As mentioned earlier, in 1985 the small reactor began operating. In 1989 it was defueled for the first time, and the North Koreans then reprocessed the spent fuel to remove the plu- tonium. In 1992 North Korea refused to cooperate with the IAEA to clarify the amount and disposition of the plutonium. We estimate that this defueling and subsequent reprocessing yielded enough plutonium for one nuclear weapon—conceivably two.

Controversy over North Korean noncompliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations continued from 1992 through mid-1994. During this time, the US consistently made clear that it wanted a negotiated solution, but talks aimed at resolution of the problem faltered.

In June 1994, events reached a crisis. During late spring of that year, North Korea defueled its reactor for the second time and refused to allow the IAEA to take steps that could have helped shed light on the amount of plutonium removed during the earlier refueling. Moreover, North Korea declared that it would end its IAEA membership and safeguards agreement, refuel the reactor, and reprocess the spent fuel taken out of the reactor.

In light of these threats, these acts, and the lack of progress in bilateral talks, the US—in cooperation with the Republic of Korea, Japan, and other allies and friends—took steps to obtain a sanctions resolution from the United Nations (UN) Security Council against North Korea.

DOD recognized that the course of seeking sanctions, while absolutely necessary, carried real risks. North Korea had declared that sanctions were, in its view, an act of war. The North has a massive conventional capability, including over 10,000 artillery tubes and multiple rocket launchers lined up along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). This capability, coupled with its threats (e.g., to turn Seoul into a sea of fire) meant that we had no choice other than take seriously the North’s postures and augment our defense capability, along with that of the Republic of Korea.

The measures undertaken involved temporary deployment of people and units, as well as accelerated implementation of planned modernization initiatives for the standing forces that the US has in Korea. The US, in consultation with the Republic of Korea, considered and began to implement a wide range of options. Under the most serious consideration were deployment options that would have cost hundreds of millions of dollars annually and would have involved the deployment of more than 10,000 additional troops, as well as planes, ships, and equipment. These deployments were not, of course, all that would have been required in the event we thought that war was imminent. Rather, they were meant to present an enhanced deterrent to North Korean aggression and provide a significant boost to our defensive posture in the region if deterrence failed. These steps were taken—and more were being considered—on the recommendation of the US and UN military commanders in the theater. These steps indicate the firmness and seriousness with which we viewed the problem and illustrate the costs and risks of alternative actions to an agreed resolution.

Throughout, we continued to believe that a diplomatic solution that met our requirements was preferable to the uncertainties and risks of sanctions and their consequences. Accordingly, June 1994 was also a time of intense diplomatic engagement through informal and formal channels with the North Koreans. Former president Jimmy Carter, acting on behalf of the US, reached an agreement with President Kim Il Sung of North Korea that the North would freeze its program temporarily in the context of an immediate return to negotiations in Geneva. Although it is impossible to be confident about North Korean motivations, I believe it was due not only to President Carter’s eloquence but in considerable part to the military readiness of the US and the Republic of Korea that North Korea took these steps to freeze its efforts—which previously it had adamantly refused to do—and reopen the talks.

After months of negotiations, on 21 October 1994 the US and North Korea signed an Agreed Framework that forms the basis for resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Of course, like most agreements, it must be implemented to realize its promise. Frankly, this agreement is not based on trust and confidence because little in North Korea’s record would justify that attitude; rather, it is based on a step-by-step approach. Action on the part of the North will be required in tandem with action on the part of the US, its allies, and friends. If for any reason North Korea fails to do what it is required to do under the framework, we retain the option of engaging in sanctions through the UN Security Council and returning—as I believe we would have to do—to the military enhancements we began in 1994 to increase the readiness and combat power of US and South Korean forces. To maintain that option even as the agreement is implemented, we and the Republic of Korea will, of course, have to maintain and modernize our forces on the Peninsula and our ability to reinforce them as needed. We will do so.

The basic principles of the agreement are quite simple: the North must stop—and eventually dismantle—its nuclear- weapons-related program, as well as come into full compliance with the NPT. Unsurprisingly, North Korea was not willing to undertake these broad new obligations without receiving something substantial in return. Specifically, in exchange for halting and later dismantling its program and resolving past discrepancies, North Korea will receive alternative energy sources—initially in the form of bunker oil for electric generators and heat and later in the form of more proliferation-resistant light water reactor (LWR) technology. LWRs are more resistant to proliferation because, among other things, they require fuel that North Korea cannot produce itself. Moreover, separating the plutonium—while not impossible—is substantially more complex and expensive than with the graphite-moderated reactor, and the spent fuel is more easily stored for expatriation.

The agreement has the following key elements:

The bulk of the funding for the LWRs will come from the Republic of Korea and from Japan, although we expect that other countries—including the US and a wide variety of nations that have an interest in the problem—will make contributions. Because so much of the money is coming from the Republic of Korea, and for other reasons as well, the reactor will have to be the new South Korean standard-design reactor. Although this device is based on improvements to a US design, it is being built in the Republic of Korea. (Incidentally, an agreement exists to build several of these LWRs in China.) But North Korea has resisted the plan to use a South Korean reactor. Unless North Korea agrees, the LWR project simply cannot—and should not—go forward. The US is fully in agreement with the Republic of Korea and other allies on this point. Were North Korea to respond to any lack of agreement on the South Korean reactors by breaking its obligations under the Agreed Framework, grave consequences would follow.

In addition to the relatively technical aspects of dismantling the nuclear program in return for the establishment of alternative energy sources, the agreement has political and economic sides as well. It carries forward the process of normalizing diplomatic and trade relations between North Korea and the rest of the world by taking small steps, as the Agreed Framework is implemented, to exchange diplomatic offices and to address issues concerning trade and sanctions. Of critical importance, the agreement requires restoration of the dialogue between North and South Korea, together with the United States, with the objective of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and eventually reaching a peaceful resolution of problems there. These include both conventional and political confrontations.

It is important to emphasize that the obligations in the nuclear field that North Korea has undertaken in this agreement go far beyond the requirements of the NPT. They require North Korea to dismantle its current nuclear program completely—not simply place it under IAEA safeguards. Nothing in the NPT prevents a party to that treaty from having graphite-moderated reactors, from having a reprocessing plant, and from actual reprocessing—provided the activities are conducted under IAEA safeguards. Further, the agreement provides for strict international monitoring of North Korean compliance at all stages.

One of the criticisms often advanced against the treaty is that the North does not have to do anything until several years have passed, when it has already received important benefits. The fact is that North Korea, under the agreement, must take—in fact, has taken—critically important steps before getting any benefit from the US or any other country. That step-by-step process will continue.

Step one of this process includes several actions (fig. 8.1). Specifically, the North Koreans have kept in storage the 8,000 fuel rods that were taken out of the reactor in the spring of 1994 instead of reprocessing them to extract plutonium sufficient for making some five or six bombs. In the time since the agreement was signed, these fuel rods could have been run through the reprocessing facility and the plutonium separated. Second, they have already sealed the reprocessing facility and fuel-fabrication and storage facilities. Third, they have refrained from refueling and restarting the five-megawatt reactor from which the spent fuel was unloaded in the spring of 1994. Running at its 1994 rate, this reactor could have produced enough plutonium for one bomb each year it operated—and it could have been run faster. However, it is now being sealed by the IAEA. Fourth, the North Koreans have stopped construc- tion of two big new reactors with capacities of 50 and 200 megawatts. These reactors together could have produced plutonium for more than a dozen bombs annually.

Also worth pointing out is the access and verification that North Korea has permitted, because these actions are so striking an improvement over its past conduct. That is, North Korea has permitted IAEA inspectors to remain permanently at Yongbyon with access to the reactor construction site nearby at Taechon to implement the freeze and to verify and monitor on a daily basis that the freeze remains in effect. The director general of the IAEA has reported good cooperation on compliance with the halt of the nuclear program by North Korea. IAEA inspectors will remain in North Korea for the duration of the framework implementation. North Korea also has permitted a US technical team to visit the Yongbyon complex to do surveys of measures necessary to stabilize the spent fuel so that it can be stored until removed from North Korea, as required by the agreement. Removal will actually start when the first nuclear components for the LWRs are delivered (see fig. 8.1).

Obviously, continued vigilance will be essential, and we expect a fair number of more or less serious bumps in the road toward implementation. But the North Koreans have accom- plished the critical first step of compliance: a verified freeze and a halt to their nuclear program.

The US also has responsibilities under step one of this process and under subsequent steps (see fig. 8.1). Specifically, in mid-January of 1995, we delivered to North Korea 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil—the first of annual supplies that will eventually reach 500,000 metric tons for use in the thermal power plant at Sonbong. We took other steps required of us in the first 90 days, including limited relaxation of trade controls.

The next milestone was the formulation of KEDO, mentioned earlier. Many countries expressed interest in KEDO during its first conference in March 1995. This agency will continue work on the LWR project to reach a detailed agreement with North Korea on the supply of LWRs.

Step two of the process (see fig. 8.1) will take place upon completion of the plant structure (i.e., the basic structure and the turbines) for the first LWR but before any of the nuclear components arrive. At that time—probably in the year 2000 and before any nuclear components for the reactor are delivered—the North will have to allow the IAEA to conduct special inspections to resolve questions about its past plutonium production (i.e., the one or two bombs’ worth removed in the 1989 refueling and reprocessed at that time). It also will have to come into full compliance with the NPT and with full-scope safeguards.

When these actions are completed—and only then—the international consortium will deliver and begin to install the nuclear components for the first LWR. At that point, the North Koreans must also commence shipping the spent fuel rods from the five-megawatt reactor out of the country for reprocessing and storage of the plutonium under IAEA safeguards.

Only when all the spent fuel has been expatriated (i.e., when North Korea has completed its responsibilities under step three [see fig. 8.1]) will the consortium complete and deliver LWR number one. Simultaneously with that completion and delivery, North Korea will begin to disassemble and destroy the graphite-moderated reactors and associated facilities. While those facilities are being disassembled, the consortium will be working to complete LWR number two. But that reactor will not be completed until the last of the North Korean nuclear-weapons-related facilities is completely dismantled. Step four will conclude when LWR number two is completed (see fig. 8.1). As the LWRs operate, North Korea will be required to export the spent fuel, as directed by the consortium or its key members—including the United States.

Proceeding simultaneously will be a resumption of North- South dialogue, an easing of trade and economic restrictions, and a gradual process of opening diplomatic relations. Clearly, this is a complex, they-take-a-step, we-take-a-step process. Nothing in this agreement depends on trust. Our performance will be based on the North Koreans’ performance. If they do not perform, we can—in my view, must—go back to the path we were on in the spring of 1994: sanctions, military enhancements, and international pressure. Conversely, of course, as continued North Korean compliance is confirmed, the US, the Republic of Korea, and Japan—as well as other countries—will carry out their own obligations.

Taking a step back from the admittedly intricate details of this agreement, we face only two choices regarding the North Korean nuclear weapons program (fig. 8.2). Realistically, the alternative of doing nothing—letting the program run unchecked in the hopes that North Korea will somehow implode or be a responsible possessor of this capability—is simply not acceptable.

Our alternatives are, therefore, (1) an agreed deal along these lines or (2) a return to the course of sanctions. Our preferred course is the agreed deal. Under the Agreed Framework, we obtain our key objectives: North Korea’s nuclear program is halted; the nuclear past is resolved; North Korea comes into full NPT compliance; spent fuel with plutonium for five or six weapons is removed from the country; and graphite-moderated, nuclear-weapons-related facilities are dismantled and replaced by far less proliferation-prone reactors.

Without an agreement, the North unquestionably would resume constructing, reprocessing, and refueling the reactors— and we would have to respond with sanctions. Further, we would have to take steps to ensure that the North could not convert into practice its rhetoric that such sanctions are the equivalent of war. Certainly, this would require substantial measures of military preparation by both the US and the Republic of Korea. Sanctions could be made to work, but such a proposition would be long term, risky, and costly.

In our view, therefore, the choice is clear. We should continue to pursue a course of implementation of the Agreed Framework so long, of course, as that is what is actually happening. We entered this agreement with no illusions, but we are working exceptionally hard—both domestically and internationally—to implement the framework. The record of North Korea in the past is clear—and not encouraging. If the North is prepared to honor this agreement, then not only will the nuclear problem be solved, but the way will be open for resolution of a broad range of political, military, and strategic problems on the Peninsula—ranging from confrontation of conventional forces to the export of missiles and missile technology.

So the agreement thus provides a framework for the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and lays the cornerstone for building a framework for security in Asia. Those benefits require implementation. Despite statements of the North Korean press to the contrary, we hope to find agreement on every aspect of this accord. We will have ample information on whether it is being implemented, and we will insist on strict implementation.

Those are the alternatives. In my view, we must press forward and take the steps necessary to implement the agreement, including putting together the financial and technical aspects of the consortium. But we and our KEDO partners also must continue to impress upon North Korea that punctilious compliance with all provisions of the agreement is essential.