APPENDIX G
STANDARDIZED COMSEC CUSTODIAN COURSE

G-1. QUOTAS

a. Communications security (COMSEC) custodians and command COMSEC inspectors must be graduates of the Standardized COMSEC Custodian Course (SCCC) (AR 380-40). In USAREUR, no person may be appointed on a DA Form 2012 (COMSEC Account Data Form) as a custodian, alternate custodian, or command COMSEC inspector without successful completion of the SCCC. In USAREUR, the SCCC is titled INTEL 34. INTEL 34 is part of the Combined Arms Training Center (CATC) at Rose Barracks, Vilseck, Germany. The CATC allocates quotas for the CATC annually to USAREUR commands with a need to train personnel as COMSEC custodians, alternate custodians, or command COMSEC inspectors. Commanders needing more then their allocated quotas must request an authorization to attend from the course proponent through command channels.

b. Turn-in procedures for unneeded quotas and requests for additional course quotas are in USAREUR Circular 351-1. USAREUR commands (USAREUR Reg 10-5) will coordinate course quotas with the Schools Branch, CATC, 476-2880/2680.

G-2. PREREQUISITES
The following qualifications must be met before requesting an allocation to attend INTEL 34. Personnel must-

a. Have no less than a Secret security clearance (marked on DD Form 1610 (Request and Authorization for TDY Travel of DOD Personnel)). This requirement is nonwaiverable.

b. Have at least 1 year remaining in command after graduation (9 months for short-tour areas).

c. Have a minimum rank of sergeant (grade E-5) or GS-4.

d. Be a candidate for COMSEC custodian, alternate custodian, or a command inspector position.

e. Have a memorandum signed by the unit security manager validating their security clearance.

NOTE: Students arriving at the INTEL 34 course without this memorandum will be sent back to their units.

G-3. WAIVERS
Requests for waivers to prerequisites in the pamphlet, appendix B, paragraph B-2, should be sent through command channels to the Commander in Chief, USAREUR, ATTN: AEAGB-CI-S, Unit 29351, APO AE 09014. Requests should include-

a. Name and rank of the requestor.

b. Date expected to return from overseas (DEROS).

c. Duty position.

d. Class date and course number (USAREUR Cir 351-1). If no current circular is available, call the Schools Branch, CATC, at 476-2680/2880 for a course number.

e. Justification and verification of other prerequisites that are met.

G-4. EMERGENCY ALLOCATIONS
Requests for emergency allocations will be submitted through command channels to the course proponent (Commander in Chief, USAREUR, ATTN: AEAGB-CI-S, Unit 29351, APO AE 09014) and include the information in the pamphlet, appendix B, paragraph B-3.

a. Emergency allocations may be requested because of loss of custodian due to unforeseen circumstances (for example, emergency leave, relief for cause).

b. Information systems security officers (ISSOs) at USAREUR commands will verify requests for emergency allocations. ISSOs will coordinate the requests with training personnel to ensure that course quotas allocated in USAREUR Circular 351-1 have been filled by authorized candidates before sending the emergency request to the DCSINT, HQ USAREUR/7A.

G-5. EXCEPTIONS

a. Personnel who were appointed to the position of COMSEC custodian before January 1988, and who have held the position continuously are "grandfathered." The course requirements in AR 380-40 do not apply for grand-fathered personnel. Grandfathered personnel are not required to attend INTEL 34.

b. Custodians are responsible for providing verification of continuous duties as a COMSEC custodian. The requestor sends the verification documentation or a memorandum from the commander listing the COMSEC account numbers of the accounts assigned to the individual to the ACCOR along with the DA Form 2012. This documentation must be available for the inspector, if necessary.

c. Nonattendance at the SCCC by grandfathered personnel is not a deficiency or shortcoming for an audit or inspection.

APPENDIX H
MAIL AND MESSAGE ADDRESSES

Table H-1 reference list for mail and message addressees of offices in the basic pamphlet.

APPENDIX I
SAMPLE COMSEC INCIDENT OR CCI INCIDENT REPORT

Figure I-1 is a sample communication security (COMSEC) incident report according to AR 380-40. Blank parentheses in the sample indicate paragraphs could be classified.

___________________________________________________________________________



FROM:   (REPORTING UNIT)



TO:     DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//V51A//(note 1)

        DIR USACCSLA FT HUACHUCA AZ//SELCL-KP-IN//



INFO:   (HIGHER HQ AS DIRECTED BY UNIT STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE)

DIR USACCSLA FT HUACHUCA AZ//SELCL-KP-OR/SELCL-KP-AU// (note 2)

66TH MI GP AUGSBURG GE//IAPG-SAS// (note 3)

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGB-CI-S/AEAIM-CO-SI//

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGD-SM-S// (note 4)

CUSALAO EUROPE SECKENHEIM GE//AMXLA-E-CCM//

NCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//F29//

USATCMO EUR 11TH SIG DET MANNHEIM GE//AFSE-CLC-CMO/5BE001// (note 5)

C O N F I D E N T I A L (SAMPLE - CLASSIFIED FOR TRAINING ONLY) (note 6)

SUBJECT: COMSEC INCIDENT (U) OR CCI INCIDENT (U) (choose appropriate 

one)

A. (U) AR 380-40, 01 SEP 94

B. (U) TB 380-41, CHAP 5, 01 OCT 94

C. (U) UR 380-40, PARA 10, 02 MAY 96

1. ( ) STATE WHETHER INITIAL, INITIAL/FINAL, AMPLIFYING, OR FINAL REPORT 

HERE. LIST COMSEC ACCOUNT, SUBACCOUNT, HAND-RECEIPT (FOR EXAMPLE, 

5CE123-01-HR-05), OR PROPERTY BOOK OFFICER DODAAC FOR CCI INCIDENTS 

INVOLVING CONTROLLED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ITEMS (CCI). ONCE A CASE NUMBER HAS 

BEEN ASSIGNED TO AN INCIDENT, ALL AMPLIFYING REPORTS MUST STATE THE CASE 

NUMBER IN THIS PARAGRAPH.

2. ( ) MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION: (AS APPLICABLE) SHORT TITLE: USKAT 1234, 

EDITION: A, SEGMENTS: 25 THRU 31, TABLES: N/A, SETS: N/A, DAYS: 25-31, 

REG NO: 164, ALC: 1 (note 7).

3. ( ) BRIEF, PRECISE DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT ACCORDING TO TB 380-41, 

PARAGRAPHS 5.28 THROUGH 5.30. IN THIS PARAGRAPH CLEARLY ADDRESS WHO, 

WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND HOW. INITIAL REPORTS MUST PROVIDE 

CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES (CONAUTHS) PRECISE FACTS SO PRECAUTIONARY 

MEASURES CAN BE DIRECTED (note 7).

4. ( ) PER AR 380-40, IDENTIFY TYPE OF INQUIRY OR INVESTIGATION PLANNED 

OR CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO AR 380-5 (note 6). NAME THE INVESTIGATING 

OFFICER (IF ASSIGNED). IAW AR 380-40, STATE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING (AS 

APPLICABLE): COMPROMISE, NO COMPROMISE, OR COMPROMISE CANNOT BE RULED 

OUT.

5. ( ) CONAUTH FOR ALL MATERIAL INVOLVED (note 7).

6. (U) DATE, TIME, AND NAME OF COORDINATION WITH CONAUTH.

7. ( ) THIS PARAGRAPH SHOULD PROVIDE ALL OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION 

AVAILABLE (APPLICABLE TB 380-41, PARAGRAPHS 5.28 THRU 5.30, RESULTS OF 

INVESTIGATIONS, CORRECTIVE MEASURES IMPLEMENTED OR PLANNED TO PREVENT 

FUTURE INCIDENTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE).

8. (U) POC NAME, GRADE OR RANK, UNIT, AND DSN AND COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE 

NUMBERS. DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES (ONLY IF THIS IS A CLASSIFIED 

MESSAGE) DECLAS ON: DATE 10 YEARS FROM DATE OF MESSAGE (ONLY IF THIS IS 

A CLASSIFIED MESSAGE)

________________________________________________________________________



NOTES: 1. DIRNSA will be an action addressee on all COMSEC incident 

reports except those involving key at user or CONAUTH level, then DIRNSA 

will be an info addressee. DIR USACCSLA FT HUACHUCA AZ//SECL-KP-IN// 

will be action addressee on all CCI incidents. CONAUTH will also be an 

action addressee if key is involved.

2. DIR USACCSLA FT HUACHUCA AZ//SELCL-KP-OR// will not be included on 

incident reports involving ALC 3 material.

3. Local CI control office to be included as an information addressee on 

all incidents.

4. The DCSLOG will be included as an information addressee on all 

incidents involving CCI.

5. USATCMO-E is included as an addressee only if the incident report 

effects edition status or effective dates for resupply (for example, 

supersession).

6. Classification guidance for message preparation is in AR 380-40 and 

TB 380-41, paragraph 5.1.

7. For physical incidents, reference TB 380-41, paragraph 5.28. For 

personnel incidents reference TB 380-41, paragraph 5.29. For 

cryptographic incidents reference TB 380-41, paragraph 5.30.

________________________________________________________________________

Figure I-1. Sample COMSEC or CCI Incident Report

GLOSSARY

SECTION I
MOBILE SUBSCRIBER EQUIPMENT (MSE) COMSEC GLOSSARY

AIRK
area interswitch rekey (see switch keys)

AKDC
Automatic Key Distribution Center, TSEC/KGX-93, (node center/large-extension nodes (NC/LENs))

AKMS
Army key management system

AN/CYZ-10
automatic net control device

BCOR
brigade COMSEC office of record. (This office is responsible for the generation and distribution of MSE keys to area signal battalions, CCOR, and DCORs.)

BCMO
brigade COMSEC management office

BT
bulk transfer

CCOR
corps COMSEC office of record (This office is responsible for MSE key distribution to users via the CMCS.)

CIK
cryptoignition key: normally issued via KSD-64 key fill devices (not currently used in MSE).

CIRK
common interswitch rekey (switdh keys).

CM
communications modem (orderwire keys).

COMSEC
communications security: COMSEC for the MSE network is achieved through netted cryptographic protection in four functional areas (T-O-S-S):

(1) Trunk - TED (KG-194A)

(2) Orderwire - CM (KY-57)

(3) Switch - AKDC (KGX-93/KG-112s)

(4) Subscriber - DSVT/SDNRI (KY-68/KY-90)

COMSEC Incident
Any incident that jeopardizes COMSEC. Such incidents should be reported immediately.

CMCS
COMSEC Material Control System. The system for accounting, safeguarding, and supply control of COMSEC material.

DCOR
division COMSEC office of record (This office is responsible for MSE key distribution to users via the CMCS.)

DTD
data transfer device (for example, AN/CYZ-10).

ETD
electronic key transfer device (for example, KYK-13/KYX-15).

Firefly
cooperative key technology (currently used in STU-IIIs).

HUS
hardened unique storage location for keys within the AKDC.

ICP
intertheater COMSEC package (This joint COMSEC key-tape system is held by the BCOR, the CCOR, and the DCORs. The BCOR loads ICP key at the PNCS and bulk transfers to NC/LENs as required.0

KEK
key encryption key (This key is used for over-the-air rekey (OTAR).)

key label
The identification (ID) assigned to electronically generated COMSEC key according to the unit SOP. As an example, V Corps MSE SOP for key labels is:

X N N N Z


- ------- -

¦ ¦ +-- Edition ID: The BCOR assigns this ID for each new key generated.

¦ +-------- HUS location: The designated AKDC storage location.

+-------------- Key type designator. This designator will be one of the 

following:



        A = AIRK                N = CM Net key

        B = Bt                  T = TED

        C = CIRK                U = U key

        K = CM Key transfer     X = X key

        M = M key

key tag
electronic key ID used in data transfer devices (DTD).

KG-112
TSEC/KG-112 loop key generator (NC/LENs).

KG-194A
TSEC/KG-194A trunk encryption device (TED).

KOK-12/KOK-16
TSEC/KOK-12/KOK-16 electronic programmable COMSEC transfer devices used by COMSEC offices.

KSD-64A
Firefly key-fill device (not currently used in MSE).

KY-57
TSEC/KY-57 VINSON used to secure CM orderwire.

KY-68
TSEC/KY-68, digital subscriber voice terminal (DSVT).

KY-90
TSEC/KY-90, secure digital net radio interface (SDNRI).

KYK-13
COMSEC key transfer device issued to small-extension nodes (SENs), random-access units (RAUs), and subscriber terminals.

KYX-15A
COMSEC net control device issued to NC/LENs.

Leader NC
See SNCS

LEN
large-extension node

LKG
loop key generator, TSEC-112 (NC/LENs)

modem
A shortened version of modulator/demodulator. It is a device that connects a computers by using a telephone line.

MSNV
message switch net variable (switch keys)

MSRV
message switch rekey variable (switch keys)

NC
node center

NODE
A system connected to a network.

OTAR
over-the-air-rekey

OTAT
over-the-air-key transfer

PNCS
primary node center switch used for COMSEC key generation and distribution. Normally collocated with the signal brigade system control center (SYSCON).

RAU
random-access unit

SCCC
standardized COMSEC custodian course

SEN
small-extension node

SNCS
secondary node center switch (This switch is used for COMSEC key generation and distribution in the absence of the PNCS. It is also referred to as leader switch, which is typically collocated with signal battalion control centers (BATCONS).)

TED
trunk encryption device (for example, TSEC/KG-194A)

TEK
traffic encryption key

trunk keys
Four types of keys used with KG-194A trunk encryption devices (TEDs). This keys are-

(1) Ti (TED initialization - T113): This TEK held by NCs and LENs in V Corps. This key is generated at the PNCS by the BCOR and prepositioned with NC/LENs. The Ti key is used for initial synchronization of TEDs to allow bulk transfer of Tn keys.

(2) Tn (TED nodal): This TEK is used between NCs and LENs. A separate Tn key is generated and transferred for each link, using the internodal link installation procedures below:


- NC/LENs initialize link with T113-Update 1
- Master NC generates T370
- Master NC transfers T370
- NC/LENs re-load TEDs with 370-Update 1
- Master NC performs TED update to correspond with the day of the month


(3) Tg (TED gateway): This TEK is used to secure gateway links. Tg keys are obtained through the CMCS by the BCOR and provided to NC/LENs as required. Gateway link installation procedures are:


- NC/LENs initialize link with designated Tg key-Update 1
- Tg key-Update 1
- Master NC performs TED update to correspond with day of month


(4) Te (TED extension): This TEK is used to secure extension links to SENs and RAUs. Te keys are generated at the PNCS by the BCOR and prepositioned with SEN/RAUs. A separate Te key is designated for SENs within each signal battalion. A common Te key (T112) is used for RAUs. (Te key assignments are listed in the HUS reference list). NCs and LENs receive Te keys by BT. SEN and RAU link installation is:


- NC/LENs initialize link with designated Te key-Update 1

orderwire keys
Two keys are used with the CM (KY-57) to provide secure orderwire capabilities:

(1) Net Traffic Key (N029). This TEK is used to provide protection for confidential CM (communications modem) communications between MSE teams corps-wide. This TEK is generated at the PNCS by the BCOR and prepositioned with all MSE teams before being deployed. NCs and LENs receive N029 by BT.

(2) Key Encryption Key (K028). The KEK that is generated at the PNCS by the BCOR and prepositioned with NCs, LENs, SENs, and RAUs throughout the corps. K028 is used at the discretion of the BCOR for OTAR between MSE teams. NCs and LENs receive N029 by BT.

SDNRI
secure digital net radio interface (for example, TSEC/KY-90)

subscriber keys
Three keys that are used to protect communications for mobile subscriber radio telephone (MSRT), wireline digital subscriber voice telephone (DSVT), and SDNRU (KY-90). These are-

(1) M key (M224). This TEK is ususally generated at the corps level PNCS by the BCOR and distributed to subscribers throughout the CMCS. The M key encryptsthe signaling between the RAU and MSRT radio. It also is used to encrypt synchronization signaling for MSRT, wireline DSVT, and KY-90 subscribers initial entry into the network.

(2) U Key. KEK used to encrypt the transmission of X and V (per call) keys between NC/LENs and MSRTs, wireline DSVTs, and KY-90s. Subscribers are assigned to 1 of 25 U-key nets based on their profile. U keys are generated at the PNCS by the BCOR and prepositioned with subscribers throughout the CMCS. NC and LENs receive U keys by BT from the PNCS.

(3) S Key (SVAR). This compartmented TEK is used in the DSVT by a small community of users to protect highly classified information (TS/SCI). Subscribers obtain S keys through the CMCS. MSE operators never handle S key. (See SVAR.)

SVAR
Procedures for loading S key in DSVTs for higher than Secret Collateral material transmitted over MSE. SVAR procedures are-

- Subscriber establishes DSVT to DSVT call.
- Both parties of the connection must load the S key in the KY-68 SVAR position. (The S key overwrites the existing V key and is valid only for the duration of the call).
- S key must be loaded for each TS/SCI call.

switch keys
The following are keys used by MSE NCs and LENs for secure-call processing:

(1) CIRK (Common Interswitch Rekey-C001). This KEK is used to encrypt the transmission of the per-call key between NCs and LENs. This key is generated at the PNCS by the BCOR and bulk transferred to each NC and LEN.

(2) BT (Bulk Transfer Key-B002). This KEK is used to encrypt the bulk transfer (BT) of keys from AKDC to AKDC between NCs and LENs. This key is generated at the PNCS by the BCOR and prepositioned with each NC and LEN.

(3) AIRK (Area Interswitch Rekey). This KEK is used to encrypt the transmission of the per-call key across the corps boundary. AIRK keys are obtained through the CMCS by the BCOR and provided to NCs and LENs as required.

(4) X Key (DSVT Net Key-X224). This TEK is used to encrypt synchronization signaling between NCs and LENs, MSRTs, wireline DSVTs, and KY-90s. The X key is generated at the PNCS by the BCOR by BT to NCs and LENs. X224 also is automatically transferred to MSRTs, wireline DSVTs, and KY-90s during affiliation.

(5) V Key (per-call key). This TEK is automatically generated and sent to MSRTs, wireline DSVTs, and KY-90s during call setup.

(6) MSRV (Message Switch Rekey Variable-U146). This KEK is used to encrypt the transmission of the per-call key to the AN/TYC-39 message switch. The MSRV is generated at the PNCS by the BCOR and provided to NCs, LENs, and messages switches as required.

(7) MSNV (Message Switch Net Key Variable-X226): This TEK used to encrypt synchronization signaling between the MSE network and the AN/TYC-39 message switch. The MSNV is generated at the PNCS by the BCOR and provided to NCs, LENs, and message switches as required.

TS/SCI
Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information.

X key
See switch keys

V key
See switch keys

SECTION II
ABBREVIATIONS

66th MI Gp
66th Military Intelligence Group

ACCLAIMS
Army COMSEC Commodity Logistics Accounting and Information Management System

ACCOR
Army COMSEC Central Office of Record

ACE
Allied Command, Europe

AE
Army Europe

ALC
accounting legend code

AR
Army regulation

CATC
Combined Arms Training Center

CER
cryptoevaluation report

CCI
controlled cryptographic item

CCIR
change of custodian inventory report

cdr
commander

CF
central facility

CFAR
COMSEC facility approval request

CIK
cryptoignition key

CINCUSAREUR
Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe

CJCSI
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Intelligence

CMDSA
COMSEC Material Direct Support Activity

CNCS
cryyptonet control station

COMSEC
communications security

CONAUTH
controlling authority

COOP
continuity of operation

DA
Department of the Army

DACAP
Department of the Army Cryptographic Access Program

DCS
Defense Courier Service

DCSIM
Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management, USAREUR

DCSINT
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAREUR

DCSLOG
Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, USAREUR

DCSOPS
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, USAREUR

DD
Department of Defense

DDMMYY
date to be filled in as a 2-digit number for the day (DD), month (MM), and year (YY)

DEROS
date expected to return from overseas

DIRNSA
Directory, National Security Agency

DOD
Department of Defense

DSN
Defense Switched Network

DTD
data-transfer device

DVOW
digital voice order wire

EAP
emergency action procedures

EKMS
Electronic Key Management System

ETS
estimated time of separation

FIS
foreign intelligence service

GDP
ground defensive position

GSA
General Services Administration

HUS
hardened unique storage

IAW
in accordance with

INSCOM
United States Army Intelligence and Security Command

INTEL 34
Standardized COMSEC Custodian Course-Europe

IR
item register

ISSM
information systems security manager

ISSO
information systems security officer

KAM
cryptographic operational maintenance manual

KAO
cryptographic operational operating manual

KEK
key encryption key

KSD
key storage device

LAR
logistics assistance representative

mm
millimeter

MOA
memorandum of agreement

MSE
mobile subscriber equipment

NAG
noncrytopgraphic operational general publication (coded)

NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NISPOM
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual

NSA
National Security Agency

OADR
originating agency's determination required

OPCODE
operations code

OPLAN
operation plan

OTAD
over-the-air-key distribution

PBO
property book officer

PCS
permanent change of station

PLL
priority load list

PMO
provost marshal office

POV
privately owned vehicle

POC
point of contact

RCS
reports control symbol

reg
regulation

S2
intelligence office

S3
operations and training office

SAEDA
subversion and espionage directed against the United States Army

SAIR
semiannual inventory report

SCAR
Security Clearance Access Roster

SCCC
Standardized COMSEC Custodian Course

SCI
sensitive compartmented information

SCO
subcontrol office

SDNS
Secure Data Network System

SF
standard form

SOI
signal operation instructions

SOP
standing operating procedure

SST
secure subscriber terminal

STU-III
secure telephone unit, third generation

TB
technical bulletin

TBA
to be announced

TCLSC-E
Theater COMSEC Logistics Support Center-Europe

TI
technical inspection

TM
technical manual

TPI
two-person integrity

TRADOC
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

TS
Top Secret

TSCM
technical surveillance countermeasures

U.S.
United States

USACCSLA
United States Army Communications-Electronics Command COMSEC Logistics Activity

USALAO-E
United States Army Logistics Assistance Office-Euorpe

USAREUR
United States Army, Europe