S. Hrg. 111-557
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 2, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
Virginia OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BILL NELSON, Florida
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
----------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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FEBRUARY 2, 2010
OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, A U.S. Senator From California. 1
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from
Missouri....................................................... 3
WITNESSES
Blair, Dennis, USN (RET.), Director of National Intelligence..... 7
Panetta, Leon, Director, Central Intelligence Agency............. 11
Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.................................................. 12
Burgess, Ronald, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency...... 13
Dinger, John, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research...................................... 15
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Prepared statement of Dennis Blair, USN (RET.), Director of
National Intelligence.......................................... 44
Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice.......................................... 90
Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts, 2009 Update
and Recent Developments........................................ 126
Examples of Leaks in Federal Terrorism Cases..................... 131
Prepared statement of Hon. Russ Feingold, a U.S. Senator from
Wisconsin...................................................... 134
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Rockefeller,
Wyden, Mikulski, Feingold, Whitehouse, Bond, Hatch, Snowe and
Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. The hearing will come to order. The
committee meets today in open session to receive the
coordinated analytic assessment of the intelligence community
of the threats facing the United States.
We welcome our witnesses, Admiral Dennis Blair, the
Director of National Intelligence, who will provide a summary
of the written statement he has submitted on behalf of the
intelligence community; the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, Leon Panetta; the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Bob Mueller; the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Ron Burgess;
and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence
and Research, Ambassador John Dinger.
This hearing presents an annual opportunity to focus on the
threats our nation faces, and it provides a rare forum for the
public to receive strategic intelligence analysis. I think that
right now the top threat on everyone's mind is the heightened
terrorism threat, especially against our own homeland. The
committee has held hearings in the past two weeks to review the
Christmas Day attempted attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and
the Fort Hood shootings by United States Army Major Nidal
Hassan. We have also reviewed the attack on CIA's Khowst base
in eastern Afghanistan on December 30th, the most deadly attack
against CIA personnel in decades.
These three events are reminders of the ongoing threat the
nation faces from within and without and the challenges and
dangers with which the intelligence community must deal on a
daily basis. We've been briefed on the continuing terrorist
threat, and I want to thank Director Mueller for our discussion
yesterday. I received a lengthy follow-up briefing on the
status of ongoing terrorism investigations and intelligence
we've received as part of those investigations.
I know this is a very sensitive matter and will ask if
members who have questions relating to counterterrorism
operations will hold them until we can go to a classified
session at the end. The written testimony submitted to us today
provides an important reminder stating that--and I quote--``the
recent successful and attempted attacks represent an evolving
threat in which it is even more difficult to identify and track
small numbers of terrorists, recently recruited and trained,
and short-term plots than to find and follow terrorist cells
engaged in plots that have been going on for years.''
Our committee stands ready and willing to provide the
tools, gentlemen, you need to make sure our counterterrorism
efforts are the very best they can be. Despite the Christmas
Day and Fort Hood intelligence shortcomings, the intelligence
community has thwarted numerous terrorist plots and apprehended
several suspects in 2009. And I'd like to tick a few off: al-
Qa'ida operative Najibullah Zazi, living outside Denver, was
identified through good intelligence work as having trained in
Pakistan and conspiring with others to detonate a bomb in the
United States. Two of Zazi's associates were arraigned in
January, and his father also has been charged.
Secondly, Chicago-based David Headley was identified for
his involvement in the Lashkar-e-Taiba attacks on Mumbai in
2008 and for his connection to a plot to bomb a Danish
newspaper. Three, 14 people were charged in Minnesota this year
for recruiting Somali-American youth to travel to Somalia,
train and fight alongside terrorist groups. In October, Tarek
Mehanna was arrested in Boston and charged with plotting to
attack shopping malls and seeking out terrorist training.
In September, Hosam Maher Husein Smadi was arrested for
plotting to bomb a Dallas skyscraper. And earlier in the year,
Daniel Boyd was identified as having traveled to terrorist
training camps and plotting an attack on U.S. military
personnel at the Quantico Marine Base. He was charged, along
with six others, on charges that include conspiring to provide
material support to terrorists. So clearly, there have been
both counterterrorism successes and a few failures. Also clear
is that the threat to the homeland is high and that terrorist
groups have identified ways of getting operators and
facilitators into the country without raising suspicion.
Let me shift from terrorism to the topic that DNI Blair
highlights in his written testimony, the threat to our
government, public and private sector from cyber espionage,
crime and attack. Director, your description of the problem is
very blunt, and I believe it to be accurate. The need to
develop an overall cyber security strategy is very clear. This
committee has carefully examined cyber security through five
hearings in the past year, carefully reviewed various cyber
attacks and penetrations from foreign actors and appointed a
cyber task force of three members--Senators Whitehouse,
Mikulski and Snowe--to conduct a six-month analysis of our
government's current plans. The task force will be reporting to
the full committee shortly.
It is my belief--and I think the belief of others--that
certain nations represent serious cyber attack potential to our
country. And I believe that robust diplomatic efforts should be
made, with the goal of effecting international agreements among
key actors regarding cyber security. The time has come to look
at the value of a cyber treaty with built-in mutual assurances
of behavior. It is noteworthy and commendable that the State
Department has, for the first time, demarched another country
for its cyber activity.
It is also worth noting that this country has stated its
willingness to cooperate internationally on these matters.
There are far more developments around the world that threaten
the national security interests of the United States. The past
year saw a Taliban surge in Afghanistan that led to the
President's decision to shift strategy and increase troop
levels. Pakistan continues to be an uneven partner in our
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. Somalia and
Yemen are failed and failing states that require enormous
attention.
These and many other threats are outlined in the DNI's
testimony. So now, let me turn to the Vice Chairman, with whom
I have had the pleasure of working this year. And I thank him
very much for his cooperation on all matters. Mr. Vice
Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Vice Chairman Bond. Madam Chair, let me welcome our
witnesses and thank you for the very open and generous way that
you and your staff have worked with the minority. We believe
that this is the way we can achieve what we're supposed to
achieve--bipartisan, nonpartisan oversight of the critically
important intelligence community.
This hearing today comes at a time where the importance of
the national security threats are currently highlighted by
recent events.
From the terror plots disrupted this fall by the FBI to the
deadly attacks at Fort Hood and the Little Rock recruiting
station to the failed attack on Christmas Day, we have seen an
alarming number of terrorist threats, in particular within and
against the homeland, and they're being carried out.
As members and witnesses are aware, this will be my last
annual worldwide threat hearing, as I intend to depart from the
Senate upon the completion of the 111th Congress. No applause
please. Ironically, I believe we find ourselves, today, in the
same place we were in when I first joined the committee years
ago--analyzing deficiencies within the intelligence community
to make recommendations for changes that will help us better
prevent plots and connect the dots.
So as we embark on our final year together, I offer these
thoughts for the path forward over the next year and into the
future. First, our priority as congressional oversight
committee members and your constant challenge as the leaders of
the IC is to focus on threats to the homeland and to our
interests overseas. Al-Qa'ida, its affiliates and other
terrorist organizations today have a global reach. In Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Algeria, Yemen, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere,
terrorist operators train and prepare for attacks against us
and our allies.
Our focus must be on these entities wherever they operate.
This is a global conflict, and yes, it is a war--a war of
terror these radicals have declared on America and the West.
The intelligence community must lean forward in this war, and
we on congressional oversight committees must back you up. When
we ask you, behind closed doors, to be aggressive, and we do
that quite freely, it is our responsibility to stand behind you
when the doors are open and to support your actions when they
are under the spotlight. And I pledge we will try to continue
to do so.
At the same time, our committee will hold the IC
accountable, and the IC must hold itself accountable, because
the threats we are dealing with are far too dangerous to
tolerate any kind of sloppy work or careless mistakes. As the
saying goes, the terrorists only have to get it right once to
be successful; you and we have to get it right all of the time.
We must use all avenues available for obtaining the crucial
information we need to protect our people, and that includes a
full and humane interrogation of captured suspects prior to or
without Miranda rights. And I emphasize enemy combatants must
be questioned to the fullest by the intelligence community
before--if they are Mirandized, before they are Mirandized and
given an attorney.
Treating terrorists like common criminals can cost us
lifesaving intelligence. While I have no doubt that the FBI
obtained useful information from the Christmas bomber, we just
don't know how many timely leads have been lost as a result of
his refusal to cooperate after he was Mirandized. This approach
gave his terrorist colleagues time to cover their tracks while
Americans remained at risk. Any FBI interrogator or other
interrogator will tell you that 50 minutes is not long enough
to build rapport and get all needed intelligence.
And any interrogator will tell you that you study up on
your subject and read everything in the file first before
you're ready to go in for a full and productive interrogation.
That takes time and that time must be devoted to the
preparation prior to effective questioning. We must plan ahead
for how we can bring intelligence to bear in interrogation,
whether at home or abroad. Timely action demands timely
intelligence, and we must ensure that all intelligence tools
are used when we find ourselves in a similar circumstance
again.
I am frankly appalled--I am appalled--that one year after
the President ended the previous administration's interrogation
program, that there was nothing in place, nothing in place to
handle the sort of situation presented by the Christmas Day
bomber. I submit to our witnesses today that we cannot afford
to make that same mistake again. I presume that the high-value
interrogation group that is still coming online will solve a
number of these problems. And rest assured that this committee
will be following this closely to ensure that it does.
Similarly, we cannot let campaign promises blindly guide
decisions, no matter what the consequences to our society. The
ideal of closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility cannot
become more important than protecting our American citizens
from the terrorists imprisoned there. And we cannot put
Americans at risk by letting detainee after detainee rejoin the
fight. That was a mistake made in a prior administration. That
mistake must not continue to be repeated today.
The top two al-Qa'ida operatives in Yemen today, just as
one example, are both Gitmo graduates that have returned to the
fight, despite the fact they were supposedly in a rehab
program. We also must not let our desire to showcase American
justice outweigh the requirement to protect our citizens.
Terror show trials in New York or anywhere else are clearly not
the most expedient way to try the 9/11 suspects. It has taken a
while for some to wake up to this reality, but I believe Mayor
Bloomberg's evolution on this topic and his comments from this
past week are telling.
Some in the administration have said they want to try them,
now, in a rural area. Well, I'm from a rural area, and speaking
from a rural state, I can tell you that we want nothing to do
with those trials in our state. Aside from the security
concerns and costs, domestic terror trials have exposed
sensitive classified information in the past and have given
intelligence to al-Qa'ida. The examples are well known; I need
not recount them there.
Former judge, former Attorney General Mike Mukasey has
spoken eloquently about that. There are some who've tried to
contradict him, but they have proven no contradiction. It is an
unacceptable risk, essentially, since this Congress has passed
and the court has upheld the military commission process, which
ensures that even a foreign terrorist/enemy combatant can get a
fair trial.
Now, turning to Afghanistan, we must win there; we cannot
afford to fail. The addition of 30,000 troops to implement
General McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy was a positive
step. Employing smart power as a whole-of-government approach
is the best way to eliminate al-Qa'ida and the Taliban
insurgency in Pakistan. But the intelligence community must
rally around General McChrystal's COIN strategy and continue to
shift from a CT-only focus to both a CT--or counterterrorist--
and counterinsurgency approach.
There are other threats that are serious, and terrorism and
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are by no means the only
threats facing our community. For more than a decade, the
intelligence community has debated Iran's nuclear intent and
all the while Iran has progressed closer and closer to a
nuclear weapons capability. Today, Iran seems to be capable of
producing highly enriched uranium. And that, gentlemen, is the
long pole in the tent of a nuclear weapons program.
And we are left waiting for a nation that provides support,
training and weapons to our enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan,
along with their allies like Hezbollah, Hamas and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to come to the bargaining table.
While Iran's intent may change over time and I'm hopeful that
the people of Iran will be successful in pressuring their
government for change, I, for one, do not believe it is in any
nation's interest--United States or other nations in the
world--for Iran to possess a nuclear weapons capability. I
trust that our witnesses will address the threat from Iran and
other nation states today.
Turning now to how we spend the money in the IC to combat
the threats we face, I believe we must be good stewards of
taxpayer resources. Unless we start moving in the right
direction with our big-dollar overhead purchases, we'll
continue to waste billions of dollars on one-trick ponies, some
of which never, ever come to fruition. Those of you in the
community know the examples of large and ultimately
unsustainable programs that have followed this path.
Now, the NRO Director told Madam Chair and me last week
that he agreed with our committee's approach to a cheaper, more
versatile acquisition that this committee has recommended for
years, and he was moving forward to execute the program. That
means we were very surprised, yesterday, in the President's
budget that this option is not even funded. I believe that's a
mistake our committee will be closely following and hope we
will be able to correct that through the legislative process.
Finally, Director Blair, I was encouraged, as was the
Chair, to see that in your written opening statement, you spent
the first two and a half pages discussing cyber threats. Recent
cyber attacks against Google underscore the importance of sound
cyber policies and initiatives. And we know that the
intelligence community recognizes this threat as real and of
highest importance and goes well beyond what we are discussing
publicly.
Yet, to my chagrin, the administration's solution has been
to create another position, I am afraid, as a figurehead--a
cyber czar--with less than a half-dozen staff. In a few years,
I believe we could lament the fact that more was not done now
to confront this challenge when we had the chance. As Senator
Feinstein, the Chair said, Senators Whitehouse, Snowe and
Mikulski comprise a cyber working group on our committee and
should have much to say on this cyber topic. I believe all on
the committee agree that it's very real, very serious and the
administration needs to treat it as such.
In conclusion, the greatest danger comes from the unknown--
the threat not yet on the radar. Further threats are unlikely
to be repeat performances, so we must create new methods and
tradecraft to recognize terror threats we haven't seen before.
Unfortunately, the process of intelligence community
reform, legislatively, is not complete. Congress gave the DNI a
load of responsibility without the requisite authority. The
squabble between the DNI and the CIA Director, which
unfortunately surfaced earlier this year, over who will serve
as the DNI representatives over this past year, is just another
disappointing example to me that we don't have the right
balance and clear rules of the road for the IC. We must get the
balance right if you are expected, Mr. Director, to meet the
challenges ahead.
Congress still has work to do in reforming itself in this
regard. I pushed a proposal for 7 years--one that 14 members of
this committee signed on to a few years ago--that would provide
better coordination between the authorization and
appropriations process for intelligence in the Senate by
creating an intelligence subcommittee on the Appropriations
Committee. The 9/11 Commission and others have said we have to
bring the authorization and appropriations together.
Unfortunately, there are some who still strongly oppose making
these necessary changes within the Congress to serve our
intelligence community better. I would hope to see progress on
that. I'm not holding my breath, but it still needs to be done.
Additionally, I would mention that the Project on National
Security Reform, led by Jim Locher, has made excellent and
prescient recommendations concerning long-needed national
security reform within the U.S. government. Leaders in the
current administration, like National Security Advisor Jim
Jones, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, Ambassador to
the United Nations Susan Rice, among others, all sat on the
guiding coalition of that project before assuming positions in
this administration. And yet, the administration subsequently
moved to strip all funding for the project and has not shown
any interest, yet, in making the necessary changes the project
rightly recommended. I hope they're listening today, because we
need some leadership to make sure that we are better equipped
to face the challenges of tomorrow.
As we remember the sacrifices made by the men and women
fighting these threats on the front lines every day, including
those who so tragically paid the ultimate price recently in
Khowst, our primary concern must be to prevent attacks on the
United States and to ensure the safety of the American people,
as well as our friends and interests abroad. Today's hearing
will give us a good idea how we can measure up. And I thank
you, Madam Chair, and look forward to hearing the testimony of
our witnesses.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Here's how we will proceed, gentlemen: Director Blair, if
you will begin, representing the entire intelligence community,
we will then go to Mr. Panetta, Mr. Mueller, General Burgess
and Mr. Dinger for five minutes or so each. And then each one
of us will proceed with questions. So Director Blair, we'd be
delighted to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS BLAIR, USN (RET.), DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Director Blair. I thank you, Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman
Bond, members of the committee. In providing you with this
intelligence community annual threat assessment, I'm proud to
represent the thousands of patriotic, highly skilled, brave
professionals of the world's finest intelligence team, and
we're especially conscious of this as we mourn the recent loss
of seven of our officers and care for a dozen others who've
been wounded in recent months.
All intelligence agencies participated in preparing my
statement for the record, and I'm pleased to be accompanied by
my colleagues here this afternoon.
Every day, as we know, information technology brings
gadgets and services that make our lives better and more
efficient. However, malicious cyber activity is growing at an
unprecedented rate, assuming extraordinary scale and
sophistication. In the dynamic of cyberspace, the technology
balance right now favors malicious actors rather than legal
actors, and it's likely to continue that way for quite some
time. In addition, the growing role of international companies
supplying software and hardware for private networks--even for
sensitive U.S. government networks--increases the potential for
subversion and mischief.
The recent intrusions reported by Google are yet another
wake-up call to those who have not taken this problem
seriously. Cyber crime is on the rise. Global cyber bank and
credit card fraud has serious implications for economic and
financial systems. Attacks against networks controlling
critical infrastructure, transportation, financial networks,
and energy could create havoc. Just the facts of the matter are
that cyber defenders have to spend more, have to work harder
than cyber attackers, and American efforts are not strong
enough in this regard right now. The United States government
and the private sector, who are interlinked inextricably in
this space, have to ensure that adequate cyber defenses are in
place.
Let me turn to the global economy, where the trends are
more positive. It was a year ago that I sat here and warned of
the dangers of a global depression. But an unprecedented policy
response by governments and central banks around the world laid
a foundation for global recovery that most forecasters expect
will continue through 2010, although high unemployment and
pockets of difficulty will still persist. Not all countries
have emerged from the slump, and several of them are important
to the United States.
Pakistan and the Ukraine are still struggling to put their
economic houses in order. Our allies are trying to insulate
spending on Afghanistan, where many of them are helping us,
from budget cuts.
China is emerging with enhanced clout. Its economy will
grow from being a third of the size of that of the U.S. to
roughly half by 2015, an earlier date than we had previously
projected. This is assuming it maintains the rapid growth,
which it appears to have the ingredients to do.
Last year, Beijing contributed to the G-20's pledge to
increase IMF resources. It deployed naval forces to
international anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. It
supported a new U.N. Security Council sanction resolution
against North Korea. However, Beijing still believes that the
United States seeks to contain it, seeks to transform it, and
it reinforces Chinese concerns about internal stability and
about perceived challenges to their sovereignty claims.
China continues to increase its defense spending.
Preparation for a Taiwan conflict involving a U.S. intervention
continues to dominate their modernization and contingency
plans. And China also increasingly worries about how to protect
its global interests.
Turning to violent extremism, as you mentioned, Madam
Chairman, we've been warning in the past several years about
al-Qa'ida itself, al-Qa'ida-associated groups and al-Qa'ida-
inspired terrorists striking the United States. And we've seen
the reality of all three of those characteristics of al-Qa'ida
in the examples that you cited in your opening statement--
Najibullah Zazi, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and Major Nidal
Hasan.
But the violent extremist threat, al-Qa'ida at center, is
evolving. We have made the complex, multiple-team attacks very
difficult for al-Qa'ida to pull off. As we saw with the recent
successful and attempted terrorist attacks however, identifying
individual terrorists, small groups with short histories using
simple attack methods, is a new degree of difficulty. We did
not identify Mr. Abdulmutallab before he boarded Northwest
Flight 253 on Christmas Day. We should have and we are working
to improve so that we can.
On a positive note, however, only a decreasing minority of
Muslims support violent extremism, according to numerous polls
within the Muslim community. But even with a decreasing and
smaller amount, al-Qa'ida's radical ideology still seems to
appeal strongly to some disaffected young Muslims, a pool of
potential suicide bombers and other fighters. And this pool
unfortunately includes Americans. Although we don't have the
high-level, home-grown threat that faces European countries
right now, we have to worry about the appeal that figures like
Anwar al-Aulaqi exert on young American Muslims.
However much we improve our intelligence--and we intend to
improve it even more than it is, however--we cannot count on it
to catch every threat. So intensified counterterrorism efforts
in the Afghan- Pakistan theater as well as around the world in
places like Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere will be critical to
further diminishing the threat.
We have to continue to work with allies and partners in
this campaign, enhance law enforcement, security measures,
immigration and visa controls, aviation and border security;
all of these are important for a multi-layered, dynamic defense
that can disrupt terrorist plans.
Let me turn to the outlook in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Since January of 2007, the Taliban has increased its influence
and expanded the insurgency while holding onto its Pashtun belt
thresholds. The challenges that we face are clear.
Number one: reversing the Taliban's momentum while we
reinforce security elsewhere. Second: improving Afghan security
forces, governance and economic capability so that security
gains will endure and that responsibility can be transferred to
the Afghanis themselves.
Early successes in places like Helmand, where Marines have
been deployed for several months, where aggressive counter-drug
and economic programs are in place, and where local governance
is competent, show that we can make solid progress even when
the threat is high.
The safe haven that Afghanistan insurgents have in Pakistan
is the group's most important outside support. Disrupting that
safe haven won't be sufficient by itself to defeat the
insurgency but disrupting insurgent presence in Afghanistan is
a necessary condition for making substantial progress.
The increase in terrorist attacks in that country has made
the Pakistani public more concerned about the threat from
Islamic extremists, including al-Qa'ida. Pakistanis continue to
support military action against insurgents. Islamabad has
demonstrated determination and persistence in combating
militants that it perceives are dangerous to Pakistan's
interests. But it also has continued to provide some support to
other Pakistan-based groups that operate in Afghanistan.
U.S. and coalition success against the insurgency in
Afghanistan could provide new, long-term incentives for
Pakistan to take steps against Afghan-focused militants.
Increased Pakistani cooperation is more likely if Pakistan is
persuaded that the United States is committed to stabilizing
Afghanistan and will ultimately have success.
Finally, turning to Iran, the available intelligence
continues to indicate that Tehran is keeping open the option to
develop nuclear weapons. This is being done in part by
developing various nuclear capabilities that bring it closer to
the ability to produce weapons.
One of the key capabilities Iran continues to develop is
its uranium enrichment program. Published information from the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, indicates that
Iran has significantly expanded the number of centrifuges
installed in its facility in Natanz. But it has had problems
operating its centrifuges, which constrain its production of
low-enriched uranium.
The United States and other countries announced last
September that Iran for years has been building in secret a
second enrichment facility near Qom. Overall, we continue to
assess that Iran has the scientific, the technical and the
industrial capacity to produce enough highly-enriched uranium
for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so, and
ultimately, to produce nuclear weapons. The central issue is a
political decision to do so. Iran also continues to improve its
ballistic missile force, which enhances its power projection
and provides Tehran a means of delivering a possible nuclear
payload.
We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build
nuclear weapons. And we continue to judge that Iran takes a
cost-benefit approach in its nuclear decisionmaking. We judge
that this offers the international community opportunities to
influence Tehran's decisionmaking.
The Iranian regime meanwhile has found itself in a weaker
internal position--internal political situation--following last
June's disputed Presidential election and the crackdown on
protestors. Reacting to stronger-than-expected opposition and
the regime's narrowing base of support, supreme leader
Khamenei, President Ahmadinejad and their hard-line allies
appear determined to retain the upper hand by force. They are
moving Iran in a more authoritarian direction to consolidate
their power. However, they have not been successful so far in
suppressing the opposition.
Madam Chairman, this is the top layer of threats and
opportunities. Other areas demand our continued attention and
focus. They include security in Iraq, on the Korean Peninsula,
weapons of mass destruction-proliferation, and challenges right
here in the Western hemisphere, especially working with Mexico
in its efforts against the drug cartels. But I'm also prepared
with my colleagues to discuss important transnational issues
like global health.
Really, it's the very complexity of the issues and
multiplicity of actors--state, nonstate--that increasingly
constitute one of our biggest challenges. The intelligence
community is meeting these challenges every day both to
policymakers and to units in the field, both civil and
military.
In my year on the job, I've been enormously impressed by
the abilities, dedication and the results of the 100,000
military and civilian intelligence professionals I have the
honor to lead.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. We'll be glad to answer
questions after my colleagues have a chance to make statements.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Director Blair.
Mr. Panetta.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LEON PANETTA, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Director Panetta. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Mr. Vice
Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for this
opportunity to be able to share our thoughts with regards to
the threats, both current and future, that face this country.
I think the Director has presented a summary of some of the
key threats that we confront. Of those, I would share with you
that my greatest concern and what keeps me awake at night is
that al-Qa'ida and its terrorist allies and affiliates could
very well attack the United States in our homeland. That's the
primary reason the President provided the mission that we
follow, which is the mission to disrupt, dismantle and defeat
al-Qa'ida and its allies.
Having said that, the biggest threat I see is not so much
that we face another attack similar to 9/11. I think the
greater threat is that al- Qa'ida is adapting their methods in
ways that oftentimes make it difficult to detect. We have done
a very effective job at disrupting their operations in the
FATA. And I think intelligence confirms that they are finding
it difficult to be able to engage in the planning and the
command-and-control operations to put together a large attack.
What's happening instead is that they are moving to other
safe havens and to other regional nodes in places like Yemen
and Somalia, the Maghreb and others. And what's happening is
that they are pursuing an effort to try to strike at the United
States in three ways.
One is that they deploy--they have deployed--individuals to
this country. We've had a series of arrests. I think the Nazi
arrest, the Headley arrest, are indicative of those that have
been deployed here and continue to stay in touch with al-
Qa'ida. Secondly, it's the concern about the terrorist who has
``clean credentials,'' that doesn't have a history of terrorism
that has come to our attention. Abdulmutallab obviously was
someone that was out there. He had a visa and, as a result,
they decided to make use of somebody like that within a very
short period of time that he arrived. I think they're going to
be looking for other opportunities like that. And thirdly,
there is the loner--the individual like Hasan who, out of self-
radicalization, decides that the moment has come to engage in
an attack by himself.
So it's the lone-wolf strategy that I think we have to pay
attention to as a threat to this country. We are being
aggressive at going after this threat. We've expanded our human
intelligence. We are engaging with our liaison partners in
other countries to try to track these kinds of threats. We
obviously are checking and reviewing watch-lists and other
lists to determine who among them could be that potential lone
wolf. And we are taking the fight to the enemy, and we will
continue to do that.
But in addition to the fight against al-Qa'ida, we are also
facing threats from other terrorist groups--terrorists like al-
Shabaab, Hezbollah, Hamas, other jihadist militant groups. And
a particular concern is LeT--Lashkar-e-Taiba--which, if they
should conduct an attack against India, could very well
undermine our efforts in Pakistan.
In addition, the Director has mentioned the threat from
North Korea and Iran, and while obviously we're concerned about
the nuclear side, they also continue to export terrorism--
providing weapons, providing support to a whole series of other
terrorist groups.
So the bottom line here is that the war on terrorism is not
just al-Qa'ida. It is a series of terrorist groups that are
basically confronting us. And it is the kind of changes that we
see in their method of approaching the United States that I
think represents a very important threat that we have to pay
attention to.
We are being aggressive, we are taking the fight to the
enemy, and at the same time, we have to be agile, we have to be
vigilant and we've got to be creative in the way we approach
these new threats. The fundamental mission we have is,
obviously, to protect this country. It's the mission that the
people at Khowst gave their lives for. And it's the mission
that the CIA will follow because we believe our greatest
mission is to keep this country safe.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Panetta. Mr.
Mueller.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, DIRECTOR,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Director Mueller. Thank you and good afternoon, Chairman
Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond and members of the committee.
Director Blair and Director Panetta rightly pointed to the
global nature of many of the threats we face, from
international terrorism in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere to
cyber attacks to computer crime committed by international
criminal enterprises.
And what is striking is how many of these overseas threats
reach directly into the United States. Today, events outside
the United States often have immediate impact on our security
here at home. And as I discuss our mission and the overall
threat assessment, I do want to highlight how quickly these
threats are evolving and how globalization has often led to the
integration of these foreign and domestic threats.
Over the past decade, the focus of strategic terrorism
threats has been South Asia, the heartland of al-Qa'ida. But
now, as Director Panetta pointed out, al-Qa'ida trainers see
the tribal areas of Pakistan as less secure and this had led
al-Qa'ida to franchise into regional components in places such
as North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. This evolution has
been most rapid with al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, which
has changed from a regional group with links to al-Qa'ida to a
global threat with reach into American cities such as Detroit.
These changes affect the way we at the FBI think about the
targets we pursue and what tools we need to pursue them. They
also require us to keep changing continuously to meet the
evolving threats of tomorrow. The expansion of violent ideology
has proven to be persistent and global, as demonstrated by the
plots we have seen in the past year--those plots listed by the
Chairman in her opening statement. Those cases demonstrate the
global diversity of the new terrorism threats.
Some extremists were radicalized over the Internet or in
prison. Others received training from known terrorist
organizations abroad. They were of different ages and
nationalities. A number were U.S.-born. The targets of these
attacks range from civilians to government facilities to
transportation infrastructure to our military, both in the
United States and overseas.
The threat from cyber attacks, as has been pointed out by
Director Blair, reflects the same globalization and pace of
change. In the past, we focused primarily on state actors
seeking national security information from our military or
intelligence services or seeking to acquire technology related
to defense systems. But as the global economy integrates, many
cyber threats now focus on economic or nongovernment targets,
as we have seen with the recent cyber attack on Google. Targets
in the private sector are at least as vulnerable as traditional
targets and the damage can be just as great.
Our focus on the cyber threat does not mean that we have
seen a decline in classic intelligence and counterintelligence
activities in the United States. The presence of foreign
intelligence officers in the United States is not declining and
they are increasingly using non-traditional collection methods
to gather information. These services continue to pose a
significant threat and our counterintelligence mission remains
a high priority for the FBI.
Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond, let me conclude
by thanking you and the committee for your support of the
bureau and on behalf of the men and women of the FBI, we look
forward to continue to work with you to improve the FBI and to
keep America safe. And thank you, and I'd be happy to answer
any questions you might have.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Mueller. General
Burgess.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD BURGESS, USA, DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Burgess. Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman Bond,
members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to be
here today to present the Defense Intelligence Agency
assessment of current and projected threats to the security of
the United States.
The global strategic environment today remains marked by a
broad array of dissimilar threats and challenges. As the United
States continues to conduct combat operations in several
theaters, the nation also faces the threat of terrorist attacks
at home. Simultaneously, we continue to face risk posed by
other nations' growing abilities to challenge our qualitative
military superiority in other regions. It is a time that
significantly challenges the international system and the
Department of Defense. Therefore, our armed forces and DIA must
remain cognizant of dynamic global forces and trends.
As the 2010 QDR states, the United States faces a complex
and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change
continues to accelerate. Al-Qa'ida remains the most significant
terrorist threat to the United States. Al-Qa'ida's propaganda,
attack planning and support of the Taliban and Haqqani networks
continues. The group still pursues chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear materials for attacks. Al-Qa'ida's
affiliates continue to extend the terrorist group reach and
brand. Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula is growing in size
and is broadening its repertoire of attacks. Once focused
mainly inside Algeria, al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb is conducting operations in neighboring countries.
Violence levels in Afghanistan increased last year while
security declined because of an increasingly capable
insurgency, the government's inability to extend security
throughout the country and insurgent access to sanctuaries in
Pakistan. Originally concentrated in the Pashtun-dominated
south and east, the insurgency retains momentum and has spread
west and north. Afghanistan's security forces are growing but
not keeping pace with the Taliban's ability to exploit the
security vacuum.
Pakistan's Federally Administrated Tribal Area continues to
provide the insurgency, al-Qa'ida and terrorist groups with
valuable sanctuary for training, recruitment, planning and
logistics. Successful strikes against al-Qa'ida and other
militant leaders in the FATA have disrupted terrorist
activities but the groups are resilient. Pakistan's military
has demonstrated increased counterinsurgency training and
doctrinal adjustments but its priority remains India. We have
confidence in Pakistan's ability to safeguard its nuclear
weapons, though vulnerabilities exist.
Notwithstanding recent high profile bombings claimed by al-
Qa'ida in Iraq, the country is still on a generally secure
path. The group remains the most capable Sunni terrorist group,
though constrained by a lack of safe havens. It has regained
some freedom of movement following U.S. forces' withdrawal from
Iraqi cities. Iraq's security forces conduct the majority of
security operations independently but still require
improvements in logistics, tactical communications and
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
In Iraq, Iran continues to rely heavily upon the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force, its special operations
command, to undermine U.S. efforts by providing weapons, money
and training to Iraqi Shia militants for attacks against U.S.
personnel.
Turning briefly to nations, region and trends of interest,
Iran supports terrorist groups and insurgents in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Gaza and elsewhere as a means to expand
its own influence, frustrate regional rivals and impede U.S.
strategy across the region. It invests heavily in developing
ballistic missiles with greater accuracy and new payloads. With
more than 8000 installed centrifuges at Natanz, Iran now has
enough low-enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon if it further
enriched and processed.
China's military modernization continues with the
acquisition of growing numbers of very sophisticated aircraft,
warships, missiles and personnel required to employ these
capabilities. China seeks military superiority along its
periphery, with a focus against traditional U.S. military
advantages in air and naval power projection and in space.
North Korea remains unlikely to eliminate its nuclear
weapon capability for the foreseeable future, believing the
weapons serve as a strategic deterrent and leverage while also
counterbalancing the logistic shortages, aging equipment and
insufficient training that plague its conventional forces.
Russia is proceeding with ambitious military reform. The
effects of the global recession, an aging industrial base,
corruption, mismanagement and demographic trends will limit
Moscow's ability to realize the full benefits of the reform
plan, but the sweeping reorganization likely will increase the
military advantages over adjacent nations.
In Latin America, Mexico remains locked in a violent
struggle against drug trafficking organizations which pose a
grave threat to the state.
Venezuelan arms purchases, primarily from Russia, continue.
Colombian operations have reduced the Marxist-oriented
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerillas' end strength
by nearly 50 percent to approximately 8500 personnel. Sustained
pressure could splinter the FARC until it poses less of a
threat to democratic institutions, though it would remain
involved in criminal activities.
The threat posed by ballistic missiles is likely to
increase and grow more complex over the coming decade as they
become more mobile, survivable, reliable and accurate at
greater ranges. Pre-launch survivability also grows as
potential adversaries strengthen their denial and deception
methods.
Let me conclude by saying that while DIA's top war time
priority is to provide the intelligence required by our
military commanders and policymakers in support of our ongoing
combat operations, this agency concurrently retains a core
responsibility to prevent strategic surprise and be positioned
to respond to a wide range of contingencies.
That requires the most prudent and judicious use of our
resources, especially our most important resource, our people--
both civilians and those in uniform. In visits with DIA's
forward-deployed military and civilian personnel, including in
Iraq and Afghanistan, I remain impressed by and thankful for
their willingness to serve the nation in wartime. Many are on
their second or third deployment alongside our troops in harm's
way. Some have been wounded by roadside bombs and mortar
attacks.
Notwithstanding their sacrifices, they continue to serve
knowing that the intelligence they provide saves lives and
speeds operations. On their behalf, I want to thank this
committee for your strong support and continuing confidence in
the Defense Intelligence Agency and our mission.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, General Burgess.
Ambassador Dinger, if you'd be the wrap-up speaker, please.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN DINGER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
Ambassador Dinger. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman,
members of the committee. It's my pleasure to be here today to
represent the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State
Department.
Although one of the smallest intelligence community
elements, we consider ourselves to be mighty contributors to
the Secretary of State as she fulfills her responsibility as
the President's chief foreign policy advisor and we're proud of
our contribution to the intelligence community as it ensures
the security of the United States.
One of INR's principal missions is to provide timely and
accurate intelligence analysis that enables U.S. diplomacy to
anticipate and address threats and opportunities and to do so
early enough so that policymakers can take action. The average
analyst in INR has 11 years of experience on his account,
allowing him to offer what we believe is an uncommon depth of
understanding of the characters and issues at play in the
world.
INR is proud to put its analytical depth at the service of
the Secretary and the intelligence community. Through our
intelligence policy and coordination staff, INR also ensures
that intelligence activities are consistent with and advance
U.S. foreign policy interests and that other components of the
intelligence community understand the information and
analytical needs of the foreign policy decisionmakers.
INR has other important missions. One is to act as the IC's
executive agent for analytical outreach, bringing outside
expertise to bear on the most challenging intelligence and
foreign policy issues of the day. INR's Office of Opinion
Research aims to be the U.S. government's foremost authority on
worldwide public opinion.
DNI Blair's written statement comprehensively addresses the
global challenges before us. I will take just a few moments to
highlight two areas that DNI and others have already spoken to
in which INR is supporting the priorities of Secretary Clinton
and the intelligence community and the United States
government.
First, countering terrorism. Terrorism remains a key focus
for INR's analysts. We have a small but dedicated team of
analysts in our Office of Terrorism, Narcotics and Crime. They
work closely with our regional analysts and with those
throughout the IC to produce all-source strategic
counterterrorism analysis with nuanced context and perspective.
The second area I also want to highlight is cyber. In 2008,
the State Department established a new office, INR's Office of
Cyber Affairs, INR Cyber, to analyze cyber issues and help
coordinate the department's cyber activities. Currently housed
in INR, INR Cyber collaborates across corridors in the State
Department and throughout the IC to strengthen cyber security.
It is also engaging with other nations to help establish norms
that will help maintain the stability of and confidence in the
Internet.
INR believes the intelligence community has an obligation
to provide global intelligence coverage. I want to very briefly
mention two regions, only one of which has been covered today
in today's oral statements.
First, economic and political progress in Africa remains
uneven, varies greatly from nation to nation and is still
subject to sudden reversal or gradual erosion. The daunting
array of challenges facing African nations makes it highly
likely in the coming year that a number of African countries
will face new outbreaks of political instability and economic
distress that will join ongoing and seemingly intractable
conflicts in places such as Sudan and Somalia.
Nigeria, for example, faces serious social, economic and
security challenges over the next year. Guinea provides an
example of how quickly African crises can emerge. Many African
nations also risk humanitarian crises.
In some Latin American countries, democracy and market
policies remain at risk because of crime, corruption and poor
governance. Powerful drug cartels and violent crime undermine
basic security elsewhere. Elected populist leaders in some
countries are moving toward a more authoritarian and statist
political and economic model and oppose U.S. influence and
policies in the region.
Madam Chairman, members of the committee, INR will continue
to think, analyze and write strategically to identify for
Secretary Clinton the threats, challenges and opportunities
arising from a complex and dynamic global environment. We will
work hand-in-glove with the rest of the intelligence community
to ensure the security of the United States. INR will strive to
put intelligence at the service of foreign policy and make
certain that intelligence activities advance America toward our
foreign policy goals and protect us from threats.
Thank you, once again, for the opportunity to appear before
you and I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
To begin the questions, I'd like to ask a very specific
question of each one of you if you would answer it. The
question is, what is the likelihood of another terrorist
attempted attack on the U.S. homeland in the next three to six
months--high or low? Director Blair?
Director Blair. An attempted attack, the priority is
certain, I would say.
Chairman Feinstein. Mr. Panetta.
Director Panetta. I would agree with that.
Chairman Feinstein. Mr. Mueller.
Director Mueller. Agree.
Chairman Feinstein. General Burgess.
General Burgess. Yes, ma'am. Agree.
Chairman Feinstein. Mr. Dinger.
Ambassador Dinger. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. All right. I think that tells us
something very clearly. There has been a response to the
Abdulmutallab case that all suspected terrorists should be
labeled enemy combatants and prosecuted through the military
commissions system, if at all.
Candidly, my view is that the President should have the
flexibility to make a determination based on the individual
circumstances of the case--the location of the terrorist
activity, the location of the arrest, the nationality of the
suspect, whether federal crimes or law of armed conflict have
been violated, et cetera.
I'd like to ask this question, Mr. Mueller. What is the
FBI's track record in gaining intelligence and collecting
evidence to convict terrorists since 9/11?
Director Mueller. Well, Madam Chairman, in your opening
statement, you mentioned many of the cases that we addressed
last year: a number of disruptions from Dallas to Springfield,
Illinois; Charlotte, North Carolina; the Zazi case in Denver
and New York. In almost all of the cases, we have gathered
intelligence. Some of that intelligence has become evidence so
that we could arrest, indict and continue to prosecute those
individuals.
Since September 11th we've had numerous disruptions. In
just about every one of these cases where there are two or more
involved, one or more of the individuals have ultimately
cooperated, given the leverage of the criminal justice system
to cooperate not just against the conspirators but also to
provide intelligence as to other potential threats.
And to the extent that we have had success since September
11th, it has been because we have been able to convince persons
to provide intelligence, to provide evidence on others who may
be involved in the plot and persuade individuals both here in
the United States as well as elsewhere in the world to
contribute intelligence as well as evidence to disrupt plots
and to assure that those who were engaged in the plots are
successfully prosecuted and incarcerated.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
I'd like to just quickly ask one question on the status of
Hezbollah which has not been mentioned. Director, you assess
that Hezbollah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial
aid, training and weaponry. And Iran's senior leadership has
cited Hezbollah as a model for other militant groups. How has
Hezbollah rebuilt its military arsenal since its 2006 war with
Israel?
Director Blair. Let me get some help from General Burgess
here too, but overall, Hezbollah is stronger now than in 2006,
when the last war took place. And it's also developed
politically.
General Burgess. Madam Chairman, I would agree with his
assessment. They in fact reinforced and replaced very quickly
what they had lost in the 2006 war with Israel. And today I
think they are actually stronger and have improved themselves.
Chairman Feinstein. Can you comment on the sophistication
of these replacements?
General Burgess. In some cases, from a missile standpoint,
I think there are indications that they have improved.
Hezbollah has increased the quantity of their missiles and may
have acquired additional systems with improved accuracy. But at
a minimum, their overall missile effectiveness remains the
same.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. I think that's
going to be it for me, for now.
Mr. Vice Chairman, why don't you go ahead?
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Madam Chair. Director
Mueller, we appreciate and congratulate you on the excellent
work that the FBI has done in capturing and bringing to justice
Zazi and other people whose capture was announced last fall.
Do you believe that questioning of an enemy combatant,
someone with potential knowledge of battlefield intelligence
for the future, can be done briefly or within a short timeframe
needed to give the customary Miranda rights of a normal
criminal suspect, a bank robber, in the United States?
Do you agree with those in the intelligence community who
say that the only effective way of interrogating somebody like
Abdulmutallab would be to spend the time to collect the
information otherwise available in the intelligence community,
background and what other intelligence may be available, in
order to question him effectively, to be able to ask him
questions about issues where we know the answers to see if he's
telling the truth and to confront him with other intelligence?
Do you believe that that is necessary in some cases to get
information on an enemy combatant?
Director Mueller. Well, Senator, let me talk generally but
then also somewhat specifically about the events of Christmas
Day. Let me start off with a belief that we in the FBI--as
everybody in this room understands--know the importance of
intelligence. Since September 11th, it has been the mission of
the FBI to prevent terrorist attacks--not just indict and
arrest and convict persons for those terrorist attacks but to
prevent the terrorist attack and intelligence is key.
If you look at the circumstances of Christmas Day, the
plane came in at approximately 12:00. Shortly there afterwards,
we started pushing out information relating to the events that
had occurred on the plane as it went into Detroit. We then, as
I think everybody in this room knows and understands, Mutallab
was arrested on the plane and taken to a hospital.
We had agents from the Joint Terrorism Task Force go to the
hospital. They were given an opportunity to talk to
Abdulmutallab before he went through surgical procedures. He
had burned himself in trying to light the explosives. They had
a window of opportunity; they exploited that window of
opportunity to try to find out information as to whether there
were other bombs on the plane, were there other bombs in other
planes, who was responsible--and took that opportunity because
it was given and there was an immediate need to have that
information, that intelligence, to determine what the threat
was at that time.
The doctors then took him in for surgical procedures. Going
into that afternoon, there were discussions here amongst most
of the agencies here as to what should occur down the road,
although no specific instructions or consultations with persons
at this table as to whether the individual should be
Mirandized.
We were then given an opportunity later that night to again
interview him. And after consultation, or in consultation with
Justice Department attorneys, we determined to follow our
protocols--protocols established by the Supreme Court--in terms
of how you interrogate and question individuals in custody in
the United States. A team went in to talk with him. He talked
for a few moments and then afterwards, after he was given his
Miranda warnings, asked for an attorney and we discontinued the
questioning.
We felt we had to take that opportunity at the outset to
gather the intelligence. It was not ideal; we did not have much
information at 3:30 in the afternoon when the plane came in at
1:00. We gathered information throughout the afternoon to do a
better interrogation that evening. We have found over a period
of time that the Miranda warnings can, but often are not, an
impediment to obtaining additional intelligence.
And the story continues. We have been successful, very
successful in gathering intelligence over a period of time with
teams, persons from various agencies, the most recent example
being the intelligence we've gotten from David Headley, who was
arrested in Chicago for his participation in the Copenhagen
plot but also subsequently indicated his involvement in the
Mumbai shootings.
As I say, this case as in all cases, we will continue to
try to provide or obtain, I should say, information and
intelligence from Abdulmutallab and to the extent that you wish
further information on that----
Vice Chairman Bond. We will ask that. I'm asking a general
procedural question. You're not saying that an enemy combatant
that comes into the United States has been ruled by the Supreme
Court to be entitled to Miranda rights before questioning
proceeds, are you?
Director Mueller [continuing]. No, what I'm saying is that
if a person is accepted by DOD for prosecution before a
military commission, he is not entitled under the procedures
that are extant to Miranda warnings. However, that has not yet
gone up to the Supreme Court. And so there is a difference
between having a person in the federal district court and the
civilian courts and under military commissions.
Vice Chairman Bond. And that's the point. That's the point.
Many commentators and I have agreed that treating this person
as a common United States criminal when he was clearly an enemy
combatant--I don't know how much more clearly you can be an
enemy combatant, like the German saboteurs who arrived in the
United States in the early 1940s. Nobody thought that they were
bank robbers coming from Germany to rob some banks. They didn't
treat them as such.
And from the press reports of what we've seen, this was not
your average bank robber. He was not a car hijacker. This
person was an enemy combatant. Who ultimately made the decision
to Mirandize him? Who was the individual--where did that
decision rest in the chain?
Director Mueller. It rested with the head of our
Counterterrorism Division along with attorneys from the
Department of Justice.
Vice Chairman Bond. So it was a Department of Justice
decision to Mirandize.
Director Mueller. No, it was a combination of our providing
the facts to the Department of Justice and in consultation with
the Department of Justice making a decision that he should be
Mirandized.
Vice Chairman Bond. While other agencies took part in it,
we have heard that they felt that they needed to have more
opportunity to question him.
Director Blair. Mr. Vice Chairman, on that score, I'm as
strong for getting as much intelligence as we can from anybody
remotely connected with terrorism, much less somebody who's
carried a bomb into the country. But I think that we need to
have a flexibility in the tools that we have available to use.
And I'm not convinced that you can make a--in fact, I'm
convinced that you cannot make a hard decision that everything
should be taken through a military tribunal or everything
should be taken through a federal court.
There are decisions that have to be made in which you
balance the requirement for intelligence with the requirement
for a prosecution and the sorts of pressure that you bring onto
the people that you arrest in either form. It's got to be a
decision made at the time. And I think the balance struck in
the Abdulmutallab case was an understandable balance. We got
good intelligence, we're getting more.
Vice Chairman Bond. I disagree very strongly with that
conclusion, but I agree with you that there should be a
decision made after consultation with the relevant agencies and
the intelligence community when an enemy combatant comes in
before the Department of Justice gives the order to Mirandize
him.
He's an enemy combatant and the decision ought to be made
with the participation of the intelligence community, whether
he thinks the future safety of the United States would make it
imperative to question that enemy combatant before giving him a
lawyer and Mirandizing him.
I see my time is up, Madam Chair.
Director Blair. Let me just say that we consider Director
Mueller a full member of the intelligence community. He's one
of the brothers.
Vice Chairman Bond. But he reports to the Attorney General
and you, Mr. Director, in my view, should be the head of the
intelligence community. If we haven't made it clear in IRTPA,
we need to make that clear.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. I don't relish pursuing this, but in
that it's become kind of a cause du jour, I think it's
important to. I agree totally, Director Blair, with what you
said, that it should be done on a case-by-case basis. Nothing
should be ruled in; nothing should be ruled out. There's an
instinct on the part of some that the only way that you can
correctly get intelligence and then prosecute the enemy
combatant or whatever you want to call him is through the
military commissions.
And I think their record is they've condemned three and two
of them are gone, on the streets. You, through the criminal
justice system, Director Mueller, have prosecuted hundreds and
they're around or in jail. Let me just ask, Director Mueller,
in your experience as FBI Director in the 8 years since 9/11--
and you've been there every single one of those days--have
terrorist suspects provided valuable intelligence after they
have been Mirandized?
Director Mueller. On a number of occasions, yes, sir.
Senator Rockefeller. Case by case?
Director Mueller. Case by case. There are two cases--one
that was already mentioned, David Headley out of Chicago, which
is one of the more recent ones. Back in 2004, there was an
individual by the name of Mohammed Junaid Zabar.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you.
Director Mueller. Another individual who provided
substantial intelligence.
Senator Rockefeller. On the flipside, do terrorist suspects
always automatically come forth with intelligence unless and
until they are Mirandized?
Director Mueller. No, it differs from case to case.
Senator Rockefeller. Case by case.
Director Mueller. Circumstance to circumstance.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you. Is it true that, depending
on the circumstances, in some cases the best method for gaining
intelligence is by charging the terrorist with a crime,
Mirandizing him and conducting a thorough criminal
investigation?
Director Mueller. We have found that the system of justice
in the United States, which allows for consideration for a
contributing intelligence and information and credit for that
is a powerful incentive to persons to provide truthful,
actionable information, evidence and intelligence.
You have other countries that don't have the same system of
justice, where there is no incentive to cooperate or provide
intelligence and the person stays in jail without any incentive
to provide intelligence and without providing, ultimately, any
intelligence. So in case after case here, we have been
successful in entering into some sort of agreement with the
defendant and having that defendant provide actionable
intelligence.
Senator Rockefeller. I don't want, particularly, an answer
from any of you on this, but it is my impression, having
studied this some, that the military commissions process for
prosecuting is relatively unformed and in a state of play. It
is not an experienced, professional process such as you have at
your disposal. It may work very well. It may not work very
well.
I'm not talking about the getting of intelligence, but I'm
talking about the prosecuting. I don't expect you to answer on
that, I'm simply giving you my opinion. Recognizing the
classification issues at stake here, can you tell me if--and
you've answered this already, but I want it on record--if
Abdulmutallab had provided the valuable intelligence in his FBI
interrogations?
Director Mueller. On Christmas Day itself, he provided
responses to questions, information and to the extent that we
go into more detail, I'd ask that we do it in closed session.
Senator Rockefeller. I understand that. I understand that.
In your professional judgment, I would say to Director Blair--
and you sort of answered this, but I'd like it again on the
record because I think this is a debate which is spilling most
unhelpfully across the talk shows and beyond--in your
professional judgment, are there compelling national security
reasons to prosecute some terrorism cases in a federal criminal
court rather than in a military commission? And on the other
side, would there be some cases where you might prefer to do it
in a military commission, or are you familiar enough with their
processes to make such a recommendation?
Director Blair. Senator, it's not my responsibility nor do
I have a great deal of expertise in the venue that's chosen for
prosecution. What I'm interested in is getting the intelligence
out so that we can do a better job against the groups that send
these people. And I've seen intelligence come from a variety of
interrogations, primarily based on the skill of the
interrogators--and there are good ones in many different
places--and by the degree to which we back them up and back
them up quickly with an intelligence team which can help them
with their requirements. I think that's the key thing from my
point of view.
Senator Rockefeller. Then I would ask both of you, and
actually of all five, it seems to me that what we've come down
to in this brief interchange is that this should be done on a
case-by-case basis based upon what seems to be best according
to professionals who carry the responsibility and the judgment
for making those decisions, should it be criminal justice,
should it be military commission. Would you agree with that?
Director Blair. I think that decision is bound up in the
interrogation, which is what I care about. So I think yes, it
should be a rapid, flexible, case-by-case, balancing the
requirement for intelligence with the requirement to put these
people behind bars and not let them go free that is what we
need.
Senator Rockefeller. Director Mueller.
Director Mueller. I think our history has been that the
decision whether or not to proceed in a federal district court
or in a civilian court versus a military commission is a
weighty decision. We've had two occasions where it's happened
in the past where somebody's been taken out of civilian courts
and put into the military courts and then ended up back in
civilian courts--al-Mari and an individual by the name of
Padilla.
And so yes, the differences in procedures for interrogation
is one factor, but there probably are a number of other factors
that need to be weighed by the Justice Department and the
executive before that decision is made. And I'm not certain
that it is a decision that can be made very quickly because
there are a number of competing factors and one would want to
take some time, I would think, in order to sort those factors
out.
Senator Rockefeller. But in the end, this is a decision
that should be made by professionals according to their
responsibilities and according to the facts of the case?
Director Mueller. Yes, but ultimately, it is the Attorney
General and the President that make the decision.
Senator Rockefeller. But what I'm saying is that we should
not limit the President by saying it has to go here or it has
to go there.
Director Mueller. Absolutely.
Senator Rockefeller. He should not be limited.
Director Mueller. Absolutely.
Senator Rockefeller. I thank you both. Thank you Madam
Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator
Rockefeller.
Senator Hatch.
Senator Hatch. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and, first of
all, I'd like to thank all of you for the hard work that you do
for our country and for our people. You're all great people in
my eyes.
Director Blair, let me just start with you. A few minutes
ago, we received from your office a copy of a letter signed by
John Brennan, who's Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism to Speaker Pelosi on the subject
of the closure of Guantanamo and the transfer of detainees
abroad.
Now, the second paragraph of the letter states the
following, ``The professional assessment of our military
commanders and civilian leaders of the Department of Defense is
that closing the detention facilities at Guantanamo is a
national security imperative in the war against al-Qa'ida.
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus have all
stated that closing Guantanamo will help our troops by
eliminating a potent recruiting tool.''
Now, in my mind, the word ``imperative'' implies something
that has to be addressed for an immediate reaction. Now,
Director Blair, I concur that terrorist propaganda does use
Guantanamo as a theme. It also uses our close relationship with
Israel, but I don't think we're going to change our policies
toward Israel as a result. And by his assertion--or this
assertion by Mr. Brennan, let me just ask you these specific
questions.
Is there any intelligence or analysis that you can share
here or provide in closed hearing that proves, indicates or
even suggests that al-Qa'ida would change its plans and intents
towards us if we closed Guantanamo?
Director Blair. I don't think it would change its plans or
intent, but it would deprive al-Qa'ida of a powerful symbol and
recruiting tool, which it has actively exploited over the
years.
Senator Hatch. Well, just because they would have one less
recruiting theme, is there an intelligence or analysis that the
threat from al-Qa'ida would be diminished?
Director Blair. Well, the extent to which they weren't able
to recruit people who the Guantanamo symbol helped to recruit,
they would be weaker without it.
Senator Hatch. Well, is there any intelligence or analysis
that you're aware of that specifically indicates that U.S.
forces abroad would be under any less threat from al-Qa'ida
were Guantanamo to be closed?
Director Blair. You're a much better lawyer than I am,
Senator Hatch. I've learned that in these exchanges, but what
I'm trying to say is that it's a factor that helps the enemy,
that if we can deprive them of that factor, it's good.
Senator Hatch. Yeah, I'm not trying to give you a rough
time, nor am I trying to cross examine you. But I am trying to
establish that, my gosh, nothing's going to change their
attitude towards us. There are a lot of things that we do that
they don't like, including our friendship with Israel and some
other countries in the Middle East, the Arab countries. Let me
ask you this, have you ever provided intelligence to our
policymakers that supports the notion that the homeland or our
troops would be safer after Guantanamo's closed?
Director Blair. We provided intelligence and I assess,
Senator Hatch, that among the things that we can do that would
weaken al-Qa'ida would be to close Guantanamo and diminish the
emotional and symbolic support that that gives them in the pool
of people they try to recruit in order to come against us.
Senator Hatch. Well, isn't it true that al-Qa'ida used the
prosecution and imprisonment of the blind sheikh as a
recruiting tool and that al-Qa'ida members have said they were
inspired to attack us because of that incarceration? You know
that's true. Is there any intelligence that suggests al-Qa'ida
would not use a prison located in the United States as a
recruiting tool?
I've been to Guantanamo. It's pretty nice compared to the
place in Illinois where they want to put them. It'd be nice and
cold in the winter time and all I can say is that I imagine
there'll be a hue and a cry that we're not fair by bringing
them here.
Director Blair. Yes, I'm sure there will be stories about
wherever they're incarcerated, but I'm thinking of books that
have been written by former detainees that are passed out,
testimonies on the Internet that Guantanamo has achieved a sort
of mythic quality which helps al-Qa'ida.
Senator Hatch. Well, I think the point I'm trying to make--
and, of course, I think it's easy to see--is that no matter
what we do, they're going to criticize us. We've got a very
significant courthouse down there at Guantanamo that could try
these in a military commission. We treat them very, very well
down there. Some of them probably are treated better than
they've ever been treated in their lifetimes.
But no matter what you do, the terrorists and al-Qa'ida and
Taliban and others are going to complain and say that we're not
doing it right. Seems to me crazy to, you know, to take the
position that because Guantanamo has been a recruiting tool,
then we ought to close it, when in fact it meets basically
every need I think that we need in handling these matters. I
have a lot of other questions, but I think I'll submit them in
writing, but I'm really concerned.
We've seen what's happened just this past week with regard
to the desire to hold the trial in midtown Manhattan. And now
there's a great desire not to. As a trial lawyer, I can tell
you right now that there are all kinds of approaches that could
be taken that would be better than trying Khalid Shaykh
Mohammed in this country.
And I think that the Zacarias Moussaoui case--4 years to
try it or to go through the whole process--he ultimately gets
off because one juror didn't believe in the death penalty. And
during that trial, he was taunting families of those who had
been killed and using it as a propaganda device to act like he
was a hero when in fact he was nothing but a murderer as the
twentieth hijacker. And I can't even begin to imagine what
Khalid Shaykh Mohammed would do if that trial was within the
confines of the United States and it's not a military tribunal.
Well, I know that you have to be a loyal member of the
administration--all of you. And I accept that. But I think it's
a dumb, dumb, stupid approach to take when we have the
facilities that are perfectly capable of taking care of these
people and doing it an a way with a military commission that
makes sense, is legal, after we corrected the military
commission statute and totally acceptable, it seems to me.
Senator Rockefeller. Would the Senator yield?
Senator Hatch. Sure.
Senator Rockefeller. That was quite a potent statement you
made there.
Senator Hatch. Yeah, it was.
Senator Rockefeller. To recognize that these five men
before us are members of an administration and therefore the
implication that they can only talk based upon what they have
been instructed to say as opposed to being profound
professionals in their field, as opposed to what they might
actually feel. So are you saying that they're just saying what
they've been told to say?
Senator Hatch. Well, I've only been here 34 years, but I
can say that I've seen administration after administration
executives that support their administration. I don't blame
them for that. Their budgets depend on it. There are lot of
other things--their jobs depend on it half the time.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you.
Senator Hatch. I don't have any problem with that. All I do
have a problem with is I think it's stupid to put the whole
country through this mess because the Attorney General feels
that might be a better way of doing things, when in fact it's
the worst way of doing things.
Chairman Feinstein. If I may----
Senator Hatch. Sure.
Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. Now, you know, you're a
good friend of mine, Senator Hatch.
Senator Hatch. I am.
Chairman Feinstein. And I love and respect that friendship.
But I've really got to correct the message.
Senator Hatch. Okay.
Chairman Feinstein. First of all, the policy was really
established during the regime of Ronald Reagan. And let me
quote Jerry Bremer, who was this President's--Ronald Reagan's--
first coordinator for counterterrorism in 1986. This is what he
said in a speech in November of 1987 to the Council of Foreign
Relations in Tampa.
He said, ``Terrorists are criminals. They commit criminal
actions like murder, kidnapping and arson. And countries have
laws to punish criminals. So a major element of our
strategy''--and remember, he's saying that on behalf of
President Reagan--``has been to delegitimatize terrorists and
get society to see them for what they are.''
That was the policy then; it was the policy of every
President since that time. George Bush--and I can go chapter
and verse on each individual when they were transferred from
one custody to another--he had flexibility, he made changes,
and now all of a sudden, it's a huge political issue. And I
think it's absolutely wrong to do that. So now I've had my say.
Senator Hatch. Now, let me just take a point of personal
privilege.
Chairman Feinstein. You may respond, Senator Hatch.
Senator Hatch. Yeah, I think that it's a question of law.
It's a question of how you approach the law. And whether Reagan
did that or not, I don't know. All I know is that we didn't
have 3,000 people killed in one day in New York City, in the
three various incidents that occurred. These are vicious
people. As I understand it, Khalid Shaykh Mohammed said he
would plead guilty and that he wanted to be executed so he
could be a martyr for his people. And I think even having said
that he deserves at least an opportunity for a trial.
But I think when you have the capacity of doing it in a
place as good as Guantanamo, it ought to be done there. And it
shouldn't be brought to this country on our shores. And I think
you're seeing more and more people getting upset about this.
And it's not so much a political thing as it is just a domestic
security thing that people are concerned about.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch.
Senator Whitehouse.
Vice Chairman Bond. Madam Chair, I just have to add. I
don't think Ronald Reagan deserves to be in this discussion.
You talk about 1986. That was before the activities of the
1990s and when 9/11 brought a whole new threat to our views.
Now, when 9/11 happened, President Bush took a number of
actions. There's some that I think--where he's been proven
wrong and I would hope we would learn from releasing detainees.
That was wrong. He made the right decision when he did treat
Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant in questioning.
But if we can't learn from our mistakes, no matter whether
it's Republican or Democrat, then we're doomed to commit them
again. And I just suggest that we are learning a lot. And I
would hope that we would have a different approach next time an
enemy combatant lands on this soil. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, thank you. Just for the record,
I'm going to submit to the record a list of individuals
convicted under the Bush administration in criminal court, in
Article III court--beginning with Richard Reid, going to Omar
Abu Ali, Zacarias Moussaoui, as well as Padilla, Lindh, the
Lackawanna Six and so on and so forth--and put these in the
record.
The point is that a President should have flexibility to
cite the venue for trial. And it may be different for different
cases. And all I can say is those of us on this side of the
aisle did not criticize President Bush for doing this at this
time. And we view with some suspicion the fact that President
Obama is being criticized for following policy that had been
established since 9/11. I'll now recognize----
Vice Chairman Bond. Madam Chair--I will add ----
Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. I'll now recognize Senator
Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Vice Chairman Bond [continuing]. I will add the names of
the people who--the information released as a result of these
trials, where we held the trials and I will discuss further--I
disagree with your characterization. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. Madam Chair, I have not been here 34
years. I have been here only three years, but I find it
extremely discouraging that with these gentlemen before us--the
head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the head of the FBI,
the Director of National Intelligence, the head of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the acting head of the State
Department's intelligence service--who I would add is the
acting head because there is a Republican blockade of the
person who is slated for that position here more than a year
into the Obama administration--that all this committee can talk
about is where Mr. Abdulmutallab was Mirandized and where
trials should be.
There are so many issues that are so important to our
national security that these gentlemen have real expertise in.
I think it's clear that the tradition has been strongly towards
civilian trials. There is one person in the world incarcerated
as a terrorist as a result of a military tribunal right now,
hundreds because of the other and yet this question persists
and persists and persists and persists and persists.
It seems to be the only talking point on the other side of
the aisle. And because so much of it is fallacious, we then
have to respond in order to try to clear up the record and then
this whole hearing turns into a focus on a point for which none
of these gentlemen would need to be here and that really does
not bear as significantly as other issues, I think, on the
responsibilities that they have to discharge.
So I say that and I will move to another issue, which is
your report, Director Blair, leads off with a discussion of the
risk of cyber attack to the country. And I want to read a
couple of statements from a recent article in Foreign Policy
magazine by Josh Rogin. He reported that senior U.S. military
officials believe, ``the Chinese government is supporting
hackers that attack anything and everything in the national
security infrastructure on a constant basis.''
He continues, ``the Defense Department has said that the
Chinese government, in addition to employing thousands of its
own hackers, manages massive teams of experts from academia and
industry in cyber militias that act in Chinese national
interest with unclear amounts of support and direction from
Chinese Peoples Liberation Army.''
It seems that the analogy in cyber warfare goes back to the
ancient days of naval combat when nations not only sent out
ships under their own flag to engage in warfare but also
offered to private ship owners, to pirates, indeed, letters of
mark to go out and act in that nation's interest.
What do you believe are the most important structural
deficits that we have and need to fix in dealing with state-
sponsored cyber attacks on our country that either come through
false legs or are hidden behind work stations that are located
all around the world in order to be able to deter these
attacks?
And, if it makes a difference, could you distinguish
between what Mr. Rogin referred to as hackers that attack
anything and everything in the national security infrastructure
on a constant basis and the brain drain that we face from
wholesale industrial espionage--stealing our manufacturing and
technological secrets so that competitors abroad can take
advantage of them without paying for the intellectual property
they have stolen.
Director Blair. Senator Whitehouse, the individual skills
of a single hacker, whether he is doing it for fun or paid off
by a criminal or employed by an intelligence service of another
country, you can have really ace hackers under all three of
those scenarios. The advantage of a government or the
characteristics of government-sponsored attacks are more the
focus on what they do and the ability to put it together with
other forms of intelligence--spies and humans that they can
use, not just sitting there at the keyboard. Criminals can do
some of that, individual hackers generally don't.
So the nature of this threat is pretty much the same no
matter who is doing it. It's just the resources they have to
put against it.
Senator Whitehouse. Those resources can matter a lot when
it ends up to thousands or even tens of thousands of attacks
daily and weekly.
Director Blair. Absolutely. And that brings me to the
second point which is that, as I said in my statement, the
general level of our defenses is just not good enough for
either the monetary value or the intrinsic value of what we
keep on the Net--intellectual property and so on. Now, our big
international central banks that send billions of dollars
across wires in networked systems have developed tough
defenses. And they spent a lot of money on them and they put a
lot of people on them. They continually check them and they can
have high confidence that they can be secure against
outsiders--an insider is still a threat.
There are many transactions that involve extremely powerful
information and which people seem to think that a relatively
simple password is enough to protect. And even a moderate
hacker can get into files in major companies in lots of
commercial areas that are not protected at all.
So I think we simply have to raise the game, spend more
money which is proportionate to what we're protecting rather
than just making it an add-on thing. Do more training of people
so that they are more skilled and take advantage of the
techniques that are available there if we just put them in and
apply them.
I'd say if we do that, we would be up at the 90, 95 percent
level of protection and after that, it would take a very
skilled, determined, resourced, timely attack in order to get
in. But a lot of extremely valuable things are available
through very, very unsophisticated hackers who just do brute
force methods. And they can be criminals or hackers or they can
be government agents.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Director. My time has
expired.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator
Whitehouse.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to all
of you for your service to our country.
We've had a number of closed sessions on the Christmas Day
attack but I'd like to talk about a couple of issues in public
to get actually on the record what I think the country is
especially concerned about. My sense is that the intelligence
community does a good job collecting intelligence but has a
harder time integrating it and analyzing it.
And you all have talked about a number of steps through the
course of the afternoon. Director Panetta, you talked about how
people like Mr. Abdulmutallab are going to be looking for other
opportunities. And here's my question, and I want to ask this
of you, Director Blair. If the events leading up to Mr.
Abdulmutallab's attempted attack were repeated over the next
several months, how confident are you now that a new Mr.
Abdulmutallab would be identified as a threat before he boarded
an airplane bound for the United States?
Director Blair. Senator Wyden, I'm confident that someone
who left the trail that Mr. Abdulmutallab did would now be
found. Even in the month since the 25th of December, we have
added human resources--we put more people on the problem, we've
assigned them more specifically, and we've made some more tools
available that would catch an Abdulmutallab.
What I can't tell you is that even with these improvements
we would be able to catch someone who took more care in--I'd
rather not talk about it in open session--but someone who is
more careful, more skilled, could still leave an intelligence
trail that we would have a hard time----
Senator Wyden. But you could provide the assurance to the
American people--because this is why I wanted to ask it in
public--that with the additional resources, with your effort to
unpack everything that took place, you are now significantly
more confident that another Mr. Abdulmutallab would be
apprehended before he got on the plane.
Director Blair [continuing]. Yes, sir.
Senator Wyden. Okay. Director Mueller, if I could, I wanted
to ask you about this homegrown al-Qa'ida and terrorist threat,
and certainly, when you look at some of the high-profile
arrests that the FBI has made over the past year of people like
Headley and Mr. Zazi, this is something also very much on
people's mind. You touched on it in your statement: How serious
do you believe the threat of a homegrown al-Qa'ida threat is
today?
Director Mueller. I think it's a very serious threat and
increasing, principally because of the enhanced use of the
Internet to radicalize and to be utilized to coordinate
actions. And so with the growth of the Internet, so too has
grown the threat domestically. If you look at individuals like
Samadi in Dallas, he was radicalized by the Internet; the
individual up in Springfield; individuals in Charlotte. The
homegrown radicalization by those who were radicalized in the
United States who do not and have not traveled overseas for
training has grown over the last several years.
Senator Wyden. Are you more concerned about al-Qa'ida
terrorists coming from inside the United States now or from
outside?
Director Mueller. I'm equally concerned about--probably
both are about the same level of concern. I do think that the
attacks undertaken by individuals who have some association or
training overseas tend to be more of a threat in terms of the
capabilities than some of the threats that we've seen
domestically. And so it is the training, the enhanced
capabilities that come for persons traveling overseas and then
coming back that would make any terrorist attack a more
substantial terrorist attack in most cases than undertaken by a
lone individual in the United States.
Senator Wyden. Let me just close the loop on this. So you
think it's a serious threat and would you say it's as
significant threat as you see, say, in Great Britain?
Director Mueller. I think to a certain extent, in some
areas, we share the same concerns as Great Britain. And by
that, I mean places like Somalia and Yemen and the ability of
terrorists in those countries to identify individuals who can
be trained in either Somalia, Yemen or Pakistan and then travel
back to the U.K. or the United States, we have somewhat the
same problems--particularly with Somali youth, individuals, we
found last year who were traveling to Somalia and coming back
to the United States.
On the other hand, the U.K. has, I believe, a stronger
network of individuals who have been radicalized with close
ties to South Asia--stronger ties to South Asia than you'll
find here in the United States--which presents a different
threat to the U.K. than it does to us.
Senator Wyden. Let me turn to one other subject for you,
Director Panetta. Do you or any of your associates have an
estimate about what it would take to drive al-Qa'ida out of the
Pakistani tribal areas? I think I want to touch briefly on the
question of Pakistan, and what is your assessment of what it
would take to drive al-Qa'ida out of that area.
Director Panetta. Senator Wyden, I've asked that question a
number of times because obviously our operations are very
aggressive and very directed and, as I said, are very effective
with regards to disrupting their operations. Having said that,
the reality is that they continue to operate; they continue to
move within the FATA and the tribal areas. I would just share
with you that I think to effectively be able to disrupt al-
Qa'ida and to end their threat we need to have boots on the
ground in addition to our operations.
Senator Wyden. One last question if I might, Madam Chair.
What else, Director Panetta, could the Pakistani government do
if Pakistani leaders wanted to provide more assistance on
counterterrorism issues?
Director Panetta. Just what I said, which is boots on the
ground. They, in fact, went into South Waziristan. That was
very effective on bringing pressure on these groups. They had
to move; they had to scramble. That helped us in terms of our
operations. We need them to continue that effort.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden.
Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you all
for being here today.
I just want to be clear because this is obviously a
profound concern and I share the sentiments expressed by my
colleague, Senator Bond, about the whole issue and issuing of
Miranda rights to a terrorist on Christmas Day. And I think the
American people need to have reassurances as well in terms of
what is going to change as a result, you know, of what
happened, and what is going to be the process going forward?
Because it seems to me, in this instance, it clearly should
have commanded the attention at the highest levels in the
intelligence community about whether further questions should
be posed to this individual to be certain that the questions
being posed were based on all of the information regarding al-
Qa'ida in Yemen, for example, about this individual, and
putting it all together before issuing his Miranda rights.
And I think that's what's so disturbing here because that
did not occur, so it didn't seem to me, and I don't think it
seemed to the American people, that there was a cohesive,
concerted effort and determination based on all of the
information that had been gathered in highly-classified
settings regarding al-Qa'ida in Yemen and, of course, this
individual and any associates, and whether or not there was
vital information that needed to be gleaned. And we won't know
that now.
And furthermore, the administration had said they were
setting up in a group called the high-value detainee
interrogation group precisely for this type of circumstance.
Has that been done? And why wasn't that done? And how are we
going forward?
How is the intelligence community going to move forward
based on this particular situation that really does cast a
shadow? Because we won't ever know about what could have been
elicited from this individual because of who posed the
questions, frankly. You weren't consulted, Director Blair, at
the highest level, for any questions that should have been
posed to this individual. And it seems to me it should have
warranted consultation with you and others to be sure under
this circumstance.
Director Blair. Yes, Senator Snowe, if we'd known all we
needed to know about Mr. Abdulmutallab, he wouldn't have been
on the airplane. It was a pop-up. There were extraordinary time
pressures on Christmas Day. I said to another committee that
the process of bringing together intelligence and skilled
interrogators, in the light of how we want to prosecute
somebody, is the absolute key thing. A form of that was done on
Christmas Day. The Joint Task Force FBI agents asked good
questions. I've read the intelligence reports that they put out
and they were good.
We have taken advantage of the time we now have in order to
bring the full intelligence expertise into the support of the
FBI, in this case, which will--we hope--bring even more
intelligence which we can use. We have this high-value
interrogation team building the file so that when we get
somebody that we know about, probably overseas, we can have
done a lot of that homework that Senator Bond referred to
first.
So the principle of using intelligence, using good
interrogators, making sure that we are taking the steps we need
to get them behind bars in the most effective way are what we
need to bring together. And we just need to do that fast and
the right way.
Director Mueller. I understand the concern in terms of the
public's understanding of what happened on Christmas Day. I
also share your concern that in doing a thorough interrogation
you have the input from a number of sources, the background,
the preparation and the like. But it also is important to
obtain the facts as soon as you can and the time frame as such
that you do not have the opportunity to do that background such
as you would like.
There were very fast-moving events on Christmas Day. We
took advantage--and I say ``we''--the FBI took advantage, in my
mind, of the opportunities to gather that intelligence as
quickly as we could under the constraints that we operate in
and with a person who is arrested in the United States.
I, along with Director Blair and Director Panetta, believe
that teams of individuals with the appropriate background
should be deployed to do interrogations. And the protocol has
been established, has been set up, but we have not waited for
that protocol. We have utilized those teams already. With
Headley, for instance, in Chicago, we had a team of individuals
who were doing the follow-up questioning of him with expertise
from a variety of areas, and there we had the luxury of time in
order to do it.
We have teams established that will be ready to go, in
terms of--or in the instance where we will pick up somebody in
a particular area of the world--where we will have teams, and
do have teams, ready to go to undertake those interrogations.
So we have done a lot in terms of putting together these teams
to interrogate. But you also have to look at what happened on
Christmas Day in the confines of trying to get intelligence on
that day as to what was the immediate threat that the American
public faced.
Senator Snowe. So what was the fast-moving event of that
day that necessitated issuing his Miranda rights? I'm not clear
on that. What was the rush and the extraordinary pressures that
were being faced?
Director Mueller. Well, first of all, we had to determine
whether there were any--in the initial interview, we had to
determine whether there were other bombs on the plane, whether
there were other planes that had similar attacks contemplated,
wanted to understand who the bomb maker was, who had directed
him. All of that came in the first series of questions.
Later that night, we had another opportunity to interview
him, and I believe that at that time, not only would we be able
to interview him, but we would interview him in the way that we
could utilize his statements to assure his successful
prosecution, understanding that we have the obligation to take
the individual before a magistrate without undue delay, which
would mean he'd go before a magistrate within the next 24
hours. So we sought to take advantage of that time to undertake
the interrogations we could with the evidence we gathered at
hand.
Senator Snowe. But why wouldn't it have been--I guess I'm
still not clear, because I don't understand why we'd want to
issue the Miranda rights when we're worried about whatever
other subsequent events that might be occurring.
Director Mueller. Because we also want to utilize his
statements to effectively prosecute him.
Senator Snowe. Well, you know, I just profoundly disagree
with that. I think most people do, given those circumstances.
It just doesn't seem to me to make sense. And frankly, not
having the collective weight on the intelligence community to
really zero in on this particular individual at this moment in
time is really disconcerting and troubling, and I think that's
the point.
Director Mueller. Now, let me just add one other point, and
that is, it is a continuum. In other words, you can look at it
in that day, but I encourage you to look at what has happened
since then. And it is a continuum in which, over a period of
time, we have been successful in obtaining intelligence not
just on day one, but day two, day three, day four, day five and
down the road. And so I encourage you to look at it as a
continuum as opposed to looking at it as a snapshot of what
happened on one day.
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you. First of all, Senator Snowe is
right, and I'm going to come back to that in just a minute. But
I want to engage in the political sparring that we've had here,
briefly, to start with.
First of all, I think the questions by my colleague from
Oregon were very on point, wanting to know if the American
people can be assured that somebody like Mr. Abdulmutallab will
not be allowed on a plane again. And I have every confidence
that you guys are right, that you've got it figured out, that
this isn't going to happen. Unfortunately, most people that, if
they're going to do this again, they won't have a guy with the
credentials that this guy's got. There's a million people out
there that have no record, and you won't see it again. But it's
important.
As far as the Article III trial, I don't understand it and
I don't--you know, whether Bush did it or Reagan did it or this
President did it, when it comes to a combatant, they're all
wrong on this. Article III courts were put together for the
protection of the United States citizen. It is expensive to try
someone in an Article III court. It is a great protection that
most of the world doesn't have. Certainly, people that come
here that are foreigners that attacked us are not entitled to
an Article III trial. So I don't care who made the decision,
what party they're in; they're dead wrong on that.
Guantanamo--yeah, it's a political issue only because it
became a political issue during the last campaign. Every one of
us here has met with people from the Arab world and what-have-
you. The flashpoint for them is not Guantanamo; it's Israel, as
was pointed out. And I'd like to associate myself with remarks
from Senator Hatch.
Let's talk about Miranda for a minute. Let me try to put
this in perspective for you. I used to be a prosecutor--in
fact, I was a prosecutor when Miranda was decided. We all
thought it was the end of the world. It turned out it wasn't.
But we learned a lot of things from it. Miranda simply--the
court said look, in America, we are not an inquisitorial
criminal process, we are an accusatorial criminal process. That
means the government's got to accuse you, they've got to prove
it and you don't have to come up with any information to help
them do it. That's what Miranda was all about.
Again, it was done for the protection of United States
citizens living under the United States Constitution, and not
for foreigners. Miranda is simply an exclusionary rule. Now, I
think most people in this room know what an exclusionary rule
is. You don't go to jail if you're a police officer because you
don't Mirandize someone. The case doesn't get thrown out
because you don't Mirandize someone. The only thing that
Miranda does is it excludes any evidence that the police got
because they didn't give the guy his Miranda warning.
All right, let's take the Christmas Day bomber. Somebody
tell me why he had to be given his Miranda warnings. With all
due respect, Mr. Mueller--and by the way, thank you for what
you do. You guys have tough jobs and I appreciate it--but with
all due respect, you didn't need to give this guy Miranda in
order to have a legitimate criminal prosecution. You had 200
witnesses that saw what he did. You didn't need a confession
from the guy.
And anything you got out of him, if you didn't Mirandize
him, couldn't be used in a court of law, but who cares? You've
got all kinds of eyewitnesses; you were going to convict him. I
would hope you'd go back and look at this again and understand
that the Miranda rule is simply an exclusionary rule.
Number one, if you're not going to try him in an Article
III court you don't need to Miranda him. And number two, if
you've got all the evidence you need, you don't need to Miranda
him. Go ahead and interrogate this guy until the cows come home
because it doesn't matter.
What you want that for is you want it for intelligence, and
if whatever he says never sees the light of day in a courtroom,
who cares? This guy is going to get convicted. But with all due
respect, I think you lost some information that could have been
very, very valuable to the American people.
And with that, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And
there's a couple minutes left, so maybe, Mr. Blair, you're in
the middle seat; do you want to comment on that.
Director Blair. I find the intelligence committee has an
awful lot of former prosecutors on it but I think that the
balance that we're trying to strike--it's interesting, I hear
these same conversations inside the executive branch when we
have our meetings on the same subjects. I mean, these are not
easy matters and somebody would have found the absolute perfect
way to balance the prosecution and intelligence value before
now if it had been right there.
So I'd just say these are balance cases and we can talk
about individual ones, but we need to keep all the tools out
there, we need a process to think them through, we need to take
advantage of whatever time we have and the circumstances of the
case, and try to do the best thing.
Senator Risch. Well, Mr. Blair, let me disagree with you,
as far as this being a balancing matter. This is not a
balancing matter. The question is, whatever I get out of this
guy, do I need it in a court of law? If you don't need it in a
court of law, there's no balance that's necessary or anything
else. I mean, there's no reason--I mean, just think about this
guy. He came from a foreign country and he wasn't able to
accomplish what he wants, so he gets drug into the room by
American authorities and he's sitting there thinking, geez, I
wonder what's coming next. You know, I don't know what these
guys do, but I bet it isn't pretty.
And somebody comes in and says, by the way, we're going to
give you a lawyer if you'd like one. This guy says, have I died
and gone to heaven? You know, I mean, of course he's going to
shut up. When you tell him don't say anything until you talk to
a lawyer and we're going to give you a free one, of course,
he's going to do that. With all due respect, this is not
difficult. It's really simple. Do you need the statement in
court or do you not need the statement in court? And if you
don't, wring everything you can out of that guy.
Madam Chairman, I'm done.
Director Mueller. May I just add one thing?
Chairman Feinstein. Yes, you may, Mr. Mueller.
Director Mueller. I don't disagree with what you said,
Senator, but I will say that you are looking at it in the rear
mirror. And the decisions that are made--you are assuming that,
at the point in time decisions are made, we have a full
understanding of the case that we have against him. And this is
but five, six hours afterwards--four or five hours after he's
gotten off the plane.
And so I don't disagree with a lot you say, but by the same
token, you're looking at it in the rear-view mirror. And if you
put yourself at the time and the decisions that you have to
make at that time, you may come down on the other side.
Senator Risch. And Mr. Mueller, I don't disagree with that.
But in this case, I'll bet you guys had talked to about a half
a dozen people that saw exactly what he did and knew you had an
airtight case against this guy.
Director Mueller. Sir, we were out interviewing that
afternoon the passengers from the plane. But the results of
those interviews, we don't get until late that night or the
following day. The first information we have off the plane,
when our agents are out there, is saying an individual has set
off some firecrackers on the plane. And that's the first
information we have. And so, as you well know as a prosecutor,
as the day goes forward and the events, that you get pieces of
information at a particular point in time.
The other point I would make is that, again, as I made it
with Senator Snowe, is this is a continuum over a period of
time. And what happens on that day happens on that day. But do
not discount what has happened or what does happen after that
in terms of gaining that intelligence.
Senator Risch. And that's fair. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Feingold, you're up.
Senator Feingold. I thank the Chair. I have a statement
that I ask be included in the record.
Chairman Feinstein. Without objection.
Senator Feingold. In light of the discussion this
afternoon, I want to note my strong support for the decision to
try Khalid Shaykh Mohammed and Abdulmutallab in federal court.
It's a decision that I think actually demonstrates our national
strength.
Director Blair, on January 7th, White House
Counterterrorism Advisor John Brennan acknowledged, ``we didn't
know that AQAP had progressed to the point of actually
launching individuals here.'' Do you agree with that statement?
Director Blair. Senator, we had some information that they
had ambitions to attack the United States before that point.
Senator Feingold. You know, this strikes me as an area of
strategic intelligence and perhaps a failure of strategic
intelligence.
And it's important, I think, that we acknowledge and
address that as part of this even as we simultaneously work on
how to improve the so-called connect-the-dots tactical
capabilities. I just think it's important to see that as part
of what happened.
CT Advisor Brennan also said that al-Qa'ida is looking in
Africa for recruits and that the government is very concerned
about this and is following up. I'd ask both Directors Blair
and Panetta, where in Africa do you see this occurring? And are
you concerned? Do we have a good enough handle on this threat
continent-wide?
Director Panetta. The areas of principal concern are
Somalia and we have intelligence that obviously there are
individuals that are going to Somalia--in some cases, U.S.
citizens that are going to Somalia and that are involved in
training camps there. And that's one area of concern. Yemen is
another area of concern, as is obvious. And, again, there al-
Qa'ida has a presence and we have strong intelligence that is
trying to target those individuals. More importantly, we have
intelligence that indicates that there is a continuing effort
to try to recruit somebody to institute some kind of attack on
the United States.
Director Blair. Senator Feingold, I think you're familiar
with the organization al-Qa'ida in the Maghreb, which is based
in Western Africa. And I think what we're learning is that this
really is a syndicate al-Qa'ida in South Asia, Yemen, other
places, and that they--in ways that we don't entirely
understand--pass people from one to the other. Abdulmutallab
was a Nigerian; 70 million Muslims, generally moderate, in
Nigeria. But obviously, there is a number who can be
radicalized to the point that he was.
So what I'm finding is to put them into geographic
pigeonholes is kind of limiting our vision. And maybe that was
part of the limited vision that we had before.
Senator Feingold. Well, I think that's exactly right, Mr.
Director. And I appreciate your adding that to the items that
Director Panetta mentioned. I tried to talk today to the
Secretary of State about the countries in Western Africa where
drug trade, perhaps from Latin America, is perhaps being
connected up with these things. And of course, your reference
to al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb is absolutely right in
terms of Northern Africa.
So I guess I go back just to comment, do we have the
resources? Do we have the capacity to follow this? These are
incredibly vast areas. And the conditions that allow al-Qa'ida
to recruit in Africa are exactly the kind of problems that I
think demand broader reform of the sort that I have proposed
and this committee and the Senate have already approved. And
I'm hoping that that can be completed and undertaken in terms
of a commission in the near future. Until we integrate the
intelligence community with the ways we openly gather
information, radicalization, I think, we'll keep being one step
behind al-Qa'ida.
We also need counterterrorism policies that are informed by
what is actually happening in these countries. Last year, the
State Department concluded that the al-Houthi rebellion in
Yemen was distracting the government from counterterrorism. Do
the witnesses have any concerns that Sana'a's recent interest
in CT will not be sustained or that fighting the rebellion
they're dealing with, the southern secessionists, will be
competing priorities?
Director Panetta.
Director Panetta. Senator, the situation in Yemen remains a
volatile situation. And although we have gotten strong support
from President Salih to go after targets and to share
opportunities to ensure that we are working together, he is
besieged by the Houthi situation on the border. He's besieged
by what's happening in the south and the potential that they
might divide from his country. So there are a series of
problems there that could very well consume him. This is not a
clear-cut situation in terms of having his support.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. Director Blair, your prepared
testimony is refreshingly candid about Pakistan's continued
support for militant proxies and about the assistance provided
by some of those groups to al-Qa'ida. You also indicated that
Pakistan's actions are motivated by a desire, of course, to
counter India, which makes Pakistan's strategic view of India
central to our national security.
I'm not convinced that the U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan are going to actually change Islamabad's
calculations in this regard. Isn't something else going to have
to happen to alter how Pakistan has looked at the region for
the past 60 years?
Director Blair. Senator, in conversations with Pakistani
officials and through assessing them with intelligence experts,
we think that that historical foundation that you cite
certainly provides the foundation and the heritage of what they
go into these decisions with. But they are constantly
reevaluating what is happening on their western border.
What I think General Kayani, for example, one of the key
leaders, said yesterday that what he sees as important in
Afghanistan is that it be a friendly state and stable state.
And he has offered, for example, training to Afghanistan armed
forces in order to achieve that. So while the Pakistani threat
coming from India is historically well-grounded and lies at the
core of Pakistan's concern, I think they are realistic in terms
of looking around and seeing how do they best carry out their
interests in that framework.
Senator Feingold. I thank you all.
Chairman Feinstein. I think we should probably begin to
wrap it up. There may be some additional questions. All right,
Mr. Vice Chairman, why don't you go ahead and then I'll wrap it
up.
Vice Chairman Bond. Okay, just a couple quick things. I
admit to having been on the government and the defense side in
a few criminal cases, limited manner, but I do associate myself
with the country lawyer from Idaho. Not only are there problems
with the trial, but I also recall Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, when
arrested, said something like, my lawyer and I will see you in
New York. So if he were to be tried in New York, which
apparently not, it would be granting his greatest wish.
Now, turning to Gitmo, it was always my understanding that
the many detainees in Gitmo were never intended to come to the
United States for trial. That's why we worked, in 2007 and
2009, to get the military tribunals properly established.
Now, moving along, Mr. Director, I was very disappointed--I
wrote you a month and a half ago asking the recidivism numbers
for the past year detainees returning to terrorism to be made
public. I first got my answer via the media last night, when
the letter from White House Advisor Brennan was sent to the
House Speaker, which stated openly what we've known, that the
recidivism rate was 20 percent.
He went on to note that all those were from the previous
administration. But putting aside all that, and the fact that
it took us a long time to get that answer, number one, I hope
that the information will be forthcoming on a regular basis in
the future. When I ask a question, I'd like to hear from you in
a more timely manner. But I do know that the detainees released
prior to 2009 were judged to be the very most rehabable or most
subject to rehabilitation detainees they had.
So I don't believe it takes a rocket scientist to realize
that letting any more go would heighten the risk. Do you have
any reason to believe that additional detainees will not go
through the so-called rehab programs, or come back with
additional information they can use to plan and execute
terrorist attacks against the United States?
Director Blair. I think you're absolutely correct on this,
Vice Chairman, that the 500-odd detainees who had been released
before last year, and then the 120-some-odd that have been
designated for release since then are probably easier cases.
And I've been personally going through some of these harder
cases, and there's a fairly large number of them that we
shouldn't----
Vice Chairman Bond. I would hope they would not be
released.
Director Blair [continuing]. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bond. Now, moving to the high-value detainee
interrogation group that everybody's calling HIG for short,
when will the document be finalized and the committee get a
copy of it, and have this operation in place?
Director Blair. Sir, the charter--I've signed off on the
charter, so it should--it requires a number of sign-offs around
the government. I'll look at when it would be available, but
it's moving along, and, as Director Mueller said, we are using
the components that we expect will coalesce into a HIG right
now.
Vice Chairman Bond. But as I understand it from the
executive order, that the HIG is actually under control of the
White House through the National Security Council. Is that
correct?
Director Blair. The body that makes the decision on
deploying it is in the White House with representatives from
everybody at this table.
Vice Chairman Bond. But it's the National Security Council.
If Usama bin Ladin were captured tomorrow, would the HIG
interrogate him? Would he be read his Miranda rights?
Director Blair. If Usama bin Ladin were captured, I would
very much hope that the HIG would interrogate him and squeeze
all the information out of him----
Vice Chairman Bond. Prior to Mirandizing him.
Director Blair [continuing]. I'm not going to talk about
the----
Vice Chairman Bond. Director Panetta, to what extent is the
CIA in the interrogation business at all? I've talked to
colleagues who've gone overseas and met with commanding
officers who, when asked about who can interrogate them, bring
their lawyer in to give an answer because they don't seem to
know. Does the CIA have any role in interrogation? If so, what
is it?
Director Panetta. Yes, Senator, we are engaged with these
teams, and what we bring is obviously the intelligence value
associated with whoever is being interrogated. But we do
participate in those kinds of interrogations.
Vice Chairman Bond. So you've been participating in the
HIG?
Director Panetta. That's correct.
Vice Chairman Bond. How long's that HIG been going?
Director Panetta. Well, obviously, we have gone ahead and
dispatched some of these teams with the CIA, with the FBI, in
order to----
Vice Chairman Bond. How long have they--I didn't know that
the CIA or anybody else was interrogating people; how long has
that been going on?
Director Panetta [continuing]. Well, we're participating
with the FBI.
Vice Chairman Bond. Since when?
Director Mueller. Last fall.
Vice Chairman Bond. So you have been doing this----
Director Mueller. I mean, we have been doing it in teams in
anticipation of the formal signing of the document, but the
concept has been in place since last fall and we have used it
on a number of occasions.
Director Blair. Senator, the CIA personnel are not the
interrogators; they're the backup, aren't they, Director
Panetta?
Director Panetta. They're backup, but they are doing some
of the interviewing.
Chairman Feinstein. If I may, the HIG is operational and
has been deployed, correct?
Director Blair. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Senator Rockefeller, you had
a comment and Senator Whitehouse, will you make a comment?
Senator Rockefeller. I don't have a question, but just a
comment because time is running out. The two things that I'd
hoped to discuss here today, but which we won't have time to
do--but we'll have plenty of time in the near future--is,
number one, to meet the two greatest growing threats within our
terrorist community. One has already been discussed, and that
is the youth--I believe by you, Director Panetta--and that is
that Abdulmutallab is--you know, he had no record; he was
clean, had a 2-year visa.
He started in when he was 22 years old. He was arrested
when he was 23 years old. I see this as growing all across the
world, including in our own country, obviously, because they
are clean, because they cannot be traced. And for that reason,
as Director Blair knows, it's a concern of mine that when these
folks choose to travel and they pay in cash, and because they
pay in cash, there's simply an interchange with somebody at an
airport or a travel agent, nothing is known about them--just
that they paid in cash and, you know, maybe checked luggage or
maybe didn't.
So there has to be a way, which we can work out, that when
somebody pays in cash, that the person at the counter or the
person at the travel agency asks questions, gets certain
information from that person--Social Security number, telephone
number, address, address where the person will be overseas.
People won't like it. Airlines won't like asking those
questions. They'll think it's a harassment upon them. But there
is no other protection that I know of for people who have a
paperless trail. So that's one thing that concerns me greatly.
And the second one we've also talked about in other
situations, and that is the fact that--I think I've read it in
several books and plenty of articles--that, let's say that the
entire operation of bringing down the twin towers cost al-
Qa'ida about $500,000 and that with all of the poppy activity,
the corruption activity, the criminal gang activity which
interrelates in with the Taliban in Pakistan, with the Taliban
in Afghanistan, and with others. And they cross-fertilize at
some point, because money is money. Also, so much money is
contributed to this from foreign countries, and we all know who
those foreign countries are.
The question of chasing down the financing of terrorism is,
to this Senator, a primary concern. I don't know how much is
being done about it. I do know that--I think that they can sort
of do a twin tower every three weeks, according to the amount
of money they raise. And that may be just from the drug trade--
the narcotics--much less the other types of financial resources
that are coming to them, just in overwhelming hundreds of
millions of dollars, hundreds of millions of dollars.
That has to be faced up to. And it's serious; it's hard;
it's a hard thing to shut down because it's worldwide. You're
dealing with different people; you're not necessarily dealing
with the terrorists themselves. You're dealing with the people
who facilitate. But now, they become equally dangerous. They
enable. And that's scary.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Whitehouse, you had a question?
Senator Whitehouse. I believe that the Chairman in her
opening remarks referenced the report that the committee is
working on on cyber security. I believe that the extent to
which the country is under cyber attack is under-appreciated by
the public. And I would like to ask each of you for your
cooperation with that report in making timely decisions about
declassification so that we can, without compromising any
national security information, present information in the
report about the scale of the attack that we face in a
meaningful way and in our time frame.
I believe that will require some cooperation from you as
declassifiers since nobody in the legislative branch of
government is a declassifier and our procedures for
declassifying information are so complex that I frankly believe
that they have never actually been used.
So it will require your cooperation and I'd just like to
take this public opportunity to ask you for your cooperation in
accomplishing that.
Director Blair. Senator, we'll do that.
And, Madam Chairman, if I can just clarify one thing in my
exchange with Senator Feingold, I just had a chance to review
the statement by Mr. Brennan that he mentioned. And we're not
at odds. It's a distinction between strategic and tactical
intelligence and we're both saying the same thing.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. I'd like just to
clarify my understanding. My understanding is that the high
value detainee interrogation team is in fact operative, that it
has been deployed and that it will participate in any future
interrogation. Is that correct?
Director Panetta. That's correct.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Panetta.
It is also my understanding that Mr. Abdulmutallab has
provided valuable information. Is that correct?
Director Mueller. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. And that the interrogation continues
despite the fact that he has been Mirandized.
Director Mueller. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. It is also my information that the no-
fly list has been substantially augmented. Is that correct?
Director Panetta. That's correct. We have added a number of
names to the no-fly list.
Chairman Feinstein. And can you discuss the definition for
placement on the no-fly list? We discussed this and you read
the definition, which took a Philadelphia lawyer to----
Director Blair. Closed session. And we showed you the stack
of paper which is required. And I think it's a case of practice
and interpretation of those rules. And, as Director Panetta
said, we are interpreting those more aggressively right now
until we get a better handle on this situation with al-Qa'ida
in the Arabian Peninsula.
So it's within the same words written on the paper, but
it's more aggressive and flexible in terms of actually getting
more names on the list when we're in the gray area.
Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. And it's my understanding
that the views of a chief of station will be taken into
consideration in terms of determining whether an individual
should be placed on a no-fly list or a watch list. Is that
correct, Mr. Panetta?
Director Panetta. That's correct.
Chairman Feinstein. I think that's very important. And I'm
delighted to hear that. All right.
I'd like to thank everybody. I'd like to thank you for your
service to the country. I'd like to thank your staff that have
worked on this. I know it's a very hard time and that the next
six months are a difficult period. So the committee stands
available to be of whatever help it can be.
Vice Chairman Bond. I was going to say, before you closed,
first, I join with the Chair in thanking you for your
discussions. I believe, having been around here a little while,
that when we have these open hearings, one of the most
important things we can do is talk about issues that are
important to the public. And while we've had very spirited
debate on both sides, there is strong disagreement.
I think the public wants to hear from you, from both sides
of the aisle on our views on this. So I find this is a very,
very helpful discussion. It's difficult because good friends
are disagreeing. But I thank the Chair for having this in open
hearing, and letting us pursue those.
Number two, I've said that I believe that we have very
strong interest on both sides of the aisle in making sure that
cyber security is pursued as an intelligence matter, but that
the American people understand just how dangerous these cyber
attacks are for our personal bank accounts, credit cards, for
the security of our infrastructure--power supply, water
companies and all that--and for our national security.
So when we find things that can be discussed openly, we
will look forward to doing so.
And finally, Madam Chair, I believe the record normally
will stay open for a couple of days.
Chairman Feinstein. It will stay open.
Vice Chairman Bond. Surprisingly enough, I didn't even get
through the questions. I would like to give our distinguished
witnesses an opportunity to respond to some of the comments
that have been made by former Attorney General, Mike Mukasey,
who was the trial judge in the Blind Sheik and other cases. And
I would like to get your reaction to those.
But I thank you, Madam Chair, for putting up with this and
having a very spirited, interesting debate.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
Supplemental Material
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Russ Feingold, a U.S. Senator from Wisconsin
The Christmas Day attack on our country, by a regional al Qaeda
affiliate in Yemen using an operative from Nigeria, underscored the
global nature of the terrorist threat we face. If we are to stay ahead
of al Qaeda, we must respond by improving our intelligence capabilities
and developing better informed and more comprehensive counterterrorism
strategies.
First, we must maximize our ability to anticipate radicalization
and the emergence of new terrorist safe havens by fully integrating our
Intelligence Community with the ways in which our government gathers
information openly around the world. I have proposed an independent
commission to do just that, and the Senate Intelligence Committee and
full Senate have approved this proposal.
Second, we need counterterrorism strategies that take into account
the local conflicts and conditions that allow al Qaeda to operate and
that distract our partners from counterterrorism. That is why, last
week, I joined with the chairmen of this committee and the Foreign
Relations Committee to introduce a resolution requiring a comprehensive
strategy for Yemen. In Somalia, the Sahel and elsewhere, our government
needs to identify and tackle head-on the conditions that serve as an
invitation to al Qaeda.
Finally, we simply cannot afford our current military escalation in
Afghanistan. It is not necessary to counter the fewer than one hundred
al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan, and it risks further destabilizing an
already dangerous Pakistan. Instead, we must develop and support
sustainable, global and effective counterterrorism strategies.
