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Great advantage is drawn
from knowledge of your adversary, and when you know the measure
of his intelligence and character, you can use it to play on his
--Fredrick the Great, 1747
IEW supports Army combat operations in war, conflict, and, when necessary OOTW. Combat operations
may involve heavy, light, or special operations forces. They may
be large-scale during war or small-scale in OOTW. Commanders may
conduct combat operations anywhere in their AO as part of close,
deep, or rear operations. MI units and resources support the commander
in executing offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations.
IEW SUPPORTS COMMANDERS
Commanders use IEW support
to anticipate the battle, understand the battlefield framework,
and influence the outcome of operations. IEW enables commanders
to focus and protect their combat power and resources. All commanders
use IEW to support force protection. And, while IEW support is
required for every situation, each application will be tailored
to the commander's requirements at each echelon and for each operation.
use IEW to plan and execute operations. These operations may be
combat operations during war or OOTW. Intelligence helps the combat
commander understand the AO, visualize his battle space, and construct
the battlefield framework. Intelligence shows where the commander
can apply combat power to exploit threat vulnerabilities or capitalize
on opportunities with minimum risk.
Combat Support Commanders
use IEW to plan, execute, and protect support operations. For
example, before establishing a communications site, a signal unit
requires specific information on the capabilities of the enemy
to intercept, locate, identify, and target friendly communications
sites. The signal unit uses MDCI to assess vulnerabilities and
plan force protection measures. During operations, the unit uses
EP to counter enemy C ² W.
Combat Service Support
Commanders use IEW
to identify the vulnerabilities of CSS sites and operations to
enemy action, both in the forward area and rear area. In addition,
CSS commanders use intelligence to anticipate friendly logistic
requirements and locate routes and positions for logistic operations.
As an example, indicators of an enemy attack might cue the use
of rear area security forces or the forward positioning of medical
Understanding and building the battlefield framework is enhanced by melding MI "electronic cavalry" with traditional reconnaissance. By melding the"top down" intelligence of MI with the "bottom up" combat information gathered by cavalry and other combat arms reconnaissance assets, the G2 (S2) can give commanders the information they need to visualize their battle space. Split-based operations further improve the commanders ability to understand and direct the battle by allowing them to receive reconnaissance and downwardly focused intelligence support during the battle while on the move. The linking of MI electronic cavalry with traditional reconnaissance, the ability to conduct split-based operations, and the availability of downwardly focused intelligence provide commanders the tools they need to win decisively on the battlefield. See Figure 4-1.
COMMANDER'S INTELLIGENCE TEAM
The G2 (S2) and MI commander
are a team whose mission is to provide IEW support to the commander.
As a team, they are responsible to the commander for planning
and directing the intelligence activities of the command. Together,
they develop standards for IEW training and operations.
The G2 (S2) is the commander's
senior intelligence officer and primary staff officer for intelligence
at Army service component-level through battalion. The G2 (S2)
directs and supervises the commander's intelligence and CI operations.
He ensures the commander is
supported with timely intelligence, targets, and BDA. The G2 (S2)
ensures that the intelligence needs of all staff elements are
addressed and supported. He coordinates the employment of IEW
assets with the G3 (S3) and the FSO to ensure full integration
of EW with the Fire Support BOS. He prepares and issues SORs to
supporting MI units. The G2 (S2) maintains close and continuous
contact with IEW elements at higher echelons to ensure his commander's
critical IEW needs are understood and acted upon. The G2 (S2)
supervises the intelligence training of the unit and his staff.
The MI commander executes
IEW operations using his organic and attached assets. He is responsible
for providing the commander with a trained and mission-ready IEW
force. He develops MI leaders capable of leading small teams in
OOTW, and companies or battalions in war. In war and OOTW, the
MI commander is responsible for the C ² , maneuver, sustainment,
and protection of his MI unit. The MI commander ensures his unit
executes the G2 (S2) intelligence SOR and G3 (S3) EW SOR in concert
with the concept of operation. The MI commander anticipates the
IEW operational requirements of future operations.
RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
IEW supports commanders across the range of military operations. Military operations are categorized
as peacetime, conflict, and war.
During the first environment,
peacetime, the Army serves as a deterrent to war and helps keep
tensions between nations below the threshold of conflict. Examples
of peacetime operations are disaster relief and nation assistance.
The second environment, conflict, is characterized by confrontation and hostilities short of war.
Examples of conflict are peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuation
operations (NEO), counterinsurgency, and support to insurgency.
The Army classifies its activities
during peacetime and conflict as OOTW. In addition to traditional
intelligence, these operations require intelligence that identifies
political, social, economic, and demographic issues. These needs
might be as diverse as the identification of weather conditions
that might interfere with disaster relief operations, or locating
drug processing centers as part of counter-drug operations.
The third environment, that
of war, is a state of armed conflict which involves large scale
combat operations against a state or nation. Wars may be limited
or general in scope. Operation Just Cause is an example of a limited
war. A general war is one in which major powers mobilize all national
resources in a struggle for survival or dominance. World War II
is an example of a general war. War requires multidiscipline intelligence
which gives the commander the information necessary to successfully
plan and execute military operations.
IEW AND THE TENENTS OF
The following describe IEW
and the tenets of Army operations:
Initiative sets or changes
the terms of battle by action and implies an offensive spirit
in conduct of all operations. The commander uses the intelligence
system to gain advance warning and to anticipate probable enemy
COAs. With foreknowledge of the enemy's intent, the commander
can act or react faster than the enemy, avoid or neutralize enemy
strength, strike at enemy weaknesses, and take maximum advantage
Agility enables the commander
to act or react faster than the enemy and is a prerequisite for
seizing and holding the initiative. The commander uses the intelligence
system to see and understand the entire battlefield, predict enemy
COAs and vulnerabilities, and anticipate changes in the operational
environment. With this intelligence, the commander can quickly
recognize decisive points, anticipate the enemy COA, and rapidly
adjust his plan to exploit opportunities or enemy vulnerabilities.
Depth is the extension of
operations in time, space, resources, and purpose. The commander
uses the intelligence system to see the battlefield in depth,
anticipate situations, and plan future COAs. Armed with intelligence,
the commander conducts or influences operations which attack the
enemy simultaneously throughout the depth of the battlefield,
and forces the enemy to fight on the commander's terms. With knowledge
of the enemy's disposition, movement, and intent, the commander
safeguards his freedom of action by protecting his forces and
resources needed for sustained operations from enemy action.
Synchronization is arranging
activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point. The
commander integrates the activities of the Intelligence BOS with
other BOSs to gain overwhelming combat power at decisive times
and places. Intelligence predicts where and when those decisive
points will occur. It provides commanders what they want (intelligence
and targets), when they want it (in time to influence the operation),
in the format they requested (immediately usable), and in concert
with their concept of operations.
Versatility enables units
to meet diverse mission requirements. The commander employs the
intelligence system to acquire intelligence about potential enemy
forces and operational environments. With this intelligence, the
commander can rapidly and effectively shift his focus, tailor
his forces, and move from mission to mission across the full range
of military operations.
Commanders build the battlefield
framework by establishing relationships between the AO, the battle
space, and the battlefield organization. This section addresses
each of these parts as they relate to IEW.
Area of Operations:
Commanders allocate AOs to
subordinate units based on METT-T and the unit's capability. The
G2 (S2) assists the commander in allocating areas by providing
him with the best intelligence on possible AOs. He advises the
commander on the availability of information on the AO, the ability
of the IEW system to cover those areas, and the support needed
from other parts of the intelligence system. The G2 (S2) also
coordinates with the G3 (S3) on deploying organic and supporting
Ml units within the AO.
By knowing the AO, commanders
at every level can anticipate developments, prepare options, and
exploit battlefield opportunities. They can attack or defend over
advantageous terrain, seize key terrain, and exploit weaknesses
in the enemy's use of terrain.
The commander's battle space
extends beyond the boundaries of the AO. The dimensions and content
of the commander's battle space change as the operation progresses.
Within the battle space, the commander must understand the physical
environment in which his forces will operate; employ available
resources to their fullest capability; and integrate joint or
combined assets which can be used to engage the enemy. The commander
must also have an appreciation for the ability of enemy forces
within and outside his battle space to jeopardize his operations.
Understanding the battle space allows the commander to plan, organize,
and synchronize his operations and successfully protect his force
while dominating the enemy within the battle space.
Area of Interest:
In the context of IEW operations,
the AI is the AO, the battle space, and the regions beyond the
battle space. IEW operations directed at the AI attempt to identify
enemy forces or other potentially hostile forces outside the battle
space which could jeopardize current or future operations. In
force projection operations, the AI could include areas through
which US Forces must transit to reach the AO. Coverage of the
AI would probably exceed the capabilities of organic IEW assets;
therefore, the G2 (S2) must plan support from higher echelon and
national intelligence activities to cover the AI.
Three closely related sets
of activities (deep, close, and rear area ) characterize operations
within the AO. IEW supports these activities simultaneously in
the following manner:
IEW supports deep operations by-
The main purpose of offensive
operations is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force.
Successful offensive actions take the fight to the enemy in such
a way as to achieve decisive victory at the least cost. Offensive
operations at all levels require effective IEW support to help
the commander avoid the enemy's main strength, and to deceive
and surprise the enemy. IEW helps the commander decide when and
where to concentrate sufficient combat power to overwhelm the
enemy. At the tactical level, effective reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance
are essential for the commander to preclude surprise from the
enemy, maintain the initiative on the battlefield, and win the
battle. Commanders at all levels synchronize intelligence and
fires with their combat and CS systems to maximize their ability
to see and strike the enemy simultaneously throughout the AO.
IEW fundamentals apply to each basic form of offense.
Movement to Contact:
Movement to contact operations
are conducted to develop the situation and to establish or regain
contact. A movement to contact may take one of several forms:
approach march; search and attack; reconnaissance in force; and
meeting engagement. The extent and form of the operation depends
on whether threat forces were previously in contact. Establishing
and maintaining contact with the enemy is a central tenet of a
movement to contact operation. The role of IEW in these operations
is to ensure commanders have the intelligence they need to conduct
mobile, force-oriented battles with minimum risk of surprise.
For IEW operations, this means providing commanders with the enemy's
locations, activities, and probable intentions with sufficient
time to influence friendly operations. Traditional reconnaissance
and security operations are a vital factor in finding and physically
fixing the enemy. By effectively combining traditional reconnaissance
and security operations with systems like the UAV and Joint STARS,
IEW operations ensure commanders have the knowledge they need
to execute movement to contact.
The purpose of the attack
is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy. The attack usually
follows a movement to contact but is also used after defensive
operations, exploitation's, and pursuits. The commander must decide
when to begin and end an attack based on its contribution to meeting
his objectives. Successful attacks are preceded by successful
reconnaissance. IEW operations help the commander identify
the conditions needed to begin, conduct, and terminate an attack
regardless of the type of attack.
Exploitation is the extension
of destruction of the defending force by maintaining offensive
pressure. Such actions may include seizing objectives deep in
the enemy rear, cutting LOC, isolating and destroying enemy units,
and disrupting enemy C ² . Aggressive exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities
can disintegrate and demoralize the enemy to the point where his
only options are to surrender or withdraw. Commanders must be
able to quickly recognize fleeting opportunities for exploitation
All of the attacking commander's
information resources must immediately report indications of enemy
vulnerabilities resulting from the initial attack. Increased enemy
prisoners of war (EPWs), disintegration of enemy units after initial
contact; disorganized defense, and capture or absence of enemy
leaders are all indications of friendly opportunities to transition
IEW assets support the commander's
decision to exploit by identifying exposed flanks or any weakness
in the enemy's defense. They determine the enemy's intentions
to defend in place, to delay, or to withdraw to other defensive
positions. IEW resources confirm destruction of enemy fighting
and support capabilities. They identify and locate vulnerable
targets in the enemy rear area, such as communications, supply,
and maintenance centers. and track enemy forces which could counter
The pursuit is an operation
against a retreating force and follows attack or exploitation.
When the enemy can no longer resist and They locate a successful
decides to withdraw, the commander may elect to pursue and destroy
the enemy force. Although the commander may not always be able
to anticipate pursuit, he should always include withdrawal and
retreat among enemy COAs considered in planning and wargaming.
Any of the commander's information
resources can provide indications that the enemy force is abandoning
its position and equipment, and retreating. The commander needs
this information as fast as possible to transition from attack
or exploitation to pursuit.
IEW assets continually report
the enemy's location, direction, and rate of movement. They locate
and track HPTs and report targeting data to FSEs the enemy force
reconstitutes its defense, IEW resources report the time, place,
and type of defense. They report any attempt to counterattack,
outflank, or cut off friendly forces which have driven deep into
The immediate purpose of defensive
operations is to defeat an enemy attack. Since only offensive
operations can destroy the enemy and win the battle, the ultimate
purpose of defensive operations is to create the opportunity to
shift to the offense. In the defense, commanders may use any combination
of combat operations at different times and places on the battlefield
to defeat the enemy. Commanders defend to buy time, hold key terrain,
hold the enemy in one place while attacking in another, or destroy
enemy combat power while reinforcing friendly forces. IEW fundamentals
apply to both primary forms of defensive operations and to defense
A mobile defense employs a
combination of fire and maneuver, offense, defense, and delay
to destroy the enemy and defeat his attack. Commanders employing
a mobile defense attempt to get the most from terrain and obstacles
while employing fire and maneuver to take the initiative from
the attacking enemy. IEW supports the commander in gaining the
initiative by identifying key terrain and potential enemy avenues
of approach; tracking the enemy throughout his attack; supporting
the targeting of the enemy's critical nodes and fire support assets;
and aiding in the neutralization of enemy reconnaissance through
deception and EW. Most importantly, intelligence and targets HPTs,
helps the commander identify the place and time when the enemy
is most vulnerable to a decisive counterattack by the friendly
mobile striking force. IEW should determine the enemy's strength,
intent, main avenue of approach, and location of his follow-on
forces. The defending commander can then decide where to arrange
his forces in an economy of force role to defend, yet still shape
the battlefield. This will afford him the time necessary to commit
the striking force precisely.
An area defense focuses on
denying the enemy access to designated terrain for a specified
period of time, rather than on the outright destruction of the
enemy. The commander conducts area defense by using a series of
mutually supported positions in depth. IEW support in area defense
identifies, locates, and tracks the enemy's main attack and provides
the commander time to allocate sufficient combat power to strengthen
the defense at the point of the enemy's main effort. Intelligence
should also identify where and when the commander can most decisively
counterattack the enemy's main effort or exploit enemy vulnerabilities.
Defense in Depth:
In the defense as well as
in the offense, operations in depth are the basis for success.
Simultaneous application of combat power throughout the depth
of the battle space defeats the enemy rapidly with minimum friendly
casualties. Commanders conducting combat operations in depth require
IEW support for deep, close, and rear operations.
MI units provide early warning
of enemy approach. They find, track, and target enemy forces enabling
the commander to attack them effectively at long range. Corps
and division aerial resources, LRSUs, theater, other services,
and national systems provide information needed for deep operations.
The primary tasks of deep IEW are to identify the enemy's main
effort and support target development. Deep collection operations
locate such HPTs as enemy second and follow-on echelons, critical
C ² nodes, reconnaissance elements, FSEs, and logistics trains.
Close operations are the activities
of the main and supporting efforts in the defensive area to slow,
canalize, and defeat the enemy's major units. The success of close
operations depends on aggressive maneuver and counterattack as
well as successful defense of key positions. As the enemy attack
begins, the commander's first concerns are to identify the enemy's
committed units and direction of attack, and gain time to react.
The first sources of this information will be reconnaissance and
security forces, MI units, SOF, and air elements conducting deep
operations. Commanders rely heavily on combat information for
immediate reports of enemy activities and vulnerabilities. Combat
information from units in contact supports friendly fire and maneuver
to attack exposed HPTs and vulnerable enemy units.
IEW resources concentrate
on tracking enemy units, providing early warning of threats against
exposed flanks, gaps in defensive positions, or any attempt to
outmaneuver the defending force. IEW identifies and targets HPTs,
supports OPSEC and deception, and conducts EA coordinated with
planned fire and maneuver.
Close IEW strives to identify
the enemy's intentions and main effort as early as possible to
support the commander's battle planning. The commander ensures
that the G2 (S2) collection strategy supports the PIR and IR developed
for the operation.
Rear operations sustain friendly,
close, and deep combat operations. Successful defense in friendly
rear areas prevents disruption of C ² , fire support, logistics,
and movement of reserves. The threat to rear operations includes
all enemy deep battle forces: conventional ground, air, and missile
forces; unconventional forces; enemy agents; and sympathizers.
The keys to rear area defense
are sound planning, early warning, continuous OPSEC, and immediate
deployment of sufficient forces and resources to counter any threat.
Detection of the enemy is
the responsibility of every soldier in the command and all intelligence
collectors at every echelon. The operations and intelligence section
of the RAOC coordinates intelligence preparation for rear operations.
The RAOC recommends intelligence requirements to the G2 (S2) for
consolidation into the unit's PIR and IR. The RAOC also requests
intelligence collection, MDCI, and CA support for rear operations.
MDCI personnel and interrogators provide HUMINT to identify and
help neutralize enemy agents, sympathizers, and unconventional
forces in the rear area.
Other IEW assets may, on order,
redirect their efforts from deep and close operations to support
combat operations against a rear area threat from conventional
forces. The corps depends on EAC and national systems for early
warning and intelligence on threats from beyond the corps' AO,
such as an attack by enemy airborne forces.
Retrograde operations are
maneuvers to the rear or away from the enemy. The purpose of a
retrograde operation is to improve the situation for the friendly
force, draw the enemy into an unfavorable position, regain the
initiative, and defeat the enemy. Units conducting retrograde
operations conceal the movement of the main force and avoid decisive
engagements. IEW supports all retrograde operations by tracking
the disposition of the enemy force and denying the enemy intelligence
on movement of the friendly force. Retrograde operations are more
effective when deception and OPSEC confuse the enemy about the
true disposition of the friendly force. There are three types
of retrograde operations--delays, withdrawals, and
delays, the commander yields ground to gain time, retain freedom
of action, and inflict the greatest possible damage on the enemy,
IEW support concentrates on measures that obscure the size and
intent of the delaying force and create the element of surprise,
Each time the enemy commander is engaged by the delaying force,
he must be convinced through the application of combat power,
deception, and OPSEC that he has engaged the main force. This
causes the enemy commander to stop, deploy his forces, and prepare
to attack or defend. The delaying force then disengages and withdraws
to the next delay position.
conduct withdrawals to avoid combat under undesirable conditions,
preserve the force, adjust defensive positions, or relocate the
entire force. In all withdrawals, the commander attempts to deceive
the enemy. Some friendly elements remain in contact and simulate
activity of the larger unit, including electronic activity, to
mask the withdrawal from enemy intelligence. MDCI teams monitor
the simulative deception based on OPSEC evaluation of normal friendly
force signatures, patterns, and profiles.
are rearward movements conducted by units not in contact with
the enemy. The commander retires his force to shorten LOC, remove
the force from the area of combat, or reposition the force to
permit its use elsewhere. IEW support includes determining routes
and favorable terrain for the retirement; identifying enemy forces
which could interdict the movement; and denying the enemy knowledge
of the operation.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNITS
MI units are organized to
support a wide range of possible missions. The doctrinal principles
for the C ² and employment of MI units are similar to those used
by non-MI units (for example, field artillery [FA] or engineer
units). FM 101-5 discusses the doctrinal principles and TTPs on
how to command and control units. This section briefly discusses
the C ² and employment considerations of MI units.
Tailoring the Force:
When the commander receives
a mission, he considers METT-T and the capability of his assets
in tailoring the force to optimize IEW support. To ensure continuous
and responsive IEW support, he establishes early the C ² structure
and means required to effectively C ² IEW assets. The commander
Planning IEW Support:
When the MI commander receives
a mission, he conducts the decision making process like any other
unit commander. The SORs become the specified tasks that drive
mission analysis. Implied tasks will include the maneuver and
support of subordinate MI units so that they can accomplish the
The MI commander's concept
of operation revolves around the organization, deployment, allocation,
and employment of subordinate MI units necessary to accomplish
the IEW requirements throughout the mission. To satisfy his collection
or EW mission, he will forward deploy systems into air or groundspace
owned by other units. This requires coordination with forward
Executing IEW Support:
During execution, the MI commander
follows the supported commander's operation and attempts to anticipate
IEW tasks required to sustain the operation or execute subsequent
COAs. He ensures MI units in GS accomplish assigned tasks and
continues to provide DS MI unit commanders with intelligence and
logistics support. The following tasks assist the MI commander
in successfully executing his unit's IEW mission:
Survivability of IEW assets
is essential in any type of operation. Consistent with security
and communications requirements and mission responsiveness, IEW
assets should disperse to the maximum extent possible and apply
all possible OPSEC measures.
FMs 34-10, 34-25 , 34-37, and 34-80 discuss TTPs for the organization of intelligence assets
at brigade, division, corps, and theater.
Sustaining MI Units:
Sustaining MI units is similar to logistics required for other combat support units operating at the operational and tactical levels. However, MI units are distinctive in that they are equipped with some low-density and classified IEW systems requiring specialized maintenance and components. A sustainment challenge for MI unit commanders is to provide logistics support to subordinate units which are widely dispersed in the AO but are not attached to the maneuver unit in whose area they are operating. For example, some low-density IEW systems can only be serviced by contractors. To maintain these systems, MI unit commanders must establish some mixture of equipment evacuation and forward deployment of civilians.
Sustaining combat effectiveness
of MI units requires commanders and staffs to follow the five
logistic imperatives addressed in FM 100-5 and FM 100-10. These
imperatives are discussed below:
Commanders and staffs must anticipate IEW logistics requirements
before and during operations.
Commanders and staffs must integrate IEW logistics requirements
and support concepts into strategic, operational, and tactical
Through planning, commanders and staffs must ensure continuity
of support during operations and reduce the possibility of diminished
combat effectiveness through lapses in support, particularly IEW
Commanders must be supported by a responsive logistics operation
capable of reacting rapidly to unforeseen situations.
and staffs must be able to improvise logistics solutions to unforeseen
situations that mean the difference between success and failure
of IEW support to the operation.
Currently, IEW equipment maintenance is performed
within the four-tiered system-unit, DS, GS, and depot. Due to
the transformation from a forward deployed Army to a force projection
Army, MI is moving towards the two-tiered system-field and sustainment
with the rest of the Army. Unit and DS are under the field tier.
The sustainment tier includes GS and higher. The goal is rapid
repair as far forward as tactically feasible. Due to low-density
and different generations, of IEW equipment in the field, the
transition from four to two tiers will not occur at the same rate
for each type of equipment.
Commanders and logistics personnel must contend with
the following problems that, in some ways, are peculiar to IEW
Commanders and G2s (S2s) must
thoroughly plan the intelligence processing and dissemination
structure required to support military operations. Communications
and ADP equipment connectivity, capacity, and redundancy must
be in place at the beginning of each operation to ensure seamless
muitiecheloned intelligence support from national intelligence
centers down to the combat commander in the field.
The intelligence networks,
planned and used in peacetime, should be similar to, if not the
same as, those used during military operations. Communications
and ADP used by MI units to process and disseminate intelligence
in garrison, should also be used by these units when they deploy.
Once established in the AO, communications and ADP capabilities,
connectivity's, and interfaces must remain flexible enough to
adjust to changing operational requirements.
Processing and Disseminating
Systems such as the ASAS and
TROJAN SPIRIT represent major leaps in MI's ability to process
and disseminate intelligence. These and other systems like them
provide the commander and G2 (S2) with the ability to --
Connectivity for intelligence
interfaces between echelons must be planned and maintained continuously
to ensure the commander receives timely and responsive intelligence
support throughout the operation. Critical intelligence products
must be capable of uninterrupted flow from national to deployed
This connectivity is achieved
by linking existing communications networks such as the Defense
Secure Network 3 (DSNET3) with the organic and special purpose
systems of the deployed force. Special purpose systems like TROJAN
SPIRIT and TENCAP require early planning to ensure connectivity
and access to national intelligence support networks and systems.
Gateways and protocols for exchanging information between and
among all intelligence systems must be planned early and exercised
in garrison to ensure successful operations.
INSCOM plays a valuable role
in providing connectivity and gaining access to national systems
Automation in Analysis
Intelligence and communications
systems can easily overwhelm a CP with information. The G2 (S2)
establishes electronic and human"pertinence filters"
to weed out irrelevant information. He must also take advantage
of the computers ability to establish a relational data base of
messages. This will enable analysts to access all informationthat falls within the specified location, time, and subject parameters.
In collection management, relational data bases and automated
journals allow complete and thorough cross-indexing, solving many
of the problems collection managers often experience in relating
requirements to reports, and tracking dissemination. He must also
plan and train for operations without computer support due to
power or system failure.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLANNING
EW planning is crucial to
the success of C ² W operations. The effectiveness of EW operations
depends upon the degree to which they are integrated with the
commander's scheme of fire and maneuver. Systematic planning and
full understanding of employment factors are critical to achieving
Effective EA requires timely
intelligence and must be synchronized with critical events. The
desired result determines the method of EA. This is especially
important since many IEW systems can identify targets to the accuracy
required by lethal fire systems. The thought should be,"Why
jam when I can kill?" If the decision is to use nonlethal
EA, then use it to maximize enemy confusion and minimize the loss
of continuity on ES exploitable targets. If lethal fire is used,
then coordinate support actions with the appropriate staff personnel.
Regardless of which type of EA is used, it must be part of a well-coordinated
The tools that allow for effective
EA and EP are the EW estimate and the EW annex. The estimate is
prepared by the G3 staff and EWO based on the commander's guidance.
It is coordinated with the MDCI analysis section which has the
responsibility for assessing enemy intelligence capabilities.
The EW estimate is a logical presentation of enemy and friendly
EW capabilities as they relate to a given mission. It includes
EW options available to the commander and weighs the relative
merits of each.
The EW annex contains the
details of EW mission, concept, and tasks to be performed by elements
of the force. It describes how EW is used to support the operation.
The G3, with input from the G2, EWO, and signal officer, prepares
the EW annex in the 5-paragraph OPORD format. Amplifying details
are covered in appendixes to the annex. For example, separate
annexes for electronic deception, signal, and EP may exist. FM 34-40(S) provides samples of EW estimates and annexes.
The G3, G2, EWO, and FSO continually
assess the effectiveness of EW operations. Assessment is crucial
to the EW process. It identifies strength and weaknesses in current
EW operations and provides a base of knowledge for planning and
executing future operations. Assessment is conducted at each step
of the EW process to ensure that EW operations are responsive
to the commander's needs.
IEW SUPPORT IN SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS
The following describe some
operational and sustainment considerations of IEW operations in
Desert operations involve
rapid movement of troops, good observation, long fields of fire,
mandatory use of deception, and a lack of what might normally
be considered key terrain. Consider the following when planning
IEW operations in a desert environment:
Jungle operations are affected
primarily by climate and vegetation. Both factors constrain IEW
operations and sustainment capabilities. Consider the following
when planning IEW operations in a jungle environment:
Mountain operations are characterized
by reduced ranges for direct fire weapons, increased importance
of indirect fire, canalized mobility along valley floors, decentralized
combat, increased collection operations from heights dominating
LOCs, and reduced C ² capabilities. Consider the following when
planning IEW operations in mountainous terrain:
FM 90-6 contains additional
information on mountain operations.
Military operations in urban
terrain are characterized by shorter engagement ranges, structural
obstructions to visual and electronic line of sight (LOS), and
the addition of a new vertical dimension provided by subterranean
structures such as sewers and buildings. Consider the following
when planning IEW operations in an urban environment:
Nuclear, Chemical, Biological:
The capability and willingness
of a growing number of nations to employ NBC weapons makes it
urgent that US Forces plan to fight in an NBC environment. US
Forces cannot allow enemy surprise or first use of NBC weapons
to decide the outcome of the conflict. The employment of these
weapons drastically alters the traditional concept of fire and
maneuver. Their use can rapidly and effectively decide the outcome
of the battle.
Consider the following when
planning IEW operations in an NBC environment:
Winter conditions have a significant
effect on IEW operations due to brittleness of antennas, ice and
fog on optic sights, and ice loading on antennas and intake filters.
Consider the following when planning IEW operations in a cold