Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers
India/Pakistan: Daniel Gouré, Michael Krepon
and David Tanks
April 3, 1998
On April 3, 1998, System Planning Corporation hosted a roundtable
discussion with CSIS' Dr. Daniel Gouré; Henry L. Stimson Center President
Michael Krepon; and David Tanks from the Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis. The participants each provided an analysis of India and
Pakistan's ballistic missile capabilities. This paper summarizes their
positions, and highlights areas of consensus and disagreement.
India
All three of the roundtable participants agreed that India has developed a
ballistic missile production capability. While David Tanks asserted that
India's missile program has benefited from both direct and indirect
assistance from nations like France, Germany, Russia and the United States,
Gouré concluded that India has placed high priority in creating an
independent military missile program which will ultimately make India
self-sufficient in the design and production of a full range of missiles,
from anti-tank and surface to air missiles, and perhaps even through
IRBM's. Furthermore, Gouré also stated that India has talented scientists
and researchers working in its military industrial complex, many of which
have been educated in the United States and have worked at U.S. facilities,
such as Wright Patterson Air Force Base
All of the participants agreed that India has developed SRBMs and IRBMs not
only to deter a potential nuclear strike from Pakistan, but also to
counterbalance the nuclear threat from China. They agreed that India has
attempted to improve both the range and accuracy of its IRBM's in order to
bring large Chinese population centers into range.
The nation has used its commercial space launch program to develop the
skills and infrastructure needed to support a ballistic missile program.
The following is a summary of India's current ballistic missile and space
launch vehicle programs, and provides an assessment of the missiles that
the nation could be developing.
Prithvi
The Prithvi I is a liquid fueled missile with a range of 150 km that is
currently deployed with army units. India has claimed that the missile is
equipped only with conventional warheads. India has recently completed
development of the Prithvi II, a 250 km version of the Prithvi I, and has
begun production of the missile. David Tanks asserted that this missile is
not a true ballistic missile insofar as it can maneuver in flight and
follow one of six different preprogrammed trajectories. India has also
allegedly planned the development of the Prithvi III, a 350 km boosted
liquid fuel system.
Agni
In 1994, the United States persuaded India to suspend testing of the 2500
km Agni missile after three test flights. The missile used an Indian SLV-3
booster for its first stage, and the liquid fueled Prithvi for its second
stage. Tanks mentioned that the recent Indian articles have suggested that
India has proposed the development of the 5000 km Agni II, a missile that
is allegedly in development. This missile will have a solid-fueled second
stage. Tanks also argued that although India has claimed that this missile
will be used only to carry a conventional warhead, the cost of the warhead
cannot be justified unless used as a nuclear delivery vehicle.
PSLV
The PSLV served as India's main space launch vehicle for a number of years.
It comprises a 9.2 ft. diameter booster with six strap-ons, has a liquid
fueled second stage, a solid fueled third stage and a liquid fueled fourth
stage. This rocket has launched a 1200 kg satellite into an 800 km high
orbit. On its next launch, this missile will place a reconnaissance
satellite and a piggy-backed light-weight satellite into orbit. This launch
will be conducted to demonstrate the missile's value to the commercial
space-launch market. In addition, the participants agreed that critical
technologies associated with the PSLV have been used for ballistic missile
applications, particularly for the Agni.
GSLV
India is reportedly concluding development of the GSLV, a three stage
missile that will allegedly be able to place a 2500 kg payload into
geo-transfer orbit. The missile will use the PSLVs first two stages, but
will use a single cryogenic stage for its third and fourth stages. The
rocket will also use four liquid fueled strap-ons that have been adapted
from the PSLVs second stage. According to Indian reports, the missile will
be launched in 1998-1999.
Suraya
India could be developing a missile with a range of 8,000-12,000 km, that
could strike targets in the continental United States. The Suraya is an
unconfirmed program that has been mentioned in the Indian press. According
to the Indian media, development of the program started in 1994, and the
missile is modeled on the PSLV. None of the participants, however, were
able to confirm that such a program exists, or that it could be used
against the United States. Nevertheless, Tanks concluded that it is likely
that India will possess a limited number of ICBM's within the next ten
years.
Indian WMD Capabilities
The participants agreed that India is a de facto nuclear power, and that it
possesses both the material and know-how to assemble deliverable nuclear
explosive devices. They also agreed that India currently possesses an
extensive civilian nuclear power program, and that it plans to construct
breeder reactors and thorium 232 reactors, both of which will produce
significant amounts of fissile material, in the future. David Tanks
concluded that India has the capability to become an "overt" nuclear power
in the future if it is willing to take on the hardships of international
sanctions.
Tanks asserted that most reports claim that India has enough fissile
material to produce between 85-100 nuclear devices, although some reports
have put the number as high as 200. Unlike Tanks, however, Daniel Gouré
stated that India is believed to have approximately 60 nuclear weapons.
A Contradictory Assessment
Although Tanks and Gouré both asserted that India has the ability to
produce advanced ballistic missiles through its advanced military
infrastructure, Michael Krepon argued that past assessments have been
exaggerated, and that India will not possess the ability to develop a
ballistic missile capable of striking the United States by 2015. Krepon
stated that India's military and defense establishment suffers from
budgetary shortfalls that will ultimately impede its ability to develop an
advanced ballistic missile capability. Krepon insisted that India's missile
programs have been designed to send political messages, and are not as
advanced as previous assessments have suggested. India is obsessed with
gaining international recognition, and perhaps even a permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council. If India does develop an intercontinental
missile capable of hitting the United States, the missile will not be
designed for strategic use against the United States. It will be used for
symbolic reasons, not military purposes. This assessment contradicts Tanks'
assessment which concludes that the only reason for India to field an ICBM
is to intimidate the United States in order to pursue its own national
interests.
Pakistan
There was a consensus among the participants that Pakistan has attempted to
obtain nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. There was
also a consensus that Pakistan has attempted to obtain these capabilities
almost exclusively to deter India. Pakistan is inferior military to India
militarily in virtually every way and thus feels the need to develop a
nuclear capability to demonstrate its technical prowess, its status as a
threshold state, and its government's commitment to national security.
Since the early 1980's, Pakistan has attempted to indigenously develop
ballistic missiles. The following is a summary of Pakistan's ballistic
missile capabilities:
Hatf I
Although the Haft I program was believed to have been halted after three
unsuccessful test flights, some of the technology associated with this 80
km missile was used in the development of the Haft II program.
Hatf II
It is also believed that the Haft II program has been halted due to
technical problems. The Pakistani's allegedly shelved this 300 km system
because of directional problems.
M-11
Pakistan began to obtain M-11 missiles from China in the early 1990's. In
late 1996, it was also revealed that China may have helped Pakistan
construct an M-11 production facility. The M-11 has a 300 km range, and can
carry a 500-800 kg. warhead, therefore suggesting that the transfer of this
missile is in violation of the MTCR. The missile has a separating warhead
and an additional payload capacity, thus making it desirable as a
nuclear-weapons delivery system. Pakistan is believed to have between 30
and 84 M-11's, although Tanks concluded that the upper end of the range is
more likely.
Hatf III (M-9 or Modified M-11)
Pakistan allegedly test-fired an 800 km missile. Indian sources asserted
that it was a Chinese M-9. U.S. analysts, however, concluded that the
missile is most likely an improved M-11. None of the participants were able
to provide any additional information on this alleged launch.
Ghauri
In December 1997, a number of sources noted that Pakistan had allegedly
developed a 1500 - 2000 km ballistic missile using indigenous resources.
Reports have also revealed that Pakistan is planning to test the missile in
the coming months. None of the participants were able to elaborate on this
missile's capabilities.
According to Gouré, there are also reports that Pakistan has acquired
longer-range missiles from North Korea. Although the M-11 can not strike
targets deep inside of India due to its limited range, a 1,300 km No Dong I
would be able to strike virtually any population center in India. Neither
Tanks nor Krepon commented on North Korean involvement in Pakistan's
ballistic missile program.
WMD Capabilities
The participants agreed that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program and
that it probably has enough fissile material to construct between 6 - 20
nuclear explosive devices. Pakistan's weapons designs are probably based on
an uranium implosion design supplied to them by China in the early 1980's.
The three men also agreed that Pakistan has attempted to miniaturize and
package their nuclear device designs so that it can be delivered by
ballistic missile. if Pakistan is able to construct a more light-weight
plutonium fueled device, Pakistan may soon be able to produce smaller and
lighter warhead. If this occurs, Pakistan's missile delivery capabilities
will improve.
A Pakistani ICBM?
There was consensus among the three participants that Pakistan will almost
certainly be unable to construct an ICBM capable of hitting the United
States by 2015. Although Pakistan's missile program, as Michael Krepon put
it, "has become a national obsession," it does not have the finances,
production base and technical know-how to construct an ICBM capable of
striking the United States. Pakistan's motives for obtaining nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems are designed exclusively to
deter India.