Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers
Daniel Gouré 1 : "The Evolution of Russian Nuclear Forces: Working to a
Plan"
The continuing decline of many elements of the Russian Federation's Armed
Forces and ongoing struggles over budgets, reform proposals and
organization should not be allowed to obscure the fact that in the area of
strategic nuclear forces Moscow has a plan for the future, one which the
leadership is striving seriously to implement. This plan has a number of
elements:
* Creation of a smaller strategic force reflective of both strategic
requirements and budgetary realities
* Re-organization of the strategic forces
* Improvement of the C3 for strategic forces
* Selected modernization of strategic systems
* Maintenance of a critical strategic industrial base
* Pursuit of selected long-term R&D projects designed to enable Russia's
Armed Forces to "leapfrog" into the Revolution in Military Affairs
sometime in the early part of the next century.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian academics and military
theoreticians have been struggling to define the basis for a national
security policy and corresponding military strategy that would guide
military planning and force development into the next century. In May 1997
the Russian Security Council published a national security strategy. This
document focused primarily on Russia's internal weaknesses as the major
source of potential security risks. However, it does argue for the
maintenance of military power sufficient to protect Russia's. national
interests and territorial integrity. At the same time, the national
security concept clearly places primacy on placing Russia's economic house
in order. 2
As part of that effort to define the objectives of a military reform
program and force development plan, Russian experts have engaged in a
lively debate over the character of nuclear doctrine, utility of nuclear
forces, and the direction of development of Russian strategic forces. The
question of the role of nuclear forces in Russian is clearly of more than
academic significance. Given the evident weakness of the Russian state, how
can Moscow maintain the military power necessary to meet its national
security interests. As one Russian analyst noted, Russia's strategic
Missile Forces consume only 8 per cent of the current defense budget. 3
One school of thought that emerged in this period argued that nuclear
weapons had lost whatever usefulness they had had with the end of the Cold
War. on of nuclear weapons in Russian national security policy and defense
strategy. This line of argument supports advocacy of minimum deterrent
postures and even the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. 4 Some
analysts in this school argued that the only purpose of nuclear forces
should be only to deter nuclear attack on Russian itself. 5 Other analysts
claimed that nuclear weapons serve a largely political purpose, countering
perceptions of Russian military weakness, but that their value in this
regard would diminish over time as Russia's economic and military
situations improved and as relations with the other nuclear powers,
particularly the U.S. and China, continued to progress.
A second school made a very different argument. They agreed with those in
the first school who acknowledge that nuclear weapons serve a political
function as a guarantor of stability in relations with other nuclear
powers. But, they go on to argue that strategic forces, and specifically
ballistic missiles, have an increasing role to play as usable instruments
in Russian military planning. Because of its current economic and military
weakness, Russia must rely heavily nuclear weapons to guarantee its
security not only in the event of a strategic threat, but also in the event
of theater conventional aggression. 6 According to some members of this
second school, Russia requires its own version of NATO's erstwhile concept
of flexible response which would permit limited nuclear strikes not only in
response to nuclear first-use, but also in response to conventional
aggression. 7 Russian analysts make arguments similar to those once made by
Western analysts, specifically that escalation can be controlled
particularly if limited strikes are not conducted against U.S. territory
and Russia retains sufficient strategic power to conduct a large second
strike in the event the U.S. escalated to homeland attacks. 8
It is not surprising, given the discussion above, that a number of Russian
defense analysts also focus on the potential utility of tactical nuclear
weapons. 9 One Russian source claimed that while the official position of
the Russian Government, MOD, and General Staff was to reject the use of
tactical nuclear weapons, among the "staff generals" there was a commonly
held view that such weapons are a necessary part of the country's defense
capability. 10 According to an article in the journal of the Russian
General Staff, tactical nuclear weapons could provide escalatory options
for the Russian Armed Forces without crossing the threshold to strategic
exchanges:
* the presence of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the Russian
Federation's
* Armed Forces permits the restoration of the unequal balance in general
purpose
* forces and their use in the course of military operations permits
compensating
* for enemy superiority on individual strategic (operational) axes
without crossing
* the activation threshold of strategic nuclear forces in the process.
11
Russian military leaders appear to have adopted this second set of
arguments. They see the need to make nuclear weapons a central element of
their operational planning for future conflict, as well as of their
declaratory policy. The budgetary impetus to find a low cost means of
meeting security requirements is self evident, and reinforced by the new
national security doctrine. 12 The doctrinal impetus for the restructuring
of the Russian strategic forces came in 1993 with the formulation of a new
Russian military doctrine that formally renounced the long-standing Russian
no first-use pledge. Russia's commitment to a military doctrine and
strategy in which nuclear weapons play a central role is reflected by a
series of actions they have taken to maintain and even increase the
effectiveness of its strategic forces. One Russian commentator referred to
this as the "Malinovsky" military reforms, referring to Soviet Marshal
Rodion Malinovsky, who presided over the development of Russia's first
nuclear force posture and strategy in the 1960s. 13 The "Malinovsky
strategy" was based on the premise that a future war with the West
inevitably would be intercontinental and nuclear and that the Soviet Union
must plan for the use of nuclear weapons from the outset of even a local or
regional conflict. 14
The Russian military has taken a number of steps to reorganize and reform
their strategic forces in line with a military strategy that relies more
heavily on nuclear weapons. First among these actions is the reorganization
on November 1, 1997 of the strategic forces, specifically the integration
of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), Military Space Forces (MSF), and
Military Space Defense Forces (MSDF) into the Strategic Deterrent Forces
(SDF). Russian military leaders assert that this has several positive
points. First, it is supposed to reduce costs by eliminating redundant and
parallel command structures, thereby saving, by some estimates, over a
trillion rubles. 15 Second, it simplifies command and control of nuclear
forces by concentrating planning, release authority and execution in the
hands of the SDF's General Staff which is a national-level command echelon
responsible to the General Staff of the Armed Forces. One commentator
characterized the new system as permitting the General Staff to control all
of the SDF assets from a single command center. 16 Third, Russian sources
also claim that integration has both increased the survivability of top
echelon command centers and improved the efficiency with which warning
information is moved and orders are transmitted. 17 Reorganization of the
Air Force and Air Defense Forces is scheduled to take in 1998.
A second set of actions the continuing development, improvement and
expansion of the C3 for strategic forces. During the Cold War, the Soviet
Union engaged in a forty-plus year program of building underground command
posts and leadership shelters. There are current reports that work
continues at a number of these Cold War-era sites. This suggests continuing
interest on the part of Russia defense decision makers in survivable
command and control.
In addition, the Russian military appears to be continuing to maintain and
even upgrade a series of communications systems built by the Soviet General
Staff. Starting in the 1970s, the Soviet General Staff and strategic
services build a massive and redundant set of C3 capabilities that linked
the General Staff and command centers of the strategic forces with
operational units. The essential purpose of the Cold War-era system was to
ensure positive launch control, that is the ability to launch a retaliatory
strike. As such, it was the military which had control of the launch codes
and which was responsible for the execution of launch orders. 18 One aspect
of that system which has received attention in the West is the so-called
"doomsday machine," a set of sensors co-located with some of Soviet command
centers that could detect signs of nuclear detonations and respond by
triggering the launch of specially-equipped ballistic missiles that, once
launched, would transmit launch codes to the ballistic missile force. The
apparent intent of this system, called Perimetr, was to provide a final
launch enabling capability should the Soviet Union suffer a successful
decapitating strike. 19
Public statements suggest that work is continuing on the Soviet-era
strategic forces C3 systems, with the intent of increasing the degree of
centralization. According to one source, at the Strategic Rocket Forces
Central Command Post an integrated system for command and control of
attack, reconnaissance and information forces has been created and is
successfully operating. 20 Strategic Forces commander, Colonel General
Yakovlev, is quoted in one article as saying that now "tactical control
signals from the Central Command Post are guaranteed to reach the SRF
subunits deployed near China within five to eight seconds." 21 This would
appear to provide a rationale for the continuing expenditures on
superhardened underground structures: a launch on attack strategy would be
supportable if Russia possessed a centralized command and control structure
housed in these underground retreats and, linked by secure, redundant
communications to strategic launchers. 22
The expenditure on strategic forces C3 is also in keeping with the argument
made by senior Russian military leaders that deterrence in the modern era
is less a matter of the numbers of weapons on both sides as it is in their
deterrence potential, meaning their ability to inflict a retaliatory attack
even under the most unfavorable circumstances. 23
A third set of actions involves the restructuring of the strategic forces
themselves, essentially downsizing the force, coupled to an effort at
selected modernization. The reduction in overall numbers is mandated by
Russia's economic situation, in addition to circumstances associated with
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, arms control, etc. As a result, the
air breathing and sea-based legs of the Russian nuclear triad have shrunk
dramatically. 24 In addition, obsolescence of the residual force is an
increasing problem. At present, according to one report, some 58 percent of
strategic missiles are being operated beyond their guarantee period along
with 31 percent of space launchers and 67 percent of orbiting hardware. 25
Other reports put the numbers of systems exceeding their age as even
higher. In addition, there are some holes in the Russian early warning net
due to a combination of the closing down of land-based early warning radars
and the failure to replace space-based early warning satellites.
While they recognize these weaknesses, Russian military leaders are quick
to point out that their exercises indicate that their systems and the
supporting C3 are operating with a high degree of reliability and technical
performance. The Russians claim that the announced tests of SS-25s and
SS-18s have all been successful, despite the fact that the latter have been
in service more than twice their guaranteed operating time. 26 The Russians
have held a number of strategic exercises in 1996 and 1997 to demonstrate
both the reliability of their ICBM force and, more important, of their
command and control system. The exercises, apparently successful, simulated
stressing conditions including launch during a period of escalating
conflict. 27
Most unclassified assessments suggest that Russia is seeking to stabilize
its strategic force posture at the level of approximately 2,000-2,500
warheads. The centerpiece of the modernization program is the SS-27, or
Topol-M, an advanced, single-RV ballistic missile which will be deployed in
both a road-mobile and silo-based configuration. One description of the
future Russian strategic force posture had a mix of approximately 200
silo-based SS-19s and SS-27s and 600 road-mobile SS-25s and SS-27s, some
1,200 warheads on 15 SSBNs (a mix of Delta IV and new Boray's, both armed
with the new SS-N-28) and approximately 100 strategic bombers. 28 Depending
on warning and deployment states, this would allow for a retaliatory strike
of about 1,000 weapons, the bulk of which would be by SRF forces. 29 In
addition, one source claims that the Topol-M would permit Russia to
increase available warheads in response to a breakdown in arms reductions
by deploying that system with three or four MRV warheads. 30 The Topol-M is
also alleged to contain advanced features for penetrating ABM systems. 31
The last set of actions by the Russian military leadership involves
investments in advanced technology to support a leap-frog into the RMA,
early in the next century. The current plan is to apply savings achieved
through restructuring and downsizing of the Armed Forces to the acquisition
of advanced weapons and hardware. According to Minister of Defense
Sergeyev, the goal of current investments in the Russian
military-industrial complex is to develop breakthrough capabilities that
are 10-15 percent ahead of all existing in the world. 32 Among the critical
areas that Russian sources identify for investment in the future are:
stealth and counter-stealth, automated control systems, information warfare
capabilities, strategic delivery systems, and precision strike
technologies.
In conclusion, Russia's military leadership is implementing a
reorganization and investment intended to provide Moscow with a strategic
force with the following features:
* Capable of launching, under the worst conditions, a retaliatory strike
of up to 1,000 warheads;
* Able to conduct flexible response options with strategic forces;
* Able to maintain positive control over strategic forces in the face of
both conventional and nuclear strikes;
* Designed with the ability to respond to a breakdown in strategic arms
control negotiations.
Overall, the current C3 system for Russian strategic forces appears to be
in relatively good shape technically, although admittedly, elements of it
are obsolescent and there are concerns for the ability of the early warning
net to cover some threat corridors. There appears to be little reason to
worry about unauthorized launch or a truly accidental launch. In addition,
the Russian military is taking steps to reduce the risk of inadvertent
launches such as might occur due to warning errors in a crisis. The
reorganization of strategic forces into the Strategic Deterrent Force is
intended, in part, to ameliorate some of the impacts of aging. More
important, however, it is intended to reduce the risk of unintended nuclear
launches by more closely coupling warning forces to launch commanders and
reducing the time necessary to transmit launch orders. This can have the
effect of increasing the time available to make a decision, even in a
crisis.
Greater concerns should be focused on the combination of the new Russian
doctrine of "flexible options," coupled to a command and control systems
which permits the General Staff or other senior command echelons to send
launch orders directly to firing units. The idea expressed by some analysts
that Russia could employ nuclear weapons in a local conflict while
controlling the escalation process is fraught with danger. Russian
strategic miscalculation, not accidental launch, should be considered the
greater source of threat to the U.S.
A second source of threat is a political crisis in Russia in which the
military fractures and factions seek to gain control of strategic forces in
the struggle for internal power. The Russian military is increasingly
politicized. Because of the technical and organizational reforms undertaken
to make the SDF more responsive and secure, a small clique within the
General Staff has the potential to gain control over strategic nuclear
weapons.
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1. Dr. Daniel Gouré is the Deputy Director for Political Military Studies
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); responsible
for analyses of U.S. national security policy, U.S. domestic management,
the future conflict of warfare, the information revolution, and counter
proliferation. Directs analyses of emerging social issues, with a special
emphasis on advanced technologies.
2. Dr. Sergey Rogov, Military Reform and the Defense Budget of the Russian
Federation, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, August 1997
3. Ibid, p. 45
4. Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's Approach to Nuclear Weapons," The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 20, Num. 3, Summer, 1997, pp. 107-114
5. General M. A. Gareyev (Ret.), "Nuclear Weapons and Russia' Security:
Specific Steps in the Cause of Disarmament are more Effective than Loud
Declarations." Foreign Military Review, No. 43, November 13, 1997, p. 4
6. Professor V. Surikov, "Fate of the Weapons of Retribution: Russia's
Strategic Nuclear Forces on he Threshold of a New Century," Pravda Five,
September 10, 1996, p. 1
7. Alexander Golts, "The Last Attribute of a Superpower," Itogi, No. 49,
December 16, 1997, p. 29
8. Victor Starukhin and Gennadiy Kuznetsov, "The Basis of Strategic
Stability, "Foreign Military Review, No. 31, August 22, 1997, p. 6
9. David Markov, "The Russians and Their Nukes," Air Force Magazine,
February, 1997, pp. 40-43
10. "Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Today's Position of the
Military-Political Elite and Prospects for its Transformation," Problems of
Security, No. 20, December, 19976, pp. 3-5
11. Colonel V. Kruglov and Colonel M. Sosnovsky, "On the Role of
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear Deterrence," Military Thought, No.
6, September, 1997, p. 12
12. So serious is the defense budget problem that Minister of Defense
Rodionov was fired in May, 1997, allegedly for criticizing defense budget
shortfalls, and replaced by Colonel General Sergeyev, former chief of the
Strategic Rocket Forces
13. Pavel Felgengauer, "The Rocket Troops are Ready for Local Wars," Today,
July 29, 1997, p.3
14. William and Harriet Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, Westview
Press, Boulder, CO, 1979, pp.41-44
15. Yuri Golotyuk, "The Kremlin Gambles on Nuclear Shield and Sword: The
Combat Efficiency of the Russian Nuclear Missile System has Increased 15
Percent," Russian Telegraph, November 19, 1997, p. 2
16. Igor Korotchenko, "Russia's Strategic Deterrent Forces," Foreign
Military Review, February 8, 1997, p. 1
17. "With a High Degree of Reliability: Strategic Missile Forces
Commander-in-Chief, Colonel General V. Yakovlev Answers Red Star's
Questions," Red Star, December 17, 1997, p. 1
18. Valery Yarunich, "Russian Strategic Command and Control, Chapter 4,
paper presented at the conference on ussian Missile Programs, the MTCR and
the Future of U.S.-Russian Arms Control, Monterrey, California, July 21-22,
1995, pp. 5-17
19. Steven A. Zaloga, "Russian's Doomsday Machine," Jane's Intelligence
Review, Volume 8, No. 2, February 1, 1996, p. 54
20. Goltz, op.cit., p. 30
21. Golotyuk, op. cit., p. 2
22. This possibility was suggested by Yarunich, op. cit., p. 24
23. "All are Responsible for the Security of the Fatherland," An interview
with Colonel General V. Yakovlev, CinC of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Red
Star, March 13, 1998, p. 1
24. For example, the majority of the Typhoon SSBNs have already been
removed from service. See David Hoffman, "Shattered Shield: The Decline of
Russia's Nuclear Forces, The Washington Post, March 16, 1998, p. A1
25. Ilya Kedrov, "In Brief," Foreign Military Review, No. 44, November 28,
1997, p. 1
26. "With a High Degree of Reliability," op. cit., p. 1
27. David Isby, "Russians Raise Strategic Exercise Numbers to Make a
Point," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, Vol. 1, Number 8, November, 1997, p.
15
28. Surikov, op. cit., p. 1
29. Colonel General Yakovlev speaks of the SRF accomplishing 90 percent of
the required tasks for strategic forces in the event of a surprise attack.
See Golotyuk, op. cit.
30. Ibid, p. 5
31. Valentin Kunin, "Russia Develops 21st Century Strategic Weapons," News,
February 20, 1998
32. Minister of Defense, I. Sergeyev, "Army Reform to Rely on Breakthrough
Technology," ITAR-TASS, September 3, 1997