*Copyright © by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; reprinted by permission.
Iran poses a number of threats to American interests in the Middle East, each requiring careful examination.1 Without help from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the US cannot protect the Persian Gulf from major threats. Yet, pushing such cooperation too far and too fast runs the risk of overloading the delicate political systems of the GCC states and plays into the hands of parties who bitterly oppose the GCC governments, including opposition groups within the kingdoms. Iranian threats include indirect and direct military challenges to the security of oil supplies and the GCC states; possible nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons programs; subversion of friendly regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt; acts of terrorism against the regime’s opponents and secularists in other Muslim countries; and opposition to the Middle East peace process. It is useful to distinguish between a range of military threats, on the one hand, and political threats that relate more to subversion and terrorism, on the other. It is also important to distinguish short-term threats from those that could arise over a longer period of time.
Iran’s professional military leaders now believe that superior military power is decisive in shaping the strategic environment in the Middle East. They learned this lesson the hard way—through their defeat in the Iran-Iraq War and the vivid images of Operation Desert Storm. As a consequence, they believe that military preparedness must be granted a high priority. Iran cannot rely on a “people’s war” fought with inferior equipment for its defense—a belief its leaders trumpeted in the early, idealistic days of the Iran-Iraq War. Instead, Iran needs large stockpiles of modern weapons and a professional force in being. The problem is that Iran has neither the trained manpower nor the money to match the conventional capabilities of the US and its allies. It may therefore be tempted to focus its strategy on subversion and terrorism while exploring shortcut routes to obtain weapons of mass destruction, including a small number of nuclear weapons.
In particular, concern exists that a desperate regime, domi- nated by radicals, could use its limited military assets not to invade a neighbor—such as Kuwait—but to change the nature of confrontation in the Gulf. Iran simply lacks the assets for such an invasion. Some people have postulated that Iranian submarines could lay mines in shipping lanes or that Iranian shore-based missiles could attack tankers to try to block the Strait of Hormuz. The purpose of these actions would not be to achieve any maritime victory over the US but to sow panic through the oil markets and put the Arab Gulf on notice that Iran will not sit back and allow its revolution to be squashed.
In such circumstances, US military assets are adequate to defeat any Iranian military action. (Determining whether a limited engagement would be in American interests is another matter.) On the other hand, escalation to a full-scale war with Iran would pose an enormous set of problems for the US—both militarily and politically.
Iran is trying to rebuild, restructure, and modernize its armed forces. Although it currently has some money to buy advanced arms on the international market and most weapons are not difficult to find, the problem of supplier reliability and total costs remains. Russia, for example, may have an ample supply of arms, but it has yet to demonstrate an ability to provide long-term support to its customers. Service is believed to be unreliable and erratic, and spare parts are often unavailable. The issue of Russian weaponry was further complicated for Iran by President Boris Yeltsin’s pledge to President Bill Clinton in late September 1994 that Russia would not sign any new defense contracts with Iran. However, Russia agreed to fulfill existing contracts.
The lessons of international sanctions imposed on Iran during the Iran-Iraq War suggest that self-reliance must be one of Iran’s long-term goals, if only to avoid future humiliations. This objective would entail increased domestic production of arms and support items and decreased dependency on foreign supplies. However, the undeveloped state of Iran’s domestic armaments industry ensures that weapons produced locally will be inferior to those purchased on the international arms market.
To mitigate the impact of continuing US and West European sanctions on arms sales, Iran has developed supply relation- ships with Russia and some of the remaining communist states to buy new aircraft, submarines, tanks, and missiles. Although their service leaves much to be desired, Russia, North Korea, and China manage to provide some advanced conventional weaponry. Iran’s modernization program should benefit from the arms glut; the problem remains, however, that while arms supplies from multiple sources may tend to reduce the hardships of future sanctions, the inefficiencies of operating different weapons from different suppliers tend to increase.
Iran’s exact expenditures for arms purchases have been difficult to pinpoint. In 1992 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that Iran was spending $2 billion on arms purchases. The Iranian minister of defense, Akbar Torkan, claimed that Iran’s entire defense budget in 1993 was only $850 million.2 A significant decrease in Iranian purchases occurred in 1992–93. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that Iran spent $867 million on the import of major conventional weapons in 1993. Several defense analysts put the 1993 figure around $800 million.
A better indicator than the actual numbers, however, is the general trend of an across-the-board buildup. Iran is rebuilding its military forces, modernizing its equipment, and seeking the most advanced arms possible. These developments do not necessarily imply aggressive intent. This program is still reasonable, given Iranian needs and comparisons with past Iranian force levels and those of neighboring states; Iran still has a long way to go to be militarily effective.3
If these trends continue and anticipated purchases materialize, Iran could eventually develop a much enhanced sea- denial capability. Its acquisition plans include Russian Kilo- class diesel submarines, Russian Su-24 Fencer attack aircraft, Chinese Silkworm antiship missiles, and—possibly—the Russian Tu-22M Backfire bomber armed with the Kitchen standoff air-to-surface missile. With a coastline far longer than Iraq’s and with more widely dispersed naval assets, Iran could slow the access of major ships through the Persian Gulf and cause trouble for US forces.
However, all evaluations of Iran’s capabilities are dogged by the paucity of concrete facts about the Iranian buying spree. This lack of information creates uneasiness as to the accuracy of available estimates. A modernization program is under way, but its parameters are unknown. Observers have difficulty assessing the buildup, especially without an end point in sight. Moreover, Iran has yet to decide on an appropriate force structure and doctrine, assure continuity of arms suppliers, standardize its hybrid equipment, replenish stocks, and upgrade existing equipment. These tasks are not easy.
We have, of course, more benign explanations of what is happening. A comparison of the current inventory against Iran’s forces at the peak of the shah’s buildup in 1978–79 reveals that Iran has only one-third to one-half the major weaponry it formerly had. It has less than half as many tanks as at the time of the shah’s fall, and most of these are outdated and improperly equipped for night warfare. Iran has a good number of artillery tubes but is unable to use them properly due to a lack of fire-control and target-acquisition systems. Iran’s approximately 100 attack helicopters date back to the 1970s. Compared with its well-armed neighbors—Iraq and Saudi Arabia—Iran’s potential military threat diminishes. Unlike Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Iran has not been a profligate spender on arms. In fact, if one accepts the 1979 baseline year, trends in military capability and balance have shifted against Iran.
Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction
There is widespread belief in Western intelligence circles that Iran has embarked on a covert nuclear weapons program. Such a program would represent a new, dangerous threat to the Middle East and would eclipse all other points of contention. Concern exists over the security of nuclear weapons and their associated technologies in the former Soviet Union. The specter of an oil-rich Middle East country that harbors nuclear ambitions and that finds it much easier to circumvent control regimes in pursuit of covert nuclear options is very well substantiated. The seizures of smuggled radioactive goods in Germany in August 1994 suggest that such a scenario is quite plausible.
Some individuals within the Islamic Republic’s hierarchy see a utility in Iran’s pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Strong evidence indicates that the Iranians are engaged in a modest nuclear research program with possible military implications.
However, confusion abounds regarding evidence that the Iranians are physically assembling the infrastructure and teams necessary for a full-fledged nuclear weapons program. In 1992 Iran permitted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect its listed nuclear facilities and other installations alleged to contain nuclear activity. On this occasion, the IAEA found no incriminating evidence of illegal actions, although some doubt exists within the intelligence community as to whether the IAEA team looked in the right places. Based on the open literature, no known secret facility in Iran is physically engaged in building components for nuclear weapons at this time. CIA director James Woolsey said on 23 September 1994 that “Iran is 8–10 years away from building such weapons, and that help from the outside will be critical in reaching that timetable.”4 He also noted Iranian efforts to purchase nuclear technology and weapons, especially in Russia. The announcement in early January 1995 that Russia had finally agreed to begin work on the unfinished nuclear reactors at Bushehr further confirmed suspicion about Iran’s nuclear intentions. Few Western economists accept Iran’s argument that it needs nuclear power stations to help redress long-term energy needs.
Although Iran has very demanding domestic needs, its hard-currency revenues are sufficiently large in aggregate terms that if a small percentage were siphoned off to support nuclear activity, it would amount to a sizable sum. It might be enough to tempt countries or individuals hard-pressed for money to sell Iran the necessary knowledge or technology. Furthermore, Iran has a significant number of well-educated scientists and engineers. The experiences of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea—poor countries in macroeconomic terms—further illustrate how advanced national security projects can be developed if major resources are allocated to such ends on a priority basis.
The uncertainty about the nuclear program poses a policy dilemma for the United States. Elevating concerns about an Iranian bomb to the top of the list of priorities may weaken US credibility on a whole array of technology-transfer issues and undermine nonproliferation strategies elsewhere. On the one hand, strident American rhetoric that includes discussion of preemptive or covert operations against Iran to stop its nuclear weapons program could have precisely the reverse effect.
On the other hand, taking a relaxed approach and dismissing nuclear rumblings as mujahideen and Zionist propaganda is even less responsible. Focusing intelligence efforts on Iran is essential. If Iran is progressing, the West must heighten controls on exports, enact sanctions against those countries or individuals who are parties to proliferation, and compel the IAEA to conduct more spot inspections of suspicious Iranian facilities. However, even under safeguards, Iran may develop the infrastructure and specialist training in nuclear engineering that, at some point in the future, could be turned to weapons use. Such a scenario could occur if Iran were prepared to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or embark on a covert program—as both Iraq and North Korea have done.
In September 1994 at the third session of the NPT-extension preparatory committee, Iran attacked the Western position on a number of issues. A key Iranian criticism dealt with Article 4, which includes the right of nonnuclear states to peaceful nuclear technology. Iran contends that, despite this article, the US and others have repeatedly blocked Iranian attempts to acquire technology for nuclear energy. Indeed, Mark Hibbs reported that Iran was considering withdrawing from the NPT over this issue,5 which is especially sensitive for Iran, given the US concessions made to North Korea in this very area.
Iran’s nuclear ambitions are bound to be influenced by the international community’s attempt to persuade Iran that Iraqi nuclear weapons are under permanent international control. Iran must be convinced that an Iraqi program will not reemerge once new leadership comes to power in Baghdad. This task will not be easy. In the long run, it is important to include Iran in any arms control regime in the Middle East. Israel will never agree to Middle East arms control regimes involving nuclear weapons unless Iran—and probably Pakistan—are subject to strict verification standards.
In addition to a possible nuclear weapons program, some analysts express concern about Iran’s nascent biological weapons programs. Once developed, biological agents could, in theory, be used for both terrorist and regular military operations. Iran also has the capability to produce chemical weapons, even though it signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Assessing the Military Threats
Iran currently poses no significant land threat to any of its Gulf neighbors, including Iraq. Iran’s army and air forces would face more severe logistical problems in projecting power into the Arab Gulf states than Iraq encountered. A land invasion of the Arabian peninsula would require initial confrontation with Iraq, which still has the largest ground forces in the region. Any attack across the Gulf waters would require major amphibious and airlift efforts, which are presently beyond Iran’s capabilities.
Nevertheless, Iran is a maritime power with a long coastline. Beyond simple acts of intimidation against its weaker neighbors, Iran could pose dangers for US and GCC maritime operations if its sea-denial capabilities continue to improve. US aircraft carriers would probably not risk entering the Gulf in the event of likely hostilities with Iran—at least in the early days of confrontation. Hence, they would be limited to air operations from positions in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. This restriction, in turn, would limit the range and intensity of naval air operations over Iranian targets, especially those north of Isfahan. The most serious naval challenge to the American fleet would be posed by a combination of submarines, mines, surface-to-surface missiles, and long-range strike aircraft with standoff missiles. US carriers based outside the Gulf could conduct isolated bombing raids deep into Iran but would not be able to sustain them without land-based air-refueling facilities. According to Western naval intelligence sources, Iranian submarines have struggled to rectify the poor performance of the batteries in their two new Russian-built Kilo-class submarines. Iran has made approaches to Kilo-class sub veterans in “an Indian naval establishment” for help in overcoming the battery challenge, since the Indian navy has eight Kilo-class submarines.6
It is unlikely that Iran can pose much of a conventional threat to the Gulf as long as the US maintains a strong forward military presence, expands defense cooperation with the GCC countries, continues to be effective in limiting technology and Western arms supplies to Iran, maintains cooperative relations with Russia, and commands wide-ranging political support throughout the Middle East. If some of these conditions change, however, Iran’s military challenges will be more difficult to counter. The US cannot assume that the next major crisis in the Gulf will be a repeat of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
Although Iran’s military potential poses a long-term threat to the Gulf, there are other causes for more immediate concern. Specifically, they are (1) Iran’s subversion of friendly regimes by means of its support of terrorism and (2) its rejection of the Arab-Israeli peace process. If Iran and its rejectionist allies succeed in promoting radical regimes in the Middle East, American military power—no matter how powerful—may not be sufficient to prevent the erosion of stability and the increasing threat to the Gulf itself.
Iran’s Activities in Sudan and North Africa
On 18 August 1993, the US government announced that Sudan would be added to the State Department’s list of countries supporting terrorism, based on evidence that Sudan harbors such terrorist groups as Hizballah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This decision underlined Sudan’s ever-growing link to Iran, which is allegedly a main supporter of these organizations. Teheran supplies Sudan with arms and ammunition and uses it as a training ground for Islamic and Palestinian terrorists. The full extent of Iranian influence over Sudan remains unclear.
In addition to US government concerns, officials in Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Algeria contend that Sudan is a launching pad for Iranian-style militancy and the supplier of significant logistical support for terrorist organizations across the region. Egyptian officials and media spokesmen have initiated a large-scale campaign to assign blame to Iran and Sudan for the surge of violence within Egypt.
Arab officials also allege that Iran is supporting Tunisia’s banned al-Nahda fundamentalist movement and the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria. Sources at the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated in November 1992 that Teheran is committed to support “the legitimate Algerian revolution against tyranny and arrogance.”7 On 27 March 1993, Algeria announced that after “analyzing the international situation and particularly the interference of certain countries in Algeria’s internal affairs, as well as their declared support for terrorism, the High Committee of State has decided to break diplomatic relations with Iran and recall our ambassador to Sudan.”8
To many Iranian officials, the willingness of Western and Arab countries to publicize Iran’s complicity appears hypo- critical and self-serving. They contend that these countries falsely blame Iran for indigenous opposition movements that harbor legitimate grievances.
Iran also has been implicated in attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets. Approximately 100 people were killed on 18 July 1994 in a bombing of Jewish organizations in Buenos Aires. Coupled with a bomb explosion on 20 July on a Panamanian plane and two bombings in London on 26–27 July, the disaster in Argentina led a resurgence in international terrorism. Israel has charged that Hamas and the Lebanese-based Hizballah are responsible for the blasts; Israeli and US officials also have singled out Iran.
Despite the fact that Iranian operatives have been linked to the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires on 17 March 1992, in which nearly 30 people were killed, the Iranian government has repeatedly denied any connection. On 8 May 1992, the US Department of State alleged Iranian involvement in the attack.9
Iranian involvement in terrorist attacks in Turkey also has been alleged. Following the death of prominent Turkish journalist Ugur Mumcu on 24 January 1993, segments of the Turkish press accused Iran of orchestrating the fatal car bombing. In early February, Turkish interior minister Ismet Sezgin announced the arrest of 19 members of a group called Islamic Action that he claimed had been trained in Iran. They were charged with the murder of two prosecular journalists—Mumcu and Ali Akbar Ghorbani, an Iranian dissident. Ghorbani had been a member of the People’s Mujahideen.10
Iran supports several organizations that have well-established records of committing acts of terrorism. According to the US State Department and other sources, Iran offers financial, political, and/or logistical support to Hizballah, Hamas, the Popular Liberation Front, and possibly the Islamic Jihad.
Iran’s Rejection of Israel and the Peace Process
The Iranian government severed relations with Israel in February 1979, soon after the overthrow of the shah. The Islamic Republic has always rejected Israel’s right to exist and has supported the more rejectionist elements of the Palestinian movement. Support for Hizballah and other terror groups is another manifestation of Iranian opposition to the peace process. Hizballah, Hamas, or other militant groups aligned with Iran can be used to disrupt the process and rattle participants.
In the wake of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement of September 1993, Iranian rejectionism carries greater risks for Iran’s foreign and economic relations, especially the potential for friction with Europe and Japan, both of whom have been far more willing to deal with Iran than has the United States. With their strong support for the peace agreements, Europe and Japan may be more likely to heed US calls for diminished ties with Iran and to support rejection of Iranian requests for debt relief from international financial institutions. Iran strongly denounced the Israeli-Jordanian treaty signed on 26 October 1994. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called the Arab-Israeli agreements “an unjust compromise.” In addition to criticism of King Hassan and King Hussein, he referred to Israel as “the Zionist knife-wielders who are alien to human sentiments.”11
Iran’s relations with the Gulf Arab countries operate on two tracks. On the one hand, Iran has a decided need to cultivate friends, escape regional isolation, and continue important trade relations. On the other hand, it nurtures a desire to assert an independent and forceful foreign policy. In view of recent Iranian behavior towards the GCC countries, one can question whether Iran’s leaders have the skill and acumen to balance these two often contradictory goals. Indeed, relations between Iran and its Arab neighbors have been strained for decades—especially since the revolution. Fearful of Islamic revivalism, most Arab states supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and paid huge sums of money to sustain Saddam Hussein’s war effort. The shock and trauma of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 put all the GCC countries on notice that they could quite literally be obliterated by aggressive neighbors. Given the vast asymmetries in population and wealth between the GCC and countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Yemen, it is not surprising that security is of paramount concern.
Even though the US umbrella provides a strong deterrent against major aggression of the kind that occurred in 1990, the American presence may be less effective against political threats and subversion. Given the complicated sociology of most GCC countries—large foreign populations and the diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds of all residents—internal security issues are an increasingly important factor in regional stability. In this context, the Iranian threat looms large.
The Gulf states have grown increasingly apprehensive that Iran is determined to become the regional hegemon. Moreover, whatever conciliatory moves Iran may have been willing to make have been obscured by its bullying tactics over control and sovereignty of Abu Musa Island and Tunb Islands. Iran’s claim to the islands has generated widespread apprehension. What began as a dispute between Sharja and Iran escalated to a dispute with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), then the GCC, and then to the Arab League. The issue is one of principle, but strong strategic overtones also exist. If Iran were to gain sovereignty over the islands, it could extend its territorial waters into large areas that contain much oil. The UAE has proposed submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice for resolution. To date, however, Iran has refused to accept this avenue of reconciliation. So long as the dispute remains unresolved and Iran continues to occupy and reinforce Abu Musa, tensions between Iran and the GCC will continue.
Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman have all signed defense-cooperation agreements with the United States; the UAE also signed an agreement on 25 July 1994. A less formalized arrangement with Saudi Arabia is also in place.12
A similar array of actions was involved in the various military agreements. The agreement with Bahrain “expanded a previous agreement to include a joint exercise program, access to ports and airfields, and prepositioning of equipment.” The US and Kuwait “signed a 10-year agreement allowing US access to ports and facilities, prepositioning of military equipment and joint training.”13 American officials renewed an existing facilities-access agreement with Oman. As a result of Saddam’s moves in October 1994, Kuwait agreed to base a squadron of US planes and to expand the number of US tanks stored in the kingdom. Qatar agreed to store a brigade’s worth of armor. Since the end of the Gulf War, allied aircraft have been based in Saudi Arabia to enforce the no-fly zone.14
Over the next 10 years, Iran could pose serious challenges to its neighbors, and its actions will continue to need deterring. Thus, an American military commitment will remain necessary to the security of the Gulf. Yet, Iran also feels threatened, and its own insecurities may contribute to the dynamics of threat escalation. The leadership in Teheran presently feels beleaguered, paranoid, and intimidated by changes occurring both in the neighborhood and in the international environment.
Iran’s mullahs are fighting a rear-guard action to save a revolution, and the removal of one or two leaders will make little difference to the governance of the country. Without a doubt, the unpopularity of the Iranian regime is second only to the impotence of the opposition, both inside and outside the country. Most Iranians would probably rejoice if the mullahs were removed from power.
Iran’s rejection of the Arab-Israeli peace process and its support for regimes and groups intent on using force to overthrow legitimate governments ensure continued conflict with moderate states in the Middle East and outside powers, especially the United States. Indeed, Iran’s leaders have rejected American calls for an official dialogue to discuss major points of contention. Although significant voices in Teheran have favored such a dialogue in the past, the radical factions headed by Khamenei have effectively torpedoed any prospects for talks in the near future. Many American observers of Iranian politics believe that the radicals fear American military power less than the prospect of America’s establishing itself as the leader of Western secularism and the generator of a global culture that threatens the very essence of the revolution. Iran’s ability to influence political events in the Middle East is clearly linked to other factors over which it has only marginal—if any—control. A revolution in Algeria leading to the establishment of an Islamic regime could have profound implications for the stability of the Mediterranean, including Egypt. A collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process, aided and abetted by Iranian interference, also could have a profound and negative domino effect on the region. The resurgence of Saddam Hussein or an equally ruthless successor in Iraq could likewise spell danger.
From an American perspective, the search for an optimum policy towards Iran and the Gulf remains illusive and fraught with dangers. At one level, military cooperation with the GCC has gone from strength to strength, and the deployments of American forces to Kuwait during October 1994 demonstrated that it will be a long time before either Iran or Iraq can directly challenge the US and GCC with military force. However, the political and sociological dimensions of Gulf security pose more complicated problems. Without GCC cooperation, the US will not be able to protect the Gulf from major threats. The stability of the Gulf will depend on how well the US can maintain a delicate balance between security needs and political action.
1. This material draws upon a recent book by the author, Forever Enemies? American Policy and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994).
2. Islamic Republic of Iran Permanent Mission to the United Nations, “Defence Minister: Iran Will Not Be Dragged into Mid East Arms Race,” release no. 075, 15 April 1993.
3. For more information on Iran’s military programs, see Shahram Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy: Intentions, Capabilities, and Impact (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994).
4. R. James Woolsey, “Challenges to Peace in the Middle East,” Peacewatch, no. 33 (26 September 1994).
5. Mark Hibbs, “Iran May Withdraw from NPT over Western Trade Barriers,” Nucleonics Week 35, no. 38 (22 September 1994): 1.
6. “Iran May Turn Down Third ‘Kilo’ Delivery,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 22, no. 14 (8 October 1994): 4.
7. Youssef Ibrahim, “Arabs Raise a Nervous Cry over Iranian Militancy,” New York Times, 21 December 1992, A1, A10; and Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 19 November 1992, 1, in FBIS [Foreign Broadcast Information Service]-NES, 23 November 1992, 52.
8. “Algeria Breaks Diplomatic Ties with Iran,” Reuters, 27 March 1993. An abbreviated version of the Reuters report appeared in “Algeria Breaks Ties with Iran,” New York Times, 28 March 1993, 14.
9. “U.S. Sees Iranian Role in Buenos Aires Blast,” New York Times, May 1992, 3. The US statement explained that “information has been gathered that indicates Iranian involvement in the attack, but there is not conclusive evidence at this time.”
10. According to People’s Mujahideen press releases, Ghorbani was kidnapped in June 1992 and then tortured and murdered with direction from Teheran. See also “Turkey Asserts Islamic Ring That Killed Three Has Iran Links,” New York Times, 5 February 1993, A6; and “Widow of Iranian Dissident Blames Teheran in His Death,” New York Times, 10 February 1993, A14.
11. Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 27 October 1994, in FBIS-NES, 27 October 1994, 42–44.
12. “Comfort Blanket for the Gulf,” The Economist, 5 December 1992, 39–40.
13. “Buying Security from the West,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 March 1992, 534.
14. Michael Gordon, “Kuwait Is Allowing U.S. to Station a Squadron of Warplanes,” New York Times, 28 October 1994, A3.