S. Hrg. 111-896
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION,
111TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
on
NOMINATIONS OF
ELIZABETH A. McGRATH; MICHAEL J. McCORD; SHARON E. BURKE; SOLOMON B.
WATSON; KATHERINE G. HAMMACK; VADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN; LTG
KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; LTG LLOYD J.
AUSTIN III, USA; GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS,
USMC; JONATHAN WOODSON, M.D.; NEILE L. MILLER; ANNE M. HARRINGTON; GEN.
JAMES F. AMOS, USMC; GEN. CLAUDE R. KEHLER, USAF; AND GEN CARTER F.
HAM, USA
----------
MARCH 23; APRIL 15; JUNE 24, 29; JULY 27; AUGUST 3; SEPTEMBER 21;
NOVEMBER 18, 2010
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[...]
NOMINATIONS OF VADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, TO BE ADMIRAL AND
COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
DEFENSE COMMAND; AND LTG KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE/
COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER COMMAND
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Udall, Hagan, Burris, Kaufman, McCain, and Thune.
Other Senator present: Senator Barbara Mikulski.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Peter K.
Levine, general counsel; and Thomas K. McConnell, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Paul
C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw,
professional staff member; and David M. Morriss, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard and Kevin A.
Cronin.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator
Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Nathan
Davern, assistant to Senator Burris; Halie Soifer, assistant to
Senator Kaufman; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Jason Van
Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Kyle Ruckert, assistant
to Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets today to consider the nominations of two senior officers
to serve in important command positions. Vice Admiral James
Winnefeld, Jr., has been nominated for promotion to the rank of
admiral and to be Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
and Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD). Lieutenant General Keith Alexander has been nominated
for promotion to the rank of general and to be Director of the
National Security Agency (NSA), the Director of the Central
Security Service, and to be Commander of the new U.S. Cyber
Command (CYBERCOM).
We welcome both our nominees and we thank them, we thank
their families, for their long and distinguished service that
they've already provided to the Nation. We thank them both also
for their willingness to continue serving our Nation in these
senior military positions for which they are so well qualified.
Vice Admiral Winnefeld has had a long and distinguished
naval career, including a number of joint duty assignments. He
has commanded the U.S. Sixth Fleet, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Striking and Support Forces, and Carrier Strike
Group 2. He is currently serving as the Director of Strategic
Plans and Policy, J-5, on the Joint Staff.
NORTHCOM, which Admiral Winnefeld has been nominated to
lead, was created following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. It is charged with two primary missions, defense of
the United States and providing defense support to civil
authorities in circumstances where the Federal Government is
needed to respond to natural or manmade disasters in the
homeland. This latter mission requires a high level of
cooperation and coordination with other Federal agencies and
State agencies, especially the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).
The Commander of NORTHCOM is also dual-hatted as the
Commander of NORAD, our binational command with Canada that
provides aerospace warning and control and since 2006 maritime
warning for North America. NORAD has been a key link between
our two nations for more than 50 years.
In addition to Canada, Mexico is also in the NORTHCOM area
of responsibility (AOR). Given the continuing high level of
drug-related violence in Mexico and the attendant risks to our
southern border region, the administration has been focusing
high-level attention on Mexico. This future close cooperation
between our countries in this and many other matters is
critically important to both our countries.
Finally, NORTHCOM is the combatant command responsible for
the operation of the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD)
system that has interceptors deployed in Alaska and California
to defend our Nation from limited long-range missile attack.
That system has been of considerable interest to this committee
for a number of reasons, including that we need it to be tested
in a way that will give us confidence in its operational
effectiveness.
General Alexander too has had a long and distinguished
career in military intelligence. He has served as the Director
for Intelligence, J-2, for U.S. Central Command; Commanding
General for the Army Intelligence and Security Command; and the
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Intelligence before
becoming Director of NSA in 2005.
With respect to the position to which General Alexander has
been nominated, the creation of a new combatant command, even
at the subunified level, is an extremely important matter. The
creation of CYBERCOM in particular warrants careful scrutiny on
the part of this committee for a variety of reasons. CYBERCOM
is to be formed solely around the mission involving the
relatively sudden dominance of the new computer and
communications technology of our age, technology that is
ubiquitous, rapidly evolving, and fraught with both great
promise and new perils for the country and the world.
As the committee's examination has confirmed, capabilities
to operate in cyber space have outpaced the development of
policy, law, and precedent to guide and control those
operations. This policy gap is especially concerning because
cyber weapons and cyber attacks potentially can be devastating,
approaching weapons of mass destruction in their effects,
depending on how they are designed and used.
Coupled with the fact that the U.S. economy and Government
are the most dependent in the world on the Internet and are
therefore the most vulnerable to attacks, the Nation must not
only invest in the effectiveness of its defense, but think
carefully about the precedents that it sets, hopefully acting
wisely in ways that we will accept if others act in the same or
similar ways.
Combatant commanders respond to attacks that affect our
forces and their ability to execute their missions. The
implications of their responses are usually limited and pertain
to the theater in which forces are operating. But responses and
initiatives in cyber space could have extremely broad and
damaging consequences and in the future may require rapid
decisionmaking. In this context, some have expressed concern
about an officer without strong career experience in commanding
combat forces serving as a subunified combatant commander.
Faced with that complex situation, the committee proceeded
methodically to gain an understanding of what Congress is being
asked to approve and what the key cyber space issues are that
need to be addressed. Committee staff have held numerous
meetings with senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials on a
host of policy and operational issues associated with CYBERCOM
and military and intelligence operations in cyber space.
Committee members held a classified meeting with the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cartwright, and
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr.
Jim Miller. The committee posed a lengthy set of policy
questions to be answered in writing by the nominee in advance
of today's hearing and followed that up with additional
meetings and discussions, including with General Alexander.
The committee has been assured that DOD's leadership and
the administration as a whole is committed to rapidly closing
the cyber space policy gap. The committee has also been assured
that DOD is proceeding with appropriate caution and care
regarding military operations in cyber space.
We look forward to hearing from our witnesses. There's a
possibility that a closed session will be required and if so
that session will be held in the Office of Senate Security in
the Visitors Center of the Capitol.
Before we turn to our wonderful colleague Senator Mikulski
to introduce General Alexander, let me call on Senator McCain
for his opening comments.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join
you in welcoming Lieutenant General Alexander and Vice Admiral
Winnefeld and their families.
General Alexander, CYBERCOM was established, as we all
know, by the Secretary of Defense last year. Since then I have
shared the concerns of Senator Levin and others about ensuring
that the role, mission, legal authorities, and rules of
engagement that CYBERCOM will employ are well thought out and
understood. I think we've made progress in achieving greater
clarity in this regard and that you are well qualified for this
new assignment.
The Department must have a centralized command to address
the challenges of cyber warfare, to provide the support to the
regional combatant commands, and to ensure that DOD, while
focused on its own military networks and information grid, also
is ready, if directed by the President, to assume a position of
leadership and support to civilian authorities in this regard.
Continuing intrusions and attacks by difficult to identify
and locate actors on our civilian and military networks and web
sites demand not only a robust defensive capability, but the
ability to respond offensively when the circumstances call for
it. One need only consider the examples of cyber warfare
conducted against the Republic of Georgia in 2008 and Estonia
in 2007 to appreciate the nature of this form of modern
warfare.
We look forward to your testimony about how CYBERCOM will
function in protecting our vital national assets and
infrastructure. I also noted in the media this morning that you
believe there are certain gaps in legislative form and also in
regulations that need to be improved in order to help you
complete your mission successfully and under the legal
framework that you feel is necessary. I look forward to hearing
from you on that aspect of your new responsibilities.
Admiral Winnefeld, I congratulate you on your nomination to
head NORTHCOM and NORAD. The vicious attacks of September 11
are never far from our thoughts. Ensuring effective support of
civilian authorities should be among our highest priorities.
The same is true, of course, for natural disasters, which
demand a capable, tested, intergovernmental response in which
NORTHCOM is a key player.
Admiral Winnefeld, I want to particularly emphasize the
continuing growing threat to our national security posed by the
violence along our border with Mexico. Your answers to the
committee's advance policy questions about the importance of
combatting drug trafficking and drug violence reflect my deep
concerns about the corrosive effect of this plague on both the
United States and Mexico. The drug-related violence in Mexico
is appalling. As you noted, there were over 6,500 drug-related
murders in Mexico last year. So far this year, there have been
nearly 2,000 deaths resulting from drug-related violence. Last
month, the murders in Juarez of Lesley Enriquez, an American
consulate worker, and her husband Arthur; of Jorge Salcido, the
husband of a U.S. consulate employee; and the murder of Robert
Krentz, a rancher in Douglas, AZ, underscored the cross-border
nature of this problem.
I've supported the assignment of federally-funded National
Guardsmen to our southern border in the past and I have
endorsed Arizona Governor Jan Brewer's recent request for 250
federally-funded National Guardsmen in Arizona to assist in
this effort to stop the flow of illegal immigrants and
narcotics.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to insert two letters into the
record: one I wrote to Secretary Napolitano on March 29; and
the other addressed to the mayor of Douglas, AZ, on March 31 in
this regard.
Chairman Levin. They will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator McCain. Unfortunately, the administration has
rejected Governor Brewer's request.
Admiral, I'm interested in your assessment of the security
situation along the border and what steps can be taken to
improve not only the ability of the United States to confront
this drug trafficking threat, but also the ability of our
allies in Mexico.
Admiral, I understand that yours is a military command and
your role is one to be carried out in combat. I can make an
argument that we are in combat with the drug cartels in Mexico.
I can make an argument that the war between the drug cartels
and the Government of Mexico directly threatens the very
existence of the Government of Mexico. I don't say these words
lightly, and I think that it's very clear that when you're
talking about a $65 billion a year business that is harming
American citizens and killing them because of the product, that
this struggle with the drug cartels is going to and already has
spilled over into the United States of America and has taken
the lives of American citizens.
I look forward to perhaps taking a visit with you to our
southern border. I look forward to working with you and
determining how we can best use some of the military equipment
we have, such as surveillance technologies, use of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), and better ways to enforce our border
and make sure that it is secure. I look forward to discussing
this and working with you, Admiral Winnefeld. This is a grave
threat and I am afraid that a lot of Americans are not aware
how serious the consequences would be of the Government of
Mexico failing and being overthrown by these drug cartels, or
at least marginalized so that the drug cartels can act freely,
and the consequences to American security.
I thank you and I will look forward to your testimony and
look forward to working with you as we carry out what I believe
is a national security requirement, and that is to secure our
southern border.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
General Alexander, you could have no more effective
advocate than Senator Mikulski. I want you to know that this
has been a long period of time for considerations because of
the newness of this position and the importance that it has for
the reasons which we've stated. But I don't think a week went
by during this long period that Barbara Mikulski did not ask
me: So when's the hearing? You're lucky to have her as a
Senator, but also as a wonderful advocate.
Senator Mikulski.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA MIKULSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF MARYLAND
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member McCain, and colleagues. I have the opportunity
today to introduce Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, who is
the current Director of NSA, located in Fort Meade, MD. I also
am very proud to sit here today with Admiral Winnefeld, and I
would like to re-echo Senator McCain's sense of urgency about
another war that we're fighting south of our own border.
I'm here today in my scope as the Senator from Maryland. My
State is the home to the mothership of signals intelligence in
the U.S. military, which is NSA. I would recommend in a
classified hearing that the scope, breadth, and talented
workforce, the nature of it really be further explored, because
I think it's often underestimated and it's undervalued because
it does come in under everybody's radar.
But today is an exciting day in introducing General
Alexander for his confirmation hearing to lead something called
CYBERCOM. He will elaborate on that command, but I'm going to
elaborate on General Alexander. President Obama nominated him
and I think it's a great choice. This job, to head up CYBERCOM,
is going to require expertise, leadership, and know-how. The
know-how is going to require technical competence in fields
that change in web years, not in fiscal years. It requires
someone who has incredible organizational skills that could
head up major dot-com companies in our own country and the
diplomatic skills to navigate not only with foreign leaders,
but the vagaries of our own governance structures.
I believe that General Alexander brings all of those
talents, skills, and even more. He brings a great deal of
expertise. His biography speaks for itself and the command
recognitions that he's received. He's been the head of NSA for
5 years. He was the Deputy Chief of Staff at the Army, General
of the U.S. Army in Intelligence Security Command, and the
Director of Intelligence for U.S. Central Command, and numerous
other positions.
That's kind of the resume stuff. But as you know, all of
you here, that it is one thing to talk about credentials and
bars on the shoulder and so on, but it's another thing to talk
about leadership. I believe that General Alexander has led the
transformation of NSA from an agency that was once focused on
Cold War threats to now a world of new world threats,
supporting both people who are literally in battle in Iraq and
Afghanistan, standing sentry over those others who have
predatory intent against us, and bringing that leadership.
Right now he is leading the fight against cyber spies who
want to steal our State secrets, cyber terrorists who want to
disrupt everything from our financial services to our power
grids, while supporting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
working with NORTHCOM and our forces at the border protecting
our borders.
Lieutenant General Alexander is a leader and a
professional. I believe he's an indispensable asset. He's had
to deal with everything from other generals and admirals to
deal with us and our often sluggish response to situations.
He's had to deal with Google as it's been threatened by China
and he's had to develop a workforce and develop technology and
he's had to do it with speed, diligence, while he's trying to
avoid attacks on the United States, he's been trying to avoid
fiscal boondoggles with his own agency.
The CYBERCOM leader needs to be respected by the military.
His service speaks for itself. He needs to be able to deal with
the private sector. They're already coming to him for advice
and how to work with us to protect dot-mil and other important
things. He's been a promoter of innovation.
I come to this because the committee must come to deal,
have a sense of urgency, not only on the confirmation, but on
cyber security. Those who have predatory intent against us are
dealing in web years. They're continually focusing on the
rapidity of change in a dynamic web environment. That's every 3
months. We deal in fiscal years, congressional sessions,
quadrennial reviews. That's pretty dated when it comes to cyber
security.
Our cyber shield is thinning. We need a unified response.
We need CYBERCOM and we need the leader who has the right stuff
to do it. I believe that's General Alexander and I hope you
confirm him with web year speed.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your kind attention.
[The prepared statement of Senator Mikulski follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Barbara Mikulski
Thank you Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain for the
opportunity to introduce Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, the current Director
of the National Security Agency (NSA), located in Fort Meade, MD.
As the Senator from and for Maryland, I am pleased and honored to
introduce Lieutenant General Alexander to the Senate Armed Services
Committee for his confirmation hearing to lead Cyber Command. In
October 2009, President Obama, with the support and backing of Defense
Secretary Gates and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Blair,
nominated Lieutenant General Alexander to lead Cyber Command.
I have known Lieutenant General Alexander since he started as
Director of the NSA in 2005. Lieutenant General Alexander's leadership
and expertise as Director of the NSA for the past 5 years, Deputy Chief
of Staff of the Army, General of the U.S. Army and Intelligence and
Security Command, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Central Command and
numerous other positions make him uniquely qualified to lead Cyber
Command.
Lieutenant General Alexander has led the transformation of the NSA
from an agency focused on counter-terrorism into an organization that
is leading the fight against cyber spies who want to steal our State
secrets, cyber terrorists who want to disrupt our power grid and cyber
criminals who want to make a quick buck, all while still supporting the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lieutenant General Alexander is a leader,
a professional and, most important for this job, he is an indispensable
asset to our Nation's cyber security.
As a member of both the Intelligence Committee and Defense
Subcommittee on Appropriations, which funds the NSA, I have seen the
tremendous things that the NSA is doing in cyber space both to protect
our national security systems and to keep us ahead of our cyber
adversaries.
The United States is being hacked and being attacked by cyber
adversaries and foes each and every day. Cyber spies want to steal our
State secrets, weapons systems, and restricted technology. Cyber
hackers who want to make off with our intellectual property and patents
and cyber criminals who want to make a quick $10,000.
Our cyber shield is thinning and a unified response is necessary.
The U.S. military needs a unified effort--a Cyber Command--to have the
ability to respond with speed, agility, and flexibility to increasingly
sophisticated cyber adversaries.
As DNI Mike McConnell--a former NSA Director himself--once told me,
Lieutenant General Alexander is an asset to our national security, and
I agree with him. Cyber hackers and warriors continue to hack and
attack us each day. Cyber hackers and warriors are operating with
increasing speed and sophistication.
This nomination is one that cannot wait. I strongly support his
nomination to lead Cyber Command and I urge his quick confirmation.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Mikulski. We
haven't acted yet with web year speed, but we surely from this
point on would hope to do so. The reasons we haven't are the
reasons that I tried to outline, though, in my introduction,
which intended to set out at least, some of the very
significant issues that this new command raises. But your
eloquence is very helpful in this regard and your comments are
very welcome.
Senator Mikulski. Good luck. I have your back.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, I think we're going to start with
you, so please proceed with your opening comments and please
introduce anybody that you'd like to introduce to us. We always
welcome family and friends should people be lucky enough to
have them with them.
STATEMENT OF VADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, NOMINEE TO BE
ADMIRAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH
AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator
McCain, and distinguished members of this committee, it's a
great honor to have been nominated by the President to become
the Commander of NORTHCOM and the Commander of NORAD. I thank
you all for the opportunity to appear before you this morning.
I'm joined this morning--and thank you, sir--by my family
and with your permission I'd like to introduce them: first my
wonderful wife and best friend, to whom I owe so much, from
Menomonie, WI, my wonderful wife Mary, who is a volunteer for
the Navy and Marine Corps Relief Society here in Washington and
who brings so much joy into my family's life. Sweetheart.
Here also are my two sons, of whom I'm so proud: my son LJ,
who tells me he'd like to follow his father's footsteps into
the Navy; and his brother Jonathan, who tells me he would
prefer to serve in the Marine Corps.
Chairman Levin. Both of them belong in school. How come
they're not there today? [Laughter.]
Admiral Winnefeld. I think they got a senatorial waiver,
sir.
Mr. Chairman, over the last 3 years my friend General Gene
Renuart has led the NORTHCOM and NORAD team with distinction
and he'll leave behind a tremendous legacy of continuous
improvement. If confirmed, I look forward to being able to
build upon his efforts.
In this light, I'd like to make two simple but important
points before receiving your questions. First, I can think of
no greater responsibility than protecting our people and our
way of life by leading our homeland's last military line of
defense and by providing support at the Federal, State, and
local level in times of great need. There are no points for
second place in either one of these missions and I view this as
a sacred trust.
Second, I have observed no other commands, no other
combatant command for sure, in which cooperation with and
support for partners is more important than with NORTHCOM and
with NORAD. I believe the significant part of my career and my
professional life spent in joint assignments has helped prepare
me for this task.
If confirmed, I will reinforce the critical importance of
close partnerships and teamwork with the other combatant
commanders and Service Chiefs, with DHS, and a host of other
interagency, State, local, and nongovernmental partners, with
our close friends and neighbors Canada and Mexico, and with the
National Guard and Reserve.
I view all of these relationships as vital, but I would
like to particularly emphasize the latter. Our Nation's Guard
and Reserve have never been better or more versatile and I look
forward, if confirmed, to forging a strong personal partnership
with them.
I also look forward to working closely with the members of
this committee to ensure we're correctly tackling the
critically important job of defending our homeland and
providing support to civil authorities.
Once again, I'm very grateful for the opportunity to appear
today and I'd like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
McCain, and the members and superb staff of this committee for
the ongoing support that you provide to our men and women in
uniform and to their families.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral. We welcome you.
We welcome your wife and your kids here today. We know how much
you treasure them and we are delighted to see them here.
General Alexander.
STATEMENT OF LTG KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA, NOMINEE TO BE GENERAL
AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY
SERVICE/COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER COMMAND
General Alexander. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
distinguished members of the committee, it is a distinct honor
and privilege to appear before you today. I am honored that
President Obama and Secretary Gates have placed their trust and
confidence in me by nominating me for the position of Director,
NSA; Chief, Central Security Service; and for Commander,
CYBERCOM. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with
the committee to address the cyber security challenges facing
our Nation today and in the future.
Sir, I'd like to introduce my wife Debby, who is with me
today--right here, just so I can identify her. Debby has
overseen 20 moves, experienced the highs and lows of almost 35
years in service, brought 4 lovely daughters into the world,
and is grandmother to our 12 grandchildren. I am indebted to
her for her love, unflagging support, wise counsel, and
occasionally letting me win in Yahtzee.
We face a growing array of cyber threats, from foreign
intelligence services, terrorists, criminal groups, and
individual hackers, who are capable of stealing, manipulating,
or destroying information that could compromise our personal
and national security. DOD in particular requires a focused
approach to secure its own networks, given our military's
dependence on them for command and control, logistics, and
military operations.
In recognition of this, Secretary Gates directed the
creation of CYBERCOM to establish a framework under which a
single military commander can achieve unity of command and
operational integration across the full range of cyber space
operations.
If confirmed, my main focus will be on building the
capacity, the capability, and the critical partnerships
required to secure our military's operational networks. This
command is not about efforts to militarize cyber space. Rather,
it is about safeguarding the integrity of our military's
critical information systems. Working with U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) and Department leadership and with help from
this committee, my goal, if confirmed, will be to significantly
improve the way we defend ourselves in this domain.
If confirmed, I also intend to draw upon the extensive
lessons I have learned over the almost 5 years serving as both
Director of NSA and Commander of the Joint Functional Component
Command Net Warfare, to ensure that CYBERCOM can effectively
leverage NSA's global intelligence capabilities.
I would like to note, however, that while there will be, by
design, significant synergy between NSA and CYBERCOM, each
organization will have a separate and distinct mission with its
own identity, authorities, and oversight mechanisms. NSA's own
mission and authorities will not change as a result of the
creation of this command and, while cyber space is a dynamic,
rapidly evolving environment, what will never change will be an
unwavering dedication by both CYBERCOM and NSA to the
protection of civil liberties and privacy of American citizens.
Finally, if confirmed, we can stand up the command under
existing authorities, but there is undoubtedly much unchartered
territory in the world of cyber policy, law, and doctrine. If
confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy charged by Secretary Gates to develop a
comprehensive strategy for DOD's cyber space operations. I will
also rely heavily on the wisdom and guidance of this committee
to ensure that we get this critically important mission right
for our military and for our Nation.
In closing, I want to again express my sincere appreciation
to this committee for holding today's hearing. If confirmed, I
look forward to working closely with you. Your wisdom, support,
and sustained engagement are critical to ensuring the success
of this endeavor.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here with you
today. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General. We welcome
you. We welcome your wife. I'm a little bit jealous of the 2 of
you with 4 daughters--I only have 3--and 12 grandkids--I only
have 5. But it's wonderful to have you both here.
I want to explore with you, General Alexander, some of that
unexplored territory that you just mentioned, cyber policy,
cyber law, and cyber doctrine. You as the first Commander of
CYBERCOM are going to be in a critical position, not just in
commanding the command, but in really setting the precedents
for how that command is going to operate. There's a lot of
unchartered territory; you and I have talked about this.
What I'd like to do is share some hypothetical scenarios.
You and I talked about your doing this and I wanted to let you
know that's what I wanted to do because I wanted you to be able
to know in advance what these scenarios are and to give us your
thoughtful response to these. This is a new area, not just for
our country, but an area which is particularly challenging, I
must say, to me, being generationally challenged when it comes
to understanding some of these issues.
Let me give you the hypotheticals, starting with the
easiest one, I think, which is assume the following: U.S.
forces are engaged in a traditional military conflict with a
country, we'll call it Country C. Now, how would you conduct
cyber operations in that country in support of the combatant
commander? Under what authorities, processes, and orders would
you be operating in that particular scenario? Then I'll give
you two additional scenarios.
General Alexander. Yes, sir. We would be operating under
title 10 authorities, under an execute order, supporting
probably that regional combatant commander. The execute order
would have the authorities that we need to operate within that
country. We have standing rules of engagement of how to defend
our networks.
I think that's the straightforward case. There would be an
execute order that comes down to that regional combatant
commander, that includes the authorities for cyber parsed and
approved by the President.
Chairman Levin. All right, so that is kind of a traditional
role. You have an execute order. You have rules of engagement.
By the way, we'll have an 8-minute first round for
questioning.
Now the second hypothetical. I want to add a complicating
factor to the scenario. Assume that an adversary launches an
attack on our forces through computers that are located in a
neutral country. That's what you've determined. The attack is
coming from computers in a neutral country. How does that alter
the way that you would operate and the authorities that you
would operate under?
General Alexander. Sir, that does complicate it. It would
still be the regional combatant commander that we're supporting
under title 10 authorities. There would be an execute order. In
that execute order and the standing rules of engagement, it
talks about what we can do to defend our networks and where we
can go and how we can block.
The issue becomes more complicated when on the table are
facts such as we can't stop the attacks getting into our
computers, and if we don't have the authorities in accordance
with the standing rules of engagement we'd go back up to
STRATCOM, to the Secretary, and the President for additional
capabilities to stop that.
But right now the authorities would be to block it in
theater under the current standing rules of engagement, and it
would be under an execute order, and again under title 10 in
support of that regional combatant command.
Chairman Levin. Is that execute order likely to have the
authority to do more than defend the networks, or would you
have to, in all likelihood, go back for that authority if it
were more than defensive?
General Alexander. Sir, it would probably have the
authority to attack within the area of conflict against the
other military that you're fighting. There would be a rules of
engagement that articulate what you can do offensively and what
you can do defensively. Sir, in offense that's both in the
exploitation and in the attack role. Both of those would be
laid out in the execute order.
What you would not have the authority to do is to reach out
into a neutral country and do an attack, and therein lies the
complication from a neutral country: What do you do to take
that second step?
Chairman Levin. Neutral being a third country, presumably?
Is that synonymous or does the word ``neutral'' mean literally
neutral?
General Alexander. It could be either, sir. It could be a
third country or it could be one that we don't know. I should
have brought in attribution, because it may or may not be a
country that we could actually attribute to, and that further
complicates this. The neutral country could be used by yet a
different country, the adversary, and it's only an attack
through.
In physical space it's a little bit easier to see firing
from a neutral country, and I think the law of armed conflict
has some of that in it. It's much more difficult and this is
much more complex when a cyber attack could bounce through a
neutral country, and therein lies the complexity for this
problem.
Chairman Levin. That's the complexity that you've
addressed.
Now a third scenario, more complicated yet. Assume you're
in a peacetime setting. All of a sudden we're hit with a major
attack against the computers that manage the distribution of
electric power in the United States. The attacks appear to be
coming from computers outside the United States, but they're
being routed through computers that are owned by U.S. persons,
located in the United States. So the routers are in here, in
the United States.
How would CYBERCOM respond to that situation and under what
authorities?
General Alexander. Sir, that brings in the real complexity
of the problem that we face today, because there are many
issues out there on the table that we can extend, many of which
are not yet fully answered. Let me explain.
First, DHS would have the responsibility for the defense of
that working with critical infrastructure. DHS could, through
the defense support to civilian authorities, reach out to DOD
and ask for support. Sir, one of our requirements in the
unified command plan is to be prepared for that task. We would
have that responsibility.
If asked to do that, again we'd get an execute order and
we'd have the standing rules of engagement that we operate
under all the time. The issues now, though, are far more
complex, because you have U.S. persons. Civil liberties,
privacy all come into that equation, ensuring that privacy
while you try to on the same network potentially take care of
bad actors. A much more difficult problem.
As a consequence, you have a joint interagency task force,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who has a great joint
cyber investigative task force that would be brought in. All of
these come to bear.
This is the hardest problem because you have attribution
issues, you have the neutrality issues that we mentioned in the
second scenario, you have interagencies working together with
industry. I think that's one of the things that the
administration is trying to address with DHS and with DOD, how
do we actually do that with industry? That's probably the most
difficult and the one that we're going to spend the most time
trying to work our way through: How does DOD help DHS in a
crisis like that?
Chairman Levin. Is that policy that's now under way in
terms of debate and discussion, is that scheduled for
completion by the end of the year? Is it what the hope is, the
goal is, for that?
General Alexander. I think DOD portions that would support
that are, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, let me ask you about the missile
defense system that we have. If I have time, I'll ask about the
issue, the GMD system that we have in Alaska and California.
But as I may run out of time, let me focus first on Europe.
We have a ballistic missile defense system in Europe. Last
September the President announced a new missile defense plan
for Europe that was unanimously recommended by Secretary Gates
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That plan includes a number of
elements that are intended to enhance the defense of the United
States against potential future long-range Iranian missiles,
particularly long-range Iranian missiles.
The forward-deployed radar in southeastern Europe would be
part of that. Development of an improved version of the
Standard Missile III Block 2 for deployment in Europe. This, of
course, would work to complement or in concert with the GMD
system that I referred to.
But first, do you agree that new missile defense plan will
improve our capability to defend the homeland against potential
future long-range missiles from Iran?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, in particular the radar that
would be placed presumably in southeastern Europe or in the
southeastern part of that AOR would provide much earlier
warning of a missile attack from Iran and therefore give much
earlier warning for the ground-based missile or ground-based
midcourse system in the United States to launch, and
potentially that will dramatically raise the ability of that
system to counter a threat coming from Iran. That's the most
important part. The SM III Block 2, obviously further down the
line with some potential intercontinental ballistic missile
capability is an adjunct to that.
Chairman Levin. If the Russian radars finally were able to
be joined to that system, would that add capability?
Admiral Winnefeld. If the Russian radars are able to feed
in into that system, then presumably, yes, sir, it would
augment that capability on top of the radar that we would have
in southeastern Europe.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Alexander, I think it would be helpful for this
committee, and also I note the presence of the chairman of the
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, if
perhaps you could submit to us for the record some of the
changes that you think are needed both in law and in regulation
to allow you to perform your functions in a not only more
efficient fashion, but to make sure that you are protected
constitutionally. Do you see my point, General?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Do you think that would be helpful to the
committee and Congress, for us to get a laundry list of what
you think needs to be done in order for you to be able to carry
out your duties in a most efficient and effective fashion?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. We'll do that, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator McCain. I think it's obvious from General
Alexander's testimony that close coordination between DHS and
DOD is critical in taking effective measures in this new cyber
war that we are in.
Chairman Levin. If I could just support what your request
is on that, Senator McCain. It's a very useful point and the
answer that you give to us in response to Senator McCain will
go to the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
as well. It's a very important point. Thank you.
Senator McCain. It may at some point argue for a joint
committee hearing, depending on how urgent the needs are. But
this is obviously a brand new field of combat and one that we
are going to have to make significant adjustments to.
Admiral Winnefeld, you are new in your responsibilities and
I congratulate you for your long years of service. Do you agree
with my opening statement concerning this real crisis we have
on our southern border and with our southern neighbor
concerning this struggle, the existential struggle of the
Government of Mexico with the drug cartels?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I certainly share your deep
concern over the levels of violence in Mexico and along our
border and certainly the corrosive effect that it ultimately
has inside our cities.
Senator McCain. Have you had time yet to assess whether the
Government of Mexico, whom we are helping out a great deal, I
think it's $1.5 billion in the Merida Plan. Have you any
assessment as to whether we are succeeding or failing or where
the drug cartels are as far as this struggle is concerned? Have
you an assessment of the situation yet?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I'm in the early stages of my
assessment, to be quite honest with you. In preparation for the
hearing, I have done my own reading. I was privileged to
accompany the large delegation that the Government sent down to
Mexico City in March to meet with their counterparts in Mexico,
and I'm watching this very closely. Of course, if I'm confirmed
I intend to really burrow into it once I get out and in
command.
Senator McCain. Would you agree that your initial
assessment is that the Government of Mexico is in an
existential struggle with the drug cartels?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that the drug cartels really
want to be left alone. They want to have space for them to
compete for market share. I don't believe at this point that
they are intent on overthrowing the Government of Mexico.
Senator McCain. I agree with that assessment. But if the
government does not have control of large parts of its
territory, then, if not an existential threat, certainly a
threat to its ability to govern.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Have you had an opportunity yet to visit
the border?
Admiral Winnefeld. I have not, and I was delighted that you
made the offer during your opening remarks, sir, because it's
one of my very first priorities, if confirmed. When I get out
there, I want to get down there and see for myself what's going
on. I would very much welcome the opportunity to accompany you
on a trip down there, sir.
Senator McCain. I would look forward to it, and soon,
Admiral.
One of the aspects of this struggle we're in--and I'm very
aware of our Constitution and the role of the military inside
the United States and all of that. But I also would argue that
when we have a level of violence that thousands of people are
being murdered on the other side of the border, American
citizens have been murdered, as I just described to you, that
at least we ought to scrutinize more carefully and utilize some
of the lessons we have learned in, say, Iraq. What I mean by
that is surveillance capability as well as physical barriers.
I do not mean to draw too close a comparison between the
war in Iraq and our struggle on the border. But I do believe
you could make a comparison between the use of UAVs,
surveillance capabilities, as well as barriers. We all know
that barriers only work if they are surveiled and maintained.
It seems to me that we could use some of the technology that
we've developed in Iraq and are using in Iraq and Afghanistan
to better surveil and enforce our borders, because I'm not sure
when this struggle between the Mexican Government and the drug
cartels is going to be over, but I do believe it's going to be
a while, and I do believe that therefore we have an obligation
to secure our borders to prevent further incidents such as the
murder of a rancher in Douglas, AZ, just a short time ago.
I look forward to visiting with you on the border. Every
area of the border has its challenges. I think factually that
the Tucson border area has the largest number of incursions. We
also have the Goldwater Ranges down near the border and some of
the illegal activity has affected our training capabilities
there. There are a number of implications associated with the
struggle on the border that argues I think for our highest
attention.
I hope that you would also, as we assess this situation,
help us assess the manpower requirements as well as the
technology requirements, since our Governors in the border
States have said that they need the National Guard there. That
request has not been met with a favorable response as of yet.
I would look forward to it and will go to work right away.
Frankly, I am more concerned than I have ever been about the
fact that many indicators are that the drug cartels are
certainly not losing, if they're not winning. If they're not
losing in any war, then they are winning. This is an irregular
warfare situation. It has many different complications. Where
are they getting the sophisticated weapons? The Mexican police
and army many times are outgunned. Also, this effect on the
United States of America of what is judged to be about a $65
billion a year business as well.
I thank you for your commitment to get down there and I
look forward to joining you as soon as possible. I know that my
colleagues that represent border States share the same concern
that I do about the size and implications of this issue.
I've been down there many times over the years and I've
visited Mexico City. I have the greatest respect and
admiration, as I know you do because you were in Mexico City,
for President Calderon. I think he is doing everything that
they can, but they are crippled by corruption and they're
crippled by a lack of training and capability of their police
and military.
I also believe that we have made some very wise investments
in helping them with technology and training that may be of
significant benefit to them in the long run.
Do you agree?
Admiral Winnefeld. Absolutely, sir, and I absolutely share
your view that the Calderon Government has exhibited extremely
good leadership and courage in this fight, because one thing--
if they wanted to immediately tamp down the violence, they
could back off the pressure on the drug cartels, and they have
had the courage to not do that. I think it's a tremendous sign
of our partner in Mexico, and I'm proud to have potentially the
opportunity to work with them, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Before I call on Senator Lieberman, let me ask you the
standard questions which we place before all of our nominees.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Winnefeld. No, sir.
General Alexander. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to Congressional requests?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Finally, do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Alexander, Admiral Winnefeld, thank you for your
service to our country. I must say, going over your biographies
in preparation for the hearing, your answers, listening to you
this morning, you're two extraordinarily capable people and our
Nation is fortunate indeed to have you in our service. I look
forward to supporting your nominations.
General Alexander, I want to pick up a bit on the line of
questioning that Senator McCain began. But first, just if you
would briefly lay on the record, as we stand up this new
CYBERCOM and you as its first leader, how serious is the cyber
threat to the United States today? To the extent that you're
able to say in open testimony, particularly about DOD web sites
and networks, how frequently are we today under attack?
General Alexander. Sir, I think one of the underlying
principles, beliefs, that the Secretary had for standing up
this command was just the amount of attacks that we're seeing
coming into DOD gateways every day.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Alexander. Hundreds of thousands of probes a day.
Senator Lieberman. Every day?
General Alexander. Every day.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Alexander. The issue that we saw was, how do you
fight against that? By putting the command together, I think
that was what he saw as the first big step that we need to make
to build the capacity and to take that on. We saw it as very
serious. We have been alarmed by the increase, especially this
year, both in the critical infrastructure within the Nation and
within DOD. So it's growing rapidly.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Hundreds of thousands of probes,
these are not attacks in the sense that we normally consider an
attack; is that correct?
General Alexander. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. They're an attempt to probe and to
exploit our system to gain information?
General Alexander. That's correct, Senator. They may scan
the network to see what type of operating system you have, to
then facilitate an exploit or an attack.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Is it fair to presume that, while
some degree of these are individual hackers, others are working
for nation states that are trying to determine what they can
about our defense structure?
General Alexander. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. That I think quickly but strongly
outlines the nature of the threat certainly to our national
security structure.
Let me get into some of the questions about the
relationship between DOD and DHS because, as Senator McCain
said, I'm privileged to be chair of the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. There's a lot of
overlap, not surprisingly, between the membership on these two
committees.
The existing system allocates responsibility between DOD
and DHS, DOD obviously having responsibility not only for
offensive cyber operations, but for the defense of DOD's
networks. DHS has responsibility for defending the civilian
networks of our Government and working with the private sector
to defend the civilian infrastructure, which probably itself
would be a target of attack, could be certainly at some point.
I welcome Senator McCain's suggestion that these two
committees work together and that we have your responses to how
we might clarify responsibilities in the future. But I think it
is important to get on the record the extent to which NSA,
which you head, is now cooperating with DHS in enabling its
work. The bottom line here is that the NSA is a treasure, a
national treasure. Its resources are extensive. No one I think
would want DHS to try to replicate those resources to carry out
its responsibility to protect Federal Government civilian
networks and outside civilian networks.
Therefore the cooperation is really critically important.
Can you explain both what that relationship is now and how you
envision CYBERCOM that you'll now head and NSA playing a
supporting role to DHS in protecting non-military networks?
General Alexander. Senator, I'm going to break that into
two parts, one that talks about what NSA is doing to support
DHS in executing their mission. As you stated, it's their
mission to defend the rest of the dot-gov and to work with the
civilian community for critical infrastructure. Our
responsibility is to provide technical support to DHS. We do
that under the comprehensive national cyber initiative to help
them build the technology that they need to defend those
networks.
In part of that, sir, we have a responsibility to provide
them the technical information for what the threat is trying to
do to them.
Senator Lieberman. Right, right.
General Alexander. Provide them early warning to that. But
they would operate and defend that system. So our
responsibility, we provide people and capabilities to help them
do that.
I think that partnership continues to grow. We've had a
number of meetings and I think we're trying to work through it.
That's part of the issue, as you can see. Then I think what
Secretary Napolitano and the country's going to have to look
at, how do we work with private industry, who owns and operates
many of these networks?
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Alexander. On the CYBERCOM side, if a crisis were
to occur, now CYBERCOM or DOD may be called in to help, defense
support to civilian authorities. What we would be asked to do
is dependent on the situation. It could go through NORTHCOM, it
could go to STRATCOM or to CYBERCOM to provide either technical
support or help prevent an attack, or in the case of a
sustained attack actually help defend our networks.
Those are the cases, and as you get into each one of those
you run into a series of issues that we have yet to work out
with the roles and responsibilities, especially with private
industry.
Senator Lieberman. Right. That was very helpful.
The second situation, the second area of overlap, would be
in what I would describe as a national security crisis, the
extent to which CYBERCOM would come in and work with DHS to
defend either Federal Government civilian networks or private
civilian networks; is that correct?
General Alexander. That is a mission that we would plan for
under the unified command plan and that we have to work out the
specifics of how to do that.
Senator Lieberman. Am I correct that you would say that the
current allocation of responsibility between DOD, CYBERCOM,
NSA, and DHS is a good one? Understanding that you have to work
out some of the questions you've talked about, but bottom line,
that DOD has responsibility for the defense networks in defense
and DHS has responsibility for the Federal Government civilian
networks and private civilian networks?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. I think it is absolutely
important to have DHS operate and defend those networks. I also
believe that there necessarily needs to be a linkage and
leverage of that capability for us to provide the technical
support, the early warning, and others. I think we're walking
down that road. I think it is written out right, but there's
more to understand as we go into that, what are the exact lanes
in the road for that and how can we help, and what happens in a
true crisis.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that answer very much.
One of the things I think was implicit in what Senator
McCain said, and I certainly share this hope, is that we can
work together to determine both with yourself and Secretary
Napolitano whether there are any legislative changes necessary
to enable DOD components to better assist DHS in its cyber
security mission.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman, and we will
work closely as committee chairmen, and our ranking members I
know will be joining us in this coordinated effort to
understand this new world and to oversee it properly.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I only wish I knew as much about this as Senator Lieberman
does and Senator McCain, because I'm kind of new to this and
when I saw your command, as I told you when you were in my
office, I'm on the surface, I started getting into it and
recognizing that there is a reason for it, and that there are
problems out there.
Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe, if I could interrupt just
for a moment. I'm going to have to leave for a short time and
I've asked Senator Udall, who will be next in line anyway to
ask questions, if he could then continue after that. He
indicated he could. After you're completed, Senator Inhofe,
it'll go then to Senator Udall, then back to somebody on your
side if there is someone here. But Senator Udall can take care
of that.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Over the last decade as the use and
connectivity has become more pervasive, most of the Information
Technology (IT) security spending has been invested in
perimeter defense of the distributed network. There has been a
reduction in appropriations or in spending in some of these
areas, and I am concerned about that.
I've been told that DOD has created and adhered to a strict
set of security configuration controls for their mainframe
systems, but there have been some reports of classified
government systems being breached. I'd like to have you just
take as much time and as much detail on this, the problems that
we have.
Second, I want to talk about some of the systems outside of
the military that I'll be asking you about, due to something
that appeared this morning in the media. Does DOD have any
issues with its mainframe security, both in its air-gapped or
non-wired systems and in the systems that are connected to the
Internet? What problems do you see that you haven't already
mentioned in the previous questions?
Again, I apologize for not being here for your opening
statement, you may have covered this. If so, that's fine.
General Alexander. Yes, sir. I think the key issue that you
bring up is some of the legacy defense capabilities would look
at a perimeter defense. As we begin to merge our offensive and
defensive capabilities onto one team, one of the things we did
was change the strategy from perimeter defense to defense I
depth.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Now, before that took place--and I'm
sorry I have to ask this question; I should know and I don't--
who was doing this then?
General Alexander. This was separated in responsibilities
between what the network defenders and operators would do
versus what you would do in the attack and exploit arena.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
General Alexander. In many of our war games, in many of our
exercises, we noted that the offense always had the upper hand.
When you look at that, the red teams and the blue teams that we
would bring out to test our networks we saw were largely
successful. As a consequence, one of the issues that we said is
can we bring some of that great talent that's on the offense to
help on the defense? When we started doing that, we made
changes to some of our doctrine, some of the operational
concepts, and some of the ways that we do it.
You bring out a key one, Senator, and that is defense in
depth. That's absolutely important because the adversary is
always going to try to penetrate our network. We have to remain
vigilant and try new capabilities, tests, and always be on
guard for those exploits or attacks into our network.
Senator Inhofe. That's good and I appreciate that.
This morning on Dark Reading--it's a business IT web site--
they talk about, even with minimal Internet access, malware and
breaches are increasingly occurring. We're talking about the
nonmilitary, nondefense field. While only 10 percent of the
industrial control systems are actually connected to the
Internet, these systems that run water, waste water, utility
power plants have suffered an increase in cyber security
incidents over the past 5 years.
Now, why don't we shift over into what is being done to
secure those networks and systems that are not government or
military, but are critical to us, such as those that are
mentioned in this article? What do you anticipate to do--you've
talked about the problems that are out there--in terms of
approaching those problems, finding solutions? Then getting
into the technology, do you really have the resources that you
need to do what you think, you anticipate, you're going to have
to do in these nonmilitary, nondefense areas?
General Alexander. Sir, the key issues that come on the
table as you lay that out is most of our infrastructure for our
Government is owned and operated by private industry. If we are
going to be successful in defending our networks, we have to
have a great partnership between DHS, who has the lead in this
area with civilian industry, with DOD and the Intelligence
Community to bring in those techniques and the early warning to
work with private industry. That's the hard issue that I see
facing us today.
Senator Inhofe. What I would ask you is, as this
progresses, I'm very interested in this. As I mentioned in my
office, if we could keep an ongoing conversation as to what
might be out there, what resources you might need, and so
forth, because I see this as just a huge area. You're the right
person for it. I'm glad that you're doing what you're doing. I
think that will probably take care of it.
Admiral Winnefeld, when you were in my office we talked
about one of the major concerns I had. I was very much involved
early on in the negotiations with both Poland and the Czech
Republic on the radar site and on the third site that we were
going to put in Poland. It was pretty risky on their part to do
something that Russia was opposed to, and they agreed to do it.
I was very much concerned when that was pulled out from under
them a year ago in the first budget of this administration.
Now, I had two concerns. One was can they really believe
what we're telling them? I've talked to them since that time
and I think that's probably all right. But the whole reason for
that is, we all know that we have ground-based interceptors in
Alaska and California and we know that we're in pretty good
shape on anything coming from that direction.
My concern is this. Our intelligence tells us--and it's not
even classified--that as early as 2015 they could have the
capability in Iran of sending one over to the eastern part of
the United States. Now, that may not be right. Maybe after
that. But nonetheless it says it could be that early.
My understanding on the third site, is that it would be
deployable by around 2012. I was very comfortable with that
time. I know the arguments, and I heard you respond to Senator
McCain's question. To me, if we're not going to use that third
site or a site someplace else--at one time we talked about
Florida--before the SM III 2-Bravo would be there--first of
all, do you have any date at all that that would come into
play, where that could be deployed?
Admiral Winnefeld. The SM III 2-Bravo is still under
development.
Senator Inhofe. I know that.
Admiral Winnefeld. About 2020, I believe is when it would--
--
Senator Inhofe. That's the date that I have heard. What
bothers me is what happens between 2015 and 2020? I heard your
response to that, but there has to be a percentage that's tied
to that, because when we look at it--I've had a lot of
briefings and I've seen the map of the coverage and the area of
how far can they reach with both radar and interception
capability from the west coast to the east coast. Frankly, I'm
just not comfortable with that.
I'd like to have all the assurance I can have that what
we're doing right now is not going to give us the vulnerability
that I think we're going to have in that period of time
somewhere between 2015 and 2020.
Do you want to elaborate on that?
Admiral Winnefeld. I would say that under the current
laydown, Alaska and Vandenberg, that there is a footprint that
covers the entire United States from both Iran and Korea. The
percentages go up as you get the radar into Europe, and
certainly if the SM III Block 2-Bravo pans out then they will
go up accordingly.
I understand your concern completely about the potential
risk in that little band before the SM III 2-Bravo would be on
line, and if confirmed that's certainly something that I would
want to understand better.
Senator Inhofe. My time has expired, but when you say the
percentages will go up, that's something you can't talk about
in an open meeting. Maybe some time we'll have a chance to
visit about that. Just keep me informed as this moves along
because I do have a great concern.
Admiral Winnefeld. I will, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Udall [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
I want to recognize Senator Reed for a minute. He has a
special acknowledgment he wants to make.
Senator Reed. Very briefly, I want to welcome General
Alexander. I think we met about 40 years ago and in the
intervening 40 years he has acquitted himself magnificently as
a soldier. I'm very confident that your leadership will improve
our national security.
Admiral, thank you for your service to the Navy, and to
your family, and to Keith's family, too. I'm sure we'll have a
chance in the days ahead to talk seriously about these very
critical issues. Thank you for your service.
Thank you very much.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Let me recognize myself for 7 minutes, and let's start with
Admiral Winnefeld. Welcome. General Alexander also, thank you
for taking the time to come by and see me in the last couple of
weeks.
General Renuart was here recently and he talked about the
synergy of his commands, Admiral, and what he believes is truly
an interdependent relationship between NORAD and NORTHCOM. Can
you tell us your thoughts about the relationship between NORAD
and NORTHCOM?
Admiral Winnefeld. Very close, clearly. The missions are
very symmetrical, aerospace warning, aerospace control, and
maritime warning for NORAD and, of course, homeland defense and
defense support to civil authorities to NORTHCOM. When you look
at the fact that NORAD might be providing some aerospace
warning of, for instance, the ballistic missile threat, that
then NORTHCOM would then assume the responsibility for
defending against, then there's clear synergy there.
I think it's important and a good move that General Renuart
has brought the staffs together. I know that the staffs enjoy
that, and my understanding is that Canada shares that view. I
think I look forward, if confirmed, to going out there and
exploring it further.
Senator Udall. We, of course, are looking forward to having
you based in Colorado, and I look forward to working with you,
as I have with General Renuart.
General Alexander, let me turn to you, if I might. We
talked about the benefits of dual hatting--speaking of dual
hatting in another setting, CYBERCOM and NSA. You talked about
your understanding of the importance that oversight
transparency will play in this new structure. Yet in the
advance policy questions you were only able to provide
classified answers to what seemed to be some of the fundamental
challenges facing CYBERCOM. Is there anything you can tell us
in this open session to get at some of those basic questions?
General Alexander. I think first transparency is important,
especially in the cyber arena, what we do on the NSA side to
support that and what we do on the CYBERCOM side. The reason I
say that, I believe that the Government combined, Congress and
the administration, to the American people, we have to help
explain that. We have to show what we're doing to ensure that
we comply with the laws. As you may know, Senator, we stood up
a Directorate of Compliance at NSA to ensure that we train our
folks significantly, we hold them accountable to complying with
that. It is important to us, and we'll carry that into CYBERCOM
as well to ensure that we have those same things.
It seems to me that's one of the fundamental issues, that
we all take an oath to the Constitution and that we support
that Constitution. Our folks take that very seriously.
Senator Udall. Let me follow on and turn the question to
the relationship with CYBERCOM and NORTHCOM. I'll ask you first
to give us your thoughts and then I'll turn to the Admiral to
provide his thoughts, if I might.
General Alexander. I think there's a great partnership. We
have already talked about this and our partnership would really
go through requests from DHS when they have an issue. From my
perspective, I could be supporting or supported depending on
the situation, and the Secretary would choose that. But it will
be a close working relationship, and I think one of the key
things that we'll look at in the future is asymmetric attacks
in cyber space on this country and how do we help DHS do their
mission.
Senator Udall. Admiral, would you care to comment?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I've forged a close friendship
with Keith Alexander over the last 18 months in our respective
roles and we get along very well. I would first tell you that I
look forward to being a satisfied customer if I'm confirmed in
terms of having networks protected and potentially, if it came
down to it, getting the types of information that I would need
in order to perform my job as the Commander of NORTHCOM or
NORAD.
I also believe that with the tremendous number of
interagency relationships that a command like NORTHCOM has to
have, that I'll have a tremendous source of information for
General Alexander on the kinds of support that those people
need, and of course with DHS in the lead. But he will be an
integral player in that process. I look forward to plugging
into that system and helping in any way I can.
Senator Udall. I understand when there's additional time
available we can discuss the respective merits of the football
teams at the two academies; is that accurate? Neither one of
you need to--well, you look like you want to comment.
Admiral Winnefeld. Being a graduate of the Georgia
Institute of Technology, but being a very loyal Navy football
fan, I think that we're in pretty good shape.
Senator Udall. Let me leave that there.
General Alexander, at a recent conference the White House
Cyber Security Adviser Howard Schmidt questioned whether an
event such as a cyber war can exist, and I'll quote what he had
to say. He said: ``A cyber war is just something that we can't
define. I don't even know how a cyber war would benefit
anybody. Everybody would lose. There's no win-lose in the cyber
realm today. It affects everybody. It affects businesses. It
affects government. So, number one, there's no value in having
one.''
That statement leaves me with a number of questions. Do you
think that a cyber war can exist? Can you define it? If there's
no value in having one, is there a need for the United States
to develop offensive cyber war capabilities?
General Alexander. Senator, in general terms I do think a
cyber war could exist. I believe it would not exist in and of
itself, but as part of a larger military campaign. I believe
that the tools and stuff for command and control that we have
today to affect those in cyber space are analogous to the tools
that we had 40 years ago for jamming communications. But now in
cyber space you can not only jam, but you can do a lot more to
information, and therein lies part of the problem.
We see that go on in civilian industry and governments
around the world, public knowledge. The issue is from a
military perspective, if these things are impacting our
networks today we have a responsibility to defend those and set
up cyber security.
I think the steps that we're taking with CYBERCOM is to do
just that: How do we secure these networks and how do we bring
those pieces of the team together under one single commander to
benefit each of the combatant commands in our Nation as a
whole?
Senator Udall. The old doctrine--and it's still in some
cases a very effective doctrine--of mutually assured
destruction or deterrence certainly could perhaps apply in a
cyber war or cyber context when you have nation states. But
when you have a lot of these individual actors under way, they
may not comport with existing both written and unwritten rules
as to how you conduct these kinds of operations. Is that a fair
characterization of the threat we face?
General Alexander. Senator, it is. Attribution will be very
difficult.
Senator Udall. We can certainly track, for example, if a
nuclear weapon is used the perpetrator of that particular
attack, from everything I know. There are signatures tied to
nuclear materials. But this is a much more difficult realm in
which to understand who may have attacked us or tried to
penetrate our systems; is that right?
General Alexander. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Udall. Let me move to this term ``geek-speak''
which I just became familiar with. You mentioned that in
developing policies for how far CYBERCOM can help protect
critical infrastructure that trying to translate that into an
understanding in the private sector is crucial. How are you
going to convey the seriousness of the threats that now are
framed in this geek-speak way, but the average individual or
even the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in some of these
civilian operations may not fully understand?
General Alexander. Senator, I think our CEOs of many of the
information technology companies are seeing the threats today
and that's becoming increasingly more public knowledge. The
banking community, your IT infrastructure, your antivirus
community, I think they see. They're on the leading edge.
They have great capability, they have great talent. Therein
lies part of the issue, the Government's going to have to
leverage part of that talent, because they own the
infrastructure that the Government operates on, and for
continuity of government DHS has a tough set of issues. In
crisis, that's where calling between DHS and DOD, that's where
the real issue is going to go.
I do think this is an education process, though. We're
going to have to teach people several things: What are the
rules and how are we operating? We have to be transparent in
how we do it. I think that's one of the key things, so that
they can see that what we're doing is just trying to protect
our networks, not invade their civil liberties and privacy.
That's a very difficult issue, because this area is so
complex it's hard for people to see it. We have to help them
understand that. I think the way to do that is by showing you
and other members of the committee and the Government and
critical infrastructure in DHS, a team, how we're doing it and
ensure that follows the right legal framework, that we're
complying with that, and you can see how we actually audit
ourselves and do that.
Senator Udall. My sense, as I close, is that in order of
focus and understanding, we're best prepared right now on the
dot-mil domain, dot-gov next. But then when you get into the
dot-com, dot-org, dot-edu, those are more vulnerable systems
and networks.
General Alexander. They have a wider spread, Senator, so
some of them really are where you say, and some of them may be
amongst the best. Your IT industry and antivirus are probably
up at the top and others like you said, yes, sir.
Senator Udall. Thank you. I look forward to working with
both of you when you're confirmed.
Let me recognize the Senator from North Carolina, Senator
Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator Udall.
I, too, want to thank both of you for your service in the
past and certainly for your upcoming service in these new
positions. Admiral Winnefeld, I want to be sure that your boys
know that I think a Senate waiver in missing school today is
critical. I think it's very important for them to be here. The
rest of your families I think, family support, certainly allows
you to do a much better job. Thank you to all of the families.
I also wanted to say I thought Senator Mikulski's
introduction was right on. We always enjoy hearing Senator
Mikulski.
Admiral Winnefeld, many defense analysts have noted that
it's time for the Nation to look beyond Goldwater-Nichols and
institute reforms that will address the needs of a new
strategic era in a manner that more effectively leverages all
of the instruments of national power. As Commander of NORTHCOM,
do you feel that there are any changes in organizational design
or statutory authority that would enable you to more
effectively close the seams between DOD and DHS and other
governmental agencies with respect to creating a more
integrated approach to homeland defense?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I think that the relationship
between NORTHCOM and DHS is illustrative in this regard. My
understanding from what I've learned over the last couple of
months here is that they do have a very close relationship, a
very close working relationship, both at the planning, exercise
and training, and operational execution levels.
At the planning levels, a lot of collaboration is going on,
pre-scripted mission assignments that DHS has worked out with
NORTHCOM, and I can go on on the planning side. On the exercise
side, the national exercise programs are participated in by
both organizations. Then on the operational side, on a day-to-
day operations piece, both of the command centers are connected
together very well. There are liaison officers from DHS and
into NORTHCOM, and vice versa.
Then of course, in the event of a disaster or some sort of
event that would require NORTHCOM to support DHS, NORTHCOM very
clearly, I believe, understands its supporting role.
I think that relationship is very strong, but we are always
receptive to new and better ways of doing business, to include
all of the numerous partners that are involved in homeland
security and homeland defense.
Senator Hagan. From the standpoint of statutory authority,
you don't see a need for a change?
Admiral Winnefeld. I don't think right now, Senator, we
need any. But I will certainly keep an open mind on that, and
I'm always willing to explore it.
Senator Hagan. The U.S. Armed Forces responded to the
devastating earthquake that struck Haiti in a tremendous
fashion and we all want to give credit where credit is due. I
think our military did great. The servicemembers provided
support to the relief effort that included assistance with the
preservation of order, protection for vital supplies, and the
overhead imagery of the devastated areas. I was able several
weeks ago to shake 200 young men's hands as they were coming
back from Haiti and just thank them for their hard work.
Admiral Winnefeld, in the event that an equally devastating
earthquake or hurricane were to strike here in the United
States, do you believe that you would have statutory authority
to provide the same support to civil authorities which is
essential to restoring public order in the aftermath of a
natural disaster?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I believe that the events in
Haiti were very instructive for us, for one thing. It was a
very nearby reminder of the kinds of things that we're going to
have to do in a disaster like that, heaven forbid that it
happen inside our own country.
I do believe that most of the authorities that are required
are there. I think there are a couple of additional things, at
least one, that we need to pursue. As you're probably aware, we
are interested in having the authority for the Reserve
component to be activated in order to support the immediate
support to the disaster there. I think that we have a very good
understanding with the Governors and the National Guard on that
and I think we can come to closure on that.
Senator Hagan. Speaking of the National Guard, during
Tuesday's Airland Subcommittee hearing I voiced concerns over
the Air Force decision to transfer 12 C-130 aircraft from
various Air National Guard units to an Air Force Reserve unit
based in Arkansas without consulting the affected adjutant
generals or State Governors. Obviously, North Carolina is one
of the States where this is being discussed.
Within the total force structure, how do you intend to
satisfy your statutory responsibilities for providing homeland
defense and support to civil authorities at the Federal level
without disrupting the capacity of State governments to do the
same?
Admiral Winnefeld. I think we have to have a very close
partnership with the Governors and with their adjutant
generals, and if confirmed it's one of my very highest
priorities, to develop that relationship, my personal
relationship with the adjutant generals, to ensure that we have
a very clear understanding and that they know that I'm a
believer in playing the supporting role that NORTHCOM has been
identified statutorily with in a crisis.
It's one of the things, if I'm confirmed, that I look
forward the most to, is building that relationship.
Senator Hagan. I think a lot of the individuals within
those States are quite concerned about this request.
General Alexander, our growing reliance upon technologies,
such as robotics, unmanned sensors, computer-based
communications systems, has created a vulnerability within the
architecture of our Armed Forces and within our Government as a
whole. Protecting the platforms and the networks that our
Nation relies upon obviously must be treated as a priority,
which is why I truly support the concept of CYBERCOM. I think
we had a good discussion in my office this week about some of
the areas of expertise that you bring to the table, as well as
your concerns about many of the issues that I know that you'll
be facing.
But as Director of NSA, Chief of Central Security Service,
and Commander of CYBERCOM, how do you envision leveraging the
capabilities of each of these organizations in order to enhance
our national security posture?
General Alexander. Senator, perhaps one of the greatest
honors I've had is to lead NSA. They have great people,
tremendous people. Our Nation has put a lot into building NSA
up--over 700 Ph.D.s up there that have operated in this arena.
We built this over 60 years. Billions and billions of dollars
have gone into it.
Over the last 5 years we've had the privilege of having the
Joint Functional Component Command Net Warfare and NSA
together, so we could leverage that infrastructure and that
talent. What I think this does for CYBERCOM is it puts our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, the young folks that
are coming in, with this experienced group for training, and
when we deploy these folks forward to support regional
combatant commands we have folks that know the best in the
world that they can reach out--they operate at the tactical
operational level and can talk to the strategic level, because
in cyber space it's one network and we have to operate as one
team.
I think that absolutely one of the key principles is
leveraging that human capital that we have within NSA that is
absolutely superb, to help train, coach, and work with these in
peacetime, crisis, and war.
Senator Hagan. When you mentioned the 700 Ph.D.s that are
working there, I'm curious, and I know we talked about this,
too, the human capital. I just left an Education Subcommittee
meeting where we were talking about the reauthorization of No
Child Left Behind, and obviously we have to have an emphasis in
education to be sure that you have the talented work pool that
you need in order to conduct the requirements that are put
before you.
Can you discuss a little bit about the quality of the
workforce that you're seeing and where you're recruiting
individuals? If there is something from an education standpoint
that we need to do as a country, I'd be very curious as to your
thoughts on that?
General Alexander. Senator, I'm a huge advocate of science,
technology, engineering, mathematics (STEM). I think it's
absolutely crucial for our country that we continue to push our
younger folks that way. We'll work on Admiral Winnefeld's great
two sons here. It's the future for our country, having this.
We have tremendous, great programs out there. I have
personally seen what the Bill Gates Foundation is doing and how
that's going throughout the country. What that does for us is
build the capacity, the capability that we need, not just for
CYBERCOM and NSA, but for our country's leadership in this key
area. That's absolutely important.
We have partnerships from our information assurance part
with over 100 universities around the United States to help
come up with curriculums that meet a certain set of standards
that DHS and NSA jointly work. It is superb because it trains
people on how to secure networks, what are the key
fundamentals. They don't all come to NSA. Many of those will go
out to industry and that's good for our country. But we do get
an awful lot of good talent.
What I would say is we have great people, and one of the
key things is--I am a technologist. I love computers. I have a
new iPad. People are the key to this, and good quality trained
people is what our Nation needs in NSA and CYBERCOM.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, and I think that is critical. I
think that national security is certainly interdependent on our
education system, too. I think the STEM program is something as
a country we have to be focused on.
Thank you very much.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
I'm tempted to get a critical review of the iPad, but
perhaps we can----
General Alexander. Wonderful.
Senator Udall. Wonderful. We'll put that for the record.
General, I'd like to talk more specifically about an area
in our infrastructure world that could be vulnerable. There's
been a lot of excitement about smart grids. I know Senator
Hagan's been a leader in this area, and we see some real
potential to lessen our dependence on foreign oil, use our
energy that we have more effectively. But at the same time, I
understand there are some vulnerabilities that may arise
because of the deployment of the smart grid technologies. Would
you care to comment?
General Alexander. Senator, I'm a proponent for the smart
grid and using some of this, but we have to walk into this with
our eyes wide open. I think these information assurance
programs between industry, government, and understanding the
full spectrum of threats that we face from individual hackers
up to nation states in securing that are going to be key.
We all have a responsibility on the NSA side and on the
future CYBERCOM side to help identify flaws in those, share
those with industry and DHS. But this is going to be an area,
Senator, I think we're going to have to work in because it will
always evolve. Someone will figure out a new way in and we have
to be there to close that gap.
Senator Udall. I was listening to you earlier talk about
defensive capabilities that exist today and the challenge we
face with providing defensive tools and techniques. It seems to
me--and I'm thinking out loud, which can be dangerous--that if
you have a kinetic environment, say at a forward operating base
in Afghanistan, if that base were to be overrun by the enemy in
a tactical effort, it would not threaten the entire effort we
have under way in Afghanistan. On the other hand, if you have a
portal or an entry point that is the site of a tactical
incursion in cyber space and that point is overrun in a
tactical sense, it could have strategic ramifications that are
much greater than those we might face on the ground in a place
like Afghanistan.
Is that a fair characterization? Straighten me out,
elaborate on that?
General Alexander. Senator, that's absolutely right.
General McChrystal has reached out to work with the other
combatant commands, with us, with NSA, in building an Afghan
mission network and ensuring that network is secure, because it
will not only be for the United States but the other coalition
partners there.
There are a lot of issues in developing that we're working
through as a joint team. I think you've hit it right on the
head, because those communications bring in our intelligence,
our operations, our logistics, and his ability to command and
control all those forces across more than 40 countries. He has
to ensure that those communications are reliable and protected.
A huge issue and one of the key ones that we're working right
now.
Senator Udall. This could be specific to Afghanistan, but
if you penetrate, again, a network and a system anywhere in the
world, it could then have effects anywhere else in the world.
You alluded to this earlier, I think, when you talked about
what defines a country, what is ground that we have to defend.
That server that's being attacked could be in any number of
countries or the attacker could be based in any number of
countries. This raises some very thorny questions, does it not?
General Alexander. Senator, it does. Those are the issues,
the policies, that we have to, I think, address. It brings up
issues such as attribution. It brings up the neutrality. I
think our response we put in there, we are trained for
proportional and discriminate, but there are still a number of
issues that are out there. As you look at the complexity from
mobile devices--we mentioned the iPad--the tremendous
capability you will have from mobile devices only makes this a
more complex issue.
Senator Udall. One of the arguments that has been brought
forth about networks is that you get particular nodes cut off
and the network itself can continue to operate. That concept's
also being applied to kinetic activities on the ground in the
kind of warfare we're now fighting. Would you elaborate a
little bit more on that, that point as well?
General Alexander. Senator, I think one of the difficult
parts that we'll have is what are the actions of the adversary
on our network? Is it exploitation or attack? Who is it, and
attributing it and their intent, in time to come up with a
coherent response. The easiest and the most important probably
is the security aspects of it.
If a system is exploited or has an infection, closing that
off is one of the key things that we do early on, segregating
that so it can't infect other systems. The network can operate
with several nodes out. That's the intent of a network for the
future. But it also causes concern of what is the adversary's
intent, what's his game plan, does he have one. These are tough
issues, especially when attribution and neutrality are brought
in, and trying to figure out what's come in, was it a hacker,
was it an annoyance, or was this a real attack?
Senator Udall. The potential to generate an escalating
conflict is not insignificant, much like we saw during the Cold
War era with nuclear weapons. I take your cautions with real
seriousness.
Admiral, I haven't allowed you an opportunity to speak. Did
you have any comments? I'm going to bring this hearing to a
close here shortly, but I wanted to see if you had any
additional thoughts.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir. I was just reflecting on the
fact that some of the questions you asked were very insightful
in the sense of deterrence against a hard-to-deter nation in
the cyber world, an empowered individual in the cyber world the
same. We see the same thing with the sorts of terrorist attacks
with potential nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiation.
I would also echo your point on the education piece.
Educating citizens about the cyber world, the same thing
applies in the kinetic world as well. This phenomenon of a
super-empowered individual is something that we have to be very
watchful of.
Senator Udall. It's a great concern to all of us. That
super-empowered individual could have a goal of trying to
trigger a significant conflict between nation states or other
entities while he or she stands to the side chortling, with
their mission to create chaos, conflict, tragedy, and all the
rest that we've seen in the toolbox that terrorists bring. So
this is very important work you are doing.
One final question. General, I think you're going to be
charged with further integrating and understanding these title
10 and title 50 responsibilities, are you not? We haven't
answered all of those questions yet. You've certainly been at
the forefront at NSA in taking on some of those challenges.
You've at times received some criticism, I think we all have,
because these are somewhat different missions, but they're
certainly interlinked.
Would you care to comment?
General Alexander. Senator, one of the key things that
we're doing is we will have a unique set of authorities, a
unique staff for CYBERCOM operating under title 10, and the
NSA, Central Security Service under title 50. We do have some
title 10 responsibilities. We are a combat support agency. We
do forward deploy people to help the regional combatant
commanders. But there will be two distinct staffs, with
distinct authorities and responsibilities for how we operate
for intelligence, for information assurance on the NSA side,
and for CYBERCOM how we defend and secure our networks and
conduct cyber space operations if directed.
Senator Udall. I thank you for your focus on that. As
somebody who's a strong supporter of our civil liberties, who
believes that Ben Franklin had it right, to paraphrase him,
when he said: A society that would sacrifice essential
liberties for short-term security deserves neither. I think
you're on the forefront, and Admiral Winnefeld as well, of
protecting those civil liberties, but also surveiling and
developing intelligence that lets us protect those very
freedoms that we hold so dear.
Thank you both for being here. I'm going to bring the
hearing to a close. Admiral, I think we ought to send one of
your boys over to the U.S. House of Representatives to
demonstrate how to behave properly, and we'll keep one here in
the U.S. Senate. It's been wonderful to have your family here,
and General Alexander as well.
We will keep the record open for additional questions for a
period of time. But with that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank
you very much for being here.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to VADM James A. Winnefeld,
Jr., USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I have served in various joint capacities throughout my
naval career and witnessed firsthand the tremendous advancements this
landmark legislation has created, not only among our Nation's military
and civilian leadership, but as a whole within the joint services and
interagency environment. As such, I do not see an immediate need to
change the provisions of this legislation. However, if confirmed, I
will take a hard look at ways Northern Command (NORTHCOM) does business
to determine if changes in the legislation are warranted.
If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in
these modifications?
Answer. Not applicable.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, NORTHCOM?
Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM is responsible for detecting,
deterring and preventing threats to the people and territory of the
United States; providing military support to Federal, State and local
authorities in response to natural or manmade disasters or for other
missions, as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense; and
executing theater security cooperation programs with Mexico, Canada and
the Bahamas.
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)?
Answer. The Commander of NORAD is responsible to both the President
of the United States and the Canadian Prime Minister for aerospace
warning, aerospace control and maritime warning of North America. The
Commander of NORAD provides tactical warning and attack assessment to
the Governments of the United States and Canada through an integrated
picture of any aerospace threat.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. It has been my honor to serve for over 30 years in a
diverse set of positions that I believe have prepared me to command
NORTHCOM and NORAD. Given my background as a naval aviator, I will
bring both an air and maritime perspective to the two commands. I have
experience on Joint Staff, Combatant Command, and Service staffs,
served as both a joint and combined commander, and have worked closely
with Congress on a variety of issues. In my current position as the
Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, I have
gained additional insight into the conduct of joint, combined and
international operations; the duties of a combatant commander; the
importance of interagency teamwork, particularly in response to natural
disasters; and the critical role of the National Guard and Federal
Reserve forces in defending our homeland and supporting civil
authorities in times of crisis.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
NORTHCOM and Commander, NORAD?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to capitalize on every opportunity
to further my understanding of NORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil
support operations; specifically, how the National Guard and Federal
Reserve forces contribute to those missions and the whole-of-government
approach to responding to natural and manmade disasters. This includes
maintaining strong relationships with The Adjutants General, State
Governors, and the leadership of key Federal agencies.
I also intend to deepen my growing knowledge of the threat posed to
the United States and our neighbors by drug trafficking organizations,
as well as existing strategies to defeat them.
If confirmed in my role as Commander of NORAD, I will continue to
expand my knowledge of NORAD's aerospace warning, aerospace control,
and maritime warning operations and how the command integrates with its
partners to detect, intercept and, if necessary, engage any air-
breathing threat to North America. Additionally, I will receive the
same training provided to other NORAD senior leaders required to direct
the actual, formal process of engaging aerospace threats to our Nation.
relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander,
NORTHCOM, to the following officials:
Question. The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM has direct title 10
responsibility to the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the
missions assigned to the command through the Unified Command Plan. If
confirmed, I will ensure NORTHCOM continues the close working
relationship it currently has with the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM provides the Deputy Secretary of
Defense information required to accomplish his duties and
responsibilities as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The Commander
of NORTHCOM also coordinates with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on
major homeland defense and civil support issues.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as the
principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national
security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD
policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. She is also a
key advocate for NORTHCOM's requirements. As such, the Commander of
NORTHCOM coordinates and exchanges homeland defense, support of civil
authorities, and security cooperation information with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy for use in formulating planning
guidance and policy.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)).
Answer. The USD(I) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence,
counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other
intelligence-related matters. The Commander of NORTHCOM works closely
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to ensure the
command has predictive and actionable threat estimates and timely
warning of worldwide threats to the homeland.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Americas' Security Affairs.
Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM routinely works with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs on significant matters regarding homeland defense,
support of civil authorities, and security cooperation.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman serves as the principal military advisor to
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security
Council. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 permits
the President to place the Chairman in the communications chain, and
oversight of the activities of combatant commanders may be delegated by
the Secretary of Defense to the CJCS. In concert with this authority,
the Commander of NORTHCOM communicates closely with the Chairman to
enable him to perform his duties. As the current Director for Strategic
Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, I have been deeply involved in
interactions between the Chairman and combatant commanders, and
understand the process well.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible
for organizing, training, and equipping forces for assignment to the
Commander of NORTHCOM and other combatant commanders. The Commander of
NORTHCOM coordinates with the Secretaries to ensure homeland defense
and civil support requirements are met. This advocacy is particularly
important for ensuring the Reserve component is ready to answer the
call here at home, and for ensuring speed of response in times of
crisis.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM communicates with the Chiefs of
Staff of the Services to support their responsibility for organizing,
training and equipping forces to accomplish homeland defense and civil
support missions. In addition, the NORTHCOM Commander seeks the advice
and judgment of the Chiefs of Staff on matters of mutual interest, and
has a key relationship with the Chiefs on matters of force protection
within his area of responsibility. If confirmed, I intend to rely on
the Service Chiefs as valuable sources of advice.
Question. The other combatant commanders, particularly U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).
Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM maintains regular dialogue
concerning issues of mutual interest and frequently interacts with the
other combatant commanders to support and execute U.S. National
Military Strategy. If confirmed, I intend to further strengthen
NORTHCOM's established, vital relationships with the other combatant
commanders. Of note, NORTHCOM has an extremely close relationship with
SOUTHCOM and recently deployed more than 100 of its headquarters staff
to SOUTHCOM headquarters and Joint Task Force Haiti in support of the
catastrophic January earthquake. NORTHCOM also maintains particularly
close relationships with U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Transportation
Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM).
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. Strong teamwork between the National Guard Bureau and
NORTHCOM is critical to defending our homeland and supporting civil
authorities. In my current position as Director for Strategic Plans and
Policy for the Joint Staff, I have developed a strong belief in the
vitality of the National Guard, and enjoy an excellent relationship
with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, General Craig McKinley. If
confirmed, I look forward to further advancing this key relationship so
together we may best serve the American people.
Question. If confirmed, in carrying out your duties, how would you
work with the Department of Homeland Security, the Homeland Security
Council, and other Federal agencies, as well as State and local
authorities and representatives from the private sector?
Answer. From my vantage point on the Joint Staff, I have observed
NORTHCOM successfully operate within the most complex interagency
network of any combatant command. If confirmed, I will establish my own
relationships with--and ensure NORTHCOM continues to work issues
closely and as appropriate with--the National Security Council; the
Department of Homeland Security; the various other Federal departments
and agencies; State, tribal and local authorities; and the private
sector. I look forward to collaborating with every possible partner to
defend the homeland while ensuring that NORTHCOM is fully prepared to
assist civil authorities in support of the primary Federal agency in
accordance with the National Response Framework and as directed by the
President and the Secretary of Defense.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, NORTHCOM?
Answer. I believe one of our Nation's most serious security
challenges is protecting the United States from an attack by violent
extremists using weapons of mass destruction; accordingly, this is one
of NORTHCOM's enduring challenges. I am increasingly concerned by the
evolving nature of this extremist threat towards smaller scale, hard-
to-detect operations. This threat is determined and patient, will
attempt to use our freedoms against us, will search for any path to
produce violent events, and harbors no qualms about killing innocent
men, women, and children to achieve its objectives.
I am also concerned about the corrosive effect on our nation's
security of drug trafficking, including its associated violence both
inside Mexico and along our border. If confirmed, I will ensure
NORTHCOM continues to support a whole-of-government approach on both
sides of our border with Mexico and in strengthening Mexico's ability
to reduce and minimize this violence by dismantling and defeating
transnational drug trafficking organizations.
In the longer run, I am concerned about the potential acquisition
by rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran, of the combination of a
nuclear weapons capability and the capacity to deliver it to our
shores. Finally, the constant potential for a major natural disaster is
something for which the NORTHCOM Commander must always be prepared.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will do everything in my power to ensure
our Nation is prepared to handle the full spectrum of threats to our
homeland. I will be an advocate for the sense of urgency required to
maintain vigilance against these threats; nurture a culture that
continuously challenges and improves our capability, particularly in
the area of information sharing with our partners; and continue
improvements to NORTHCOM's rigorous exercise program. I will examine
the command's homeland defense and civil support plans to ensure they
address evolving threats and are tailored to need. I will continue to
strengthen NORTHCOM's relationships with its National Guard,
interagency, State, local, tribal, and international partners to ensure
the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
mission of northern command
Question. What is the mission of NORTHCOM?
Answer. NORTHCOM anticipates and conducts homeland defense and
civil support operations within its assigned area of responsibility in
order to defend and secure the United States and its interests. In
addition, the command is responsible for executing theater security
cooperation with Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas, with full respect for
their sovereignty.
Question. How does NORTHCOM's mission relate to the mission of the
Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for
guarding against terrorism; securing our borders; enforcing our
immigration laws; and improving our readiness for, response to, and
recovery from natural and man-made disasters. NORTHCOM is responsible
for detecting, deterring, and preventing external threats to the United
States, and when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense,
providing defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). NORTHCOM
cooperates closely with--and for DSCA missions will be in support of--
the Department of Homeland Security in the execution of its missions in
accordance with direction from the President or the Secretary of
Defense.
Question. Are there circumstances under which you would anticipate
NORTHCOM would have the lead Federal role in responding to a terrorist
incident?
Answer. Normally, the DOD (including NORTHCOM) will be in support
of agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Department
of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in preventing,
countering, and responding to terrorist incidents in the United States.
However, the President may determine that a terrorist incident rises to
the level of an armed attack against the United States and therefore
direct that DOD take the lead in the defense of the Homeland. The
Commander of NORTHCOM, as the Geographic Combatant Commander, would
likely be assigned as the supported DOD commander.
Question. Or do you believe NORTHCOM would operate only in support
of other Federal departments and agencies?
Answer. See previous answer.
Question. What responsibility, if any, does NORTHCOM have with
respect to the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program?
Answer. In accordance with the Secretary of Defense's January 2010
directive on critical infrastructure, as a regional combatant command,
NORTHCOM is responsible for preventing or mitigating the loss or
degradation of DOD-owned critical assets within its area of
responsibility.
organization and authority
Question. NORTHCOM has been assigned responsibility for force
protection and antiterrorism within its area of responsibility.
What actions would you take, if confirmed, to mitigate force
protection vulnerabilities, and what force protection challenges do you
anticipate you would face within NORTHCOM's area of responsibility?
Answer. If confirmed, I will employ an all-hazards approach to
force protection. I also understand that it is challenging to strike
the right balance between threat mitigation, responsible stewardship of
resources, and installation efficiency--areas that depend upon robust
DOD and interagency coordination to provide for mission assurance at
over 2,500 installations located in the NORTHCOM area of
responsibility. If confirmed, I will make a concerted effort to
determine where we stand on this key issue, and continue the command's
ongoing efforts to mitigate force protection vulnerabilities.
Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
efficiency in the use of funding for force protection and to prevent
unnecessary duplication of efforts between NORTHCOM, the Military
Services, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense?
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize coordination among NORTHCOM,
the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs on force protection
planning and resourcing to maximize efficiencies and preclude redundant
efforts. In addition, I will focus the command's ongoing efforts to
share force protection information to support critical analysis, as
well as employing force protection and biometric technologies that are
state-of-the-art and cost effective.
Question. What specific forces, if any, have been assigned to
NORTHCOM?
Answer. The forces assigned to NORTHCOM are those inherent within
the Headquarters staff, as well as the staffs of the subordinate/
component commands listed below:
U.S. Army North
Marine Forces North
Air Forces Northern
Joint Task Force Civil Support
Joint Task Force North
Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region
Question. How has the assignment of forces to NORTHCOM changed
since NORTHCOM was established on October 1, 2002?
Answer. On 1 October 2003, when Full Operational Capability was
achieved, the forces assigned to NORTHCOM consisted of the Service
component headquarters and two standing Joint Task Force headquarters.
In 2004, the command stood up a third Joint Task Force, Joint Force
Headquarters National Capital Region.
On 1 October 2008, NORTHCOM was assigned forces in support of the
standing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield
Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management Execute Order for a period of
12 months (October 2008 to September 2009). On 1 October 2009, the
status of the CBRNE Consequence Management forces was changed back to
allocated vice assigned, per the 2010 Global Force Management
Allocation Plan.
norad
Question. What is the mission of the NORAD?
Answer. NORAD is charged with the missions of aerospace warning,
aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America. Aerospace
warning includes the detection, validation, and warning of attack
against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles,
through mutual support arrangements with other commands. Aerospace
control includes ensuring air sovereignty and air defense of the
airspace of the United States and Canada. Maritime warning consists of
processing, assessing, and disseminating maritime intelligence and
information, and warning of maritime threats to or attacks against,
North America.
Question. How has NORAD's mission evolved since the creation of
NORTHCOM?
Answer. Since NORTHCOM stood up in 2002, NORAD's mission expanded
in two areas: maritime warning and ballistic missile warning. The April
2006 NORAD Agreement renewal added a maritime warning mission, which
entails a shared awareness and understanding of the activities
conducted in U.S. and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime areas and
inland waterways. NORAD also provides ballistic missile warning to
NORTHCOM in support of Ground-Based Midcourse Defense operations.
Additionally, NORAD has been instrumental in rapidly developing a close
operational relationship between NORTHCOM and Canada Command, the
Canadian equivalent to NORTHCOM, which was established in 2005.
Question. How does NORAD's mission relate to NORTHCOM's mission?
Answer. NORTHCOM and NORAD are separate commands; neither is
subordinate to the other. The commands have complementary missions,
operate within a common security environment, and share a largely
integrated headquarters staff. NORTHCOM is committed to the defense of
the United States and NORAD is committed to the air defense of and
maritime warning for both the United States and Canada.
Question. How does NORAD's mission relate to the mission of the
Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. NORAD, by performing its bi-national defense mission,
provides significant but indirect support to the Department of Homeland
Security by deterring threats in the air and maritime domains.
Question. Do you believe that NORAD should continue to have a
combined operations and planning staff, and a consolidated command
center, with NORTHCOM? Why or why not?
Answer. I understand that the NORAD and NORTHCOM staffs are fully
integrated, with the exception of separate operations directorates, and
that both commands believe this is effective. In my experience, where
organizations are integrated well, greater effectiveness and efficiency
can be the result. If confirmed, I will examine whether this
organizational structure maximizes the operational effectiveness of
both commands.
northcom joint task forces
Question. Since the establishment of NORTHCOM, several multi-
service task forces, e.g., Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS),
Joint Task Force-North (JTF-North), have been placed under its
authority.
What is the current status of the Joint Task Force organizations
under NORTHCOM in terms of organization, planning, personnel
allocation, and capability?
Answer. NORTHCOM currently has three Joint Task Forces:
Joint Task Force Civil Support: Aligned under U.S.
Army North; provides command and control of DOD incident
management forces that respond to catastrophic CBRNE events.
Joint Task Force North: Aligned under U.S. Army North;
supports counterdrug and border patrol support along the United
States-Canada and southwestern U.S. border, and other
operations against transnational threats.
Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region:
Provides land-based homeland defense, civil support, and
incident management in the National Capital Region.
Joint Task Forces under NORTHCOM's authority are well-manned multi-
service organizations that plan and execute Homeland Defense and
Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations, as directed by the
President or the Secretary of Defense. Joint Task Force operational
planning is synchronized through continuous development and
coordination of Joint Task Force plans that support NORTHCOM concept
plans. These Task Forces further develop and refine plans, and exercise
with HQ NORTHCOM, to enhance execution of existing and emergent
homeland defense and civil support missions.
counter-narcotics efforts
Question. Each year the Department of Defense (DOD) spends several
hundred million dollars to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the
United States, yet the availability of drugs on the street has not been
significantly reduced, and some countries continue to face internal
security challenges in responding to this threat. Some of these funds
are executed within the NORTHCOM AOR, and some have questioned the
effectiveness and focus of our counter-narcotics programs.
What role does NORTHCOM play in the DOD's overall counterdrug
mission and organization?
Answer. DOD supports the counterdrug mission in both domestic and
international environments, fully respecting jurisdictional and
sovereignty restrictions in each area. NORTHCOM plays an integral role
in these efforts, including cooperating closely with SOUTHCOM and PACOM
in sharing information and situational awareness of drug-related
threats to U.S. national security.
Question. NORTHCOM's Joint Task Force North provides DOD support of
civil authorities for U.S. law enforcement agencies in counternarcotics
operations, as well as working with Mexican military and civil
authorities along the border to enhance their capability. NORTHCOM is
working with Mexico as it continues to build their overall capability
and capacity to fight drug trafficking organizations as part of DOD's
support to the Merida Initiative. NORTHCOM also partners with Canada
and with the Bahamas on counterdrug matters.
Question. What is your assessment of the ongoing counternarcotics
operations within the NORTHCOM AOR and the geographic seam NORTHCOM
shares with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)?
Answer. Interdicting drug flow in the Western Hemisphere is a
complex, ever-evolving effort against a determined and resourceful
adversary. Substantial efforts by U.S. Federal civilian agencies and
State and local law enforcement agencies, supported by DOD, along with
efforts by military and police forces from other nations, have made
progress. However, demand for drugs remains a problem within our
country, and the United States needs to continue its whole-of-
government efforts to counter the flow of drugs coming north and the
flow of weapons and money to the south. I view this as a major
problem--where NORTHCOM can contribute to solving it, it should be an
important part of the command's mission. If confirmed, I will ensure
NORTHCOM continues to work with interagency and international partners
on all fronts to reduce the flow of narcotics into and within the
NORTHCOM area of responsibility.
The geographic seam between SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM is a key route
for drugs to enter Mexico on their way to the United States My
understanding is that the two commands work closely together on this
issue. Based on our collaboration in the aftermath of the Haiti
earthquake, I have developed a close working relationship with General
Doug Fraser, the Commander of SOUTHCOM. If confirmed, I fully expect to
continue our work together to ensure a seamless effort across the
border between the two areas of responsibility, to include further
strengthening the relationships among Joint Interagency Task Force-
South (JIATF-S), NORTHCOM's Intelligence Directorate, and JTF-North.
Question. How are counterdrug operations coordinated across
combatant command boundaries with PACOM?
Answer. Counterdrug operations, including those occurring on the
boundaries with PACOM, are coordinated through sharing of intelligence
information among combatant commands, interagency partners, the
National Interdiction Centers, and PACOM's Joint Interagency Task
Force-West. I believe that synchronization among combatant commands is
a critical ingredient of our Nation's unity of effort in counterdrug
operations. If confirmed, I will continue to nurture the relationship
among NORTHCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM regarding counter-drug information
sharing and operations.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the other
combatant commanders and interagency partners NORTHCOM supports to
identify and eliminate any operational seams to improve counterdrug
operations.
Question. How would you recommend that the success of the
Department's counter-narcotics programs be measured?
Answer. I believe that success in counternarcotics is not easy to
quantify. Traditional metrics, such as the price of drugs for sale on
the street, are the product of many different factors, and their
exclusive use could lead to false optimism or pessimism over our
efforts. If confirmed, I intend to further explore this topic to
determine whether there are useful input and output metrics that could
be applied to NORTHCOM's counternarcotics efforts.
Question. Do you believe that the current programs that the
Department is pursuing are the most effective for the region, or should
the Department's efforts focus elsewhere?
Answer. DOD's experience in countering insurgent and violent
extremist networks is useful in countering drug trafficking networks,
as all of these networks move people, material, money and information
using clandestine methods. Accordingly, DOD's contribution to
interagency counternarcotics efforts is expanding. DOD normally takes a
supporting role to the interagency in this arena. If confirmed, I look
forward to forming my own assessment, and assisting DOD in determining
which counternarcotics programs are most effective in the region to
improve operational mission support to law enforcement and theater
security cooperation efforts in combating these threats.
Question. Compared to other missions that you would be responsible
for as Commander, NORTHCOM, if confirmed, where would you rank counter-
narcotics in terms of its contribution to our national security and the
ability of DOD to make a meaningful contribution?
Answer. NORTHCOM conducts missions to defend and secure the United
States and its interests--these are no-fail missions. Drug trafficking
directly affects our national security in several ways, including its
corrosive effects within our society, violence along our border, and
violence that severely impacts our neighbor and friend, Mexico. As
such, I would rank contributing to counternarcotics efforts very high
among NORTHCOM's missions. If confirmed, and within appropriate
limitations of jurisdiction, sovereignty, and available resources, I
will continue NORTHCOM's efforts to support its domestic partner
agencies and partner nations to address illicit narcotics and
transnational threats to the Homeland.
Question. There has been a surge in drug-related violence in Mexico
over the past year, which has increased the risk of cross-border
violence into the United States. Much of the drug supply comes into
Mexico across its southern border. The vast majority of Latin America,
however, is in the SOUTHCOM AOR, so the security situation in Mexico is
an example of the need for a well-coordinated effort between NORTHCOM
and SOUTHCOM.
What is your vision of how SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM could work
together in a fully coordinated and seamless fashion with respect to
Mexico and other security challenges?
Answer. While I believe the geographic boundary between NORTHCOM
and SOUTHCOM is appropriately placed, it is absolutely critical that
these two commands work effectively together on common security
threats, including counternarcotics. This will require: a strong
partnership based on personal relationships; overall and theater
security cooperation strategies that mesh closely together; deep
information sharing enabled by quality liaison officers and modern
technology; and a willingness to allow the opposite command to relate
to partners in each other's area of responsibility. If confirmed, I
look forward to capitalizing on the excellent working relationship I
developed with General Doug Fraser, the SOUTHCOM Commander, during
operations in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake.
Question. The United States and Mexico announced in 2007, the start
of a multiyear, bilateral security agreement called the Merida
Initiative. This Initiative aims to combat drug trafficking and other
criminal activity along the U.S.-Mexican border, as well as in Central
America. The U.S.-Mexican border is viewed as especially important for
U.S. counternarcotics efforts because Mexico is currently the primary
point of entry for cocaine and other drug shipments smuggled into the
United States.
What is your understanding of the Merida Initiative as it relates
to NORTHCOM?
Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM plays a vital role in
coordinating acquisition, contracting, and delivery of items provided
through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) Programs within the auspices of the Merida Initiative. These
items improve the Mexican military's ability to deploy rapid-reaction
forces quickly in support of police operations against drug trafficking
organizations, and to conduct maritime surveillance in an effort to
deny the use of the eastern Pacific and western Caribbean to
transnational criminal organizations, including drug traffickers and
potential terrorists.
Additionally, NORTHCOM assists its Mexican military partners--while
respecting Mexican sovereignty--with focused training, equipment, and
related support intended to help reduce violence, weaken the drug
trafficking organizations, ensure rule of law and respect for human
rights, and set the conditions for the eventual operational takeover of
the drug war by Mexican law enforcement authorities.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of DOD in
countering transnational drug cartels and gangs?
Answer. Countering drug trafficking organizations is a
transnational, trans-border effort that must be approached in a
holistic, ``whole-of-governments'' manner. The DOD plays largely a
supporting role in countering drug trafficking organizations and gangs
by working closely with both domestic and international partners to
counter these transnational threats.
In accordance with Federal statutes, NORTHCOM provides military
support to Federal law enforcement agencies to assist in the
identification and interdiction of transnational threats within and
along the approaches to the United States. NORTHCOM also supports
Federal law enforcement agencies through information collection,
analysis, fusion, and sharing appropriate information.
Through its Theater Security Cooperation efforts, NORTHCOM is
focused on building partner capability and capacity with Mexico and The
Bahamas, and on enhancing coordination and interoperability with
Canada, in order to develop and strengthen mutually beneficial
partnerships to counter transnational drug trafficking organizations
and gangs. NORTHCOM also works closely with its partner combatant
commands through common strategies and information sharing in order to
mutually enhance each command's effectiveness in these efforts.
security relationships with canada and mexico
Question. The NORTHCOM area of responsibility includes the land
areas of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The binational NORAD
Command ensures close cooperation between the United States and Canada
on security matters. NORTHCOM has been working with the Mexican
military on security cooperation related to Mexico's efforts to counter
drug trafficking and violence.
What is your assessment of the current security relationship
between the United States and Canada?
Answer. I believe that our security relationship with Canada is
excellent at all levels and in every Department of the U.S. Government.
This relationship is characterized by extraordinary trust and
confidence, evidenced by the long standing cooperation our two nations
have enjoyed through the NORAD agreement. Canada has been an absolutely
vital partner in the International Security Assistance Force's role in
Afghanistan, conducting operations and making enormous sacrifices in
some of the most challenging areas of that country. My understanding is
that NORTHCOM also has a very strong relationship with its Canadian
counterpart, Canada Command. If confirmed, I look forward to
contributing to the success of this longstanding partnership.
Question. What is your assessment of the current security
relationship between the United States and Mexico?
Answer. In my opinion, the current security relationship on a
military-to-military level between the United States and Mexico is the
best it has ever been. This was recently exemplified by the 30 March
2010 Merida Initiative High-Level Consultative Group discussions held
in Mexico City at the highest levels of our governments, which included
the defense minister equivalents from both countries, as well as our
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is also reflected by
military-to-military discussions that continue to grow in substance and
importance, to include recently-held U.S.-Mexico Defense Bilateral
Working Group discussions in Washington, DC.
Mexico is a critical partner that has demonstrated its commitment
to combating drug trafficking organizations that affect the safety and
security of North America. President Calderon and the Mexican military
have been on the leading edge of a 3-year national effort to disrupt
the drug trafficking organizations and curtail narco-violence in
Mexico. NORTHCOM security cooperation activities continue to be a key
and successful element of fostering a new era of U.S. Government-
Government of Mexico collaboration.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your goals as Commander of
NORTHCOM for improving security relations with Mexico, and how would
you plan to achieve them?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the positive momentum
NORTHCOM has established in this relationship. This will include:
developing personal relationships with my counterparts informed by an
understanding of their concerns; extending this level of trust downward
through our respective chains of command; working to accelerate
delivery of equipment under the Merida initiative, as well as other
capabilities; and continuing to provide training and information
sharing requested by the Mexican authorities. I will capitalize on past
and ongoing successes and look for new and innovative ways to build
upon these achievements.
Question. What is your assessment of the security challenges to the
United States posed by drug-related violence in Mexico?
Answer. In addition to the corrosive effects of drugs within our
own cities, I believe the violence associated with drug trafficking in
Mexico is a significant security challenge to the United States through
its potential to spill over the border and by virtue of its severe
negative impact on the internal security of a neighbor and friend.
Mexican criminal organizations have been responsible for murders
(including U.S. personnel who work in Mexico), kidnappings, extortion,
human smuggling, arms and drug trafficking, and other violent
activities.
It is my understanding that narco-violence increased in 2009, with
some reports indicating 6,587 drug-related murders, up from 5,207 drug-
related murders in 2008. Despite the increase in violence, President
Calderon and the Mexican military are fighting back with notable
successes, including the attempted apprehension of Arturo Beltran Leyva
(Head of the Beltran Leyva Cartel, who was killed in the ensuing gun
battle), the capture of his brother Carlos Beltran Leyva, and the
arrest of Roberto Sanchez Arras, the one-time number three man in the
Juarez Cartel. It is my belief that the U.S. Government should continue
to provide security assistance to Mexico to build its capability and
capacity to counter the violence that poses such a threat to their
society.
northcom-state relations
Question. NORTHCOM has the primary military responsibility to
provide defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) when directed by
the President and the Secretary of Defense, including consequence
management operations. Such military assistance would support Federal
assistance to State and local emergency response units.
Do you believe it is important for NORTHCOM to have an
understanding of the emergency response capabilities and plans of the
various States before a crisis arises, in order to optimize NORTHCOM's
consequence management support to civil authorities?
Answer. Yes. I understand NORTHCOM already works collaboratively
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Guard
Bureau, and the States to anticipate DOD consequence management support
to civil authorities and to coordinate potential requirements for
effective consequence management. I have also observed that through
NORTHCOM's Component Command, U.S. Army North, and their assigned
Defense Coordinating Officers, that NORTHCOM works with the FEMA
regional offices and States to improve relationships, information
exchange, and mutual understanding. If confirmed, I look forward to
participating in the Council of Governors meetings to further
understand the States' capabilities and how DOD can best prepare to
assist States in an emergency.
Question. If so, how would you plan to ensure that NORTHCOM has
sufficient knowledge of State emergency response capabilities,
including capabilities of National Guard units, and a good working
relationship with State emergency response leaders?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure NORTHCOM continues its progress
with FEMA, the National Guard Bureau, and the States in planning and
integrating a whole-of-government approach to natural disaster
response. In addition, if confirmed, I will examine NORTHCOM's staff
substructure to determine if the command is organized optimally for
this important mission area.
force provision for northcom
Question. NORTHCOM has the mission of conducting military
operations for homeland defense and, when directed by the President or
Secretary of Defense, for providing military assistance to civil
authorities, including consequence management for natural disasters and
CBRNE incidents. Yet NORTHCOM has relatively few military forces
assigned to it on a permanent basis.
What is your understanding of how forces are planned to be
allocated to NORTHCOM for its full range of mission requirements, and
the role that U.S. Joint Forces Command plays in that process?
Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM's contingency plans
and orders contain force requirements that are allocated by joint force
providers. Forces are not normally identified and sourced until just
prior to a planned event or impending incident, or immediately after a
no-warning incident. The exceptions are the standing Execute Orders for
CBRNE Consequence Management response forces and the Homeland Defense
Quick Reaction Force/Rapid Response Force. Additionally, under the
Defense Support of Civil Authorities Operations Standing Execute Order,
the NORTHCOM Commander has the authority to place certain military
capabilities on a 24-hour prepare-to-deploy order in advance of or in
response to a contingency.
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to ensure that NORTHCOM
will have sufficient forces available to it, properly trained and
equipped, to accomplish its assigned missions?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense allocates forces to Combatant
Commands based on global requirements. The Service Chiefs, in
accordance with their title 10 responsibilities, are responsible for
providing combatant commanders trained and ready forces for employment
within their respective areas of responsibility. If confirmed, I will
ensure the Joint Staff and the joint force providers are aware of my
force requirements, and that allocated forces are ready to perform
their various missions required in supporting civil authorities and
protecting the United States. I will maintain continuous liaison with
joint force providers and the Services and, in order to promote speed-
of-response, I will explore innovations that would enable pre-
identification of the units that would be sourced to NORTHCOM in a
contingency.
Question. If confirmed, how will you monitor the personnel,
equipment and training readiness of U.S. military forces (Active and
Reserve) for homeland defense mission-essential tasks in support of
NORTHCOM's contingency plans, and for its DSCA missions?
Answer. As I understand it, NORTHCOM has the ability to track the
readiness of title 10, title 32, and non-DOD capabilities of individual
States throughout its area of responsibility using the Defense
Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). NORTHCOM directly interfaces with
the National Guard Bureau to obtain the readiness status of title 32
capabilities and is supporting the National Guard Bureau in
establishing DRRS in every State. Moreover, if confirmed, I intend to
work closely with my Service and National Guard counterparts to
personally observe, when possible and appropriate, the readiness of
units that will be assigned Homeland Defense or DSCA missions.
northcom-dhs relationship
Question. The Department of Homeland Security is still a relatively
new Federal agency, and is continuing to improve its ability to meet
its homeland security missions.
As the Department of Homeland Security improves and matures its
homeland security capabilities, do you expect that will reduce the
demands on NORTHCOM to provide DSCA?
Answer. This really depends on whether the combined capacity of
civil and military resources in a particular mission area (such as
counternarcotics or disaster response) is currently adequate. Where
this is true, it can be viewed as a zero-sum situation in which
additional Department of Homeland Security capability could reduce
demands on NORTHCOM. However, there may be areas where our current
capacity is inadequate, and increased Department of Homeland Security
capacity will merely make additional progress towards buying down risk
to a more acceptable level. If confirmed, I will collaborate with the
Department of Homeland Security to understand how the various
capacities mesh--both where savings may be realized and where
additional capacity may be required.
Question. What do you consider to be the appropriate role for DOD
and NORTHCOM's vis-a-vis DHS and State authorities in identifying and
validating the dual-use equipment and other requirements associated
with defense and homeland security missions?
Answer. In accordance with the Secretary of Defense's guidance, I
believe the role of NORTHCOM is to coordinate with the Secretaries of
the Military Departments, the Commander of SOCOM, the Commander of
PACOM, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to identify critical
dual-use equipment necessary for Active and Reserve component units and
personnel to assist civil authorities in responses to natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters as
identified in the national planning scenarios. In accordance with my
answer above, I believe it is also incumbent on NORTHCOM to coordinate
with the Department of Homeland Security and State authorities as
required to more fully understand equipment requirements in a resource-
constrained environment.
response to christmas day aircraft bomb plot
Question. There has been considerable confusion about the events
surrounding the attempted bombing of a commercial U.S. aircraft over
Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.
Do you believe that NORTHCOM or NORAD have any responsibility for
apprehending, detaining, or interrogating a terrorist suspect who tries
to destroy an aircraft in flight inside U.S. airspace? If so, what is
that role?
Answer. Apprehending, detaining, or interrogating an individual
alleged to have committed a criminal act within U.S. jurisdiction is a
law enforcement function. NORAD conducts air defense operations as part
of Operation Noble Eagle and would likely be involved operationally if
needed, and both NORAD and NORTHCOM would remain alert for potential
associated or follow-on attacks.
national guard
Question. There is still debate about the role the National Guard
should play in the Homeland. In an April 21, 2008 letter to the
committee concerning the recommendations of the Commission on the
National Guard and Reserves, Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, wrote that, ``I have some concerns about the
Commission's ideas on enhancing the Defense Department's role in the
Homeland. While Reserve component civil support requirements are
important, they should not be of equal importance to DOD combat
responsibilities.''
Do you agree with this view of Admiral Mullen?
Answer. Yes. Defending our country is the military's primary duty,
which is why all DOD forces, including the National Guard and Federal
Reserves, are organized, trained, and equipped to fight our Nation's
wars. This is not to minimize the absolutely vital role the National
Guard and Reserves play in civil support, and we must ensure these
agile forces are adequately resourced and prepared for this mission.
Question. Do you believe that defending the Homeland or civil
support should become the National Guard's primary missions?
Answer. As a component of the Total Force, the National Guard has
distinguished itself across full spectrum of DOD operations, both at
home and abroad. Never has this been more true than over the last 9
years of both conflict abroad and pressing missions at home. In my
view, the National Guard should remain a full member of the Total
Force. Their contribution to the success of DOD's mission is too
significant to be limited to just homeland defense and civil support.
Moreover, to create additional force structure to execute the Federal
missions currently being accomplished by the National Guard would be
cost-prohibitive. In short, the Guard is providing exceptional service
and flexibility to our Nation in its current status.
Question. What is the current status of the working relationship
between NORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and individual State
National Guard headquarters?
Answer. My sense is that the working relationship among NORTHCOM,
the National Guard Bureau, and individual States' Guard headquarters
has never been better and continues to improve. The robust National
Guard presence within the NORTHCOM headquarters bears witness to this
and fosters information sharing, collaborative planning, and Total
Force mission execution that are paying dividends every day. If
confirmed, I look forward to leveraging the excellent rapport I
maintain with General Craig McKinley and other Guard leaders whom I
have met in order to further advance this vital relationship.
Question. If confirmed, what type of liaison relationships for
planning and operational purposes would you advocate between NORTHCOM,
the Department of Homeland Security, Federal, State, and local first
responders, and National Guard units under State authority?
Answer. As a former Joint Task Force Commander, I understand the
value of strong liaison relationships and their contribution to an
organization's success. If confirmed, I intend to enhance the existing
liaison relationships that NORTHCOM currently already employs with
these organizations by ensuring that liaison officers are empowered,
motivated and prepared to take all actions necessary to build
relationships and understanding, conduct mutual planning, and remain
prepared to transition seamlessly to cooperative execution. Where
necessary, appropriate, and permitted by personnel resources, I will
build new liaison relationships with key partners.
cbrne response capabilities
Question. NORTHCOM has two primary missions: Homeland Defense and
DSCA, including preparation for and response to an incident or attack
involving CBRNE materials or weapons, in the NORTHCOM area of
responsibility.
If confirmed, how would you approach the challenge of ensuring
adequate military forces, capabilities, and plans to respond to such
incidents in support of civil authorities?
Answer. I believe the CBRNE Consequence Management (CM) mission in
our homeland is a no-fail mission, and that forces assigned to this
mission must be able to respond as required. NORTHCOM has developed
detailed plans to support CBRNE CM in support of civil authorities. I
understand the NORTHCOM CBRNE CM Response Forces are in transition and
evolving into what is designed to be a robust and responsive force to
provide faster life-saving capability and mitigate human suffering. If
confirmed, I will work closely within DOD and with the National Guard
and the States to ensure adequate forces are allocated to this mission
and that they are properly trained, resourced, and exercised to
maintain their readiness to respond when needed.
Question. There are currently a variety of organizations and units
intended for CBRNE response and consequence management, including Joint
Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), the CBRNE Consequence Management
Response Force (CCMRF), the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological
Incident Response Force (CBIRF), National Guard Weapons of Mass
Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs), and National Guard CBRNE
Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) units.
If confirmed, how would you plan to manage this mix of capabilities
to ensure the best possible response force to support civil authorities
in the event of a CBRNE incident, and to avoid unnecessary duplication?
Answer. The military organizations designed to respond to a CBRNE
CM incident are structured to provide a graduated response capable of
handling small incidents, as well as large-scale incidents, in support
of civil authorities. Some are Federal forces, while others are
National Guard forces normally controlled by the State Governors. Each
echeloned element is designed to respond under different timelines to
build upon and integrate with the others to provide capability to civil
authorities.
If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the National Guard
Bureau and the States to ensure all forces established to accomplish
this mission are properly manned, trained, equipped to execute it, and
that timelines and command and control relationships during execution
are clearly understood and effective.
Question. What is your assessment of the ability of the CBRNE
CCMRF, as currently constituted, to provide a significant capability to
support Federal civil authorities in the event of a CBRNE incident?
Answer. It is my understanding that the two existing CCMRFs provide
a responsive and flexible capability with federally-controlled forces
that are trained, equipped, exercised, evaluated, and employed by
NORTHCOM to respond to near-simultaneous incidents. I also understand
that incremental modifications have been made to the CBRNE CCMRF
concept--based on analysis and lessons learned from State- and
national-level exercises--in order to improve its ability to provide
comprehensive and self-sustaining support to first responders. I am
also aware that DOD has determined that further improvements in CBRNE
response capability are warranted to provide rapid response capability
that is aligned within FEMA regions and responsive to State Governors.
Question. How would you assess the relative capabilities of a
trained and equipped CCMRF to a trained and equipped National Guard
CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)?
Answer. It is my view that each of these forces present
complementary capabilities that enhance our overall CBRNE Consequence
Management response.
The CBRNE CCMRF is a relatively large force (4,000-4,500 personnel)
that contains the required centralized capabilities to integrate with
and support a Federal response under the National Response Framework.
These capabilities include search and extraction, decontamination, air
and ground casualty evacuation, mortuary affairs, information
dissemination, communications, logistics, and a command and control
structure to support integration of follow on forces.
CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs), under the control
of State Governors, represent a much smaller (90-180 personnel), more
agile and timely response force that is focused on regional support to
provide security, triage, mass casualty and patient decontamination and
stabilization.
When responding to a domestic event, both force elements provide a
balanced approach by integrating and synchronizing the advantages of
the National Guard CERFP and the robust Federal capability of the
CCMRF.
Question. Do you believe that U.S. military forces providing DSCA
in the event of CBRNE incidents should be under the command of the
Commander, NORTHCOM?
Answer. In most cases, the incident will be managed at the State
level with DOD in support. For all incidents, Federal forces would
``lean forward'', as permitted under the National Response Framework,
in order to monitor and assess CBRNE capabilities and provide
additional support if requested. If title 10 forces do respond, I
believe the Commander of NORTHCOM should maintain command and control
of these forces in a ``direct support'' relationship aligned closely
with the primary Federal agency and the affected State Governor(s)
under the principle of unity of effort. In certain rare circumstances,
the NORTHCOM Commander may be asked to assume overall command and
control due to the nature or scope of an incident. If confirmed, I will
ensure that Federal forces under my command are responsive under either
command and control framework.
wmd-csts and cerfps
Question. There is now at least one National Guard Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) in each of the 54 States and
territories, and there are 17 National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response
Force Package (CERFP) units.
Do you believe the WMD-CSTs and CERFPs are appropriately organized,
sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions?
Answer. Yes, in my view, WMD-CSTs are appropriately organized,
sized, trained and equipped to accomplish their assigned detection and
analysis mission. WMD-CSTs are standardized forces and their training
and readiness is overseen by NORTHCOM through its Army component, U.S.
Army North.
I understand that there may be a need to improve CERFP
organization, equipment standardization, and readiness. If confirmed, I
will work with the National Guard Bureau to assist in any way to ensure
that CERFPs are ready to accomplish their assigned mission in
accordance with the CBRNE Enterprise identified in the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR).
Question. If not, what changes do you believe are needed?
Answer. Today, I cannot say with certainty what changes are needed.
However, if confirmed, I will quickly focus on CBRNE consequence
management to do my part to ensure our nation has adequate response
capability across the spectrum.
cbrne consequence management response force units
Question. Several years ago, the Department decided to create three
CBRNE CCMRF units to provide DSCA in the case of major CBRNE incidents
in the United States requiring Federal consequence management. The
recently released 2010 QDR proposed a significant restructuring of the
CBRNE response force, from the 3 CCMRFs under DOD control, to 1 robust
CCMRF, 2 military command and control units, and 10 future Homeland
Response Forces (HRFs) within the National Guard and under the control
of Governors in the 10 FEMA regions.
Do you believe the CCMRF concept, organization, and capability
remain sound?
Answer. I believe the existing CCMRF concept was an important
milestone toward achieving increased capability for this vital mission.
The makeup of CBRNE response should inevitably represent a balance
among speed, capability, resources, and ownership. Clearly, a robust
Federal response to augment State and local responses is a vital
component of this response. It is my sense that the restructuring
directed by Secretary of Defense and outlined in the 2010 QDR
represents an effort to refine this concept, and that DOD is committed
to ensuring forces within the CBRNE CM Enterprise remain trained and
ready, regardless of how they are organized. I understand NORTHCOM is
actively working to fully outline this concept with DOD partners,
especially the National Guard Bureau, and Federal interagency partners
to ensure it is effectively employed.
Question. What is your assessment of the organization, capability,
and potential effectiveness of the proposed HRFs in responding to a
major CBRNE incident, as compared to the capability of the existing
CCMRFs?
As I understand it, the intent of this decision is to rebalance the
Nation's CBRNE CM forces to better reflect the shared roles of the
States and Federal government during a domestic event. As such, it
appears to me that the HRFs were designed to provide a faster life-
saving response than the existing CCMRFs, and to capitalize on the
advantages of alignment with the FEMA regions, deeper regional
knowledge, and State ownership.
That said, it remains important that a robust Federal response be
prepared to augment the HRFs. This will be provided by a revised CCMRF
that has 700 additional personnel and a more rapid response capability,
along with two command and control CCMRFs that can coordinate responses
to additional CBRNE events using general purpose forces.
It is my understanding that work is in progress at NORTHCOM, in
collaboration with the requisite partners, on detailed implementation
planning for this modified construct. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the National Guard Bureau and others to implement it
properly, while at the same time closely monitoring training and
readiness levels to ensure we provide the nation the strongest possible
response capability.
Question. In your position as Director for Strategic Plans and
Policy on the Joint Staff, were you involved in the debate and/or
formulation of the HRF plan as outlined in the QDR?
Answer. No. Within the Joint Staff, the Force Structure, Resources,
and Assessment Directorate partnered with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to lead the formulation of the HRF plan within the QDR
effort. I was informed of my pending nomination for the position of
Commander, NORTHCOM towards the end of the formulation and decision
process, at which time I requested an information brief and attended
two meetings as an observer.
Question. Do you believe it would be prudent to disestablish an
existing CCMRF unit and eliminate its capability prior to having an
equivalent alternative capability in place?
Answer. I do not believe it would be prudent to give up an existing
capability prior to an alternative capability being in place.
Question. In order to ensure adequate defense support of civil
authorities, do you believe the three CCMRFs, or any related units
created from the proposed restructuring outlined in the QDR, should be
Federal forces under the command of NORTHCOM?
Answer. In the new concept, Federal Restructured-CCMRF and the two
smaller command and control elements created under the proposed
restructuring outlined in the QDR should and will be under the command
and control of the NORTHCOM Commander. State assets, such as the HRFs,
CERFPs, and WMD-CSTs, will be under the command and control of the
Governors through their Adjutants General, but could be Federalized
under title 10 if needed. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with
the National Guard Bureau and the individual States to ensure command
and control arrangements are clear and are exercised.
western hemisphere institute for security cooperation
Question. The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
(WHINSEC), which replaced the School of the Americas in 2001, has the
mission of contributing to theater cooperation activities through the
education and training of students in the Western Hemisphere from
Canada to Chile. If confirmed, you will be a member of the WHINSEC
Board of Visitors.
What is the relationship between NORTHCOM and WHINSEC?
Answer. I understand that the National Defense Authorization Act of
2008 added the Commander of NORTHCOM to the WHINSEC Board of Visitors.
The Board of Visitors reviews curricula to ensure compliance with U.S.
laws, regulations, and policy goals, with an emphasis on human rights.
Question. In your view, does WHINSEC promote the national security
interests of the United States in the Western Hemisphere?
Answer. It is my belief that WHINSEC is a strategic tool for
international engagement that supports principles set forth in the
Organization of American States Charter. WHINSEC's professional
education and training has a positive impact upon the 800-1,000 Latin
American students in attendance annually from military, law enforcement
and civilian institutions. I agree with the sense of Congress, as
expressed in section 1084 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010, that WHINSEC is building partner capacity that
enhances regional and global security.
Question. In your view, how should NORTHCOM participate in command
oversight and curriculum development?
Answer. As I understand it, NORTHCOM has an Academic Outreach and
Human Rights Officer who is responsible for the hands-on oversight of
WHINSEC from a NORTHCOM perspective and raises concerns to the
commander as appropriate. If confirmed, I will evaluate the
effectiveness of this arrangement to see if any changes are necessary,
and will exercise personal oversight to ensure this process is
effective.
Question. In your view, what more, if anything, does WHINSEC need
to do to emphasize human rights in its curriculum?
Answer. I believe that human rights are an absolutely essential
ingredient of the WHINSEC curriculum. If confirmed, I will examine this
issue closely and determine if more emphasis is needed.
Question. In your view, how can WHINSEC improve its outreach
efforts to individuals or groups interested in its activities,
particularly those who have accused the school of contributing to human
rights violations by former students?
Answer. After WHINSEC was activated, safeguards such as the Board
of Visitors were put in place to ensure compliance with U.S. laws,
regulations, and policy goals, with an emphasis on human rights. If
confirmed, I will examine outreach efforts in order to determine
whether they are effective, and to reassure these groups of NORTHCOM's
commitment to human rights within the WHINSEC curriculum.
Question. If confirmed, will you attend the WHINSEC Board of
Visitor's annual meeting?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to attending the Board of
Visitors annual meeting--I will ensure that only a higher priority
event requiring my presence would interfere with my attendance at the
annual meeting.
intelligence sharing/national counterterrorism center
Question. What is NORTHCOM's role and involvement in developing
intelligence assessments regarding terrorist threats?
Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM develops all-source
intelligence assessments of the transnational terrorist threat in order
to provide warning and situational awareness in support of the missions
of Homeland Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and Force
Protection. NORTHCOM collaborates with all members of the Intelligence
Community, other combatant commands, and the National Counterterrorism
Center to ensure the command is able to anticipate potential responses
to transnational terrorist threats as they develop.
Question. What intelligence agencies are involved in providing
input to NORTHCOM's staff for the development of intelligence
assessments?
Answer. I understand that NORTHCOM develops intelligence
assessments based on all-source intelligence derived from all 16
Intelligence Community members. This collaborative environment is
fostered by a networked approach that allows NORTHCOM analysts to
leverage relevant expertise throughout the Intelligence Community.
These collaborative relationships are created and maintained by a
robust liaison program. National Agency Representatives from the
Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Department
of Homeland Security, the Service intelligence agencies, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency are located within NORTHCOM.
Similarly, NORTHCOM liaison officers are located at the Department
of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) the Canadian National Defence
Headquarters in Ottawa.
Question. What is the current relationship between NORTHCOM and the
NCTC?
Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM has a strong
relationship with the National Counterterrorism Center in a
collaborative information-sharing environment. NORTHCOM routinely
relies on the Center's finished production and their collaborative
tools, all of which is facilitated by having two full-time NORTHCOM
personnel who are physically assigned to the Center as liaison
officers.
Question. Does NORTHCOM have representatives located at the NCTC on
a daily basis? If so, what are their functions and responsibilities? If
not, why not?
Answer. Yes. NORTHCOM currently has two full-time liaison officers
at the National Counterterrorism Center who facilitate the flow of
information between NORTHCOM and the Center.
One liaison officer is assigned to the Defense Intelligence Unit,
which is responsible for reviewing intelligence databases for
information related to DOD equities. The other liaison officer is
assigned to the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning at the
Center and ensures NORTHCOM is aware of and involved in community
operational and contingency planning.
Question. Do you believe NORTHCOM representatives at NCTC have the
access to intelligence needed to fully perform their functions?
Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM liaison officers
have access to all intelligence databases available to other Center
analysts and are fully capable of performing their functions in support
of the Center.
Question. How do posse comitatus, privacy restrictions, and other
laws and regulations concerning the collection of intelligence within
the United States, affect the way NORTHCOM receives and uses
intelligence?
Answer. NORTHCOM accomplishes its intelligence mission within the
framework of existing laws and policy; I understand NORTHCOM is
vigilant in ensuring all intelligence activities conducted in support
of its mission comply with intelligence oversight law and policy. If
confirmed, I will ensure all intelligence activities conducted in
support of NORTHCOM operations are reviewed by legal staff to ensure
they are conducted in accordance with law and policy.
ballistic missile defense
Question. One of NORTHCOM's missions is the defense of the United
States against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack. The
recently released Ballistic Missile Defense Review report stated as one
of its policy priorities: ``Before new capabilities are deployed, they
must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic
conditions.''
Do you agree that it is essential that our deployed ballistic
missile defense systems are operationally effective?
Answer. Yes. In light of the growing threat from North Korea and
Iran, both in numbers and sophistication, the capability to defend the
Nation with an effective ballistic missile defense system is becoming
increasingly important. The recently-announced Phased Adaptive
Approach, a four-phase global approach, will provide a layered defense
capability for the homeland, as well as for forward-deployed troops and
allies.
Question. Do you agree that it is important to conduct
operationally realistic flight tests to demonstrate the operational
capability and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
system?
Answer. Yes. Operationally realistic flight tests are one of the
most important, and visible, ways of demonstrating the operational
capability and reliability of the GMD system. I understand the NORTHCOM
staff has worked closely with U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile
Defense Agency in the formation of the Integrated Master Test Plan.
This robust test plan lays the foundation for increasingly realistic
operational flight tests over the next several years, and beyond.
cruise missile defense
Question. NORTHCOM and NORAD have responsibilities for warning and
defending the United States against airborne threats, including cruise
missiles.
Relative to cruise missile defense, what do you believe should be
the relationship between the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Organization (JIAMDO) of the Joint Staff, on the one hand, and NORTHCOM
and NORAD, on the other hand?
Answer. I understand the JIAMDO has maintained a working
partnership with NORAD since 1999 and NORTHCOM since its establishment
in 2002. The JIAMDO has expanded its theater focus to include homeland
air and cruise missile defense gaps, as well as ballistic missile
defense gaps, through operational concept, architecture, and roadmap
development efforts. The JIAMDO has a liaison office at NORAD and
NORTHCOM to ensure daily coordination and collaboration. If confirmed,
I look forward to building upon this relationship to enhance our
homeland capabilities against the potential threat of a cruise missile
attack.
Question. Relative to the full spectrum of threats to the United
States, how would you assess the cruise missile threat to the United
States and its territories?
Answer. I believe the overall cruise missile threat to the United
States and its territories is currently low. While technically
feasible, there are other means to use that are operationally easier
for those who would harm us.
Question. If confirmed, what capabilities would you prioritize to
address this threat?
Answer. While I believe the threat is currently low, continued
efforts in Wide Area Surveillance of North America are needed to
improve capabilities to address future capabilities. If confirmed, this
will be a key area I will address, as well as a review of the NORAD and
NORTHCOM Surveillance Gap Filler strategy. As I understand it, this
strategy outlines the NORTHCOM plan to address air and maritime
surveillance shortfalls through a family-of-systems approach to sensor
development and improved information sharing of interagency sensors.
Finally, through our intelligence resources, it is imperative that we
remain alert to any game-changing evolution in capability that would
raise the prominence of this threat.
continental air defense
Question. How has the continental air defense mission changed since
the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001?
Answer. Prior to 11 September 2001, NORAD's air defense posture was
aligned to counter external threats to North America. In response to
the attacks on 11 September 2001, the command's mission was expanded to
protect against domestic airborne threats originating within the United
States and Canada.
Operation Noble Eagle began immediately after the September 11
attacks and continues today to protect and defend the airspace of the
United States and Canada. NORAD implemented an improved air defense
system by integrating radar, air patrols, surface-launched missiles,
and control centers. This system also includes the capability to
protect the National Capital Region from air attacks.
Question. Do you believe that current U.S. continental air defense
capabilities are adequate to meet national security needs?
Answer. Yes. NORAD continues to adapt in an effort to counter the
terrorist threat posed to the United States and Canada by maintaining a
network of alert fighters, tankers, airborne early warning aircraft,
and ground-based air defense assets. This capability, combined with
improvements to surveillance and communications systems, as well as
better coordination and information sharing with the interagency
community, ensures NORAD provides air defense for the United States and
Canada.
Question. If confirmed, what capabilities and programs would you
prioritize to address any identified deficiencies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will examine NORAD's air defense
capabilities with the goal of further improving the North American air
surveillance picture not only for DOD, but also for our interagency
partners--notably the National Capital Region Coordination Center and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. I understand that Homeland Air and
Cruise Missile Defense, wide-area air surveillance, and refining
intelligence sharing within the interagency community are critical to
this effort. I will also work closely with the Services to ensure
continuity of air sovereignty mission commensurate with postulated
threats.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, NORTHCOM, and
Commander, NORAD?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
border security
1. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what is your assessment
of the current security situation along our southern border?
Admiral Winnefeld. I view with concern the escalating violence
along the Southwest border that in many cases is attributable to drug
trafficking organizations. In addition to the corrosive effects of
drugs within our own cities, I believe the violence associated with
drug trafficking in Mexico is a significant security challenge to the
United States through its potential to spill over the border and by
virtue of its severe negative impact on the internal security of a
neighbor and friend. As I mentioned in my hearing, if confirmed I plan
to travel to the border region soon after taking command in order to
more closely assess the situation.
2. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what is your view about
the need for deployment of federally-funded national guardsmen along
the southern border to assist and support civilian law enforcement
agencies?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that the National Guard has a place in
support of civilian Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies
along the border. Indeed, over 300 title 32 forces from the 4 border
States, specially trained in counterdrug activities, are currently
deployed in support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which
is the lead Federal agency responsible for border security. I believe
such deployments should be subject to the following principles: First,
they should be undertaken only to the extent that the capacity of
civilian agencies is exceeded by the security requirement or where the
Guard can provide unique capability in support of civilian operations.
In some cases, it may be necessary for the Department of Defense (DOD)
forces to provide a bridge to increased DHS or local capacity. Second,
such deployments should account for the impact they would have on
support for U.S. troops that are engaged in combat overseas, as some of
the capabilities that may contribute to border security are in short
supply overseas. Third, I believe we need to be cautious about the
perception of militarizing the border, though we should not allow this
to prevent deployments required to guard against serious threats.
Finally, these deployments should be made in response to a request from
civilian agencies that is approved by the President or the Secretary of
Defense. If confirmed, I will contribute to interagency assessments
intended to assess the capacity and capabilities of civilian law
enforcement and the suitability and magnitude of DOD contributions.
3. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what additional steps
can U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) take, in coordination with DHS,
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and the Government of Mexico, to
bring the drug-trade violence we are seeing on both sides of our
southern border under control?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that NORTHCOM has separate but
complementary roles north and south of the border. It is my
understanding that NORTHCOM is well-engaged with interagency partners,
the Embassy Country Team, the Government of Mexico, and SOUTHCOM in
evaluating ways the command can effectively support U.S. Government
efforts to stem drug-trade related violence in our hemisphere. As one
example, the command recently hosted and facilitated the Ciudad Juarez-
El Paso Merida Planning Initiative from 22-26 February, 2010, with
these organizations. Those discussions, as well as coordination with
these organizations on a daily basis, point to several additional steps
that can be taken to stem the wave of violence that has gripped the
border region.
If confirmed, I look forward to broadening and deepening the
asymmetric warfare experience that we share with our domestic and
Mexican partners. I will further pressurize our efforts in intelligence
fusion and sharing, secure communications systems, biometrics
equipment, night vision equipment, and accelerating the delivery of the
helicopters and surveillance aircraft that are part of the Merida
Initiative. I will seek ways to more effectively support DHS, the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and other critical stakeholders in a
whole-of-government approach to enhancing security along the southwest
border. I will review current NORTHCOM initiatives, visit the Southwest
border, listen to our Mexican partners, and assess how best the command
can support U.S. Government efforts to assist Mexico and other
international partners in the region. Finally, I will work closely with
SOUTHCOM to explore what additional steps we might take to enable the
countries on Mexico's southern border to act more effectively to
interdict drug traffic in that region.
legislative gap in reserve activation authority
4. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, DOD currently lacks
statutory authority to order Reserve personnel to involuntary Active
Duty service for the purpose of providing civil support in response to
a natural disaster. While such authority exists for terrorist attacks,
proposals to give this legislative authority in response to a natural
disaster has been opposed by State Governors, apparently due to a
dispute about who will have operational control of Federal forces. What
is your understanding of this problem and why have the States opposed
ensuring that Federal Reserve Forces can be called up, if needed?
Admiral Winnefeld. Federal Reserve Forces have capabilities but
only limited authorities to make important and timely contributions in
support of local and State officials in response to domestic disasters.
First, they may only be used for immediate, life-and-limb support when
they are already on Active Duty status if/when a crisis occurs. Second,
if they volunteer, they may be used only if there is also a request for
assistance for title 10 support from another Federal agency. DOD is not
authorized in any scenario to involuntarily mobilize Reserve Forces in
response to a catastrophe or disaster.
State Governors, bound by their State constitutions to act as
Commanders in Chief of their State forces, have been reluctant to
support such authority until they better understand how such forces
would be employed. Accordingly, they have taken the initial position
that they must have command of all military forces (State and Federal)
operating within their States. However, it is my understanding that
constitutionally, the President of the United States, as Commander in
Chief, cannot relinquish command of Federal forces.
To resolve this issue, OSD has proposed a concept to the Council of
Governors addressing the command relationship as one of ``direct
support'' using the principle of ``unity of effort.'' Under this
arrangement, which I fully support, Federal forces would ``consult,
coordinate with, and respond to State authorities'' during a domestic
disaster while maintaining existing command relationships. In this
manner, Federal forces, including Federal Reserve Forces, would
technically remain under the command of Federal authorities while
responding directly to a Governor's needs. I have experienced this type
of unity of effort relationship several times during my career, and it
works. This concept is supported throughout the National Response
Framework, which also emphasizes unity of effort vice unity of command.
5. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, do you believe that
title 10 Federal forces should be placed under the operational or
tactical control of State Governors?
Admiral Winnefeld. No, I believe the Commander of NORTHCOM should
maintain command and control of title 10 forces in a ``direct support''
relationship, remaining closely aligned with the primary Federal agency
as well as coordinating closely with and remaining responsive to the
affected State Governor(s) under the principle of unity of effort. I
believe there is good balance in this construct. On the one hand, the
President should maintain operational command of Federal forces for a
variety of reasons. On the other hand, Federal forces should be very
responsive to a Governor's needs in a crisis and be tightly aligned
with the Adjutant General of the affected State. If confirmed, I intend
to make it very clear to my State partners that we will act in support
of a Governor's needs in time of crisis.
6. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what has been Secretary
Gates' position on this issue?
Admiral Winnefeld. Secretary Gates supports title 10 forces
remaining under the Federal chain of command in accordance with
subsection (b) of title 10, U.S.C. Sec. 162. Secretary Gates also
reiterated at the Council of Governors meeting in February 2010 that he
believes we can find a consensus approach that respects the
Constitutional authorities of both the Governors and the President of
the United States. I believe this is a sound approach and provides a
positive way forward.
7. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, do you believe NORTHCOM
currently has sufficient authority to access Reserve component
personnel and capabilities to fulfill your command's mission?
Admiral Winnefeld. In terms of NORTHCOM's primary mission of
homeland defense, I believe DOD does, in fact, have sufficient
authority to access Reserve component personnel and capabilities.
However, in terms of NORTHCOM's mission for Defense Support of Civil
Authorities, I do not believe there is sufficient access to the Reserve
component. In accordance with title 10, Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Federal reservists are only available for civil emergencies
while in voluntary Inactive Duty for Training status.
The National Governors Association supported Congress's rejection
of a DOD-proposed statutory change that would have allowed the
Secretary of Defense to order reservists to Active Duty to provide
assistance when the response capabilities of Federal, State, and local
civilian agencies are or could be exceeded. Under the knowledge
possessed by the Governors at the time, I understand and am sympathetic
to their rationale for not supporting this initiative. However, since
then, OSD has begun working closely with the Governors to outline DOD's
concept of ``direct support,'' briefly described above. I am very
hopeful that DOD can come to agreement with the Governors on this
construct so that they will support a statutory change. I understand
that the Council of Governors will discuss this issue further during
their next meeting in June 2010, and if confirmed, I plan to attend
that meeting to help forge a way ahead--and to make it clear to the
Governors that I will be responsive to their needs in a crisis
8. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, would you recommend that
we take action this legislative session to fix this problem?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that it is important to have the
support of the Governors on solutions to this problem. I understand it
was discussed extensively in the first Council of Governors meeting
with the Secretary of Defense in February 2010. It is also my
understanding that it will be further addressed at the next Council of
Governors meeting in June 2010, and if confirmed, I plan to attend that
meeting. With a better understanding of both DOD and the Governor's
concerns, appropriate actions for legislative session can be proposed--
and I am hopeful that this will occur this year.
9. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what is the potential
vulnerability if we do not take action?
Admiral Winnefeld. Certain DOD capabilities reside exclusively or
in significant numbers in the Federal Reserve Forces, such as aerial
spray, ``Hurricane Hunter'' weather reconnaissance, combat surgical
hospitals, search and rescue, aeromedical evacuation, mortuary affairs,
engineering and logistical support. Without this authority, these title
10 Federal Reserve Forces, which can be the most capable and closest
unit to a disaster, cannot be involuntarily called forward to support a
response, ultimately increasing costs and more importantly, risk to
American lives. This is why it is critical that we forge a consensus
solution as soon as possible and provide recommendations to Congress at
that time.
joint responses to attacks
10. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, how will NORTHCOM and
CYBERCOM work together to support civil authorities in the event of a
computer network attack on the Homeland?
Admiral Winnefeld. As I understand it, NORTHCOM has developed a
very strong relationship with U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Once
CYBERCOM stands up, I believe NORTHCOM will extend this relationship to
CYBERCOM as well. Similar to other combatant commands, NORTHCOM is a
routine consumer of the cyber security and information that STRATCOM
and CYBERCOM will provide. In the event of an attack, NORTHCOM will
work in a supported-supporting relationship as designated by the
Secretary of Defense to ensure the .mil domain is protected and that
all available support is provided, as appropriate, to the owners of
other domains.
11. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, do roles and
authorities exist to guide a joint response, if the Nation is attacked?
Admiral Winnefeld. The 2008 Unified Command Plan recognizes
cyberspace as a warfighting domain, and NORTHCOM's mission set crosses
all domains in order to defend, protect, and secure the United States
and its interests against all threats, including cyber.
There are myriad authorities supporting Homeland Defense and Civil
Support missions, as well as a joint response to cyber attack against
the Nation. These include NORTHCOM authorities identified in title 10,
as well as title 50, and the Unified Command Plan, Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan, Guidance for Employment of the Forces, and the
National Response Framework. Additionally, there are a number of DOD
policies and orders, contingency plans (to include NORTHCOM's Homeland
Defense CONPLAN 3400), and Joint Staff-directed orders that guide a
joint response. The authorities that are in place today for cyber
center primarily on self-defense. If we had to act today in response to
a cyber attack on critical national assets, the joint response would
also be guided by the National Cyber Incident Response Plan. That said,
I believe one of CYBERCOM's key roles will be to advise STRATCOM in
recommending any adjustments to existing authorities required to better
provide a joint response to an attack.
12. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, with respect to other
combatant commands, the Military Departments, and the many
organizations within DOD, how will CYBERCOM function to ensure cyber
operations are protected?
Admiral Winnefeld. As I understand it, CYBERCOM will have both
supported and supporting cyber roles. As the supported command for
defense of the Defense Information Networks, CYBERCOM will have the
technical capability to conduct effective ``defense in depth''
protection of cyber operations and infrastructure that is common to all
combatant commands. At the same time, as the supporting command,
CYBERCOM will have the technical capability to provide information and
awareness to enable its customers to effectively mitigate cyber threats
to operations within their own areas of responsibility.
threats to the homeland
13. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what do you consider to
be the biggest threats to the Homeland?
Admiral Winnefeld. There are many potential threats to our
Homeland, among which I would name five of particular concern. First,
extremists who are directed, supported, or inspired by al Qaeda
continue to plan terrorist attacks on our Homeland. Those attempting to
obtain weapons of mass destruction pose the most consequential threat,
while those pursuing smaller scale, hard-to-detect attacks using
improvised explosive devices or conventional weapons represent the most
likely threat. Second, I am concerned about the corrosive effect on our
Nation's security of drug trafficking, including its associated
violence, both inside Mexico and along our border. Third, the cyber
threat to our information infrastructure is increasing in parallel with
our growing reliance on the Internet. Fourth, North Korean and Iranian
pursuit of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them against our
Homeland using long-range ballistic missiles or other means is a
growing concern. Finally, the constant potential for a major natural
disaster, which can produce damage far greater than most terrorist
attacks, is something for which the NORTHCOM Commander must always be
prepared.
14. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, where do you assess the
greatest vulnerabilities in our ability to defend the Homeland?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe our greatest vulnerability remains
extremist threats, who are determined and patient, will search for any
path to produce violent events, and harbor no qualms about killing
innocents to achieve their objectives. Our vulnerabilities to this
threat derive from the immense array of potential targets within our
Nation, the relative ease of entering a large and diverse country, and
the extremists' intent to exploit the freedom of movement (and other
important freedoms) we enjoy within our country.
15. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, if confirmed, how will
you address these vulnerabilities?
Admiral Winnefeld. If confirmed, I will do everything in my power
to ensure our Nation is prepared to handle the full spectrum of threats
to our homeland. I will:
Advocate the sense of urgency required to maintain
vigilance against these threats;
Nurture a culture that continuously challenges and
improves our capability, particularly in the areas of
information sharing with our partners and speed-of-response;
Continue improvements to NORTHCOM's rigorous exercise
program;
Examine the NORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil
support plans to ensure they address evolving threats and are
tailored to need;
Strengthen NORTHCOM's relationships with its National
Guard, interagency, State, local, tribal, and international
partners to ensure the whole is greater than the sum of the
parts;
Work closely with the other COCOMs and service chiefs
on issues of relevance to defending the Homeland;
Remain cognizant of the health of our ballistic
missile defense program; and
Support a whole-of-government approach on both sides
of our border with Mexico and strengthen Mexico's ability
efforts against drug trafficking organizations.
interoperability with state and local first responders
16. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, a tragic lesson learned
in the response to the attacks of September 11 was the inability of
first responders to communicate amongst one another. Given the role DOD
forces would assume in assisting State and local authorities in
responding to large-scale incidents, the importance of these varying
groups to communicate is vitally important if we are to avoid
unnecessary miscommunication and risk. If confirmed, what steps will
you take to ensure interoperability between title 10 forces and their
civilian counterparts?
Admiral Winnefeld. It is my belief that communications
interoperability among all mission partners is a cornerstone of the
Nation's response to disaster events. As I understand it, NORTHCOM has
taken several initiatives to reduce miscommunication and ensure
information sharing among our partners. NORTHCOM is a key participant
in the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and
Interoperability and the Federal Partnership for Interoperable
Communications and, in concert with DHS and the National Guard Bureau,
developed both the Strategic Operational Information Sharing Plan and
the Deployable Communications Standards Publication. These efforts are
critical in establishing interoperability protocols and standards for
both communications systems and information exchange processes and will
be used as the foundation for future procurement of DOD communications
systems. I also believe it is important that we test these systems to
ensure they function.
Further, NORTHCOM continues to partner with the National Guard
Bureau and the Federal Emergency Management Agency on use and
employment of our Deployable Cellular Systems and Incident Awareness
and Assessment/Full Motion Video suites. These systems are designed for
rapid employment to an incident to improve communications and shared
situational awareness through augmented cellular phone services and
video situational awareness to facilitate decisionmaking. In
particular, mobile cellular capability can be used to mitigate
commercial communications outages by providing cellular voice and data
devices for key civilian leadership and agencies while at the same time
providing radio communications interoperability among first responders
and title 32/title 10 DOD forces.
17. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, are you aware of any
interoperability gaps between State and local first responders and
title 10 forces?
Admiral Winnefeld. I am not aware of any specific interoperability
gaps forces among first responders and title 10 forces, but if
confirmed I will look closely at interoperability in communications. As
I understand it, NORTHCOM is dedicated to constantly improving
processes and procedures to mitigate potential and unidentified gaps.
For instance, since 2005 NORTHCOM has hosted an annual communications
exercise solely designed to refine interoperable communications among
National Guard, State, and local emergency management personnel and
first responders. Last year's exercise conducted in Texas, Arizona, and
South Carolina drew over 50 different participants from Federal, State,
and local agencies.
Additionally, NORTHCOM is participating in efforts conducted by the
Interagency Board and DHS's Office of Interoperability and
Compatibility to develop a Communications Unit Leader track under the
National Incident Management System. This track is designed to train
and certify communications personnel in typing incident scene
communications requirements, standardizing processes and protocols, and
providing a credentialing system to ensure equivalency among
communications personnel.
sharing of information and intelligence between agencies
18. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, if confirmed, how will
you seek to break down the barriers relating to intelligence collection
and evaluation between agencies to ensure NORTHCOM has an accurate
picture of potential threats?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that persistent engagement and
collaboration with our interagency partners is essential to ensure we
are aware of and prepared to deal with emerging threats. To the maximum
extent allowed by law and policy, we must strive for an ``information
push'' rather than an ``information pull'' culture, as well as seek new
ways of manipulating the information we do have in order to separate
key threat signals from the noise. Often, this information is sensitive
and closely held in law enforcement and/or intelligence channels. If
confirmed, I will consistently articulate mission needs, particularly
in the Force Protection and Defense Support of Civil Authorities
arenas, while assuring the lead Federal agencies that we will safeguard
their operational and investigative sensitivities. We must also pursue
these activities in full compliance with Intelligence Oversight
guidelines and ensure we maintain public trust in our ability to
protect civil liberties. I will also strive to develop and maintain a
solid and trusted set of relationships with the various intelligence
agencies that includes as many liaison officers as feasible.
restructuring of federal homeland response forces
19. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) calls for a significant restructuring of the force
packages NORTHCOM provides in support of civil authorities in the event
of a large-scale disaster or attack. The proposal calls for the
restructuring of one existing brigade-sized element, the elimination of
another, and the creation of 10 smaller Homeland Response Forces (HRFs)
to be spread throughout the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) regions of the country. What are your views about this new
approach?
Admiral Winnefeld. As I understand it, the intent of this decision
is to rebalance the Nation's Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and high-yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management (CM)
forces to better reflect the shared roles of the States and Federal
Government during a domestic event. It also appears to me that the HRFs
are designed to provide a faster life-saving response than the existing
CBRNE CM Forces (CCMRFs) and to capitalize on the advantages of
alignment with the FEMA regions, deeper regional knowledge, and State
ownership.
That said, it remains important that a robust Federal response be
prepared to augment the HRFs. This will be provided by a revised CCMRF
that has 700 additional personnel and a more rapid response capability,
along with two command and control CCMRFs that can coordinate responses
to additional CBRNE events using general purpose forces.
It is my understanding that work is in progress at NORTHCOM, in
collaboration with the requisite partners, on detailed implementation
planning for this modified construct. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the National Guard Bureau and others to implement it
properly, while at the same time closely monitoring training and
readiness levels to ensure we provide the Nation the strongest possible
response capability.
20. Senator McCain. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, are there any concerns
about the apparent shift of authority of these forces from Federal
control to that of the States, particularly given the potential for
these forces to be moved and utilized across State lines?
Admiral Winnefeld. Although work is ongoing to develop this new
construct, I believe the various Federal and State response forces,
under the National Response Framework, will be able to achieve unity of
effort. My sense is that advance planning, gaming, exercising, and
effective employment of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
will be important elements of a successful program. If confirmed, I
intend to work closely with and through the National Guard Bureau to
the States to ensure all forces established to accomplish this mission
are properly manned, trained, and equipped to execute it, and that
timelines and command and control relationships during execution are
clearly understood and effective.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
guard and reserve in northern command
21. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, the integration of
Active, Reserve, Guard, and interagency elements into your headquarters
and the makeup of your subordinate units, makes NORTHCOM one of the
most diverse agencies this Government has. As we all know, without our
Guard and Reserve Forces, it would be impossible to conduct operations
abroad while ensuring that our Homeland is secure and safe. I have
legitimate concerns with respect to the impacts of Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom rotations on our National Guard, as
well as what I have been told to be the Air Force fighter reduction
plan of 250 aircraft for the Air National Guard and its impacts on the
18 Air Sovereignty Alert site requirement. As I have been informed,
this reduction in aircraft will reduce or cancel Operation Noble Eagle
and the associated Combat Air Patrols (CAP) that were instituted post-
September 11. What are your thoughts on the state of our National Guard
and Reserves and their ability to provide support in times of crisis?
Admiral Winnefeld. I believe our National Guard and Reserves have
never been more capable than they are today; they are an amazingly
versatile and battle-hardened force. From my point of view, they are
critically important to NORTHCOM's mission, and their ability to
provide support in times of crisis is solid and growing. If confirmed,
I intend to develop a close relationship with the leadership of the
Guard and Reserve--indeed, I already enjoy a superb relationship with
the Chief, National Guard Bureau. While the Air Guard force structure
resulting from the Air Force recapitalization plan remains to be seen,
the professionals who employ this force will adapt with the
demonstrated skill necessary to safeguard the Homeland.
22. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, do you believe that
NORTHCOM has the right mix of Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard
present within your command?
Admiral Winnefeld. It seems to me that the NORTHCOM staff has a
healthy mix of Active Duty and Reserve component--although, if
confirmed, I will develop a more informed view. My understanding is
that NORTHCOM has a Reserve component presence in every staff
directorate HQs working alongside their Active Duty co-workers. In
addition, I understand that the National Guard has made a significant
investment in personnel assigned to NORTHCOM. In fact, NORTHCOM has the
largest concentration of title 10 National Guard officers in a joint
organization outside of the National Guard Bureau. I am aware that
there are over 50 full-time Reserve component authorizations in
NORTHCOM HQs, of which 45 are filled, which is about the same
percentage that applies to the active component.
23. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, can you confirm if
there will be an Air Force fighter reduction in the Air National Guard?
If so, what impact will it have on the 18 Air Sovereignty Alert sites
and CAP requirements?
Admiral Winnefeld. In my current position as Director of Strategic
Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, I am unable to confirm a
reduction of the number of fighters in the Air National Guard; the
balance between active and Guard force structure is a decision process
led by the Department of the Air Force. However, if a reduction occurs,
NORAD and NORTHCOM will work closely with the Air Force to ensure that
the resulting force structure will still meet the requirements of
Homeland Defense as directed under Operation Noble Eagle. I understand
that the Air Force submitted to Congress, in response to National
Defense Authorization Act language, a report that indicated that the 18
Air Sovereignty Alert sites would be unaffected by the fiscal year 2011
President's budget position. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Air Force to ensure the Air Sovereignty Alert site configuration
supports national guidance on Homeland Air Defense.
missile defense
24. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, I have spent a lot of
time and energy with regards to missile defense and I am convinced that
the current administration does not take the necessity of the program
seriously. I believe we are underfunding missile defense programs and
not driving the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and others to develop
a robust, layered, and integrated system of ground-, sea-, and
space-based radars and interceptors. I have specific concerns about the
Phased Adaptive Approach:
there is no map or plan showing the deployment of the
system and how it will be integrated;
while Aegis and our SM-3s are outstanding assets and
vital to our National security, we do not have enough Aegis
ships that are Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capable;
I have been told we are having problems with the
development of SM-3 1B which has taken expertise and focus away
from 2A and 2B development, potentially pushing back the
timeline;
I am concerned about our ability to integrate all the
radars we have into the existing BMD architecture which I have
been told is limited looking out to the east (Iranian threat)
as well as integrating Aegis with existing ground based radars;
I am concerned there is not enough testing for our
ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska and California nor
are there enough missiles to ensure we can continue to test as
well as maintain enough on status;
I am concerned we have not tested the new kill
vehicles that are being installed on our GBIs; and
I am concerned that we are not moving forward on
testing the two-stage GBI.
Every day there are open source reports of the efforts of North
Korea and Iran, known enemies of the United States, to develop more
advanced missiles and munitions with the intent to target the United
States and our military forces. China and Russia continue their
advancements as well, even as our President works to reduce our own
capabilities and restrain our efforts to adequately defend the Nation.
In short, our enemies are advancing their ability to reach out and hit
us in a devastating way. What are your thoughts on whether we are
assuming too much risk? If not, what can you tell me on how we are
mitigating the known risk from those threats I have mentioned?
Admiral Winnefeld. DOD spent considerable time during the recently
concluded Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) assessing both
evolving threats as well as our country's current and projected
capabilities over the next 10 years. I believe the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, as currently envisioned, will provide
adequate defense against the evolving threat from North Korea and Iran,
neither of which are currently capable of attacking the United States
but which certainly possess the ambition to develop this capability. At
the same time, DOD is placing additional emphasis on regional missile
defense under the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in order to pace the
threat and provide assurance to our allies and partners. As such, we
will be able to provide some measure of defense against medium and
intermediate range missiles launched from the Middle East against our
forces and our allies in Europe sooner than previously planned.
Moreover, Homeland ballistic missile defense will benefit from this
approach as soon as a surveillance radar becomes operational in
southeastern Europe, which will provide earlier warning of an Iranian
attack against the United States and increase the probability of
success of GMD interception. In the longer term, when future
interceptors such as the SM-3 Block IIB become operational, they could
provide an additional layer of defense for the Homeland.
If confirmed, I will participate along with the other combatant
commanders and service chiefs in the department's ongoing analysis to
ensure our future capability requirements and hedge strategies continue
to stay ahead of the threat. I will also work to ensure that our
systems are adequately tested and our operators properly trained to
execute this important mission.
25. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, have you looked at the
recommendations on the development of either the three-stage or two-
stage GBIs?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, though if confirmed I will reinforce my
knowledge of this program. My understanding is that the BMDR includes a
hedge strategy that includes the continued development and assessment
of a two-stage ground-based interceptor, including a test later this
year. If confirmed, I will work closely with the MDA to explore the
potential advantages of deploying a three-stage, two-stage mix of GBIs
within the Homeland.
26. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what are your thoughts
on a Third Site location on the east coast of the United States?
Admiral Winnefeld. As a follow-on to the BMDR, the Department is
examining how it will execute, operationally and programmatically, the
tenets laid out in the BMDR. I understand that as part of the ongoing
analysis, the capabilities and deployment strategy being studied by
NORTHCOM includes an east coast capability.
27. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, on February 11, the
Airborne Laser successfully intercepted a boosting ballistic missile--
the first time a directed-energy system has destroyed such a target in
any phase of flight. In a time of crisis, is there any plan to be able
to use this aircraft to protect our Homeland?
Admiral Winnefeld. The recent engagement test of the Airborne Laser
demonstrated a unique capability in the area of BMD and is a pathfinder
for future directed energy technologies. However, it is my
understanding that due to the operational challenges associated with
effectively employing this system against a real-world threat as
opposed to the high cost of maintaining it, the program has been
redesignated as a technology demonstration program and is therefore not
part of the baseline BMD architecture.
28. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, should we look into
that?
Admiral Winnefeld. It is my belief that during a time of crisis,
the Department will seek to provide the combatant commands with the
required capabilities to deter or, if necessary, defeat the threat.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator George S. LeMieux
border security
29. Senator LeMieux. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, one of your areas of
responsibility is the southwest border shared with Mexico. How secure
are our southern borders and what recommendations do you have to stem
the flow of humans and narcotics through them?
Admiral Winnefeld. Illicit trafficking of drugs, arms, and bulk
cash challenge the U.S. and Mexican Governments on both sides of the
border. As such, my sense is that NORTHCOM has separate but
complementary roles north and south of the border. Regarding the
former, the command plays a supporting role to DHS, DOJ, and other
critical stakeholders in a whole-of-government approach to enhancing
security along the southwest border. If confirmed, I will look for ways
to improve this support that are both effective and legal. Regarding
the latter, given the Mexican military's assigned role in the struggle
against drug trafficking organizations, NORTHCOM plays a vital role in
enhancing the Mexican military's capability and capacity, which I would
seek to enhance. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing current
NORTHCOM initiatives, visiting the Southwest border, listening to our
Mexican partners, and assessing how best the command can support U.S.
Government efforts to assist Mexico and other international partners in
the region.
ballistic missile defense
30. Senator LeMieux. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, what is your
assessment of America's current ballistic missile defense capabilities
and in what areas would you like to see further development?
Admiral Winnefeld. It is my belief that the GMD system adequately
addresses the potential rogue threats we face today. The MDA's
evolutionary development of the GMD system continues to demonstrate
technology enhancements that will enable us to defeat the evolving
threats from long-range missiles under development by North Korea and
Iran.
Meanwhile, the newly-adopted Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in
Europe, intended to pace the threat by providing defense against medium
and intermediate ballistic missiles coming from the Middle East much
sooner, should also provide deployable, agile, and tailorable defensive
capabilities to enhance defense of the Homeland. For example, in the
near term, a PAA surveillance radar in southeastern Europe will provide
earlier warning of a ballistic missile attack from Iran, and thus
provide the GMD system with a higher probability of intercepting such a
threat. In the long term, when future interceptors such as the SM-3
Block IIB become operational, they will provide an additional layer of
defense.
As for areas requiring further development, I believe we must
continue developing our space-based sensor capabilities in order to
attain a birth-to-death tracking and engagement capability and we need
to continue moving into a net-centric integrated architecture to enable
service, agency, and potentially allied systems integration to
facilitate data sharing, situational awareness and coordinated
engagement capabilities.
eguardian system
31. Senator LeMieux. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, the eGuardian system
is an unclassified system, that once implemented, will help DOD and law
enforcement identify suspicious activity and hopefully preempt a
terrorist attack. How close are we to implementing this system?
Admiral Winnefeld. As I understand it, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy will establish a plan and issue policy and
procedures for the implementation of the eGuardian system no later than
June 30, 2010. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Americas' Security Affairs estimates that the fielding and
implementation of eGuardian will begin in September 2010.
Implementation in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility will be scheduled
in four phases, followed by a fifth phase for the other Geographical
Combatant Commands. Each implementation phase will involve all Service
components, Services, and agencies and each phase will require 60-to-90
days for completion.
cyber attacks
32. Senator LeMieux. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, in your opinion, how
should government-sanctioned Chinese cyber penetrations of American
companies be categorized? Is it an act of war, a violation of
international law, or something else?
Admiral Winnefeld. It is my belief that, depending on the
circumstances, a cyber intrusion into a privately owned network could
constitute one of the following: a violation of international law, a
violation of domestic law, espionage, a violation of a State's
sovereignty, or an act of trespass. In my opinion, such an intrusion
would only be an act of war if it were conducted by an identifiable
adversary and included demonstrated intent, planning, and execution,
leading to actual destruction of our infrastructure or our financial
system.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
homeland response
33. Senator Collins. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, in the recently
released QDR, the Pentagon announced plans to develop HRFs in each of
the 10 FEMA regions. These units would respond to domestic incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction, or other catastrophic disasters.
How do you envision the HRF's coordinating, planning, training, and
exercising with the FEMA regional offices?
Admiral Winnefeld. NORTHCOM is working closely with the National
Guard Bureau and other mission partners to develop integrated plans for
employment of the HRFs. The HRF concept aligns the HRFs with the 10
FEMA regions and tasks them with coordinating regionally focused
military planning, training, exercises, and other efforts to support
unity of effort across Federal, State, and local responses. As such, I
would expect a close coordinating relationship between the HRFs and the
FEMA regional offices, as well as with the NORTHCOM Defense
Coordinating Officer within each FEMA region. If confirmed, I look
forward to working together with the National Guard Bureau as the HRF
capability stands up.
34. Senator Collins. Vice Admiral Winnefeld, one of the most
effective ways to enhance our National preparedness is to develop
coordinated and detailed plans for preventing and responding to
disasters before they occur. DOD has unique planning capabilities that
can be brought to bear to assist in these efforts. How can the
Pentagon, and NORTHCOM specifically, more effectively leverage its
planning expertise to assist DHS and other Federal agencies in planning
for catastrophic natural disasters or terrorist attacks?
Admiral Winnefeld. It is my understanding that DOD (including
NORTHCOM) has for some time leveraged its planning expertise to assist
DHS and other Federal agencies under the Integrated Planning System
(set forth in the National Strategy for Homeland Security of 2007, and
Annex I (National Planning) to Homeland Security Presidential Directive
8 (HSPD-8) (National Preparedness). Specifically:
NORTHCOM planners participate, in coordination with
OSD and the Joint Staff, in all levels of planning with DHS and
FEMA, from mission analysis to approved and published Federal
plans.
NORTHCOM, when requested by DHS/FEMA, routinely sends
planners to assist in planning efforts.
NORTHCOM attends and hosts planning conferences with
its mission partners to coordinate and provide planning
assistance.
NORTHCOM shares its plans with critical mission
partners, including Federal agencies.
The National Security Staff is leading the development of a
National Preparedness Presidential Policy Directive that will supersede
HSPD-8 (including Annex I) and will implement a new planning system. If
confirmed, I will ensure NORTHCOM continues to provide planning
expertise on the development of Federal interagency plans, attend and
host planner-related events, and continue to share plans and
information to foster a closer working relationship with Federal
partners.
______
[The nomination reference of VADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr.,
USN, follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 20, 2010.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Navy to the
grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be Admiral.
VADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., 5212.
______
[The biographical sketch of VADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr.,
USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Department of the Navy,
2000 Navy Pentagon,
Washington, DC, October 29, 2009.
Hon. Carl Levin, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The President, under the provisions of section
601, title 10, U.S.C., has submitted to the Senate the nomination of
Vice Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., U.S. Navy, for appointment to the
grade of admiral.
Vice Admiral Winnefeld is presently serving as Director, Strategic
Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff; Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to
the United Nations Military Staff Committee. He will be assigned as
Commander, Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense
Command. He is 53 years of age.
This action will not result in the Navy exceeding the number of
authorized four-star positions.
For the information of the committee, I am enclosing a career
resume on Vice Admiral Winnefeld which includes a summary of his joint
duty assignments.
Most respectfully,
R.S. Erskine,
Director, Flag Officer
Management and Distribution.
cc:
Hon. John McCain, Ranking Member,
Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
______
Transcript of Naval Service for VADM James Alexander Winnefeld, Jr.,
USN
24 April 1956............................. Born in Coronado, CA
07 June 1978.............................. Ensign
07 June 1980.............................. Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 July 1982.............................. Lieutenant
01 September 1988......................... Lieutenant Commander
01 September 1992......................... Commander
01 September 1997......................... Captain
01 October 2003........................... Rear Admiral (lower half)
06 May 2006............................... Designated Rear Admiral
while serving in billets
commensurate with that
grade
01 August 2006............................ Rear Admiral
14 September 2007......................... Vice Admiral, Service
continuous to date
Assignments and duties:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Station, Annapolis, MD (Division Officer). June 1978 Nov. 1978
Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL Nov. 1978 Apr. 1979
(DUINS)........................................
Training Squadron SIX (Student)................. Apr. 1979 June 1979
Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL June 1979 Dec. 1979
(DUINS)........................................
Training Squadron TWO THREE (Student)........... June 1979 Dec. 1979
Training Squadron TWO TWO (Student)............. Dec. 1979 May 1980
Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Replacement Jun. 1980 Apr. 1981
Pilot).........................................
Fighter Squadron TWO FOUR (Power Plants Branch Apr. 1981 Nov. 1983
Officer).......................................
Naval Fighter Weapons School, San Diego, CA Nov. 1983 Jan. 1987
(Quality Assurance Officer)....................
Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Replacement Naval Jan. 1987 Apr. 1987
Aviator).......................................
Fighter Squadron ONE (Operations Officer)....... Apr. 1987 Jan. 1990
Joint Staff (Action Officer, EUCOM/CENTCOM Feb. 1990 July 1991
Branch, J3)....................................
Joint Staff (Senior Aide-De-Camp to the Chaiiman July 1991 Aug. 1992
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)..................
Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Student)......... Aug. 1992 Jan. 1993
XO, Fighter Squadron TWO ONE ONE................ Jan. 1993 Apr. 1994
CO, Fighter Squadron TWO ONE ONE................ Apr. 1994 Mar. 1995
Naval Nuclear Power Training Command, Orlando, Mar. 1995 Feb. 1996
FL (Student)...................................
Prospective Executive Officer, USS John C. Feb. 1996 Mar. 1996
Stennis (CVN 74)...............................
Naval Reactors, Department of Energy, Mar. 1996 Aug. 1996
Washington, DC (Student).......................
XO, USS John C Stennis (CVN 74)................. Aug. 1996 May 1998
CO, USS Cleveland (LPD 7)....................... May 1998 Feb. 2000
CO, USS Enterprise (CVN 65)..................... Feb. 2000 Mar. 2002
Office of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations Mar. 2002 July 2003
(Executive Assistant)..........................
Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Director, July 2003 Dec. 2004
Warfare Programs and Readiness) (N8)...........
Commander, Carrier Strike Group TWO............. Dec. 2004 June 2006
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (Director June 2006 Aug. 2007
of Joint Innovation and Experimentation, J9)...
Commander, SIXTH Fleet/Commander, Striking and Sep. 2007 Aug. 2008
Support Forces NATO/Deputy Commander, U.S.
Naval Forces Europe/Commander, Joint
Headquarters Lisbon............................
Joint Staff (Director, Strategic Plans and Aug. 2008 To date
Policy) (J5)/Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to
the United Nations Military Staff Committee....
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medals and awards:
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with two Gold Stars
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Air Medal with First Strike/Flight Award
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Gold Star
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Navy Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star
Navy ``E'' Ribbon with ``E'' Device
National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two Bronze Stars
Southwest Asia Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star and one Bronze
Star
Expert Pistol Shot Medal
Special qualifications:
BS (Aerospace Engineering) Georgia Institute of Technology, 1978
Designated Naval Aviator, 1980
Capstone, 2004-3
Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009
Personal data:
Wife: Mary Alice Werner of Menomonie, WI
Children: James A. Winnefeld (Son) Born: 29 November 1995; and
Jonathan J. Winnefeld (Son) Born: 11 May 1998.
Summary of joint duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Staff (Action Officer, Feb. 90-July 91 LCDR
EUCOM/CENTCOM Branch, J3).......
Joint Staff (Senior Aide-De-Camp July 91-Aug. 92 CDR
to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff)................
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces June 06-Aug. 07 RADM
Command (Director of Joint
Innovation and Experimentation,
J9).............................
Commander, SIXTH Fleet/Commander, Sep. 07-Aug. 08 VADM
Striking and Support Forces NATO/
Deputy Commander, U.S. Naval
Forces Europe/Commander, Joint
Headquarters Lisbon.............
Joint Staff (Director, Strategic Aug. 08-To date VADM
Plans and Policy) (J5)/Senior
Member, U.S. Delegation to the
United Nations Military Staff
Committee.......................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by VADM James A.
Winnefeld, Jr., USN, in connection with his nomination
follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
James A. Winnefeld, Jr. (nickname: Sandy)
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace
Defense Command.
3. Date of nomination:
20 January 2010.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
24 April 1956; Coronado, CA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to the former Mary Alice Werner.
7. Names and ages of children:
James A. Winnefeld III, age 13; Jonathan J. Winnefeld, age 11.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member (otherwise referred to as a Trustee) of U.S. Naval Academy
Foundation: Athletic and Scholarship Programs (a nonprofit
organization).
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Member of the Academy of Distinguished Engineering Alumni, Georgia
Institute of Technology.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
James A. Winnefeld, Jr.
This 29th day of October, 2009.
[The nomination of VADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on May 5, 2010, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 7, 2010.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Keith B. Alexander,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-
Nichols Act has been a remarkable achievement. Our military forces are
more interoperable today than they ever have been in our Nation's
history. I do not see a need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act at
this time.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. In accordance with Secretary of Defense guidance of June
23, 2009, the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command is responsible for
executing the specified cyberspace missions detailed in Section 18d(3)
of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) as delegated by the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command to secure our freedom of action in cyber space and
mitigate the risks to our national security that come from our
dependence on cyberspace and the associated threats and
vulnerabilities. Subject to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command,
delegation and in coordination with mission partners, specific missions
include: integrating cyberspace operations and synchronizing
warfighting effects across the global security environment; providing
support to civil authorities and international partners; directing
global information grid operations and defense; executing full-spectrum
military cyberspace operations; serving as the focal point for
deconfliction of the Department of Defense (DOD) offensive cyberspace
operations; providing improved shared situational awareness of
cyberspace operations, including indications and warning; and providing
military representation to U.S. national agencies, U.S. commercial
agencies, and international agencies for cyberspace matters.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I am deeply honored that the President nominated me to be
the first Commander of U.S. Cyber Command. Over the past 3 decades, I
have served in a wide variety of Joint and Army positions, including 15
years in command, that have prepared me well for the challenges ahead
if confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
First, I have 35 years in the profession of arms, serving in
various command, staff and intelligence positions in the military. I
have served as the Deputy Chief of Staff of Intelligence, Headquarters,
Department of the Army; Commanding General of the U.S. Army
Intelligence and Security Command; Director of Intelligence, U.S.
Central Command; and Deputy Director for Requirements, Capabilities,
Assessments, and Doctrine, J-2, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Second, my experiences and knowledge gained over the last 4\1/2\
years serving as Director, National Security Agency (NSA), Chief,
Central Security Service and Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command-Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) have been instrumental in preparing
me for the challenges of this new complex warfighting domain that is
cyberspace. NSA's cryptologic work in SIGINT/Computer Network
Exploitation, Information Assurance and Network Threat Operations is
second to none and foundational to our future success in the cyber
domain. I have personally championed NSA's work and learned a great
deal from the outstanding professionals at NSA/CSS. Over the last 4\1/
2\ years, I have also forged important partnerships with both our
allies and with industry to strengthen the defense of our collective
networks. Furthermore, my assignment as the Commander, JFCC-NW,
including operational control over Joint Task Force-Global Network
Operations (JTF-GNO) for the past 18 months, has provided me with the
experience, particularly in the realm of deliberate and crisis action
planning, to ensure the effective execution of cyberspace
responsibilities as directed by the Secretary of Defense through
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.
Finally, I believe my academic background has intellectually
prepared me for the challenges of high-level command and complex
environments. I have Masters of Science degrees in Business
Administration, Systems Technology (Electronic Warfare) and Physics, as
well as National Security Strategy.
Question. If confirmed as the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command,
would you have command of or exercise operational control of the
Defense Information Systems Agency's (DISA) and Military Services'
communications networks?
Answer. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, I will be
responsible for directing the operation and defense of DOD's military
information networks as specified in the UCP and as delegated by
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. I will execute this mission through
each of the Service Network Operations and Security Centers. I will not
exercise command or operational control over the DISA communications
networks. DISA will continue to be responsible for acquiring,
engineering and provisioning enterprise infrastructure to assure the
availability of military information networks. As a Combat Support
Agency, DISA will maintain a close working relationship with U.S. Cyber
Command, providing expertise on the networks, communications and
computing infrastructure operated by DISA through both a DISA Field
Office and a DISA Support Element.
Question. As a career intelligence officer, what experience do you
have that qualifies you to command these networks and to command
military forces and military operations?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. I fundamentally believe that there is always something to
be learned to enhance my expertise in this very complex and dynamically
changing domain. If confirmed, I will engage with combatant commanders
to understand better how U.S. Cyber Command can best support and help
meet their operational missions. Additionally, I would engage with key
officials and personnel within the Executive and Legislative branches
of the U.S. Government, senior military leaders, and leaders throughout
the Intelligence Community in order to identify, assess, and mitigate
the cyber threats we face.
Question. Is there a precedent for a career intelligence officer to
serve as a combatant commander?
Answer. I know of no career intelligence officers who have
previously served as either a combatant or subunified commander.
However, two former Directors of NSA, General Lew Allen and Admiral
Noel Gayler, served with great distinction as the Chief of Staff, U.S.
Air Force and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, respectively.
relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship the Commander, U.S.
Cyber Command, will have to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Pursuant to title 10, U.S.C., section 164, subject to the
direction of the President, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command,
performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of Defense and is directly responsible to the Secretary for
the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the
command. As a subunified command under the authority, direction, and
control of the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Cyber Command
will be directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command . If confirmed, I will work closely
with the Secretary in coordination with Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command, on matters of strategic importance.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. In accordance with title 10, U.S.C., section 132, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense will perform such duties and exercise
powers prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense will act for and exercise the powers of the Secretary of
Defense when the Secretary is disabled or the office is vacant. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary, in
coordination with Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, on matters of
strategic importance.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
Answer. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of
2004 established the Director of National Intelligence to act as the
head of the Intelligence Community, principal advisor to the President,
National Security Council, and Homeland Security Council on
intelligence matters pertaining to national security, and to oversee
and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.
Pursuant to title 50, U.S.C., section 403, subject to the authority,
direction, and control of the President, the Director of National
Intelligence is responsible to coordinate national intelligence
priorities and to facilitate information sharing among the Intelligence
Community. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command and through the Secretary of Defense to coordinate
and exchange information with the Director of National Intelligence as
needed to ensure unified effort and the leveraging of available
synergies within the Intelligence Community to support matters of
national security.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their
respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries
exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their
responsibilities, the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and
directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command, on all policy issues that affect U.S. Cyber Command
operations.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their
respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries
exercise policy and oversight functions and, in discharging their
responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and
directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command, on matters in the area of U.S. Cyber Command's
assigned responsibilities.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their
respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries
exercise policy and oversight functions and, in discharging their
responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and
directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination
with Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, on matters in the area of U.S.
Cyber Command's assigned responsibilities.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration .
Answer. Under the authority of DOD Directive 5144.1 and consistent
with titles 10, 40, and 44, U.S.C., the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)) serves as the DOD
Chief Information Officer (CIO) and is the principal staff assistant
and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense
on networks and network-centric policies and concepts; command and
control (C2); communications; non-intelligence space matters;
enterprise-wide integration of DOD information matters; Information
Technology (IT), including National Security Systems (NSS); information
resource management (IRM); spectrum management; network operations;
information systems; information assurance; positioning, navigation,
and timing policy, including airspace and military-air-traffic control
activities; sensitive information integration; contingency support and
migration planning; and related matters. Pursuant to chapter 113,
subchapter III of 40 U.S.C., the ASD(NII)/DOD CIO has responsibilities
for integrating information and related activities and services across
DOD. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration through
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command, on matters in the area of U.S. Cyber Command's
assigned responsibilities.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
executes responsibilities including overall supervision of the homeland
defense activities of the DOD while serving under the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy. Any relationship the Commander, U.S. Cyber
Command requires with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Security would exist with and through the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense in concert with Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command, Commander, U.S. Northern Command, and
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command on related national security issues.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the
President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. title
10, U.S.C., section 163 allows communication between the President or
the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to flow through
the Chairman. By custom and tradition, and as instructed by the UCP, I
would normally communicate with the Chairman in coordination with the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Under title 10, U.S.C., section 165, subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and
subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries
of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and
support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.
The authority exercised by a subunified combatant commander over
Service components is quite clear but requires close coordination with
each Secretary to ensure that there is no infringement upon those
lawful responsibilities which a Secretary alone may discharge. If
confirmed, I look forward to building a strong and productive
relationship with each of the Secretaries of the Military Departments
in partnership with Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Service Chiefs are charged to provide organized,
trained, and equipped forces to be employed by combatant commanders in
accomplishing their assigned missions. Additionally, these officers
serve as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as such have a lawful
obligation to provide military advice. Individually and collectively,
the Service Chiefs are a tremendous source of experience and judgment.
If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Service
Chiefs.
Question. The combatant commanders and specifically the Commanders
of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Command.
Answer. U.S. Cyber Command is a subordinate unified command under
U.S. Strategic Command. The Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, will have
both supported and supporting relationships with other combatant
commanders, largely identified within the UCP, the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan, execute orders and operation orders. In general, the
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, will be the supported commander for
planning, leading, and conducting DOD defensive cyber and global
network operations and, in general, is a supporting commander for
offensive missions. Specific relationships with Commander, U.S.
Northern Command will be delineated by the Secretary of Defense or the
President in execute and/or operation orders. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the combatant commanders to broaden and enhance
the level and range of these relationships.
Question. The Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency.
Answer. DISA is a DOD combat support agency that provides command
and control capabilities and enterprise infrastructure to continuously
operate and assure a global net-centric enterprise in direct support to
join warfighters, national-level leaders, and other mission and
coalition partners across the full spectrum of operations. Commander,
U.S. Cyber Command must maintain a close relationship with the
Director, DISA to coordinate and represent requirements in this mission
area, in order to accomplish U.S. Strategic Command delegated UCP
missions. To this end, Lieutenant General Pollett, the current Director
of DISA, has committed to providing both a DISA Field Office as well as
a DISA support element unique to U.S. Cyber Command. If confirmed, I
will continue to work closely with the Director of DISA on matters of
shared interest and importance.
oversight
Question. The duties of the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command will
include conducting integrated intelligence collection and offensive and
defensive operations in cyberspace. However, the resourcing, planning,
programming and budgeting, and oversight of these three basic
activities is fragmented within DOD, the executive branch as a whole,
and within Congress. Multiple elements within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have responsibilities for one
or more of the missions of Cyber Command. The same is true for the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, as well
as the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees in Congress. The
single point of confluence would be the Commander of Cyber Command,
dual-hatted as the Director of NSA.
How do you anticipate that the Department will ensure the necessary
degree of coordination and timely decisionmaking across the Department
to guide the operations and resourcing of Cyber Command?
Answer. Through the Secretary of Defense's policy initiatives for
cyberspace operations and implementation guidance concerning national
security directives, the Department will ensure the necessary degree of
coordination and timely decisionmaking across the Department to guide
the operations and resourcing of U.S. Cyber Command. If confirmed, I
envision that the Department will retain its commitment to close
coordination both internally and externally to guide the operations and
resourcing of this command.
Question. What is the risk, in your view, that this fragmented
policy and oversight structure will result in a lack of coherent
oversight of cyberspace and U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. I believe we have a coherent policy and oversight structure
in place for cyberspace and that there is no risk that we will lack
coherent oversight. If confirmed, I can assure you that my actions will
be guided by the authorities vested in me by the Secretary of Defense
and Commander, U.S. Strategic Command and oversight of my actions will
be clearly auditable for overseers.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. I believe the major challenge that will confront the
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command will be improving the defense of our
military networks as they exist today. Additionally, in order to defend
those networks and make good decisions in exercising operational
control over them, U.S. Cyber Command will require much greater
situational awareness and real-time visibility of intrusions into our
networks. Finally, I believe the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command will
have to identify continuously policy and authority gaps to U.S.
Strategic Command and our civilian leadership as computer and
communication technologies evolve.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. What are your priorities for the U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
u.s. cyber command missions
Question. In an overarching sense, how do you define the U.S. Cyber
Command missions?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
offensive cyber warfare capabilities
Question. The attached solicitations and program descriptions show
that the military services are developing capabilities to stealthily
penetrate foreign computer networks, maintain a presence on those
networks, collect and extract information clandestinely, and undertake
offensive actions. The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace
Operations, published in 2006, also indicates that the U.S. military
places considerable importance on acquiring potent offensive cyber
warfare capabilities.
Does DOD possess significant capabilities to conduct military
operations in cyberspace at the tactical, operational, and strategic
levels?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is there a substantial mismatch between the ability of
the United States to conduct operations in cyberspace and the level of
development of policies governing such operations?
Answer. President Obama's cybersecurity 60-day study highlighted
the mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations
and the governing laws and policies, and our civilian leadership is
working hard to resolve the mismatch. In the June 23, 2009 memorandum
outlining the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command, the Secretary of
Defense directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to lead a
review of policy and strategy to develop a comprehensive approach to
DOD cyberspace operations. This review is active and ongoing.
Question. Are you concerned that you are being assigned to command
an organization that may be directed to conduct activities whose
legality and rules have not been worked out?
Answer. Given current operations, there are sufficient law, policy,
and authorities to govern DOD cyberspace operations. If confirmed, I
will operate within applicable laws, policies, and authorities. I will
also identify any gaps in doctrine, policy and law that may prevent
national objectives from being fully realized or executed to the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command and the Secretary of Defense.
Question. When does the administration intend to close existing
policy gaps?
Answer. The administration has provided a comprehensive set of
cyber security initiatives that will inform policy making (e.g.,
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) and the
President's Strategy to Secure Cyberspace). In support of the Secretary
of Defense, we will continue to work to identify gaps, inform the
development of meaningful and enduring national cyber policy, and be
prepared to adjust rapidly to changes.
support to the comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative
Question. Under the CNCI, NSA is providing support to the
Department of Homeland Security.
What is the nature and extent of that support?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is this support provided as a DOD activity or as an
intelligence activity through the Director of National Intelligence? If
the latter, what is the Secretary of Defense's role as the President's
executive agent for signals intelligence (SIGINT) under Executive Order
12333?
Answer. The support provided by NSA to DHS is provided as a DOD
activity, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence.
Specifically, with respect to the Foreign Intelligence support to
DHS, per Executive Order 12333, as amended, NSA is an element of both
the Intelligence Community, of which the Director of National
Intelligence serves as the head, and DOD, whose Secretary acts, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, as the
Executive Agent for the U.S. Government for SIGINT activities. In these
capacities, NSA conducts SIGINT activities for both national and
departmental requirements.
Further, with respect to Information Assurance support to DHS, for
such support that is given in connection with NSSs, National Security
Directive 42 provides that the Secretary of Defense shall serve as the
executive agent of the Government for National Security
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security. NSD 42 further
designates the Director NSA as the National Manager for National
Security Telecommunications and Information's Systems Security and is
responsible to the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for carrying
out those responsibilities. With respect to Information Assurance
support to DHS that is provided in connection with non-NSSs, NSA is
authorized by EO12333 to provide technical assistance to other U.S.
Government departments and agencies for either NSSs or non-NSSs.
support to civil authorities
Question. DOD officials have informed the committee that U.S. Cyber
Command will have a mission to support civil authorities, such as the
Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement agencies, to help
defend government networks and critical infrastructure networks owned
and operated by the private sector.
Please describe in detail your understanding of the ways that U.S.
Cyber Command is most likely to assist civil authorities.
Answer. If I am confirmed as Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, I will
work closely with the Commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S.
Northern Command to answer any request for assistance from the
Department of Homeland Security. Our assistance could include technical
assistance and recommendations for immediate defensive actions, as well
as technical assistance and recommendations for more systemic
mitigation, such as improvements in network configurations and
improvements in information assurance measures or best practices.
Additionally, U.S. Cyber Command would continually assess the cyber
threat to DOD's information systems to ensure we are prepared to
provide cyber support to civil authorities in the event of a cyber
threat to the Nation's critical infrastructure.
Question. U.S. Northern Command was established to serve as the
focal point for DOD support to civil authorities.
Will cybersecurity support to civil authorities be provided through
U.S. Northern Command, as a supported command, or otherwise? If not,
why not?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
use of force in cyberspace
Question. Does DOD have a definition for what constitutes use of
force in cyberspace, and will that definition be the same for U.S.
activities in cyberspace and those of other nations?
Answer. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that states shall
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State. DOD operations are
conducted consistent with international law principles in regard to
what is a threat or use of force in terms of hostile intent and hostile
act, as reflected in the Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules
for the Use of Force (SROE/SRUF).
There is no international consensus on a precise definition of a
use of force, in or out of cyberspace. Consequently, individual nations
may assert different definitions, and may apply different thresholds
for what constitutes a use of force. Thus, whether in the cyber or any
other domain, there is always potential disagreement among nations
concerning what may amount to a threat or use of force.
Remainder of answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Has DOD or the administration as a whole determined what
constitutes use of force in cyberspace in relation to the War Powers
Act, the exercise of the right of self-defense under the U.N. Charter,
and the triggering of collective defense obligations? If not, when will
these fundamental policy issues be resolved?
Answer. The President of the United States determines what is a
threat or use of force/armed attack against the United States and
authorizes DOD through the SROE to exercise our national right of self-
defense recognized by the U.N. Charter. This determination involves an
objective and subjective analysis that considers the facts surrounding
a particular cyber attack, and is made within the bounds of U.S. and
international law. If the President determines a cyber event does meet
the threshold of a use of force/armed attack, he may determine that the
activity is of such scope, duration, or intensity that it warrants
exercising our right to self-defense and/or the initiation of
hostilities as an appropriate response. It is also within the
President's authority to determine, based upon the circumstances of any
event, including a cyber event, and the contemplated response, what
consultations and reports to Congress are necessary consistent with the
provisions of the War Powers Resolution. The U.N. Charter recognizes a
State's inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, and
the United States would evaluate its collective defense obligations
when another State is threatened or subject to a use of force in the
cyber domain just as it would in the other warfighting domains.
Question. Could U.S. Cyber Command lawfully employ offensive cyber
weapons against computers located abroad that have been determined to
be sources of an attack on the United States or U.S. deployed forces if
we do not know who is responsible for the attack (i.e., a foreign
government or non-state actors)?
Answer. The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command, in and of itself,
does not change the lawful employment of military force for self-
defense. In this case, if the ``attack'' met the criteria approved by
the President in our Standing Rules of Engagement, the military would
exercise its obligation of self-defense. Operationally, it is difficult
to develop an effective response when we do not know who is responsible
for an ``attack''; however, the circumstances may be such that at least
some level of mitigating action can be taken even when we are not
certain who is responsible. Regardless whether we know who is
responsible, international law requires that our use of force in self-
defense be proportional and discriminate. Neither proportionality nor
discrimination requires that we know who is responsible before we take
defensive action.
Question. Without confident ``attribution,'' under international
law, would DOD, in your judgment, be allowed to ``fire back'' without
first asking the host government to deal with the attack?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Traditionally, espionage has not been regarded as a use
of force or an act of war. Generally speaking, in cyberspace
operations, experts agree that gaining access to a target for
intelligence collection is tantamount to gaining the ability to attack
that target. If a penetration is detected, the victim cannot determine
whether the purpose of the activity is limited to espionage or also
constitutes preparation for an attack.
With the foregoing in mind, are there or should there be classes of
U.S. or allied targets that the U.S. Government would consider off-
limits from hostile penetration because of the danger that any such
breaches would present to national security?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Would or should such targets be immune to penetration by
the United States in peacetime even for intelligence collection?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
authorities of commander, u.s. cyber command
Question. Offensive cyber warfare weapons or operations could have
devastating effects, depending on the target of the attack and the
method used, which conceivably could be comparable to those caused by
weapons of mass destruction.
If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, would you have the
authority to use offensive cyber weapons against the following
representative classes of targets:
Military command and control networks;
Military air defense networks;
Military platforms and weapons;
Power grids;
Banks and other financial institutions and networks;
Transportation-related networks; and
National telecommunications networks?
Answer. The categories listed are all potential targets of military
attack, both kinetic and cyber, under the right circumstances. It is
difficult for me to conceive of an instance where it would be
appropriate to attack a bank or a financial institution, unless perhaps
it was being used solely to support enemy military operations.
Offensive cyber weapons would only be authorized under specific
lawful orders by the Secretary of Defense and the President and would
normally come with supplemental rules of engagement.
All military operations, to include actions taken in cyberspace,
must comply with international law that governs military operations.
Specifically, any U.S. military operation must comport with the
principles of military necessity, discrimination, and proportionality.
These legal principles are addressed during the planning and
operational phases of all military operations.
Question. Do you have this authority now as the Joint Functional
Component Commander for Network Warfare?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. At what level of command can decisions be made to pre-
deploy offensive cyber weapons against these same classes of targets?
Will this change after the standup of U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. This authority rests with the Secretary of Defense and the
President. It will not change after U.S. Cyber Command is established.
Question. Operations in cyberspace occur at nearly the speed of
light. Speed of response is widely considered to be necessary in some
circumstances when operating in cyberspace.
Is there currently or do you anticipate that there will be a
requirement to pre-authorize the use of force in cyberspace below the
level of the National Command Authority? If so, to what level and in
what circumstances?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is it your understanding that, as is the case with the
Commander of the subunified U.S. Forces Korea Command, the subunified
Commander of Cyber Command will have freedom of action to fight the
war?
Answer. The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command will have freedom of
action to conduct military operations in cyberspace based upon the
authorities provided by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. Because cyberspace is not
generally bounded by geography, the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command
will have to coordinate with U.S. agencies and combatant commanders
that would be affected by actions taken in cyberspace.
Question. What is the role of the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command, in directing or approving courses of action of the Commander,
U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, as the combatant
commander, has the responsibility to specify U.S. Cyber Command
missions and tasks and delegate appropriate authority to accomplish
those tasks. In accordance with joint doctrine, authority is normally
given to subordinate commanders to select the methodology for
accomplishing the mission, including selection and approval of courses
of action. However, this authority may be limited by directives or
other orders of the superior commander. Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command has indicated to the Secretary of Defense he will delegate
authority for all UCP cyber tasks, with the exception of advocacy for
cyberspace capabilities and integration of the Theater Security
Cooperation activities with Geographic Combatant Commanders.
laws of war
Question. Has DOD determined how the laws of armed conflict
(including the principles of military necessity in choosing targets,
proportionality with respect to collateral damage and unintended
consequences, and distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants)
apply to cyber warfare with respect to both nation-states and non-state
entities (e.g., terrorists, criminals), and both when the source of an
attack is known and unknown?
Answer. Per DOD guidance, all military operations must be in
compliance with the laws of armed conflict--this includes cyber
operations as well. The law of war principles of military necessity,
proportionality and distinction will apply when conducting cyber
operations.
Question. If not, when will the Department produce authoritative
positions on these issues?
Answer. See answer above.
balancing equities
Question. There have been many instances in history where military
and political leaders had to struggle with the choice of acting on
intelligence information to save lives or forestall an enemy success
but at the cost of the enemy learning that their communications,
information, or capabilities had been compromised. These choices are
referred to as ``balancing equities'' or ``gain-loss'' calculations.
U.S. Cyber Command is to be headed by the Director of the NSA, which,
like all intelligence agencies, could be naturally expected to seek to
protect sensitive sources and methods.
Who will be in charge of the equities/gain-loss process for
cyberspace within the military?
Answer. Within DOD, the equities/gain-loss process is built into
the deliberate and crisis action planning process and initiated by the
combatant commanders. In most cases, the gain-loss recommendation
within DOD is initially made by the supported combatant commander after
the risk of loss is well articulated by the Intelligence Community. If
there is disagreement I, as the commander of JFCC NW, serve as the
focal point for DOD offensive cyberspace operations in accordance with
the deconfliction process directed in NSPD-38. If the NSPD-38
deconfliction process does not resolve the interagency disagreement,
the issue goes to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of
Defense, the NSC Deputies, the NSC Principals, and then the President,
where the gain-loss determination continues to be considered. (In
counterterrorism issues, the National Counterterrorism Center is
brought in before the Deputies Committee considers the issue.) If
confirmed as Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, I will continue to have
responsibility for this process within the Department.
Question. If these decisions will rest with the Commander of Cyber
Command, how would you expect the process to work to ensure that the
combatant commands, the Military Services, and other defense agencies
have the opportunity to defend their interests and are not overruled by
NSA?
Answer. We would use the process outlined by the Joint Staff and
used by other combatant commands. Intelligence Gain-Loss is a
consideration of target vetting and is coordinated with the
Intelligence Community agencies and with supporting combatant commands
throughout the planning process. Those agencies and commands provide
comments on their equities and issues for the commander's review and
validation. The supported command then makes a determination based on
their mission and expected effects. If the targeting issues cannot be
resolved between the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command/Director, NSA and
the Federal Bureau of Investigations Cyber Division, the issue goes to
the NSC Deputies Committee, and if still unresolved, the NSC Principals
Committee.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that equities/gain-loss
decisions are made for the Nation as a whole? How will the interests of
the vulnerable private sector, critical infrastructure, and civil
agencies be weighed in the selection of targets for intelligence
collection and attack in wartime?
Answer. Our deconfliction process, documented in a Tri-lateral
Memorandum of Agreement among DOD, DoJ and the Intelligence Community,
includes appropriate representation of other agencies as directed in
NSPD-38. As with targeting issues within the Department, the reclama
process for issues spanning Federal agencies matriculate from the
Seniors to the Deputies Committee to the Principals Committee if they
remain unresolved.
deterrence and escalation control
Question. The U.S. Government currently does not appear to have a
cyber warfare deterrence strategy or doctrine. Promulgating such a
doctrine requires at least some broad statements of capabilities and
intentions regarding the use of offensive cyber capabilities, both to
influence potential adversaries and to reassure allies. Such statements
are not possible given the current degree of classification of all
aspects of U.S. cyber warfare capabilities.
Do you agree that it is necessary to declassify some information
about U.S. cyber warfare capabilities in order to support deterrence
and engagement with allies and potential adversaries?
Answer. I agree and fully support the President's executive order
regarding security classification. This is a complex subject, and we
will continue to implement directed policies and inform policymakers of
operational impacts.
Question. Is there a process and timetable in place to accomplish
this objective?
Answer. I am not aware of any plan or timetable to declassify
detailed information about U.S. offensive cyber capabilities.
Articulating new processes and timetables would flow from direction set
by the White House.
Question. Most experts believe that the attacker has a substantial
advantage over the defender in cyber warfare. It is also widely
believed that preemptively striking first against an adversary's
networks offers an advantage if the adversary's command and control
networks can be degraded, and because the attacker can take steps to
protect itself from a retaliatory attack. These considerations suggest
that cyber warfare is currently ``unstable'' from the perspective of
classic deterrence theory and escalation control.
Do you, or to your knowledge, experts in the Department, have a
different view of these dynamics?
Answer. I'd certainly agree that cyber warfare has unique and
important differences from classic deterrence theory and escalation
control. Experts, both inside and outside government, as well as within
DOD and Intelligence Communities, have widely differing views of these
dynamics, as should be expected. A consensus has yet to emerge, either
on how to characterize the strategic ``instability'' or on what to do
about it.
u.s. military strategy in cyberspace
Question. The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations
(NMS-CO), December 2006, states that ``The United States must have
cyberspace superiority to ensure our freedom of action and deny the
same to our adversaries through the integration of network defense,
exploitation, and attack. . . . The NMS-CO is the comprehensive
military strategy for the U.S. Armed Forces to ensure U.S. superiority
in cyberspace.''
Is this strategy statement consistent with current policy? If not,
is there a plan to issue a new or revised NMS-CO?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is this strategy realistic in light of the vulnerability
of U.S. Government and private networks to attack?
Answer. The military strategic goal of cyberspace superiority is
realistic, but not without difficulty in achieving its objectives in
the current national security environment. The 42 tasks in the NMS-CO
Implementation Plan continue to inform how DOD will move towards
achieving cyberspace superiority. Many of these tasks are defensive,
directed at addressing the vulnerabilities of the DOD networks, and
take into consideration the fact that the internet is a completely
connected environment where both DOD and private networks reside.
Question. In an interview on ``60 Minutes,'' former Director of
National Intelligence Michael McConnell said that ``If I were an
attacker and I wanted to do strategic damage to the United States . . .
I would sack electric power on the U.S. east coast, maybe the west
coast, and attempt to cause a cascading effect. All of those things are
in the art of the possible from a sophisticated attacker.'' He was then
asked whether he believes that adversaries have the ability to bring
down the power grid, and he replied ``I do.'' Crippling the U.S. power
grid would not only cause catastrophic economic problems; presumably it
would lead to significant loss of life, especially if the outage was
prolonged. Likewise, it could cripple DOD's ability to generate and
sustain forces.
In light of our current vulnerability to cyber attack, what is the
risk in your view that DOD and U.S. Cyber Command could be deterred
from undertaking coercive action against countries such as Iran or
North Korea because of the possibility that they could successfully
launch devastating attacks on critical U.S. infrastructure?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is this level of vulnerability consistent with the NMS-CO
assertion that the United States ensures ``superiority'' in cyberspace?
Answer. Yes, it is consistent that the United States seeks to
ensure superiority in cyberspace: Even with the clear understanding
that we could experience damage to our infrastructure, we must be
prepared to ``fight through'' in the worst case scenario. Based on
vulnerability, step one is to ensure that we can defend our networks.
In fact, the use of the term superiority, versus dominance or
supremacy, reflects the limits of our capabilities throughout the
domain. Having recognized the gap between the end states of the NMS-CO
and current capabilities, the Department developed an implementation
plan to close these gaps. The current state of our networks presents a
strategic vulnerability for the Department and the Nation. If
confirmed, I will focus U.S. Cyber Command on securing the Department's
networks and, as requested, assisting other Federal agencies to secure
the networks for which they are responsible.
Question. The NMS-CO states that ``U.S. law and national policy
assign DOD three main roles: defense of the Nation, national incident
response, and critical infrastructure protection. . . . Although
partner departments and agencies have responsibilities to secure
portions of cyberspace, only DOD conducts military operations to defend
cyberspace, the critical infrastructure, the homeland, or other vital
U.S. interests. If defense of a vital interest is implicated, DOD's
national defense mission takes primacy even if that would conflict
with, or subsume, the other support missions.''
Are these statements consistent with DOD's statements that U.S.
Cyber Command will not have the mission to defend the ``.gov'' and
``.com'' networks?
Answer. Yes, they are consistent. Although U.S. Cyber Command's
mission will not include defense of the .gov and .com domains, given
the integration of cyberspace into the operation of much of our
critical infrastructure and the conduct of commerce and governance, it
is the obligation of the Department to be prepared to provide military
options to the President and Secretary of Defense if our national
security is threatened. Any defensive action in support of a domain
other than .mil would require a proper request for assistance or a
directive from the President.
Question. Has ``critical infrastructure'' been formally defined or
otherwise identified for the purposes of cybersecurity?
Answer. Yes, specifically ``critical infrastructure'' has been
formally defined in HSPD-7 as those systems or assets, whether physical
or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of those matters.
Question. Do these statements reflect current policy?
Answer. Yes, they reflect current policy.
Question. Do these statements mean that DOD's mission to defend the
Nation ``takes primacy'' over the Department of Homeland Security's
role in some situations?
Answer. Yes, when war or any attack or other national security
crisis arises whereby the use of force is contemplated, DOD would take
the lead in defending the Nation. However, a Presidential order calling
on DOD to take the lead role in responding to a cyber attack on the
United States would be required before DOD assumes this lead role. I
believe that DOD and DHS are completely in synch on this point.
Question. The NMS-CO states that ``under the authorities of the
Secretary of Defense, DOD will use network exploitation to gather
intelligence and shape the cyberspace environment as necessary to
provide integrated offensive and defensive options.'' This statement
appears to mean that DOD will attempt to gain access to foreign
networks to create the ability to conduct offensive operations.
Under what conditions would DOD prepare foreign networks for
offensive operations when access is acquired for intelligence
gathering?
Answer. DOD conducts extensive planning for a wide range of
contingencies including planning for cyberspace operations. Effective
planning for offensive cyber operations requires extensive knowledge
and understanding of foreign networks and is accomplished by foreign
intelligence collection. Any preparation of foreign networks outside
that is beyond the realm of intelligence gathering can only be
conducted by lawful order (EXORD) from Secretary of Defense and the
President.
Question. Are such actions authorized and reported to Congress
under title 10 or title 50?
Answer. Preparation of foreign networks for offensive operations is
authorized only when part of a Secretary of Defense-approved military
operation under title 10 of the U.S.C.; such military operations are
subject to congressional armed services committee oversight. Foreign
intelligence collection activities are subjected to congressional
intelligence oversight.
Question. Does the Secretary of Defense have the unilateral
authority to direct intelligence-gathering operations in cyberspace?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as authorized by law and
executive order, can direct intelligence activities in cyberspace for
those intelligence activities, such as SIGINT, under his operational
control.
Question. If the Secretary of Defense is the President's executive
agent for SIGINT, what is the role of the Director of National
Intelligence in directing SIGINT collection in cyberspace?
Answer. The DNI provides the National Intelligence Strategy and the
National Intelligence Priority Framework, among others, to the entire
Intelligence Community. The DNI also plays a role with respect to
resource allocation via the National Intelligence Program.
Question. Under the Secretary's role as the executive agent for
SIGINT, what was the Secretary's responsibility for the policy
decisions regarding the NSA's Terrorist Surveillance Program, and the
assistance that NSA is providing to the Department of Homeland Security
through the Einstein 3 intrusion detection and prevention program?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. The NMS-CO states that ``Adversaries are deterred from
establishing or employing offensive capabilities against U.S. interests
in cyberspace. DOD will deter malicious adversary use of cyberspace,
while promoting freedom of action and trust and confidence in U.S.
cyberspace operations. Through deterrence, DOD seeks to influence the
adversary's decisionmaking processes by imposing political, economic,
or military costs; denying the benefits of their actions; and inducing
adversary restraint based on demonstrated U.S. capabilities.''
In your opinion, is it the case that ``adversaries are deterred''
from acting against U.S. interests in cyberspace?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Does the United States have a deterrence doctrine and a
deterrence strategy for cyber warfare?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Has the United States ever ``demonstrated capabilities''
in cyberspace in a way that would lead to deterrence of potential
adversaries?
Answer. Not in any significant way. We have conducted exercises and
war games, and responded to threats, intrusions, and even attacks
against us in cyberspace. Law Enforcement and the Counter-Intelligence
community have responded to intrusions and insider threats. Even
industry and academia have attempted to ``police'' the Internet. How
all of these have deterred criminal actions, terrorists, hostile
intelligence entities, and even nation states cannot be systematically
measured.
implications of u.s. dependence on cyber networks
Question. Many experts assert that the United States is the most
vulnerable country in the world to cyber attack because we are the most
networked nation and the one that has most fully-exploited computer
networks for business, government, and military functions. This
judgment implies that the United States has the most to lose in a
serious cyber conflict.
How could DOD best compensate for U.S. dependence on vulnerable
cyber networks in developing effective deterrent strategies?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Given U.S. vulnerabilities, is it in our interest to
engage in certain kinds of offensive cyber warfare, and possibly set
precedents by example that other nations might follow?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
covert action versus traditional military operations
Question. What is your understanding of whether clandestine
offensive actions in cyberspace conducted by DOD in connection with an
ongoing military conflict where the hand of the U.S. Government is
intended to be concealed ``covert action'' under the law, or are they
considered traditional military operations?
Answer. Covert action, as defined by law, includes ``an activity or
activities of the U.S. Government to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
U.S. Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.'' The
law goes on specifically to except ``traditional . . . military
activities'' from being considered covert actions. (50 U.S.C.
413b(e)(2000)) Traditional military activities are often clandestine in
order to guarantee mission success and protect tactics, techniques, and
procedures--this is no different in cyberspace. DOD believes the
traditional military activities exception applies to the emerging field
of cyberspace operations.
Question. Does it matter whether such actions are conducted within
or outside of a theater of ongoing, traditional armed conflict?
Answer. This is a matter of ongoing debate. Proposed actions to
deliver effects to combatant commanders at the tactical and operational
level should be pursued as traditional military operations, under
existing authorizations, if possible. Any actions that we take must be
approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President through a lawful
order.
requirement for transit rights
Question. Under international law, nations enjoy sovereign rights
over the territorial extent of their countries and the airspace above
it, although not in space. Transiting that sovereign territory and
airspace for military purposes requires permission.
In a situation where a government intends to deliver a cyber weapon
or capability to a country not adjacent to its territory, through
terrestrial telecommunications networks, what is the legality of doing
so without the permission of the governments of the Nations through
which the weapon must pass?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
the challenge of attribution
Question. An essential feature of military, intelligence, and
criminal or malicious activities in cyberspace is the ease with which
the origin and the identity of those responsible for an attack can be
concealed. This ``attribution'' problem is severe. If it is impossible
to say with certainty who committed an attack, no one can be held
responsible, making deterrence and retaliation alike problematic. The
attribution capabilities that do exist appear to be time- and resource-
intensive, which can make appropriate, timely responses difficult or
even impossible.
How can deterrence be established in the absence of reliable
attribution?
Answer. I agree that attribution can be very difficult. We must
approach this problem in two ways. First and foremost, the most
effective way to deter adversaries is to increase the security of our
own networks. This will act as a deterrent to those adversaries who
target the United States simply because we are an easy mark. This is a
national problem and better security solutions must be encouraged for
all U.S. public and private networks.
Concurrently, we must partner closely with the Intelligence
Community to improve our ability to determine attribution. We must also
establish partnerships with nation-states that share common goals for
lawful behavior in cyberspace. Such agreements would establish
expectations of normative behavior for cyber activities and thresholds
for bad behaviors that would not be allowed to continue. Such
expectations will require standards of evidence that are mutually
acceptable and include highly automated procedures that allow attacks
to be alerted on and halted quickly.
Criminal law models depend on deterrence, as well. Legal scholars
have argued that crimes that often go unsolved (vandalism, for example)
should be punished more harshly to ensure an effective example is
offered in the few cases when it's available. Under this model, the
United States should take swift and effective action in every case in
which it can attribute an offensive action to a particular adversary.
Attribution has been a problem since the beginning of the terrorism
era. For example, in 1983 when the Marine barracks in Beirut was
bombed, the United States would likely have taken strong action against
the perpetrator--but the perpetrator was dead and the planners were
unknown. This problem continues today in kinetic operations as well as
in cyber.
The bottom line is, the only way to deter cyber attack is to work
to catch perpetrators and take strong and public action when we do.
Question. What authorities are required, or what procedures must be
invoked, to track back through layers of an attack involving computers
located in the United States and owned by U.S. persons?
Answer. Investigations of cyber attacks originating or appearing to
originate from the United States are typically law enforcement
investigations and a law enforcement warrant is used to attempt to
track back through layers involving computers located in the United
States or owned by U.S. persons. If there is reason to believe that the
attack is being conducted by a foreign power or agent of a foreign
power, though appearing to originate from the United States, the
investigation can be a counter intelligence investigation and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act order would be used to track back
through layers involving computers located in the United States or
owned by a U.S. person.
Question. What are the legalities, both in domestic and
international law, involved in ``shooting back'' immediately at the
sources of a large-scale attack, with and without a determination that
the sources are commandeered computers?
Answer. A commander's right to general self-defense is clearly
established in both U.S. and international law. Although this right has
not been specifically established by legal precedent to apply to
attacks in cyberspace, it is reasonable to assume that returning fire
in cyberspace, as long as it complied with law of war principles (e.g.,
proportionality), would be lawful.
Remainder of answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. The law regarding self-defense in the case of an attack
has never required a determination of identity before action can be
taken. For example, if someone is shooting at you, it isn't necessary
to establish what his name is before shooting back. If someone in a car
is trying to run down a police officer, the officer is not required to
determine whether the car is stolen before shooting out the tires in
self-defense. Similarly, the fact that computers may be commandeered is
irrelevant to the exercise of self-defense.
The United States has always hoped that the Internet would play a
``subversive'' role in countries with authoritarian governments.
If the U.S. Government takes vigorous diplomatic action, as some
experts recommend, to establish the norm that governments are
responsible for what happens in cyberspace within their sovereign
domains as a way to deal with the attribution problem, is there a
danger we could be providing a strong justification for governments
abroad to intensify surveillance and increase government controls on
the Internet?
Answer. Governments that have a tendency to curtail the freedoms of
their citizens will likely take such actions regardless of U.S.
policies regarding cyberspace. However, the United States has the
opportunity to model for other nations the process by which a nation-
state can allow freedom of expression, and even advanced concepts such
as Net Neutrality, and still insist on cyberspace behaviors that meet
the norms of international expectations in that they could not be
construed as constituting an attack in cyberspace. We can do this
without increased individual surveillance.
Question. Is it accurate that a large proportion of world-wide
unauthorized cyber intrusions and malicious cyber activity originates
or appears to originate within the United States?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is it reasonable to hold other governments responsible
for all such activity originating in their countries if the U.S.
Government cannot or will not stop it here?
Answer. Every government is responsible for actions originating in
its own country. We make every effort to address activity originating
in the United States, and we expect other countries will do the same.
title 10 versus title 50 reporting and oversight
Question. As the attached solicitations and program descriptions
indicate, and the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations
implies, gaining access to a cyberspace target for the purpose of
collecting intelligence also provides the basis for attacking that
target, and vice versa. Intelligence collection in cyberspace is
authorized and overseen under title 50 procedures, whereas operational
preparation of the environment for military action is authorized and
overseen under title 10 procedures.
Has the administration determined how it is going to authorize
these actions and report them to Congress?
Answer. Intelligence collection in cyberspace is conducted as part
of a foreign intelligence mission and is subject to congressional
intelligence oversight; e.g., the SIGINT Computer Network Exploitation
mission is conducted in accordance with SIGINT procedures and is
reported to the intelligence oversight committees. Military actions in
cyberspace done to prepare the environment for possible cyber attack
are authorized through Secretary of Defense Execute Orders and
reportable to the Armed Services Committees.
The attached solicitations and program descriptions indicate that
non-intelligence elements of DOD are developing capabilities to
penetrate foreign networks clandestinely, remain there undetected, and
exfiltrate data secretly.
Question. Are non-intelligence elements of DOD authorized to
collect intelligence in cyberspace through the clandestine penetration
of networks?
Answer. Non-intelligence elements of the DOD are not authorized to
collect intelligence or conduct preparation of the environment without
an appropriate execute order.
systems acquisition
Question. Combatant commands by design play a restricted role in
the acquisition process. However, the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, is
to be dual-hatted as the Director of NSA, which is a large enterprise
with substantial resources for developing, procuring, and supporting
new equipment, systems, and capabilities. In addition, the Commander
will exercise operational control of DISA networks, which also acquires
systems and capabilities.
Answer. Commander, U.S. Cyber Command will not exercise command or
operational control over the DISA communications networks. DISA will
continue to be responsible for acquiring, engineering and provisioning
enterprise infrastructure to assure the availability of military
information networks. As a Combat Support Agency, DISA will maintain a
close working relationship with U.S. Cyber Command, providing expertise
on the networks, communications and computing infrastructure operated
by DISA through both a DISA Field Office and a DISA Support Element.
Question. Is there a precedent for a combatant commander to
exercise this degree of direct control over acquisition organizations,
aside from Special Operations Command, which Congress expressly
provided with acquisition authority?
Answer. Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, would depend upon the
Military Departments and Agencies to deliver on U.S. Cyber Command-
documented requirements for capabilities. Each of the military
departments and agencies has oversight to ensure that this is done
properly. This is consistent with other combatant and subunified
commands, with the exception of U.S. Special Operations Command.
Question. What measures is the Department taking to guarantee that
Commanders of U.S. Cyber Command do not circumvent the requirements
process and the established acquisition process by directing
subordinates at NSA or DISA to directly address needs perceived by
Cyber Command?
Answer. U.S. Cyber Command will be a separate organization with a
separate and distinct acquisition authorities/process and staff from
the NSA and DISA. The separate oversight, accountability chains, and
the ability to audit actions taken by the two distinct organizations of
NSA and the future U.S. Cyber Command exist to ensure that the
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command follows the Cyber Command requirements
process and that the Director of NSA follows the established NSA
acquisition process. Specifically, NSA and U.S. Cyber Command will have
separate staffs with distinct authorities and oversight. U.S. Cyber
Command will operate under the same authorities and oversight as other
Combatant Commands and Subunified Commands.
NSA must operate under the authority and oversight of DOD and
Director, National Intelligence. Operating under distinct authorities
is not a new condition for the Director of NSA. I, like all the DIRNSAs
before me, am used to working under distinct authorities (title 10 and
title 50) and oversight (DOD and DNI), because of NSA's two separate
missions in Foreign Intelligence and Information Assurance.
Furthermore, as Director of NSA, I have delegated acquisition
authority to the Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE), who is not
assigned to or aligned with U.S. Cyber Command. The SAE position was
established in response to recommendations by Congress in 2000.
Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) and the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (ODNI) both have Milestone Decision Authority
(MDA) for some NSA Major System Acquisitions (MSA). While ODNI and
USD(AT&L) have delegated the NSA SAE Milestone Decision Authority for
certain major acquisition programs through the annual delegation
process, they retain joint acquisition oversight over all MSAs. Both
organizations conduct quarterly reviews of all MSA/Acquisition Category
I and Special Interest Programs, and USD(AT&L) conducts a tri-annual
review of NSA's contracting process in accordance with the Defense
Financial Acquisition Regulation Supplement.
The Director of DISA reports to ASD(NII) and will not be a
subordinate of Commander, U.S. Cyber Command. Additionally, Commander,
U.S. Cyber Command will have no subordinates in DISA.
extended deterrence in cyberspace
Question. With respect to close allies who depend upon the United
States for their security, will DOD provide a defense capability
against attacks on their critical military, government, and economic
infrastructure?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. Is DOD considering an ``extended deterrence'' model
similar to that which we have offered through the U.S. ``nuclear
umbrella''?
Answer. I am not aware of any efforts to develop an extended
deterrence model for cyber.
Question. The financial sector in the United States is tightly
integrated with and dependent upon the global financial network, such
that a massive attack on financial networks abroad would probably
inflict great harm on the United States.
To what extent does DOD consider that the defense of some U.S.
critical infrastructures must encompass network extensions abroad?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
authorities and procedures for investigating ``.mil'' intrusions
Question. One of the difficult issues confronting the Einstein 3
intrusion detection and prevention program is what to do when packets
are detected that contain malicious code. Attackers usually act
indirectly against their targets, routing attacks through a series of
innocent intermediaries to hide their identities and locations. A
malicious penetration or attack on a ``.gov'' computer or network may
be launched from a specific computer but without the knowledge of the
legitimate owner of that computer. However, government personnel
discovering such an attack have no way of knowing, without further
investigation, which computer owners in a chain may be complicit. The
Federal Government has not announced how it will specifically respond
in terms of investigating actual or apparent attacks, retaining and
analyzing associated data, when a warrant is required, and so forth,
for the defense of the civil ``.gov'' networks. However, DOD has
already fielded intrusion detection and prevention capabilities
developed by NSA at the gateways to the ``.mil'' networks.
Does this mean that the Department has developed and received
approval for protocols and procedures for investigating U.S. persons
whose computers may be implicated in attacks on ``.mil'' targets?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
explaining cybersecurity plans to the american people
Question. The majority of the funding for the multi-billion dollar
CNCI is contained in the classified National Intelligence Program
budget, which is reviewed and approved by the congressional
intelligence committees. Almost all important aspects of the CNCI
remain highly classified, including the implementation plan for the
Einstein 3 intrusion detection and prevention system. It is widely
perceived that the Department of Homeland Security is actually likely
to simply extend the cyber security system that the NSA developed for
DOD into the civilian and even the private sector for defense of
critical infrastructure. DOD is creating a subunified Cyber Command
with the Director of NSA as its Commander.
In your view, are we risking creating the perception, at home and
abroad, that the U.S. Government's dominant interests and objectives in
cyberspace are intelligence- and military-related, and if so, is this a
perception that we want to exist?
Answer. No, I don't believe we are risking creating this perception
as long as we communicate clearly to the American people--and the
world--regarding our interests and objectives.
Question. Based on your experience, are the American people likely
to accept deployment of classified methods of monitoring electronic
communications to defend the government and critical infrastructure
without explaining basic aspects of how this monitoring will be
conducted and how it may affect them?
Answer. I believe the government and the American people expect
both NSA and U.S. Cyber Command to support the cyber defense of our
Nation. Our support does not in any way suggest that we would be
monitoring Americans.
I don't believe we should ask the public to accept blindly some
unclear ``classified'' method. We need to be transparent and
communicate to the American people about our objectives to address the
national security threat to our Nation--the nature of the threat, our
overall approach, and the roles and responsibilities of each department
and agency involved--including NSA and DOD. I am personally committed
to this transparency, and I know that DOD, the Intelligence Community,
and rest of the administration are as well. What needs to remain
classified, and I believe that the American people will accept this as
reasonable, are the specific foreign threats that we are looking for
and how we identify them, and what actions we take when they are
identified. For these areas, the American people have you, their
elected representatives, to provide the appropriate oversight on their
behalf.
Remainder of answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. What are your views as to the necessity and desirability
of maintaining the current level of classification of the CNCI?
Answer. In recent months, we have seen an increasing amount of
information being shared by the administration and the departments and
agencies on the CNCI and cybersecurity in general, which I believe is
consistent with our commitment to transparency. I expect that trend to
continue, and personally believe and support this transparency as a
foundational element of the dialogue that we need to have with the
American people on cybersecurity.
military service roles in cyber command
Question. Each of the military services is planning to create new
organizations and structures, or expand existing ones, to support the
new U.S. Cyber Command. However, cyberspace is a virtual realm,
considerably removed from the physical world.
Has the Department undertaken any analyses of alternative means of
providing forces and capabilities to the new Command?
Answer. In accordance with the Secretary of Defense memorandum
directing the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command, each of the Services
conducted a thorough mission analysis on how best to provide
capabilities to U.S. Cyber Command, selected a course of action for the
near term, and briefed that selection to the Deputy Secretary.
Further, U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with the Services
and other combatant commanders, completed a study last year that gives
us an initial vector for required force size and composition for a
portion of the force. To that end, the Joint Requirements and Oversight
Committee approved that recommendation and directed a more in-depth
study. The study, the Cyber Analysis Campaign, is underway and should
give us a force sizing construct by the end of the summer.
Question. Can it be said that there is a logical basis for ground,
sea, and air components in cyberspace--apart from the fact that each of
the Services operate networks that must be defended?
Answer. There is a logical basis for the department to organize
both efficiently and consistently to achieve its assigned mission. In
much the same manner that--from a mission standpoint--Special
Operations or logistics crosses all warfighting dimensions, so does
cyberspace. There may come a time when this would merit further
consideration based upon lessons to be learned. Currently, the Military
Departments organize, man, train, and equip to generate and sustain
mission capacity on behalf of the Nation. Like other operational
commands, it will be U.S. Cyber Command's business to take this cyber
capacity--built to a common standard--and turn that into joint,
combined cyber capability to achieve the supported commander's assigned
mission as authorized by the Secretary of Defense.
Question. Is it optimal that each service have a separate
organization for supporting U.S. Cyber Command, especially in the areas
of intelligence and offensive cyber warfare?
Answer. Yes, I believe so. If cyberspace was homogenous and the
entirety of the work force did the same job, one could make the
argument that the Department doesn't need each Service to have its own
cyber component. But that would be a vast oversimplification of the
complexity of the domain. At the operational and tactical levels of
war, the Service components will be responsible for significant cyber
operations. They will depend upon the networks for command and control
of their forces and must be able to defend those networks. Over time
the Services will also bring resources to bear in the intelligence and
offensive cyber realm that will support their component missions at the
operational and tactical levels of war, with deconfliction by U.S.
Cyber Command. Each Service brings a unique perspective and some
specialized capability to the fight that would be neither efficient nor
effective to flatten into a singular whole. In cyberspace, as in all
the domains, each Service brings capability to be employed in the
combined arms philosophy that makes the whole greater than the sum of
the parts.
command of national defense in cyberspace
Question. A cornerstone of military doctrine is the importance of
unity of command, particularly in time-sensitive scenarios such as
those that are likely to arise in cyberspace. In the Federal
Government, the Department of Homeland Security is in charge of
defending the country against cyber attacks, but authorities and
responsibilities are fragmented and spread across the Intelligence
Community, DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice
Department, the Treasury Department, and the Department of Energy.
Also, each department and independent agency is responsible for
operating and equipping its own networks.
In your opinion, is there adequate unity of command and authorities
for the Nation's response to serious cyber attacks?
Answer. Unity of command within DOD is being improved with the
establishment of U.S. Cyber Command; however, unity of effort, vice
command, is equally important and achievable since effective cyber
security requires a whole-of-government approach.
As securing and defending our national cyber interests is an
evolving work in progress, coordination, cooperation, and information
sharing across the Federal Government is paramount. A rigorous
partnership with DHS--as they look to secure and protect the .gov
domain and critical infrastructure--is particularly crucial.
DOD continually reviews its existing authorities and directives to
determine what, if any, changes need to be requested to support ongoing
or contingency plans. Our unique challenge in this domain is to develop
a thorough understanding of the domain, posture to be prepared to
recognize as rapidly as possible those vulnerabilities or threat
unknowns and set effective ``post-crisis'' frameworks and conditions
for decisionmakers, policymakers, and legislators pre-crisis.
Question. If not, what is the process and schedule for defining and
establishing an effective construct?
Answer. Ultimately, the best processes and policies are those that
enable our national decisionmakers and operating forces to achieve the
best desired outcome. DOD continues to support and help protect our
national cyber interests as authorized and directed.
designing the internet for better security
Question. Cyber security experts emphasize that the Internet was
not designed for security.
How could the Internet be designed differently to provide much
greater inherent security?
Answer. The design of the Internet is--and will continue to
evolve--based on technological advancements. These new technologies
will enhance mobility and, if properly implemented, security. It is in
the best interest of both government and industry to consider security
more prominently in this evolving future internet architecture. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee, as well as
industry leaders, academia, the Services, and DOD agencies on these
important concerns.
Question. Is it practical to consider adopting those modifications?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
Question. What would the impact be on privacy, both pro and con?
Answer. Answer provided in the classified supplement.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
intelligence collection goals versus military warfighting goals
1. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, there was a recent
Washington Post report of a supposed offensive cyber operation to take
down an internet site that, according to the report, was providing
valuable information to the Intelligence Community. Whether this
article is accurate or not, the article highlights the concern about
arbitrating between the potentially competing priorities of protecting
useful intelligence sources, versus taking offensive or defensive
action to achieve military objectives. What do you believe is the
appropriate mechanism for arbitrating between protecting a potentially
valuable source of intelligence and conducting cyber operations in
support of some military objective?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
2. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, do you agree that
it is appropriate that this committee be informed of all significant
U.S. offensive cyber operations in a timely manner?
General Alexander. Yes, I agree that in almost all circumstances
the Armed Services Committees should be informed in a timely manner of
significant offensive cyber operations conducted by Cyber Command
(CYBERCOM).
oversight for offensive cyber operations
3. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, one of the
committee's major concerns is that an action to penetrate a network in
order to collect intelligence in many situations is deemed by experts
to be virtually identical to the steps one would take to prepare that
target for offensive operations. In the advance policy questions, we
asked you under what authorities these activities would be conducted,
reported, and overseen by Congress.
You replied that that preparation of a target network for offensive
operations is ordered only by the Secretary of Defense in an Execute
Order and is reported to the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees, while penetration for intelligence collection is approved
under intelligence authorities and reported to the intelligence
committees.
Unfortunately, the reality is not that clear. There is no neat and
clear distinction between these two activities in cyberspace. In fact,
a distinction does not really exist, which is why we posed the question
in the first place to ensure that you, the Department of Defense (DOD),
and the administration address this problem.
Unfortunately, we also learned, after asking a specific question
following the appearance of a Washington Post article reporting on an
apparent offensive cyber operation, that DOD has undertaken a number of
offensive cyber operations in the last several years, none of which was
reported to the Armed Services Committees, notwithstanding your answer
to the question. Have the Armed Services Committees been informed of
all U.S. offensive cyber operations?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
4. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, do you agree that
it is appropriate that the Armed Services Committees be informed of all
U.S. offensive cyber operations?
General Alexander. Yes, I agree that in almost all circumstances
the Armed Services Committees should be informed in a timely manner of
significant offensive cyber operations conducted by CYBERCOM.
acquisition conflicts of interest
5. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, if confirmed, you
would lead the development of requirements for CYBERCOM. At the same
time, you would remain as the Director of the National Security Agency
(NSA), which has a sizeable acquisition budget. Why should we have
confidence that you will be able to arbitrate effectively between your
requirements definition role at CYBERCOM and your acquisition provider
role at NSA?
General Alexander. While the Commander, CYBERCOM, and the Director,
NSA, roles are slated to be dual-hatted under the same individual, each
organization will have separate and distinct staffs.
Acquisition Authority for the NSA has been delegated by the
Director, NSA, to the NSA Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE), who is
not assigned to nor aligned with CYBERCOM. The SAE position was
established in response to requests/recommendations by Congress in
2000. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Office of the Director
for National Intelligence both have Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)
for NSA Major Systems Acquisitions. These two safeguards will ensure
that acquisition processes and external oversight are properly
executed.
CYBERCOM, as a subunified command of STRATCOM, will not have
acquisition or procurement authority and will work through its
Executive Agent, the U.S. Air Force, to satisfy its requirements.
6. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, what thoughts do
you have for how we can build the appropriate firewalls between your
multiple roles, and how we can develop an acquisition process for
cyberspace that provides the high degree of agility required to keep
pace with the technology while preserving acquisition discipline and
oversight?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
decision on use of force
7. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, in our advance
policy questions, we asked you if you would have authority to fight the
war as does U.S. Forces Korea, the only other subunified command. You
said that you would have the authorities provided by the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM).
In answer to another question, you said that under joint doctrine
``authority is normally given to subordinate commanders to select the
methodology for accomplishing the mission,'' implying that you would
have the freedom to decide how to accomplish mission orders. You went
on to say that the Commander of STRATCOM has indicated already that he
would delegate to CYBERCOM ``authority for all UCP [Unified Command
Plan] cyber tasks.'' If you were to view these answers collectively,
CYBERCOM could have the discretion to use offensive weapons to achieve
any or all assigned cyber tasks.
If you are confirmed, will authority to employ such weapons be
delegated to you? If so, under what circumstances would you have
authority to act without having further direction from the President,
the Secretary of Defense, or the Commander of STRATCOM?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
authorities of the director of national intelligence
8. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, in the advance
policy questions, you were asked to characterize the role of the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in signals intelligence
(SIGINT) in cyberspace in light of the emphasis DOD is placing on the
role of the Secretary of Defense as the President's Executive Agent for
Signals Intelligence under Executive Order 12333. You said that the
DNI's role is to issue the National Intelligence Priorities Framework
and to oversee resource allocation.
Your answer appears to overlook the fact that the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 explicitly provides the DNI
with the operational authority to task all national intelligence
collection and analysis. That includes SIGINT.
Could you elaborate on the respective roles and authorities of the
Secretary of Defense and the DNI with this in mind?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
Both the DNI and the Secretary of Defense have roles and
responsibilities for the direction and management of the Nation's
SIGINT activities. These roles and responsibilities were provided for
in the ``Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004''
(IRTPA), and implemented through amendment of Executive Order 12333
(EO12333), ``United States Intelligence Activities.''
Section 1018 of IRTPA said the President shall issue guidelines to
ensure the effective implementation and execution within the executive
branch of the authorities provided to the DNI without abrogating the
statutory responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense. The President
did so with EO12333, as amended by EO13470. For example, the DNI shall
determine requirements and priorities for, and manage and direct the
tasking, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of,
national intelligence by elements of the Intelligence Community. At the
same time, the Secretary of Defense is the U.S. Government's executive
agent for SIGINT but, as provided for in section 1.10(e) of EO12333,
exercises his executive agent responsibilities ``in coordination with''
the DNI. As a result, as the Director of NSA, I take direction from
both the Secretary of Defense and the DNI to ensure that I am
collecting and producing SIGINT that is responsive to national and DOD
requirements (to include support to military operations).
9. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, does the Secretary
of Defense have the authority to direct SIGINT collection and analysis
unilaterally, or only at the direction or approval of the DNI?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
role of commercial industry in cyber security
10. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, it is widely
believed and reported that the NSA has advised the last administration
and the current one that only the NSA has the technology and know-how
to provide effective defenses for the Government and the companies that
own and operate critical infrastructure--like banking, transportation,
power distribution, and telecommunications. However, the committee
understands that the major telecommunications companies, as well as
leading information technology companies, believe that their industries
possess major capabilities that in some respects exceed those of the
Government.
For example, the so-called tier 1 communications providers who own
and operate most of the world's telecommunications networks on which
the Internet operates have unparalleled insight into what is happening
in cyberspace on a global scale, and have tools to detect and stop
threats as they are materializing. Do you agree that the commercial
sector has untapped potential to help solve our cyber security
problems?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
11. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, do you support
pilot projects and demonstrations to test out some of these ideas?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, if the commercial
telecommunications providers have the legal authority and capability to
see cyber threats as they arise and traverse across the global network,
they would be in a position to quickly identify where attacks
originate, whereas the Government, as you have pointed out, must get
warrants to start backtracking to trace the route of an attack. Is
industry in principle in a better position to sense, characterize, and
respond rapidly to threats in cyberspace?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, which Government
agency should manage a relationship with industry in which commercial-
sector warning and threat information is provided to the Government?
Should it be the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
adequacy of nsa cyber security solution
14. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, Howard Schmidt,
the President's recently appointed cyber policy coordinator, just
released a description of the equipment--known as Einstein 3--which NSA
developed to help defend the military and Federal civilian networks
from cyber attacks. He characterized it as a signatures-based intrusion
detection and prevention system. Experts in cyber security, and leading
security officials in DOD, believe that such intrusion prevention
devices cannot by themselves defend against all threats, especially not
certain kinds of sophisticated or unknown threats. DOD's strategy is to
include the Einstein 3 technology as one part of a defense-in-depth. Do
you agree that Einstein 3 is but one element of a robust defensive
capability?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
15. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, do you think that
the investments made to date under the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative, for non-DOD .gov agencies and departments,
have reflected a proper balance between all the various aspects of a
strong defense-in-depth?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
response to attacks on dod networks
16. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, in the advance
policy questions, we asked you what the legal process is for
backtracking through the layers of computers or servers located in the
United States. Your reply was that law enforcement agencies have to do
that, and they have to have a warrant. Then, if there are grounds at
some point for believing that a foreign power is behind the attack that
is routed through U.S. computers, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) warrant may be necessary. These procedures appear
necessarily time-consuming--hardly matching the net speed that everyone
touts as necessary.
We also asked you about the legality of shooting back against an
attack that seems to come from U.S. sources, even if we cannot tell
whether the attacking computers are the source of the attack, or
whether they may have been commandeered for such as purpose.
Your answer is that the right to self defense allows commanders to
return fire. Are you really saying that it is lawful and appropriate
for U.S. military commanders to shoot back against computers located in
the United States under the doctrine of self-defense--especially in
light of the fact your answer to the first question was that a warrant
is required to start to unravel the origins of an attack?
General Alexander. Under normal circumstances, U.S. military forces
would not be authorized to engage targets in the United States.
However, the right and obligation of self-defense recognizes that under
exceptional circumstances such a course of action may be justified. For
example, if a military member comes under fire when guarding a military
installation, even in the United States, the member is authorized to
return fire in self-defense. There is no requirement for the member to
hold fire and try to determine whether the attacker is a U.S. national.
Similarly, in the cyber arena, when a military system comes under
attack, the commander charged with protecting the system is authorized
to act in self-defense. That right and obligation of self-defense may
include cyber actions, which would be based on the severity of the
attack, and could be characterized as ``firing back'' in order to stop
the threat. Obviously, as in all military operations, the principles of
necessity and proportionality would be applied. Military members would
take care to use the minimally effective solution to stop the attack.
17. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, how do you
reconcile these answers?
General Alexander. See answer to question #16.
18. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, how could we ever
get to a suitably rapid response to attacks that have been routed
through U.S.-based computers and infrastructure if a complicated legal
procedure is required?
General Alexander. The challenge for U.S. cyber leadership is to
balance the critical constitutional and legal protections we provide
U.S. persons with the necessity of defending our Nation from attack. We
must make use of every instrument of national power, drawing on the
resources and authorities of every agency of our Government to prevent
attacks on American interests. When prevention fails, we must have the
clear authority to act swiftly to end adversary attacks. Working within
the interagency process to determine how best to strike this balance is
one of DOD's top priorities.
real time regional gateway program
19. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Alexander, an NSA Inspector
General report on the Real Time Regional Gateway (RTRG) program found
that the NSA SAE recommended to you in 2006 that the RTRG program be
designated as a major acquisition, which would have subjected the
program to a significantly higher degree of internal and external
oversight. This recommendation was based on the fact that RTRG had
grown immensely in size and scope and plans were being made to extend
the fielding to multiple combatant commands. You rejected that
recommendation and did not brief the USD(AT&L), even though you briefed
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and other senior officials.
Why did you not brief the USD(AT&L), and reject your SAE's
recommendation, in spite of the fact that you briefed the program to
higher-level officials?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
interagency cooperation
20. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, one thing
that I commonly look for are stovepipes and whether the Services are
duplicating efforts or truly enhancing overall mission effectiveness.
Last year at the STRATCOM hearing, General Chilton highlighted the
importance of sharing information among agencies, including the DHS,
the Intelligence Community, and DOD, in addressing security risks in
cyberspace. I worry that in response to cyber security threats, without
strong coordination, agencies will create their own unique defenses. If
each agency builds their own protective walls, they ultimately stifle
collaboration and the ability to disseminate intelligence information
among agencies, which has been our Achilles heel--an inability to share
intelligence, connect the dots, and prevent future attacks. What do you
see as your role in interagency coordination of cyber security and
information exchange protocols?
General Alexander. I believe my role in interagency coordination of
cyber security and information exchange protocols centers on improving
mechanisms to foster this activity. Principal among these activities
will be the collaboration/coordination across the operational
cybersecurity centers such as NSA's NTOC, DHS's US-CERT, FBI's NCIJTF,
JTF-GNO's JOC and others. Additional coordination efforts include to
the Joint Interagency Task Force-Cyber (JIATF-Cyber) whose membership
includes the NSA/Central Security Service, Defense Intelligence Agency,
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Justice, Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Office of
the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, Joint Functional Component Command-Network Warfare (JFCC-NW),
Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), Joint Functional
Component Command for Global Strike, Joint Information Operations
Warfare Center (JIOWC), Departments of Treasury (DOT), State (DOS), and
Homeland Security, and the combatant commands. As CYBERCOM matures, we
will look to refine and improve our coordination processes with all our
Cyber partners.
I believe my role must be as a proponent for improving the
information exchange protocols among a variety of DOD and interagency
partners every day. We need to do this not only through changes within
our organizational structure and improvements to our procedures, but
also through a change in organizational culture that fosters
information sharing as essential to deterring our adversaries and
preventing future attacks.
21. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, how do you
see the relationship between the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA) and U.S. CYBERCOM?
General Alexander. DISA is a DOD combat support agency that
provides command and control capabilities and enterprise infrastructure
to operate and assure a global net-centric enterprise in direct support
of joint warfighters, national-level leadership, and other mission and
coalition partners across the full spectrum of operations. A strong
relationship between DISA and CYBERCOM is essential to ensure we build,
lease, and/or operate networks so that they are defensible and so that
we are able visualize a Common Operating Environment (COE) in
cyberspace, which serves as a foundation for CYBERCOM's execution of
delegated missions assigned to STRATCOM in the Unified Command Plan.
In recognition of the crucial nature of this relationship, the
Director of DISA has committed to providing both a DISA Field Office to
support CYBERCOM and a DISA Support Element, unique to CYBERCOM which
will be integrated into the Joint Operations Center. CYBERCOM will
provide a liaison officer to DISA to facilitate the exchange of
information and coordination between the two commands.
22. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, do you have
or expect to have a formal process to provide requirements for DISA to
use as it acquires future network systems?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
23. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, how will you
ensure that DISA and the Service components' technical solutions to
cyber security issues do not end fielding proprietary solutions
resulting in information stovepipes that limit our cyberspace
operational effectiveness?
General Alexander. Technical capability development to support
CYBERCOM mission needs will be driven by a formal requirements process,
the definition and use of standards, and a force integration plan that
will include the Service cyber components assigned to the command as
well as DISA. Joint membership on a requirements review board will
ensure that all entities participate in the identification,
prioritization, and resource investment decisions for technical
solutions. Close collaboration and joint status reviews among the
respective development organizations will avoid duplication of effort,
and ensure activities remain complementary whether developed by the
Government or by industry. Supporting acquisition organizations must
ensure the careful crafting of acquisition contracts and associated
statements of work to ensure that the rare proprietary solution is not
a stovepiped solution, but rather is fully integrated with cyber
operations across the enterprise. If confirmed, we will work closely
with STRATCOM, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Military
Departments to ensure these solutions are properly aligned and
integrated.
cyber threats
24. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, in February,
Admiral Mullen stated before this committee that ``Threats in
cyberspace are increasing faster than our ability to adequately defend
against them.'' A key aspect of providing a strong cyber defense is
having enough talented people with the right skills to do the job. The
fiscal year 2010 budget increased the training capacity for cyber
experts to attempt to improve the DOD's ability to safeguard our
information and information systems. What progress are the Services
making in providing forces to address the cyber threat from a manning
perspective?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
25. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, is cyber
training capacity sufficient to get out in front of this rapidly
evolving threat? If not, what else is needed?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Alexander, are the
Services properly coordinating their cyber efforts such as training and
material solutions to ensure we are adequately protected against the
threat of a substantial cyber attack?
General Alexander. The Services are leveraging existing mechanisms
to coordinate training and material solutions to ensure our protection
against cyber attacks, and I will continue to work closely with them on
these efforts. The creation of CYBERCOM along with its Service cyber
components should significantly enhance the efforts of the Services to
train and equip cyber forces to a common standard.
Service initiatives to address cyber training shortfalls are well
developed and coordinated. STRATCOM and NSA/CSS along with the Services
have combined experience and expertise to confront the complicated
issues related to Computer Network Operations (CNO) workforce
development. Subject matter experts representing each of the CNO job
functions have defined each work role, and outlined the knowledge,
skills, abilities needed to perform those CNO tasks. Further enhancing
this initiative are the combined efforts of the Consolidated Staff
(JFCC-NW/JTF-GNO), under the auspices of STRATCOM and JFCOM, to develop
a Cyber Training Initiative to assess combatant commander and Service
joint cyber training efforts. Collectively, these efforts are ensuring
our cyber training is coordinated among the Services and poised to
address the threat of cyber attacks.
The Services' continued use of the Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System (JCIDS) remains an essential element of
coordinating material solutions to address our pressing cyber needs.
These efforts--including capability needs, capability gap and non-
materiel solutions--must continue. Concurrent with this, we will ensure
the technical capability development to support CYBERCOM mission needs
will be driven by a formal requirements process, and will include the
Service cyber components.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
cyber threats
27. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, I am convinced
that DOD's decision to stand up CYBERCOM is the right answer to a
drastically growing threat. As you well know, there is a significant
threat to our National security in the cyber world; a threat we are
dealing with daily - attacks against our civilian and military
infrastructure. Like threats to space assets, cyber threats fall into
that nebulous realm of what is a direct attack and what is something
just short of that. What are your thoughts on the seriousness of these
threats?
General Alexander. The adversaries our Nation faces today cover the
full spectrum, from individual hackers to terrorists and organized
criminal groups, as well as foreign militaries and intelligence
services. Indeed, the growing cyber threat has outpaced our defenses,
and we are experiencing increasingly sophisticated, coordinated, and
damaging cyberpenetration. We face a dangerous combination of known--
and unknown--vulnerabilities, strong adversary capabilities, and weak
situational awareness that could compromise our personal and national
security. Moreover, we have witnessed a dramatic rise over the past
several years in the number of intrusions against our military
networks; DOD networks are now scanned millions of times a day by
unauthorized users. In the most serious and significant cyber incident
to date on U.S. military computer networks, several thousand computers
were infected by malicious software attempting to exploit military
systems and compromise national security. These intrusions affected a
number of critical systems responsible for military command and
control. The seriousness of the threats our Nation faces in cyberspace
prompted the Secretary of Defense to stand up CYBERCOM and ensure our
military could maintain its ability to use cyberspace for critical
mission operations. The interconnected nature of these networks will
require CYBERCOM to actively coordinate its operations both within the
Department as well as in close partnership with the other agencies
authorized to address these threats.
28. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, what do we need
to do to combat these threats?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, besides the
charter of CYBERCOM to address cyber-based threats, what else is within
the CYBERCOM's purview?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
network/internet security
30. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, over the last
decade, as internet use and connectivity have become pervasive, most
information technology (IT) security spending that has been invested in
``perimeter defense'' of the ``distributed network''. Breaches seem
frequent and sometimes seem easy, and therefore focusing on IT security
of the distributed network has been critical. While there has been
increasing focus and increasing spending on the IT security of the
distributed network over the past decade, I have been told that
spending on IT security for the mainframe has declined. This could
potentially lead to serious cyber security vulnerabilities in our
mainframe network. I have been told that DOD has created and adhered to
a strict set of security configuration controls for their mainframe
systems. However, there have been reports of classified Government
systems being breached. As I have been told in some detail, the
peripheral security of networks has been the primary focus with less
effort spent on the mainframes. Does DOD have any issues with its
mainframe security, both in its air-gapped systems and in the systems
that are connected to the internet?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
31. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, what is being
done to secure those networks and systems that are not Government or
military but are critical to us, such as civilian agencies, State
governments, and private sector elements such as utility companies,
banks, pipelines, phone companies, et cetera?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
law and cyber command
32. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, I just read a
news release from Defense News on the legal issues associated with our
ability to conduct operations in cyber space. It basically said that
the NSA can monitor when we are under attack but right now DOD is
powerless to respond due to DHS ownership of responding to network
attacks. The article was not overly complimentary of the current
process. Experts indicated that we need to look at doing some serious
review of our statutory law. What are your thoughts on where we stand
with the legal aspects of responding to cyber attacks?
General Alexander. The process for DHS to request and receive DOD
support for any national event is known as Defense Support to Civil
Authorities (DSCA). If there is a national cyber emergency for which
DOD assistance is requested, the Secretary of Defense will provide
guidance, and we will comply with such guidance under all
circumstances. Any DOD cyber assistance will partner with the U.S.
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), the DHS lead organization,
under their National Cyber Security Division, for the day-to-day
defense of the Federal executive branch (.gov) networks.
Separate from the DSCA process, however, a new legal framework may
be needed to ensure the cyber security of our Nation at large.
President Obama's Cyberspace Policy Review specifically highlighted the
mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and
the governing laws and policies for the United States.
As stated in the Cyberspace Policy Review, law applicable to
cyberspace is a ``complex patchwork'' that ``shapes viable policy
options.'' This patchwork is the result of the convergence of once very
diverse industries and technologies--each governed by different laws
and policies--to create what we now call ``cyberspace.'' In response to
this convergence, ``law and policy should continue to seek an
integrated approach'' that leverages all the capabilities and expertise
of both the public and private sectors so that, together, we can
enhance the national security, economic competitiveness, public safety
and civil liberties and privacy of the American people. I completely
agree with this finding.
Until this integrated approach can be realized, policy gaps exist
that prevent us from doing all that can be done to increase the cyber
security of the Nation, especially our Nation's critical
infrastructure. Foremost amongst these gaps are the potential
impediments to the public-private cybersecurity information sharing
partnership, which I believe is critical to more effectively
attributing and countering this threat. These include two core issues.
First, the U.S. Government needs to be able to disseminate to the
owners of the critical infrastructure and other private sector entities
threat information that reflects real time exigencies, and to receive
such information from private entities, while balancing concerns
regarding anti-trust regulations and other unfair competition matters;
civil liberties and privacy; and due regard for the Constitution and
all applicable laws, policies, and procedures. The second issue
involves how private companies will protect sensitive Government
information and use it for the purpose of better cybersecurity without
incurring liability or unduly disrupting their network operations.
NSA/CSS, as a member of both DOD and the Intelligence Community and
in partnership with DHS and other departments and agencies, is working
closely with the President's Cybersecurity Coordinator, Mr. Howard A.
Schmidt, on these issues. We are exploring options within existing law,
policy, and doctrine to address these issues and we will inform
Congress if any legislation may be needed.
33. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, what needs to be
done to ensure that the bureaucracy does not interfere with our
security necessities?
General Alexander. In my experience, we currently have an
unprecedented level of commitment across the public and private sectors
to improving the cybersecurity of our Nation. Evidence of the
commitment and cooperation is seen in the implementation of the
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) and the
President's Cyberspace Policy Review. The issues the Nation faces in
this domain are complex and challenging, necessarily taking time to
thoughtfully resolve even with the complete commitment of all
stakeholders. As stated in the Cyberspace Policy Review, integrating
the Nation's response to such challenging issues needs to be led ``from
the top,'' which is happening under the leadership of Mr. Howard A.
Schmidt, Special Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity
Coordinator. In support of the Secretary of Defense, and if confirmed,
I will continue to work to identify gaps, inform the development of
meaningful and enduring national cyber policy, and be prepared to
adjust rapidly to changes.
education in information technology
34. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, when we met in my
office yesterday, we discussed the need to attract extremely technical,
qualified, and diverse professionals. This begins with ensuring our
colleges and universities throughout the United States have programs in
place to educate and groom future generations of IT professionals. One
program we discussed was University of Tulsa's iSec, specializing in
educating students in cyber defense, deterrence, and warfare. Are we
doing enough in academic institutions to produce the IT professionals
this country needs in the future?
General Alexander. We have seen a lot of progress in academic
institutions responding to the high demand for IT professionals, but
more can be done to build this critical resource. The explosion of
cyber threats and increases in organized cyber crime activity has
driven the trend for information technology professionals upward. We
are starting to see more 4 year programs like the one at Tulsa and even
2 year programs at Community Colleges. For example, the Chronicle of
Higher Education reported that as early as 7 years ago, virtually no
Community Colleges offered cyber security programs. Now cyber security
education has spread across the 2 year college sector, spurred by
Federal grants and post-September 11 focus on infrastructure security.
Finally, President Obama is stressing the importance of such colleges
and a new White House cyber security push points to the need for
workforce training. All of this demand does lead to an increasing role
for 2 and 4 year colleges that can supply government agencies and
private companies with workers steeped in cyber security.
Through partnerships with Government, academia, and industry, NSA's
Information Assurance (IA) Mission advocates improvements in IA
education, training, and awareness. The National IA Education and
Training Program (NIETP) operates as the national manager for IA
education and training relating to national security systems. Its
programs assure the very finest preparation of professionals entrusted
with securing our critical information. The NIETP develops IA training
standards with the Committee on National Security Systems. It also
assesses current course IA offerings to identify gaps and determine how
to fill those gaps. The NIETP encourages and recognizes universities
through the National Centers of Academic Excellence in IA Education and
the National Centers of Academic Excellence in Research. The NIETP is
also one of the Government sponsors of the Colloquium for Information
Systems Security Education. There are over 106 National Centers of
Academic Excellence in the field of Information Assurance as recognized
by the NSA/Central Security Service. Including The University of
Tulsa's iSec program, these institutes of higher learning are located
in 37 different States, Washington, DC, and Puerto Rico. Prior to
submitting an application for the National Center of Excellence
Program, IA courseware must be certified under the IA Courseware
Evaluation Program as meeting the Committee on National Security
Systems (CNSS) Training Standards, and the certification must remain
current. There is a minimum number of points required in nine different
criteria to qualify as a National Center of Academic Excellence.
The partnership that we have with all of these institutions of
higher education will continue to evolve in order to meet the future
need of producing the very best IT professionals. Through NSA and other
government and industry efforts, we must remain engaged with academia
to ensure we foster the development of the right curriculum, based on
identifiable standards, to ensure the continued growth in the numbers
of IT professionals our country will need in the future.
35. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, is there a
research/development gap in cyber defense/deterrence/technology/
intelligence?
General Alexander. There are research and development gaps that do
exist in the areas of cyber operations and intelligence; principally
these involve a need for shared situational awareness, better
attribution technologies, and real-time visibility of intrusions into
our networks. These and other gaps are being identified and used to
influence DOD's research and development priorities. The technical
solutions associated with cyber defense will continue to evolve rapidly
as our adversaries become increasingly sophisticated. Given that
intrusions into DOD systems are virtually the same as those attacks
experienced by the commercial sector, DOD can both benefit from and
influence commercial development efforts, consistent with DOD
authorities, to address those vulnerabilities. Ultimately, we believe
automated solutions which adapt to rapidly increasing adversary
capability sophistication and to employ proactive measures to defeat
adversary attacks will be critical to ensuring the defense of our
military networks.
standing up cyber command
36. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, as I have seen
with the standup of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), putting together a
combatant or functional command organization is a tall order. It
requires herculean efforts on the parts of all entities and can easily
be subjected to inertia and bureaucracy. What is your understanding of
the infrastructure and capabilities requirements and status of
CYBERCOM?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
37. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, what is needed to
ensure the command is fully functional?
General Alexander. Since CYBERCOM will initially be established
with the existing personnel from JFCC-NW and JTF-GNO along with
existing military Service component organizations, I believe that we
will be fully functional upon establishment of the command. That being
said, if confirmed and upon activation, we will be looking to
continually enhance and evolve our mission effectiveness. We need to
build capacity (trained personnel, facilities, communications, IT . . .
), enable effective collaboration (DOD, interagency, government,
industry, academia, foreign partners), and achieve collocation of a
critical set of core capabilities to provide agility in defeating
known, emerging, and unanticipated threats. In the short term, we are
standing up the headquarters within the Fort Meade area/NSA campus by
merging the JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW mission sets to better leverage the
capabilities of the global SIGINT enterprise while using existing
infrastructure. As necessary, we will pursue more contiguous space
solutions to house our authorized strength, host key Service cyber
component elements and liaison offices.
38. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, what will be the
interagency support to the headquarters?
General Alexander. Currently, we have several representatives from
key interagency partners integrated into the Consolidated JFCC-NW/JTF-
GNO staff. My intent is to grow and strengthen these relationships by
increasing the level of integration of our key interagency partners. As
an example, we intend to further promote this enhanced coordination and
collaboration by seeking the integration of interagency personnel on
the CYBERCOM operations floor. We will also explore opportunities to
expand DOD/NSA liaison positions at other key departments and agencies.
In addition we will seek ways to improve the interagency coordination
process under the command's purview. One such process is the day-to-day
operational planning, deconfliction, and execution performed by JIATF-
Cyber that coordinates offensive cyberspace operations. Current member
organizations of JIATF-Cyber includes the NSA/Central Security Service,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Department of Justice (DOT), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint
Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, JFCC-NW, JTF-GNO, Joint
Functional Component Command for Global Strike, JIOWC, Departments of
Treasury (DOT), State (DOS), and Homeland Security and the combatant
commands. As CYBERCOM matures, we will look to improve this process and
expand our coordination to full-spectrum cyberspace operations.
39. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, how will your
responsibilities for the NSA impact or integrate with your
responsibilities for CYBERCOM?
General Alexander. Across my 4\1/2\ years as the Director of NSA/
Chief, CSS, and Commander of JFCC-NW (18 months of which I also served
as the operational commander of JTF-GNO), I have worked closely with
and been supported by excellent line commanders and leaders across the
STRATCOM, NSA, and CSS organizations who, in turn, have taken on
greater responsibility for executing their assigned tasks while
ensuring greater synchronization with all. I fully expect to be able to
draw upon the capabilities and talents of that broad leadership cadre
combined with the additional leaders that will join us upon activation
of CYBERCOM to effectively synchronize their work across NSA and
CYBERCOM.
While CYBERCOM's ability to leverage NSA's cryptologic capabilities
and its world class Information Assurance expertise will be critical to
its success in operating in the cyber domain, CYBERCOM and NSA will
remain separate and distinct organizations with their own identities,
authorities, missions, funding, and oversight mechanisms. I intend to
draw upon the extensive lessons I have learned over the past 4\1/2\
years to ensure that I am able to perform both missions effectively.
The addition of a three-star Deputy Commander for CYBERCOM, a fully
resourced joint staff and robust Service cyber components will be
critical enablers in this regard.
40. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, where would you
like to see CYBERCOM in the next 1, 5, and 10 years?
General Alexander. Over the next year, I see CYBERCOM focusing on
building the command and staff; implementing an effective operational
construct; and informing, and benefiting from, the development of DOD's
policy and strategy review to address cyberspace operations. Building
the command includes relocation of over 400 JTF-GNO personnel from
Arlington to Fort Meade, the establishment of a joint staff structure,
and the stand up of Service cyber components. Implementing an effective
operational construct is also key during the coming year and centers on
improving our ability to dynamically defend our military networks as
well as the development of a structured process to receive and respond
to combatant command cyber requirements. Underlying all of these goals
is the ongoing, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-led, review of
DOD cyberspace policy. This effort, as it comes to fruition, will
significantly shape and influence our actions in the cyber domain.
At year 5, I envision a significant improvement in defending of our
military cyber infrastructure. This improvement will be bolstered by
substantive growth and maturation of our Service cyber capacity and
capability as well as a considerable investment in physical and
information technology infrastructure to support shared cyber
situational awareness. Moreover, I envision a robust partnership with
the DHS and commercial sector to ensure the defense of the .mil, .gov,
and critical infrastructure, with roles, responsibilities and
authorities clearly defined and executed. At year 10, I envision
CYBERCOM, working closely with the Services, component commands, and
select agencies achieving a mature integrated operational construct
that allows for seamless interoperability, a capability to conduct net-
speed operations and a COE to conduct effective operations in
cyberspace.
41. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Alexander, what level of
funding is necessary to achieve these goals?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator George S. LeMieux
cyber attacks
42. Senator LeMieux. Lieutenant General Alexander, what threshold
would constitute an act of war?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
43. Senator LeMieux. Lieutenant General Alexander, would we be
willing to commit kinetic forces in response to a cyber attack?
General Alexander. The President and the Secretary of Defense would
determine whether kinetic forces were to be committed. Important
considerations informing this decision would include the scale of the
attack and the ability to attribute it to a specific adversary as well
as the destructive effect. The use of kinetic force in response to a
cyber attack would also need to satisfy necessity and proportionality
requirements of the law of armed conflict.
44. Senator LeMieux. Lieutenant General Alexander, who are the
decisionmakers in reacting and responding to a cyber attack?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
45. Senator LeMieux. Lieutenant General Alexander, a March 23rd
article in Defense News claims that 120 countries have or are
developing offensive cyber attack capabilities. Is the United States
prepared to deal with this threat?
General Alexander. While the majority of these nations developing
offensive cyber attack capabilities are not our adversaries, the United
States does in fact face a serious threat from a spectrum of actors.
The growing cyber threat has, in fact and in my opinion, outpaced the
country's defenses and we are experiencing increasingly sophisticated,
coordinated, and damaging cyber penetration, for which I do not believe
we are adequately prepared.
The ever increasing intrusions into on our classified and
unclassified military networks, specifically, led to the Secretary of
Defense's decision to establish CYBERCOM in order to confront the
threats and reduce the vulnerability of our military cyber
infrastructure. As recognized in the President's Cyberspace Policy
Review, what is truly needed, however, is a comprehensive framework to
ensure coordinated response and recovery by the whole of government
working with the private sector. The interconnected nature of DOD
networks and the free flow of information across various domains
necessitate an active partnership between DOD and agencies across the
U.S. Government, along with the private sector, to ensure that the
security of these networks is synchronized. CYBERCOM will focus on
securing the Nation's military networks. Military operations and
command and control, however, no longer consistently fit neatly within
the boundaries of the .mil networks. Increasingly, key logistics and
other operational missions are performed by cleared defense contractors
and commercial vendors via routine network communications. Thus,
protecting the Nation's military networks and operations from
disruption will increasingly require close interaction with such
entities and new constructs to guarantee unimpeded operations.
As DOD works through the development of these new constructs, we
will do so in concert with the White House, the Justice Department,
DHS, and other agencies to ensure we develop a synchronized way ahead
within an overall national cyber policy framework. These collective
efforts will be foundational to our Nation's success in the cyber
domain.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
cyber attacks
46. Senator Vitter. Lieutenant General Alexander, first, I want to
thank you for our productive meeting and discussion last month about
NSA's continuing operations and future plans. How important do you view
an American offensive cyber capability?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
47. Senator Vitter. Lieutenant General Alexander, will you make
offensive capabilities a priority to counter or deter other nations'
cyber attacks?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
government/private sector collaboration
48. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, how critical is
collaboration between the private sector and the Government to reducing
our cyber vulnerabilities?
General Alexander. Collaboration is absolutely essential. I believe
building an effective partnership between the U.S. Government and the
Nation's private sector is integral to reducing the country's cyber
vulnerabilities.
Cyberspace is fundamentally owned and operated by the private
sector. Most of the government infrastructure is owned and operated by
private industry. For our mutual defense, the Government must share
information and expertise regarding threats and vulnerabilities with
the private sector--and the private sector should be able to do the
same. It must be a partnership.
49. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, can you discuss
how the NSA and CYBERCOM currently interact with the private sector and
your plans for that interaction to be stronger in the future?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
50. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, what specific
provisions in Federal law prevent information sharing between the
Government and the private sector, thus hampering our efforts to
protect cyberspace?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
51. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, if the private
sector shares information with the Government to help protect against
criminal and terrorist attacks, are there adequate protections in place
within the NSA and CYBERCOM to guard against the release of trade
secrets and other proprietary information?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
cyber coordination
52. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, NSA and CYBERCOM
play lead roles in protecting U.S. military networks. DHS is the lead
agency in terms of protecting the Federal Government's civilian
networks and the Nation's critical infrastructure. How do you plan to
coordinate the different responsibilities of NSA, CYBERCOM, and DHS in
this regard?
General Alexander. Each organization has specific missions and
authorities, and all will be required in order to increase the
cybersecurity of the Nation. Therefore, as you state, coordination is
essential for success. In my experience, the elements of effective
coordination are communication, collaboration, and respect. In response
to cyber threats and intrusions already encountered NSA, the Joint Task
Force for Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) and DHS are continually
strengthening coordination in a manner that recognizes and respects
each others' authorities and capabilities, supports the exchange of
vital information, and results in collaboration on solutions that
mitigate the threat and reduce vulnerabilities. DHS, NSA, and the
Consolidated Staff (Joint Functional Component Command Network Warfare
and JTF-GNO) have also conducted a series of table top exercises to
improve coordination in cyberspace. Coordination, however, is necessary
beyond these three organizations. Coordination with other key
departments and agencies, to include the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice,
as well as State, local, and tribal government, industry and our allies
is imperative. In accordance with the White House Cyberspace Policy
Review, the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator is leading this
national effort.
Secretary Gates directed the creation of CYBERCOM to establish a
framework under which a single military command can achieve unity of
command and operational integration within DOD across the full-range of
cyberspace operations. CYBERCOM will increase the DOD's effectiveness
in this critical domain.
53. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, what is the
NSA's role in forming the technical standards, guidelines, or best
practices for protecting the evolving networks of the Government and
the private sector?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
cyber attacks
54. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, the former DNI,
Mike McConnell, recently pronounced that the United States ``is
fighting a cyber war today and it is losing.'' Various reports have
indicated that foreign powers have been at the root of serious and
malicious cyber attacks against U.S. Government networks and against
private interests. The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review
states that DOD's networks ``are infiltrated daily by myriad of
sources, ranging from small groups of individuals to some of the
largest countries in the world.'' In many cases, the attacks have been
conducted through private networks to cover their tracks. At what point
does an attack by a foreign power on our Government's systems or on a
U.S. private sector system become an act of war?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
55. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, authentication
of the source of a cyber attack is a critical component of any response
to the attack. However, authentication can often be a difficult
undertaking in the area of cyber security. It often requires the
cooperation of multiple Federal agencies as well as the assistance of
foreign governments. What steps is CYBERCOM taking to address this
challenge?
General Alexander. [Deleted.]
56. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Alexander, what actions
should the U.S. Government take to improve authentication efforts,
including the need to pass any new laws?
General Alexander. We must approach this problem in several ways.
First, we must continue to encourage collaboration within the
Intelligence Community to improve our ability to determine
authentication. Second, we must invest in the right technologies to
promote rapid attribution of cyber intrusions as well as agile tipping
and cueing mechanisms to provide early warning and rapid response to
these threats. This must be done with careful attention to the
protection of privacy and civil liberties; if we are successful, these
measures and the resulting strengthening of cybersecurity will enhance
privacy through better protection of private information.
It is not clear at this time whether new laws are required to
improve U.S. Government authentication efforts, though some gaps do
exist today that prevent us from using technology to its fullest to
increase the cyber security of the nation, especially our Nation's
critical infrastructure. Foremost amongst these gaps are the potential
impediments to the public-private cybersecurity information sharing
partnership, which I believe is critical to more effectively
attributing and countering this threat. These include two core issues.
First, the U.S. Government needs to be able to disseminate to the
owners of the critical infrastructure and other private sector entities
threat information that reflects real time exigencies, and to receive
such information from private entities, while balancing concerns
regarding anti-trust regulations and other unfair competition matters;
civil liberties and privacy; and due regard for the Constitution and
all applicable laws, policies, and procedures. The second issue
involves how private companies will protect sensitive government
information and use it for the purpose of better cybersecurity without
incurring liability or unduly disrupting their network operations.
NSA/CSS, as a member of both DOD and the Intelligence Community and
in partnership with DHS and other departments and agencies, is working
closely with the President's Cyber Security Coordinator, Mr. Howard A.
Schmidt, on these issues. We are exploring options within existing law,
policy, and doctrine to address these issues and we will notify
Congress if any legislation maybe needed.
______
[The nomination reference of LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
October 20, 2009.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the
grade of indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be General.
LTG Keith B. Alexander, 9763.
______
[The biographical sketch of LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Department of the Army,
Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison,
Washington, DC, October 15, 2009.
Hon. Carl Levin, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The President has forwarded to you under
separate cover the following nomination.
For appointment to the grade of General:
Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Director, National
Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, Fort Meade,
MD, as Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central
Security Service/Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, Fort Meade, MD.
For the information of the committee, I am enclosing a military
career resume for this officer showing his assignments and grades held.
Sincerely,
Bernard S. Champoux,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Legislative Liaison.
Enclosure
______
Transcript of Naval Service for LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.
Educational degrees:
U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
Boston University - MS - Business Administration
Naval Postgraduate School - MS - Electronic Warfare
Naval Postgraduate School - MS - Physics
National War College - MS - National Security Strategy
Military schools attended:
Armor Officer Basic Course
Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
National War College
Foreign language(s): None recorded.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date of
Promotions appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT................................................. 5 Jun 74
1LT................................................. 5 Jun 76
CPT................................................. 8 Aug 78
MAJ................................................. 1 Sep 85
LTC................................................. 1 Apr 91
COL................................................. 1 Sep 95
BG.................................................. 1 Jan 00
MG.................................................. 1 Jan 03
LTG................................................. 1 Aug 03
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major permanent duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Feb. 75......................... Mar. 76........... Platoon Leader, B
Company, 2d
Battalion, 81st
Armor, 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Mar. 76......................... June 77........... Assistant S-4
(Logistics),
later S-4, 511th
Military
Intelligence
Battalion, 66th
Military
Intelligence
Group, U.S. Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
July 77......................... June 78........... Commander, Field
Office, 511th
Military
Intelligence
Battalion, 66th
Military
Intelligence
Group, U.S. Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
July 78......................... Feb. 79........... Student, Military
Intelligence
Officer Advanced
Course, U.S. Army
Military
Intelligence
Center and
School, Fort
Huachuca, AZ
Feb. 79......................... July 79........... Electronic Warfare
Staff Officer,
525th Military
Intelligence
Group, Fort
Bragg, NC
July 79......................... Jan. 81........... Commander, 336th
Army Security
Agency Company,
319th Military
Intelligence
Battalion (Corps
Electronic
Warfare
Intelligence),
525th Military
Intelligence
Group, Fort
Bragg, NC
Jan. 81......................... July 81........... Assistant S-3
(Operations),
525th Military
Intelligence
Group, Fort
Bragg, NC
Aug. 81......................... Sep. 83........... Student, Naval
Postgraduate
School, Monterey,
CA
Oct. 83......................... June 85........... Operations
Officer, later,
Chief,
Intelligence
Electronic
Warfare Systems
Task Force, later
Chief, Concepts
and Studies
Division, U.S.
Army Intelligence
Center and
School, Fort
Huachuca, AZ
June 85......................... June 86........... Student, U.S. Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS
June 86......................... June 88........... Deputy Director,
Intelligence and
Electronic
Warfare Master
Plan Special Task
Force, later
Intelligence
Staff Officer,
Office of the
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Intelligence,
U.S. Army,
Washington, DC
June 88......................... Mar. 90........... S-3 (Operations),
later Executive
Officer, 522d
Military
Intelligence
Battalion, 2d
Armored Division,
Fort Hood, TX
Mar. 90......................... June 91........... Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2
(Intelligence),
1st Armored
Division, U.S.
Army, Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany and
Operations Desert
Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia
June 91......................... July 93........... Commander, 204th
Military
Intelligence
Battalion, U.S.
Army, Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Aug. 93......................... June 94........... Student, National
War College, Fort
McNair,
Washington, DC
June 94......................... May 95............ Chief, Army
Intelligence
Initiatives,
Office of the
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Intelligence,
U.S. Army,
Washington, DC
May 95.......................... June 97........... Commander, 525th
Military
Intelligence
Brigade, Fort
Bragg, NC
June 97......................... July 98........... Deputy Director
for Intelligence,
J-2, The Joint
Staff (Defense
Intelligence
Agency),
Washington, DC
July 98......................... Feb. 01........... Director for
Intelligence, J-
2, U.S. Central
Command, MacDill
Air Force Base,
FL
Feb. 01......................... July 03........... Commanding
General, U.S.
Army Intelligence
and Security
Command, Fort
Belvoir, VA
Aug. 03......................... July 05........... Deputy Chief of
Staff, G-2, U.S.
Army, Washington,
DC
Aug. 05......................... Present........... Director, National
Security Agency/
Chief, Central
Security Service,
Fort Meade, MD
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Mar. 90-June 91 Lieutenant Colonel
(Intelligence), 1st Armored
Division, U.S. Army Europe and
Seventh Army, Germany and
Operations Desert Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia (Partial Joint
Credit)........................
Deputy Director for June 97-July 98 Colonel
Intelligence, J-2, The Joint
Staff (Defense Intelligence
Agency), Washington, DC
(Cumulative Joint Credit
Awarded).......................
Director for Intelligence, J-2, July 98-Feb. 01 Brigadier General
U.S. Central Command, MacDill
Air Force Base, FL.............
Director, National Security Aug. 05-Present Lieutenant General
Agency/Chief, Central Security
Service, Fort Meade, MD........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of operations assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Mar. 90-June 91 Lieutenant Colonel
(Intelligence), 1st Armored
Division, U.S. Army Europe and
Seventh Army, Germany and
Operations Desert Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia...................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Distinguished Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Air Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Senior Parachutist Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Keith B.
Alexander, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Keith B. Alexander.
2. Position to which nominated:
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service/
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command.
3. Date of nomination:
October 20, 2009.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
December 2, 1951; Syracuse, NY.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Deborah Lynn Alexander (nee Douglas).
7. Names and ages of children:
Jennifer Lynn Leonard, age 33.
Julie Marie Bailey, age 31.
Diana Lauri Glaser, age 29.
Heather Michelle Burton, age 25.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Association of U.S. Army.
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power.
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Keith B. Alexander.
This 1st day of July, 2009.
[The nomination of LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on May 5, 2010, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 7, 2010.]
NOMINATIONS OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND; AND LTG
LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-IRAQ
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