Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers
Keith Payne and Robert Rudney: "The Unique Value of Ballistic Missiles for
Deterrence and Coercion"
Executive Summary
A variety of motives lead proliferant states to choose ballistic missiles
over alternative delivery platforms. An important factor in this regard is
the intended purpose for ballistic missiles. Because the United States is a
global power, a self-identified goal for some regional powers is to
establish a deterrent capability against U.S. and allied force-projection,
thereby gaining a "free hand" locally.
When deterrence is the objective, the priority role for ballistic missiles
and WMD may neither be to strike U.S. or allied targets, nor to achieve a
militarily significant capability. Rather, the goal is to establish a
sufficiently plausible ballistic missile/WMD threat to U.S. and allied
civilian targets to deter U.S. and allied force projection. The
distinctions here are between the intent to threaten a U.S. target for
deterrence/coercive purposes as opposed to destroying it, and between
seeking to shape U.S. will, not to battle the U.S. militarily. For this
purpose, ballistic missiles combined with WMD offer significant advantages
over other delivery platforms. These advantages include:
1. Missiles are an excellent deterrent threat as there are very limited
defenses against them.
2. Missiles may be operationally effective on the battlefield, increasing
the anticipated cost of U.S. and allied force projection.
3. Missiles are relatively cheap compared to air- and naval-delivered
modes.
4. Missiles have a longer-range potential than available air and
naval-delivered threats.
5. Missiles are secure, home-based systems.
6. Missiles are controllable, especially when compared with terrorist
modes of delivery.
7. Missiles have prestige value.
8. Missiles are relatively survivable, especially when mobile.
Despite serious economic and technical impediments, several countries are
actively seeking to acquire a ballistic missile capability. There is a
spectrum of motives that leads countries to acquire missiles, and to value
them for certain purposes over alternative delivery platforms. Often, a
missile capability addresses more than one concern, both internal and
external, for a developing country's leadership. For example, missiles may
be valued for prestige, as an export, for their operational capabilities,
and/or for their potential as a deterrent.
Most importantly for this report, some proliferator states seek weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile delivery systems for their
potential deterrent effect on the United States and other Western powers.
It is hoped that missiles, in combination with WMD, will deter U.S. force
projection and thereby provide the proliferator with a "free-hand" to
pursue its own regional objectives.
The incentive to acquire missiles for deterrence purposes is strengthened
by the open and sometimes lengthy U.S. political debate regarding military
engagements, and the obvious U.S. sensitivity to casualties. Each of these
factors contributes to a general perception that U.S. political will can be
slow to coalesce and may be relatively easily deterred. Historically, this
perception has been the basis for challengers, including Japan, Germany,
and Iraq to anticipate achieving a fait accompli that the United States
would be unwilling or unable to reverse. 1
Most important to note in this regard is that for deterrence purposes
challengers do not need to launch a missile strike against the United
States: the value of missiles is as a withheld threat intended to deter.
Indeed, if a challenger employed its missiles and WMD, they likely would
have failed in their primary role as a deterrent to U.S. force projection.
The frequent assertion that "they would never dare" to strike the United
States does not address this motive for acquiring missiles. The threat they
pose in this manner has little to do with actual use per se; it is the
effect that concern of their possible use will have on the willingness of
U.S. leaders and allies to project power in regional crises.
Anticipation of an effective deterrent to U.S. intervention may embolden
some regional challengers to provocations that otherwise would have been
deterred by the prospect of U.S. power projection. 2 That is, some regional
challengers may themselves be undeterred by U.S. power from provocation in
the belief that their missile and WMD capabilities will enable them to
exploit the deliberative character of the U.S. political process and deter
U.S. intervention for a useful period of time or entirely.
As the OSD report, Proliferation: Threat and Response, observes: "The
potential for coercion is perhaps the long-range ballistic missile's
greatest value to a proliferator and the greatest challenge to those
seeking to restrain that state." 3 This value applies not only to
long-range missiles that could conceivably threaten the United States
directly, but also to missiles capable of threatening U.S. expeditionary
forces, regional assets and allies. Some proliferator states clearly value
missiles and WMD as a means to deter and coerce their regional neighbors as
well.
There is direct evidence that many states in the developing world,
particularly "rogue" states hostile to U.S. interests, see WMD and missiles
in these terms, i.e., as means to deter and coerce their potential
opponents, including the United States. The threat of missile strikes
against population centers, and to a lesser extent forces in the field, are
seen as compensatory when an opponent has numerical or technological
superiority. Libyan leader Moammar Qadhafi explained this rationale
explicitly in a 1990 speech:
If they know that you have a deterrent force capable of hitting the United
States, they would not be able to hit you. If we had possessed a
deterrent--missiles that could reach New York--we would have hit it at the
same moment. [reference to 1986 U.S. air strike on Tripoli] Consequently,
we should build this force so that they and others will no longer think
about an attack. 4
In late 1995, Qadhafi similarly asserted that "...As things stand today I
would attack every place from where aggression against Libya was being
planned. I would even be prepared to hit Naples where there is a NATO
base." 5
In 1993 Serbian political leader Vojislav Seseij made missile threats
against Italian cities in an ill-fated effort to deter Italy from serving
as a base for NATO air operations. "We have FF-22(sic) missiles which can
reach your country, but we will not target military compounds, because
their defense is prepared. In case we are attacked, we will fire at your
civilian targets." 6
Iran and Iraq see ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, in
part, as a deterrent against the Israeli nuclear force, should either of
these Islamic states enter into a conventional war with the Israelis.
Kim Myong Chol, a North Korean writer living in Japan and reportedly with
close ties to the North Korean government, has written that "in less than
10 years, North Korea will likely deploy an operational intercontinental
ballistic missile force capable of hitting the American mainland." Kim also
asserts that the North Korean leadership recognizes that missiles are
"politically effective" instruments and that one of the steps Kim Jong-il
could take to convince U.S. leaders that "war would be futile" would be to
threaten long-range missile strikes against strategic targets like nuclear
power stations and major population centers in Japan and the United States.
7
It is important to recall here that a primary motive for acquiring missiles
is deterrence. The obvious limitations of relatively primitive missiles,
such as limited payload and accuracy, are relatively insignificant for this
basic mission. The goal is to shape U.S. and allied decision-making with
regard to regional force projection. Some proliferant states obviously have
judged that this mission does not necessitate sophisticated counterforce
capabilities; a primitive countervalue threat is deemed sufficiently
deterring to be of interest.
China also recognizes the value of WMD and missiles for deterrence and
coercion. China has used "test" launches of its TBMs, which landed in
international waters very near Taiwan, in a self-defined attempt to
intimidate voters during Taiwan's first democratic presidential election. A
senior Chinese military leader also reportedly stated that the United
States would not become involved in a conflict over Taiwanese independence
because U.S. leaders "care more about Los Angeles than they do about
Taiwan;" a deterrent threat made possible by China's long-range missile
capability. 8
The motive to acquire a deterrent, of course, is not limited to those
countries hostile to the United States. In reference to the DF-3/ CSS-2
missiles Saudi Arabia purchased from China, Saudi Prince Sultan has
observed:
It was against this background of Iranian violence and persistent
belligerence that, I assume, King Fahd decided that we needed a weapon to
improve the morale of our armed forces and our people; a deterrent weapon
not intended to be used, except as a last resort when it should be able to
demoralize the enemy by delivering a painful and decisive blow; a weapon
which once launched, could not be jammed or intercepted; a weapons which
would make an enemy think twice before attacking us. The challenge was to
find a country able to supply such a weapon at speed and without
constraining conditions. 9
Thus, Saudi Arabia moved to acquire CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China.
The following summarizes why ballistic missiles are particularly attractive
to Third World countries as instruments of deterrence and coercion, in
addition to several additional motives for missile acquisition.
1. Missiles are an excellent deterrent threat as there are very limited
defenses against them.
As noted by Saudi Prince Sultan above, post-launch survivability
contributes to the attractiveness of ballistic missiles in comparison to
manned aircraft. A 1998 National Air Intelligence Center report noted:
"Missiles are attractive to many nations because they can be used
effectively against an adversary with a formidable air defense system,
where an attack with manned aircraft would be impractical or too costly.
Missiles also have the advantage of fewer maintenance, training, and
logistic requirements than manned aircraft." 10
In the words of one analyst, "[b]allistic missiles may be unique among
weapons for their ability to affect perceptions in great disproportion to
their actual ability to cause death and destruction." 11 The absence of
active defense and sufficient warning time for civilian populations to seek
secure passive protection, makes the ballistic missile an ideal instrument
of civilian terror. The chaotic evacuation of Teheran in the wake of Iraqi
missile attacks during the War of the Cities has already been cited. The
German V-2 ballistic missile offensive in 1944-45 severely undercut
civilian morale in London, even though these inaccurate missile attacks
caused limited damage and casualties. 12 In each case missile attacks and
the threat of attack against civilians had a political impact far out of
proportion to their direct military significance.
Even in use, reliable penetration to target helps make missiles an
excellent means to demoralize an enemy, as demonstrated by the panic in
Teheran during the Iran-Iraq war, 13 and by the significant slowing of the
Israeli economy caused by the Israeli sheltering program during the 1991
Gulf War. Iraqi aircraft were mostly either destroyed or neutralized by
being flown to Iran. The U.S. maintained air supremacy. It could not,
however, effectively counter Iraqi ballistic missile attacks. This lesson
has not been lost on the Iraqis and other proliferator-states.
Moreover, penetration of air defense systems requires the incorporation of
a number of highly sophisticated and expensive systems in combat aircraft.
As W. Seth Carus states:
High performance engines are needed to move the plane through enemy
airspace as quickly as possible, shortening its exposure to enemy air
defenses. Sophisticated navigation and attack systems are needed, including
high quality radar, to allow a pilot to locate and designate the intended
target at distances beyond the reach of antiaircraft weapons. The aircraft
must be equipped to operate stand-off munitions that can be released at
long ranges. Finally, they must be equipped with sophisticated
self-protection systems, including warning devices to detect enemy air
defense radar and missiles and electronic countermeasures to defeat
radar-guided and infrared homing guns and missiles. 14
2. Missiles may be operationally effective on the battlefield, increasing
the anticipated cost of U.S. and allied force projection.
A challenger could use missiles to threaten regional targets critical to
U.S. expeditionary forces, including airfields, ports, staging areas,
depots, C3I, troop concentrations, ships and amphibious landing areas, and
maneuver forces. Such threats, by driving up the expected costs of U.S.
intervention and discouraging allied participation, are considered an
excellent tool for deterring U.S. regional force projection. A number of
analyses suggest that for these types of missions, aircraft may be more
cost effective delivery vehicles. 15 However, for developing countries,
missiles may indeed be the "best available" option. This is particularly
true for states which would otherwise have to fly against highly advanced
air defenses such as those of the U.S. or Israel.
Missiles can also serve operational objectives on the battlefield to
degrade U.S. force projection capabilities and thereby challenge U.S.
political will. Even if the U.S. maintained air superiority, missile
attacks against the U.S./coalition rear can critically disrupt logistics
and communications, particularly during a vulnerable deployment such as a
long-distance intervention. 16 This ability to create havoc behind the
front lines can be intensified by arming missiles with CW or BW. Detection
of even traces of CW or BW would result in tedious, time-consuming passive
defense precautions. There is considerable evidence to demonstrate that
North Korea perceives ballistic missiles, possibly armed with WMD, as "an
important means of augmenting its large conventional land forces in the
event of a conflict on the peninsula." 17
Similarly, for a country like Syria, ballistic missiles can threaten
significant operational effectiveness for pre-war deterrent purposes;
including, for example, surprise attacks (conceivably with CW or BW)
against Israeli military installations to disable airfields, to neutralize
Israeli air assets and to slow down Israeli mobilization. As Dr. Dore Gold,
Israel's UN Ambassador and a noted strategist, writes: "...[U]nder
conditions of surprise attack, the Israeli Air Force would have virtually
no time to reduce adversarial formations before both sides' ground forces
engaged. With the eventual modernization of Middle Eastern missile forces
through increases in missile accuracy, future missile barrages on Israeli
air bases could disrupt any early Israeli air campaign in support of
outnumbered Israeli ground units." 18 Gold cites military analyst Major
General (res.) Israel Tal who warns: "In the future it will be possible to
begin wars at the first stage with firepower and not with mobility, with
all its open preparations. This is one of the great dangers that exists
with missiles." 19
Missile quantities can conceivably substitute for quality on the
battlefield. It is likely that "[s]tates with more launch capability than
demonstrated by Iraq during the Gulf War will launch large scale salvo
attacks against high priority targets, with smaller numbers of missiles
being directed against targets of opportunity. Salvo attacks maximize
damage and compensate for the inaccuracy of older technology missiles." 20
Missiles can also be fired at night when aircraft may not be able to
operate effectively. And, missiles with primitive nuclear explosives could
threaten U.S. low-orbit systems.
3. Missiles are relatively cheap compared to air- and naval-delivered
modes.
There is also an economic motive to prefer missiles over alternative
platforms for deterrent and operational purposes. The OSD report states
that "[m]issiles are much less expensive than acquiring and maintaining a
world-class air force competitive with U.S. military aviation." 21 In this
respect, missiles require less maintenance, training, and logistics than
manned aircraft. 22 Effective pilot training represents a particularly
heavy cost for developing nations. According to the Office of Technology
Assessment: "To the extent that cost matters in delivering a nuclear
weapon, it is probably the total cost of acquiring a delivery
capability--not the cost per ton of payload--that is relevant. Here,
missiles (ballistic or cruise) have a strong advantage, since they are
generally cheaper than advanced aircraft." 23
Even a conventional attack by combat aircraft requires a retinue of
expensive support aircraft and other systems. For attacks against Libya in
1986, the U.S. Navy used more than 70 aircraft but only 14 actually dropped
bombs. Other missions for support aircraft included defense suppression,
electronic jamming, command and control, tanker support, and air cover. 24
Similarly, land-based missile systems do not require the extensive support
that is needed to maintain and protect sea-based systems.
For some countries like North Korea, ballistic missiles offer an instrument
to threaten well beyond national borders without the costs involved in
long-range military aviation or a blue-water navy.
Indeed, North Korea clearly views missiles as a positive economic asset.
They offer a key export commodity and source of scarce hard currency, as
well as a means of supporting research and development on more advanced
missiles. These exports also serve to gain influence in key areas like the
Middle East and South Asia. 25 DIA reportedly believes the North Korean No
Dong to be designed as a system for export. An initial customer is likely
to be Iran, which reportedly has been closely involved with the North
Korean SCUD programs and the No Dong program. 26
In addition to the supply of whole systems, the sale of technologies and
expertise is also a motive to develop a credible missile capability. For
example, in March and April of 1996, North Korea reportedly shipped
materials and equipment to Egypt which "could allow Egypt to begin SCUD C
series production." 27 In addition, some non-governmental, and perhaps
governmental, entities in the states of the former Soviet Union apparently
see their missile technology base as a source of revenue. Sophisticated
Russian guidance technology was reportedly intercepted in Jordan on its way
to Iraq. According to reports, the guidance components may have been
designed for ICBMs. 28
In addition to the obvious functional motives for missile acquisition,
there are also internal circumstances which lead countries to pursue
missile capabilities. For example, in India the military-technical
infrastructure is both highly-capable and independent in what it chooses to
explore. In many respects, Indian decisions on missile technology owe more
to the interests of the military-technology infrastructure than to driving
Army or Air Force missions and requirements (e.g., the Prithvi program had
been underway for almost seven years before the Army became directly
involved). 29 Acquisition of missile components and technologies may be
justified for both military and commercial space launch reasons.
4. Missiles have a longer-range potential than available air and
naval-delivered threats.
Ballistic missile ranges permit states with otherwise limited power
projection capabilities to threaten distant opponents. Chinese deterrence
policy vis-a-vis the United States presently is based on fewer than 25 DF-5
ICBMs, with a 13,000 km. range. 30 Neither its SLBM nor its bomber force
can threaten CONUS at this time. North Korea is developing its Taepo Dong 2
IRBM with the estimated capability to target U.S. Pacific facilities and
territories, in addition to parts of Alaska. 31 For its part, Iran is
completing the 1300-km. range Shahab-3 that could target Israel and is
reportedly developing the even longer range Shahab-4 that can threaten
Europe. Before the Gulf War, Iraq was reportedly working on a long-range
ballistic missile that could threaten targets in Western Europe.
It should be noted that the Chinese model for missile development and
deterrence/coercion was a self-conscious program to expand targeting range:
to threaten U.S. regional facilities as Chinese missile programs allowed
greater range and ultimately the capability to target the United States
itself. North Korea and possibly Iran appear to be consciously pursuing a
similar model.
Of course, many Third World targets are relatively close to their potential
attackers. Seoul is less than 50 kilometers from the North Korean border.
Distances between key Middle East targets are also short. Consequently,
ballistic missiles of modest range (Scuds or SS-21s) provide the potential
for regional deterrence and coercion.
5. Missiles are secure, home-based systems.
Ground-based ballistic missiles can be deployed on sovereign territory,
thus obviating the risks of sea-basing or dependence on external air bases.
32 This factor is particularly important for an isolated state like North
Korea with few friends, a desire for tight central control, and a growing
risk of regime destabilization. Command and control (and political
reliability), particularly if WMD payloads are involved, are seen as more
easily maintained in a missile force based at tightly-controlled
facilities.
6. Missiles are controllable, especially when compared with terrorist modes
of delivery.
A great deal of attention has recently been paid to the possibility of
attack by the "smuggled bomb," i.e., bringing WMD to a target (conceivably
to CONUS) by covert means, possibly using terrorist networks. A frequent
assertion is that ballistic missiles pose no unique threat because WMD
could be deployed aboard a barge, smuggled in on a Cessna, etc. While such
scenarios should be of concern, they are largely dismissed as "not serious"
by the professional military in proliferant states because of the lack of
reliable control over smugglers and saboteurs. The political cultures in
regimes such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran are unsympathetic to giving
control of an extraordinarily destructive and valuable device over to
covert operatives, to move out-of-country, where they may not be subject to
sufficient control.
In addition, such scenarios also are largely inconsistent with the purpose
of deterrence. Operations such as the sabotage scenarios identified above
are, for good reason, covert. Deterrence however, is based on the
possession of a threat that is sufficiently familiar to the opponent to be
regarded as credible. That credibility is best served by a threat that is
well-established and even visible, i.e., well-known to the opponent. For
this purpose, ballistic missiles are often paraded in public by
proliferator states to demonstrate national competence and to serve as a
warning to its neighbors and to any Western power contemplating
intervention. The 1996 Chinese missile "tests" in the Taiwan Strait were
another example of telegraphing a political message by demonstrating
missile delivery capability. From this perspective, ballistic missiles are
eminently more reliable, controllable, and visible than the oft-suggested
smuggler. Because deterrence and coercion is the objective--not destroying
a target--reliability, control, and visibility are critical.
7. Missiles have prestige value.
Missiles are also acquired as symbols of power and prestige. Some regimes
in the developing world see a missile force as a talisman which imparts
international respect and ushers them into the company of the great powers:
"Much like the dreadnought at the beginning of this century, ballistic
missiles are seen as symbols of power and prestige. Because the great
powers have such delivery systems, less-developed countries aspire to them
as well." 33
Reports suggest, for example, that China's objections to U.S. regional
missile defense plans stem in part from concern that BMD deployment would
undermine the prestige conferred by China's nuclear missile capability. 34
In another vein, Ukraine's unwillingness to give up its SCUD Bs as a
prerequisite for MTCR membership may simply be an issue of national pride.
35 North Korea's ballistic missile program is critical to the regime's
self-perception because, as a diplomatic bargaining chip, it forces the
United States to negotiate on a one-to-one basis, excluding South Korea.
Other countries share similar perceptions of the symbolic value of
missiles. Again, according to the Saudi prince charged with creating the
Saudi Strategic Missile Force:
The acquisition of strategic missiles represented a turning point in Saudi
Arabia's defense strategy, and must be placed in the context of the
proliferation of missile systems which has characterized the region in
recent years. Besides reinforcing Saudi Arabia's defenses, the creation of
a Saudi Strategic Missile Force reflected the Kingdom's growing
responsibilities in the Middle East, in the Muslim world as a whole, and on
the world stage. 36
8. Missiles are relatively survivable, especially when mobile.
Another important characteristic of a deterrent threat is its
survivability. This is a well-known tenet of U.S. deterrence policy. Here
too, missiles offer some important advantages as instruments of deterrence
and coercion. In addition to their post-launch survivability, missiles can
be highly-survivable prior to launch. Missiles can be mounted on mobile
launchers and hidden from attacking forces, as demonstrated by the
successful Iraqi concealment and camouflage tactics during the Gulf War.
When not in flight, aircraft are vulnerable targets located at specific
bases or airfields that can be disabled. The Gulf War experience has
impressed itself on proliferator countries: the North Korean No Dong is
road-mobile, as are the Indian Prithvi and the Pakistani Hatf. 37 The
Indian Agni follow-on is listed as "mobile," while the new Pakistani MRBM
is described as road-mobile. All of Iran's missiles are on mobile
launchers. 38
Conclusion
Because the United States is a global power, the prospect of U.S. force
projection often is a concern to local powers seeking a "free hand" in
their region--particularly those "rogue" states with self-expressed
hostility toward the United States. One reason such states prefer ballistic
missiles over alternative delivery platform missiles is for their expected
deterrent and coercive potential vis-a-vis the United States. Ballistic
missiles have unique characteristics that are particularly valuable for
deterrence and coercion. They are relatively survivable, inexpensive,
visible, subject to close control, and have a potential effect on civilian
morale that may outweigh their military significance. Alternatives such as
air and naval platforms, or sabotage are relatively disadvantageous for
deterrent purposes.
Thinking of the United States as a target of deterrent threats, as opposed
to the issuer of threats may be difficult. To understand the attraction of
WMD and ballistic missiles, however, the traditional U.S. role as deterrer
must be put aside. Acquiring a deterrent WMD/missile capability is
important to some "rogue" leaders not because they intend to destroy U.S.
targets, but because they see value in "trumping" U.S. force projection
capabilities with WMD deterrent threats. They seek to attack what they
regard as the vulnerabilities of U.S. will. It is in this context that the
unique value of missiles is obvious and frequently so identified by
military and political experts and leaders in the developing world.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. This view, although difficult for many Americans to understand, clearly
played a role in the Japanese attack in 1941, Hitler's declaration of war
against the United States in 1941, China's decision to enter the Korean
War, and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The traditional U.S.
sensitivity to casualties now extends not only to taking casualties, but to
inflicting them. Note the U.S. concern about Iraqi casualties on the
"highway of death" during the Gulf War. See for example, CBS, CBS Reports:
The Gulf War +5, 18 January 1996, transcript by Burrelle's Information
Services.
2. Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, KY:
University Press of Kentucky, 1996) p. 30.
3. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Secretary of Defense, April 1996) p. A-7.
4. Speech by Qadhafi at a meeting of students of the Higher Institute for
Applied Social Studies at the Great al-Fatih University, 18 April 1990,
Tripoli Television Service, 19 April 1990; in FBIS Daily Report: Near East
and South Asia (FBIS-NES-90-078) 23 April 1990, p. 8. Abul Abbas, head of
the Palestine Liberation Front, has made similar comments: "...revenge
takes 40 years; if not my son, then the son of my son will kill you. Some
day, we will have missiles that can reach New York." And, "I would love to
be able to reach the American shore, but this is very difficult... Some day
an Arab country will have ballistic missiles. Some day an Arab country will
have a nuclear bomb. It is better for the United States and for Israel to
reach peace with the Palestinians before that day." See, "A Terrorist Talks
About Life, Warns of More Deaths," Wall Street Journal, 10 September 1990,
p.1; and, "Terror Chief Threatens Onslaught in Europe," London Sunday
Times, 23 September 1990, p. 2.
5. Reuters, 10:45 EST, 31 December 1995 (mimeo). See also "Gadhafi ready to
use missiles," Minneapolis Star Tribune, 1 January 1996, p. A4.
6. Quoted in, RFE/RL Research Institute, RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 91, May
13, 1993, p. 3-4.
7. Kim Myong Chol, "North Korea prepared to fight to the end as Kim Jong-il
has his own version of The Art of War," Asia Times, 10 April 1996, p. 9.
8. Patrick Tyler, "As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens,"
New York Times, 24 January 1996, p. A3.
9. HRH General Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior, (New York: Harper
Collins, 1995), p. 145.
10. National Air Intelligence Center, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat," Wright-Patterson AFB, NAIC-1031-0985-98 (1998), p. 1
11. Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, 1996) p. 47-48.
12. Robin Ranger, "Theater Missile Defenses: Lessons from British
Experiences with Air and Missile Defenses," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12,
No. 4 (October-December 1993), pp. 405-407.
13. Proliferation Study Team, The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States (Fairfax, VA: National Security Research, Inc., February
1993) p. 5.
14. W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and
Response (Washington, D.C.: Praeger/Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 1990) p. 29.
15. For example, see John Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced
Strike Aircraft," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2, Fall 1992, pp.
41-83.
16. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Secretary of Defense, April 1996) p. A-7.
17. Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 4.
18. Dore Gold, "The Geopolitics of Arab-Israeli Diplomacy in the 1990s:
Security, Territory, and Peace," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12, No. 4
(October-December 1993), p. 392.
19. Cited in Ibid, p. 392.
20. Proliferation: Threat and Response , p. A-7.
21. Ibid.
22. National Air Intelligence Center, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat," Wright-Patterson AFB, NAIC-1031-0985-98 (1998), p. 1
23. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying
Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO,
December 1993) p. 199.
24. Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third
World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991) p. 70.
25. Proliferation: Threat and Response , p. 4.
26. Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's
Intelligence Review: Special Report No. 6, June 1995, pp. 18-22. According
to some reports, the new Pakistan missile, the Ghauri, is derived from the
North Korean No Dong. "Ghauri, A North Korean Missile Variant," The Hindu,
2 May 1998, p. 8.
27. Evan Medeiros, "Egypt Received Scud Missile Parts from North Korea,
Report Says," Arms Control Today, Vol. 26, No. 5, July 1996, p. 25.
28. R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.N. is Said to Find Russian Markings on Iraq-Bound
Military Equipment," Washington Post, 15 December 1995, p. A30.
29. Greg Gerardi, "India's 333rd Prithvi Missile Group," Jane's
Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No. 8, August 1995, p. 361.
30. National Air Intelligence Center, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat," p. 13.
31. National Air Intelligence Center, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat," p. 8.
32. Proliferation Study Team, The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States, p. 5.
33. Proliferation Study Team, The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States, p. 5.
34. Patrick Tyler, "China Warns Against `Star Wars' Shield for U.S. Forces
in Asia," New York Times, 18 February 1995, p. 4.
35. Jeff Erlich, "Scud Missile Cache Stymies Ukraine Effort to Join MTCR,"
Defense News, 30 September-6 October 1996, p. 46.
36. HRH General Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior, (New York:
HarperCollins, 1995), p. 138.
37. National Air Intelligence Center, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat," pp. 5, 9.
38. Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 27.