Fighting ProliferationChapter 3
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is a powerful archetype for efforts to prevent proliferation. Over the years, many arms controllers have proposed adapting the NPT’s provisions to control the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, missiles, and even conventional arms. This essay examines the possibilities—and the dangers—of applying the NPT model to the current international policy that controls exports for missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
The policy, called the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), was announced by seven governments in 1987 to limit the spread of nuclear-capable missiles. By 1993 the concern had broadened to missiles capable of delivering chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons, and today the membership in the MTCR has expanded to 26 governments—most recently Russia. Beyond these 26, other governments—including Brazil, China, Israel, Romania, South Africa, and Ukraine—have declared their support for the regime. Indeed, among major missile-exporting nations, only North Korea stands aloof from the principles of the MTCR.
Given the growth of the MTCR into an international standard for restraint in missile proliferation, proposals have been made to “strengthen” it with the features of the NPT. The proposals would convert it from a mere policy applying only to missile exporters to a treaty that is global (i.e., that binds missile “haves” and “have-nots” alike). Three versions of the proposals are the Global Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Zero Ballistic Missiles (ZBM), and a recent Canadian proposal for a ban on ballistic missiles.
All of these proposals offer the advantages of a treaty: they can stabilize international rules and provide for enforcement and verification. The proposals also offer the advantages of global coverage: they develop equitable, legitimate, and international rules or “norms” supported by the have-nots because the have-nots have a role in negotiating them. Further, these proposals build on existing international regimes for missile disarmament—the INF Treaty, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)—so that their implementation would be an extension of existing practice rather than a leap into the utopian unknown.
That is the good news. The bad news is that the mechanics of the treaty process will almost certainly weaken the MTCR. The negotiation period will be prolonged, and strong export-control actions will be difficult to take during this period. Moreover, the dynamics of the negotiation process will require assurances that anything not specifically prohibited is permitted—weakening rather than strengthening the limits on missile proliferation. The global coverage of these proposals will also work in favor of the proliferator. In order to attract the have-nots, all the proposals would allow the proliferation of “peaceful” versions of proscribed missile systems—even though the “peaceful” and the “military” versions are fully interchangeable. The existing missile-disarmament regimes on which these proposals would be based turn out to be poor models for nonproliferation regimes because they ban systems of greatest relevance to the US-Russian strategic relationship rather than systems likely to be exploited by proliferators.
The central problem turns out to be the conflict between nonproliferation and disarmament. Nonproliferation seeks to stop the arms spread where it is now; it can accept differences among nations, and it can work within flexible structures other than treaties. Disarmament seeks reductions in force structures. To make its rules stick, it must write them into treaties; and to apply those rules on a global basis, it must offer “compensation” to some parties—often in the form of just the technologies that nonproliferation would seek to restrict. The global MTCR proposals that we examine are disarmament rather than nonproliferation.
This essay addresses the issues of an NPT for missiles in four parts: first, the advantages and problems of any global treaty to control missile proliferation; second, the recent specific proposals for a global treaty; third, the example of Brazil as the kind of participant in missile nonproliferation that a global treaty might encounter; and fourth, some general conclusions.
Two features characterize all proposals for a global MTCR: the treaty and global coverage.
Treaty
A treaty, because it is the most binding of international undertakings, can give durability and stability to international rules. Moreover, it can provide for enforcement and verification. Thus, a treaty stands in contrast to the MTCR, which is only a common policy—with no formal mechanism for enforcement or verification.
The greatest problem with the treaty approach is that it will almost certainly weaken the supplier restraints of the MTCR. This difficulty occurs for several reasons. First, the dynamics of treaty negotiations almost invariably lead to assurances that anything not specifically prohibited is permitted. That is, participants want to be assured that they are not bound by more restraints than are spelled out in the treaty. This limitation is not a problem if the treaty prohibits everything that needs to be prohibited. But the discussion below of global coverage and of specific proposals suggests that a treaty is unlikely to go that far.
If differences exist between the restraints prescribed in the treaty and in the MTCR, nations will face a temptation to engage in “venue shopping.” A 300-kilometer-range threshold in the MTCR versus a 500-kilometer threshold in a Global INF will make missile transfers of 300–500 kilometers easier to excuse on the grounds that they comply with the more binding of the two international rules. This problem is not theoretical. Already, some members of the nonaligned movement, especially Iran, are objecting to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group (AG) as inconsistent with their respective treaties—the NPT and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Moreover, a continuing tension exists between long-term agreements for nuclear safeguards and the NPT’s 90-day withdrawal period.
Treaties present two additional problems: rigidity of rules and effort to negotiate.
Treaties are the laws of the land; their rules are binding. Those rules must be clear enough to be enforceable. Subtle distinctions and case-by-case flexibility are difficult to handle in treaties. If allowed, they usually must be accompanied by the creation of an adjudicatory body with considerable authority. This authority is likely to include intrusive verification because simple verification schemes cannot cope with subtleties. In the missile business, intrusive verification can compromise the security of technical information. The potential compromise of commercial information will increase resistance to ratifying the treaty and will create economic liabilities for the regime; the compromise of sensitive missile technology will undercut the nonproliferation objectives of the treaty. So the enforcement and verification provisions of a treaty can become a two-edged sword.
These features were considered during the negotiation of the MTCR, and they were rejected. Why? For one thing, missiles are not like nuclear or chemical weapons; they cannot all be treated alike. Some missiles—those capable of delivering a payload of 500 kilograms to a range of 300 kilometers and all missiles intended to deliver weapons of mass destruction—are deemed by the MTCR to be so dangerous that their transfer is subject to a strong presumption of denial. But some missiles—antitank and air-defense missiles, for example—fall below these thresholds and are often stabilizing in situations in which aggressive forces would otherwise possess unchallenged offensive power.
Although this distinction among missile types is relatively clear for complete missile systems, it descends into subtlety for components and technologies, which can contribute to a variety of missile types. Controlling the proliferation of complete missile systems is impossible without also controlling the proliferation of components and technologies. Thus, as long as there are “good missiles” and “bad missiles,” subtlety is inevitable. The MTCR handles this problem by creating one control list for items such as complete missiles and their major components—items subject to a strong presumption of export denial—and another list for lesser ingredients that could be put to acceptable as well as unacceptable end uses—items subject to case-by-case review, international assurances when necessary, and exchanges of information “as necessary and appropriate.”
How does one implement “as necessary and appropriate” in a treaty? One could do so with a formal organization, such as the Coordinating Committee (COCOM), which reviewed exports to the Soviet bloc during the period in which the MTCR was negotiated. But COCOM consumed enormous bureaucratic resources, and the founders of the MTCR were not about to create another bureaucratic behemoth to police an area that involved such a great deal of acceptable activity.
In sum, the rigidity of a treaty would interfere with the necessary flexibility of the MTCR. Such flexibility is best disciplined not by an international bureaucracy but by active consultations among MTCR adherents.
The other problem posed by a treaty is its cumbersome negotiation process. Although the MTCR took more than four years to negotiate, the NPT took some seven years. The CWC took more than a decade. Unlike the MTCR, the treaties took (or, in the case of the CWC, are taking) additional years to ratify and bring into force.
This is so in part because many more nations were involved, in part because their views were more disparate than those of the seven governments negotiating the MTCR, and in part because the have-nots in treaty negotiations invariably prolong the process by seeking concessions from the haves (more on this below). It is possible, even likely, that “spoiler” governments may use the negotiation process to prevent the emergence of any significant restraints while seeking to gain the advantages of prolonged negotiations. (This tactic arguably occurred in the 12-year negotiation of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe, which never resulted in an agreement.)
What is the consequence of an extended negotiation? Without exception (and the original negotiation of the MTCR was no exception), it is to hobble the nonproliferation policy process during the period of the negotiation. Such is the case, partly because of limited nonproliferation staffs in the United States and, even more, in other nations. The negotiation of a treaty takes priority over the mundane, day-to-day process of reviewing intelligence and exports and of working with other governments on specific proliferation problems. So negotiation displaces implementation.
This displacement results from more than staff limitations. Governments are careful not to offend their negotiating partners, and preventing proliferation requires a willingness to offend. Thus, during a negotiation, there are fewer diplomatic demarches to try to prevent unwise exports. The same may happen to the development of theater missile defenses during the process of negotiation. If the treaty is going to eliminate the threat, why invest massive funds—and offend some negotiating partners—by developing countermeasures to the threat?
Proliferators and exporters out to make a fast buck see what is happening and actually increase their activities during a negotiation in order to take advantage of the low-demarche period and to get their transfers completed before the new regime is implemented. So, in a perverse manner, the negotiation of a new nonproliferation regime—or of any arms control regime, for that matter—actually leads to a short-term increase in the activity to be prevented. If the negotiations are prolonged, the “short-term increase” may be a lengthy one.
Consequently, the difficulties of a negotiation process can lead to counterproductive results. The world with a missile nonproliferation treaty may be more proliferated than the world with a mere missile nonproliferation export policy.
Global Coverage
The proponents of a global MTCR want more than a treaty. They want a broad-based regime combining haves and have-nots. The main argument usually advanced for this requirement is that missile nonproliferation is missing the keystone of the other nonproliferation regimes—a global “norm.” Once a principle is shared by nearly all governments, it is much easier to gain common support for action. The proponents argue that a global regime is the best way to establish such a norm for at least two reasons. First, there will be wide participation in negotiating such a regime, and participation translates into support. This situation stands in contrast to the MTCR; in that case, seven supplier governments negotiated the regime in secret. Second, the rules for such a regime will be widely perceived as equitable; no other rules would be negotiable on a global basis. Consequently, these factors will create a wide perception that the global regime is legitimate, and its principles will become “norms.”
To be sure, the MTCR already has a global element. The last paragraph of the MTCR guidelines states that “the adherence of all States to these Guidelines in the interest of international peace and security would be welcome,” an invitation to all nations to adopt the MTCR’s export controls. It does not, however, invite them into the inner workings—the information sharing—of the regime, and it certainly does not invite them to receive missile technology.
The MTCR is an export-control regime. In its original concept, the common policy among major possessors of missile technology sought to prevent that technology from proliferating. It was not intended to increase the transfer of missile technology—not even among its members.
This concept was slightly stretched by the effort starting in 1989 to bring into the regime some countries that were not major possessors of missile technology. These nations included all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Space Agency (ESA), and the European Community (EC)—treaties that potentially require sharing some facets of missiles or their technology—and close allies such as Australia and New Zealand. The concept was stretched a little more when Argentina and Hungary became members in 1993 and Russia in 1995. But the concept would be torn to tatters by a global MTCR.
How would one bring the have-nots into such a regime? Why would they want to sign a treaty prohibiting them from acquiring missile technology? The answer could be the one that originally inspired the negotiation of the NPT: to prevent their neighbors from acquiring a threatening capability, the have-nots would agree to forgo such a capability themselves. This clear objective seems to have been the dominant one in the early 1960s, when India and other smaller nations promoted nuclear nonproliferation in the United Nations.
But once the haves—the US, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union—joined the NPT negotiations, the objective changed. It became the Faustian bargain: the have-nots would forgo the development of nuclear weapons only if compensated by “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (NPT Article 4, paragraph 2). The language elsewhere in the same article—that the right to nuclear energy must be “in conformity with Articles I and II” (the key nonproliferation articles)—has been handily ignored by some NPT parties as they cite the treaty as justification for their pursuit of “peaceful” capabilities that bring them within days or weeks of nuclear weapons.
The analogy with a global missile nonproliferation treaty is clear. The have-nots can be expected to demand “peaceful” missile technology (e.g., that for space-launch vehicles—SLV) as compensation for forgoing proscribed missile technology.
In negotiating the MTCR, the partners wrestled for a year and a half with the question of how to handle SLV technology. Would it not undercut support for missile nonproliferation if the MTCR prevented the export of peaceful SLV technology? Or would it be more important for the effectiveness of the regime to conform to the laws of physics?
In the end, all seven governments yielded to the laws of physics. What goes up can come back down, whether ballistic missile or SLV. The hardware, technology, and production facilities of both are interchangeable. One cannot control the proliferation of ballistic missiles without equally controlling the proliferation of SLVs. Thus, the MTCR places identical restrictions on both. The same is true of other “peaceful” items—sounding rockets and unmanned air vehicles—when they become large enough to be interchangeable with the ballistic and cruise missiles that are subject to the regime’s “strong presumption to deny” exports.
How would the laws of physics fare in the negotiation of a global MTCR? Some have-nots might realize that forgoing “peaceful” items that were interchangeable with proscribed items was the price they had to pay for preventing their neighbors from acquiring the items. They might realize that one can enjoy the benefits of SLVs without possessing the rockets themselves; after all, a competitive international market exists for providing space-launch services.
But not all have-nots would be so wise. They would insist on a Faustian missile bargain. Would the “have” governments resist them? Almost certainly not—if the history of arms control negotiations is any guide. The participation of the Brazils of the world (see below) would be a prime motivation for a global treaty. And the “have” negotiators would exert considerable influence on their home governments to make the necessary accommodations.
Apart from the problem of the Faustian bargain, how can a regime function if some of its members are engaged in activities that the regime seeks to prevent? This is a problem with the NPT—a problem largely dealt with outside of the treaty by the export-control efforts of the NSG and the efforts of some major nonproliferators working with the leadership of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But could the export-control and information-sharing aspects of the current missile nonproliferation regime work effectively in a global regime? The odds would be stacked against it.
In sum, global coverage undercuts effectiveness. It leads to pressures to compromise the technical focus of the regime, and it weakens the implementation of the regime. But these problems have not deterred proposals for a global missile nonproliferation treaty.
Shortly after the announcement of the MTCR, proposals appeared for a globalization of the US-Soviet INF Treaty—a “Global INF.” In recent years, two additional proposals have appeared—a ZBM regime and a Canadian proposal for a global ban on ballistic missiles.
Global INF
The US and the Soviet Union signed the INF Treaty less than eight months after the announcement of the MTCR, and the treaty entered into force in mid-1988. Widely considered a major arms control success, the treaty eliminated an entire class of US and Soviet ground-launched missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers.
It was a short step for the Soviets and some parties in the US to advocate combining the “best” features of the INF and the NPT treaties into a Global INF.1 Such a treaty would avoid the discriminatory features of the MTCR by placing identical bans on certain types of missiles in all nations. Moreover, the Global INF would enshrine this equitable arrangement in a binding treaty.
But what would such a treaty control? The INF bans only ground launched ballistic or cruise missiles tested or deployed for weapons delivery and tested to a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (if a ballistic missile) or capable of this range (in its “standard design mode”) if a cruise missile. This leaves out a lot of systems:
The MTCR controls all of these missiles and more. A simple globalization of the INF would make all of them legitimate. (Remember, what is not prohibited is permitted.)
Even if a Global INF could be defined to cover all the systems targeted by the MTCR, it would need to apply the same rules to the haves and have-nots—leading to bans on conventionally armed missiles and missile defenses that would be difficult or impossible to negotiate. Verification—intrusive and complex in the US-USSR INF treaty—would be even more so if a Global INF were refined to avoid gaps in coverage. Moreover, the problems discussed in the previous section would remain. Those problems are intrinsic to treaties and to global coverage.
Zero Ballistic Missiles
The ZBM concept, proposed by some American arms controllers in 1992, calls for a treaty banning all ballistic missiles everywhere.2 It would seek to eliminate weapons that—by virtue of their speed—are regarded by many people as the most destabilizing. A ZBM would have a verification advantage over a Global INF. Obviously, banning all ballistic missiles would mean that proliferators could not disguise tests of an illegal type of ballistic missile as tests of a legal type.
However, the ZBM would not control sounding rockets and SLVs, even though they are interchangeable with ballistic missiles. Further, it would not control cruise missiles.
In some ways, the ZBM proposal is aimed less at preventing proliferation than at completing the process of removing the great powers’ ballistic missiles. But by banning the most survivable of the strategic deterrent systems—sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)—the proposal might increase rather than reduce the crisis instability of nuclear forces. (The proposal would replace SLBMs with nuclear-armed bombers and sea-launched cruise missiles, neither of which exists with both survivability and range comparable to the newest SLBMs.)
Moreover, the proponents of ZBM have a most unsettling plan for gaining global acceptance. They would offer SLV technology to all parties to the treaty, thus greatly increasing the proliferation of long-range ballistic missile capabilities. When the penalties of treaties and global coverage are subtracted from the net effects of a ZBM treaty, its value becomes more one of poetry than of arms control.
Canadian Proposal for a Ballistic Missile Ban
Canada has proposed a scheme that appears to borrow elements from both the Global INF and ZBM. It is a global ban on all ground-launched ballistic missiles with a range of 300 (versus the INF’s 500) to 5,500 kilometers. A Canadian official states that “we see the solution to the problem of ballistic missile proliferation as being founded on enduring rules of international law, not technical fixes or ad hoc responses like ATBMs (anti-tactical ballistic missiles) or the MTCR. These are not long term answers.”3
The proposal features many of the loopholes of a Global INF or a ZBM treaty: no coverage of cruise missiles (“we have to be realistic and stick to what is doable”)4 or of SLVs (to avoid discriminatory denials of technology). Verification has not been worked out, and some approaches will likely raise issues of national security and commercial confidentiality.
The dangers of attempting to globalize the MTCR are not limited to future proposals such as those described here. The dangers are unfolding at the present time in the US approach to possible MTCR membership for Brazil.
Brazil is a large nation with large ambitions. In the 1970s, it concluded the “deal of the century” with the Federal Republic of Germany for eight expensive nuclear reactors—plus reprocessing and enrichment facilities. The venture collapsed, not because of the objections of the nonproliferators, but because of its expense. However, a simultaneous venture quietly continued—Brazil’s program to build a space-launch vehicle.
According to Brazilian press reports of the early 1980s, the SLV (VLS in Portuguese) program was tied to the nuclear program by more than simultaneity. The VLS was intended to provide an option for delivery of a nuclear warhead by ballistic missile.5 Like the nuclear program, the VLS suffered from lack of funds and was a waste of money unless—as a recent RAND report demonstrated—it could enjoy access to foreign technology and produce exports of ballistic missiles on the side.6
For nonproliferation reasons, the United States refused to support the VLS program. However, the US government has an astonishingly strong Brazil lobby, so restraint with respect to the VLS was characterized by fits and starts.
There was enough restraint for Brazilian officials publicly to complain in the late 1980s that the MTCR had set the VLS program back several years. There was enough restraint for the French in the early 1990s quietly to drop a potential program of VLS cooperation with Brazil. And there was enough restraint for the US to put the VLS program—and various related ballistic-missile proposals—on a published list that subjected Brazilian importers of missile-related items to special scrutiny.
But fits occurred among these starts. In the mid-1980s, the Brazilophiles in the US government repeatedly sought to pull the teeth of the MTCR as it was being negotiated. In the early 1990s, the US State Department unilaterally approved US technical services for the VLS—an act for which it later apologized to Congress. By and large, however, the US and other nations acted to retard the VLS—until the advent of the Clinton administration.
One of that administration’s first decisions was to authorize the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to launch a series of large sounding rockets from the Brazilian VLS facility at Alcântara. This action gave an important seal of approval to the pariah program—inviting explorations of support from other governments and more funds from the Brazilian parliament.
The next decision by the Clinton administration had potentially more widespread effects on missile nonproliferation. On 23 September 1993, the president reversed a de facto policy that applicants for membership to the MTCR must terminate programs targeted by the regime. This stance had helped lead Argentina to dismantle its Condor ballistic-missile program. However, the new policy proposed a new distinction among missiles—one that the drafters of the MTCR found impossible to square with the laws of physics. The new distinction required only “offensive ballistic missiles” to be dropped before a nation could join the MTCR—leaving the applicants free to take their other rockets and all unmanned air-vehicle systems into the regime. The new policy stated that, although “the United States will not support the development or acquisition of space-launch vehicles in countries outside the MTCR,” once a nation had joined the regime, things would change. Then, the US would “consider exports of MTCR-controlled items to MTCR member countries for peaceful space launch programs on a case-by-case basis.”7
This policy left Argentine commentators asking whether they should have been allowed to continue a Condor-based “SLV” program to match their neighbor’s VLS. The policy was hardly equitable to South Africa, which was then in the process of dismantling its “SLV” program. In fact, the policy effectively proposed to gerrymander the regime to the immediate benefit of only one nation—Brazil. The Clinton proposal has not yet been accepted by the other members of the regime, but it may come up for a test at the next meeting of regime members.
Meanwhile, according to the press, the Clinton administration learned of Russian assistance to the VLS—assistance sanctionable under US law. Again, according to the press, the administration waived these sanctions—setting the stage for Russian and Brazilian entry into the MTCR.8
This victory of the Brazil lobby over the MTCR—and, for that matter, over the laws of physics—holds lessons for the issue of globalizing the MTCR. If a low-priority program like Brazil’s VLS can result in a gerrymandering of the MTCR, then the demands of an India or an Israel can lead to even more damaging Faustian bargains in a global regime.
The NPT is a treaty at war with itself. Articles 1, 2, and 3 belong in a treaty devoted to nonproliferation—stopping the spread of nuclear weapons without disarming those countries that already possess them. Article 6 belongs in a treaty for nuclear disarmament—eliminating nuclear weapons globally. And Article 4 is the Faustian bargain: compensating have-nots for following their own security interests, even if the compensation carries the cost of more proliferation.
The conflict is between nonproliferation and disarmament. Nonproliferation seeks primarily to stop the process of pro- liferation where it is now. It accepts differences among nations. It can be promoted by the flexibly organized actions of a relatively small number of supplier governments. By contrast, disarmament seeks reductions in force structures. It seeks identical treatment of all participants. If it seeks global participation, it must enact various schemes for “compensation.” And it must employ all the impedimenta of the treaty process in order to try to make its rules stick.
For all the reasons described above, it is doubtful that a global missile nonproliferation treaty would make a net contribution to nonproliferation. Moreover, the specific schemes that we have examined for a global MTCR are disarmament—not nonproliferation. (Noteworthy is the fact that the 1990 edition of Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements does not include the texts of the NSG, the AG, or the MTCR.) The schemes we have examined, as well as any similar global-treaty approach, would submerge the nonproliferation process under cumbersome treaty procedures and could be expected to weaken—not strengthen—the MTCR. Given the dynamics of the negotiation process, the schemes would spread missile capabilities more widely in the hope of gaining acceptance for global rules.
Sometimes less is more. Perhaps, a world without a global MTCR would be safer than one with it.
1. See Ken Adelman, “Curing Missile Measles,” The Washington Times, 17 April 1989; idem, “Capable of Going Ballistic,” The Washington Times, 26 July 1989; idem, “How to Limit Everybody’s Missiles,” New York Times, 7 April 1991; and “Welcomes Proposal for INF Ban,” Moscow TASS in English, 20 April 1989, in FBIS [Foreign Broadcast Information Service]-SOV-89-076, 21 April 1989, 10.
2. Alton Frye, “Zero Ballistic Missiles,” Foreign Policy, Fall 1992, 3–19.
3. “Canada Calls for Ballistic-Missile Ban,” International Defense Review, June 1995, 5; and Canadian official, interview with author, 7 July 1995.
4. “Canada Calls for Ballistic-Missile Ban,” 5.
5. Roberto Godoy, “Possibility of Producing a Bomb by 1990 Discussed—Reaction,” O Estado de São Paulo, 9 December 1983 [in Portuguese]; and “Country’s Role under New Conditions of World Power Examined,” Aviação em Revista, São Paulo, April 1983 [in Portuguese].
6. See Brian G. Chow, Emerging National Space Launch Programs: Economics and Safeguards, RAND Report R-4179-USDP (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993).
7. The White House, fact sheet, Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, 27 September 1993.
8. R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Waives Objection to Russian Missile Technology Sale to Brazil,” The Washington Post, 8 June 1995; “U.S. Waives Russia-Brazil MTCR Violation,” Arms Control Today, July–August 1995, 27; Philip Finnegan, “Brazil Prepares to Sign MTCR,” Space News, 24–30 April 1995, 3 and 29; José Casado, “Rocket Program, Technology Gains Outlined,” O Estado de São Paulo, 30 April 1995 [in Portuguese]; and Maria Helena Tachinardi, “President Seeks to Join Missile Technology Group,” Gazeta Mercantil, 24 July 1995.