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One of the surestways of forming good combinations in war should be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?
Throughout history, military
leaders have recognized the importance of intelligence. IEW operations
are the commander's keys to victory in war and success in OOTW.
Commanders use IEW to focus the combat power at their disposal
to win decisively. Commanders also use IEW to protect and conserve
combat power and resources during operations.
The Intelligence BOS described
in Chapter 1 is a powerful tool. However, the commander, G2 (S2), MI unit commanders, and other leaders must work hard to explo it the full capabilities of the Intelligence BOS. IEW operations
describe the execution of tasks related to the functions of intelligence
and EW. This chapter describes the fundamentals of IEW operations.
TOTAL FORCE EFFORT
IEW operations are a total
force effort. IEW supports all soldiers from the commander to
the individual soldier in combat, CS, and CSS units. All soldiers
must appreciate the importance of intelligence and the role IEW
plays in --
LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE
The levels of intelligence correspond to the established levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. Like the levels of war, the levels of intelligence serve as a framework in which commanders and MI personnel visualize the logical flow of operations, allocation of resources, and assignment of tasks. The levels of intelligence are not tied to specific echelons but rather to the intended outcome of the operations which they support. As illustrated in Figure 2-1, echelons and levels of intelligence vary. The relationship is based upon the political and military objectives of the operation and the commander's needs.
The commander on the ground,
regardless of echelon, is provided a mixture support from each
level of intelligence. Strategic intelligence provides information
on the host nation's political climate; operational intelligence
identifies key objectives for the campaign; and tactical intelligence
shows of where the enemy can be decisively engaged. Advances in
technology and the requirements of the modern battlefield also
make the demarcation between strategic, operational, and tactical
intelligence resources indistinguishable. Collection assets which
normally support strategic intelligence can and often are tasked
to support operational and tactical intelligence requirements.
This blending of levels and resources is a characteristic of intelligence
in the post-Cold War era, a characteristic which the Intelligence
Strategic intelligence supports
the formation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations
at the national and theater levels. Strategic intelligence --
Operational intelligence supports the planning and execution of campaigns and major operations, and reflects the nature of the theater ofwar itself. Intelligence at this level serves as a bridge between
strategic and tactical levels. Strategic intelligence --
Tactical intelligence supports
the execution of battles and engagements. It provides the tactical
commander with the intelligence he needs to employ combat elements
against enemy forces and achieve the objectives of the operational
commander. Tactical intelligence is distinguished from other levels
by its perishability and ability to immediately influence the
outcome of the tactical commander's mission. Tactical intelligence
normally supports operations by echelons corps and below (ECB)
INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES AND FUNCTIONS
To clearly describe MI, the
various intelligence areas are divided into four intelligence
disciplines: HUMINT, IMINT, measurement and signature intelligence
(MASINT), and SIGINT; and two multidiscipline intelligence
functions: CI and technical intelligence (TECHINT).
These disciplines and functions are performed by personnel
who specialize in one of the areas of intelligence operations.
To be effective and minimize threat deception, every intelligence
operation must attempt to use all disciplines. The disciplines
themselves must complement and cue each other for maximum effectiveness.
Rarely will separate disciplines produce a comprehensive picture
of the threat. Instead each discipline will produce bits and pieces
of information which analysts will synthesize to approach a total
HUMINT is the oldest of the
intelligence disciplines. HUMINT is particularly important in
force protection during OOTW. Although HUMINT can be a sole collection
discipline, it is normally employed to confirm, refute, or augment
intelligence derived through other disciplines. HUMINT is less
restricted by weather or the cooperation of the enemy than technical
means and does not require fire, maneuver, or communications to
collect. HUMINT is restricted by access to targets and timeliness
and, by its nature, can be risky to the safety of the collectors.
HUMINT collection is well suited to the initial detection of emerging
threats if placement and access are established early. The success
of HUMINT in areas not previously targeted will be marginal in
the early phases of a conflict or OOTW operation. Its effectiveness
improves as HUMINT refocuses its efforts on the AO.
Interrogation and document
exploitation are examples of HUMINT operations. HUMINT collection
may also be conducted by long-range surveillance units (LRSUS),
scouts, and patrols. Examples of other sources of HUMINT are pilot
debriefings, refugees, and defectors. Furthermore, special operations
forces (SOF) operating in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive
areas, provide a unique HUMINT source. For more information on
HUMINT, refer to FM 34-5(s) and FM 34-52.
IMINT is the product of imagery
analysis. Imagery is derived from, but is not limited to, radar,
infrared, optical, and electro-optical sensors. IMINT and imagery
systems increase the commander's ability to quickly and clearly
understand his battle space and AI. IMINT is an important source
of intelligence for intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB), targeting, terrain and environmental analysis, and battle
damage assessment (BDA). IMINT is often primary source of intelligence
for the physical damage assessment portion of BDA. IMINT is subject
to some limitations. Because most imagery requires ground processing
and analysis, IMINT may be unable to respond to time-sensitive
requirements. Imagery collection also be hampered by adverse the
weather and the vulnerability of the platform. As with other intelligence
sources, IMINT is subject to threat attempts at deception. IMINT
is most effective when used to cue other collection systems or
to verify information provided by other sources. Systems that
provide IMINT include the U2R Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar
System (ASARS), Joint STARS, UAV, and TENCAP systems. For more
information on IMINT, refer to FM 34-25-1, FM 34-25-2, and TC 34-55.
Measurement and Signature
MASINT uses information gathered
by technical instruments such as radar's, lasers, passive electro-optical sensors, radiation detectors,
seismic, and other sensors to measure objects or events to identify
them by their signatures. MASINT is critical for updating data
on smart munitions. As future adversaries develop new technologies
to evade some of the SIGINT and IMINT collection systems, MASINT
will be used as another means of sensing the enemy. MASINT exploits
other information that is not gained through SIGINT, IMINT, or
HUMINT. The Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS)
is an example of a MASINT collector. For more information on REMBASS,
refer to FM 34-10-1.
SIGINT results from collecting, locating, processing, analyzing, and reporting intercepted communications and noncommunications (for
example, radar's) emitters. SIGINT provides the commander with
valuable, often NRT intelligence and targeting information on
enemy intentions, readiness status, and dispositions by intercepting
and locating enemy command, maneuver, fire support, reconnaissance,
air defense, and logistics emitters. SIGINT operations require
efficient collection management and synchronization to effectively
overcome and exploit enemy efforts to protect his critical communications
and weapons systems through emissions control, communications
operating procedures, encryption, and deception. SIGINT is subdivided
into: communications intelligence (COMINT); electronic intelligence
(ELINT); and Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT).
Examples of SIGINTground-based
intercept and direction finding (DF) systems are the AN/PRD-12,
the AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 (TEAMMATE), and the AIWRQ-I 52 (TRACKWOLF)
systems. The GUARDRAIL Common Sensor (GRCS) is an example of an
airborne intercept and DF system for both communications and noncommunications
emitters. The AN/FSQ-144V (TROJAN) is the Army's remote collection
system supporting in-garrison collection by tactical MI units.
The essence of the Army's
CI mission is to support force protection. By its nature, CI is
a multidiscipline (counter-HUMINT, counter-IMINT, and counter-SIGINT)
function designed to defeat or degrade threat intelligence and
targeting capabilities. MDCI is an integral and equal part of
IEW. MDCI operations support force protection through support
to operations security (OPSEC), deception, and rear area operations
across the range of military operations.
Examples of MDCI support to
OPSEC range from evaluating components of a unique signature for
a particular unit's tactical command post (CP) to strategic level
MDCI support to special access programs.
MDCI personnel advise deception
planners on the vulnerabilities of threat foreign intelligence
services (FISs) and associated battlefield collection systems
to various friendly deception capabilities and techniques. This
input is important because a deception plan cannot succeed if
the enemy has no means to collect the details of the deception
story. The MDCI estimate provides significant input to the deception
MDCI personnel support rear
area operations through collection, analysis, and reporting of
threats to the rear area. They work with military police, Civil
Affairs (CA), and psychological operations (PSYOP) elements to
provide intelligence support to rear area security. They assist
combat, CS, and CSS staffs in developing the MDCI estimate of
the rear area threat for integration into OPLANs and operation
orders (OPORDs). Under the direction of the G2 (S2), MDCI personnel
support the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) commander by assessing
rear base vulnerabilities and recommending countermeasures. MDCI
personnel also provide the RAOC commander with indications and
warnings (I&W) on rear area threats and assist with the countermeasures
to such threats. For more information on MDCI functions and activities,
refer to FM 34-5(S) and FM 34-60.
is a multidiscipline function which supports commanders by either
identifying or countering an enemy's momentary technological advantage,
or by maintaining a friendly technological advantage. TECHINT
is obtained by collecting, analyzing, and processing information
in foreign technological developments. It also results from studying
the performance of foreign material and its operational capabilities.
The two parts of TECHINT, battlefield TECHINT and scientific and
technical intelligence (S&TI) support commanders at all levels.
There is a mutually dependent
relationship that exists between the support the commander gets
from the TECHINT system and the support the TECHINT system gets
from the commander. Operational and tactical commanders provide
the raw material analysts need to identify, capture, protect,
and evacuate enemy equipment, documents, and other items. Commanders
further ensure the success of the process by demanding TECHINT
support for the tactical effort to defeat the enemy. The analysts
then take the raw material and produce the countermeasures commanders
need to overcome an enemy's technological advantage. For more
information on TECHINT, refer to FM 34-54.
CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
The effectiveness of intelligence
is measured against the following standards:
Intelligence must be provided
early enough to support planning, influence decisions and execution
of operations, and prevent surprise from enemy action. it must
flow continuously to the commander before, during and after an
operation. Regardless of distance and time, intelligence organizations,
data bases, and products must be available to develop estimates,
make decisions, and plan operations.
Intelligence must support the commander's concept of operation and the unit's mission. It must be tailored to the capabilities of the unit and
intelligence priorities of the commander. Intelligence must be
in usable format which meets the specific needs of the requester
and explains its own significance.
Intelligence must give the commander a balanced, complete, and objective pictureof the enemy and the operational environment. It should support
and satisfy the priorities of the commander. To the extent possible,
intelligence should correctly identify threat intentions, capabilities,
limitations, and dispositions. It should be derived from multiple
sources and disciplines to minimize the possibility of deception
or misinterpretation. Alternative or contradictory assessments
should be presented, when necessary, to ensure balance and bias-free
Intelligence should tell the
commander what the enemy is doing, can do, and his most likely
course of action (COA). It should anticipate the intelligence
needs of the commander.
PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE TASKS
MI accomplishes its mission
through six primary tasks which generate intelligence synchronized
to support the commander's mission and intelligence requirements.
The derived products assist the commander in focusing and protecting
his combat power. Figure 2-2 illustrates how the six intelligence tasks aid the commander in decision making. The six tasks can
be thought of as the METL for intelligence. As such, these tasks
serve as a framework for intelligence training .The six intelligence
Indications and Warnings:
The commander uses I&W
for early warning to prevent surprise through anticipation and
reduce the risk from enemy actions that are counter to planning
assumptions. This enables him to quickly reorient the force to
unexpected contingencies and shape the battlefield by manipulating
enemy activities. I&W helps a commander decide whether to
maintain or increase unit readiness levels if hostilities are
likely. In force projection operations, I&W provides the commander
time to plan and surge the intelligence effort for the impending
operation. Detection of developments which initiate force projection
operations requires that intelligence readiness be developed and
maintained through pre-crisis intelligence operations.
The commander and G2 (S2)
integrate intelligence requirements to support I&W into the
total unit collection plan. Collection plans and supporting SORs
are developed during the decision making process. The G2 (S2)
develops reporting procedures (for example, "FLASH"
designation) in support of I&W requirements to ensure the
commander can implement the appropriate OPLAN in a timely manner.
During war an OOTW, the G2
(S2) identifies those actions by threat and potential threat groups
that would change the basic nature of the operations. Examples
of such activities include --
of the Battlefield:
The commander uses IPB to
understand the battlefield and the options it presents to friendly
and threat forces. IPB is a systematic, continuous process of
analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic
area. The process consists of four steps: defining the battlefield
environment; describing the battlefield effects; evaluating the
threat; and determining threat COAs. By applying the IPB process,
the commander gains the information necessary to selectively apply
and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space
on the battlefield.
The commander focuses the
G2 (S2) effort and the IPB process by clearly defining his PIR.
The G2 (S2) then uses the IPB process to continually assess threats
to, and opportunities for, the friendly force. This assessment
helps the commander initiate OPLANs, branches, and sequels. The
IPB process and access to the intelligence system also allows
logistics planners to develop the logistics preparation of the
theater plan and other support plans.
Using the IPB process, the G2 (S2) predicts threat COAs and identifies the events that will enable them to confirm or deny each threat COA. The commandeer and staff use the results to wargame threat COAs against friendly actions, evaluate future threat actions, and perform situation and target development. This generates refined intelligence requirements which the G2 (S2) staff includes in the intelligence synchronization matrix as well as the decision support template (DST) produced by the G3 (S3). These products support the commander and staff in decision making by developing specific unit OPLANs or OPORDs. As shown in Figure 2-3, the G2 (S2) must have some basic IPB products ready before the staff begins each step of the staff planning process. For more information on IPB, refer to FM 34-130.
The commander uses situation
development to help understand the battlefield, thereby reducing
risk and uncertainty while executing his plan. Situation development
provides an estimate of the enemy's combat effectiveness. Based
on the results of continuous IPB, it confirms or denies enemy
COAs and explains what the enemy is doing in relation to the friendly
F force commander's intent. Situation development helps the commander
in his decisions to execute branches and sequels as the operation
In situation development,
the G2 (S2) and collection manager use the DST, collection plan,
intelligence synchronization matrix, and SOR. The G2 (S2) uses
these tools to state types of information needed, the degree of
specificity, and the latest time information is of value (LTIOV).
These products synchronize intelligence requirements to the decisions
that the commander and staff expect to make during the upcoming
operation. See Figure 2-4.
As the battle, operation,
or campaign progresses, the G2 (S2) uses the intelligence synchronization
matrix and DST to anticipate which decisions the commander and
staff will soon make. The G2 (S2) and collection manager implement
the intelligence synchronization and collection plan by issuing
SORs to Intelligence BOS units, including non-Ml units. SORs explicitly
state the information required, where to focus collection, the
LTIOV, and where to report the information. The G2 (S2) must anticipate
future COAs to allow time for Ml assets to be tasked and repositioned.
The G2 (S2) monitors and, when required, redirects intelligence
operations to deliver the intelligence required for each decision
in a timely manner.
Situation development is especially
demanding for Ml units. As an asset manager, the Ml commander
must anticipate and wargame the collection positions for each
of his IEW systems throughout the operation. Based upon the results
of this wargaming, the Ml unit commander may prompt the supported
unit's staff to reconsider select elements of its plan.
Target Development and
Support to Targeting:
The commander uses intelligence
in target development to effectively employ nonlethal electronic
attack (EA) and lethal fires. Target development provides targets
and targeting for attack by fire, maneuver, and electromagnetic
means. Our ability to broadcast target information to multiple
echelons in NRT makes the detect function of targeting
almost instantaneous. This demands that the "decide"
phase of targeting be accomplished in detail as an integral part
of the commander's concept of operation.
Intelligence support to target
development provides targets and targeting to unit attack systems
and collection assets for exploitation. The G2 (S2) uses the same
techniques as described in the IPB and Situation Development sections
above. Additionally, during wargaming, the G2 (S2) participates
in the targeting process led by the fire support officer (FSO).
During the "decide" function of the targeting process,
the G2 (S2) will identify the high-value targets (HVTs) which
are critical to the enemy commander's COA. Through wargaming,
the targeting team or board reduces this set of targets to the
high-payoff targets (HPTs). HPTs are HVTS which must be acquired,
tracked, and successfully attacked in order for the commander's
mission to succeed. The G2 (S2) advises the commander on the viability
of collection against each HPT.
As required, the G2 (S2) establishes
procedures for the direct "sensor to shooter" dissemination
of targeting information from collection assets to the fire support
element (FSE) and targeting cell. Direct dissemination enables
the FSE and targeting cell to rapidly pass identified HPTs and
other targets directly to the FSE of the supporting unit or, if
authorized by the commander, to the firing unit. The G3 (S3) and
FSO must identify the requirements for direct dissemination during
the" decide" phase of the targeting process. The G2
(S2) and FSO must also establish controls in the "detect"
phase to revalidate planned targets. The G2 (S2) must incorporate
these requirements into the SOR and establish a system to track
the status of each request. These procedures require considerablecoordination between the commander, G3 (S3), G2 (S2), electronic warfare officer (EWO), FSO, field artillery intelligence officer, MI unit, and firing unit to be effectively executed. Additionally,
targeting information relating to deep attack must be disseminated
to elements such as the Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC).
The ACE is a crucial interface with the DOCC for intelligence
support to the deep battle.
Commanders, G3s (S3s), G2s
(S2s), and fire support personnel must realize that risks are
inherent when acting upon NRT targeting information, particularly
in an automated environment. Criteria should be established for
using and confirming NRT targeting information to reduce the possibility
of engaging the wrong enemy target or, worse, friendly forces.
In addition, automation in the targeting process should not replace
the human check and balance system needed to reduce the possibility
of fratricide, For more information on the targeting process and
intelligence, refer to FM 6-20-10.
The commander uses the Intelligence 80S to support force protection. Intelligence operations-MDCl operations in particular-identify, locate, and target an enemy's ability to target and affect friendly forces, facilities, and operations. Intelligence support to force protection must --
Users of force protection intelligence support vary widely across the battlefield. For example --
Intelligence supports the
assess phase of the targeting process through the BDA process.
The commander uses BDA to determine if his operational and targeting
actions have met his conditions for initiating subsequent COAs
or beginning the next phase of an operation. If the desired operational
conditions have not been met, BDA gives the commander the information
necessary to decide if, when, and how the targets
should be reengage. It also estimates the enemy's remaining military
capabilities and potential at different points throughout the
mission or operation.
BDA is the timely and accurate
estimate of damage resulting from the application of military
force, either lethal or nonlethal, against an objective or target.
BDA includes physical and functional damage assessments as well
as target system assessment. The most accurate BDA is derived
from multiple sources and the results of all-source analysis.
Although producing BDA is primarily an intelligence responsibility,
it requires extensive coordination with operational elements to
be effective. It also requires that common procedures and methodology
be established which synchronize and integrate Army BDA with those
at joint and national levels.
The commander, supported by
the G2 (S2), must decide what critical areas require BDA to determine
if the targeting effect for operational success has been achieved.
These areas form the commander's BDA-related PIR and must be prioritized
against his other PIR developed during the targeting process.
The G2 (S2) integrates the commander's BDA-related PIR into the intelligence collection
plan and synchronizes their collection with the target engagement
windows. Since allocating collection resources for acquiring and
tracking damage could divert IEW assets from other missions, BDA-related
PIR should only address the commander's most critical requirements.
The G2 (S2) ensures intelligence collected on BDA-related PIR
is integrated into the targeting process, specifically the G3
(S3) combat assessment.
BDA is a complex and dynamic
process which seldom falls out of routine intelligence collection.
Commanders and staffs must conduct front-end analysis and establish
criteria to identify the precise operational and targeting effect
required to support specific decisions. Success in the BDA process
and the combat assessment function of the targeting process are
achieved when the commander has the information necessary to quickly
Intelligence operations follow
a five-step process known as the intelligence cycle. The intelligence
cycle is focused on the commander's mission and concept of operation.
The overarching principle of the cycle is intelligence synchronization.
Each step within the cycle must be synchronized with the commander's
decision making and operational requirements to successfully influence
the outcome of the operation. See Figure 2-5.
Plan and Direct
IPB is the primary intelligence
task which helps the G2 (S2) focus and direct this step and the
remaining steps of the intelligence cycle. Planning and directing
involves task organizing Ml assets; identifying personnel, logistics,
and communications requirements; identifying, prioritizing, and
validating intelligence requirements; developing a collection
plan and synchronization matrix; issuing SORs for collection and
production; and monitoring the availability of collection information.
Collecting is Pr acquiring
information and providing this information to the processing and
production elements. It includes the maneuver and positioning
of intelligence assets to locations favorable to satisfying collection
Processing is the conversion of collected information into a suitable form that can be readily used to produce intelligence. Processing includes data form conversion, photographic development, and transcription and translation of foreign language material. As with collection management, processing must be prioritized and synchronized with the commander's PIR. Effective processing management ensures that critical information is extracted and processed ahead of information of lesser immediate value.
Producing involves the integration,
evaluation, analysis, and synthesis of information from single
or multiple sources into intelligence. At the tactical level,
time constraints and demands of the battle tend to make the processing
and producing steps indistinguishable.
is the timely conveyance of intelligence to users in a usable
form. The diversity of forms and means requires interoperability
among command, control, communications, and intelligence (C 3
I ) systems.
The intelligence cycle is
a continuous process in which steps are executed concurrently,
though not always sequentially. For example, while new information
is being collected to satisfy one set of requirements, the G2
(S2) plans and redirects efforts to meet new demands while intelligence
produced from previously collected information is disseminated.
One or several iterations of the intelligence cycle may be conducted
depending on the time constraints of the mission.
COMMANDER'S INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
The commander directs the
intelligence effort by selecting and prioritizing intelligence
requirements. They support the commander in conducting and planning
operations. The information the commander needs to visualize the
outcome of current operations is called the commander's critical
information requirements (CCIRs). CCIRs include information on
both friendly and threat forces. The threat information portion
of the CCIR are the commander's PIR. In designating PIR, the commander
For more information on PIR
development, refer to FM 34-2, Appendix B, and FM 34-8, Appendix A.
commander uses IPB products to assess the facts about the battle
space and to understand how friendly and threat forces will interact
on the battlefield. Mission analysis, supported by IPB, identifies
gaps in the command's knowledge of threat forces, the operational
environment, and its effects on potential COAs. During mission
analysis, the commander identifies his CCIR which provide the
G2 (S2) with initial PIR.
Develop Courses of Action:
The commander and staff develop friendly COAs based on facts and assumptions
identified during mission analysis. The G2 (S2) ensures that realistic
expectations of the intelligence BOS are considered when developing
friendly COAs and that most likely enemy COAs are accurately presented.
Analyze and Compare Courses
Using wargaming, the commander and staff "fight" the set of threat COAs against each potential friendly COA. This enables
them to assess when and where they might require intelligence
about the threat or events at key areas. These key areas become
named areas of interest (NAIs). When, as a result of wargaming,
the commander determines he must make a decision based on activity
at an NAI, that NAI becomes a decision point (DP) or creates a
DP related to that NAI. The information needed by the commander
to make that decision becomes an intelligence requirement.
Among the tools the staff
uses to record the results of wargaming are the DST and BOS synchronization
plan. The DST normally depicts DP and time phase lines (TPLs)
associated with an event or decision as well as the commander's
options. The synchronization plan supports the DST. It depicts
NAIs and DPs, the LTIOV, the commander's options for each BOS,
and TPLs associated with a DP and the commander's options.
The G2 (S2) incorporates NAIs,
decision points, and HPTs identified during the wargame into a
prioritized list of intelligence requirements. He develops and evaluates collection strategies
for each intelligence requirement and ensures that intelligence
collection is capable of supporting the friendly COA.
The commander, with staff
recommendations, decides upon a COA and issues implementing orders.
He approves the intelligence requirements associated with that
COA and designates the most important as PIR.
The commander prioritizes
the complete set of intelligence requirements which includes his-
PIR are the key intelligence
requirements, listed in priority order, which the unit must answer
or satisfy to achieve mission success. PIR support the planned
operation and associated branches and sequels. The commander's
PIRs drive the intelligence cycle.
The commander prioritizes the complete set of intelligence requirements which includes his-
The G2 (S2) synchronizes the
intelligence operation with the combat operation to ensure the
Intelligence BOS provides the required intelligence when needed.
He identifies the indicators and specific information requirements
(SIR) necessary to satisfy each PIR. The G2 (S2) will allocate
most of his efforts to those requirements designated as PIR, and
develops a collection plan and synchronization matrix. This collection
plan includes direction to organic assets and coordination with
higher echelons for collection requirements beyond the organic
capabilities of the unit.
The collection management
and synchronization process orchestrates, prioritizes, and focuses
the Intelligence BOS. The plan includes the collection, processing,
and dissemination required to support each intelligence requirement,
The intelligence synchronization matrix ensures intelligence collection,
analysis, and dissemination are in concert with the commander's
operation. Synchronization ensures the commander receives the
intelligence he needs, in the form in which he can use it,and
in time to influence his decision making.
As the commander executes
his selected COA, the G2 (S2) and collection manager monitor the
execution of the collection plan. They use the intelligence synchronization
matrix to ensure-
For more information on the
decision making process, collection management, and intelligence
synchronization, refer to FM 34-2 and FM 101-5.
When developing the concept of operations, tactical commanders should consider EW assets the same as they do artillery assets.
FM 100-5, 14 June 1993
EW is an essential component
of command and control warfare (C²W). As part of C2W, EW is
used in conjunction with MDCI to protect friendly command and
control (C² ) while attacking the enemy's C² structure.
Effective use of EW as a decisive element of combat power requires
coordination and integration of EW operations with the commander's
scheme of maneuver and fire support plan. The integrated use of
EW throughout the battlefield supports the synergy needed to locate,
identify, damage, and destroy enemy forces and their C² structure.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE COMPONENTS
EW is an overarching term
that includes three major components: electronic attack (EA),
electronic warfare support (ES), and electronic protection (EP).
The overlapping ovals in Figure 2-7 illustrates that some EW
actions are both offensive and protective and may use ES in their
execution, Other EW functions, such as the use of wartime reserve modes (WARM), can fall under either EA or EP.The actions listed under each of the major components are illustrative,
EA uses lethal (directed energy)
and nonlethal (jamming) electromagnetic energy to disrupt, damage,
destroy, and kill enemy forces. Ml units use nonlethal EA to jam
enemy C ² and targeting systems. It can also support psychological
and deception operations. Jamming degrades or denies the enemy
effective use of his C ² and targeting systems. Electronic deception
causes an enemy to misinterpret what is received by his electronic
systems. For more information on Electronic Attack, refer to FMs 24-33, 34-40(s) and 34-40-7.
Electronic Warfare Support:
ES gathers information by
intercepting, locating, and exploiting enemy communications (radios)
and noncommunications emitters (radar's). ES gives the commander
timely information upon which he can base his immediate decisions.
Intelligence obtained through ES supports all-source analysis,
EA, and EP. As one source of combat information, ES focuses on
the commander's immediate needs for identifying the enemy's intent
and obtaining targeting information.
EP protects personnel, facilities,
or equipment from the effects of friendly or enemy EW which degrades
or destroys friendly communications and noncommunications capabilities.
Good electromagnetic emanations practices are the key to a successful
defense against the enemy's attempt to destroy or disrupt our
communications and noncommunications systems. Proper management
of electromagnetic emanations makes the use of our communications
equipment appear to be without pattern; as a result, it is difficult
for the enemy to target and is consistent with good EP practices.
For more information on Electronic Protection, refer to
FM 24-33 and FM 34-40(S).
Army EW operations are developed
and integrated as part of the commander's overall concept of operations.
The execution of EW operations occurs across all BOSS and units.
EW often provides commanders with substantial capabilities to
electronically influence and control the battlefield.