Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers
Michael Eisenstadt 1 : "Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in
Iraq and Iran"
Current Developments and Potential
for Future Surprises
This paper will attempt to answer the following questions: 1) What are the
current missile capabilities of Iraq and Iran? 2) What kind of WMD payloads
can these countries put atop their missiles?
3) What considerations should analysts bear in mind in assessing the future
direction of missile and WMD programs in these two countries?
Iraq 2
Ballistic Missiles
Before the 1991 Gulf War, the backbone of Iraq's missile force consisted of
the al-Husayn missile, which was an extended-range variant of the Soviet
Scud-B. Originally, the al-Husayn was built by cannibalizing Scud-Bs, using
three Scud-Bs to create two al-Husayns. Subsequently, Iraq was able to
achieve a 1:1 conversion ratio by producing airframe and fuel-tank
components locally. By the time of the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq was able to
produce most of the components for the al-Husayn locally, including
warheads, airframes, and motors. (Iraq is not believed to have been able to
produce the guidance system and turbopumps for the motors, and Iraq claims
that of the 80 or so motors it produced, none performed to standard.) Iraq
was also working on a number of medium- and intermediate-range missiles
which never got beyond the design or initial development stages. 3
Iraq may retain a small force of operational missiles--probably locally
produced versions of the al-Husayn--equipped with chemical or biological
warheads and mounted on mobile launchers. In addition, Iraq has conducted
computer design studies of missiles with proscribed ranges since the 1991
Gulf War (including missiles with ranges of several thousand kilometers),
and it has continued efforts to procure components for such
missiles--including gyroscopes obtained in 1995 from scrapped Russian
intermediate-range missiles. Because Iraq is permitted to produce missiles
with a range of 150 km or less, it retains the infrastructure, talent, and
know-how needed to reconstitute its missile program rapidly, and it has
been working on several systems--such as the Ababil (which uses an SA-2
rocket motor) and the Sumud (a miniature Scud-B) in order to preserve the
skills of design and production personnel. Were inspections and monitoring
to cease, Iraq could produce a missile of proscribed range perhaps within a
year, by clustering or stacking missiles currently in its inventory, or by
resuming production of the al-Husayn missile. 4
WMD Payloads
Despite seven years of inspections, Iraq retains a significant residual CBW
arsenal, and is probably is quietly continuing with its nuclear effort.
Iraq's Pre-1991 Missile Force
Missile Range(km) Comments
Fao 100-200 An extended range HY-1 Silkworm anti-ship
missile ground targets
Fahd 300 SA-2 modified for use against ground targets
Scud-B 300 Standard Soviet 8K-14 Scud-B
Al-Husayn 650 Modified Scud-B, fitted with HE and CBW
warheads
Al-Husayn "short" 650 Al-Husayn modified in attempt to solve
flight instability problems
Al-Husayn Al-Husayn modified to carry nuclear weapon
"nuclear" 630 to be produced under August 1990 "crash
program"
Al-Hijara 650 Al-Husayn fitted with concrete-filled
"kinetic penetrator" warhead
Al-Abbas 950 Extended range al-Husayn
Al-Abid Space launch vehicle test-launched December
1989
Tammuz Al-Husayn with SA-2 second stage; mock-up
built
Solid-fuel missile being developed jointly
Badr 2000 750+ with Argentina and Egypt. Development only
partially completed. Intended as Iraq's
primary nuclear delivery system.
Chemical Weapons
Iraq is believed to still possess a small stockpile of lethal agents,
munitions, precursor chemicals, and production equipment that provide it
with the ability to inflict massive casualties on an unprotected civilian
population, though it probably does not have sufficient quantities of
chemical munitions for effective battlefield use. This residual inventory
probably includes stocks of blister and nerve agents, possibly including
quantities of "VX salt"--a form of the highly lethal nerve agent that can
be stored on a long-term basis. The U.S. government believes that if
inspections and monitoring were to cease, Iraq could resume production of
mustard agent in weeks, sarin within months, and VX in 2-3 years. 5
Some 45-75 al-Husayn warheads remain unaccounted for (Iraq claims to have
unilaterally destroyed them but offers no proof). Iraq's first generation
CW warhead consisted of converted Scud-B warheads, and was a unitary design
that relied on a burster charge to aerosolize and disseminate the agent.
Because these warheads retained the contact fusing of the original warhead,
the burster charge would have detonated only upon impact, disseminating the
agent over a very limited area (perhaps several tens of meters from the
point of impact). A nerve agent payload, however, could nonetheless create
a downwind hazard extending hundreds of meters or more from the impact
point, depending on weather conditions and building patterns. If Iraq has
succeeded since 1991 in acquiring barometric or radar proximity fuses for
its missile warheads, it might be able to make a more efficient warhead
that would disseminate its CW payload over the heads of the target
population (i.e. prior to impact), dramatically increasing the size of the
lethal downwind footprint, and increasing the number of potential
casualties per missile strike. 6
Biological Weapons
Iraq probably retains agent seed stocks, growth media, production
equipment, and munitions, and almost certainly has sufficient quantities of
biological agent on hand to cause massive casualties among civilians,
though it may not yet have perfected the means for effectively
disseminating biological warfare agents. Both UNSCOM and the U.S.
government believe that if inspection and monitoring were to cease, Iraq
could resume production of biological agents within a matter of days. Some
UN inspectors, however, believe that Iraq may currently possess a
clandestine biological warfare agent production capability, which means
that they could be producing biological warfare agents even now. 7
Iraq almost certainly retains a residual biological warfare capability,
since some agents (such as anthrax in its spore form) can be stored and
remain viable for decades, although it is unclear whether Iraq has
developed an effective warhead for missile delivery. Iraq is believed to
have used basically the same modified Scud-B warheads used in its CW
program as its first generation BW delivery system. As such, these warheads
would have probably been even less effective at disseminating BW agent than
CW agent, since the explosive burster charge would have killed many of the
pathogens during dissemination. And if Iraq was producing BW agent in
liquid form only (as it claims), the percentage of agent aerosolized by the
burster charge in the optimal size for inhalation would have been
minuscule. Even in the worst case, perhaps several tens of people would
have been affected. Perhaps more people would have been killed by the
impact of the warhead and missile airframe.
This assessment would change, however, if Iraq succeeded since 1991 in
acquiring and fitting barometric or radar proximity fuses to its surviving
al-Husayn missile warheads. This would result in a warhead that would
disseminate its BW payload overhead--before impacting with the
ground--allowing for more efficient dissemination of the agent. While it
may be difficult for Iraq to test such an arrangement under the nose of UN
weapons inspectors, it is not impossible: they may have done so by testing
such a fusing arrangement on one of its missiles of permitted (less than
150 km) range. Likewise, Iraq might be working on designs for a more
efficient and effective second generation BW warhead employing submunitions
to more uniformly disseminate the agent over a broader area. It would be
almost impossible for UN inspectors to detect such activities if they were
restricted to paper and computer design studies and lab work.
Finally, if Iraq were to have the capability to produce BW agent in dried
form and to mill the dried agent to the optimal size for dissemination and
inhalation by human subjects, it would be able to introduce dramatic
improvements into its warhead design. Iraq is believed to retain the
equipment required to do so, though it is unclear whether it has mastered
the technique. As stated above, Iraq's first generation BW weapons used
agent in liquid form. When disseminated by a burster charge, a large
percentage of pathogen are killed by the explosion, and much of the
resulting aerosol is not the right size for inhalation. Only about 1% of a
liquid agent load is effectively disseminated when dispersed by a burster
charge. However, in the case of dried agent that is already milled to the
proper size before loading in the warhead, a much higher percentage of the
agent payload can be effectively disseminated (even if the dissemination
pattern provided by a unity warhead is relatively inefficient). And if Iraq
could master the design of bomblets for a submunition warhead that would
uniformly disseminate the agent over a wide area, even greater efficiencies
could be realized. It is not clear whether Iraq has made any progress in
developing such a warhead since 1991, although there is reason to believe
that it was working on such a design before the Gulf War. 8
Nuclear Weapons
Iraq possesses a workable bomb design, bomb components produced before the
Gulf War (it claims to have destroyed these but has not provided credible
evidence), and its cadre of experienced scientists and technicians--who are
being kept together and are probably able to do paper and computer studies
and simulations as well as weapons design work with little risk of
detection.
Since the Gulf War, Iraq is suspected of having conducted clandestine
theoretical research relating to bottlenecks in its pre-1991 program, which
would make it easier to resurrect its program if inspections and monitoring
were to cease. The greatest concern, however, remains the possibility that
were Iraq to acquire fissile material from abroad, it could probably
produce an operational nuclear device--perhaps within a year--even with
inspections and monitoring in place. It is not clear, however, whether such
a device would be small enough and reliable enough to be delivered by
missile. In such a case, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft delivery options are
possible. 9
Iraq also retains the capability to produce radiological weapons. Iraq
researched radiological weapons in the mid-late 1980s and field tested one
or two different types of bombs filled with a radiological payload. United
Nations Security Council resolutions allow Iraq to possess radioactive
isotopes for medical, agricultural, and industrial purposes, which are the
raw materials needed to produce radiological weapons. These, however, are
probably more useful as terror weapons than weapons of mass destruction. 10
Iran 11
Ballistic Missiles
The backbone of Iran's strategic missile force consists of 200-300 North
Korean Scud-B and -C missiles, with ranges of 320 km and 500 km,
respectively. These missiles are armed with conventional and perhaps
chemical warheads, are mounted on ten to fifteen mobile launchers, and can
reach major population centers in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller Arab
Gulf states. In addition, Iran funded the development of North Korea's
Nodong-1 missile which, with a range of 1,300 km, is capable of reaching
Israel from Iran. The program, however, has reportedly been plagued by
technical and financial problems; the Nodong-1 has been tested only once
(in May 1993) and only a small number of systems (ten mobile launchers with
missiles) have been produced by North Korea and fielded with its own
forces. Though Iran is not believed to have taken delivery of finished
Nodong-1 missiles, it is believed to have received much of the technology
incorporated in this missile as compensation for its financial support. 12
Iran also signed a contract in 1989 for some 200 Chinese CSS-8 missiles,
and at least several score have been delivered. These are SA-2 (HQ-2)
surface-to-air missiles which have been modified for use against ground
targets. Though possessing limited range, payload, and accuracy, they would
be important in the event of a future war with Iraq because of their
ability to hit major Iraqi population centers near the border with Iran and
because they offer Iran a cheap and effective way to dramatically augment
its offensive punch. 13
Iran has been trying since the mid-1980s to acquire a missile production
capability, in order to end its reliance on external sources of supply.
This effort, however, has been plagued by various bottlenecks, including a
shortage of skilled personnel, special materials, technological expertise,
and adequate financing. As a result, until recently, Iran had little
success in creating an indigenous production capability thus far. 14
This may be changing, however, thanks to aid provided by Russia, China, and
North Korea in the past 2-3 years. This assistance includes equipment,
machinery, components (including guidance systems), and special materials
required to produce missiles. At present, Iran assembles Scud-C missiles
acquired in kit form from North Korea and it is reportedly building two
hybrid liquid-fuel systems with substantial help from Russia: the
Shehab-3--based on the North Korean Nodong-1 is expected to have a range of
1,300 km, and the Shehab-4--based on the Soviet SS-4 is expected to have a
range of 2,000 km. In 1997, Iran conducted 6-8 static ground tests of the
motor for the Shehab-3, indicating that work has gone beyond the design
stage. According to leaked intelligence estimates, the Shehab-3 is likely
to make its first test flight within 1-2 years, and the Shehab-4 its maiden
flight within about 3-4 years. 15 Iran is also believed to have a parallel
short-range solid-fuel missile (with a range of 150 km) that it is
undertaking with Chinese help. 16
Iran's Rocket and Missile Forces
Range (km) Payload Source Comments
Rockets:
Shahin-1/2 20 HE/CBW(?) Local --
Oghab 45 HE/CBW(?) Local --
Fajr-3/5 45 HE/CBW(?) Local --
Naze`at-4/6/10 90 HE/CBW(?) Local --
Zelzal-2 100 HE/CBW(?) Local --
Missiles:
CSS-8 150 HE/CBW(?) China
Scud-B 320 HE/CBW(?) N. Korea
Scud-C 500-600 HE/CBW(?) N. Korea
Shehab-3 1,300 CBW(?) Local (with Nodong-1
foreign help) derivative?
Shehab-4 2,000 CBW(?) Local (with SS-4 derivative?
foreign help)
Iran also produces a range of artillery rocket systems, including the
Shahin, Oghab, Fajr, Naze`at, and Zelzal. Although these rocket systems
were developed primarily for a battlefield support role, Iran used the
Oghab in a strategic role during the February-April 1988 "War of the
Cities," to bombard Iraqi cities and towns, as well as military targets
along the border. In a future war with Iraq, they would almost certainly be
used in such a fashion again, and could be used to deliver chemical strikes
if necessary.
Iran is also reportedly working on a cruise missile to deliver conventional
and nonconventional payloads. A first-generation Iranian cruise missile
would probably be based on missiles currently fielded by Iran, such as the
Chinese HY-1 Silkworm or C-802 anti-ship missiles, which would simplify and
expedite initial production efforts. Indeed, there are reports that Iran is
developing an extended-range version of the HY-1. 17
Because of its isolation and weakness, the Islamic Republic of Iran has
shown a preference for using covert, indirect methods--such as the use of
terrorist proxies--as a means of achieving key political or military
objectives. This has enabled Iran to challenge more powerful adversaries
while minimizing the risk of retaliation. Because of its success in
employing such methods in the past, Iran is more likely than other states
to rely on covert delivery means to deliver chemical and biological agents
(saboteurs armed with aerosol dispensers, or specially trained teams
operating vehicles, aircraft, or small boats fitted with spray tanks)
especially when dealing with an adversary capable of retaliating in kind,
or escalating with nuclear weapons.
Chemical Weapons
Iran possesses one of the largest chemical warfare programs in the
developing world. It can produce several hundred tons of chemical agent a
year and may have produced several thousand tons of agent to date,
including blister (sulfur mustard), choking (phosgene), blood (cyanidal),
and possibly nerve (sarin) agents. 18 Given that Syria first received
Soviet binary-type Scud missile warheads for its own stockpile of Scud-Bs
in 1979, 19 and that Syria and Iran are believed to have a rather close
relationship in the military R&D domain, it would seem prudent to assume
that Iran gained access to these warheads for reverse engineering purposes,
or that it emulated the Iraqi approach in modifying conventional Scud
warheads in order to produce a first generation chemical warhead for its
own inventory of Scud-B and -C missiles.
In January 1993, Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which
it ratified in June 1997, and which obligates it to destroy its stocks of
chemical weapons within ten years of ratification. Despite these steps
toward apparent compliance with the CWC, it is hard to believe that Iran
would give up a potentially important tactical force multiplier and the
core component of its strategic deterrent while Iraq may retain residual
chemical and biological warfare capabilities. One explanation is that Iran
has ratified the treaty with the intention of hiding stocks of chemical
weapons for future contingencies. If so, it might give up its stockpiles of
older, less effective agents, while covertly retaining its stocks of more
lethal agents. Alternatively, it might intend to give up its agent
stockpile while retaining an emergency surge capability for production
during a crisis. Either way, Iran may provide an early test of the efficacy
of the CWC.
Biological Weapons
Iran may have produced small quantities of biological agent and perhaps a
small number of weapons. It probably is researching such standard agents as
anthrax and botulin toxin (two agents also produced by Iraq) and it has
shown interest in acquiring materials that could be used to produce various
other toxins (specifically, mycotoxins and ricin). Iran can probably deploy
biological weapons and disseminate them via either terrorists or spray
tanks mounted on vehicles, aircraft, or boats, although more advanced means
of dissemination--by unmanned aircraft or missiles, for instance--may
currently be beyond its means. 20
Nuclear Weapons
Iran's known nuclear technology base is at present rather rudimentary,
although it is building an extensive civilian nuclear infrastructure that
could serve as a stepping stone to a weapons program. In particular, its
efforts to acquire research reactors, nuclear power plants, and nuclear
fuel cycle related facilities, its apparent investigation of various
enrichment techniques (gas centrifuge enrichment in particular), and
reports of Iranian efforts to obtain fissile material in the former Soviet
Union have raised questions about Iran's intentions.
Because Iran's nuclear program is believed to be in the early stages, at
this time there are few unambiguous indicators of nuclear intent. However,
Iran's procurement activities during the past decade are not entirely
consistent with a peaceful nuclear program. Iran's strategy is probably to
build up its civilian nuclear infrastructure while avoiding actions that
would clearly violate its NPT commitments, using its new contacts in Russia
and China to gain experience, expertise, and dual-use technology that could
assist a parallel clandestine military program sometime down the road. Most
public estimates of the time Iran will need to attain a nuclear capability
range between seven and fifteen years, although Tehran could probably
acquire a nuclear capability sooner if it were to receive fissile material
and extensive help from abroad. Because of the uncertainties involved, it
is impossible to predict how long it could take Iran to develop nuclear
weapons. There is no doubt though, that the acquisition of civilian
research reactors, nuclear power plants, and nuclear technology from Russia
and China will ultimately aid this effort. Without such outside help, Iran
will probably face formidable obstacles to realizing its nuclear ambitions.
21
Outlook
In the coming years, it will be very difficult to assess the scope and
progress of the missile and WMD programs of Iraq and Iran, due to target
country deception and denial efforts, because progress in each of these
programs will depend on the interplay of several variables whose
interaction are difficult to predict or assess, and because these programs
may benefit from help from various foreign actors (individuals, companies,
or governments) whose identity and motives may not always be clear.
In Iraq, the international community will be faced with the problem of
detecting covert design and development work and field tests of warheads
and other components destined for missiles of proscribed range,
masquerading as tests of missiles of permitted range. It is likely that
Iraq will be able to conduct significant research, development, and testing
that will not be detected by UN inspectors or observed by foreign
intelligence agencies. As a result, Iraq might be able to make unexpected
progress on its missile and WMD programs despite sanctions and inspections,
even if it is unable to engage in the full range of development and testing
activities that are considered part of the R&D cycle elsewhere. This could
include progress toward more efficient chemical and biological missile
warhead designs, innovative ways to extend the range of permitted systems
beyond 150 km by stacking or clustering, the elimination of bottlenecks in
the al-Husayn program to enable the resumption of production once sanctions
are lifted, and work on medium- and intermediate-range missile designs.
In the case of Iran, the problem is somewhat different. There, the problem
is determining the scope and depth of foreign help to Iran's missile (and
WMD) programs, including the transfer of know-how and technology. While
technology transfers can be documented (even if this is easier said than
done), getting a handle on the know-how that has been transferred (both
officially and unofficially) may often be impossible. And while technology
transfers are important, the transfer of know-how is probably the more
important factor in the long-term. This assistance might enable Iran to
develop chemical and biological warheads for its missiles (if it does not
possess these already), and enable Iran to skip the production of
short-range liquid-fuel missiles and move directly to medium- and
intermediate-range liquid-fuel missiles--perhaps equipped with rudimentary
penetration aids (simple decoys, a modest maneuver capability, or chaff and
low power electronic countermeasures) 22 In addition, future progress will
depend on whether Iran's military industries will be able to overcome the
lack of managerial and systems integration skills that have been an
obstacle to progress in the missile and WMD field in the past.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Mr. Eisenstadt is a Senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. He has published studies concerning the armed forces of Iraq,
Iran, Syria and Israel. He was a research analyst for the Secretary of the
Air Force and contributed to the Gulf War Power Survey.
2. For an assessment of Iraq's missile and WMD capabilities that cites many
useful open source references from before and immediately after the 1991
Gulf War, see: Michael Eisenstadt, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes? The
Future of Iraqi Military Power (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, 1993).
3. W. Seth Carus and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. "Iraq's Al-Husayn Missile
Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1990, pp. 204-209, and
June 1990, pp. 242-248; Der Spiegel, January 28, 1991, pp. 3-4 in JPRS-TND,
February 25, 1991, p. 49; Der Spiegel, November 18, 1991, pp. 41-52, in
FBIS-WEU, November 21, 1991, pp. 11-14; William Lowther, Arms and the Man:
Dr. Gerald Bull, Iraq, and the Supergun (New York: Ivy Books, 1991), pp.
174-176, 200, 207, 250-251.
4. Interview with UNSCOM missile team leader Nikita Smidovich in AFP, June
4, 1993, in FBIS-NES, June 7, 1993, p. 31; U.S. Government (USG), Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, 13 February, 1998, pp. 7-10, 17.
5. USG, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, pp. 5-7, 15.
6. Much of the information in this section is derived from discussions and
interviews with UNSCOM weapons inspectors during the period 1992-1998.
7. USG, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, pp. 4-5, 13;
discussions and interviews with UNSCOM weapons inspectors, 1998.
8. Discussions and interviews with UNSCOM weapons inspectors, 1998.
9. Eisenstadt, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes?, pp. 26-30; Maurizio
Zifferero, "IAEA Activities and Experience in Iraq Under the Relevant
Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council," in IAEA, International
Nuclear Safeguards 1994: Vision for the Future (Vienna, Austria:
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1994), pp. 211-221; Steven Dolley,
"Iraq and the Bomb: The Nuclear Threat Continues" (Washington, D.C.:
Nuclear Control Institute, February 19, 1998).
10. Eisenstadt, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes?, pp. 29-30.
11. For an assessment of Iran's missile and WMD capabilities that cites
many useful open source references, see: Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian
Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions (Washington, D.C.: The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996).
12. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," in William C.
Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (Eds.) The International Missile Bazaar: The
New Suppliers Network (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 47-74;
Middle East Defense News (MEDNEWS), May 18. 1992, pp. 1-2; MEDNEWS,
December 21, 1992, pp. 4-5; Defense Week, May 1, 1995, pp. 1, 14.
13. Bermudez, "Iran's Missile Development," p. 64.
14. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS), A New Challenge After the
Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Moscow: FIS, 1993),
in JPRS-TND, March 5, 1993, p. 29.
15. Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1997, pp. A1, A6; Washington Times,
September 10, 1997, p. A1; The Washington Post, December 31, 1997, p. A1;
The Washington Post, January 18, 1998, p. A9.
16. Defense News, June 19-25, 1995, p. 1; Washington Times, May 22, 1997,
p. A3; Washington Times, June 17, 1997, p. A3; Washington Times, September
10, 1997, p. A1.
17. Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 1, 1993, pp. 26-27; MEDNEWS,
December 21, 1992, p. 4.
18. New York Times, January 29, 1989, p. A1; Robert M. Gates, Director of
Central Intelligence, remarks to the Comstock Club, Sacramento, California,
December 15, 1992; R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence,
testimony to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, February 24, 1993;
FIS, A New Challenge After the Cold War, p. 29; United States Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats
to the United States and its Interests Abroad (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 82.
19. Jane's Defence Weekly, September 3, 1997, p. 3.
20. New York Times, August 13, 1989, p. A11; Newsweek, June 22, 1992, p.
42; MEDNEWS, April 19, 1993, p. 5; Herb Krosney, Deadly Business: Legal
Deals and Outlaw Weapons, The Arming of Iran and Iraq, 1975 to the Present
(New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993), pp. 195-199; Anthony H.
Cordesman, Iran & Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 100-103; Iran Brief, May 1, 1995, pp.
11-12; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected
National Security Threats to the United States and its Interests Abroad, p.
82
21. Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions, pp.
9-25.
22. Uzi Rubin and Azriel Lorber, "Future Trends of Missile Proliferation in
the Middle East and its Impact on Regional Missile Defences," paper
presented at the 8th American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
(AIAA)
Multinational Conference on Theater Missile Defense, London, June 6-9,
1995.