Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers
Russia/Ukraine: Bruce Blair, Stephen Blank,
Daniel Gouré and Nadia Schadlow
April 1, 1998
On April 1, 1998, System Planning Corporation hosted an unclassified
roundtable discussion on Russia for the Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States. SPC assembled four prominent experts
on the Russian and Ukrainian ballistic missile capabilities: Dr. Bruce
Blair, Dr. Stephan J. Blank, Dr. Daniel Gouré, and Ms. Nadia Schadlow. This
paper summarizes their findings and notes key areas of consensus and
dissent.
Russia
The three presenters on Russia agreed that Moscow relies on the defense
policy of deterrence and a strategy of preemptive first strike. With this
defense policy, Russia maintains its international position as a nuclear
power. The reliance on nuclear capabilities enables a delay in military
reform and reduces the reliance on conventional forces. Stephan Blank
explained that nuclear weapons provide an inexpensive alternative to a
fully equipped army during economic hardships.
Current Threat
Bruce Blair termed the Russian situation as unstable due to deteriorating
strategic force capabilities, weak nuclear control and weakened C3
capabilities. He stated that the deterioration of C3 capabilities poses the
most serious threat to US interests. Early warning systems, in particular
the satellite (earth observation) capability, are deteriorating; this
encourages the reliance on a launch-on-warning policy.
Daniel Gouré took a more optimistic approach to the Russian situation and
stated that what appears to be weakness, actually represents progress on a
rational course towards a smaller, controlled, and modernized military
structure.
Russia maintains two deterrence policies; one policy focuses on deterring
China, while the other policy addresses the threat from NATO and the United
States. Russia does not distinguish between conventional and nuclear
weapons and will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if Russia, the CIS, or
its vital interests are threatened. Daniel Gouré explained that Russia, in
effect, advocates use of nuclear weapons in response to nuclear or
conventional aggression.
Capabilities
Consensus among the presenters focused on the view that Russia does not
have the economic resources to maintain the current number of nuclear
weapons in its arsenal. They agreed that Russia must downsize, but maintain
a capability of at least 1000 warheads. Currently, fifty weapons depots
exist where tens of thousands of strategic weapons are stored. Today there
are 3000-4000 strategic weapons in storage for combat use and between
19,000 and 15,000 tactical weapons in the process of being dismantled.
Daniel Gouré suggested that the Russian seek to stabilize their strategic
forces at 2,000-2,500 warheads. Blair stated that by 2003 Russia will not
have more than several hundred warheads in inventory and the current
inventory will be obsolete.
The future of the arsenal depends on funding, arms control, East-West
relations, and economics. Topol (SS-27) provides the missile centerpiece
for Russia. The Boray (SSBN) program is in question and the naval nuclear
forces are declining due to the lack of political backing and expense.
Russia must maintain the Boray or a follow-on system to be within the START
parameters. The Topol has political backing from high ranking officials and
provides a link between the space applications and nuclear capabilities.
Daniel Gouré addressed the selective modernization plan, which focuses on
the Topol, Boray, and SSN-28 (with the DS5). He projected that this
modernization will aid the Russian's ability to respond flexibly both to
conventional and nuclear first use capabilities, counter a ballistic
missile attack, and aid flexibility. Cost savings through the reduction of
redundancy and downsizing will provide the funding for select system
upgrades and result in better control mechanisms. Blair countered this
assertion and suggests that these savings are already spent on select
projects such as the Topol.
C3I
The presenters described operational safety, export, and theft as the three
main risks to Russian nuclear command and control. Accidental launch risks
are likely to increase under the short response time and a deteriorating
early warning system. They used the Norway weather rocket example, which
triggered Russian launch mechanisms, to illustrate the risk of accidental
launch. Further, the export control policy is incoherent. The potential for
theft due to corrupt officials and the dependency on an unstable control
structure.
Today, control of the missile launch capability remains Moscow-centric. The
1994 de-targeting agreement between the U.S. and the Russians had no effect
on the risk of launch and the potential of negligence in the military (due
to low morale). Blair considered the old Soviet architecture that
maintained rigid accountability preferable over the current Russian system
that lacks a clearly defined warning and control structure. In the future,
launch mistakes may not be aborted due to weak institutions, a coup, or
warring military factions. Additionally, military sites in the Far East and
the Pacific may splinter from Moscow and seek to export military articles
for profit.
Stephan Blank and Bruce Blair agreed that primary threats include internal
corruption and economic threats to stability. They agreed that the
resources are not available to maintain the 2500 warheads that Daniel Gouré
suggested.
Exports
Russia exports defense-related goods to both China and the Middle East.
Stephan Blank asserted that the Middle East, because of its geographic
proximity, is a source of interest for Russia. He specifically noted that
Russian exports to Iran exemplifies Moscow's interest in the region,
especially in gaining geostrategic influence over the U.S. with respect to
WMD exports.
The participants concurred that Russia sees technology and equipment
exports for civil, dual-use, and military use as integral to its foreign
policy. On the one hand, this policy is based on Russia's need for capital
to keep its defense industries functioning. On the other hand,
privatization, corruption, and political leverage to potentially hostile
states fuel arms sales. Blank, for instance, stated that there have been
exports in missile guidance technology in addition to export of chemical,
nuclear and biological technologies and components, which have been in
violation of Russia's arms control commitments.
Conclusions
All of the presenters speculated that the economy may recover in 10-12
years, but whether Russia can achieve stability in that time frame, is
unclear. Ultimately, military and economic reforms are crucial. Although
Blair advocates a "lean mean" nuclear arsenal, he sees this scenario as
unlikely due to the Russian government and C3 weaknesses and the lack of
economic resources, which are unable to sustain the political, military and
economic pressures. The crux of the argument: the reality of defense
capabilities must be maintained within the available economic resources.
Ukraine
Actors in Ballistic Missile Proliferation
Two primary actors drive Ukrainian ballistic missile proliferation policy:
the government leadership and the regional enterprises. The leaders of the
Ukrainian state are preoccupied by state reform, a weak government,
impending elections in 1999, and unsteady bilateral relations with Russia
and the United States.
Risks of Exports and Technology Transfer Continue
Ukraine's inability to pursue meaningful economic reforms increases the
potential for nuclear exports or technology sharing. During 1994-1996,
Ukraine pursued multiple questionable export activities with Libya, China,
and Russia. After export activity to Libya was uncovered, the Ukrainian
government levied sanctions, removed export licenses, and shared
information about end-uses and end-users with the United States. Further,
the Ukrainian government established an Export-Technical Commission to
review all missile technology-related sales.
Two main economic incentives pose risks for the export control objectives.
The first risk results from potential export of missile technology and
related defense articles. The majority of former Soviet defense production
was located in Russia. Ukraine, however, retained important design and
fabrication enterprises for missile production. Under the current economic
hardships, the likelihood that firms will export civil and military
technologies to China and other nations increase. Another economic risk
results from the Russian control in the energy sector. The Ukrainian energy
sector relies heavily on Russia trades in debt for equity, which increases
Russian control over Ukrainian strategic interests.
De-nuclearization and Non-proliferation Efforts
Between 1992 and 1997, Ukraine transferred approximately 2650 to 4500
nuclear missiles to Russia. The nuclear transfers allowed Ukraine to obtain
much-needed fuel rods from Russia. Further actions by Ukraine to support
non-proliferation include: membership in the NPT; signing the Ukraine-NATO
Charter; and destroying the SS-24 missiles instead of using the missiles in
a space launch capacity. Most recently, Ukraine joined the MTCR, which
limits missile production to a range of less than 300 km.
In March of 1998, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the
United States and Ukraine. This agreement resulted in the following:
creating an export control regime; confirming MTCR membership; dismissing
modernization plans for Ukraine's Scud missiles; and withdrawing the
commitment to construct turbines for Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant. In
return, the US announced an economic aid and investment program. In
particular, the space sector will be aided by joint projects and research
and development programs.
Conclusions and Future Challenges
In future, the West must encourage Ukraine to strengthen government
institutions and export controls. Economic and political pressures continue
to influence export policies and create incentives for regional enterprises
to engage in efforts contrary to the MTCR. At the same time, a weak
government in need of economic support may risk overlooking questionable
export practices for economic gains.