the slow rate of this processin part to the immense amount of staying power in government bureaucracieson both sides.

57 While the Frenchwould be "at the table" from the outset, French reductionswould occur only at the end of Stage Two. The French weapons,though not reduced, would be counted together with the US totalsagainst the Russian ceilings. Also, in order to assuage Europeanconcerns, initial US reductions could come from weapons deployedin the CONUS and not from the current European-based US nonstrategicnuclear arsenal.

58 The informationpresented here was drawn from Theodore B. Taylor's, "VerifiedElimination of Nuclear Warheads" in Science and GlobalSecurity, Vol. 1, 1989.

59 Ibid., p.1.

60 Ibid., p.7.

61 Ibid., p.22.

62 The informationcontained in this section is drawn from the following two sources:Steve Fetter, et al,. "Detecting Nuclear Warheads,"in Science and Global Security, Vol. 1, 1990, pp. 225-302;and Zachary Koenig, et al, "Wide-Area Nuclear Detectionfor Monitoring and Tracking Nuclear-Weapon Material" in ArmsControl and Nonproliferation Technologies, Third Quarter 1994,pp. 27-28.

63 Fetter et al,"Detecting Nuclear Warheads," p. 226.

64 Koenig et al,"Wide-Area Nuclear Detection," p. 27.

65 Ibid. Emphasisadded.

66 Ibid.

67 David S. Yost,"Nuclear Debates in France," Survival, Winter1994-95, p. 129.

68 Text of televisedinterview provided by the French Embassy, Washington DC, "Interviewwith M. Jacques Chirac," 7 Sur 7, TF1, 18 September1995, p. 9.

69 Francois Mitterandcited in David S. Yost, "France," in Douglas J. Murrayand Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations:A Comparative Study, third edition (Baltimore: The Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1994), p. 266.

70 Based on interviewswith several French nuclear policy experts conducted in both Washington,DC, and Monterey, California, from February through June 1996.

71 France. Ministryof Defense. Defense White Paper. 1994.

72 For informationon START I see "START: Basic Provisions of the Treaty,"WEB Edition, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 21 May 1996.For information on START II, see "START II: Treaty Betweenthe United States of America and the Russian Federation on FurtherReductions and Limitations of Strategic Arms," The NuclearRoundtable (Background Document), Internet Edition, The HenryStimson Center.

73 "RatifikatsiyaDogovora SNV-2: Resheniya, Problemy, Perspectivy," SpecialSupplement to Obozrevatel-Observer, 19 July 1996.

74 The following informationwas obtained during an interview with Dr. Nikolai Sokov, MontereyInstitute of International Studies, on August 16, 1996.

75 Laurence Martin,"Dismantling Deterrence?" Review of InternationalStudies, Vol. 17, 1991, p. 224.

76 Khripunov, "Russia'sDangerous Weakness," p. 43.

77 Ivo Daalder, "WhatVision for the Nuclear Future?" in Lexis-Nexis (TheWashington Quarterly, Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Spring1995.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Daalder, TheNature and Practice of Flexible Response, pp. 8-9.

81 Russia would retainthe capability to regenerate nuclear artillery, short-range missiles,etc. However, the assumption is that an air-delivered nuclearweapon can be employed in a much more rapid and potent fashionthan, for example, an artillery shell or short-range missile-unless,of course, the weapons target is immediately adjacent to its deploymentsite.

82 Allison et al,p. 176.

83 Daalder, "WhatVision for the Nuclear Future