[Congressional Record: February 25, 2010 (House)]
[Page H838-H845]
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 2701, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, WAIVING REQUIREMENT OF CLAUSE 6(a) OF RULE
XIII WITH RESPECT TO CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN RESOLUTIONS, AND
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF MOTIONS TO SUSPEND THE RULES
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee
on Rules, I call up House Resolution 1105 and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 1105
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule
XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 2701) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2010 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The
first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points
of order against consideration of the bill are waived except
those arising under clause 9 of rule XXI. General debate
shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour
equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking
minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be
considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall
be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose
of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the
nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be
considered as read. All points of order against the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived.
Notwithstanding clause 11 of rule XVIII, no amendment to the
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in
order except those printed in the report of the Committee on
Rules accompanying this resolution. Each such amendment may
be offered only in the order printed in the report, may be
offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be
considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified
in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent
and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall
not be subject to a demand for division of the question. All
points of order against such amendments are waived except
those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. At the
conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the
Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with
such amendments as may have been adopted. The previous
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and
amendments thereto to final passage without intervening
motion except one motion to recommit with or without
instructions.
Sec. 2. The Chair may entertain a motion that the
Committee rise only if offered by the chair of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence or his designee. The Chair
may not entertain a motion to strike out the enacting words
of the bill (as described in clause 9 of rule XVIII).
Sec. 3. After passage of H.R. 2701, it shall be in order
to consider in the House S. 1494. All points of order against
the Senate bill and against its consideration are waived. It
shall be in order to move to strike all after the enacting
clause of the Senate bill and to insert in lieu thereof the
provisions of H.R. 2701 as passed by the House. All points of
order against that motion are waived. If the motion is
adopted and the Senate bill, as amended, is passed, then it
shall be in order to move that the House insist on its
amendment to S. 1494 and request a conference with the Senate
thereon.
Sec. 4. The requirement of clause 6(a) of rule XIII for a
two-thirds vote to consider a report from the Committee on
Rules on the same day it is presented to the House is waived
with respect to any resolution reported through the
legislative day of February 26, 2010.
Sec. 5. It shall be in order at any time through the
legislative day of February 26, 2010, for the Speaker to
entertain motions that the House suspend the rules. The
Speaker or her designee shall consult with the Minority
Leader or his designee on the designation of any matter for
consideration pursuant to this section.
{time} 1030
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida is recognized for
1 hour.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Hastings of Florida was allowed to speak
out of order.)
Announcement Regarding PATRIOT Act Authorities
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise to inform Members that
the Intelligence Committee has received a classified document from the
Department of Justice that is related to the PATRIOT Act authorities
currently set to expire at the end of the month.
The House may consider a 1-year extension of the PATRIOT Act today so
the Intelligence Committee will be making this document available for
Member review in the committee offices located in HVC-304. Staff from
the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, as well as personnel from
the Justice Department and with the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, will be available to answer any questions that Members
may have. Members who want to review the document should call the
Intelligence Committee to schedule an appointment.
Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30
minutes to the gentleman from California, my good friend, Mr. Dreier.
All time yielded during consideration of the rule is for debate only.
General Leave
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members have 5 legislative days with which to revise and extend
their remarks and to insert extraneous materials into the Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
[[Page H839]]
Mr. Speaker, the resolution, as announced by our Clerk, provides for
consideration of H.R. 2701, the Intelligence Authorization Act for
fiscal year 2010, under a structured rule. The resolution waives all
points of order against consideration of the bill except those arising
under clause 9 of rule XXI. The resolution provides 1 hour of debate on
the bill, makes in order only those amendments printed in the rule, and
the resolution waives all points of order against such amendments
except those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI.
The resolution provides one motion to recommit with or without
instructions and provides that the Chair may entertain a motion to rise
only if offered by the Chair of the Intelligence Committee or his
designee and provides that the Chair may not entertain a motion to
strike the enacting words of the bill.
The resolution provides for a motion to consider the Senate bill and
substitute its text with the text of H.R. 2701 as passed by the House.
The resolution waives all points of order against the Senate bill and
its consideration. It also makes in order a motion that the House
insist on its amendment and request a conference with the Senate and
waives all points of order against such motion.
The resolution waives a requirement of clause 6(a) of rule XIII for a
two-thirds vote for same-day consideration of a report from the Rules
Committee through the legislative day of Friday, February 26. It also
permits the Speaker to consider motions to suspend the rules through
the legislative day of Friday, February 26. The Speaker shall consult
with the minority leader on the designation of any matter under this
authority.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the rule providing for
consideration of H.R. 2701, the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010.
As vice chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, I know that the intelligence community is the first line
of defense against terrorists, proliferators of weapons of mass
destruction, and other rogue elements who wish to do us and our allies
harm here at home and across the globe.
This legislation provides policy guidance for 16 agencies of the
intelligence community while also improving oversight and helping to
prevent disastrous consequences that faulty intelligence and a
misinformed Congress can have on national security.
Mr. Speaker, I have the honor and privilege of meeting many of our
intelligence professionals in over 50 countries around the world during
my oversight travel as a member of the Intelligence Committee. I cannot
overstate how much I and the members of the committee, and I am sure
all Members of this body, appreciate them and are humbled by their
service. Their dedication and commitment became more evident when seven
Americans made the ultimate sacrifice during a terrorist attack in
Khost, Afghanistan, this past December.
But the attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 253 on
Christmas Day was a startling reminder to all Americans that in spite
of our best efforts we are still under attack, and we still have much
work to do to get it right. The constant threat from violent extremists
reinforces that now more than ever, and we must give the intelligence
community the resources and flexibility it needs to thwart the
continuing and emerging threats to United States national security.
For the last 4 years, our country has gone without an intelligence
authorization bill. I find it very distressing that the House
Intelligence Committee, which was created to ensure proper oversight
and accountability of our intelligence community, has worked diligently
every year to pass a bill but has not seen one signed into law in
recent years.
As we have seen, the intelligence community is in dire need of
independent oversight. Sadly, when we created the Director of National
Intelligence, we did not create an independent Inspector General. This
bill would remedy that flaw by making clear that the Inspector General
does not serve at the whim of the Director of National Intelligence and
also has an independent responsibility to keep Congress informed.
Some of my colleagues on the other aisle have argued against the
creation of a new Inspector General. I would respectfully disagree with
their assessment. It is clear that this provision will help to
streamline and coordinate oversight.
This bill also contains a provision in the manager's amendment
providing sensible reforms to the Gang of Eight process. As vice
chairman of the committee, I have seen that process abused in the past,
and I am glad that we are taking a careful step towards reform. I
believe that the administration has a statutory and constitutional duty
to keep members of the Intelligence Committee, all members of the
Intelligence Committee, fully informed on certain intelligence matters.
Therefore, by reforming this process, the bill enhances transparency
and bolsters Congress' capacity to conduct important oversight.
The bill also clarifies the responsibility of the Director of
National Intelligence to cooperate with GAO investigations initiated by
Congress. GAO can provide the Congress with valuable expertise and
assist with oversight functions, especially in areas of auditing and
security clearance reforms.
I have stated time and time again that the intelligence community is
not diverse enough to do its job of stealing and analyzing foreign
countries' secrets. Diversity is a mission imperative. When I came on
this committee, I came on after the legendary Lou Stokes, who served on
this committee and advanced many measures that are in law today dealing
with intelligence. My good friend and my good friend from California's
good friend, Julian Dixon, who has departed life, carried that banner,
as did Sanford Bishop when he was on this committee.
I, along with many other members of the committee, particularly
Chairman Reyes, Anna Eshoo and others countless throughout the years,
Jane Harman included, we have fought for continuing diversity on this
committee. We need people who blend in, speak the language, and
understand the cultures in the countries that we are targeting.
As my colleagues on the committee and I have mentioned on many
occasions, when the intelligence leadership comes to testify, we don't
see a lot of diversity at the table. We don't see enough women at the
table. It is time for the community to get serious about improving
diversity for the sake of our national security.
A real diversity effort means more than just staging recruitment
drives at colleges with a lot of black students or Latino students.
Diversity means hiring, hiring more Arab Americans. It means hiring
more Iranian Americans, more Pakistani Americans, more Chinese
Americans and more Korean Americans. If the intelligence community is
to succeed in its global mission, it must have a global face.
I have offered an amendment on diversity in the intelligence
community to the underlying bill. My amendment contains a requirement
for the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress on a
comprehensive plan to improve diversity in the intelligence community.
It calls on the Director to report on specific implementation plans for
each element agency in the community. It also requires information on
plans to improve minority retention, not only at the junior and mid-
grade levels, but at the senior and management levels as well.
Finally, it requires that the Director of National Intelligence
report to the congressional Intelligence Committees on the efforts
being made with diversity training and how improvement in diversity
will be measured. This amendment, along with many other important
provisions in this bill, will make our intelligence community more
effective, more efficient, and more accountable.
Given the immense security challenges facing our Nation, it is vital
that Congress pass this legislation so that we may continue to fulfill
our commitment to the safety and well-being of the great American
people.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DREIER. I yield myself such time as I might consume.
(Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, let me first express my appreciation to my
friend from Fort Lauderdale, a member
[[Page H840]]
of both the Rules Committee and a distinguished member of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. Speaker, last Christmas Day, as we all know, when a passenger
boarded Northwest Airlines Flight 253 headed for the Detroit Metro
Airport, the issue of national security once again came to the
forefront, to the top of the agenda for everyone in our country. This
is, of course, never, never far from our minds. But in recent months,
as several high-profile terrorist plots have been thwarted, the tragic
shooting at Fort Hood had taken place and our troops continue to fight
two wars, we know that the threat of attacks on Americans remains a
very real threat to us.
What was so shocking and revealing about the attempted attack on
Christmas Day was not that al Qaeda remains a threat. This much we all
know. What was most troubling to the American people was the revelation
that key information was available that could have prevented Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab from ever boarding that plane in the first place.
Last month, December 25, as everyone, including the President has
acknowledged, the system failed us. If not for the perpetrator's
failure to properly detonate the device and the heroic acts of his
fellow passengers, this attempted attack would have become a horrible,
horrible tragedy. It was not careful intelligence gathering, analysis,
and coordination that saved the people on that plane; it was luck and
the quick thinking on the part of those very courageous passengers.
Mr. Speaker, the American people rightly began, immediately after
Christmas, on Christmas Day and thereafter, to ask questions about what
is being done to address this failure that allowed Abdulmutallab to
board that plane. What exactly what wrong? How can we fix the system?
What can we do to ensure that this kind of failure never, ever happens
again.
Now, in light of these questions, it would seem appropriate that
today we would be considering our annual intelligence authorization
bill. Now is the time to compile the lessons learned from the attempted
attack on Flight 253, the Fort Hood shooting, the numerous arrests of
would-be terrorists like Najibullah Zazi and David Headley and the
continued items that obviously we don't hear about out there.
{time} 1045
Now is the time to take, Mr. Speaker, these new insights and reform
our intelligence agencies and policies to better protect our homeland
and the American people, and that has to remain the top priority. That
is where all of the attention should be focused. And yet, inexplicably,
we are considering a bill today that is nearly 8 months old. This
legislation was reported out of committee in June of last year. It was
written before any of these recent attacks and attempted attacks took
place, before any of these new revelations of flaws in our system and
before any analysis was conducted on how to fix them.
Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, the Democratic majority's decision to
bring up this hopelessly outdated bill is made all the more
inexplicable by the fact that it was known to be a seriously flawed
bill even back in June when it was being finalized. In fact, Mr.
Speaker, the Obama administration released a scathing criticism of this
legislation and even issued a veto threat.
According to the Statement of Administration Policy from July 8 of
last year: ``The administration has serious concerns with a number of
provisions that would impede the smooth and efficient functioning of
the intelligence community and that would raise a number of policy,
management, legal and constitutional concerns.'' That is the Statement
of Administration Policy.
The statement went on to elaborate on the bill's flaws: the serious
risk of compromising highly sensitive data, the new layers of
bureaucracy, the impediments to building an intelligence workforce for
the 21st century, the wasted resources. These were not the accusations,
Mr. Speaker of political adversaries; these were the serious criticisms
of President Obama. And they were leveled nearly 8 months ago before a
whole host of new challenges made themselves apparent to us. If this
was a flawed bill last July, as the President clearly defined it as
being, it is now a flat-out dangerous bill.
I believe that the American people will be stunned to learn that the
Democratic majority has chosen, with this legislation, to simply ignore
the grave new concerns that have been raised in recent months. No
lessons have been learned and no new solutions have been contemplated.
The Democratic majority's bold approach is to take up an 8-month-old
bill that wasn't even a good idea at the time and, as I said, was
criticized harshly by President Obama.
The manner in which they are bringing this bill to the floor is just
as troubling, Mr. Speaker. The Democratic majority will likely claim
that a bipartisan amendment process has been allowed: five Democratic
amendments were made in order, four Republican amendments, and three
bipartisan amendments. But what these numbers mask is the fact that 21
Democratic amendments were included in the manager's amendments. This
not only skews the process in a very partisan way, but it denies the
Members of this body representing all Americans, representing Democrats
and Republicans alike, the opportunity to vote on these 21 amendments
individually based on their merits. We are denied the opportunity for
transparency and scrutiny.
What's worse, Mr. Speaker, is that this rule has implications for
legislation far beyond the intelligence bill at hand. This rule
provides a blank check for the Democratic leadership to bring up any
bill at any time today or tomorrow without a shred of transparency or
even one moment of public scrutiny. This rule gives them carte blanche
to take whatever legislative action they choose, entirely absent of any
accountability.
And I've got to say, I was thinking about this last night when we
were in the Rules Committee, to impose this kind of structure this
early in a Congress--the second month of the second session of the
111th Congress--is beyond the pale. When such drastic and draconian
measures are taken to shield their actions from all scrutiny, we can
only ask ourselves, what exactly are they plotting? What exactly are
they trying to hide from the American people?
Mr. Speaker, for the sake of the security of our homeland and for the
sake of a return to the often-promised accountability and transparency,
I urge my colleagues to reject this rule. What we need to do is we need
to take a hard look at the intelligence failures that have taken place.
Let's ask the hows and the whys and make the necessary reforms that
will ensure that we never again have to rely on blind luck to protect
the American people.
Mr. Speaker, perhaps most important of all, we must reject this
attempt to shield the Democratic majority's actions from public view.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
You know, Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my good friend from California's
desire to address Flight 253; but in my view, his complaints that the
bill is outdated ignores the rule. The rule makes in order an amendment
by Representative Schauer directed at the lessons of Flight 253.
Now, listen, the intelligence community, constituted of 16 elements,
is organic. It is constantly in a state of change, and there is
considerable coordination and collaboration regarding the globe, not
just one airplane, not just one individual. And when you isolate one
individual, like the person that was on Flight 253, you do have that
anomaly to show that we are steadily being set upon. But that was mild
by comparison to some of those incidents that never make it in the
public realm.
I am reminded of the constant saying that success has a thousand
fathers, but failure evidently doesn't even have a mother because
anytime there is a failure, the whole community is set upon, while day
after day after day, year after year after year they're stopping
countless attacks on this country that go unnoticed, whether it be in
the field of cyber, whether it be on the battlefield. We are constantly
in that position. There have been hundreds of successes to protect our
homeland security.
Mr. DREIER. Will the gentleman yield?
[[Page H841]]
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Certainly I will yield to my friend.
Mr. DREIER. I thank my friend for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, let me say that I completely concur with my colleague
about this notion of our recognizing that day after day--and I had that
in my opening remarks--day after day we are seeing the prevention of
the kinds of attacks that we are all concerned about, and we
congratulate and herald the intelligence community for that. I think
that what we need to focus on is the Abdulmutallab situation, the Fort
Hood shootings, and the Najibullah Zazi and David Headley arrests.
These things have taken place since this bill had any kind of committee
consideration last year. And all we are arguing is, yes, it's great
that some amendments have been made in order--unfortunately, it's a
very partisan item to have 21 amendments included in the manager's
amendment--but we believe very strongly that the committee--and you
know very well, having worked so hard on that committee, that a lot of
work takes place in secrecy, understandably, that in dealing with these
situations, that should happen before bringing a measure of this
magnitude to the floor that even the President and so many others have
acknowledged is flawed.
I thank my friend for yielding.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Well, when you speak of the President's
directions, there were several principal matters that the President
referenced in his, as you put it, threatened veto. But the veto, more
specifically, the principal objection was to the Gang of Eight
restriction that many of us in the committee supported for the reason
that we think--and thought--that each of the intelligence members
should be advised by the President the same as those of the Gang of
Eight.
You know, we use these terms around here. The Gang of Eight are the
central players--the Speaker, the minority leader, the majority leader,
and the committee Chairs and ranking members. That is who that small
kernel of people are who receive specific information. I hope the
public at least understands some aspect of that.
The point that I was trying to make and will continue to make is--let
me give you a for example. In the last month, I have visited our
intelligence operations in nine countries, including Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Ukraine, Germany, just to mention a few.
In each of those places--and there were others that will go
unmentioned--in each of those places I learned of immense success and
reporting of successes coming back here to the intelligence community
and to the President. Nobody talks about that in the newspaper. Nobody
talks about that in this particular setting. You pick three incidents
out of thousands of successes and point to a community's failures. I
can't accept that.
For 10 years I have watched on this committee these people work their
hearts out, Republicans and Democrats, under the leadership of--friends
of mine and yours--Porter Goss, who led this committee, others long
before Leon Panetta, and the other committees that don't even get
mentioned at all because most people don't even know that they have
intelligence operations. What would happen in this world, what would
happen with our allies if we did not have the SIGNET? How would we be
having the successes that we are having in Afghanistan today of picking
off leaders of Taliban, leaders of al Qaeda?
All the time it seems to me that all that comes out as is, oh, they
just took out another one, but it doesn't get played up. If one of them
managed to get to Canada and to the United States, then that would be
the biggest talk that we would have here in Congress. It's not fair,
and fairness to the intelligence community is as deserving as any other
parts of our bureaucracy that fail considerably, including this
institution.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for just 1 second?
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I was going to yield my time, and I ask the
gentleman to take his time, but I am more than happy to yield.
Mr. DREIER. I thank my friend for yielding. And Mr. Speaker, let me
just say that I totally concur with absolutely everything my friend
just said.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Well, then, I will just take my time back,
now that you agree with me.
Mr. DREIER. All I want to do is agree with you. So thank you very
much.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I am very, very happy to yield
4 minutes to the very hardworking and diligent and thoughtful ranking
member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, our friend from
Clarendon, Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
Mr. THORNBERRY. I appreciate the gentleman from California yielding
to me.
I think it is important to step back and put this bill in a bit of
context. The Intelligence Committee reported H.R. 2701 out of committee
on June 26, 2009, by a vote of 12-9 and the Rules Committee first
reported a rule for its consideration here on the floor on July 8,
2009. And yet, from July 8, 2009, until today there has not been time
found on the floor to consider this measure. Now, we did find time to
consider the Restore Our American Mustangs Act, we did find time to
consider the Chesapeake Bay Gateways and Watertrails Network Continuing
Authorization Act, we found time to consider the Castle Nugent National
Historic Site Establishment Act for St. Croix, all under a rule--none
of these even included suspensions--but we couldn't find time to have
the Intelligence authorization bill in support of the very people that
the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman from California are
talking about who keep us safe.
What has happened over the past 7 months since this bill was reported
out, as the gentleman from California mentioned, is that we have had a
number of arrests and attempted attacks against our homeland; I count
eight that have made the papers. Some of them we have stopped by the
diligent work of our intelligence professionals. One of them at least
was stopped by just pure luck. One of them was not stopped at all, and
that was at Fort Hood, where a number of people tragically lost their
lives.
In addition, in the last several months, the situation in Afghanistan
has changed tremendously. We have had increased terrorist threats
emanating from Yemen and Somalia and other places around the world. And
yet for some reason intelligence was not a high enough priority, with
the leadership of this House at least, to bring this Intelligence
authorization bill to the floor.
In addition to that, I would say that a number of issues have been
much discussed in the press and around the country that are very
central to the efforts of those intelligence professionals to keep us
safe. For example, the President said he was going to close Guantanamo
Bay within 1 year; it hasn't happened. What's going to happen with
those prisoners now? What happens if an American somehow joins a
terrorist organization overseas? What are his rights and what are our
responsibilities when we get into that situation?
{time} 1100
Should there be a complete record of the briefings that were made to
Congress about various antiterrorism matters or should those just be
selectively leaked out as is happening now?
Another question: Should we automatically give the Miranda warning
that says you have the right to remain silent when a non-U.S. person is
obtained here in the United States?
Now, amendments on every one of these issues I've just mentioned were
filed before the Rules Committee, and yet none of those amendments was
made in order.
Why? We have these issues that are central to safeguarding the
country. Yet the majority does not make those in order. What does it
make in order? A number of reports, as we have discussed.
In addition, in the manager's amendment, there is a section that, I
am afraid, illuminates for us all the approach that at least some
people in this House are taking in this fight against terrorism. I do
not believe it represents a number of the members of the Intelligence
Committee, who see this every day; but in the manager's amendment are
provisions that apply only to intelligence community professionals. The
provisions say that they will go to jail for forcing one to do
[[Page H842]]
something that is against one's individual religious beliefs.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. DREIER. I am happy to yield to my friend an additional 2 minutes.
Mr. THORNBERRY. I appreciate the gentleman for yielding.
Now, remember, we can't have debates on serious issues regarding
Guantanamo, Miranda rights and other things. What is hitting in this
blizzard of reports are several pages which say, if our intelligence
professionals try to get information from a terrorist in order to
prevent future terrorist attacks and if they don't give him the proper
amount of sleep, our intelligence professionals will go to jail.
If they do anything that violates how the terrorist sees his
religious rights, without any standard of reasonableness, without any
standard to judge it by--it's like, if the terrorist says, My religion
requires me to have a Big Mac every day. If we don't give him that Big
Mac, we are violating this provision, and our intelligence
professionals will go to jail.
There are provisions which say subjecting a terrorist to prolonged
isolation will cause our intelligence professionals to go to jail. How
many county jails and State prisons in the country could operate under
this standard? I would say none. This provision will treat terrorists
more gingerly than those in our criminal defense system.
So, Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, what this rule does is it avoids the
debates on the substantive issues. Yet there is this thread, which I
don't believe the President seems to share--perhaps some in his
administration do, and perhaps a few people in this Congress do--a
thread of antagonism against our intelligence professionals which says
we are going to prosecute them, as the Justice Department is
investigating, and that we are going to send them to jail if they don't
coddle these terrorists in the appropriate way.
I think that reflects a lack of seriousness with this measure, and
that is sufficient reason to reject this rule.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I have listened to my
colleague, who is an absolutely brilliant member of the intelligence
community, and he has provided continuing and dedicated service for the
period of time that he and I have served on the committee together.
There is one thing, I think, I know a little bit more about than he
does, and that is our prison system, and that is for the reason that I
participated, as a State and a Federal judge and then as a lawyer, in
dealing with circumstances in our prisons.
Our colleague suggests that detainees are treated in a certain way,
and those particular things--for example, food and the length of the
hair or religious convictions--have been litigated ad nauseam in the
United States. I can assure you that persons who are in custody in the
United States find themselves able to access to the food that comports
with their religious requirements and also the other circumstances.
One thing that is great about America is that we do have values, and
one thing that is great about us in handling others, even much better
than they even ever consider us, is that those values manifest
themselves in the treatment of persons who are our enemies.
Now, I am going to try with this document here to put to rest this
not-in-my-backyard argument that I continue to hear from my colleagues
about Guantanamo.
I first want to commend to my colleagues H.R. 3728, the Detainment
Reform Act of 2009, which I filed, and I would urge them to look at it
and to look at the detention criteria and at the ways to process
detainees, as well as the reporting requirements that transpire. I will
not take the time now to go into detail, but that measure is sitting
here, and any one of them can join it. I have no pride of authorship,
and I've said to Members on the other side and on our side that, if
there is something they can add or detract, then please do so.
Regarding where you put people whom we hold and somehow or another
the thought being that we can't try people in our Federal system or,
for that matter, if we have a situation where every detainee must be
tried in military commissions, according to some, well, let me tell you
some of the people whom we hold in one prison today.
According to the Bureau of Prisons, ADX Supermax in Florence,
Colorado, has a capacity of 490 inmates. There are currently 445,
leaving 45 cells available. I can assure you anybody in Guantanamo
could be transferred here with no threat to Florence, Colorado. No one
has ever escaped Supermax. Supermax officers are some of the best
trained in the Nation, and current and former inmates include--let me
just give you some of these people:
Anthony Casso, a mobster and former underboss of the Lucchese crime
family, is at this prison. Wadih el-Hage, a coconspirator in the 1998
United States Embassy bombings, is in this prison. Matthew Hale, a
white supremacist leader convicted of soliciting the murder of a
Federal judge, is in this prison. Larry Hoover, the leader of the
Gangster Disciples Nation, based in Chicago, is in this prison. Jeff
Fort, the cofounder of the Black P. Stones gang in Chicago and the
founder of its El Rukn faction, is in this prison. Omar Portee, the
cofounder of the United Blood Nation, is in this prison and has never
escaped. Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber, is in this prison in
Colorado. Juan Matta-Ballesteros, the drug trafficker and coconspirator
in the Enrique Camarena case, is in this prison. Zacarias Moussaoui--
remember him? He was tried in our regular system as a coconspirator in
the September 11, 2001, attacks. Guess where he is? In Colorado, in
Supermax. Terry Nichols, the Oklahoma City bomber, is in this prison.
Richard Colvin Reid, the Islamic terrorist, nicknamed the ``Shoe
Bomber,'' who also came through our regular system under the aegis of
the previous President, is in this prison. Eric Robert Rudolph,
convicted of the 1996 Olympic Park bombing, is in this prison. Dwight
York is in this prison. Ramzi Yousef, of the World Trade Center
bombing, is in this prison.
Enough of this ``not in my backyard.'' We can hold these people.
H. Rap Brown is in this prison. Thomas Silverstein, convicted of
murdering a Federal correctional officer, is in this prison. Luis
Felipe, founder of the Almighty Latin Kings and Queens Nation, is in
this prison. Howard Mason, a drug trafficker, who ordered the murder of
Police Officer Eddie Byrne, is in this prison. A leading member of the
Aryan Brotherhood, Barry Mills, is in this prison.
So what are you all talking about when you stand around and tell
people that we can't hold people in this Supermax prison? We can hold
them in Guantanamo. We can hold them in Supermax, and we can do
everything that is required of us as a nation in order to protect
ourselves in that regard.
Yet what has happened in this institution is you have given the
American people a chance to believe that they should be afraid if you
hold them in certain institutions in your neighborhoods. Well, they
come through your neighborhoods an awful lot, and you evidently don't
know about it. I, personally, am just a little tired of your not-in-my-
backyard attitude about this particular system. We can hold terrorists,
and we can hold criminals, and we've been doing it all of my adult
career, and that's 50 years as a lawyer.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, let me just say that my friend from Gold
River, California, has been attempting to engage in a colloquy with my
friend.
I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Gold River, California (Mr.
Daniel E. Lungren), and I am sure that he will yield to the gentleman
from Fort Lauderdale if he would like to respond in any way.
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman
asked: Why?
Well, you know, it's not just in my backyard. I don't want them in
any American's backyard. Guess what? The American people agree with me.
That's why Mr. King and I went before your committee, to ask
permission if we could possibly debate this issue on the floor.
Everything you just said is part of a debate that could take place, and
we could resolve it, but the Rules Committee decided, in their infinite
wisdom, not to allow us to debate that on the floor.
Mr. King's and my amendment did one simple thing. It said that those
who are currently in or in the future
[[Page H843]]
will be in Guantanamo Bay will not be transferred to U.S. sovereign
territory for any trials. That is, they will stay at Guantanamo with
the specially created courtroom that we have there--absolutely secure--
under the Military Tribunal Act, which we, the Congress, passed in
2005.
I mean that's the answer to your question, but it must seem strange
to the American people that the majority would be afraid, seemingly, to
allow us to debate that with real consequence. You can allow us to
debate that in the rule, knowing it has no consequence. The real
consequence would be if we had an opportunity for the American people
to actually be heard by way of legislation.
It is interesting that you did make in order the manager's amendment,
which will give newly established rights, by way of penalty, to our
members of the intelligence community if they would dare deprive one of
these individuals of sleep or if they would isolate them for too long a
period of time--neither one of them defined in the statute.
So what we have done is we have said we will continue to ignore the
American people who have said loudly and clearly, We do not want Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed and his confederates to come to New York. We do not
want those in Guantanamo to come to the United States.
I find it strange that the gentleman from Florida would compare H.
Rap Brown to a terrorist involved in a terrorist network. He doesn't
understand--I know he does understand. I'm sure it was a rhetorical
device the gentleman was using--the difference between someone who is
an American citizen and the rights that he has versus someone who
happens to be a noncitizen--in fact, an unlawful enemy combatant. There
is a distinction that has always been known in our courts, and the idea
that we are going to extend the full parity of constitutional rights to
someone whose only connection with the United States is that that
person was captured on the battlefield, attempting to kill Americans,
is inconsistent with the history of this Nation and is inconsistent
with all of the decisions of the Supreme Court.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. DREIER. May I inquire of the Chair how much time is remaining on
both sides before I yield to my friend from Gold River?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 13 minutes
remaining. The gentleman from Florida has 7 minutes remaining.
Mr. DREIER. I yield an additional 1 minute to my friend from Gold
River, California.
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. So we have right now, taking
place across the street from the White House, a summit on health care.
We should be having a summit today on the intelligence community, in
our effort against those who would wish to destroy us by terrorism. The
way we act suggests to the American people this is not on the top of
our priority list but on the bottom.
Later, we are going to have the rule on the PATRIOT Act. Why?
Because, within a couple of days, three provisions of the PATRIOT Act
are set to expire.
Monday, we rushed in here. We had an extra day of voting. What did we
do? We worked to rid the country of the scourge of unnamed post
offices. We were here to make sure that--man, we've got to find some
more post offices to name.
Why couldn't we give additional time to allow amendments that are
serious in nature and that the American people want us to deal with on
this floor? But no. Once again, the Rules Committee has said we are not
going to allow it, but we are going to incorporate in the manager's
amendment an amendment which actually provides greater rights to those
who are being held and put at jeopardy our intelligence community.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to my good
friend on the Rules Committee, I would just like to comment regarding
my good friend, Mr. Lungren's comments.
Mr. Lungren, there have been three people who have been convicted in
military commissions, and two of them are already free. During that
same period of time, under President Bush's administration and under in
President Obama's administration, more than 300 people have been
convicted in our civilian courts.
{time} 1115
And you're correct. I was using the people in the Supermax to make
the point no matter who they were, whether they were Zacarias
Moussaoui, who certainly isn't an American citizen, or countless
others, that we can hold them and that they can't escape. The fear some
seem to think is that they would escape.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to my colleague on the Rules Committee,
the distinguished gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Perlmutter).
Mr. PERLMUTTER. I won't take the 1 minute.
I'd say to my friend from California, in Colorado we were asked to
take over the trial of Timothy McVeigh, who had blown up an office
building in Oklahoma. He didn't do it in Colorado. But we said okay,
we're part of this country. We're part of America. We have a
responsibility. We don't know what kind of crazy people are going to
come and try to disrupt or harm our judges, our people that worked in
the prisons or the like, but we took that responsibility. We weren't
afraid of that responsibility. And our judicial system, our Federal
judges, handled that matter, I think, in a very fair, fine, and proper
manner. We did it because that's who we are. And we've taken prisoners
into our supermax who are terrorists by anybody's definition.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I yield the gentleman an additional 30
seconds.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. We take responsibility for those things that
Americans have to deal with. We don't like dealing with it. You don't
like dealing with it. But we have to. So we're prepared. In our court
system in America, whether it's in New York or Colorado or Texas or
California, we have good judges. We have good people that work in our
Bureau of Prisons. We can handle this.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I might consume.
I would first say in response to my good friend from Colorado, Mr.
Lungren has just reminded me that the moment one of these individuals
is on American soil, they have enhanced rights that they would not
otherwise have.
I would like to engage in a colloquy with the very distinguished
ranking member of the Select Committee on Intelligence to discuss one
of the amendments that unfortunately will not see the light of day,
that we will not have the opportunity to debate other than in the
context of the overall manager's amendment, which included 21
amendments from our Democratic colleagues, including the McDermott
amendment.
Now, the McDermott amendment, which was discussed by my friend from
Clarendon, is an amendment that provides basically carte blanche, an
opportunity for any individual, one of these barbarians, to claim for
religious reasons that they are being mistreated. The moment I heard
the word ``Big Mac'' come forward from my friend Mac Thornberry, I have
to say who's my Big Mac, but I thought, my gosh, someone could actually
claim that being denied a Big Mac would be cruel and unusual
punishment? And I've got to say as I look at the litany of items on
here, including exploiting phobias of the individual, I just don't
understand it. And I wonder if my friend might further enlighten us on
this.
I'm happy to yield.
Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank my friend for yielding.
Let's start with a bit of context. Remember, the Army field manual
has been published so that terrorists all around the world know what we
will and will not do to them. This will take it another step forward
and actually give terrorists more rights, more consideration than
ordinary criminals in our criminal justice system.
For example, it is not unusual, I suspect, for the FBI to interrogate
someone accused of a crime, perhaps involving murder, to say you'd
better cooperate with us or you may get the death penalty. That would
be illegal under this amendment. As a matter of fact, the intelligence
professional who says that under this amendment would go to jail for 15
years because you cannot threaten the use of force.
The gentleman's correct; there is no standard of reasonableness for
what
[[Page H844]]
they would classify as your religious practice, so I can classify as my
religious practice anything I say. And the intelligence professionals
have to coddle to that or they could go to jail. It is an outrageous
inversion of our priorities, I think, Mr. Speaker, where we care more
about coddling the terrorists than we do about protecting the American
people.
Mr. DREIER. I thank my friend for his contribution.
He just reminded me that the speech that everyone heard, what was
described as the ``Scott heard 'round the world'' when we saw Scott
Brown elected to the United States Senate seat in Massachusetts, the
line that came to the forefront was, I want to make sure that my tax
dollars are expended on fighting against these terrorists rather than
expending our tax dollars defending these terrorists. And the McDermott
amendment takes and expends more time and effort and energy in
defending them. And, unfortunately, the only discussion that we will
have on this, Mr. Speaker, is during consideration of the rule because
we're not going to have a chance to vote on this amendment other than
its being included in the overall manager's amendment with 20 other
amendments being included.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I continue to have to teach law
here, and I never wanted to do that.
The language in the manager's amendment restates existing criminal
law prohibitions like those in the Detainee Treatment Act and clearly
establishes that the United States will adhere to the rule of law, and
that's whether a person is in Guantanamo or whether they are in
Colorado.
That said, at this time I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentlewoman from New Hampshire (Ms. Shea-Porter).
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the chairman for
his hard work on the underlying bill.
As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I know just how
important it is to focus on vulnerabilities in the global supply chain,
and I'm glad that my amendment was included in the manager's amendment.
My amendment broadens review of global supply chain vulnerabilities
to include the risks not only from counterfeit products but from
original products. Considering the number of foreign state-owned or
state-invested enterprises in the technology industry that manufacture
products for our market, original products present serious risks to our
defense and intelligence systems.
The amended review also assesses the impact of the provision of
services by foreign-owned companies, which also creates vulnerabilities
in the supply of parts and equipment, causing increased vulnerability
to cyberattack on our intelligence systems.
I urge my colleagues to support the rule and the manager's amendment.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 3 minutes to a very
thoughtful new Member who has expended a great deal of time and energy
trying to ensure that we can at least have a debate on the issue of
bringing terrorists onto U.S. soil, my friend from Peoria, Mr. Schock.
Mr. SCHOCK. I thank my good friend from California for the time.
What a novel idea. The United States House of Representatives would
debate the power of a good idea.
You know, in my short 1 year in this body, it's amazed me how many
amendments have come before this body at a straight up-or-down party
vote. Republicans vote one way and Democrats vote another.
We live within the confines of majority rule. It's something that our
voters and taxpayers live with. It's something that we in this body
live with. But I think there's something that almost everyone that I
represent in my district abhors, and that is the notion that the power
of a good idea is not allowed the form of debate in this body and is
not allowed a straight up-or-down vote for each Member to cast his or
her vote based on the best interests of their districts. And for that
reason, Mr. Speaker, I offered three what I thought were thoughtful
amendments specifically dealing with the proposal to move the much-
talked-about Guantanamo Bay detention facility to my State in Illinois.
I might add, Mr. Speaker, that this wasn't just an idea that I had,
but rather, I was joined by every single member of the Illinois
delegation on my side of the aisle. They felt this was important enough
to allow both sides to be able to debate this issue, both sides, each
individual Member, a straight up-or-down vote.
Now, what is it that we wanted each Member to be able to vote on?
Well, ladies and gentlemen, there's been much talk about moving all of
these prisoners, close to 100 of them, from Gitmo to the center part of
our country, in the Midwest, in Illinois, and the idea that somehow
that will make us safer as a Nation by moving those terrorists to our
country. Yet one of the questions that continually is asked of me, as
well as my colleagues who represent the State of Illinois, is who are
these people? What are their names? Why are they being held? What acts
of terror have they attempted or committed against our country?
So our amendment was very simple. It said this: The American people
ought to know what we know. If the American people are supposed to
weigh in to their elected representatives to say, yes, we think it's a
great idea for Guantanamo Bay to come to Illinois, don't you think they
should have the information to make an educated decision? After all, I
sat in this front row a year ago and listened to the Speaker of this
House talk about how I was going to be a part of the most transparent
and open government in United States history. Imagine being a part of
the most transparent and open government in United States history. And
yet today, ladies and gentlemen, taxpayers, voters, not just in the
State of Illinois where these terrorists are supposed to be coming, but
every American----
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to my friend from
Illinois.
Mr. SCHOCK. Thank you. I'll wrap up.
Ladies and gentlemen, it's real simple. In the most transparent and
open government in United States history, shouldn't the American people
know what we know?
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I'd inquire if my colleague has
any remaining speakers. I'm the last speaker for this side, and I will
reserve my time until the gentleman closes.
Mr. DREIER. Let me say to my friend that I anxiously look forward to
his spellbinding closing remarks that I'm sure we'll all be able to
benefit from, but I have one other speaker and then I'll close and look
forward to sitting patiently and listening to my friend.
Mr. Speaker, at this time I am happy to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to a
hardworking member of the Intelligence Committee, a veteran of the FBI,
the gentleman from Brighton, Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, something fundamentally
different has happened in the last year. We have fundamentally changed
the way we deal with terrorists in the United States. We should
absolutely fully have that debate on the policy of that switch. Why?
Because it has had tremendous consequences.
Think about this: The CIA officers who, given direction by the
Department of Justice, interrogated and debriefed and got some 70
percent of what we know about al Qaeda through their debriefings, are
now being treated as criminals. Foreign-trained criminals are being
brought to the United States and being treated as Americans.
The fact that we would take a terrorist off a plane who had just
attempted to kill some 300 people and the people on the ground and say
you have the right to remain silent--wrong. You don't. I need to know
if there's anybody else out there. I need to know where the training
camp was. I need to know a name of an airline you may have heard while
you were training in a place like Yemen to come to the United States on
a combat mission and kill Americans. They should be treated as enemy
combatants. That's exactly who they are. And when you make this
fundamental switch from a proactive intelligence approach to keep them
at bay to a law enforcement effort to bring them to the United States,
it will have negative consequences for the national security of the
United States.
[[Page H845]]
To not allow the amendments--I have had many and many of my
colleagues here who had amendments to debate and talk about these very
serious issues. There is a reason that they couldn't wrap up the fact
that there was a shooting at Fort Hood and the Christmas Day bomber.
There's a reason that happened. Because when you bring in law
enforcement, it slows things down.
{time} 1130
They stop providing information until their lawyer can cut their best
deal possible. This can't be about lawyers in the back room cutting
good deals for foreign-trained terrorists trying to kill Americans. It
has to be about the protection of every citizen in the United States
and our allies abroad. When we lose that focus, we will lose the
ability to stop everyone that comes to these shores.
And if our new program is we are going to catch them at the airport
by spending lots more money, we are going to lose this fight. We need
to get them in Yemen, in Saudi Arabia, in the tribal areas of Pakistan,
and wherever else they train, they finance, and they commit themselves
to an act of combat to kill U.S. citizens.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized
for 2\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, we all know where the eyes of the American
people are focused right now, and it is not here on the House of
Representatives. They are focused down across the street from the White
House at the Blair House, where the health care summit is taking place.
I have no idea how it is going. We have been managing this debate on an
issue that is of paramount importance.
The five most important words in the middle of the preamble to the
U.S. Constitution I regularly say are ``provide for the common
defense.'' We need to recognize that this is priority number one, our
Nation's intelligence. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Najibullah Zazi,
David Headley, these are names that have come to the forefront because
these individuals pose a threat to the United States of America.
There is no issue that is more important for us to be focusing on.
Mr. Lungren said earlier rather than having a 6-hour summit on the
issue of health care, which we all acknowledge is important and needs
to be addressed, the attention should be focused on national security.
And unfortunately, it is not only not being focused on, but what we are
doing here today is taking a flawed bill from July of last year, 8
months old, that was maligned and criticized by the statement of
administration policy from President Obama, and what is it we have
done? We have denied amendment after amendment.
Mr. Schock's very thoughtful amendment to deal with the issue of
should we give enhanced rights to these people who have perpetrated
terrible acts against us? Bring them onto U.S. soil, which would make
that happen? We think we should have a chance to debate that issue.
Should we take the 21 amendments that our Democratic colleagues have
offered, including my friend, Mr. McDermott, who has an amendment that
dramatically enhances the power of those individuals who have either
tried or have perpetrated terrible acts against us and provides them
new defense?
Again I mentioned Scott Brown earlier. And what resonated from his
acceptance speech when he won the election was that we shouldn't be
expending our taxpayer dollars on defending these terrorists. We should
be expending our taxpayer dollars to fight to make sure they never,
ever pose a threat against us. This is a terrible rule. It is a
terrible rule because it denies the opportunity for debate. And the
bill itself needs to be reworked by the Select Committee on
Intelligence.
Mr. Speaker, we can do better. I urge my colleagues to reject it.
Let's do the right thing.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, this is a responsible bill that
will enhance vital human intelligence collection, fill the critical
gaps in our intelligence-gathering activities, authorize significant
investment in our Nation's cybersecurity capabilities, as well as
provide much needed reform by forbidding the CIA's practice of
outsourcing interrogation to private contractors operating outside the
law.
It is unfortunate that we live in a dangerous and different world,
where we must always be vigilant of those who wish to cause harm to
others. This bill is critical to addressing the many challenges we face
within the intelligence community.
I want to take this moment of personal privilege to thank Chairman
Reyes and the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Republican and Democratic staff, for their extraordinary hard work and
dedication in helping to see this excellent bill to fruition.
Four years is far too long for the intelligence community to go
without guidance from its oversight committees. I believe we should get
an authorization bill passed and on the President's desk for signature
into law. There is going to be added general debate. But when I
listened to my colleague, who is my good friend, I kind of feel like
that all of the labor on both sides, including speakers that I served
with on that committee, Mr. Thornberry and Mr. Rogers, we have worked
very actively to get us to the position that we are in with reference
to this authorization bill. There have been agreements and there have
been disagreements. And there are always things that can be added.
The responsibility of the Rules Committee is to move the agenda. I am
very proud of the fact that there is a summit on health care going on
at the White House at the same time that we are discussing the
authorization bill, and that I am getting ready to leave here and go to
a jobs task force, which I believe is high on the minds of the American
agenda, which proves that we really can do legislation, prepare
legislation, chew gum and walk at the same time. We are an incredible
lot of people we are, and just like that we can also secure this
Nation, as this bill does in high kind.
But I am going to say to you all one more time, enough of the
business about not in my backyard. If I didn't dispel it today, I will
see you another time on the floor to have you understand just how
extraordinary the Federal judiciary is, just how extraordinary the
intelligence community is, and just how important it is to our Nation's
security that we allow them to function accordingly.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the
previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
____________________
[Congressional Record: February 25, 2010 (House)]
[Page H849-H895]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2701.
{time} 1321
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 2701) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2010 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Ms. Edwards of Maryland in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan
(Mr. Hoekstra) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. REYES. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Madam Chair, I am proud to rise today in support of H.R. 2701, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This is an unusual
time of the year for us to be considering this legislation. However, it
is and remains a very important bill which addresses critical national
security issues, and one that we ultimately need to see enacted.
As chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, my
most important job is to guide the committee in providing appropriate
tools, resources, and authorities to aid the dedicated men and women of
the intelligence community in keeping our Nation safe. I believe that
H.R. 2701 does just that.
First and foremost, this bill authorizes the activities and the funds
for the 16 agencies of the intelligence community. It is difficult to
talk about their roles and their missions in the open, but in some ways
it is probably one of the most important things that we do on the
Intelligence Committee. In addition to providing authorization for
intelligence activities, this bill takes the initial important steps to
improve congressional oversight of that intelligence community.
I want to highlight two legislative provisions from this year's bill
that I believe will significantly improve oversight.
When this bill was marked up in committee, we made significant
changes to the so-called ``Gang of Eight'' procedures. As Members know,
the President has had the statutory authority to limit briefings to the
Gang of Eight when they involve sensitive covert actions. It was the
sense of the committee that the Gang of Eight statutory authority had
been overused, and that, on matters of critical importance, the
committee as a whole should have been informed. For that reason, that
earlier version of the bill removed the statutory authority for
limiting briefings to the Gang of Eight.
Last July, the administration issued a statement of policy on H.R.
2701 that included a veto threat with respect to the provisions that
would modify the Gang of Eight notification procedures. I believe that
some level of concern at that point was justified, and I have been
working with the administration over the past several months to resolve
those differences. Since July, there have already been noticeable
improvements in the way the administration and the intelligence
community are communicating and briefing Congress.
Accordingly, the manager's amendment I will offer includes a revised
provision on Gang of Eight reform. I know that many Members have strong
feelings about this issue on both sides of the aisle. The provision
that is in the manager's amendment is intended to be a strong and
significant step towards better oversight which still respects the
constitutional authorities of the President. It recognizes that both
elected branches have a role in national security.
I fully expect that once we pass this bill we will then revisit this
issue during conference between the House and the Senate. And I am
happy to work with Members to seek improvements at that time. Through
this process, we will be able to find a workable solution to a problem
that has persisted over the past several years, if not longer.
Another provision that I think is absolutely critical establishes a
statutory Inspector General for the intelligence community. This
provision will eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse, and it will also help
keep a close eye on the protection of the rights of Americans.
This year's bill is truly a product of many hands. The Inspector
General provision, which I just spoke about, in large part is due to
the efforts of Ms. Eshoo, the chair of the Intelligence Community
Management Subcommittee. The vice chairman of the full committee, Mr.
Hastings, has offered an amendment to include critical provisions on
our shared interest in promoting diversity as a mission imperative. He
has been working at this long and hard for many, many years. Our newest
majority member, Mr. Boren, has worked hard to develop a pilot program
to improve language capability in African languages.
The chairman of the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, Mr.
Ruppersberger, has worked hard on the classified annex to make sure our
approach to acquisitions and our most technical programs make good
sense. He has been a pivotal part to the committee's oversight process
in these very important areas.
The bill includes several provisions offered by Ms. Schakowsky, the
chairwoman of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, which
relate to
[[Page H850]]
her longstanding interest in appropriately monitoring and managing
contractors in the intelligence community.
Mr. Holt, the chairman of the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel,
advocated for a provision addressing the videotaping of interrogations
and another on intelligence information on the health risks faced by
Desert Storm veterans.
Mr. Thompson of California, another subcommittee chairman, has worked
hard on this bill as well. He pushed successfully for the inclusion of
a provision to study the benefits paid to the families of the men and
women of the intelligence community who have made the ultimate
sacrifice. I am proud to support that as well.
We also received important input from the committee's minority
members. Mr. Kline of Minnesota offered an excellent amendment, which
we were pleased to accept, that requires the National Reconnaissance
Organization to rewrite its charter to meet its current missions. Mr.
Conaway's personal interest in auditable financial statements led to a
provision in the bill that requires the intelligence community to focus
on its internal financial management and to provide a system that
achieves auditability.
Madam Chair, I believe that this bill will provide the resources and
the tools that the intelligence community needs to do its important
work in keeping our Nation safe. That includes collection and analysis
of human intelligence, signals intelligence, and geospatial
intelligence.
{time} 1330
It includes funds to detect and disrupt terrorist plots, to provide
for intelligence support to the warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and also improves the recruitment and training of a diverse and capable
workforce.
During my time on this committee, I've had the good fortune to be
able to travel and to meet the brave men and women of the intelligence
community, both uniformed and civilian, and I am continually impressed
and in awe of the great work that they do and the great morale that
they have. They are dedicated, professional and highly skilled
patriots, and I'm proud to offer a bill that supports them and all that
they do for our great Nation.
This past December, we lost seven of those brave men and women in the
attack in Khost, Afghanistan. It is for them, and for those who carry
on their mission, that I proudly submit this bill today.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I shall
consume.
Madam Chairman, annual Intelligence authorization bills should be
bipartisan legislation designed to address critical national security
issues and deal in a deliberate and considered way with legislation
affecting the intelligence community, the personnel within the
intelligence community. Unfortunately, this bill does neither. I'm
forced to rise in strong opposition.
When this bill was first reported almost 8 months ago, the bill
failed to address critical national security issues such as Guantanamo
detainees, attempts by this administration to convert intelligence and
counterterrorism into matters of criminal law and meaningful reforms to
the congressional notification process.
In the nearly 8 months since this bill was reported out of committee,
our country has suffered two major terrorist attacks and a significant
number of near misses. During that time, the majority took no time and
no action to bring this bill to the floor.
In 8 months nothing was done to fix the flaws in our intelligence
community that were apparent to every American in the wake of the first
attack at Fort Hood and, later, the Christmas bombing attack on an
American airliner.
In 8 months, nothing was done to clarify who is in charge of
interrogation of high-value terrorist detainees, these people that are
captured around the world who want to do harm to America.
In 8 months, nothing was done to provide a long-term renewal of our
critical intelligence authorities under the USA PATRIOT Act.
In 8 months, nothing was done to, once and for all, stop hard-core,
radical jihadist terrorists from being brought into the United States,
despite the clear opposition that has arisen to this ill-considered
idea from average Americans across the country.
In 8 months, nothing has been done to clarify how covert actions
should be conducted or authorized when they could have deadly effects
on American citizens. Nothing has been done.
Then, you go through and you take a look at the amendments that we
wanted to propose that would have addressed these issues, and all of
these were thrown out by the majority, an amendment that would direct
the DNI to establish a panel to review the intelligence relating to
weapons of mass destruction programs of Iran. Politically speaking, our
intelligence community is now to the left of the United Nations as to
our assessment of what Iran's capabilities are, to the left of the ill-
fated National Intelligence Estimate that came out under the previous
administration.
We've asked for an independent panel of experts to give us a red team
review. Our colleagues on the other side of the aisle said, no, that's
not necessary.
We asked for an amendment that would require the CIA to release
publicly unclassified versions of documents relating to the use of
enhanced interrogation techniques, this controversial background as to
who knew what when, including some of the leading Members of this body.
We asked for those documents to be released. The majority said no.
We asked for the prohibition of funds to bring Guantanamo detainees
into the United States. The majority said, we won't even debate it. We
won't consider it. We won't allow for an amendment that would do just
that.
We asked for a report requiring the DNI to submit a report detailing
steps taken to fix problems identified in the President's Fort Hood
intelligence review prior to December 25. Why? Because the incident on
November 5 had striking parallels to what happened on December 25, and
we thought it was fair to ask the question and ask the Director of
National Intelligence: With the information that you gained on November
5, what actions did you take that might have helped prevent what
happened on Christmas Day? And the answer was, no, we don't think that
that would be a worthwhile effort to ask the intelligence community
those kinds of tough and difficult questions and be held accountable to
this body.
And then we said we had another amendment that said, Don't we think
it would be appropriate that we actually establish a process for the
authorization and the notification of covert actions that may result in
the death of a targeted U.S. citizen? It doesn't get into a debate as
to whether that is appropriate, an appropriate course of action. It
just says, don't we think that the intelligence community and the
executive branch should have in place a detailed process of how these
decisions are made, how they are authorized, and when Congress would be
notified? And the answer from the majority was no. A process that would
give us an idea as to how the administration would authorize and notify
Congress when they took actions that might result in the death of a
targeted U.S. citizen, a targeted U.S. citizen.
And these are just the amendments that were not considered,
substantive, serious issues that the majority is unwilling to debate,
to discuss and to address.
Later on, as we go through the day and as we take a look at the
manager's amendment and the other amendments, we'll take a look at the
striking contrast between what the majority is willing to debate and
discuss and to act on, and what they are unwilling to debate and
discuss. And it has a direct impact on the safety of each and every
American.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, now it's my privilege to yield 3 minutes
to my good friend and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), who actually has jurisdiction
over some of the issues that the ranking member mentioned just a couple
of minutes ago.
Mr. SKELTON. Madam Chairman, first, let me thank the gentleman from
Texas, Chairman Silvestre Reyes, for
[[Page H851]]
the hard work that he did on this bill. So I rise today in strong
support of the Intelligence Authorization Act.
From my perspective as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, it's
a good bill, one that will support the intelligence needs of our
soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Every day, American men and
women who are deployed into harm's way depend on the intelligence
capabilities authorized by this bill to achieve their missions. I
cannot state strongly enough about how those in uniform who are in
harm's way depend upon the intelligence that they receive.
This legislation ensures continued delivery of quality intelligence
products and capabilities through our warfighters. It will lead to
important improvement in the future.
As I've said before, the relationship between the intelligence
community and the Department of Defense is fundamental to the success
on the battlefield. This bill strengthens the relationship by expanding
the intelligence community's technical and human collection
capabilities.
It adds significant resources to modernize signals intelligence
capabilities, and other cutting-edge technologies that are the
foundation for intelligence support for our warfighters in Afghanistan.
The bill also adds resources for HUMINT collection against terrorists
and other enduring and emerging global security issues in Asia, Africa,
as well as in Latin America.
This measure will improve oversight of the intelligence community by
creating a statutory and independent intelligence community-wide
inspector general.
And, finally, this bill enhances cybersecurity, which is becoming
very, very important, cybersecurity efforts by authorizing significant
investments to support the President's comprehensive cybersecurity
strategy.
I congratulate Chairman Reyes on bringing this bill to the floor and
urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this very, very important
measure.
And I might add, Madam Chairman, that we, on the Armed Services
Committee, have dealt with some, and have the jurisdiction of dealing
with some, matters that my friend from Michigan mentioned a few moments
ago. They are within our jurisdiction.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 4
minutes to a member of the committee, Mr. Thornberry from Texas, who
will talk about the continued efforts by this administration in what
appears to be a war on the intelligence community, a legal war on our
intelligence community, the brave men and women in that community.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chairman, I appreciate the distinguished
ranking member yielding to me.
In many ways, this bill is a tale of two bills. Part of this bill is
the classified annex where specific dollar amounts are allocated to
various programs. And the classified annex, I'm happy to report, is a
bipartisan product. And I appreciate the chairman of this committee,
Subcommittee Chairman Ruppersberger, and others working with
Republicans compromising from both sides, but having a bipartisan
product that has the support, I believe, of the full Intelligence
Committee and should have the support of the full House. Unfortunately,
that is not the case with the other provisions of this bill, the policy
provisions of this bill, which are deeply disturbing.
As the ranking member has indicated, a number of key issues, whether
it's Guantanamo, to reading Miranda Rights, have not even been allowed
to be debated and voted on on the floor of the House. Those issues have
been shoved aside.
Instead, what we have in the underlying bill are 41 new reports, plus
an additional 17 more reports that would be required of the
intelligence community in the manager's amendment. But deeply buried
within the blizzard of all those reporting requirements is something
that is deeply disturbing, and that is a new criminal part of the
statute that would apply only to the intelligence community when they
try to elicit information from a terrorist that can prevent future
terrorist attacks.
And I think it would be helpful for all our Members to just remember
a bit of the history here. Last year the Obama administration released
a number of classified memos detailing interrogation techniques,
despite the appeal of five former CIA directors not to do it, because
doing so would harm our efforts against a terrorist. They did it
anyway.
Then, secondly, last year, the administration decided that they would
re-investigate CIA personnel who were involved in interrogations, even
though it had been thoroughly investigated and there was no basis found
for any sort of prosecution. Instead, the Obama administration decided
they wanted to appoint a special prosecutor to go after those people
again.
Third, there's an effort to bring lawyers up on ethics charges
because some people disagree with the legal opinion that they reached.
And, of course, just recently we found that that effort has failed.
Fourth, last year, the Speaker, under pressure from questions about
what she knew about these interrogations, alleged that the CIA lies all
the time, despite the considerable evidence that she had been fully
briefed about the interrogations. And the Speaker's charge was so
indefensible that this bill got postponed for 7 months and couldn't
even come to the floor, in order to protect her.
{time} 1345
So you see that string of going after the intelligence community of
making accusations against them. And then what we find in the manager's
amendment is this provision that creates new crimes only for the
intelligence community when they try to illicit information. It is
rather remarkable.
Anywhere in America, if a prison guard tries to wake a prisoner up,
it's okay; it's part of the prison routine. Under this provision, if a
terrorist does not get a proper amount of sleep, the intelligence
community can be prosecuted and sent to jail for 15 years.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield the gentleman an additional 2 minutes.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Anywhere in America there is a criminal
investigation, it might be pointed out to a criminal suspect that it
would be better to cooperate or the death penalty could be a potential
punishment for his crime. It is against the law under this McDermott
provision for an intelligence professional to in any way threaten
physical harm or coercion against a terrorist in order to get
information. In other words, what goes on every day all across America
in the criminal justice system would be prohibited in this provision in
the manager's amendment.
It is in many ways unthinkable. In many ways, it's topsy-turvy land
where we forget who the good guys are, who the guys trying to keep us
safe are, and who the bad guys are. It's all turned upside down.
We all remember the photos of abuses from Abu Ghraib in Iraq. They
were deplorable. The people responsible were prosecuted under the
criminal law, as they should have been. But to extrapolate from that,
the source of restrictions here starting on page 33 of the manager's
amendment is, I think, indefensible.
Intelligence is a serious business. The people who are involved in it
risk their lives to keep us safe. And to threaten, as this law would,
to put them in jail for 15 years if they don't give somebody, whatever
the terrorist says is part of their individual religious beliefs, I
think, is dangerous, irresponsible. And it tells the intelligence
community that we talk so much but we're not going to back up our
words; in fact, we're going to prosecute you. That's a mistake.
I am deeply disturbed by some of the trends in this bill, and I hope
that the manager's amendment will not be adopted, and if it is, this
bill should certainly be rejected.
Mr. REYES. It's now my pleasure to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my good
friend and former member of the House Intelligence Committee who still
is a valued resource for us, Mr. Boswell from Iowa.
Mr. BOSWELL. Madam Chair, I would like to engage the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee for the purposes of a colloquy.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I am happy to oblige my good friend, Mr.
Boswell.
Mr. BOSWELL. I would like to clarify the intent of section 312 of
H.R. 2701
[[Page H852]]
regarding the authorization of the Intelligence Officer Training
Program.
As I understand it, that section will authorize the Director of
National Intelligence to provide grants to institutions of higher
learning to develop, among other things, innovative methods of teaching
high-priority foreign language skills.
Is my understanding of this provision correct?
Mr. REYES. You are correct, Mr. Boswell.
Mr. BOSWELL. My understanding is that Drake University in Des Moines,
Iowa, has a highly innovative foreign language skills program. Under
that program, Drake students work with native speakers in groups of
five or fewer three times a week. Such students may also take a
``strategies'' course, which has several goals, including helping
students approach the culture they are studying through a
nonethnocentric lens.
Former students of this program have gone on to teach in China,
become Fulbright Scholars, provide translation services, perform
nonprofit and missionary work in El Salvador, complete advanced degrees
in languages, and excel in the corporate world more generally.
Is Drake University's language program the type of program that the
intelligence community believes would be a good candidate to receive a
grant from the ODNI under section 312 of H.R. 2701?
Mr. REYES. Having had the opportunity to visit Drake University with
you, you are correct.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. REYES. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you, Chairman Reyes, for that comment and that
visit. That is correct. I appreciate that.
I want to thank you for the clarification.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I would like to yield 4 minutes to my colleague from
Michigan, a strong defender of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I can't tell you how disappointed I am in
this bill for all that is at stake in the country.
When there was a switch in debate about how we approach the war on
terror, that's a legitimate argument, a legitimate debate to have, and
we should do it under the light of day with all of the sets of
consequences that come with any change of policy about how we go after
terrorists overseas. And the notion that was brought out that, gee, if
we just treat this like a law enforcement environment, if we treat it
the way we would treat the average American citizen and extend the
rights and the privileges to foreign-trained terrorists, the world will
like us, the world will be a better place, we will have no more
problems, they're going to go away, we will get them in the courtrooms
of America, there is a fundamental flaw with doing this.
In order to fully function as a law enforcement effort, the
administration has sent FBI agents overseas into the battlefield to
read Miranda rights to tell foreign-trained terrorists who probably
couldn't find, some of them, America on a map that you have the right
to remain silent; if you can't afford a lawyer the United States will
appoint one for you; we will pay for it.
The fact that if they get to the airport and stand in line with an
explosive device next to you or your children or a family member or
some other American citizen, we will catch them then, and we will put
them in trial and read them their Miranda rights even though they were
recruited overseas, trained overseas, in many cases surreptitiously
moved to different parts of different countries in order to get every
aspect of their training. And they're taught that they are on a combat
mission. That is what they're taught, that your goal in this event is
to go cause harm and casualties and chaos to Americans on American soil
or to our allies on their soil. So they look at this as they have when
they've declared war numerous times. They have declared war on the
United States, and they're ready to kill Americans to prove their
point.
So some notion that by the time they get to the airport or board the
plane we've been successful because we've had the opportunity to read
them the Miranda rights is fundamentally flawed, and that is a fight
that we will lose. We're going to lose that fight. You can't hire
enough TSA agents. You can't hire enough domestic FBI agents. You can't
send enough FBI agents into the battlefield to read Miranda rights to
stop their effort.
When you treat them like a criminal and read them their rights, you
allow a defense attorney to start the negotiations about how much they
will or will not cooperate. That starts. That happens. Clearly, the
Christmas Day bomber enjoyed that same benefit.
And I'll tell you, that first 24 to 48 hours is critically important
in the intelligence community because of a small thing. This guy isn't
going to be able to give you all of the layout of al Qaeda and all of
their financing and all of their logistical movements, but he could
have given us incredibly valuable information--maybe the name of
another airline that may have been targeted on that day that we didn't
know about, maybe the name or the description of a bad guy who trained
in how to use that explosive device or a place or a town or a person
that they may have seen in their training cramp. To most people, that
wouldn't mean a lot. To trained professionals in the intelligence
business, it means the difference between stopping them and them being
successful. That little, small piece of information can save lives.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield my colleague 1 more minute.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. They made a fundamental shift, from proactive
intelligence overseas to find them where they train, to where they
finance, to where they recruit, to a law enforcement effort to bring
them back to the United States. We're bringing foreign-trained
terrorists to the United States and putting them in mainstream
courtrooms. We're prosecuting CIA officers for following legal advice
from the Department of Justice in interrogation. So we're treating CIA
officers like criminals, and we're treating foreign-trained terrorists
like Americans with all of the benefits and the privileges therein.
You almost couldn't make this up. You couldn't come to this
conclusion. And with it, we've got consequences.
When you look at the series of events from the Fort Hood shootings to
the Christmas Day bomber and the mistakes that were made and the lost
opportunity for disruption, we all ought to sit down and work this out
and get us back to where we're putting the interests of Americans first
versus the interests of the rights of terrorism before the safety and
security of the United States.
I strongly urge a rejection of this bill.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I don't quibble with the opinions that my
friends on the other side of the aisle have. It's just facts that don't
support those opinions that I quibble with. They're not entitled to
their own facts.
I now yield 1\1/2\ minutes to a new member of our committee, the
gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Boren), a valued member of our committee.
Mr. BOREN. Madam Chair, I rise today in support of H.R. 2701, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This bill makes an
excellent product and much needed investment in many critical areas,
including those that have been previously underresourced.
One of the most important investments is this bill's commitment to
developing foreign language capabilities, specifically in African
languages that have historically been underrepresented within the
intelligence community. The bill creates a pilot program under the
National Security Education Program, or the NSEP. It expands the David
Boren Scholars by requiring the Director of National Intelligence to
identify high-priority African languages for which language education
programs do not currently exist. The NSEP would then develop intensive
training programs for implementation in both the United States and in
countries where these languages are spoken.
Let's not forget that 10 years ago we didn't anticipate the conflicts
along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the need for speakers of the
local languages and dialects. When the need arose, we didn't have the
capabilities to meet immediate demands, and to this day, we are still
playing catch-up.
[[Page H853]]
Similarly, we cannot predict from where the next crisis will emerge,
but by recognizing the current instability in the Horn of Africa,
Sudan, and Congo, we can anticipate crises that will impact national
security.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. REYES. I yield the gentleman an additional 15 seconds.
Mr. BOREN. We should be training the linguists and translators in the
relevant languages now so that once again we are not reactive in our
efforts; we're proactive in our actions.
I urge support for this bill.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time, I'd like to yield 2 minutes to my
colleague from Texas (Mr. Burgess).
Mr. BURGESS. I thank the ranking member for yielding.
This is a very unfortunate bill, and I think this side of the aisle
has sufficiently laid out abundant reasons why it should be sent to the
committee and fixed. The intelligence community is too important to our
national security to allow a bill with as many concerns as this one to
pass.
However, I am here also to discuss what I see as a fatal flaw in the
way information is disseminated to Members of the House who are not
committee members.
Nothing is more critical to the role each of us plays in representing
our districts and this country than for us to have every relevant piece
of information available to us prior to casting an important vote--
certainly prior to casting a vote on one updating the authorizations
for the way our government gathers intelligence. Yet many Members of
this House have been denied access to key pieces of information simply
by virtue of the fact that they do not sit on the Intelligence
Committee.
I recognize that membership on any given committee in this Chamber
means that one is given access to matters in a special capacity. I
respect that. I would even say that dividing up responsibilities is
critical in achieving everything in a body as large as this one, but
not being a member of the committee should not translate into having
access to nothing that falls under the jurisdiction of this committee.
Certainly, there are some pieces of information that are so important,
of such importance to national security, that every Member of this
body, should they so desire, should have access.
Last summer, the story broke about photographs alleging detainee
abuse at Guantanamo.
{time} 1400
I formally requested, through the Intelligence Committee, access to
these photos. I assumed it would be a simple request. In 2005, similar
photos at Abu Ghraib were made readily available to every Member of
this House by the same committee under the leadership of then-Chairman
Hoekstra.
This time, after months of no response, I was informed that the
committee did not retain the photos and could not or would not allow
nonmembers of the Intelligence Committee access. At the same time as my
request to view these photos, I requested to review the classified CIA
Inspector General report titled ``Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Activities.''
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. BURGESS. After months, I was denied my request, no reason given
for the denial. I can hardly believe that on an issue as critical and
crucial as this I would not be allowed access. I believe strongly that
for me to vote on something as important as the Intelligence
Authorization Act I should have access to every bit of information.
Finally, on the shooting at Fort Hood, I asked to have attendance at
the briefing that was being given. But because a business meeting had
to occur before I would be granted permission and none was scheduled, I
simply could not attend.
Madam Chair, this bill has problems on many, many levels, but it is
impossible for me to vote in the affirmative given the restrictions on
activities of members of the minority from this committee.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, just so we are clear, it doesn't appear that
some members of the other aisle realize how important the rules are.
The rules of the House apply to everyone on a bipartisan basis. The
information he sought was denied from our committee because it didn't
fit the criteria and the rules of the House.
With that, I now yield 2 minutes to my friend from the Armed Services
Committee, chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, and a new member of
our House Intelligence Committee this year, Mr. Smith of Washington.
Mr. SMITH of Washington. I certainly think there are a lot of very
good things in this bill. Our intelligence community is a critical
piece of fighting terrorism. Their counterterrorism efforts are
absolutely at the top of the list of what the Intel Committee does.
We are supporting all of our agents in the CIA and throughout the
intelligence community, and we thank them for their brave efforts. We
are aware that they are putting their lives on the line to prosecute
this war every single day. This bill supports them across the board. It
has the resources and support they need to do their job.
I could say a lot more about that, but I really want to take issue
with some of the things that the minority has said, in particular with
these alleged massive changes to our approach to counterterrorism. We
have heard about Miranda all day long and what the Justice Department
does.
It would surprise people listening to the debate to know this
administration has not changed the policy on when or when not to give
Miranda to people in the field. Under the Bush administration, the
Justice Department went through the same set of issues. If you are
looking at a domestic U.S. prosecution of that individual, then you
give Miranda. If not, you don't.
There is no blanket order across the Justice Department right now
telling the FBI to give Miranda to everybody it has captured throughout
the world. It does not exist. It did not happen, despite what the
minority has said. You have to make that decision.
In addition, we continue, under the Obama administration, to hold
people right now, without Miranda, without trial, without those rights,
terrorists from foreign places that we can't do anything else with but
we understand they are a threat. That policy has not changed.
What we have attempted to do is clarify those policies for the
members of the intelligence community in the field so they know what
they are supposed to do and, yes, also to prevent things like Abu
Ghraib and Guantanamo, which every single member of the Armed Forces
and the intelligence community has told us was a crushing blow to our
effort in the counterterrorism effort. To do that, to make those
changes is necessary.
But to listen to the minority, you would think that we have given up
prosecuting terrorists outside of civilian court.
We haven't. You would think that we would read Miranda to absolutely
everybody. We don't. We are trying to make intelligent decisions.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. REYES. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. SMITH of Washington. We need to do a better job of intelligence.
We need to better coordinate that intelligence. That's what I think we
learned from the Christmas Day attack. There is stuff in this bill to
try to do this.
We need to do oversight better. We need to have a better idea from
the intelligence community to do what they are going to tell us and
when, and to make sure there is a record of it, which is in this bill,
so that no one can later dispute what they were or were not told.
The minority has a critical role to play in making that happen.
Instead they make these baseless charges that somehow we have given up
in the fight on terror and we are not supporting the intelligence
community. That is absolutely untrue. Majority and minority strongly
support our intelligence community, and we are absolutely committed to
prosecuting this war to the fullest extent possible.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, how much time do we have remaining on each
side?
The Acting CHAIR (Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas). The gentleman from
Michigan has 10\1/2\ minutes and the gentleman from Texas has 13\1/2\
minutes.
[[Page H854]]
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I would like to reserve my time until we are more
equal.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I now yield 2 minutes to the chairman of the
Terrorism-HUMINT, Analysis and Counterintelligence Subcommittee, my
good friend from California (Mr. Thompson).
Mr. THOMPSON of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.
I am pleased that this legislation supports critical U.S.
intelligence capabilities at a level higher than we ever have in past
years. This bill improves the intelligence community's ability to
understand hard targets, those countries that pose the greatest
strategic threat to U.S. interests.
But it also increases funds for intelligence collections that will
support U.S. policy decisions in other important regions such as
Africa, Latin America, and Asia. We must continue to focus our
resources on our priority targets, but we can't neglect emerging
threats. This bill does both.
The bill also includes an amendment that I introduced in committee in
conjunction with our colleague, David Price of North Carolina, to
improve the effectiveness of interrogations and prevent a return to
past abuses.
It calls on the Director of National Intelligence to evaluate
scientific research on interrogations and assess how to improve our
U.S. interrogators' training. It also requires the DNI to assess the
ethics training provided to interrogators so they understand the
boundaries within which they can operate.
Finally, the bill contains a provision that I sponsored that requires
the newly created Inspector General of the intelligence community to
study the intelligence community's electronic waste disposal
procedures. This provision was designed to protect not just our
environment, but also our security. The Inspector General must assess
both the environmental impact of these practices and the steps taken to
ensure that discarded devices do not contain sensitive information that
our adversaries would be able to exploit.
Madam Chair, this legislation will strengthen the capabilities of our
intelligence communities and makes our Nation safer.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself 1 minute.
I hope that as we have the general debate on this bill right now that
we have at least one person who will come up on the other side and
explain exactly what is in the McDermott amendment, what it means and
what the implication will be to our men and women in the intelligence
community. We hear over and over again how ``we support the
intelligence community''--without a single hearing.
Perhaps with about 1 minute of debate on the manager's amendment that
has been allotted to that McDermott amendment, we will fundamentally
change the nature of the intelligence community, how they work and how
they operate by creating new criminal statutes, not a minute of
hearings in this committee, and all of a sudden it appears out of
nowhere in a manager's amendment.
Would someone on the other side please explain the rationale for
bringing that in this bill with having no hearing when it will have a
fundamental impact on the intelligence community? What is the
rationale, and why was the majority unwilling to have hearings on this
issue? Why were they unwilling to debate this issue, and why did they
bury it into a manager's amendment with 22 other amendments?
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I am now pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
chair of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, and our former
ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, Ms. Harman of
California.
Ms. HARMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me and hope that
what I am about to discuss is supported by the current ranking member.
I rise in strong support of the manager's amendment, which includes
two provisions which I authored and which address problems continuing
to impede our efforts to keep our country safe.
First, it requires the Inspector General of the intelligence
community to report to Congress in 180 days on overclassification of
intelligence. Stamping documents ``secret'' or ``top secret'' for the
wrong reasons interferes with accurate, actionable, and timely
information sharing within the Federal Government and with State and
local law enforcement. Protecting sources and methods is the right
reason to classify information, but protecting turf or personal
embarrassment is not.
D.C. Police Chief Cathy Lanier says she hesitates to share
information with the Federal Government for fear it will be immediately
classified and rendered useless because she can't tell her officers in
the field what to look for when on patrol. A variety of civil liberties
and good government groups support our amendment, and I am glad it's in
the manager's amendment.
Second, Madam Chair, the manager's amendment requires the Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, to assess intelligence on harmful radiological materials,
including highly disbursable substances like Cesium-137. It's not
possible in this open setting to describe the threat posed by unsecured
radiological materials, but a range of experts, including the Defense
Science Board, have warned about the danger posed by medical equipment
that uses this material.
These machines are in hospitals across the country, in every major
town and city. They are not tamper-proof. The Departments of Energy and
Homeland Security are adding short-term hardening measures to these
machines, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is investigating
alternatives. They need more support.
My thanks to the Rules Committee and to Chairman Reyes for including
my provisions in the manager's amendment. I am very pleased that after
4 long years we will probably pass an intelligence authorization bill
today. I urge an ``aye'' vote.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I thank my colleague from California for coming down
and explaining her amendments. These are issues that we have talked
about in the past, and congratulations for having them included in the
manager's amendment. I support those kinds of amendments, because they
have been discussed and they have broad bipartisan support.
There are other parts of the manager's amendment which I am strongly
opposed to because they haven't even had any dialogue, debate or
hearings on that.
To discuss one of those, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague from Texas
(Mr. Thornberry).
Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chair, I agree with much of what has been said
on the other side of the aisle about the good provisions in this bill.
I am also disappointed, as the ranking member talked about, that a
number of substantive issues were not even allowed to be discussed and
voted on.
But in my mind all of that is dwarfed by the provisions in the last
section of the manager's amendment beginning on page 32, and I would
recommend every Republican and Democrat in this House read for him- or
herself this language, because it is a devastating blow to the
professionals in our intelligence community who we ask to keep us safe.
This language delineates a number of specific acts that it says by law
are cruel and degrading treatment. One of those acts is prolonged
isolation.
As I mentioned earlier, any prison or county jail anywhere around the
country sometimes has to put a prisoner into solitary confinement. But
under this law, if an intelligence community professional does that, he
is liable for up to 15 or more years in jail for prolonged isolation.
If he does anything that would blaspheme a terrorist's religious
beliefs, or cause him to participate in action intended to violate his
individual religious beliefs, he is guilty of violating a criminal
statute and that intelligence professional whom we count on to keep us
safe goes to jail--not the terrorists, but the guy or lady that we are
counting on to keep us safe.
There is provision after provision, whether it's deprivation of
sleep, even threatening to use force, the religious provisions, as I
mentioned, or any act that is the equivalent of this laundry list--
sensory deprivation--the terrorists who would be captured would be
treated more gingerly than any criminal in any county jail or any
prison across the country. This is wrong, and it's reason enough to
reject the bill.
[[Page H855]]
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I now yield 2 minutes to the chairwoman of
the Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management, a valued member
of my committee, Ms. Eshoo from California.
{time} 1415
Ms. ESHOO. I thank the chairwoman, and I thank our distinguished
chairman for his wonderful and dedicated leadership of the House
Intelligence Committee.
It's been far too long since we've had an Intelligence authorization
bill enacted. Because Congress has the responsibility to set guidance
for the intelligence community to strengthen our national security,
which is really our highest obligation here in Congress, I am really
pleased that this critical legislation is on the floor today.
This bill take some very important steps to increase congressional
oversight of the intelligence community, which is very much needed. I
would like to address two in particular that came out of the
subcommittee that I am proud to chair.
First, the bill creates an independent intelligence community
inspector general. So many of the issues in the intelligence community
cut across multiple agencies, and today there is no one who can look at
all sides of these issues. This inspector general will have the dual
responsibility to report to the Congress, not just to the Director of
National Intelligence, increasing our oversight.
Second, this bill allows the GAO to conduct audits and reviews of the
intelligence community. We all know the value of the GAO's assessments
firsthand. Their reputation for objective, thorough reviews is second
to none. But today, the intelligence community refuses to allow GAO in
the door, even when Congress has asked them to investigate. This is not
going to stand because the bill corrects it.
The bill increases oversight of the security clearance process and
takes steps to improve information sharing, both high priorities of my
subcommittee. We have had numerous hearings on these topics and will
continue to do so.
Finally, my colleagues, we all take this responsibility to oversee
the intelligence community very seriously. We are the eyes and ears of
the American people to examine the issues that are hidden behind the
walls of classification, and as the voice of the American people to ask
the questions which they cannot. This bill strengthens our ability to
do just that, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Mr. REYES. I yield the gentlelady 15 additional seconds.
Ms. ESHOO. Finally, I would like to say in response to really a
terrible charge that was made by one of our colleagues on the other
side of the aisle that this bill weakens the intelligence community,
that it is an attack on the intelligence community: we can't let that
stand. There isn't anything farther from the truth. This is singularly
the largest Intel authorization with its base budget in the history of
the United States of America. We are giving to the intelligence
community the very tools that it requires, that it has requested, and
are glad to do so.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I would like to yield 2 minutes to my
colleague from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I, too, along with my colleague from Texas,
and certainly the ranking member from Michigan, want to bring to the
attention of this body just how dangerous the amendment is that says
this, ``Any officer or employee of the intelligence community who, in
the course of or in anticipation of a covered interrogation, knowingly
commits, attempts to commit or conspires to commit an act of cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment.'' And it goes on to talk about
infringing on their religious beliefs by any notion whatsoever that
isn't defined in the bill.
Sleep--it talks about lack of sleep. As a matter of fact, the
interrogators are probably getting a lot less sleep than actually the
terrorists they are interrogating because they also process the
information before and after the interrogations.
You have created a whole new direction to go after the very people
who are interrogating people trying to kill Americans, and you are
saying we are going to put you in jail if you push your limits. And by
the way, torture is already against the law. Nobody, and I mean nobody,
is pushing torture. What we're saying is, you cannot make this so
unreasonable that they won't do it. And if you don't think that this
will have an impact on an agent making the determination, should I or
shouldn't I, you know what? I was hoping to turn around and find 300
screaming, cheering Americans saying thank you for your patriotism and
your service, not 25 Justice Department lawyers with subpoenas.
You will absolutely freeze the intelligence community's ability to go
out and get information that they need, and it is absolutely naive to
believe that they're going to do it anyway. I'm sorry, that's not the
way it works. These folks want to follow the law; they want to follow
the Constitution. And guess what? At the end of the day, they're
willing to risk their lives to protect their country and their fellow
Americans, and this is the treatment that we give them.
This one provision alone will disrupt I can't tell you how many
operations worldwide and is worthy of our rejection of this direction
in the intelligence community.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, it is now my privilege to yield 2 minutes to
the chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical
Intelligence, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, first, I would like to focus on two
of this bill's most important provisions as it relates to technical and
tactical: first, cybersecurity, and, number two, space.
The bill makes significant investments in the variety of critical
cybersecurity programs, a need highlighted by repeated attacks on the
information technology systems of the Federal Government and private
industry over the past year.
As cybersecurity evolves and intensifies, our intelligence community
must be able to respond quickly and with the latest technologies
available. The National Security Agency, which I'm proud to say is in
my district, has already developed a number of technologies that are
already helping to protect us against these threats; but we need to
ensure that NSA and other intelligence agencies have the resources that
they need to develop and deploy the defenses that will keep our
networks running and information secure. This bill helps do that.
Second, this bill makes important investments in space. It supports
the President's request to develop a new imagery capability. In
addition, it supports the Senate proposal, which we must start funding
to continue building upon our known capabilities.
These are critical investments, and we are prepared to see them
through. We must keep major space acquisitions on budget and on
schedule. We do not have unlimited resources and cannot afford to have
these critical acquisitions spin out of control.
I am also pleased that the bill encourages the DNI and Director of
the NRO to leverage commercial capabilities to the fullest extent
possible. Commercial tools have significantly improved in recent years.
Using these capabilities to complement government efforts will not only
provide a cost-effective way of meeting our needs; it will support the
revitalization of the long-struggling commercial space industry.
I also want to make just some response to my peers on the other side.
The Intelligence Committee is a very important committee; national
security is at stake. We must come together as citizens first. There
are a lot of allegations--we understand there are some politics in
whatever we do--but when it comes to national security intelligence, we
have got to find a way to make sure we focus on the priorities. Those
priorities are in this budget.
There are some things that we might not all agree with; but in the
end, we vote on the bill that we feel is right for our Nation. And
believe me, there is nothing that either side will do to help the
terrorists; we will go after the terrorists with a vigor.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself 1 minute.
There are a lot of things in this bill that are not addressed, that
were not
[[Page H856]]
allowed to be put in order as we went through the rules process. One of
those things is how we are going to deal with the detainees from
Guantanamo.
You know, at one time they were going to be moved into Kansas; the
people in Kansas stood up and said no. They then were going to moved to
Michigan, and the people in Michigan stood up and said no. They then
were going to be moved to South Carolina, and the leadership in South
Carolina said no. Now it is the people in Illinois that are fighting
the valiant battle and saying, no, we don't want them in our State
either.
There has been a fundamental problem in each case where the
administration has proposed moving these individuals into a State;
there has been absolutely no transparency. People in Michigan, people
in Illinois, people in South Carolina and Kansas have all asked for the
fundamental information: Who are these individuals? Why are they in
Guantanamo? What did they do to deserve to be there? What has their
behavior been while they have been in Guantanamo? In each case, for
each of those States we've said, before the States make up their mind
as to whether they are going to accept these individuals or not, share
these individuals with the policymakers and the decision-makers in that
State.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, it is probably a good point that the ranking
member makes that there should be a debate on Guantanamo;
unfortunately, this is not the right bill to have that debate on.
I now yield 2 minutes to the chairman of the Select Intelligence
Oversight Panel, and a member of the House Intelligence Committee, a
valued member, Mr. Holt from New Jersey.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, I thank the distinguished Chair of the House
Permanent Select Committee for bringing this bill to the floor. As he
said, it is not perfect, and there are some things that have developed
since the committee sent this bill to the floor, but on balance, we
need it and I support it.
I am pleased that the bill includes language I developed that
mandates video recording of detainee interrogations by the Central
Intelligence Agency. This provision's purpose is simple: to improve the
intelligence operations of the CIA and enhance our national security by
ensuring the video recording of each detainee interrogation. It
requires the Director of the CIA to promulgate and to provide to
Congress the guidelines under which such video recording shall be done.
And it requires that the video recordings have to be maintained and so
forth. I note that this provision is extremely similar to the one that
was included in last year's National Defense Authorization Act and that
now serves as the legal basis for video recording of detainee
interrogations within the Department of Defense.
The benefits of video recording and electronically recording
interrogations are evident, and law enforcement organizations across
the United States routinely use the practice to both protect the person
being interrogated and the officer conducting the interrogations and,
importantly, to get better, more useful information. Clearly, the CIA
itself valued this tool as well, otherwise it would not have made the
recordings that it did of interrogations of ``high-value'' detainees
that were captured in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The amendment will
allow the CIA Director to determine how to conduct the recordings in a
way that protects the identity of interrogators and protects other
material that must be kept secret.
Finally, the bill also advances some of my other priorities,
including a sustained emphasis on improving foreign language
capabilities, expanding GAO's ability to conduct investigations of
intelligence community activities, and a long-overdue declassification
review requirement for gulf war illness-related records at the CIA.
I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for this bill.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield my colleague from Texas (Mr. Thornberry) 1\1/2\
minutes.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chair, our colleague on the Intelligence
Committee from New Jersey talked about the importance of
interrogations. It is absolutely true that much of the information that
the United States has received since 9/11 which has prevented further
successful terrorist attacks on our homeland has come from
interrogations. That is why it is so important that we maintain that
tool done by professionals in the right way, absolutely. But to tie
their hands and allow those professionals conducting interrogations of
terrorists even less latitude than the county sheriff or the FBI
investigating a bank robbery have just seems to me to be madness. And
yet the manager's amendment, which has traditionally been used for
technical-type corrections, less controversial sorts of issues, the
manager's amendment on this bill includes an amazing expansion of
criminal liability only for those in the intelligence community.
It seems to me that before we start prosecuting members of the
intelligence community for not giving terrorists the amount of sleep
they ask for or for doing something that may violate whatever they
describe as their religious beliefs, we ought to think twice about it.
It is important to say there is no reasonableness standard to say
what is reasonably your intelligence belief or a reasonable amount of
sleep; this is all at the discretion of the terrorist. We are jumping
to their tune under this language. It is dangerous, and it should be
rejected.
{time} 1430
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, may I inquire of the time remaining on both
sides?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Texas has 3\1/4\ minutes
remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan has 3 minutes remaining.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I am going to be the last speaker, so we
only have one speaker left.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I now yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the chairwoman
of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, the gentlewoman from
Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Madam Chair, I am proud to support this legislation
because it will provide the men and women of our intelligence community
with the tools they need to protect the Nation while implementing vital
provisions to promote accountability and oversight.
As the Chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, I
have worked to limit the intelligence community's dangerous
overreliance on private contractors. To that end, I have worked hard to
include section 338 in this bill, which requires the Director of
National Intelligence to provide a comprehensive report to Congress on
the intelligence community's use of personal service contracts. It is
my hope that this report will finally give us a clear picture of how
much our national security has been doled out to the lowest bidder.
I want to talk for a minute about the issue of torture. I think it is
so important to underscore that the manager's amendment includes
language originally proposed by Mr. McDermott that reiterates existing
law on torture and that provides statutory criminal penalties for
individuals who knowingly commit an act of cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment.
What I have been hearing from the Republicans is that somehow we are
sacrificing our national security by not allowing the torture of our
enemies. In fact, I think we are enhancing our national security by
saying that we will eliminate provisions which allow for terrorists to
be empowered and to recruit more people. If we stick to our values, we
enhance our national security. These are already in law right now, and
that is all this bill does is underscore the lawfulness of the new
rules.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to a valued member of our
committee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Madam Chair, I rise in support of the intelligence authorization
bill. As a member of the committee, I am confident it provides our
intelligence community with the tools it needs to keep our country
safe. There are two aspects of the bill that I would like to highlight.
First, the bill includes the most substantial reform to the oversight
relationship between Congress and the executive branch in a generation.
The bill
[[Page H857]]
requires that the President provides all notifications in writing and
to maintain a record of briefings. It requires the President to inform
all members of the Intelligence Committees when a Gang of Eight
briefing is conducted, giving members who are not in the Gang of Eight
the awareness they need to prevent abuse of the process. It requires
the President to open up the briefing to the full committee after 180
days unless the Director of National Intelligence recertifies that the
standards of the statute are still met.
Second, the bill makes critical investments in our overhead
infrastructure and architecture. This is essential to our intelligence
capability and wouldn't be possible without the work of some of the
most brilliant minds in the country, like the scientists at the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory.
We are not giving the administration a blank check. It is imperative
that our major acquisitions stay on budget and on schedule. Resources
are scarce, and we cannot allow a handful of programs to spin out of
control. The committee will keep a close eye on those programs.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, my colleague on the other side of the
aisle, Chairman Reyes, has said now is not the time to talk about
Gitmo. Obviously, the majority has also said now is not the time to
talk about getting an independent assessment of what is going on in
Iran. Now is not the time to talk about the release of unclassified
versions of documents related to the use of enhanced interrogation
techniques. Now is not the time to talk about bringing the Gitmo folks
here. Now is not the time to talk about the time lapse between Fort
Hood and Christmas Day and what did and did not happen during that
period of time. Now is not the time to talk about a process for the
authorization and notification of covert actions that may result in the
death of a targeted U.S. citizen.
So it is not time to talk about any of those or to debate any of
those issues which are absolutely critical to the effectiveness of our
intelligence community and to keeping America safe.
Interestingly enough, it is the day not to talk about but to bury
into a manager's amendment 22 different amendments, including one that
will fundamentally change the way our intelligence community has to do
business. No hearings. No discussions. No debate. Buried in there is
the McDermott amendment. We are now limited to, at most, 10 minutes per
side to talk about 22 amendments in the manager's amendment, which will
come up immediately following this general debate. Yet it is
interesting that, in the discussion of general debate, not one person
on the other side was willing to defend this amendment and the process
by which it was included--meaning no discussions, no debate--or to
defend the content of what is included in the manager's amendment.
Is this what the process in the House has now come down to, that we
bury these critical amendments between 22 other amendments? If we split
up the time equally, let's see. We have 22 amendments divided by 20
minutes. We will, maybe, have 1 minute of debate. We will have 1 minute
of debate on this amendment. It will be interesting when our folks in
the intelligence community see what our friends on the other side of
the aisle have done to them today, our friends on the other side who
talk about how they so strongly defend our intelligence community. When
they go visit them in the field, I would guess that they are going to
get a very cold reception.
The other thing that they are going to do is they are going to have
questions, and they are going to expect the majority to explain how
they did this with no hearings. They are going to have to explain
exactly, Now, what does this amendment do? How does it impact us? What
does it mean? How is it operational?
I assume you knew that before you voted on it on the floor of the
House, and my answer is going to be, I don't think they do.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I understand the frustration on the minority
side. As an Army veteran, as a veteran of Federal law enforcement for
26\1/2\ years, I understand and value the United States Constitution. I
understand and value that we have to live by the rules. I understand
and value the fact that we are a global leader that is much respected.
The gentleman talks about one amendment, and that amendment simply
says, Follow the rules. Follow the law. Follow the principles that have
made this country great. I understand that.
Apparently, the minority does not understand that, and I feel for
them because, in the final analysis, I have been with members of the
intelligence community in faraway places around the world. I have been
with them and their families at Bethesda when they were recuperating
from the attack in Khost. I have been to the ceremony at the CIA. I
understand what they go through. This is a good bill. It deserves
everybody's support.
Mr. HOYER. Madam Chair, I rise in support of this Intelligence
Authorization bill, which authorizes the tools America needs to detect
and combat its greatest threats, including what President Obama called
``a far-reaching network of violence and hatred.''
In the past weeks, we've seen a great deal of evidence that policies
adopted by President Obama and Democrats are working to keep Americans
safer. In Pakistan, the government is cooperating for the first time in
the arrest of top Taliban leaders, including second-in-command Abdul
Ghani Baradar and Abdul Kabir, a member of the senior leadership. At
home, Najibullah Zazi has just pled guilty in federal court for
attempting to bomb New York City's subway, and the Christmas Day bomber
is giving us timely intelligence.
This bill continues the policies that are working and strengthens
America's intelligence collection. It significantly increases funding
for human intelligence, a resource that is irreplaceable in disrupting
terrorist networks. To ensure the broad reach of our intelligence
community, it makes important investments in language training and
scholarships, so that our personnel will have the resources to
infiltrate networks and intercept communications around the world. It
also strengthens our defenses against the emerging threats of
cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare, which, if unchecked, could have a
crippling effect on our military and economy. And this legislation
makes an important contribution to America's nuclear non-proliferation
efforts by requiring reports on the nuclear intentions and capabilities
of Iran, Syria, and North Korea, as well as on the worldwide black
market in materials that could contribute to nuclear weapons.
At the same time as it strengthens our intelligence capabilities,
this authorization bill also ensures that they receive reasonable and
responsible oversight to protect Americans' rights. It creates an
independent inspector general with responsibility for the entire
intelligence community; protects the Intelligence Committees' access,
through the Government Accountability Office, to the information it
needs to conduct proper oversight of intelligence activities; and
requires that the CIA Inspector General audit each covert action at
least once every three years. To prevent the abuse of detainees that
weakens our moral case to the world without making Americans safer,
this bill also prohibits private contractors from interrogating
detainees in CIA custody. Finally, this bill, like the recently-passed
Defense Authorization bill, prevents the release or transfer of
Guantanamo detainees until the president provides a plan for dealing
with those detainees and mitigating any risk their release or transfer
might cause.
Madam Chair, the Founders spoke of providing ``for the common
defense'' not only because we face common threats, but because the work
of overcoming them must be common to all of us. That work is far too
important to be subjected to fear-mongering or the demands of the
political cycle. That doesn't obligate all of my colleagues to vote for
this bill, though I hope they will; but it does oblige us to conduct
this debate, today and in the days to come, with the respect and
responsibility that our common defense from common danger demands.
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Madam Chair, I stand in support of the 2010
Intelligence Authorization Act.
This measure continues congress' commitment to delivering to the men
and women who serve in the country's intelligence community the
resources they need to conduct the vital work of protecting American
lives. This bill ensures that these resources are delivered in a manner
that strengthens accountability.
In addition to authorizing funding for 16 U.S. intelligence agencies
and intelligence-related activities of the government, the bill
contains important provisions to expand independent government
oversight of the intelligence community so that the American public can
be confident that the essential work of intelligence gathering is done
in a manner that comports with the highest moral standards.
To ensure that all relevant members of congress are kept abreast of
all important intelligence developments, the bill repeals the
[[Page H858]]
``Gang of Eight'' provision which has for years limited some
congressional intelligence committee member access to intelligence
information and activities. With the passage of this measure, the
president will be required to brief all covered members of congress on
the covert actions and programs of the government. This will ensure
that all officials who have been elected to oversee intelligence
matters are briefed and aware of events as they unfold.
To help combat waste, fraud and abuse, the bill creates a new Office
of the Inspector General and invests the office with subpoena powers
and important protections to ensure its independence.
Madam Chair, Congress has not sent an intelligence authorization bill
to the president for his signature in more than 5 years. That means for
five years, congress has not been a full partner in the development of
this country's national security policy. We need to pass this bill, not
only to fulfill our oversight responsibilities, but also for the sake
of the brave men and women in and out of uniform who have dedicated
themselves to the important work this bill helps to fund.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chair, I rise today in strong
support of this legislation. It has been five long years since an
intelligence authorization bill was last signed into law, and each new
revelation about the conduct of the previous administration testifies
to the need for effective congressional oversight of the intelligence
community.
This bill also provides an opportunity to move beyond questions of
misconduct and abuse to address the longer-term challenges of improving
our intelligence capabilities, making them responsive to cyber-security
and other new threats, and ensuring that they are accountable to
Congress and the American public.
I'd like to highlight two aspects of the bill on which I have worked
in recent years (along with colleagues such as Ms. Schakowsky and Mr.
Holt), and which I believe are important steps toward improving the
effectiveness of our intelligence operations.
First, the bill contains several provisions dealing with the use of
private contractors by the intelligence community, which by some
reports has come to consume nearly half of the annual intelligence
budget.
It would require a comprehensive report on the number and cost of
contractors employed by the intelligence community and the extent of
their use for intelligence collection, analysis, and other covert
activities including detention and interrogation.
It also explicitly prohibits the use of contractors for the
interrogation of detainees, codifying a prohibition that the CIA itself
has already adopted.
Both of these measures are based on my Transparency and
Accountability in Intelligence Contracting Act (H.R. 963), and both
were approved by the House in the last intelligence authorization bill
but were not signed into law.
Secondly, the bill lays a foundation for making the practice of
interrogation more effective, professional, and ethical.
I have worked closely with Subcommittee Chairman Mike Thompson in
crafting a section of this bill based on H.R. 591, my comprehensive
interrogation and detention reform bill.
Our provision would require the DNI to report to Congress on:
The quality and value of existing scientific research on
interrogation;
The state of interrogation training within the intelligence
community, including its ethical component;
Efforts to enhance career paths for interrogation specialists; and
The effectiveness of existing processes for studying and implementing
best practices.
These and other key provisions of this bill are only a start, but
they represent an important first step toward improving the
effectiveness and accountability of our intelligence community, and
ensuring that the necessary measures we take to protect our country do
not come at the cost of our fundamental values.
Finally, I feel compelled to add that my colleagues on the other side
of the aisle who are claiming that this bill--and this Administration--
somehow do not appreciate the threat our nation is facing have clearly
neither read the text of this legislation nor given the issue much
serious thought. Rather than holding up military commissions at
Guantanamo Bay as a panacea for all of our ills, we should be
confronting the threats we face squarely, soberly, and with vigilant
attention to questions of effectiveness and ethicality--which is
exactly what this bill does.
I thank Chairman Reyes, Ranking Member Hoekstra, and the members of
their committee for their leadership and their continued attention to
these vital issues, and I urge my colleagues to support this
legislation.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. Madam Chair, I rise today in support of H.R. 2701 the
Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act. This bill will make
our nation safer by improving federal intelligence operations and
supporting a national defense strategy that is both strong and smart.
I am proud to represent Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base. For many
years I was the only member from North Carolina on the Homeland
Security Committee. I am also a veteran of the United States Army. All
these experiences make me particularly mindful of the importance of
intelligence. Successful intelligence makes our men and women in the
military safer. This is the least we can do for those who voluntarily
put themselves in harm's way.
I am also aware of the cost of intelligence failures, where either
oversight or intelligence falls short. H.R. 2701 is an important bill
that both provides necessary investments in intelligence, and
implements the democratic controls needed to be certain that those
investments are well managed.
This bill will ensure that Congress fully understands own responses
to terror. Complete review of the recent, failed attempt at an attack
on Northwest Airlines flight 253 can make future attempts more likely
to fail as well. Similarly, the mandated report on the anthrax attacks
of nine years ago will publicize lessons learned about emerging
threats, helping us to deal with similar threats more effectively in
the future.
Madam Chair, I support this legislation, and I urge my colleagues to
join me in passing H.R. 2701.
Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of the dedicated
public servants of our intelligence community. Their work to ensure our
national security is to be commended. However, I must oppose the
Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010.
This legislation contains provisions that implement vital measures of
accountability, such as a provision to prohibit the use of funds for
payment to any contractor to conduct interrogations of detainees
currently in custody. I also support the provision in this legislation
to establish an independent intelligence community-wide Inspector
General. These provisions are an important step to ensure that
mechanisms of accountability and oversight are in place. However, I
remain concerned that some of the methods being employed by our
intelligence community may amount to serious violations of
international law and our Constitution.
Last month, The Washington Post and New York Times reported that the
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) maintained lists of ``high
value individuals'' targeted for assassination abroad, and that those
lists contain U.S. citizens. What's more, the President may have
authorized military operations with the express understanding that a
U.S. citizen might be killed, or may be killed in the future.
Under such a policy, U.S. citizens are added to the list simply for
being suspected of involvement in terrorism, in subversion of their
basic constitutional rights to due process of law. Their right to a
trial and to present a defense is summarily and anonymously stripped
from them. History has demonstrated that the U.S. government has been
mistaken when accusing someone of involvement in terrorism. Most
recently, following the 2008 Supreme Court decision to afford detainees
held indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay habeas corpus rights, the
government was forced by federal judges to release thirty-three of
thirty-nine detainees on the grounds of insufficient evidence to
support accusations of their involvement in terrorism. U.S. citizens
accused of involvement in terrorism are not even afforded the same
rights that Guantanamo detainees are--if they are added to the targeted
assassination list, their punishment is murder.
In response to these reports, I submitted a common-sense amendment
that would have required the President to report to the congressional
intelligence committees the identities of all U.S. citizens included on
such lists, currently or in the future. My amendment was about
accountability. If the Administration sees fit to revoke unilaterally
the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens abroad based on suspicion of
involvement in terrorism, devoid of any judicial review, it must at
least be required to report to the congressional intelligence
committees each time a U.S. citizen is added to a targeted
assassination list.
Since the beginning of the War in Iraq more than eight years ago, I
have expressed grave concern that intelligence is being fabricated or
abused by the Executive Branch to justify the war in Iraq. More
recently, The Nation reported that Blackwater was intimately involved
in a targeted assassination program run by the JSOC and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Pakistan--a country with which we are not
at war. I am gravely concerned about the use of private security
contractors in intelligence work, particularly in programs that have
virtually no transparency, accountability, or oversight. I remain
concerned that we are continuing to conduct intelligence work in
contravention of international law and in violation of the U.S.
Constitution.
I will continue to work to ensure that all have equal protection
under the law; and that
[[Page H859]]
Congress conducts its constitutionally mandated oversight of the
Executive Branch effectively.
Mr. REYES. I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute
printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the
purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered
read.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as
follows:
H.R. 2701
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Prohibition on earmarks.
Sec. 106. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--Personnel Matters
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Temporary appointment to fill vacancies in Presidentially
appointed and Senate confirmed positions in the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 303. Enhanced flexibility in nonreimbursable details to elements
of the intelligence community.
Sec. 304. Provisions relating to the Defense Civilian Intelligence
Personnel System.
Subtitle B--Education
Sec. 311. Permanent authorization for the Pat Roberts Intelligence
Scholars Program.
Sec. 312. Intelligence officer training program.
Sec. 313. Modifications to the Stokes educational scholarship program.
Sec. 314. Pilot program for intensive language instruction in African
languages.
Subtitle C--Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions
Sec. 321. Reporting on covert actions.
Subtitle D--Reports and Other Congressional Oversight
Sec. 331. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.
Sec. 332. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence
community.
Sec. 333. Semiannual reports on nuclear weapons programs of Iran,
Syria, and North Korea.
Sec. 334. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the
intelligence community.
Sec. 335. Government Accountability Office audits and investigations.
Sec. 336. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.
Sec. 337. Reports on foreign industrial espionage.
Sec. 338. Report on intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 339. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 340. Report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Sec. 341. Report on international traffic in arms regulations.
Sec. 342. Report on nuclear trafficking.
Sec. 343. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 344. Study on electronic waste destruction practices of the
intelligence community.
Sec. 345. Report on retirement benefits for former employees of Air
America.
Sec. 346. Study on college tuition programs for employees of the
intelligence community.
Sec. 347. National Intelligence Estimate on global supply chain
vulnerabilities.
Sec. 348. Review of records relating to potential health risks among
Desert Storm veterans.
Sec. 349. Review of pensions of employees affected by ``five and out''
program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 350. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of
detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 351. Summary of intelligence on Uighur detainees held at United
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 352. Report on interrogation research and training.
Sec. 353. Report on plans to increase diversity within the intelligence
community.
Sec. 354. Review of Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise of
enforcement jurisdiction in foreign nations.
Sec. 355. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 356. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
Sec. 357. Conforming amendments.
Subtitle E--Other Matters
Sec. 361. Modification of availability of funds for different
intelligence activities.
Sec. 362. Protection of certain national security information.
Sec. 363. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt
and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.
Sec. 364. Exemption of dissemination of terrorist identity information
from Freedom of Information Act.
Sec. 365. Misuse of the intelligence community and Office of the
Director of National Intelligence name, initials, or
seal.
Sec. 366. Security clearances: reports; ombudsman; reciprocity.
Sec. 367. Limitation on use of funds for the transfer or release of
individuals detained at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 368. Intelligence community financial improvement and audit
readiness.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on colocation of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the
Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology.
Sec. 404. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy
efficiency reports.
Sec. 405. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community.
Sec. 406. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 411. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 412. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for
interrogations involving persons in the custody of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 413. Appeals from decisions of Central Intelligence Agency
contracting officers.
Sec. 414. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 415. Protection against reprisals.
Sec. 416. Requirement for video recording of interrogations of persons
in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Subtitle C--Other Elements
Sec. 421. Homeland Security intelligence elements.
Sec. 422. Clarification of inclusion of Drug Enforcement Administration
as an element of the intelligence community.
Sec. 423. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 424. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components of
the intelligence community.
Sec. 425. Associate Director of the National Security Agency for
Compliance and Training.
Sec. 426. General Counsel of the National Security Agency.
Sec. 427. Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
Sec. 428. Charter for the National Reconnaissance Office.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
Sec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the
Research and Development Programs of the United States
Intelligence Community.
Sec. 502. Expansion and clarification of the duties of the program
manager for the information sharing environment.
Sec. 503. Classification review of executive branch materials in the
possession of the congressional intelligence committees.
Sec. 504. Prohibition on use of funds to provide Miranda warnings to
certain persons outside of the United States.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
Sec. 511. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949.
Sec. 512. Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision of
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.
Sec. 513. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to section 105 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
[[Page H860]]
Sec. 516. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 518. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 519. Technical amendments to title 10, United States Code.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2010 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and,
subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as
of September 30, 2010, for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through
(16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill
H.R. 2701 of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable
distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of
the Schedule, within the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2010 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to
in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence
determines that such action is necessary to the performance
of important intelligence functions, except that the number
of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such
element.
(b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15
days prior to each exercise of an authority described in
subsection (a).
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2010 the sum of $672,812,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2011.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 853 full-time or full-
time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2010. Personnel
serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available
to the Director of National Intelligence under section 103
are also available to the Director for the adjustment of
personnel levels within the Intelligence Community Management
Account.
(d) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2010 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for
advanced research and development shall remain available
until September 30, 2011.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2010, there are authorized such additional personnel for the
Community Management Account as of that date as are specified
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a).
SEC. 105. PROHIBITION ON EARMARKS.
(a) In General.--Nothing in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations, a report of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate to accompany the bill
H.R. 2701 of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress, a joint
statement of the managers accompanying a conference report on
such bill, or the classified annex to this Act, shall be
construed to authorize or require the expenditure of funds
for a congressional earmark.
(b) Congressional Earmark Defined.--In this section, the
term ``congressional earmark'' means a provision or report
language included primarily at the request of a Member,
Delegate, or Resident Commissioner of the House of
Representatives or a Senator providing, authorizing, or
recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget
authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for
a contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or
other expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a
specific State, locality, or congressional district, other
than through a statutory or administrative formula-driven or
competitive award process.
SEC. 106. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2010 the sum of $290,900,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--Personnel Matters
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT TO FILL VACANCIES IN
PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED AND SENATE CONFIRMED
POSITIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3) is amended by--
(1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
(2) inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e) Temporary Appointment to Fill Vacancies.--
Notwithstanding section 3345 of title 5, United States Code,
if an officer of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, other than the Director of National
Intelligence, whose appointment to office is required to be
made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, dies, resigns, or is unable to perform the
functions and duties of the office--
``(1) if during the 365-day period immediately preceding
the date of death, resignation, or beginning of inability to
serve of the applicable officer, the person serving as the
first assistant to the office of such officer served as such
first assistant for not less than 90 days, such first
assistant shall perform the functions and duties of the
office temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time
limitations of section 3346 of title 5, United States Code;
``(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President may
direct a person who serves in an office for which appointment
is required to be made by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to perform the functions
and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting
capacity subject to the time limitations of such section
3346; or
``(3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the Director of
National Intelligence shall recommend to the President, and
the President may direct, a person to perform the functions
and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting
capacity subject to the time limitations of such section
3346, if--
``(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of
death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve of the
applicable officer, such person served in a position in an
element of the intelligence community for not less than 90
days;
``(B) the rate of pay for the position described under
subparagraph (A) is equal to or greater than the minimum rate
of pay payable for a position at GS-15 of the General
Schedule; and
``(C) in the case of a person who is employed by an element
of the intelligence community--
``(i) the Director of National Intelligence shall consult
with the head of such element; and
[[Page H861]]
``(ii) if the head of such element objects to the
recommendation, the Director of National Intelligence may
make the recommendation to the President over the objection
of the head of such element after informing the President of
such objection.''.
SEC. 303. ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY IN NONREIMBURSABLE DETAILS TO
ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 113 the following new section:
``detail of other personnel
``Sec. 113A. Except as provided in section 904(g)(2) of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C.
402c(g)(2)) and section 113 of this Act, and notwithstanding
any other provision of law, an officer or employee of the
United States or member of the Armed Forces may be detailed
to an element of the intelligence community funded through
the Community Management Account from another element of the
United States Government on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable
basis, as jointly agreed to by the Director of National
Intelligence and the head of the detailing element, for a
period not to exceed two years.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 113 the
following new item:
``Sec. 113A. Detail of other personnel.''.
SEC. 304. PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE CIVILIAN
INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SYSTEM.
(a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``covered position'' means a defense
intelligence position in the Department of Defense
established under chapter 83 of title 10, United States Code,
excluding an Intelligence Senior Level position designated
under section 1607 of such title and any position in the
Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service;
(2) the term ``DCIPS pay system'', as used with respect to
a covered position, means the provisions of the Defense
Civilian Intelligence Personnel System under which the rate
of salary or basic pay for such position is determined,
excluding any provisions relating to bonuses, awards, or any
other amounts not in the nature of salary or basic pay;
(3) the term ``Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel
System'' means the personnel system established under chapter
83 of title 10, United States Code; and
(4) the term ``appropriate pay system'', as used with
respect to a covered position, means--
(A) the system under which, as of September 30, 2007, the
rate of salary or basic pay for such position was determined;
or
(B) if subparagraph (A) does not apply, the system under
which, as of September 30, 2007, the rate of salary or basic
pay was determined for the positions within the Department of
Defense most similar to the position involved,
excluding any provisions relating to bonuses, awards, or any
other amounts which are not in the nature of salary or basic
pay.
(b) Requirement That Appointments to Covered Positions
After June 16, 2009, Be Subject to the Appropriate Pay
System.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law--
(1) the DCIPS pay system--
(A) shall not apply to any individual holding a covered
position who is not subject to such system as of June 16,
2009; and
(B) shall not apply to any covered position which is not
subject to such system as of June 16, 2009; and
(2) any individual who, after June 16, 2009, is appointed
to a covered position shall accordingly be subject to the
appropriate pay system.
(c) Termination of DCIPS Pay System for Covered Positions
and Conversion of Employees Holding Covered Positions to the
Appropriate Pay System.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall take all
actions which may be necessary to provide, within 12 months
after the date of enactment of this Act, for the termination
of the DCIPS pay system with respect to covered positions and
for the conversion of any employees holding any covered
positions which, as of such date of enactment, remain subject
to the DCIPS pay system, to the appropriate pay system. No
employee shall suffer any loss of or decrease in pay because
of the preceding sentence.
(2) Report.--If the Secretary of Defense is of the view
that the DCIPS pay system should not be terminated with
respect to covered positions, as required by paragraph (1),
the Secretary shall submit to the President and both Houses
of Congress as soon as practicable, but in no event later
than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, a
written report setting forth a statement of the Secretary's
views and the reasons therefor. Such report shall
specifically include--
(A) the Secretary's opinion as to whether the DCIPS pay
system should be continued, with or without changes, with
respect to covered positions; and
(B) if, in the opinion of the Secretary, the DCIPS pay
system should be continued with respect to covered positions,
with changes--
(i) a detailed description of the proposed changes; and
(ii) a description of any administrative action or
legislation which may be necessary.
The requirements of this paragraph shall be carried out by
the Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Director of
the Office of Personnel Management.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
considered to affect--
(1) the provisions of the Defense Civilian Intelligence
Personnel System governing aspects of compensation apart from
salary or basic pay; or
(2) the application of such provisions with respect to a
covered position or any individual holding a covered
position, including after June 16, 2009.
Subtitle B--Education
SEC. 311. PERMANENT AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PAT ROBERTS
INTELLIGENCE SCHOLARS PROGRAM.
(a) Permanent Authorization.--Subtitle C of title X of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.) is
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``program on recruitment and training of intelligence analysts
``Sec. 1022. (a) Program.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence shall carry out a program to ensure that
selected students or former students are provided funds to
continue academic training, or are reimbursed for academic
training previously obtained, in areas of specialization that
the Director, in consultation with the other heads of the
elements of the intelligence community, identifies as areas
in which the current capabilities of the intelligence
community are deficient or in which future capabilities of
the intelligence community are likely to be deficient.
``(2) A student or former student selected for
participation in the program shall commit to employment with
an element of the intelligence community, following
completion of appropriate academic training, under such terms
and conditions as the Director considers appropriate.
``(3) The program shall be known as the Pat Roberts
Intelligence Scholars Program.
``(b) Elements.--In carrying out the program under
subsection (a), the Director shall--
``(1) establish such requirements relating to the academic
training of participants as the Director considers
appropriate to ensure that participants are prepared for
employment as intelligence professionals; and
``(2) periodically review the areas of specialization of
the elements of the intelligence community to determine the
areas in which such elements are, or are likely to be,
deficient in capabilities.
``(c) Use of Funds.--Funds made available for the program
under subsection (a) shall be used to--
``(1) provide a monthly stipend for each month that a
student is pursuing a course of study;
``(2) pay the full tuition of a student or former student
for the completion of such course of study;
``(3) pay for books and materials that the student or
former student requires or required to complete such course
of study;
``(4) pay the expenses of the student or former student for
travel requested by an element of the intelligence community
in relation to such program; or
``(5) for such other purposes the Director considers
appropriate to carry out such program.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Table of contents.--The table of contents in the first
section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by
section 303 of this Act, is further amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 1021 the following new
item:
``Sec. 1022. Program on recruitment and training of intelligence
analysts.''.
(2) Repeal of pilot program.--Section 318 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public
Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 441g note) is repealed.
SEC. 312. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM.
(a) Program.--Subtitle C of title X of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.), as amended by
section 311 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
``intelligence officer training program
``Sec. 1023. (a) Programs.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence may carry out a grant program in accordance with
subsection (b) to enhance the recruitment and retention of an
ethnically and culturally diverse intelligence community
workforce with capabilities critical to the national security
interests of the United States.
``(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director of
National Intelligence shall identify the skills necessary to
meet current or emergent needs of the intelligence community
and the educational disciplines that will provide individuals
with such skills.
``(b) Institutional Grant Program.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence may provide grants to institutions of
higher education to support the establishment or continued
development of programs of study in educational disciplines
identified under subsection (a)(2).
``(2) A grant provided under paragraph (1) may, with
respect to the educational disciplines identified under
subsection (a)(2), be used for the following purposes:
``(A) Curriculum or program development.
``(B) Faculty development.
``(C) Laboratory equipment or improvements.
``(D) Faculty research.
``(3) An institution of higher education seeking a grant
under this section shall submit an application describing the
proposed use of the grant at such time and in such manner as
the Director may require.
``(4) An institution of higher education that receives a
grant under this section shall submit to the Director regular
reports regarding the use of such grant, including--
``(A) a description of the benefits to students who
participate in the course of study funded by such grant;
``(B) a description of the results and accomplishments
related to such course of study; and
``(C) any other information that the Director may require.
``(c) Regulations.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out this section.
[[Page H862]]
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Institution of higher education.--The term
`institution of higher education' has the meaning given the
term in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1001).
``(2) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director of
National Intelligence.''.
(b) Repeal of Duplicative Provisions.--
(1) In general.--The following provisions of law are
repealed:
(A) Section 319 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 403 note).
(B) Section 1003 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 441g-2).
(C) Section 922 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375;
50 U.S.C. 402 note).
(2) Existing agreements.--Notwithstanding the repeals made
by paragraph (1), nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to amend, modify, or abrogate any agreement,
contract, or employment relationship that was in effect in
relation to the provisions repealed under paragraph (1) on
the day prior to the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Conforming Amendments.--The table of contents in the
first section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401 note), as amended by section 311 of this Act, is further
amended by--
(1) striking the item relating to section 1003; and
(2) inserting after the item relating to section 1022 the
following new item:
``Sec. 1023. Intelligence officer training program.''.
SEC. 313. MODIFICATIONS TO THE STOKES EDUCATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP
PROGRAM.
(a) Expansion of Program to Graduate Students.--Section 16
of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402
note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``undergraduate'' and inserting
``undergraduate and graduate''; and
(B) by striking ``the baccalaureate'' and inserting ``a
baccalaureate or graduate''; and
(2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``undergraduate'' and
inserting ``undergraduate and graduate''.
(b) Termination.--Section 16(d)(1)(C) of such Act is
amended by striking ``terminated either by'' and all that
follows and inserting the following: ``terminated by--
``(i) the Agency due to misconduct by the person;
``(ii) the person voluntarily; or
``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the person to
maintain such level of academic standing in the educational
course of training as the Director of the National Security
Agency specifies in the agreement under this paragraph;
and''.
(c) Authority To Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With
NSA.--Section 16(e) of the National Security Agency Act of
1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``(1) When
an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency
efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''.
(d) Other Elements of the Intelligence Community.--
(1) Authorization.--Subtitle C of title X of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441g et seq.), as amended by
section 312 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
``stokes scholarship program
``Sec. 1024. The head of an element of the intelligence
community may establish an undergraduate and graduate
training program with respect to civilian employees of such
element in the same manner and under the same conditions as
the Secretary of Defense is authorized to establish such a
program under section 16 of the National Security Agency Act
of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note).''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by
section 312 of this Act, is further amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 1023 the following new
item:
``Sec. 1024. Stokes scholarship program.''.
SEC. 314. PILOT PROGRAM FOR INTENSIVE LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION IN
AFRICAN LANGUAGES.
(a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the National Security Education Board
established under section 803(a) of the David L. Boren
National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1903(a)),
may establish a pilot program for intensive language
instruction in African languages.
(b) Program.--A pilot program established under subsection
(a) shall provide scholarships for programs that provide
intensive language instruction--
(1) in any of the five highest priority African languages
for which scholarships are not offered under such Act, as
determined by the Director of National Intelligence; and
(2) both in the United States and in a country in which the
language is the native language of a significant portion of
the population, as determined by the Director of National
Intelligence.
(c) Termination.--A pilot program established in accordance
with subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 5
years after the date on which such pilot program is
established.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to
carry out this section $2,000,000.
(2) Availability.--Funds authorized to be appropriated
under paragraph (1) shall remain available until the
termination of the pilot program in accordance with
subsection (c).
Subtitle C--Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions
SEC. 321. REPORTING ON COVERT ACTIONS.
(a) General Congressional Oversight.--Section 501(a) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(a)) is amended
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall
provide to the congressional intelligence committees all
information necessary to assess the lawfulness,
effectiveness, cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary
authority, and risk of an intelligence activity, including--
``(A) the legal authority under which the intelligence
activity is being or was conducted;
``(B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought in
carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, including
dissenting legal views;
``(C) any specific operational concerns arising from the
intelligence activity, including the risk of disclosing
intelligence sources or methods;
``(D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will
exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of funds or
other resources; and
``(E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will
fail.''.
(b) Procedures.--Section 501(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
413(c)) is amended by striking ``such procedures'' and
inserting ``such written procedures''.
(c) Intelligence Activities.--Section 502(a)(2) of such Act
(50 U.S.C. 413a(a)(2)) is amended by inserting ``(including
any information or material relating to the legal authority
under which an intelligence activity is being or was
conducted, and any information or material relating to legal
issues upon which guidance was sought in carrying out or
planning the intelligence activity, including dissenting
legal views)'' after ``concerning intelligence activities''.
(d) Covert Actions.--Section 503 of such Act (50 U.S.C.
413b) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``(including any
information or material relating to the legal authority under
which a covert action is being or was conducted, and any
information or material relating to legal issues upon which
guidance was sought in carrying out or planning the covert
action, including dissenting legal views)'' after
``concerning covert actions'';
(2) in subsection (c)--
(A) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following
new paragraph:
``(2) If, pursuant to the procedures established by each of
the congressional intelligence committees under section
501(c), one of the congressional intelligence committees
determines that not all members of that committee are
required to have access to a finding under this subsection,
the President may limit access to such finding or such notice
as provided in such procedures.''; and
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``is limited to the
Members of Congress specified in paragraph (2)'' and
inserting ``is not provided to all members of one of the
congressional intelligence committees in accordance with
paragraph (2)'';
(3) in subsection (d)--
(A) by striking ``(d) The President'' and inserting
``(d)(1) The President'';
(B) in paragraph (1), as designated by subparagraph (A) of
this paragraph, by striking ``specified in'' and inserting
``informed in accordance with''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall
constitute a `significant undertaking' if the activity--
``(A) involves the potential for loss of life;
``(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities,
including authorities relating to research, development, or
operations;
``(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or
other resources;
``(D) requires notification under section 504;
``(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing
intelligence sources or methods; or
``(F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic
relations of the United States if such activity were
disclosed without authorization.''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
``(g)(1) A Member of Congress to which a finding is
reported under subsection (c) or notice is provided under
subsection (d)(1) may submit to the Director of National
Intelligence an objection to any part of such finding or such
notice. Not later than 48 hours after such an objection is
submitted to the Director of National Intelligence, the
Director shall report such objection in writing to the
President and such Member of Congress.
``(2) In any case where access to a finding reported under
subsection (c) or notice provided under subsection (d)(1) is
not made available to all members of a congressional
intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2),
the President shall provide such members with general
information on the content of the finding or notice.
``(3) The President shall--
``(A) maintain a record of the Members of Congress to which
a finding is reported under subsection (c) or notice is
provided under subsection (d)(1) and the date on which each
Member of Congress receives such finding or notice; and
``(B) not later than 30 days after the date on which such
finding is reported or such notice is provided, provide such
record to--
``(i) in the case of a finding reported or notice provided
to a Member of the House of Representatives, the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives; and
``(ii) in the case of a finding reported or notice provided
to a Member of the Senate, the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate.
``(h) Any requirement under section 501, 502, or this
section to provide information to the congressional
intelligence committees shall be construed to require the
submission of such information to all members of such
committees, unless
[[Page H863]]
such information is specifically authorized not to be
submitted to all members of one of such committees in
accordance with subsection (c)(2).''.
Subtitle D--Reports and Other Congressional Oversight
SEC. 331. REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST
ASSETS.
Section 118 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
404m) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``semiannual'' and
inserting ``annual'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``Semiannual'' and
inserting ``Annual'';
(B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``semiannual basis'' and inserting ``annual
basis''; and
(ii) by striking ``preceding six-month period'' and
inserting ``preceding one-year period'';
(C) by striking paragraph (2); and
(D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs
(2) and (3), respectively; and
(3) in subsection (d)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the Committee on Armed
Services,'' after ``the Committee on Appropriations,''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the Committee on Armed
Services,'' after ``the Committee on Appropriations,''.
SEC. 332. ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413
et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 507 the
following new section:
``annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community
``Sec. 508. (a) Assessment.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of each
element of the intelligence community, prepare an annual
personnel level assessment for such element that assesses the
personnel levels of such element for the fiscal year
following the fiscal year in which the assessment is
submitted.
``(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence
committees each year along with the budget submitted by the
President in accordance with section 1105 of title 31, United
States Code.
``(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a)
shall include, for the element of the intelligence community
concerned, the following information:
``(1) The budget submission for personnel costs of such
element for the upcoming fiscal year.
``(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current
fiscal year.
``(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs as compared to the personnel costs during the
preceding five fiscal years.
``(4) The number of personnel positions requested for such
element for the upcoming fiscal year.
``(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such number as compared to the number of personnel positions
of such element of the current fiscal year.
``(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such number as compared to the number of personnel positions
of such element during the preceding five fiscal years.
``(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of
contractors to be funded by such element for the upcoming
fiscal year.
``(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs of contractors as compared to the best estimate of
the costs of contractors to be funded by such element during
the current fiscal year.
``(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of
contractors, and the number of contractors, of such element
during the preceding five fiscal years.
``(10) A written justification for the requested personnel
and contractor levels.
``(11) The number of intelligence collectors and analysts
employed or contracted by such element.
``(12) A list of all contractors that have been the subject
of an investigation completed by the inspector general of
such element during the preceding fiscal year, or are or have
been the subject of an investigation by such inspector
general during the current fiscal year.
``(13) A statement by the Director of National Intelligence
of whether, based on current and projected funding, such
element will have sufficient--
``(A) internal infrastructure to support the requested
personnel and contractor levels;
``(B) training resources to support the requested personnel
levels; and
``(C) funding to support the administrative and operational
activities of the requested personnel levels.''.
SEC. 333. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF
IRAN, SYRIA, AND NORTH KOREA.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 332, is
further amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``semiannual reports on the nuclear weapons programs of iran, syria,
and north korea
``Sec. 509. (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less
frequently than every 180 days, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the intentions and capabilities of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with regard to the
nuclear weapons programs of each such country.
``(b) Content.--Each report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran,
the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea--
``(1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each
country;
``(2) an evaluation of the sources upon which the
intelligence used to prepare the assessment referred to in
paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such sources
and an assessment of the reliability of each source;
``(3) a summary of any intelligence related to any program
gathered or developed since the previous report was submitted
under subsection (a), including intelligence collected from
both open and clandestine sources for each country; and
``(4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence
in the assessment referred to in paragraph (1).
``(c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of
National Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence
Estimate on the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, or the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea in lieu of a report required by
subsection (a) for that country.
``(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In
this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees'
means--
``(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
``(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
``(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate.''.
(b) Applicability Date.--The first report required to be
submitted under section 509 of the National Security Act of
1947, as added by subsection (a), shall be submitted not
later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
SEC. 334. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413
et seq.), as amended by section 333 of this Act, is further
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community
``Sec. 510. Each year on the date provided in section 507,
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate
a report on the proficiency in foreign languages and, as
appropriate, in foreign dialects, of each element of the
intelligence community, including--
``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency and the level of
proficiency required;
``(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each
element will require during the five-year period beginning on
the date of the submission of the report;
``(3) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency that are filled
by--
``(A) military personnel; and
``(B) civilian personnel;
``(4) the number of applicants for positions in such
element in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign
language proficiency, including the foreign language
indicated and the proficiency level;
``(5) the number of persons hired by such element with
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language
and proficiency level;
``(6) the number of personnel of such element currently
attending foreign language training, including the provider
of such training;
``(7) a description of the efforts of such element to
recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are
proficient in a foreign language;
``(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic,
advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
``(9) for each foreign language and, as appropriate,
dialect of a foreign language--
``(A) the number of positions of such element that require
proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
``(B) the number of personnel of such element that are
serving in a position that requires proficiency in the
foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of
the position;
``(C) the number of personnel of such element that are
serving in a position that does not require proficiency in
the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty
of the position;
``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each
level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level of
proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the
requirements of such element;
``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as
linguists for such element that are not qualified as
linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language
Roundtable;
``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists
for such element during the preceding calendar year;
``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that
discontinued serving such element during the preceding
calendar year;
``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills
that is fulfilled by an ally of the United States; and
``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills
that is fulfilled by contractors;
``(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and
capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole;
``(11) recommendations for eliminating required reports
relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of
National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer
relevant; and
[[Page H864]]
``(12) an assessment of the feasibility of employing
foreign nationals lawfully present in the United States who
have previously worked as translators or interpreters for the
Armed Forces or another department or agency of the Federal
Government in Iraq or Afghanistan to meet the critical
language needs of such element.''.
SEC. 335. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AUDITS AND
INVESTIGATIONS.
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413
et seq.), as amended by section 334 of this Act, is further
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``government accountability office analyses, evaluations, and
investigations
``Sec. 511. (a) In General.--Except as provided in
subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall
ensure that personnel of the Government Accountability Office
designated by the Comptroller General are provided with
access to all information in the possession of an element of
the intelligence community that the Comptroller General
determines is necessary for such personnel to conduct an
analysis, evaluation, or investigation of a program or
activity of an element of the intelligence community that is
requested by one of the congressional intelligence
committees.
``(b) Exception.--(1)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the
Director of National Intelligence may restrict access to
information referred to in subsection (a) by personnel
designated in such subsection if the Director determines that
the restriction is necessary to protect vital national
security interests of the United States.
``(B) The Director of National Intelligence may not
restrict access under subparagraph (A) solely on the basis of
the level of classification or compartmentation of
information that the personnel designated in subsection (a)
may seek access to while conducting an analysis, evaluation,
or investigation.
``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under
paragraph (1), the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an appropriately classified statement
of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7
days.
``(3) The Director shall notify the Comptroller General at
the time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to
the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, provide the Comptroller General with a
copy of such report.
``(4) The Comptroller General shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees any comments on a
report of which the Comptroller General has notice under
paragraph (3) that the Comptroller General considers
appropriate.''.
SEC. 336. CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OVERSIGHT
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 335 of
this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``certification of compliance with oversight requirements
``Sec. 512. The head of each element of the intelligence
community shall semiannually submit to the congressional
intelligence committees--
``(1) a certification that, to the best of the knowledge of
the head of such element--
``(A) the head of such element of the intelligence
community is in full compliance with the requirements of this
title; and
``(B) any information required to be submitted by such head
of such element under this Act before the date of the
submission of such certification has been properly submitted;
or
``(2) if such head of such element is unable to submit a
certification under paragraph (1), a statement--
``(A) of the reasons such head of such element is not able
to submit such a certification;
``(B) describing any information required to be submitted
by such head of such element under this Act before the date
of the submission of such statement that has not been
properly submitted; and
``(C) that the head of such element will submit such
information as soon as possible after the submission of such
statement.''.
(b) Applicability Date.--The first certification or
statement required to be submitted by the head of each
element of the intelligence community under section 512 of
the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a)
of this section, shall be submitted not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 337. REPORTS ON FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE.
(a) In General.--Section 809(b) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. app.
2170b(b)) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Annual'' and inserting
``Biannual'';
(2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following
new paragraph:
``(1) Submission to congress.--The President shall
biannually submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, and congressional leadership
a report updating the information referred to in subsection
(a)(1)(D).'';
(3) by striking paragraph (2); and
(4) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2).
(b) Initial Report.--The first report required under
section 809(b)(1) of such Act, as amended by subsection
(a)(2) of this section, shall be submitted not later than
February 1, 2010.
SEC. 338. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.
(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1,
2010, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the
Senate a report describing the use of personal services
contracts across the intelligence community, the impact of
the use of such contracts on the intelligence community
workforce, plans for conversion of contractor employment into
Federal Government employment, and the accountability
mechanisms that govern the performance of such personal
services contracts.
(b) Content.--
(1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include--
(A) a description of any relevant regulations or guidance
issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head
of an element of the intelligence community relating to
minimum standards required regarding the hiring, training,
security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and
how those standards may differ from those for Federal
Government employees performing substantially similar
functions;
(B) an identification of contracts where the contractor is
performing substantially similar functions to a Federal
Government employee;
(C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings achieved by
awarding contracts for the performance of such functions
referred to in subparagraph (B) instead of using full-time
employees of the elements of the intelligence community to
perform such functions;
(D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using
contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph
(2);
(E) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the number
of personnel working under such contracts, related to the
performance of activities described in paragraph (2);
(F) a comparison of the compensation of contract employees
and Federal Government employees performing substantially
similar functions;
(G) an analysis of the attrition of Federal Government
personnel for contractor positions that provide substantially
similar functions;
(H) a description of positions that will be converted from
contractor employment to Federal Government employment;
(I) an analysis of the oversight and accountability
mechanisms applicable to personal services contracts awarded
for intelligence activities by each element of the
intelligence community during fiscal years 2008 and 2009;
(J) an analysis of procedures in use in the intelligence
community for conducting oversight of contractors to ensure
identification and prosecution of criminal violations,
financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by
contractors or contract personnel; and
(K) an identification of best practices for oversight and
accountability mechanisms applicable to personal services
contracts.
(2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are
the following:
(A) Intelligence collection.
(B) Intelligence analysis.
(C) Covert actions, including rendition, detention, and
interrogation activities.
SEC. 339. REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE
CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION.
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and
the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate a report describing the
Director's long-term vision for transforming the intelligence
capabilities of the Bureau and the progress of the internal
reforms of the Bureau intended to achieve that vision. Such
report shall include--
(1) the direction, strategy, and goals for transforming the
intelligence capabilities of the Bureau;
(2) a description of what the fully functional intelligence
and national security functions of the Bureau should entail;
(3) a candid assessment of the effect of internal reforms
at the Bureau and whether such reforms have moved the Bureau
towards achieving the goals of the Director for the
intelligence and national security functions of the Bureau;
and
(4) an assessment of how well the Bureau performs tasks
that are critical to the effective functioning of the Bureau
as an intelligence agency, including--
(A) identifying new intelligence targets within the scope
of the national security functions of the Bureau, outside the
parameters of an existing case file or ongoing investigation;
(B) collecting intelligence domestically, including
collection through human and technical sources;
(C) recruiting human sources;
(D) training Special Agents to spot, assess, recruit, and
handle human sources;
(E) working collaboratively with other Federal departments
and agencies to jointly collect intelligence on domestic
counterterrorism and counterintelligence targets;
(F) producing a common intelligence picture of domestic
threats to the national security of the United States;
(G) producing high quality and timely intelligence
analysis;
(H) integrating intelligence analysts into its intelligence
collection operations; and
(I) sharing intelligence information with intelligence
community partners.
SEC. 340. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES DEDICATED TO IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN.
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the
congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate
a report on intelligence collection and analysis resources
(1) dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal years
2008 and 2009, and
[[Page H865]]
(2) planned to be dedicated during fiscal year 2010. Such
report shall include detailed information on fiscal, human,
technical, and other intelligence collection and analysis
resources.
SEC. 341. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS
REGULATIONS.
(a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2011, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate a report assessing the threat to
national security presented by the efforts of foreign
countries to acquire, through espionage, diversion, or other
means, sensitive equipment and technology, and the degree to
which United States export controls (including the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations) are adequate to
defeat such efforts.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) International Traffic in Arms Regulations Defined.--The
term ``International Traffic in Arms Regulations'' means
those regulations contained in parts 120 through 130 of title
22, Code of Federal Regulations (or successor regulations).
SEC. 342. REPORT ON NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING.
(a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2010, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the
illicit trade of nuclear and radiological material and
equipment.
(b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include, for a period of time including at least the
preceding three years--
(1) details of all known or suspected cases of the illicit
sale, transfer, brokering, or transport of--
(A) nuclear or radiological material;
(B) equipment useful for the production of nuclear or
radiological material; or
(C) nuclear explosive devices;
(2) an assessment of the countries that represent the
greatest risk of nuclear trafficking activities; and
(3) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence
in the assessment referred to in paragraph (2).
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted
in classified form, but shall include an unclassified
summary.
SEC. 343. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
conduct a study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions
of personnel of the intelligence community who commit
unauthorized disclosures of classified information, including
whether revoking such pensions is feasible under existing law
or under the administrative authority of the Director of
National Intelligence or any other head of an element of the
intelligence community.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report containing the results of the study conducted under
subsection (a).
SEC. 344. STUDY ON ELECTRONIC WASTE DESTRUCTION PRACTICES OF
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Study.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall conduct a study on the electronic waste
destruction practices of the intelligence community. Such
study shall assess--
(1) the security of the electronic waste disposal practices
of the intelligence community, including the potential for
counterintelligence exploitation of destroyed, discarded, or
recycled materials;
(2) the environmental impact of such disposal practices;
and
(3) methods to improve the security and environmental
impact of such disposal practices, including steps to prevent
the forensic exploitation of electronic waste.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing the results of
the study conducted under subsection (a).
SEC. 345. REPORT ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR FORMER EMPLOYEES
OF AIR AMERICA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the
advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to
United States citizens for the service of such citizens prior
to 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated company
during a period when Air America or the associated company
was owned or controlled by the United States Government and
operated or managed by the Central Intelligence Agency.
(b) Report Elements.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) The history of Air America and the associated companies
prior to 1977, including a description of--
(A) the relationship between Air America and the associated
companies and the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
element of the United States Government;
(B) the workforce of Air America and the associated
companies;
(C) the missions performed by Air America, the associated
companies, and their employees for the United States; and
(D) the casualties suffered by employees of Air America and
the associated companies in the course of their employment.
(2) A description of--
(A) the retirement benefits contracted for or promised to
the employees of Air America and the associated companies
prior to 1977;
(B) the contributions made by such employees for such
benefits;
(C) the retirement benefits actually paid such employees;
(D) the entitlement of such employees to the payment of
future retirement benefits; and
(E) the likelihood that such employees will receive any
future retirement benefits.
(3) An assessment of the difference between--
(A) the retirement benefits that former employees of Air
America and the associated companies have received or will
receive by virtue of their employment with Air America and
the associated companies; and
(B) the retirement benefits that such employees would have
received or be eligible to receive if such employment was
deemed to be employment by the United States Government and
their service during such employment was credited as Federal
service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits.
(4) Any recommendations regarding the advisability of
legislative action to treat such employment as Federal
service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in
light of the relationship between Air America and the
associated companies and the United States Government and the
services and sacrifices of such employees to and for the
United States.
(5) If legislative action is considered advisable under
paragraph (4), a proposal for such action and an assessment
of its costs.
(6) The opinions of the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, if any, on any matters covered by the
report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
considers appropriate.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Air america.--The term ``Air America'' means Air
America, Incorporated.
(2) Associated company.--The term ``associated company''
means any entity associated with, predecessor to, or
subsidiary to Air America, including Air Asia Company
Limited, CAT Incorporated, Civil Air Transport Company
Limited, and the Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport,
during the period when such an entity was owned and
controlled by the United States Government.
SEC. 346. STUDY ON COLLEGE TUITION PROGRAMS FOR EMPLOYEES OF
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
conduct a study on the feasability of--
(1) providing matching funds for contributions to college
savings programs made by employees of elements of the
intelligence community; and
(2) establishing a program to pay the college tuition of
each child of an employee of an element of the intelligence
community that has died in the performance of the official
duties of such employee.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to Congress a report containing the results of
the study conducted under subsection (a).
(c) College Savings Program Defined.--In this section, the
term ``college savings program'' means--
(1) a qualified tuition program, as defined in section 529
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
(2) a Coverdell education savings account, as defined in
section 530 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and
(3) any other appropriate program providing tax incentives
for saving funds to pay for college tuition, as determined by
the Director of National Intelligence.
SEC. 347. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL SUPPLY
CHAIN VULNERABILITIES.
(a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to Congress a National Intelligence Estimate or
National Intelligence Assessment on the global supply chain
to determine whether such supply chain poses a risk to
defense and intelligence systems due to counterfeit
components that may be defective or deliberately manipulated
by a foreign government or a criminal organization.
(b) Review of Mitigation.--
(1) NCIX review.--The National Counterintelligence
Executive shall conduct a review of the adequacy of the
mechanisms to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in the
global supply chain that pose a risk to defense and
intelligence systems due to counterfeit components that may
be defective or deliberately manipulated by a foreign
government or a criminal organization.
(2) Submission.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the National Counterintelligence
Executive shall submit to Congress a report containing the
results of the review conducted under paragraph (1).
SEC. 348. REVIEW OF RECORDS RELATING TO POTENTIAL HEALTH
RISKS AMONG DESERT STORM VETERANS.
(a) Review.--The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall conduct a classification review of the records
of the Agency that are relevant to the known or potential
health effects suffered by veterans of Operation Desert Storm
as described in the November 2008, report by the Department
of Veterans Affairs Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War
Veterans Illnesses.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress the results of
the classification review conducted under subsection (a),
including the total number of records of the Agency that are
relevant.
[[Page H866]]
(c) Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 349. REVIEW OF PENSIONS OF EMPLOYEES AFFECTED BY ``FIVE
AND OUT'' PROGRAM OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act
may be used to implement the program of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation requiring the mandatory reassignment of a
supervisor of the Bureau after such supervisor serves in a
management position for seven years (commonly known as the
``seven and out'' program) until the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation submits to the congressional
intelligence committees a certification that the Director has
completed a review of issues related to the pensions of
former employees of the Bureau affected by a previous program
of mandatory reassignment after serving in a management
position for five years (commonly known as the ``five and
out'' program) and the effect of such program on the Bureau
and the results of such review.
SEC. 350. SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO TERRORIST
RECIDIVISM OF DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED STATES
NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of--
(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees
currently or formerly held at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and
(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees
will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in
terrorist organizations.
SEC. 351. SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE ON UIGHUR DETAINEES HELD AT
UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY,
CUBA.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of--
(1) intelligence relating to threats posed by Uighur
detainees currently or formerly held at United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense;
and
(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees
will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in
terrorist organizations.
SEC. 352. REPORT ON INTERROGATION RESEARCH AND TRAINING.
(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than December 31,
2009, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination
with the heads of the relevant elements of the intelligence
community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives and the Senate a report on the state of
research, analysis, and training in interrogation and
debriefing practices.
(b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) an assessment of--
(A) the quality and value of scientific and technical
research in interrogation and debriefing practices that has
been conducted independently or in affiliation with the
Federal Government and the identification of areas in which
additional research could potentially improve interrogation
practices;
(B) the state of interrogation and debriefing training in
the intelligence community, including the character and
adequacy of the ethical component of such training, and the
identification of any gaps in training;
(C) the adequacy of efforts to enhance career path options
for intelligence community personnel that serve as
interrogators and debriefers, including efforts to recruit
and retain career personnel; and
(D) the effectiveness of existing processes for studying
and implementing lessons learned and best practices of
interrogation and debriefing; and
(2) any recommendations that the Director considers
appropriate for improving the performance of the intelligence
community with respect to the issues described in
subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (1).
SEC. 353. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1,
2010, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination
with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community,
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the plans of each element to increase diversity
within the intelligence community.
(b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include specific implementation plans to increase diversity
within each element of the intelligence community,
including--
(1) specific implementation plans for each such element
designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic
plan of the Director of National Intelligence on equal
employment opportunity and diversity;
(2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to
increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates;
(3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to
improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior,
midgrade, senior, and management levels;
(4) a description of specific diversity awareness training
and education programs for senior officials and managers of
each such element; and
(5) a description of performance metrics to measure the
success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs
described in paragraphs (1) through (4).
SEC. 354. REVIEW OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION EXERCISE
OF ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION IN FOREIGN NATIONS.
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
review of constraints under international law and the laws of
foreign nations to the assertion of enforcement jurisdiction
with respect to criminal investigations of terrorism offenses
under the laws of the United States conducted by agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in foreign nations and
using funds made available for the National Intelligence
Program, including constraints identified in section 432 of
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States.
SEC. 355. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Annual Report on Intelligence.--Section 109 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404d) is repealed.
(b) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence
Initiatives.--Section 1102(b) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``(1) The Director'' and inserting ``The
Director'' ; and
(2) by striking paragraph (2).
(c) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification
Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is
amended--
(1) by striking subsection (d); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as
subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively.
(d) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.--
Section 826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873
note) is repealed.
SEC. 356. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional
intelligence committees that is included in the classified
annex to this Act is hereby incorporated into this Act and is
hereby made a requirement in law.
SEC. 357. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
(a) Report Submission Dates.--Section 507 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (G);
(ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), (D), (E),
(F), (H), (I), and (N) as subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D),
(E), (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
``(I) The annual report on financial intelligence on
terrorist assets required by section 118.
``(J) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in
the intelligence community required by section 510.''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraph (D); and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (6).
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first
section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by
section 313 of this Act, is further amended by--
(1) striking the item relating to section 109; and
(2) inserting after the item relating to section 507 the
following new items:
``Sec. 508. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence
community.
``Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear weapons programs of Iran,
Syria, and North Korea.
``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence
community.
``Sec. 511. Government Accountability Office analyses, evaluations, and
investigations.
``Sec. 512. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.''.
Subtitle E--Other Matters
SEC. 361. MODIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DIFFERENT
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read
as follows:
``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an
emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases
efficiency; and''.
SEC. 362. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION.
(a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover
Intelligence Officers and Agents.--
(1) Disclosure after access to information identifying
agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking
``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''.
(2) Disclosure after access to classified information.--
Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking ``five
years'' and inserting ``10 years''.
(b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of
Intelligence Identities.--The first sentence of section
603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
423(a)) is amended by inserting ``including an assessment of
the need for any modification of this title for the purpose
of improving legal protections for covert
[[Page H867]]
agents,'' after ``measures to protect the identities of
covert agents,''.
SEC. 363. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT
RECEIPT AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND
DECORATIONS.
Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of
the intelligence community, the head of such element may
delete the information described in subparagraph (A) or (C)
of paragraph (2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph
(3) if the head of such element certifies in writing to the
Secretary of State that the publication of such information
could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or
methods.
``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of
State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be
transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who
shall keep a record of such information.
``(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community'
has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.
SEC. 364. EXEMPTION OF DISSEMINATION OF TERRORIST IDENTITY
INFORMATION FROM FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.
Section 119 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
Section 404o) is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
``(k) Exemption of Dissemination of Terrorist Identity
Information From Freedom of Information Act.--(1) Terrorist
identity information disseminated for terrorist screening
purposes or other authorized counterterrorism purposes shall
be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5,
United States Code.
``(2) In this section:
``(A) Authorized counterterrorism purpose.--The term
`authorized counterterrorism purpose' includes disclosure to
and appropriate use by an element of the Federal Government
of terrorist identifiers of persons reasonably suspected to
be terrorists or supporters of terrorists.
``(B) Terrorist identity information.--The term `terrorist
identity information' means--
``(i) information from a database maintained by any element
of the Federal Government that would reveal whether an
individual has or has not been determined to be a known or
suspected terrorist or has or has not been determined to be
within the networks of contacts and support of a known or
suspected terrorist; and
``(ii) information related to a determination as to whether
or not an individual is or should be included in the
Terrorist Screening Database or other screening databases
based on a determination that the individual is a known or
suspected terrorist.
``(C) Terrorist identifiers.--The term `terrorist
identifiers'--
``(i) includes--
``(I) names and aliases;
``(II) dates or places of birth;
``(III) unique identifying numbers or information;
``(IV) physical identifiers or biometrics; and
``(V) any other identifying information provided for
watchlisting purposes; and
``(ii) does not include derogatory information or
information that would reveal or compromise intelligence or
law enforcement sources or methods.''.
SEC. 365. MISUSE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE NAME,
INITIALS, OR SEAL.
(a) Intelligence Community.--Title XI of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``misuse of the intelligence community name, initials, or seal
``Sec. 1103. (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except
with the written permission of the Director of National
Intelligence or a designee of the Director, knowingly use the
words `intelligence community', the initials `IC', the seal
of the intelligence community, or any colorable imitation of
such words, initials, or seal in connection with any
merchandise, impersonation, solicitation, or commercial
activity in a manner reasonably calculated to convey the
impression that such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized
by the Director of National Intelligence, except that
employees of the intelligence community may use the
intelligence community name, initials, and seal in accordance
with regulations promulgated by the Director of National
Intelligence.
``(b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney
General that any person is engaged or is about to engage in
an act or practice which constitutes or will constitute
conduct prohibited by subsection (a), the Attorney General
may initiate a civil proceeding in a district court of the
United States to enjoin such act or practice. Such court
shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and
determination of such action and may, at any time before
final determination, enter such restraining orders or
prohibitions, or take such other action as is warranted, to
prevent injury to the United States or to any person or class
of persons for whose protection the action is brought.''.
(b) Office of the Director of National Intelligence.--Title
XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et
seq.), as amended by subsection (a) of this section, is
further amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``misuse of the office of the director of national intelligence name,
initials, or seal
``Sec. 1104. (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except
with the written permission of the Director of National
Intelligence or a designee of the Director, knowingly use the
words `Office of the Director of National Intelligence', the
initials `ODNI', the seal of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, or any colorable imitation of such
words, initials, or seal in connection with any merchandise,
impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a
manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that
such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the Director
of National Intelligence.
``(b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney
General that any person is engaged or is about to engage in
an act or practice which constitutes or will constitute
conduct prohibited by subsection (a), the Attorney General
may initiate a civil proceeding in a district court of the
United States to enjoin such act or practice. Such court
shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and
determination of such action and may, at any time before
final determination, enter such restraining orders or
prohibitions, or take such other action as is warranted, to
prevent injury to the United States or to any person or class
of persons for whose protection the action is brought.''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by
section 357 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the
end the following new items:
``Sec. 1103. Misuse of the intelligence community name, initials, or
seal.
``Sec. 1104. Misuse of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence name, initials, or seal.''.
SEC. 366. SECURITY CLEARANCES: REPORTS; OMBUDSMAN;
RECIPROCITY.
(a) Reports Relating to Security Clearances.--
(1) Quadrennial audit; security clearance determinations.--
(A) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 336 of
this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``reports on security clearances
``Sec. 513. (a) Quadrennial Audit of Position
Requirements.--(1) The President shall every four years
conduct an audit of how the executive branch determines
whether a security clearance is required for a particular
position in the Federal Government.
``(2) Not later than 30 days after the completion of an
audit conducted under paragraph (1), the President shall
submit to Congress the results of such audit.
``(b) Report on Security Clearance Determinations.--(1) Not
later than February 1 of each year, the President shall
submit to Congress a report on the security clearance
process. Such report shall include, for each security
clearance level--
``(A) the number of Federal Government employees who--
``(i) held a security clearance at such level as of October
1 of the preceding year; and
``(ii) were approved for a security clearance at such level
during the preceding fiscal year;
``(B) the number of contractors to the Federal Government
who--
``(i) held a security clearance at such level as of October
1 of the preceding year; and
``(ii) were approved for a security clearance at such level
during the preceding fiscal year; and
``(C) for each element of the intelligence community--
``(i) the amount of time it took to process the fastest 80
percent of security clearance determinations for such level;
``(ii) the amount of time it took to process the fastest 90
percent of security clearance determinations for such level;
``(iii) the number of open security clearance
investigations for such level that have remained open for--
``(I) 4 months or less;
``(II) between 4 months and 8 months;
``(III) between 8 months and 12 months; and
``(IV) more than a year;
``(iv) the percentage of reviews during the preceding
fiscal year that resulted in a denial or revocation of a
security clearance;
``(v) the percentage of investigations during the preceding
fiscal year that resulted in incomplete information;
``(vi) the percentage of investigations during the
preceding fiscal year that did not result in enough
information to make a decision on potentially adverse
information; and
``(vii) for security clearance determinations completed or
ongoing during the preceding fiscal year that have taken
longer than one year to complete--
``(I) the number of security clearance determinations for
positions as employees of the Federal Government that
required more than one year to complete;
``(II) the number of security clearance determinations for
contractors that required more than one year to complete;
``(III) the agencies that investigated and adjudicated such
determinations; and
``(IV) the cause of significant delays in such
determinations.
``(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the Director of
National Intelligence may consider--
``(A) security clearances at the level of confidential and
secret as one security clearance level; and
``(B) security clearances at the level of top secret or
higher as one security clearance level.''.
(B) Initial audit.--The first audit required to be
conducted under section 513(a)(1) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (as added by paragraph (1)) shall be completed
not later than February 1, 2010.
(C) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by
section 365 of this Act, is further amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 512 the following new
item:
``Sec. 513. Reports on security clearances.''.
[[Page H868]]
(2) Report on metrics for adjudication quality.--Not later
than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
President shall submit to Congress a report on security
clearance investigations and adjudications. Such report shall
include--
(A) Federal Government wide adjudication guidelines and
metrics for adjudication quality;
(B) a plan to improve the professional development of
security clearance adjudicators;
(C) metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of interagency
clearance reciprocity;
(D) Federal Government wide investigation standards and
metrics for investigation quality; and
(E) the feasibility, counterintelligence risk, and cost
effectiveness of--
(i) by not later than January 1, 2012, requiring the
investigation and adjudication of security clearances to be
conducted by not more than two Federal agencies; and
(ii) by not later than January 1, 2015, requiring the
investigation and adjudication of security clearances to be
conducted by not more than one Federal agency.
(b) Ombudsman for Intelligence Community Security
Clearances.--
(1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 303 of
this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 103G
the following new section:
``ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances
``Sec. 103H. (a) Appointment.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence
community security clearances.
``(b) Provision of Information.--The head of an element of
the intelligence community shall provide a person applying
for a security clearance through or in coordination with such
element with contact information for the ombudsman appointed
under subsection (a).
``(c) Report.--Not later than November 1 of each year, the
ombudsman appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing--
``(1) the number of persons applying for a security
clearance who have contacted the ombudsman during the
preceding 12 months; and
``(2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and questions
received by the ombudsman from persons applying for security
clearances.''.
(2) Appointment date.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence
community security clearances under section 103H(a) of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by paragraph (1), not
later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(3) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by
subsection (a)(1)(C) of this section, is further amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 103G the
following new item:
``Sec. 103H. Ombudsman for intelligence community security
clearances.''.
(c) Security Clearance Reciprocity.--
(1) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall conduct an audit of the reciprocity of
security clearances in the intelligence community.
(2) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing the results of
the audit conducted under paragraph (1). Such report shall
include an assessment of the time required to obtain a
reciprocal security clearance for--
(A) an employee of an element of the intelligence community
detailed to another element of the intelligence community;
(B) an employee of an element of the intelligence community
seeking permanent employment with another element of the
intelligence community; and
(C) a contractor seeking permanent employment with an
element of the intelligence community.
SEC. 367. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE TRANSFER OR
RELEASE OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED
STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence may
not use any of the amounts authorized to be appropriated in
this Act for fiscal year 2010 or any subsequent fiscal year
to release or transfer any individual described in subsection
(d) to the United States, its territories, or possessions,
until 120 days after the President has submitted to the
congressional defense committees the plan described in
subsection (b).
(b) Plan Required.--The President shall submit to Congress
a plan on the disposition of each individual described in
subsection (d). Such plan shall include--
(1) an assessment of the risk that the individual described
in subsection (d) poses to the national security of the
United States, its territories, or possessions;
(2) a proposal for the disposition for each such
individual;
(3) a plan to mitigate any risks described in paragraph (1)
should the proposed disposition required by paragraph (2)
include the release or transfer to the United States, its
territories, or possessions of any such individual; and
(4) a summary of the consultation required in subsection
(c).
(c) Consultation Required.--The President shall consult
with the chief executive of the State, the District of
Columbia, or the territory or possession of the United States
to which the disposition in subsection (b) includes a release
or transfer to that State, District of Columbia, or territory
or possession.
(d) Detainees Described.--An individual described in this
subsection is any individual who is located at United States
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of the date of the
enactment of this Act, who--
(1) is not a citizen of the United States; and
(2) is--
(A) in the custody or under the effective control of the
Department of Defense, or
(B) otherwise under detention at the United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
SEC. 368. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FINANCIAL IMPROVEMENT AND
AUDIT READINESS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is no longer excusable to allow poor business
systems, a deficiency of resources, or a lack of commitment
from senior leadership of the intelligence community to
foster waste or nonaccountability to the United States
taxpayer;
(2) the Director of National Intelligence has not made
compliance with financial management and audit readiness
standards a top priority; and
(3) the Director of National Intelligence should require
each element of the intelligence community to develop and
implement a specific plan to become compliant with the law.
(b) Review; Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall--
(1) conduct a review of the status of the auditability
compliance of each element of the intelligence community; and
(2) develop a plan and timeline to achieve a full,
unqualified audit of each element of the intelligence
community not later than September 30, 2013.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON COLOCATION OF THE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3), as amended by section 302(1) of this Act, is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (f) (as so redesignated)--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of
Headquarters With Headquarters of'';
(B) by striking ``Commencing as of October 1, 2008, the''
and inserting ``(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2),
the'';
(C) in paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (2) of
this section, by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before
``the Office'';
(D) in paragraph (1) (as so designated), by striking ``any
other element'' and inserting ``the headquarters of any other
element''; and
(E) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) The President may waive the limitation in paragraph
(1) if the President determines that--
``(A) a waiver is in the interests of national security; or
``(B) the costs of a headquarters of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence that is separate from the
headquarters of the other elements of the intelligence
community outweighs the potential benefits of the
separation.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(g) Location of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.--The headquarters of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence may be located in the Washington
metropolitan region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40,
United States Code).''.
SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.
Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the
Director's designee.''.
SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY.
Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7);
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``; and'' and inserting
``;''; and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new
paragraphs:
``(5) assist the Director of National Intelligence in
establishing goals for basic, applied, and advanced research
to meet the technology needs of the intelligence community;
``(6) submit to the congressional intelligence committees
an annual report on the science and technology strategy of
the Director that shows resources mapped to the goals of the
intelligence community; and''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(3)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)--
(i) by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate'';
and
(ii) by striking ``; and'' and inserting ``;'';
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C);
and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new
subparagraph:
``(B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research
programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence
community; and''.
SEC. 404. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA
CENTER ENERGY EFFICIENCY REPORTS.
(a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
develop a plan to implement the
[[Page H869]]
recommendations of the report submitted to Congress under
section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote
the use of energy efficient computer servers in the United
States'' (Public Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the
intelligence community.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing the plan developed under
subsection (a).
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
SEC. 405. TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
(3) in subsection (c) in the matter preceding paragraph
(1), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after
``Chief Information Officer''; and
(4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''.
SEC. 406. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 366 of
this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 103H
(as added by such section 366) the following new section:
``inspector general of the intelligence community
``Sec. 103I. (a) Office of Inspector General of
Intelligence Community.--There is within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community.
``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community is to--
``(1) be an independent and objective office appropriately
accountable to Congress and to initiate and conduct
investigations, inspections, and audits on matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence;
``(2) recommend policies designed--
``(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in
the administration and implementation of matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence; and
``(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such
matters;
``(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of National
Intelligence fully and currently informed about--
``(A) problems and deficiencies relating to matters within
the responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence; and
``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective
actions; and
``(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that
the congressional intelligence committees are kept informed
of--
``(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to
matters within the responsibility and authority of the
Director of National Intelligence; and
``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective
actions.
``(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1)
There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
``(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as
Inspector General shall be made--
``(A) without regard to political affiliation;
``(B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with the
security standards of the intelligence community, and prior
experience in the field of intelligence or national security;
``(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting,
financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or auditing; and
``(D) on the basis of expertise in investigations.
``(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only
by the President. The President shall communicate in writing
to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for
the removal of any individual from the position of Inspector
General not later than 30 days before the date on which the
Inspector General is removed from office.
``(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections
(g) and (h), the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall--
``(1) provide policy direction for, and plan, conduct,
supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations,
inspections, and audits relating to matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in
accordance with applicable law and regulations;
``(2) keep the Director of National Intelligence and
Congress fully and currently informed concerning violations
of law and regulations, violations of civil liberties and
privacy, fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and
deficiencies that may occur in matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director, and report the
progress made in implementing corrective action;
``(3) take due regard for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued
by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with
the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures
as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of
intelligence sources and methods described in such reports;
and
``(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities
under this section, comply with generally accepted Federal
Government auditing standards.
``(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1)(A) Subject to
subparagraph (B), the Director of National Intelligence may
prohibit the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
from initiating, carrying out, or completing any
investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director
determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect
vital national security interests of the United States.
``(B) The Director of National Intelligence may not
prohibit an investigation, inspection, or audit under
subparagraph (A) solely on the basis of the level of
classification or compartmentation of information that the
Inspector General may seek access to while conducting such
investigation, inspection, or audit.
``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under
paragraph (1), the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an appropriately classified statement
of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7
days.
``(3) The Director shall notify the Inspector General at
the time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to
the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a
copy of such report.
``(4) The Inspector General shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees any comments on a
report of which the Inspector General has notice under
paragraph (3) that the Inspector General considers
appropriate.
``(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to
the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any
purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the
Inspector General.
``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any
employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of
the intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
``(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers,
recommendations, or other material which relate to the
programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector
General has responsibilities under this section.
``(C) The Director or, on the recommendation of the
Director, another appropriate official of the intelligence
community, shall take appropriate administrative action
against an employee, or employee of a contractor, of an
element of the intelligence community that fails to cooperate
with the Inspector General. Such administrative action may
include loss of employment or termination of an existing
contractual relationship.
``(3) The Inspector General shall, in accordance with
subsection (g), receive and investigate complaints or
information from any person concerning the existence of an
activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the
Director of National Intelligence constituting a violation of
laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of
funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific
danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint
or information has been received from an employee of the
Federal Government--
``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity
of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless
the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is
unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the
disclosure is made to an official of the Department of
Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution
should be undertaken; and
``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any
employee, unless the complaint was made or the information
was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with
willful disregard for its truth or falsity.
``(4) The Inspector General shall administer to or take
from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever
necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector
General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when
administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office
of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force
and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an
officer having a seal.
``(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the
Inspector General may require by subpoena the production of
all information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence
necessary in the performance of the duties and
responsibilities of the Inspector General.
``(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other
elements of the United States Government, the Inspector
General shall obtain information, documents, reports,
answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and
evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using
procedures other than by subpoenas.
``(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for,
or on behalf of, any element of the intelligence community,
including the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
``(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a
subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be
enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the
United States.
``(6) The Inspector General may obtain services as
authorized under section 3109 of title 5,
[[Page H870]]
United States Code, at rates for individuals not to exceed
the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic pay
payable for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule under section
5332 of title 5, United States Code.
``(7) The Inspector may, to the extent and in such amounts
as may be provided in advance by appropriations Acts, enter
into contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies,
analyses, and other services with public agencies and with
private persons, and to make such payments as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
``(g) Coordination Among the Inspectors General of the
Intelligence Community.--(1)(A) If a matter within the
jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community that may be subject to an investigation,
inspection, review, or audit by both the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community and an inspector general with
oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence
community, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community and such other inspector general shall
expeditiously resolve the question of which inspector general
shall conduct such investigation, inspection, review, or
audit to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities of
the inspectors general.
``(B) In attempting to resolve a question under
subparagraph (A), the inspectors general concerned may
request the assistance of the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum established under subparagraph (C).
If a dispute between an inspector general within an agency or
department of the United States Government and the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community has not been resolved
with the assistance of the Forum, the inspectors general
shall submit the question to the Director of National
Intelligence and the head of the affected agency or
department for resolution.
``(C) There is established the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum which shall consist of all statutory
or administrative inspectors general with oversight
responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.
The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
serve as the chair of the Forum. The Forum shall have no
administrative authority over any inspector general, but
shall serve as a mechanism for informing its members of the
work of individual members of the Forum that may be of common
interest and discussing questions about jurisdiction or
access to employees, employees of a contractor, records,
audits, reviews, documents, recommendations, or other
materials that may involve or be of assistance to more than
one of its members.
``(2) The inspector general conducting an investigation,
inspection, review, or audit referred to in paragraph (1)
shall submit the results of such investigation, inspection,
review, or audit to any other inspector general, including
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, with
jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection,
review, or audit who did not conduct such investigation,
inspection, review, or audit.
``(h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community with appropriate and adequate
office space at central and field office locations and with
such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and
communications facilities and services as may be necessary
for the operation of such offices.
``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall select, appoint, and
employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to
carry out the functions, powers, and duties of the Inspector
General. The Inspector General shall ensure that any officer
or employee selected, appointed, or employed has a security
clearance appropriate for the assigned duties of such officer
or employee.
``(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and
employees have the requisite training and experience to
enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the
Inspector General effectively.
``(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the
Inspector General shall recommend policies to the Director of
National Intelligence to create within the intelligence
community a career cadre of sufficient size to provide
appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the
effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
``(3)(A) The Inspector General may, in consultation with
the Director, request such information or assistance as may
be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities
of the Inspector General from any department, agency, or
other element of the United States Government.
``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information
or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the
department, agency, or element concerned shall furnish to the
Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such
information or assistance.
``(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
may, upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the
intelligence community and in coordination with the inspector
general of that element pursuant to subsection (g), conduct
an inspection, review, or audit of such element and may enter
into any place occupied by such element for purposes of the
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
``(i) Reports.--(1)(A) Not later than January 31 and July
31 of each year, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall prepare and submit to the Director of
National Intelligence a report summarizing the activities of
the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community during the preceding six-month period. The
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall provide
any portion of the report involving a component of a
department of the United States Government to the head of
that department simultaneously with submission of the report
to the Director of National Intelligence.
``(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include the
following:
``(i) A list of the titles or subjects of each
investigation, inspection, review, or audit conducted during
the period covered by such report, including a summary of the
progress of each particular investigation, inspection, or
audit since the preceding report of the Inspector General
under this paragraph.
``(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and
deficiencies relating to the administration and
implementation of programs and operations of the intelligence
community, and in the relationships between elements of the
intelligence community, identified by the Inspector General
during the period covered by such report.
``(iii) A description of the recommendations for
disciplinary action made by the Inspector General during the
period covered by such report with respect to significant
problems, abuses, or deficiencies described in clause (ii).
``(iv) A statement of whether or not corrective or
disciplinary action has been completed on each significant
recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and,
in a case where corrective action has been completed, a
description of such corrective action.
``(v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector
General has had full and direct access to all information
relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector
General.
``(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General
during the period covered by such report.
``(vii) Any recommendations that the Inspector General
considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and
implementation of matters within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and to
detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such matters.
``(C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a
report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall submit the
report to the congressional intelligence committees together
with any comments the Director considers appropriate.
``(D) Each report submitted under subparagraphs (A) and (C)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to
the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies relating to matters within the responsibility
and authority of the Director of National Intelligence.
``(B) The Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A)
within 7 days of the receipt of such report, together with
such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The
Director shall submit to the committees of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a
department of the United States Government any portion of
each report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem,
abuse, or deficiency related to a component of such
department simultaneously with transmission of the report to
the congressional intelligence committees.
``(3) The Inspector General shall immediately notify and
submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees
on an investigation, inspection, review, or audit if--
``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
significant differences with the Director affecting the
execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector
General;
``(B) the investigation, inspection, review, or audit
carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any current
or former intelligence community official who--
``(i) holds or held a position in an element of the
intelligence community that is subject to appointment by the
President, whether or not by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, including such a position held on an acting
basis;
``(ii) holds or held a position in an element of the
intelligence community, including a position held on an
acting basis, that is appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence; or
``(iii) holds or held a position as head of an element of
the intelligence community or a position covered by
subsection (b) or (c) of section 106;
``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General
to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by
a current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of
possible criminal conduct of any current or former official
described in subparagraph (B); or
``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible
alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary
information in the course of such investigation, inspection,
review, or audit.
``(4)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of
the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor of
the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress
a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern
may report such complaint or information to the Inspector
General.
``(B) Not later than the end of the 14-day period beginning
on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or
information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General
shall determine whether the complaint or information appears
credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector
General shall submit to
[[Page H871]]
the Director a notice of that determination, together with
the complaint or information.
``(C) Upon receipt of a submittal from the Inspector
General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, not later
than 7 days after such receipt, forward such transmittal to
the congressional intelligence committees, together with any
comments the Director considers appropriate.
``(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible
under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted
under subparagraph (A), or does not submit the complaint or
information to the Director in accurate form under
subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may
submit the complaint or information to Congress by contacting
either or both of the congressional intelligence committees
directly.
``(ii) An employee may contact the congressional
intelligence committees directly as described in clause (i)
only if the employee--
``(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the
employee's complaint or information and notice of the
employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence
committees directly; and
``(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the
Inspector General, direction on how to contact the
intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate
security practices.
``(iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or
information under clause (ii) does so in that member or
employee's official capacity as a member or employee of such
committee.
``(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General
under this paragraph of each action taken under this
paragraph with respect to the complaint or information. Such
notice shall be provided not later than 3 days after any such
action is taken.
``(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector
General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial
review.
``(G) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit
the protections afforded an employee of or contractor to the
Central Intelligence Agency under section 17(e)(3) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403q(e)(3)).
``(H) In this paragraph, the term `urgent concern' means
any of the following:
``(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of
law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the
funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence
activity involving classified information, but does not
include differences of opinions concerning public policy
matters.
``(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful
withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact
relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an
intelligence activity.
``(iii) An action, including a personnel action described
in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code,
constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under
subsection (f)(3)(B) of this section.
``(5) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United
States Code, the Inspector General shall report to the
Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint
received by the Inspector General relating to violations of
Federal criminal law that involves a program or operation of
an element of the intelligence community, or in the
relationships between the elements of the intelligence
community, consistent with such guidelines as may be issued
by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such
section. A copy of each such report shall be furnished to the
Director.
``(j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures to be
issued by the Director in consultation with the congressional
intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence
Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community.
``(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of
Intelligence Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to
subsection (g), the performance by the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community of any duty, responsibility, or
function regarding an element of the intelligence community
shall not be construed to modify or affect the duties and
responsibilities of any other inspector general having duties
and responsibilities relating to such element.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401
note), as amended by section 366 of this Act, is further
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103H
the following new item:
``Sec. 103I. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.
(b) Repeal of Superseded Authority To Establish Position.--
Section 8K of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.) is repealed.
(c) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new item:
``Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.
(d) Applicability Date; Transition.--
(1) Applicability.--The amendment made by subsection (b)
shall apply on the earlier of--
(A) the date of the appointment by the President and
confirmation by the Senate of an individual to serve as
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community; or
(B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the
duties of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
by the individual serving as the Inspector General of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence as of the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Transition.--The individual serving as the Inspector
General of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence as of the date of the enactment of this Act
shall perform the duties of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community until the individual appointed to the
position of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
assumes the duties of such position.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 411. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR
GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b), as amended by section 321 of this
Act, is further amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (i) and
transferring such subsection to the end; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an
audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such
audits shall be conducted subject to the provisions of
paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) of section 17 of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to
conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that
has been terminated or suspended if such covert action was
terminated or suspended prior to the last audit of such
covert action conducted by the Inspector General and has not
been restarted after the date on which such audit was
completed.
``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion
of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
containing the results of such audit.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)'';
(2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by
striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)''; and
(3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)''.
SEC. 412. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR
INTERROGATIONS INVOLVING PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``prohibition on the use of private contractors for interrogations
involving persons in the custody of the central intelligence agency
``Sec. 24. (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall not expend or obligate funds for payment to any
contractor to conduct the interrogation of a detainee or
prisoner in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency.
``(b) Exception.--
``(1) In general.--The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency may request, and the Director of National Intelligence
may grant, a written waiver of the requirement under
subsection (a) if the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency determines that--
``(A) no employee of the Federal Government is--
``(i) capable of performing such interrogation; and
``(ii) available to perform such interrogation; and
``(B) such interrogation is in the national interest of the
United States and requires the use of a contractor.
``(2) Clarification of applicability of certain laws.--Any
contractor conducting an interrogation pursuant to a waiver
under paragraph (1) shall be subject to all laws on the
conduct of interrogations that would apply if an employee of
the Federal Government were conducting the interrogation.''.
SEC. 413. APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY CONTRACTING OFFICERS.
Section 8(d) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41
U.S.C. 607(d)) is amended by inserting before the sentence
beginning with ``In exercising'' the following new sentence:
``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an appeal from
a decision of a contracting officer of the Central
Intelligence Agency relative to a contract made by that
agency may be filed with whichever of the Armed Services
Board or the Civilian Board is specified by the contracting
officer as the Board to which such an appeal may be made and
the Board so specified shall have jurisdiction to decide that
appeal.''.
SEC. 414. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Establishment and Duties of Deputy Director of CIA.--
Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402
et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 104A the
following new section:
``deputy director of the central intelligence agency
``Sec. 104B. (a) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Agency.--There is a Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by the President.
``(b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall--
``(1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and
[[Page H872]]
``(2) during the absence or disability of the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, or during a vacancy in the
position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, act
for and exercise the powers of the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Executive schedule iii.--Section 5314 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking ``Deputy Directors
of Central Intelligence (2)'' and inserting ``Deputy Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
(2) Table of contents.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401
note) is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 104A the following new item:
``Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(c) Applicability.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply on the earlier of--
(1) the date of the appointment by the President of an
individual to serve as Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, except that the individual
administratively performing the duties of the Deputy Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the
enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties
until the individual appointed to the position of Deputy
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency assumes the
duties of such position; or
(2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the
duties of the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency by the individual administratively performing such
duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 415. PROTECTION AGAINST REPRISALS.
Section 17(e)(3)(B) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(3)(B)) is amended by inserting
``or providing such information'' after ``making such
complaint''.
SEC. 416. REQUIREMENT FOR VIDEO RECORDING OF INTERROGATIONS
OF PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) In General.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), as amended by section 412 of
this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``requirement for video recording of interrogations of persons in the
custody of the central intelligence agency
``Sec. 25. (a) In General.--Except as provided in
subsection (b), the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall establish guidelines to ensure that each
interrogation of a person who is in the custody of the
Central Intelligence Agency is recorded in video form and
that the video recording of such interrogation is
maintained--
``(1) for not less than 10 years from the date on which
such recording is made; and
``(2) until such time as such recording is no longer
relevant to an ongoing or anticipated legal proceeding or
investigation or required to be maintained under any other
provision of law.
``(b) Exception.--The requirement to record an
interrogation in video form under subsection (a) shall not
apply with respect to an interrogation incident to arrest
conducted by Agency personnel designated by the Director
under section 15(a) that are assigned to the headquarters of
the Central Intelligence Agency and acting in the official
capacity of such personnel.
``(c) Interrogation Defined.--In this section, the term
`interrogation' means the systematic process of attempting to
obtain information from an uncooperative detainee.''.
(b) Submission of Guidelines.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees the guidelines developed under
section 25(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,
as added by subsection (a) of this section. Such guidelines
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.
Subtitle C--Other Elements
SEC. 421. HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS.
Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (H), by inserting ``the Coast Guard,''
after ``the Marine Corps,''; and
(2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``The elements'' and
all that follows through ``the Coast Guard'' and inserting
``The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department
of Homeland Security''.
SEC. 422. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION AS AN ELEMENT OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)(H)), as amended by section 421 of this Act, is
further amended by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement
Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of
Investigation,''.
SEC. 423. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
EXECUTIVE.
(a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of
Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l),
and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i),
respectively; and
(3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2) of
this subsection, by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2)
of this section--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (f)'' and
inserting ``subsection (e)''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (f)'' and
inserting ``subsection (e)''; and
(2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and
inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and
inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.
SEC. 424. CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT OF HEADS OF CERTAIN
COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Director of National Security Agency.--The National
Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended
by inserting after the first section the following new
section:
``Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security
Agency.
``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be
the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge
such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or
otherwise by law.''.
(b) Director of National Reconnaissance Office.--The
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 106(b)(2) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is
amended--
(1) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B);
(2) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) through (I) as
subparagraphs (A) through (G), respectively; and
(3) by moving subparagraph (G), as redesignated by
paragraph (2) of this subsection, two ems to the left.
(d) Effective Date and Applicability.--The amendment made
by subsection (a) and the provisions of subsection (b) shall
apply upon the earlier of--
(1) the date of the nomination by the President of an
individual to serve in the position concerned, except that
the individual serving in such position as of the date of the
enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties
after such date of nomination and until the individual
appointed to such position, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position;
or
(2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the
duties of such position by the individual performing such
duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 425. ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FOR COMPLIANCE AND TRAINING.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402
note), as amended by section 424 of this Act, is further
amended by inserting after section 2 (as added by such
section 424) the following new section:
``Sec. 3. (a) There is an Associate Director of the
National Security Agency for Compliance and Training, who
shall be appointed by the Director of the National Security
Agency.
``(b) The Associate Director of the National Security
Agency for Compliance and Training shall ensure that--
``(1) all programs and activities of the National Security
Agency are conducted in a manner consistent with all
applicable laws, regulations, and policies; and
``(2) the training of relevant personnel is sufficient to
ensure that such programs and activities are conducted in
such a manner.''.
SEC. 426. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
(a) General Counsel.--The National Security Agency Act of
1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by section 425 of this
Act, is further amended by inserting after section 3 (as
added by such section 425), the following new section:
``Sec. 4. (a) There is a General Counsel of the National
Security Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
``(b) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency
shall serve as the chief legal officer of the National
Security Agency.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date
on which the Director of the National Security Agency is
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in
accordance with section 2 of the National Security Agency Act
of 1959, as added by section 424 of this Act.
SEC. 427. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
Section 12 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the National Security
Agency;'' after ``the Federal Emergency Management Agency,'';
and
(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the National Security
Agency,'' after ``the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration,''.
SEC. 428. CHARTER FOR THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16) of title
10, United States Code) a revised charter for the National
Reconnaissance Office (in this section referred to as the
``NRO''). The charter shall include the following:
(1) The organizational and governance structure of the NRO.
(2) NRO participation in the development and generation of
requirements and acquisition.
(3) The scope of NRO capabilities.
(4) The roles and responsibilities of the NRO and the
relationship of the NRO to other elements of the intelligence
community and the defense community.
[[Page H873]]
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF
THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Extension.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public
Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking
``September 1, 2004'' and inserting ``February 1, 2011''.
(2) Effective date.--Subject to paragraph (3), the
amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if
included in the enactment of such section 1007.
(3) Commission membership.--
(A) In general.--The membership of the National Commission
for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of
the United States Intelligence Community established under
subsection (a) of section 1002 of such Act (Public Law 107-
306; 116 Stat. 2438) (referred to in this section as the
``Commission'') shall be considered vacant and new members
shall be appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as
amended by subparagraph (B).
(B) Technical amendment.--Paragraph (1) of section 1002(b)
of such Act is amended by striking ``The Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence for Community Management.'' and
inserting ``The Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence.''.
(4) Clarification of duties.--Section 1002(i) of such Act
is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking
``including--'' and inserting ``including advanced research
and development programs and activities. Such review shall
include--''.
(b) Funding.--
(1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated by this Act for the Intelligence Community
Management Account, the Director of National Intelligence
shall make $2,000,000 available to the Commission to carry
out title X of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2437).
(2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until
expended.
SEC. 502. EXPANSION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE DUTIES OF THE
PROGRAM MANAGER FOR THE INFORMATION SHARING
ENVIRONMENT.
Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``terrorism and homeland
security information'' and inserting ``national security
information'';
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as
paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively; and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new
paragraph:
``(4) National security information.--The term `national
security information' includes homeland security information
and terrorism information.'';
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``terrorism
information'' and inserting ``national security
information''; and
(B) in paragraph (2) in the first sentence of the matter
preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``terrorism
information'' and inserting ``national security
information''; and
(3) in subsection (f)(1)--
(A) in the second sentence, by inserting ``in the Executive
Office of the President and shall serve'' after ``The
individual designated as the program manager shall serve'';
and
(B) in the third sentence, by striking ``homeland security
information, terrorism information, and weapons of mass
destruction information'' and inserting ``national security
information''.
SEC. 503. CLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH MATERIALS
IN THE POSSESSION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.
The Director of National Intelligence shall, in accordance
with procedures established by each of the congressional
intelligence committees, conduct a classification review of
materials in the possession of each of those committees
that--
(1) are not less than 25 years old; and
(2) were created, or provided to that committee, by the
executive branch.
SEC. 504. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO PROVIDE MIRANDA
WARNINGS TO CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE OF THE
UNITED STATES.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act
may be used to provide the warnings of constitutional rights
described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966), to
a person located outside of the United States who is not a
United States person and is--
(1) suspected of terrorism, associated with terrorists, or
believed to have knowledge of terrorists; or
(2) a detainee in the custody of the Armed Forces of the
United States.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY ACT OF 1949.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a
et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 5(a)(1), by striking ``authorized under
paragraphs (2) and (3)'' and all that follows through ``(50
U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and
405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section 104A of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a)''; and
(2) in section 17(d)(3)(B)--
(A) in clause (i), by striking ``advise'' and inserting
``advice''; and
(B) in clause (ii)--
(i) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director''
and inserting ``Associate Deputy Director'';
(ii) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National
Clandestine Service'';
(iii) in subclause (III), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of Intelligence'';
(iv) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Administration'' and inserting ``Director of Support''; and
(v) in subclause (V), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Science and Technology'' and inserting ``Director of Science
and Technology''.
SEC. 512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT
PROVISION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
RETIREMENT ACT.
Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)(A)) is amended to read
as follows:
``(A) Upon reaching age 65, in the case of a participant in
the system who is at the Senior Intelligence Service rank of
level 4 or above; and''.
SEC. 513. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
(a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating
to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the
following new item:
``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code is amended by striking the item relating
to the General Counsel of the Office of the National
Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item:
``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.''.
SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 101--
(A) in subsection (a), by moving paragraph (7) two ems to
the right; and
(B) by moving subsections (b) through (p) two ems to the
right;
(2) in section 103, by redesignating subsection (i) as
subsection (h);
(3) in section 109(a)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 112.;'' and
inserting ``section 112;''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking the second period;
(4) in section 301(1), by striking `` `United States' ''
and all that follows through ``and `State' '' and inserting
`` `United States', `person', `weapon of mass destruction',
and `State' '';
(5) in section 304(b), by striking ``subsection (a)(3)''
and inserting ``subsection (a)(2)''; and
(6) in section 502(a), by striking ``a annual'' and
inserting ``an annual''.
SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 105 OF THE
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004.
Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31
U.S.C. 311 note) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after
``subsection (a)),''.
SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND
TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended--
(1) in section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by
striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and
inserting ``Department of Justice'';
(2) in section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
(A) in subsection (c)(1)--
(i) by striking ``shall,'' and inserting ``shall''; and
(ii) by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional
culture'';
(B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National
Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section
112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National
Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law'';
and
(C) in subsection (f) in the matter preceding paragraph
(1), by striking ``shall,'' and inserting ``shall''; and
(3) in section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and
inserting ``Federal''; and
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and
inserting ``specific''.
SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``FOREIGN'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign'';
(B) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears; and
(C) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'';
(3) in subsection (b), by striking ``The Director'' and
inserting ``The Director of National Intelligence''; and
(4) in subsection (c)--
(A) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
[[Page H874]]
(B) by striking ``section 114a'' and inserting ``section
221''.
SEC. 518. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
OF 1947.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.)
is further amended--
(1) section 3(4)(L), by striking ``other'' the second place
it appears;
(2) in section 102A--
(A) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets
for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program'';
(B) in subsection (d)--
(i) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military
Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence
Program or any successor program'';
(ii) in paragraph (3) in the matter preceding subparagraph
(A), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' and inserting
``paragraph (1)(A)''; and
(iii) in paragraph (5)--
(I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or personnel'' in
the matter preceding clause (i); and
(II) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or agency
involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case
of the Central Intelligence Agency)'';
(C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and
inserting ``paragraph''; and
(D) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after
``Acquisition'';
(3) in section 103(b), by striking ``, the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.),'';
(4) in section 104A(g)(1) in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A), by striking ``Directorate of Operations''
and inserting ``National Clandestine Service'';
(5) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by
striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)'';
(6) in section 701(b)(1), by striking ``Directorate of
Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service'';
(7) in section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C.
432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting
``responsive''; and
(8) in the table of contents in the first section--
(A) by striking the item relating to section 1002; and
(B) by inserting after the item relating to section 1001
the following new item:
``Sec. 1002. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and
training.''.
SEC. 519. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES
CODE.
Section 528(c) of title 10, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Associate Director of CIA
for Military Affairs'' and inserting ``Associate Director of
Military Affairs, CIA''; and
(2) by striking ``Associate Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs'' and inserting
``Associate Director of Military Affairs, Central
Intelligence Agency, or any successor position''.
The Acting CHAIR. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order
except those printed in House Report 111-419. Each amendment may be
offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated
in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the
time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the
proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall
not be subject to a demand for division of the question.
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Reyes
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1
printed in House Report 111-419.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Reyes:
Page 9, line 21, strike ``$672,812,000'' and insert
``$643,252,000''.
Page 23, line 14, strike ``a grant program'' and insert
``grant programs''.
Page 23, line 15, strike ``subsection (b)'' and insert
``subsections (b) and (c)''.
Page 24, after line 10, insert the following:
``(c) Grant Program for Historically Black Colleges and
Universities.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence may
provide grants to historically black colleges and
universities to provide programs of study in educational
disciplines identified under subsection (a)(2) or described
in paragraph (2).
``(2) A grant provided under paragraph (1) may be used to
provide programs of study in the following educational
disciplines:
``(A) Foreign languages, including Middle Eastern and South
Asian dialects.
``(B) Computer science.
``(C) Analytical courses.
``(D) Cryptography.
``(E) Study abroad programs.''.
Page 24, line 11, strike ``(3) An'' and insert ``(d)
Application.--An''.
Page 24, line 15, strike ``(4) An'' and insert ``(e)
Reports.--An''.
Page 25, line 1, strike ``(c)'' and insert ``(f)''.
Page 25, line 4, strike ``(d)'' and insert ``(g)''.
Page 25, line 10, strike the quotation mark and the second
period.
Page 25, after line 10, insert the following:
``(3) Analytical courses.--The term `analytical courses'
mean programs of study involving--
``(A) analytic methodologies, including advanced
statistical, polling, econometric, mathematical, or
geospatial modeling methodologies;
``(B) analysis of counterterrorism, crime, and
counternarcotics;
``(C) economic analysis that includes analyzing and
interpreting economic trends and developments;
``(D) medical and health analysis, including the assessment
and analysis of global health issues, trends, and disease
outbreaks;
``(E) political analysis, including political, social,
cultural, and historical analysis to interpret foreign
political systems and developments; or
``(F) psychology, psychiatry, or sociology courses that
assess the psychological and social factors that influence
world events.
``(4) Computer science.--The term `computer science' means
a program of study in computer systems, computer science,
computer engineering, or hardware and software analysis,
integration, and maintenance.
``(5) Cryptography.--The term `cryptography' means a
program of study on the conversion of data into a scrambled
code that can be deciphered and sent across a public or
private network, and the applications of such conversion of
data.
``(6) Historically black college and university.--The term
`historically black college and university' means an
institution of higher education that is a part B institution,
as such term is defined in section 322 of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061).
``(7) Study abroad program.--The term `study abroad
program' means a program of study that--
``(A) takes places outside the geographical boundaries of
the United States;
``(B) focuses on areas of the world that are critical to
the national security interests of the United States and are
generally underrepresented in study abroad programs at
institutions of higher education, including Africa, Asia,
Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, Latin American, and the
Middle East; and
``(C) is a credit or noncredit program.''.
Page 30, strike lines 10 through 12.
Page 30, line 13, strike ``(C)'' and insert ``(B)''.
Page 30, line 16, strike ``(D)'' and insert ``(C)''.
Page 30, line 19, strike ``(E)'' and insert ``(D)''.
Page 31, line 1, strike ``any information'' and all that
follows through ``dissenting legal views'' and insert ``the
legal authority under which the intelligence activity is
being or was conducted''.
Page 31, line 11, strike ``any information'' and all that
follows through ``legal views'' and insert ``the legal
authority under which the covert action is being or was
conducted''.
Page 31, strike line 18 and all that follows through line 8
on page 32 and insert the following:
(2) in subsection (c)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``in writing'' after
``be reported'';
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``If the President'' and
inserting ``Subject to paragraph (5), if the President''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(5)(A) The President may only limit access to a finding
in accordance with this subsection or a notification in
accordance with subsection (d)(1) if the President submits to
the Members of Congress specified in paragraph (2) a
certification that it is essential to limit access to such
finding or such notification to meet extraordinary
circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States.
``(B) Not later than 180 days after a certification is
submitted in accordance with subparagraph (A) or this
subparagraph, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
``(i) provide access to the finding or notification that is
the subject of such certification to all members of the
congressional intelligence committees; or
``(ii) submit to the Members of Congress specified in
paragraph (2) a certification that it is essential to limit
access to such finding or such notification to meet
extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the
United States.'';
Page 32, strike lines 12 through 15 and insert the
following:
(B) in paragraph (1), as designated by subparagraph (A) of
this paragraph, by inserting ``in writing'' after
``notified''; and
Page 33, line 13, insert ``or to the limiting of access to
such finding or such notice'' after ``notice''.
Page 33, line 13, strike ``48 hours'' and insert ``seven
days''.
Page 33, line 22, strike ``on the content of'' and insert
``regarding''.
Page 34, strike lines 14 through 20.
Strike section 334 (Page 41, line 8 and all that follow
through line 25 on page 44) and insert the following new
section:
SEC. 334. REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and annually thereafter for four years, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate
a report on the proficiency in foreign languages and,
[[Page H875]]
as appropriate, in foreign dialects, of each element of the
intelligence community, including--
(1) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency and the level of
proficiency required;
(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each
element will require during the five-year period beginning on
the date of the submission of the report;
(3) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency that are filled
by--
(A) military personnel; and
(B) civilian personnel;
(4) the number of applicants for positions in such element
in the preceding fiscal year that indicated foreign language
proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the
proficiency level;
(5) the number of persons hired by such element with
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language
and proficiency level;
(6) the number of personnel of such element currently
attending foreign language training, including the provider
of such training;
(7) a description of the efforts of such element to
recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are
proficient in a foreign language;
(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic,
advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
(9) for each foreign language and, as appropriate, dialect
of a foreign language--
(A) the number of positions of such element that require
proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
(B) the number of personnel of such element that are
serving in a position that requires proficiency in the
foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of
the position;
(C) the number of personnel of such element that are
serving in a position that does not require proficiency in
the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty
of the position;
(D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each
level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
(E) whether the number of personnel at each level of
proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the
requirements of such element;
(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as
linguists for such element that are not qualified as
linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language
Roundtable;
(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists for
such element during the preceding calendar year;
(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that
discontinued serving such element during the preceding
calendar year;
(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that
is fulfilled by an ally of the United States; and
(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that
is fulfilled by contractors;
(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and
capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole;
(11) an identification of any critical gaps in foreign
language proficiency with respect to such element and
recommendations for eliminating such gaps;
(12) recommendations for eliminating required reports
relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of
National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer
relevant; and
(13) an assessment of the feasibility of employing foreign
nationals lawfully present in the United States who have
previously worked as translators or interpreters for the
Armed Forces or another department or agency of the Federal
Government in Iraq or Afghanistan to meet the critical
language needs of such element.
Page 45, beginning on line 18, strike ``one of the
congressional intelligence committees'' and insert ``a
committee of Congress with jurisdiction over such program or
activity''.
Page 46, beginning on line 8, strike ``the congressional
intelligence committees'' and insert ``each committee of
Congress with jurisdiction over the program or activity that
is the subject of the analysis, evaluation, or investigation
for which the Director restricts access to information under
such paragraph''.
Page 46, line 13, strike ``report'' and insert
``statement''.
Page 46, line 16, strike ``report'' and insert
``statement''.
Page 46, beginning on line 17, strike ``the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the
Comptroller General has notice under paragraph (3)'' and
insert ``each committee of Congress to which the Director of
National Intelligence submits a statement under paragraph (2)
any comments on the statement''.
Page 46, line 21, strike the closing quotation mark and the
final period.
Page 46, after line 21, insert the following:
``(c) Confidentiality.--(1) The Comptroller General shall
maintain the same level of confidentiality for information
made available for an analysis, evaluation, or investigation
referred to in subsection (a) as is required of the head of
the element of the intelligence community from which such
information is obtained. Officers and employees of the
Government Accountability Office are subject to the same
statutory penalties for unauthorized disclosure or use of
such information as officers or employees of the element of
the intelligence community that provided the Comptroller
General or officers and employees of the Government
Accountability Office with access to such information.
``(2) The Comptroller General shall establish procedures to
protect from unauthorized disclosure all classified and other
sensitive information furnished to the Comptroller General or
any representative of the Comptroller General for conducting
an analysis, evaluation, or investigation referred to in
subsection (a).
``(3) Before initiating an analysis, evaluation, or
investigation referred to in subsection (a), the Comptroller
General shall provide the Director of National Intelligence
and the head of each relevant element of the intelligence
community with the name of each officer and employee of the
Government Accountability Office who has obtained appropriate
security clearance and to whom, upon proper identification,
records and information of the element of the intelligence
community shall be made available in conducting such
analysis, evaluation, or investigation.''.
Page 48, line 15, strike ``Biannual'' and insert
``Biennial''.
Page 48, line 19, strike ``biannually'' and insert
``biennially''.
Page 62, line 14, strike ``NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE''
and insert ``REPORT''.
Page 62, beginning on line 18, strike ``National
Intelligence Estimate or National Intelligence Assessment''
and insert ``report''.
Page 62, strike line 20 and insert the following: ``supply
chain and global provision of services to determine whether
such supply chain and such services pose''.
Page 62, line 21, strike ``counterfeit''.
Page 62, line 22, strike ``defective'' and insert
``counterfeit, defective,''.
Page 62, line 23, insert ``or services that may be managed,
controlled, or manipulated by a foreign government or a
criminal organization'' after ``organization''.
Page 63, beginning on line 5, strike ``counterfeit''.
Page 63, line 6, strike ``defective'' and insert
``counterfeit, defective,''.
Page 63, line 8, insert ``or services that may be managed,
controlled, or manipulated by a foreign government or a
criminal organization'' after ``organization''.
Page 63, at the end of line 8 insert the following: ``Such
review shall include an examination of the threat posed by
State-controlled and State-invested enterprises and the
extent to which the actions and activities of such
enterprises may be controlled, coerced, or influenced by a
foreign government.''.
Strike section 353 (Page 67, line 20 and all that follows
through line 25 on page 68).
Page 69, beginning on line 5, strike ``Federal Bureau of
Investigation'' and insert ``Federal Bureau of Investigation,
in consultation with the Secretary of State,''.
Insert after section 354 (Page 69, after line 15) the
following new sections:
SEC. 355. REPORT ON QUESTIONING AND DETENTION OF SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Attorney General, shall submit to
Congress a report containing--
(1) a description of the strategy of the Federal Government
for balancing the intelligence collection needs of the United
States with the interest of the United States in prosecuting
terrorist suspects; and
(2) a description of the policy of the Federal Government
with respect to the questioning, detention, trial, transfer,
release, or other disposition of suspected terrorists.
SEC. 356. REPORT ON DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERTERRORISM
INFORMATION TO LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to Congress a report on the dissemination of critical
counterterrorism information from the intelligence community
to local law enforcement agencies, including recommendations
for improving the means of communication of such information
to local law enforcement agencies.
SEC. 357. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF STATE AND
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to Congress a report on the intelligence capabilities of
State and local law enforcement agencies. Such report shall
include--
(1) an assessment of the ability of State and local law
enforcement agencies to analyze and fuse intelligence
community products with locally gathered information;
(2) a description of existing procedures of the
intelligence community to share with State and local law
enforcement agencies the tactics, techniques, and procedures
for intelligence collection, data management, and analysis
learned from global counterinsurgency and counterterror
operations;
(3) a description of current intelligence analysis training
provided by elements of the intelligence community to State
and local law enforcement agencies;
(4) an assessment of the need for a formal intelligence
training center to teach State and local law enforcement
agencies methods of intelligence collection and analysis; and
(5) an assessment of the efficiently of co-locating such an
intelligence training center
[[Page H876]]
with an existing intelligence community or military
intelligence training center.
SEC. 358. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON OVER-CLASSIFICATION.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall submit to Congress a report
containing an analysis of the problem of over-classification
of intelligence and ways to address such over-classification,
including an analysis of the importance of protecting sources
and methods while providing law enforcement and the public
with as much access to information as possible.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 359. REPORT ON THREAT FROM DIRTY BOMBS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall
submit to Congress a report summarizing intelligence related
to the threat to the United States from weapons that use
radiological materials, including highly dispersible
substances such as cesium-137.
SEC. 360. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
IN ARGENTINA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 270 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report containing the following:
(1) A description of any information in the possession of
the intelligence community with respect to the following
events in the Republic of Argentina:
(A) The accession to power by the military of the Republic
of Argentina in 1976.
(B) Violations of human rights committed by officers or
agents of the Argentine military and security forces during
counterinsurgency or counterterror operations, including by
the State Intelligence Secretariat (Secretaria de
Inteligencia del Estado), Military Intelligence Detachment
141 (Destacamento de Inteligencia Militar 141 in Cordoba),
Military Intelligence Detachment 121 (Destacamento Militar
121 in Rosario), Army Intelligence Battalion 601, the Army
Reunion Center (Reunion Central del Ejercito), and the Army
First Corps in Buenos Aires.
(C) Operation Condor and Argentina's role in cross-border
counterinsurgency or counterterror operations with Brazil,
Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, or Uruguay.
(2) Information on abductions, torture, disappearances, and
executions by security forces and other forms of repression,
including the fate of Argentine children born in captivity,
that took place at detention centers, including the
following:
(A) The Argentine Navy Mechanical School (Escuela Mecanica
de la Armada).
(B) Automotores Orletti.
(C) Operaciones Tacticas 18.
(D) La Perla.
(E) Campo de Mayo.
(F) Institutos Militares.
(3) An appendix of declassified records reviewed and used
for the report submitted under this subsection.
(4) A descriptive index of information referred to in
paragraph (1) or (2) that is classified, including the
identity of each document that is classified, the reason for
continuing the classification of such document, and an
explanation of how the release of the document would damage
the national security interests of the United States.
(b) Review of Classified Documents.--Not later than two
years after the date on which the report required under
subsection (a) is submitted, the Director of National
Intelligence shall review information referred to in
paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) that is classified to
determine if any of such information should be declassified.
(c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
SEC. 361. REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY STRATEGY TO
PROTECT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NETWORKS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency shall
submit to Congress a report on the strategy of the National
Security Agency with respect to securing networks of the
Department of Defense within the intelligence community.
SEC. 362. REPORT ON CREATION OF SPACE INTELLIGENCE OFFICE.
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to Congress a report on the feasibility and advisability of
creating a national space intelligence office to manage
space-related intelligence assets and access to such assets.
SEC. 363. PLAN TO SECURE NETWORKS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress
a plan to secure the networks of the intelligence community.
Such plan shall include strategies for--
(1) securing the networks of the intelligence community
from unauthorized remote access, intrusion, or insider
tampering;
(2) recruiting, retaining, and training a highly-qualified
cybersecurity intelligence community workforce and include--
(A) an assessment of the capabilities of such workforce;
(B) an examination of issues of recruiting, retention, and
the professional development of such workforce, including the
possibility of providing retention bonuses or other forms of
compensation;
(C) an assessment of the benefits of outreach and training
with both private industry and academic institutions with
respect to such workforce; and
(D) an assessment of the impact of the establishment of the
Department of Defense Cyber Command on personnel and
authorities of the intelligence community;
(3) making the intelligence community workforce and the
public aware of cybersecurity best practices and principles;
(4) coordinating the intelligence community response to a
cybersecurity incident;
(5) collaborating with industry and academia to improve
cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, the defense
industrial base, and financial networks;
(6) addressing such other matters as the President
considers necessary to secure the cyberinfrastructure of the
intelligence community; and
(7) reviewing procurement laws and classification issues to
determine how to allow for greater information sharing on
specific cyber threats and attacks between private industry
and the intelligence community.
(b) Updates.--Not later than 90 days after the date on
which the plan referred to in subsection (a) is submitted to
Congress, and every 90 days thereafter until the President
submits the certification referred to in subsection (c), the
President shall report to Congress on the status of the
implementation of such plan and the progress towards the
objectives of such plan.
(c) Certification.--The President may submit to Congress a
certification that the objectives of the plan referred to in
subsection (a) have been achieved.
SEC. 364. REPORT ON MISSILE ARSENAL OF IRAN.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report
assessing the threat posed by the missile arsenal of Iran to
allies and interests of the United States in the Persian
Gulf.
SEC. 365. STUDY ON BEST PRACTICES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN
COMBATING VIOLENT DOMESTIC EXTREMISM.
(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
conduct a study on the best practices of foreign governments
(including the intelligence services of such governments) to
combat violent domestic extremism.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report containing the results of the study conducted under
subsection (a).
SEC. 366. REPORT ON INFORMATION SHARING PRACTICES OF JOINT
TERRORISM TASK FORCE.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall submit to Congress a report on the best practices or
impediments to information sharing in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation-New York Police Department Joint Terrorism Task
Force, including ways in which the combining of Federal,
State, and local law enforcement resources can result in the
effective utilization of such resources.
SEC. 367. REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY TO ENABLE INFORMATION SHARING.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to Congress and the President a report describing the
improvements to information technology needed to enable
elements of the Federal Government that are not part of the
intelligence community to better share information with
elements of the intelligence community.
SEC. 368. REPORT ON THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY OF THE UNITED
STATES.
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to Congress a report in unclassified form describing the
future threats to describing the future threats to the
national security of the United States from continued and
increased dependence of the United States on oil sources from
foreign nations.
Page 70, strike lines 1 through 7.
Page 74, line 16, strike ``includes'' and insert ``means''.
Page 75, line 24, strike the closing quotation mark and the
final period.
Page 75, after line 24, insert the following:
``(D) Terrorist screening purpose.--The term `terrorist
screening purpose' means--
``(i) the collection, analysis, dissemination, and use of
terrorist identity information to determine threats to the
national security of the United States from a terrorist or
terrorism; and
``(ii) the use of such information for risk assessment,
inspection, and credentialing.''.
Page 86, line 11, strike ``the congressional defense
committees'' and insert ``Congress''.
[[Page H877]]
Page 87, line 17, strike ``the''.
At the end of subtitle E of title III (Page 88, after line
18), add the following new section:
SEC. 369. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MONITORING OF NORTHERN BORDER
OF THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Finding.--Congress finds that suspected terrorists have
attempted to enter the United States through the
international land and maritime border of the United States
and Canada.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the intelligence community should devote sufficient
resources, including technological and human resources, to
identifying and thwarting potential threats at the
international land and maritime border of the United States
and Canada; and
(2) the intelligence community should work closely with the
Government of Canada to identify and apprehend suspected
terrorists before such terrorists enter the United States.
Page 96, line 14, insert after the period the following:
``Nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit a personnel action
with respect to the Inspector General otherwise authorized by
law, other than transfer or removal.''.
At the end of subtitle A of title IV (Page 116, after line
6), add the following new section:
SEC. 407. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR
REVIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS
REGULATIONS AND EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
REGULATIONS.
The Director of National Intelligence may provide support
for any review conducted by a department or agency of the
Federal Government of the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations or Export Administration Regulations, including a
review of technologies and goods on the United States
Munitions List and Commerce Control List that may warrant
controls that are different or additional to the controls
such technologies and goods are subject to at the time of
such review.
Strike section 411 (Page 116, line 9 and all that follows
through line 2 on page 118) and insert the following new
section:
SEC. 411. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR
GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(4)--
(A) by striking ``(4) If'' and inserting ``(4)(A) If''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) The Director may waive the requirement to submit the
statement required under subparagraph (A) within seven days
of prohibiting an audit, inspection, or investigation under
paragraph (3) if such audit, inspection, or investigation is
related to a covert action program. If the Director waives
such requirement in accordance with this subparagraph, the
Director shall submit the statement required under
subparagraph (A) as soon as practicable, along with an
explanation of the reasons for delaying the submission of
such statement.'';
(2) in subsection (d)(1)--
(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) and (F) as
subsections (F) and (G), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new
subparagraph:
``(E) a list of the covert actions for which the Inspector
General has not completed an audit within the preceding
three-year period;''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(h) Covert Action Defined.--In this section, the term
`covert action' has the meaning given the term in section
503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
413b(e)).''.
Strike section 426 (Page 128, line 21 and all that follows
through line 15 on page 129).
Strike section 427 (Page 129, lines 16 through 25).
Strike section 502 (Page 133, line 1 and all that follow
through line 10 on page 134).
At the end of subtitle A of title V (Page 135, after line
12), add the following new section:
SEC. 505. CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE.
(a) Establishment.--There is established a cybersecurity
task force (in this section referred to as the ``Task
Force'').
(b) Membership.--
(1) In general.--The Task Force shall consist of the
following members:
(A) One member appointed by the Attorney General.
(B) One member appointed by the Director of the National
Security Agency.
(C) One member appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence.
(D) One member appointed by the White House Cybersecurity
Coordinator.
(E) One member appointed by the head of any other agency or
department that is designated by the Attorney General to
appoint a member to the Task Force.
(2) Chair.--The member of the Task Force appointed pursuant
to paragraph (1)(A) shall serve as the Chair of the Task
Force.
(c) Study.--The Task Force shall conduct a study of
existing tools and provisions of law used by the intelligence
community and law enforcement agencies to protect the
cybersecurity of the United States.
(d) Report.--
(1) Initial.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit to
Congress a report containing guidelines or legislative
recommendations to improve the capabilities of the
intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to
protect the cybersecurity of the United States. Such report
shall include guidelines or legislative recommendations on--
(A) improving the ability of the intelligence community to
detect hostile actions and attribute attacks to specific
parties;
(B) the need for data retention requirements to assist the
intelligence community and law enforcement agencies;
(C) improving the ability of the intelligence community to
anticipate nontraditional targets of foreign intelligence
services; and
(D) the adequacy of existing criminal statutes to
successfully deter cyber attacks, including statutes
criminalizing the facilitation of criminal acts, the scope of
laws for which a cyber crime constitutes a predicate offense,
trespassing statutes, data breach notification requirements,
and victim restitution statutes.
(2) Subsequent.--Not later than one year after the date on
which the initial report is submitted under paragraph (1),
and annually thereafter for two years, the Task Force shall
submit to Congress an update of the report required under
paragraph (1).
(e) Termination.--The Task Force shall terminate on the
date that is 60 days after the date on which the last update
of a report required under subsection (d)(2) is submitted.
SEC. 506. CRUEL, INHUMAN, AND DEGRADING TREATMENT IN
INTERROGATIONS PROHIBITED.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Cruel,
Inhuman, and Degrading Interrogations Prohibition Act of
2010''.
(b) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States is a world power and an exemplar of
the merits of due process and the rule of law.
(2) The use of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment harms our servicemen and women because it removes
their assurance that they are operating under a legally
acceptable standard, brings discredit upon the US and its
forces, and may place US and allied personnel in enemy hands
at a greater risk of abuse by their captors.
(3) The use of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment gives propaganda and recruitment tools to those who
wish to do harm to the people of the United States.
(4) Torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment do
not produce consistently reliable information or
intelligence, and are not acceptable practices because their
use runs counter to our identity and values as a nation.
(5) The moral standards that reflect the values of the
United States governing appropriate tactics for
interrogations do not change according to the dangers that we
face as a nation.
(6) Every effort must be made to ensure that the United
States is a nation governed by the rule of law in every
circumstance.
(7) Executive Order 13491 requires those interrogating
persons detained as a result of armed conflicts to follow the
standards set out in Army Field Manual FM 2-22.3.
(8) The Congress should act in affirmation of its
principles and the Executive Order 13491 by enacting
standards for interrogations and providing criminal liability
for those who do not adhere to the enacted standards.
(9) The courageous men and women who serve honorably as
intelligence personnel and as members of our nation's Armed
Forces deserve the full support of the United States
Congress. The Congress shows true support, in part, by
providing clear legislation relating to standards for
interrogation techniques.
(c) Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment Prohibited.--
Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after chapter 26 the following:
``CHAPTER 26A--CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
``531. Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
``532. Definitions.
``533. Application.
``534. Exclusive remedies.
``Sec. 531. Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
``Any officer or employee of the intelligence community
who, in the course of or in anticipation of a covered
interrogation, knowingly commits, attempts to commit, or
conspires to commit an act of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment--
``(1) if death results from that act to the individual
under interrogation, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life;
``(2) if that act involves an act of medical malfeasance
(as defined in section 1371), shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both; and
``(3) in any other case, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned for not more than 15 years, or both.
``Sec. 532. Definitions
``In this chapter:
``(1) The term `act of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment' means the cruel, unusual, and inhuman treatment or
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution
[[Page H878]]
of the United States, as defined in the United States
Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New
York, December 10, 1984, and includes but is not limited to
the following:
``(A) Any of the following acts, knowingly committed
against an individual:
``(i) Forcing the individual to be naked, perform sexual
acts, or pose in a sexual manner.
``(ii) Beatings, electric shock, burns, or other forms of
inflicting physical pain.
``(iii) Waterboarding.
``(iv) Using military working dogs.
``(v) Inducing hypothermia or heat injury.
``(vi) Depriving the individual of necessary food, water,
sleep, or medical care.
``(vii) Conducting mock executions of the individual.
``(B) Any of the following acts, when committed with the
intent to cause mental or physical harm to an individual:
``(i) Using force or the threat of force to compel an
individual to maintain a stress position.
``(ii) Exploiting phobias of the individual.
``(iii) Using force or the threat of force to coerce an
individual to desecrate the individual's religious articles,
or to blaspheme his or her religious beliefs, or to otherwise
participate in acts intended to violate the individual's
religious beliefs.
``(iv) Making threats against any individual that, if
carried out, would result in death or serious bodily injury
(as defined in section 1365(4)) to that individual.
``(v) Exposure to excessive cold, heat, or cramped
confinement.
``(vi) Sensory deprivation or overload, including the
following:
``(I) Prolonged isolation.
``(II) Placing hoods or sacks over the head of the
individual.
``(III) Applying duct tape over the eyes of the individual.
``(C) Any act that causes pain or suffering to an
individual equivalent to the acts described in subparagraph
(B) or (C).
``(2) The term `covered interrogation' means an
interrogation, including an interrogation conducted outside
the United States, conducted--
``(A) in the course of the official duties of an officer or
employee of the Federal government; and
``(B) under color of Federal law or authority of Federal
law.
``(3) The term `intelligence community' has the meaning
given such term under section 3(4) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
``(4) The term `interrogation' means the questioning of an
individual for the purpose of gathering information for
intelligence purposes.
``(5) The term `US national' means any national of the
United States as defined in section 101 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.
``(6) The term `United States' means the several States of
the United States, the District of Columbia, and the
commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United
States.
``(7) The term `waterboarding' includes any act in which an
individual is immobilized on the individual's back with the
individual's head inclined downwards, while water is poured
over the individual's face and breathing passages.
``Sec. 533. Application
``Section 531 applies to any alleged offender who is--
``(1) a US national; or
``(2) any officer, employee, or contractor (including a
subcontractor at any tier and any employee of that contractor
or subcontractor) of the Federal Government--
``(A) who is not a US national; and
``(B) while acting in that capacity.
``Sec. 534. Exclusive remedies
``Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as precluding
the application of State or local laws on the same subject,
nor shall anything in this chapter be construed as creating
any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any
party in any civil proceeding.''.
(d) Medical Malfeasance.--Part I of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 65 the following:
``CHAPTER 66--MEDICAL MALFEASANCE
``1371. Medical malfeasance.
``1372. Definitions.
``Sec. 1371. Medical malfeasance
``Any medical professional who, in the course of or in
anticipation of a covered interrogation (as defined in
section 532(2)), knowingly commits, attempts to commit, or
conspires to commit an act of medical malfeasance with the
intent to enable an act of cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both.
``Sec. 1372. Definitions
``In this chapter:
``(1) The term `medical professional' means any individual
who--
``(A) has received professional training, education, or
knowledge in a health-related field (including psychology)
and who provides services in that field; and
``(B) is a contractor (including a subcontractor at any
tier and any employee of that contractor or subcontractor),
officer, or employee of the intelligence community (as
defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4))).
``(2) The term `covered interrogee' means an individual who
is interrogated in a covered interrogation (as defined in
section 532(2) of this title).
``(3) The term `act of medical malfeasance'--
``(A) means the use by a medical professional of his or her
training, education, or knowledge in a health-related field
to cause a significant adverse effect on the physical or
mental health of a covered interrogee; and
``(B) includes but is not limited to any of the following
contraventions of the principles of medical ethics with
respect to a covered interrogee:
``(i) To be involved in any professional relationship with
a covered interrogee, the purpose of which is not solely to
evaluate, protect, or improve the physical and mental health
of that covered interrogee.
``(ii) To fail to protect the physical or mental health of
a covered interrogee in the same way as a medical
professional would protect the physical or mental health of
any prisoner of war pursuant to Article 15 of the Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at
Geneva, August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316).
``(iii) To fail to treat any disease or condition of the
covered interrogee in the same way as a medical professional
would treat a disease or condition of any prisoner of war
pursuant to Article 15 of the Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949
(6 UST 3316).
``(iv) To certify, or to participate in the certification
of, the fitness of a covered interrogee for any form of
treatment or punishment that may have a significant adverse
effect on the physical or mental health of the covered
interrogee.
``(v) To participate in any way in the infliction of any
treatment or punishment referred to in clause (iv).
``(vi) To participate in any procedure for restraining a
covered interrogee unless such a procedure is determined, in
accordance with purely medical criteria, as being necessary
for the protection of the physical or mental health of the
covered interrogee or of others, and presents no additional
hazard to the covered interrogee's physical or mental
health.''.
(e) Clerical Amendments.--The table of chapters at the
beginning of part I of title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by inserting, after the item relating to ``Criminal
street gangs'' the following:
``26A. Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment................531'';....
and
(2) by inserting, after the item relating to ``Malicious
mischief'' the following:
``66. Medical malfeasance...................................1371''.....
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and a Member opposed each will control 10
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. REYES. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chair, the manager's amendment includes a number of revisions
to H.R. 2701 along with a number of technical changes. I would like to
highlight several of these key provisions.
The manager's amendment makes significant changes to the underlying
bill's reforms to the process for notifying Congress on sensitive
covert actions.
As my colleagues know, the National Security Act requires that the
President inform Congress through the intelligence committees about all
significant intelligence activities including covert actions.
In very limited circumstances, it allows the President to limit
briefings on certain highly sensitive covert actions to the Gang of
Eight--the leadership of the Intelligence Committees and the leadership
of both Houses.
Over the past several months, we have carefully considered the
administration's objections to the reforms that the committee included
in the underlying bill. The manager's amendment is a product of that
work.
The bill, as amended, would require the President to maintain a
record of all Gang of Eight briefings. It also requires that the full
committee be notified every time that a Gang of Eight briefing is
conducted and be provided with general information regarding that
briefing.
In the event the President decides that a briefing must be limited to
the Gang of Eight, the manager's amendment also requires that he submit
a certification stating that extraordinary circumstances require the
briefing to be limited.
In the case of a limited briefing, the DNI will have to reissue that
certification every 180 days or open the briefing to all members of the
committee.
[[Page H879]]
This reform is a substantial improvement over the language we
included in previous authorization bills and which some of my
colleagues still support. This earlier language would have actually
expanded the President's authority to conduct restricted briefings,
going so far as to include all intelligence activities, not just covert
actions. It would also result in more restricted briefings and not
fewer.
I am interested in passing laws that reform the notification process,
not, as some would say, in sending political messages.
The manager's amendment also includes a number of provisions proposed
by my colleagues. These include an amendment by Mr. Bishop, which would
require the DNI and the Attorney General to provide Congress with a
strategy on balancing intelligence collection needs with the interests
of the United States in prosecuting terrorist suspects.
The questioning and prosecution of terrorist suspects has been the
subject of some controversy in recent weeks, and I believe that
Congress could benefit from understanding how the administration plans
to handle such cases in the future.
A second provision included in the manager's amendment was proposed
by Mr. Marshall of Georgia. It requires the DNI to study the best
practices of other foreign governments to combat violent domestic
extremism.
A number of our allies, including the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands, have established programs to stop individuals from turning
to terrorism. This is a growing problem here in the United States, and
we could benefit from learning how our friends and allies have dealt
with this problem.
Madam Chair, I urge the passage of the manager's amendment.
At this point, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I claim time in opposition.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 10
minutes.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Since the other side doesn't want to talk about this amendment, I
find myself having to come back and, once again, bring up the McDermott
amendment. I would just appreciate, since there have been no hearings
on this and it has slipped into this in the dead of night, just some
answers to questions that maybe someone on the majority side can
answer.
Remember, we are in a community now where the people at the front
lines realize, when they have been asked by Congress and the President
to do something, that, 3 or 4 years later, they may be prosecuted for
those very activities by following the requests of this Congress.
We are talking about enhanced interrogation techniques. The record
indicates that even people as high as the Speaker of this House knew
about it. Yet this House is supporting those efforts to perhaps go back
and prosecute this. Now we open up a whole new set of legal risk for
our people in the intelligence community. I wish this thing just said,
``Follow the rules,'' but it doesn't. It's 11 pages of legalese,
creating all types of new and ambiguous rules for our people in the
intelligence community.
Would someone please answer the question: Why did we never have any
hearings on this? Why no discussion? Why no debate? Why does this
amendment define a criminal offense that only intelligence community
personnel would be guilty of? This only applies to intelligence
community personnel. Answer the question.
The amendment would make it a crime for depriving the individual of
necessary food, water, sleep, or medical care. How does the bill define
``necessary''? How will we explain that to the people in the
intelligence community?
The amendment would make it a crime to require someone to participate
in acts intended to violate the individual's religious beliefs. Is
there any objective standard to define that term or is it a subjective
standard? Is there any requirement of reasonableness?
The amendment would make it a crime to exploit phobias of the
individual. Phobias? Could you explain why this would be a criminal
offense for a member of the intelligence community but not a criminal
offense for a prosecutor who threatens a detainee with increased jail
time if he does not cooperate?
These are just some simple questions--questions that I would think
people in the intelligence community would ask the next time someone
from this body comes and visits with them and tells them how much we
support them and how great of a job we think they're doing. I would
think they would hold this amendment up and say, Sir, Madam, did you
vote for this? Did you understand what it meant when you voted for it?
Could you explain it to me? Somebody please answer these questions.
{time} 1445
We sure didn't have the opportunity to ask this in committee, to get
any briefings on this, to have any hearings, for someone to explain
this to us. But, no, if the other side has its way, soon this will be
law.
Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Rhode Island, and a valued member of our committee, Mr. Langevin.
(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding and for his
leadership on the Intelligence Committee.
Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2701.
This bill before us today funds critical intelligence activities that
are vital to our national security. Of particular interest to me, it
provides the resources for the foundational capabilities of a
comprehensive cybersecurity strategy.
As the recent cyberattacks against Google and U.S. networks have
demonstrated, our information infrastructure is far more vulnerable
than many realize. It is absolutely imperative that the United States
strengthen its cyberdefenses to ensure government and commercial
functions are protected and to improve our ability to attribute attacks
and hold aggressors accountable. The intelligence community has begun
this work, and the President has committed to developing a broad
strategy to secure U.S. information networks. I applaud those efforts.
In order to further foster cyberreadiness of our intelligence
agencies, I offered an amendment requiring the administration to submit
to Congress a plan for securing intelligence networks and determining
whether we have the workforce we need to secure this vital part of
cyberspace as well as the ability to recruit and retain the best and
brightest in this field. I'm truly grateful this provision has been
included in the manager's amendment that we're debating today.
Another issue of great importance is congressional oversight of our
intelligence community. I'm pleased that this bill modifies the Gang of
Eight notification process currently used to brief Congress on
intelligence activities. During the last administration, we saw the
danger of giving the executive branch too much leeway to engage in
activities outside of congressional review. Reforming the mechanism
governing congressional notification will restore Congress's ability to
conduct oversight on our intelligence activities.
So with that I just want to thank Chairman Reyes for his leadership
in crafting this bill as well as his general leadership of the
Intelligence Committee itself and particularly the attention he's paid
to the issue of cybersecurity. I support the bill and I urge my
colleagues to do the same.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague from
Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, just to further again tell you
how dangerous the amendment is on making it a criminal act for CIA
officers to try to conduct interrogations, again I just want to read--
this goes after specifically any intelligence officer or employee of
the intelligence community. So saying we're just restating law simply
isn't true. And then it goes on to say ``interrogation knowingly
commits, attempts to commit, or conspires to commit an act of cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment.'' ``Degrading,'' of course, is
undefined.
But think of this: It goes on to explain at a further portion in
their language ``if you seek to blaspheme his or
[[Page H880]]
her religious beliefs.'' Now, we know that al Qaeda through their
training always says when you're caught by the United States, allege
abuse. It shuts the system down. Guess what we just did. Does that mean
a Jewish FBI official is no longer able to go in and conduct an
interview? I don't know. Does it mean that if an uncovered woman goes
in to conduct an interview, we've blasphemed their beliefs and their
religion? I don't know. But we've certainly made it easier to make the
allegation, haven't we? We have made it almost impossible for them to
do what we have to have them do, and that's extract information that's
going to save lives. I mean you could go on to any sector of any
religion that has become radicalized and understand it's impossible to
meet that standard. Impossible. We are hugely restricting and
handcuffing our intelligence community from doing what they need to do,
and that's to get information, without torture, that keeps Americans
safe and alive.
And, again, al Qaeda, Madam Chair, uses the technique, and we know
this through a whole series of sources, to allege abuse. They use it in
their media campaign, and they know it makes us chase our tail for
weeks on end. This only enhances, this only strengthens their cause and
al Qaeda's operational tactic to slow us down in the obtaining of that
information.
I can't tell you how serious this amendment is with no debate and no
discussion. It's dangerous. I urge rejection on this alone.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, it is now my privilege to yield 1 minute to
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Richardson), who is a member of
the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging Threats.
Ms. RICHARDSON. Madam Chair, I rise to engage the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee for purposes of a colloquy.
Mr. REYES. I am happy to oblige.
Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Homeland Security
Committee and subcommittee Chair, I'm concerned that the members of the
Homeland Security Committee have not consistently and were not
adequately briefed by the administration on the events surrounding the
failed Christmas Day terrorist attack. The Homeland Security Committee
has an important role in congressional oversight over agencies within
its jurisdiction.
Mr. Chairman, do you agree with me and Chairman Thompson that the
Homeland Security Committee should be briefed in a timely manner on
national security matters that play a central role in homeland
security?
Mr. REYES. I believe that the Homeland Security Committees have an
important role to play in congressional oversight of national security
matters and that the committee should be briefed on national security
matters that fall within its jurisdiction.
Ms. RICHARDSON. I thank the chairman for that response.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to my colleague from
Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chair, a few moments ago, a Member stated that
the McDermott language only restates what's in current law. I would be
very interested for any Member who can come to the floor and tell me
where in current law it says any officer or employee of the
intelligence community who forces an individual to be naked goes to
jail for 15 years. Sometimes there's a good reason to ask someone to
take their clothes off--to make sure they don't have bombs strapped
around their waist. And yet an intelligence officer who does that under
the McDermott language is liable for 15 years in jail.
The McDermott language says an officer or employee in the
intelligence community who deprives an individual of necessary sleep
goes to jail for 15 years.
Now, I cannot believe the many good Members on both sides of the
aisle who are concerned about prosecuting terrorists, about keeping the
country safe, have thought through the implications of this language.
And to have it included in a manager's amendment along with 20 other
amendments is just amazing to me.
I strongly encourage every Member of the House to read this language
and be careful before you vote on it.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I yield myself 2 minutes.
The manager's amendment includes language originally proposed by Mr.
McDermott that reiterates existing law on torture and provides
statutory criminal penalties for individuals who knowingly commit an
act of cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. Torture is a
reprehensible and counterproductive practice. The U.S., as we all know,
has no business engaging in that. The language in the manager's
amendment simply reasserts existing law.
Executive Order 13491 prohibits interrogators from engaging in any of
the activities highlighted in the manager's amendment language. This
Executive Order limits interrogations to the interrogation techniques
that are authorized by the Army Field Manual. It also spells out the
terms of Common Article 3 and relevant provisions of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment as the minimum standard for the United States to follow.
The language in the manager's amendment restates existing criminal
law prohibitions like those in the Detainee Treatment Act and clearly
establishes that the United States will adhere to the rule of law. It
provides a specific criminal penalty for those who knowingly cause the
death of a detainee. It is already a crime for an interrogator to
knowingly murder a detainee. This provision merely adds a concrete
statutory penalty to that conduct.
This language does not, does not, give terrorists greater rights than
ordinary criminals.
We cannot afford another Abu Ghraib, and the language in the
manager's amendment simply reasserts these important provisions already
codified in law, plain and simple.
Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself 1 minute.
I wish it were plain and simple. It's 11 pages, 11 pages dropped in
in the middle of the night. No debate, no discussion, just inserted.
If it's already a crime, why are you putting it in here?
We haven't answered all the questions that we asked before. I notice
that the sponsor of the amendment, who was here for an extended period
of time, I'm not sure if he wanted to speak on the amendment or not but
obviously wasn't given the opportunity to speak on the amendment if he
wanted to. It's too bad because I think there's legitimate need for
discussion and debate because I don't think it's at all clear that this
is just a restatement of current law.
Answer the questions. The amendment would make it a crime to exploit
phobias of the individual. Why is this a criminal offense for a member
of the intelligence community but for no one else, not a criminal
offense for a prosecutor? Why didn't we ever talk about this in
committee? Why didn't we ever debate it?
Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I now yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Barrow).
Mr. BARROW. I thank the Chair for yielding.
I rise to commend Chairman Reyes for including in the manager's
amendment my amendment to develop a competitive grant program that will
encourage the U.S. intelligence community to partner with Historically
Black Colleges and Universities to recruit, train, and retain an
ethnically and culturally diverse intelligence workforce.
We face a diverse and growing array of threats around the globe. As
the means used by our enemies become more advanced, so must our
defenses. Cultural, language, and educational barriers affect the
quality of intelligence we can gather, and it's critical that our
intelligence community have the human assets to overcome these
barriers.
The area of Georgia that I represent is home to several HBCUs with
specific expertise in languages and computer sciences. Engaging these
centers of academic excellence, as this amendment does, will produce
more sophisticated intelligence officers, who will in turn make our
country more secure.
I want to thank Chairman Reyes for his work on this important
legislation,
[[Page H881]]
and I urge my colleagues to support passage of this bill.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my colleague
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, it's not that you're giving
terrorists better rights than Americans. It's the fact that you're
extending to foreign terrorists, foreign nationals, foreign-trained
individuals coming here to commit acts of violence and kill civilians
the same rights as Americans. That's wrong. They are enemy combatants.
You say, well, we can't have Abu Ghraib. You're right; we can't.
Torture is illegal. It was illegal then, and guess what? It was
investigated and they have been prosecuted, rightly so. They abused
people. Wrong. They go to jail. That's what happens in this system.
What you're doing now is interjecting mass confusion into the people
who are going to try to conduct debriefings all over the world, and
they're going to go to dangerous places, and guess what? You've engaged
one of the worst parts of the al Qaeda playbook that says, remember,
when Americans are shooting at themselves and chasing their tail, they
are not shooting at us. Allege abuse. You've just put 11 confusing
pages right into the hands of our enemy to say, make it really hard on
the folks who are risking their lives to save Americans so that we can
continue to do what we do, and that's plan, train, recruit, and we will
send people to America to kill American civilians.
This is a dangerous, dangerous, dangerous step that you take. No
debate. No discussion. Lots of confusion. Don't do this to the men and
women who risk their lives every day to protect the United States of
America.
{time} 1500
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. REYES. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I rise to inform my colleagues on the other side that the men and
women protecting this country are clear about their duties. They are
focused on keeping us safe. They are not concerned about the political
spin here. They are not concerned about the rhetoric that they hear.
But they do appreciate actions more than rhetoric.
I know because I have been around the world visiting them. I have
been to talk to various groups in the intelligence community. They know
that we appreciate the work that they do each and every day to keep us
safe. And they are not going to be fooled, like the American people are
not going to be fooled, by the rhetoric that comes up, the spin that
they try to put on the manager's amendment, and in particular the
reiteration of something that is fundamentally American, and that is we
have a Constitution. We have rules that we all have to live by. We
understand the law. And we have to have respect for that law. It does
not undermine any of that.
It is a good manager's amendment. I urge the adoption of the
manager's amendment.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield myself the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 1\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you.
Madam Chair, my colleague on the other side of the aisle is exactly
right. The people in the intelligence community are watching exactly
what we are doing. And actions do speak louder than words. The actions
that they have seen, their colleagues were asked by this Congress,
including, the record shows, the leadership of this House and the
former administration, to do things on their behalf to keep America
safe, and they see their colleagues now potentially being prosecuted
because the rules changed under this administration.
As they see the rules changed for them and perhaps their colleagues
being prosecuted, they see a global justice initiative coming out of
the FBI where we are reading Miranda rights to our enemies on the
battlefield in Afghanistan. They see the actions and they see the
actions are very, very different.
They see that we are moving KSM from Gitmo to trial in New York City.
Thankfully, the people in New York City are saying no way, we are not
doing it. And at the same time that KSM is being promised a trial in
civilian courts in the United States, they are seeing 11 pages of new
vulnerabilities being placed on them after no hearings and no debate.
Yes, our men and women in the field are seeing a real difference.
They are seeing a real difference in actions by this Congress and by
this administration. They see that they have become kind of a target of
this administration, that this is now not about keeping America safe,
it is about putting them into a legal framework, an ugly legal net.
Madam Chair, I rise in strong opposition to this bloated Manager's
Amendment. Its flaws powerfully demonstrate how the Intelligence
Committee is failing to do its work and has in fact become
counterproductive to the work of the intelligence community.
This amendment is everything that is wrong with intelligence policy
in 2010. It is politicized, it fails to recognize or act on the serious
threats that we continue to face as a nation, and it puts off the tough
decisions indefinitely. Where it does take a substantive action,
instead of taking meaningful steps to fix the problem it blames the men
and women of the intelligence community for failing to follow a
politically correct policy, even though that policy was ratified by
Members of Congress at the highest levels. I think we have heard this
story before.
The Managers Amendment contains the text of 22 Democratic amendments,
and no Republican amendments. The Committee minority was not consulted
on a single one of these amendments--in fact, one of them continues to
reverse a bipartisan agreement on notification reform from last year.
Instead of taking meaningful steps to address critical national
security problems such as the threat posed by bringing Guantanamo
detainees to the United States, the flaws revealed in our intelligence
sharing by the Fort Hood and Christmas attacks, and the issues posed by
American citizens who join terrorist groups abroad, it would require 16
new reports, to bring the total for the bill to at least 57 new
reports. And instead of supporting the men and women of our
intelligence community, it would create a new criminal offense that not
only would duplicate an existing law--it would apply only to our
intelligence personnel. How's that for gratitude?
Instead of trying to provide proper procedures are in place to govern
the conduct of covert action activities that could impact American
citizens, the Majority believes it is more important to order yet
another duplicative report on foreign language proficiency when the
Committee is already briefed regularly and repeatedly on the efforts
that are ongoing in this area.
Instead of trying to fix the intelligence sharing problems that were
laid bare at the Fort Hood shooting and shown to be critical during the
Christmas bombing attack, the Majority has instead chosen to put its
head in the sand and order up a report on events in Argentina between
the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s.
Instead of resolving the serious problems in coordinating the
interrogation of the high-value detainees that became apparent when
Miranda rights were read to a foreign radical jihadist, the Majority
has chosen to require the intelligence community to write up not one,
but two new reports and a ``Task Force'' on cybersecurity even though
the Committee is in the middle of a series of comprehensive briefings
and hearings on the subject and has conducted repeated oversight.
Madam Chair, I can't think of a single terrorist plot that has ever
been disrupted by a report to Congress.
In addition to these more fundamental issues, I need to note for the
record some specific serious problems with this amendment.
First, the amendment does even further damage to the bipartisan
agreement that had been reached on reform of congressional
notification. Instead of providing a mechanism that respects the
separation of powers and the various equities of the President and the
Congress, this amendment has ceded the decision of which Members of
Congress will be briefed on sensitive covert actions entirely to the
President, apparently to avoid the White House's veto threat on the
bill. That is ironic for a majority who has claimed so long and so
loud--despite clear records and the recollection of others to the
contrary--that it was never briefed on intelligence policies that they
explicitly helped to ratify on a bipartisan basis.
Second, the amendment does even further damage to years of carefully
developed practice and procedure for how the congressional intelligence
committees conduct oversight by attempting to cede its responsibility
to the GAO. The original bill was flawed because it would have provided
the GAO with virtually unfettered authority to insert itself into
intelligence community matters without applying
[[Page H882]]
the same rules that govern the congressional intelligence committees or
limiting the dissemination of any work product to protect sources and
methods.
It was so bad that even the Obama administration objected that the
bill ``would fundamentally shift the longstanding relationship and
information flow between the IC and intelligence committee members and
staff.'' This Managers Amendment makes these problems even worse by
allowing the Comptroller General to unilaterally develop procedures for
handling of highly sensitive material with no requirement that it
follow House or Committee rules, and in fact would allow committees
other than the intelligence committees to request GAO review of the
intelligence community.
This is contrary to the Rules of the House and the recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission. How many times do we have to learn the simple
lesson that intelligence oversight is most effective when it is
conducted by the intelligence committees--at least when those
committees do more than just require new reports.
Third, buried deep within the 22 amendments contained in this
Managers Amendment is an extraordinary provision that would create a
new criminal offense that would only apply to the men and women of the
intelligence community. Title 18 of the U.S. Code, section 2340A,
already gives effect to the Convention Against Torture and makes
torture a criminal offense in the United States. Torture is already
against the law.
Apparently, that's not enough for the Majority--it has to have a
special offense that would apply only to the men and women of the
Intelligence Community--just as Attorney General Holder has appointed a
special prosecutor to investigate them. There is no legal reason to do
this--it apparently exists only to make a political statement. The
intelligence operatives on the front lines deserve our thanks and our
support for doing hard things in hard places, like the men and women
who made the ultimate sacrifice this year in Khost, Afghanistan. They
do not deserve to be singled out for special criminal offenses. I
believe that this is wrong.
Madam Chair, I strongly oppose this amendment.
Mr. PATRICK J. MURPHY of Pennsylvania. Madam Chair, I'd like to
extend my sincere thanks to Chairman Reyes for accepting this amendment
and taking an important step toward strengthening our Nation's cyber
infrastructure against attack. Madam Chair, the protection of our
country's cyber infrastructure is one of today's most pressing--and
challenging--national security issues. Computers and Internet device
technology have become pervasive in every type of crime and federal
agencies are experiencing an increase in cyber-intrusions into our most
secure and sensitive government computer networks. This growing threat
is extraordinarily difficult to address. The technology used to
perpetrate these crimes evolves constantly and rapidly, and it can be
exceedingly difficult to track down the perpetrators. It is our duty to
ensure that our Intelligence Community and our Nation's law enforcement
agencies have every tool necessary in their arsenal to combat cyber
criminals and cyber terrorists who seek to access or steal protected
information.
To be successful in preventing security breaches, Madam Chair, the
agencies tasked with protecting the country from cyber attacks must
constantly revise and improve their primary functions of data
collection, analysis, and dissemination to keep pace with expanding
threats. Experts in the field have pointed to several areas of the law
which may need to be reviewed and updated to ensure their effectiveness
and to best protect American individuals, businesses, and our national
security.
Our proposal would establish the Cybercrime Task Force to analyze the
current tools available to the Intelligence Community and law
enforcement and provide legislative recommendations on ways to
strengthen those resources, reduce our national exposure, and prevent
and deter cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage, and
cybercrimes.
The goals of the task force include improving attribution to specific
criminals, understanding the nontraditional targets of attackers, and
strengthening federal computer crime statutes to deter would-be
perpetrators.
First, crucial to better deterrence--and the possibility of
implementing sanctions--is improving the IC's ability to designate
concrete attribution for cyber attacks. Attacks committed with the aid
of computer or Internet device technology are often cleared with
negative clearance. In order words, the IC is not able to detect and
identify hostile foreign actors because of missing data at Internet
service providers. The task force shall provide evidence-based
recommendations on mandatory data retention requirements that balance
the privacy of an individual's data, the technical and financial
limitations of companies and Internet service providers, and the need
to ensure effective cybercrime investigation.
The task force shall incorporate in their recommendations suggestions
to minimize barriers to entry into the service provider industry and to
lessen any negative impact on innovation or new start-ups in the
industry.
Second, Madam Chair, in light of the rapidly evolving nature of the
crimes, we must better understand the likely, but nontraditional,
targets to which perpetrators may seek unauthorized access. Cyber
attacks are increasingly the preferred method of foreign intelligence
services collection of data against the U.S., raising a host of novel
training, counterintelligence and investigative issues. To improve
these operations in the IC's understanding of the extent to which
computer and Internet device technology pervades traditional crimes,
the task force shall compile a list of nontraditional targets (i.e.,
economic or industrial bases) in the U.S. that the IC has not
traditionally dealt with as a target for foreign intelligence services.
Finally, Madam Chair, an increasing number of ``terrestrial'' (i.e.,
physical) crimes are being committed with the aid of a computer or
Internet services. The task force shall survey the current federal
crime statute for computer fraud and abuse to determine whether it is
sufficient in light of the advanced nature of the crimes being
committed and to enhance the ability of our law enforcement agencies to
identify, detect and apprehend suspects as well as enhance
investigative and prosecutorial efforts.
The task force shall survey the current federal crime statute for
computer fraud and abuse (as provided in 18 U.S.C. 1030) to determine
whether it is sufficient in light of the advanced nature of the crimes
being committed. It shall determine the adequacy of the laws for which
cybercrime and cyber espionage constitute a predicate offense and
provide recommendations for updating those statutes when warranted. The
task force shall establish and disseminate guidelines for States to
revise their State-level statutes equivalent to 18 U.S.C. 1030 to help
ensure they keep pace with Federal changes.
An increase in the prevalence of crimes facilitated through computer
fraud and abuse raises novel investigative, prosecutorial and training
issues because of the complex and unique attributes of computer and
Internet technology. To improve law enforcement's understanding of the
extent to which computer technology pervades traditional crimes, the
task force shall compile a list of which crimes are most often
committed with the aid of computers or Internet devices, determine
whether the relevant prosecutorial tools are up to date, and provide
specific legislative recommendations on how to update the statute to
improve prosecution efforts while simultaneously providing for
individual privacy and data security.
The task force shall also advise whether a need exists to outlaw, or
more clearly prohibit, certain behavior (i.e., unauthorized access)
regardless of intent or resulting damage, whether monetary or to a
computer system. The recommendations should take into account the
increasing prevalence of individuals using pre-programmed hacking tools
to commit a crime without necessarily understanding the full
implications or potential consequences of the technology.
The task force shall analyze existing Federal and State data breach
notification requirements and advise whether and how current law should
be amended to strengthen requirements and improve compliance, including
notification of relevant law enforcement authorities as well as any
individuals whose personally identifiable information may be at risk
from the breach. Currently, forty-three States have enacted breach
notification requirements, and they vary widely, resulting in low
compliance levels. The task force shall analyze discrepancies among
existing State-level statutes, determine barriers to compliance, and
provide recommendations for overcoming such barriers (i.e., through
Federal legislation, tying a company's obligations to specific
jurisdiction and their requirements, or through some other means).
Finally, the task force shall determine whether and how current
victim restitution statutes should be amended in order for victims of
cyber attacks to be made whole. Currently States have varying forms of
recourse for victims of cyber attacks, particularly when a person is
hurt because a company's data was breached. The task force shall
recommend whether a Federal law is needed to address this and if so,
how it should be structured.
Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to ensure that we stay a step ahead
of hackers and cyber terrorists seeking to cause us harm and to pass
this important amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by
[[Page H883]]
the gentleman from Texas will be postponed.
Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2
printed in House Report 111-419.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Hoekstra:
Insert after section 354 the following new section:
SEC. 355. PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON PROCEDURES USED IN
NARCOTICS AIRBRIDGE DENIAL PROGRAM IN PERU.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall make publicly available an unclassified version of the
report of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency entitled ``Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge
Denial Program in Peru, 1995-2001'', dated August 25, 2008.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I would like to yield myself as much time
as I may consume.
Madam Chair, this is a very straightforward amendment. I thank the
Rules Committee for making it in order. It basically says that for not
later than 30 days after the enactment of this act, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall make publicly available an
unclassified version of the report of the Inspector General entitled
``Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge Denial Program in Peru.''
Many of you may remember that this was a very tragic incident where,
with the assistance of our intelligence community, two of my
constituents were tragically killed in Peru, shot down by the Peruvian
Air Force. We need an unclassified version of this report being made
available to the public, and more importantly, to the families, the
families of those who were killed.
You know, it wasn't that long ago, it was within the last month that
there was a discussion about an accountability review. Almost 9 years
after that tragic shoot-down, there was an Accountability Board that
had been convened. And its results have been made or were reported to
our committee. Roughly 4 weeks ago I asked the Director of the CIA
whether the families of those killed would be briefed on what was found
in the Accountability Board and the accountabilities that were put in
order. To date I am yet waiting for an answer.
This has been unfair to these families, it has been unfair to the
American public that when we have had such a tragic failing in the
intelligence community, which included, from my perspective, an
attempted coverup by the previous administration or by the intelligence
community as to exactly what happened, how it happened, and how these
Americans were killed, that we have been so closed in sharing that
information with the American public and the families.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. I would like to claim the time in opposition, even though
I am not opposed to it.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Texas is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. REYES. I yield such time as she may consume to my friend from
California (Ms. Harman).
Ms. HARMAN. I thank the chairman for yielding, and surely hope that
we will accept his amendment. I recall during my years as ranking
member on the committee when we were, in quotes, ``briefed'' on this
incident. I am very disappointed about the way it was handled. I
personally think the gentleman from Michigan is correct, and I applaud
what he is doing.
As we debate this bill, we must thank again the thousands of
patriotic and courageous women and men who are serving in our
intelligence community around the world. As I so often say, a grateful
Nation salutes them for their efforts to keep us safe. Our Nation also
remembers and honors those who lost their lives, most recently at
Forward Operating Base Chapman in Afghanistan.
Madam Chair, in addition to this excellent amendment, I applaud the
underlying bill's provisions to reform the way Congress is notified of
sensitive covert programs, briefings that for too long were limited to
the so-called ``Gang of Eight.'' During my years as ranking member, it
was clear that effective oversight required providing the entire
committee with information previously limited to its leadership. And so
this bill rightly provides for full committee notice of Gang of Eight
briefings, a contemporaneous record of those briefings, something we
sorely lacked, and it entitles the full committee to receive the same
briefings as the Gang of Eight within 180 days.
These changes go a long way toward correcting the frustration felt on
both sides of the aisle during my tenure on the committee. We should
not have been put in the position of on the one hand upholding our oath
of secrecy, while on the other hand being starved for information to
conduct necessary oversight.
Just last week, pursuant to a FOIA request, memoranda describing some
of our briefings were declassified. The documents, which are available
to the public, show repeated pushback from Intelligence Committee
members, surely including me, about the failure to brief us or to
provide documents or other timely information.
Madam Chair, last time I checked, Congress was an independent branch
of government. We must assert our prerogative to monitor and rectify
problems that surface in the programs we oversee. In the intelligence
world, some of these problems affect our core values as well as our
Constitution. Security and liberty are not a zero sum game. It is our
sworn duty to protect both. The language in the underlying bill and
this amendment offered by Mr. Hoekstra go a long way to rectify long-
existing problems.
I urge support for the bill and support for this amendment.
Mr. REYES. I reserve the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan has the right to close.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairwoman, I am prepared to accept the amendment,
and want the record to reflect that Ms. Schakowsky from Illinois is
very much in agreement with Mr. Hoekstra.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I would like to thank my colleagues on the other side of the aisle
and the chairman for accepting the amendment, my colleague from
California for the kind words that she had to say. We worked on this
program for a number of years together. And it has taken us such a long
period of time to get the answers that help understand but do not
explain what happened.
This amendment is intended to get more information to the American
people, more information to the families. I do hope that over the
coming days that the Director of the CIA, that the people in the
intelligence community decide to give the families full access to the
Accountability Board.
I appreciate the support of the chairwoman of the subcommittee, Ms.
Schakowsky from Illinois. This is a case where we have worked uniquely
in a bipartisan way to address failings within the intelligence
community, to try to right those wrongs, and to try to move us forward
in a constructive and positive way. I thank my colleagues who have
enabled that process to work and to work effectively.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3
printed in House Report 111-419.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the
desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida:
[[Page H884]]
Insert after section 352 the following new section:
SEC. 353. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) To most effectively carry out the mission of the
intelligence community to collect and analyze intelligence,
the intelligence community needs personnel that look and
speak like the citizens of the many nations in which the
United States needs to collect such intelligence.
(2) One of the great strengths of the United States is the
diversity of the people of the United States, diversity that
can positively contribute to the operational capabilities and
effectiveness of the intelligence community.
(3) In the past, the intelligence community has not
properly focused on hiring a diverse workforce and the
capabilities of the intelligence community have suffered due
to that lack of focus.
(4) The intelligence community must be deliberate and work
hard to hire a diverse workforce to improve the operational
capabilities and effectiveness of the intelligence community.
(b) Requirement for Report.--Not later than one year after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the
elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans
of each element to increase diversity within the intelligence
community.
(c) Content.--The report required by subsection (b) shall
include specific implementation plans to increase diversity
within each element of the intelligence community,
including--
(1) specific implementation plans for each such element
designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic
plan of the Director of National Intelligence on equal
employment opportunity and diversity;
(2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to
increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates;
(3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to
improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior,
midgrade, senior, and management levels;
(4) a description of specific diversity awareness training
and education programs for senior officials and managers of
each such element; and
(5) a description of performance metrics to measure the
success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs
described in paragraphs (1) through (4).
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Hastings) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Madam Chair, I would like to correct some
things, because I have been here all day listening to our colleagues
complain about the process. This is the beginning of the process. And
it is an important one, one that has not been undertaken in 4 years,
such that we have not had an authorization bill for all that time.
Now, I am sure that my colleagues know that when this measure is
completed, and on the other side in the other body, that we will have a
conference. And many of the discussions that are being heard here today
are likely to be addressed in that conference report.
Now, I have stated time and again that the intelligence community is
not diverse enough to do its job of obtaining and analyzing foreign
countries' secrets. Diversity is a mission imperative. We need people
who blend in, speak the language, and understand the cultures and the
countries that we are targeting.
The intelligence community is our Nation's first line of defense
against the increasing dangers and threats we face around the world.
From the scourge of terrorism, to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, to hostile governments, intelligence work is often unseen,
and mostly thankless.
Now, I keep hearing all this talk about Mirandizing people on the
battlefield. I have a lot of difficulty understanding when that
happened. I have been on the committee for 10 years, and I don't know
that that is a methodology that is being employed with any regularity.
I have had the honor and privilege of meeting many of our
intelligence professionals during my oversight travel as a member of
the Intelligence Committee to more than 50 countries. I cannot
overstate how much all of us, Democrats and Republicans, every Member
of this House and every President that I have known, are appreciative
and humbled by their service. And yes, I will stand and say that when
this authorization measure passes that I do support the men and women
in the 16 elements of the intelligence services and appreciate them
very much.
I am proud to support this measure for several reasons. It
substantially increases funding for human intelligence collection and
counterintelligence activities, tools that have been underresourced in
the past years.
{time} 1515
The bill continues the essential funding to support the critical
efforts of U.S. warfighters in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and
provides additional funding to address significantly emerging issues in
Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. And I would urge my colleagues to
footnote that.
There is no place that I think that we should focus as much attention
as we have with Iran as Yemen. It is going to be critical for us to pay
attention to that area of the world.
This bill also adds funds and authorities for language programs.
Chairman Reyes and I and countless other members on this committee have
fought this issue repeatedly for us to make progress in languages; and,
I might add, we have been successful. If you see the new people
entering the service, if you visit our operational activities, you
begin to see more and more people that are in the service.
I do have something to quarrel about, and that is, the gays in the
military provision that allows, among other things, that we're putting
people out of the service who are Farsi and Arabic speakers because
they're gay, and I think that's ridiculous in the environment that
we're operating in.
But we still don't have enough women. We still don't have enough
Arabs. We still don't have enough North Koreans, and I could go on and
on.
While the intelligence community has made some progress in hiring
people with diverse backgrounds, education and experience, including,
indeed, more women and minorities, this progress has been at a glacial
speed. The intelligence community has been historically slow to
recognize the wealth and abundance of talent and skills that reside in
first-, second-, and even third-generation Americans. We still don't
have an intelligence workforce that looks like our country. We aren't
even close.
The bottom line is that we, until we have every segment of society
participating in the intelligence community, our capabilities will not
rise to the level needed to defeat terrorism.
I'd like to yield the balance of my time to the distinguished
chairperson of the Intelligence Committee, and to thank the Members of
the Democrat and Republican staff on the House Intelligence Select
Committee.
Mr. REYES. I just want to thank the vice chair of our Intelligence
Committee for his hard work. I know he's worked ever since he's been on
the committee on this very important issue that keeps, I think, the
face of the intelligence community reflecting the face of this Nation.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I'd like to claim the time in
opposition, although I will not be opposed to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I would like to recognize my colleague from Texas (Mr.
Thornberry) for 1 minute.
Mr. THORNBERRY. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) has been a
forceful and eloquent advocate for greater diversity in the
intelligence community. And he's exactly right: we will be more
effective when we have greater diversity in the intelligence community.
We're more effective human collectors when we look like those from whom
we are collecting. We will be more effective when we have a greater
range of language talents including dialects. All of that is absolutely
true.
My point, in addition, however, is that it's not just getting them
into the intelligence community. It's how we treat them once they're
hired. And some of the recent actions over the last year, whether it's
a special prosecutor to go after, again, interrogators after they have
already been investigated, or whether it's releasing classified
[[Page H885]]
memos, even though five CIA directors recommend not having it done,
that cuts against the ability to keep these qualified people in
government service after we have them hired. And I can think of nothing
worse than to threaten these people with 15 years of prison if they
stray across the line in an interrogation as far as encouraging our
intelligence professionals to stay with the government.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time.
Madam Chairman, I will not oppose the amendment. I support the
amendment. I think the report on highlighting the progress that we have
made or that we may not have made toward our objectives of increasing
the diversity within the intelligence community is something that is
needed and something that my colleague has been championing for all the
years that we have served on the committee together. I support the
amendment and urge my colleagues to support it as well.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida will
be postponed.
Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4
printed in House Report 111-419.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I have an amendment at the
desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan:
Strike section 349 (page 64, lines 8 through 24) and insert
the following new section:
SEC. 349. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE
SUPERVISORY TERM LIMIT POLICY.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act
may be used to implement the field office supervisory term
limit policy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation requiring
the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau
after a specific term of years.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, it's with a heavy heart I
rise with this amendment. This has been a bipartisan issue for, I hate
to say it, going on 5 years where the Director of the FBI implemented a
new policy, and the policy was designed to try to get a different
talent pool of individuals to come to Washington, D.C. to be
supervisors in their new bureaucracy of the intelligence community, if
you will. They were having a difficult time doing it.
So what they ended up doing is they forced supervisors in the field.
These are FBI experts in a whole variety of fields--it could be white-
collar crime, it could be organized crime, it could be foreign
counterintelligence, could be counterterrorism efforts--and arbitrarily
said, after 5 years you're done. You either have to step down, you have
to come to Washington, D.C. and apply to be an ASAC or other job, or
you have to move on. You can either leave the Bureau, you can step down
and go back to the ranks of what we used to call a brick agent in the
FBI.
Five years ago we said, you know this is really unfair to a lot of
agents. You're going to lose agents. Unfortunately, they implemented
it, we lost agents, senior agents, talented agents. And from both sides
of this aisle we heard stories after stories where we represented about
good, quality, talented, seasoned FBI agents being forced to make
decisions based on their families. Some were just not in a position to
come back to Washington, D.C., so their reward for all that honorable
service is get out.
Well, the Director cut a deal with this Congress, not this particular
session, but a Congress a few years ago, 5 years ago: I will fix this
problem for the agents who this harmed. We are still waiting today.
This is called the up-and-out policy of the FBI. It is wrong, Mr.
Director. It is absolutely unconscionable that this continues to be a
problem, after they've given the Congress of the United States your
word it would be fixed. I just implore the Director to fix this
problem.
The only way for us to join together to get this fixed for the men
and women who have risked their lives, who moved their families, who
make the difficult choices to be an agent of the FBI, is to offer this
amendment and say, no more. We're not playing anymore. Fix this
problem. It's wrong to treat the men and women of the FBI with this
blatant disregard for what has been harmful to them and their families,
in some cases, their pensions as well. It's wrong.
I know it has been bipartisan in the past, and I hope that it
continues to be a bipartisan effort. And, Madam Chairman, I can't
strongly enough say that I support it. But also, I have a letter here
from the FBI, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents Association,
representing literally tens of thousands of former and current agents
all across the country who have stood up and said this is the right
thing. They support this amendment unconditionally.
Let us stand with those men and women who are doing so much to keep
us safe today. This is the one thing that we can do and send a message
to this Director. For all the good and all the bad that happened since
9/11 and he's been part of a lot of good things, this could be a
horrible black mark on what could otherwise be a great career there if
you don't take care of the people who have been taking care of America.
I reserve the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek time?
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Seeing there's no further speakers, I would
just urge the body's quick support and, again, hopefully we can stand
with the men and women who have stood with us in difficult times across
the country. I yield back my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Ms. Eshoo
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5
printed in House Report 111-419.
Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 5 offered by Ms. Eshoo:
At the end of subtitle A of title III, add the following
new section:
SEC. 305. CONFLICT OF INTEREST REGULATIONS AND PROHIBITION ON
CERTAIN OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES.
(a) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--Section 102A of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(s) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--(1) The Director
of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director
of the Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations
prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the
intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if
such employment creates a conflict of interest or appearance
thereof.
``(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall annually
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
describing all outside employment for officers and employees
of elements of the intelligence community that was authorized
by the head of an element of the intelligence community
during the preceding calendar year. Such report shall be
submitted each year on the date provided in section 507.''.
(b) Outside Employment.--
(1) Prohibition.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``prohibition on certain outside employment of officers and employees
of the intelligence community
``Sec. 120. An officer or employee of an element of the
intelligence community may not personally own or effectively
control an entity that markets or sells for profit the use of
knowledge or skills that such officer or employee acquires or
makes use of while carrying out the official duties of such
officer or employee as an officer or employee of an element
of the intelligence community.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of such Act (50
[[Page H886]]
U.S.C. 401 note) is further amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 119B the following new item:
``Sec. 120. Prohibition on certain outside employment of officers and
employees of the intelligence community.''.
Page 71, strike line 11 and insert ``section 510.''.
Page 71, after line 11 insert the following:
``(K) The annual report on outside employment required by
section 102A(s)(2).''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Eshoo) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, I rise to offer an important amendment to
the Intelligence Authorization Act.
Madam Chairman, many of the provisions that I supported and authored
are already in the legislation that was reported out of the committee.
Today I'm offering this amendment to address a problem that arose after
our consideration of the bill last year.
Earlier this month we discovered that intelligence community
employees have been starting businesses to sell private companies the
very skills they use in their employment for the government. For
example, a number of CIA employees launched a company to sell deception
detection services to hedge funds and ran this company while they were
Federal employees. I'm very troubled by this. I questioned the Director
of National Intelligence about this at HPSCI's worldwide threats
hearing, and he said he would look into it. While waiting for a formal
answer, I discovered, to my great surprise, that this activity had
already been approved by their agencies. Clearly, we need to tighten up
that process.
All Federal agencies are required to have conflict of interest
guidelines that set limits on employees' outside employment. Now, these
guidelines are developed jointly by the agency and by the Office of
Government Ethics. But the DNI has not issued intelligence community-
wide policy guidance on conflicts of interest for outside employment.
So this amendment does two things. First, it requires the DNI to
establish an intelligence community-wide conflict of interest
regulation working in connection with, and in conjunction with, the
Office of Government Ethics to establish a community-wide process for
checking outside employment for conflicts of interest, and also to
submit an annual report to the intelligence committees on outside
employment activities that were approved in the last year.
Second, it would prohibit employees from owning companies that sell
skills that are related to their government service.
I think that government employees, and especially those in the
intelligence community, should adhere to the highest ethical standards.
The American people have to have confidence that government employees
are working in the best interest of the Nation and not in just a
personal self-interest.
I want to thank my colleagues from the HPSCI, Representatives
Tierney, Boren, Schakowsky, Thompson, Holt, Rogers and Myrick, for
cosponsoring this amendment. And I urge the adoption of it.
Madam Chairman, how much time do I have left?
The Acting CHAIR. 2\1/2\ minutes is remaining.
Ms. ESHOO. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) 1\1/2\
minutes.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I want to thank my good
friend, Ms. Eshoo from California. You know, sometimes you can get
ahead of a problem. We don't often do that in Congress. I think this is
a great way to get ahead of a problem.
Given the fact that these individuals who have, who are doing great
things for their country, we're thankful for it, takes sometimes a
piece of intellectual property that really belongs to the people of the
United States, and some of it is very sensitive, very
compartmentalized. It's information that is shared with very few. So it
is an incredible responsibility. And for us not to have a policy on how
we make sure that those people don't use that information for personal
gain on the outside of that community, especially the intelligence
community, I think is wrong. And I think this is a good measure that
puts some really basic protections, not only for them, but for the
intelligence community and the people of America.
And I want to commend the gentlelady for her work and effort on this.
And I wholeheartedly support this effort.
{time} 1530
Ms. ESHOO. I want to thank the gentleman for his support. This is a
bipartisan amendment.
I just want to add, Madam Chair, this is in no way a ban across the
entire Federal Government and Federal workers. There are some that
teach at universities at night; there are others that make really very
low salaries--GS-1s in the $17,000 range--that do have some outside
employment.
This goes directly to the skill set that the American people train
these CIA officers and others in the intelligence community to do their
work relative to national security. That shouldn't be sold off in bits
and parts by moonlighting.
So I think that we've done that respectfully, and I think that we've
done it thoughtfully. And I'd like to thank the chairman again for
this, Mr. Rogers, and Members that have supported it. I think it's a
good amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. Who seeks time in opposition?
With no one seeking time in opposition, the question is on the
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Conaway
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6
printed in House Report 111-419.
Mr. CONAWAY. I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Conaway:
Page 87, strike line 21 and all that follows through page
88, line 9, and insert the following:
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is imperative that intelligence community-wide
auditability be achieved as soon as possible;
(2) the Business Transformation Office of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence has made substantial
progress and must be of sufficient standing within the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence to move the plan for
core financial system requirements to reach intelligence
community-wide auditability forward;
(3) as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the
National Reconnaissance Office is the only element of the
intelligence community to have received a clean audit; and
(4) the National Reconnaissance Office should be commended
for the long hours and hard work invested by the Office to
achieve a clean audit.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Conaway) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Madam Chair.
This amendment is a pretty simple, straightforward one. It's about
good governance. It's about protecting the assets of the American
taxpayer as utilized by the intelligence community.
This bill came out of committee 8 months ago. We've now learned some
things in the last 8 months that we didn't know then, and this
amendment would simply substitute a new paragraph A for the old
paragraph A. This paragraph would simply say it's an important
initiative for the intelligence community to work to get audited
financial statements across all of the entities. This takes a lot of
work, a lot of effort to make that happen.
I'd like to call the Chair's attention to the National Reconnaissance
organization, who is the only entity within the intelligence community
that has, in fact, achieved an unqualified audit opinion on their
financial statements. Under Dr. Scott Large's leadership, that hard
work was done. And then more directly, Karen Landry, the Chief
Financial Officer for the NRO, and Sandra Van Booven, the Director of
Financial Management, led an incredible team to do an awful lot of hard
work to make that happen. I don't discount
[[Page H887]]
how hard that is. From my professional experience, I know it's hard.
But they're to be commended as the agency that has achieved clean
audited financial statements.
As important as that is, it's an ongoing effort, and I hope that
General Bruce Carlson, who is now the leader at NRO, will continue to
lead the efforts needed to make that happen.
This is a top-down function. It has to have the initiative of the
leadership. The Office of Director of Intelligence has to make this a
priority. And this amendment would seek to recognize that priority and
continue to draw attention to it from our body so that the executive
branch body, in fact, knows that we believe that it's important to get
this done. So it's a pretty straightforward amendment, Madam Chair.
I recognize the hard work of some of the folks over at NRO is kind of
a pat on the back for having done it correctly, shown us how it can be
done, an incredible amount of hard work done by the team led by Ms.
Landry and Ms. Van Booven.
So, with that, I encourage my colleagues on the floor today to
support this good governance amendment that would further the hard
efforts being done across the community to achieve unqualified audit
opinions on their financial statements and all of the internal controls
and systems that go behind that.
One final comment. There are some tough decisions ahead for Director
Blair and others to make this happen, and I encourage them to make
those decisions sooner than later. And I encourage my colleagues to
support the amendment.
I yield back.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Conaway).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Arcuri
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7
printed in House Report 111-419.
Mr. ARCURI. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Arcuri:
Insert after section 354 the following new section:
SEC. 355. CYBERSECURITY OVERSIGHT.
(a) Notification of Cybersecurity Programs.--
(1) Requirement for notification.--
(A) Existing programs.--Not later than 30 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
to Congress a notification for each cybersecurity program in
operation on such date that includes the documentation
referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph
(2).
(B) New programs.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the commencement of operations of a new cybersecurity
program, the President shall submit to Congress a
notification of such commencement that includes the
documentation referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of
paragraph (2).
(2) Documentation.--A notification required by paragraph
(1) for a cybersecurity program shall include--
(A) the legal justification for the cybersecurity program;
(B) the certification, if any, made pursuant to section
2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) of title 18, United States Code, or other
statutory certification of legality for the cybersecurity
program;
(C) the concept for the operation of the cybersecurity
program that is approved by the head of the appropriate
agency or department;
(D) the assessment, if any, of the privacy impact of the
cybersecurity program prepared by the privacy or civil
liberties protection officer or comparable officer of such
agency or department; and
(E) the plan, if any, for independent audit or review of
the cybersecurity program to be carried out by the head of
the relevant department or agency of the United States, in
conjunction with the appropriate inspector general.
(b) Program Reports.--
(1) Requirement for reports.--The head of a department or
agency of the United States with responsibility for a
cybersecurity program for which a notification was submitted
under subsection (a), in consultation with the inspector
general for that department or agency, shall submit to
Congress and the President, in accordance with the schedule
set out in paragraph (2), a report on such cybersecurity
program that includes--
(A) the results of any audit or review of the cybersecurity
program carried out under the plan referred to in subsection
(a)(2)(E), if any; and
(B) an assessment of whether the implementation of the
cybersecurity program--
(i) is in compliance with--
(I) the legal justification referred to in subsection
(a)(2)(A); and
(II) the assessment referred to in subsection (a)(2)(D), if
any;
(ii) is adequately described by the concept of operation
referred to in subsection (a)(2)(C), if any; and
(iii) includes an adequate independent audit or review
system and whether improvements to such independent audit or
review system are necessary.
(2) Schedule for submission of reports.--The reports
required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted to Congress and
the President according to the following schedule:
(A) An initial report shall be submitted not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(B) A second report shall be submitted not later than one
year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(C) Additional reports shall be submitted periodically
following the submission of the reports referred to in
subparagraphs (A) and (B) as necessary, as determined by the
head of the relevant department or agency of the United
States in conjunction with the inspector general of that
department or agency.
(3) Cooperation and coordination.--
(A) Cooperation.--The head of each department or agency of
the United States required to submit a report under paragraph
(1) for a particular cybersecurity program, and the inspector
general of each such department or agency, shall, to the
extent practicable, work in conjunction with any other such
head or inspector general required to submit such a report
for such cybersecurity program.
(B) Coordination.--The heads of all of the departments and
agencies of the United States required to submit a report
under paragraph (1) for a particular cybersecurity program
shall designate one such head to coordinate the conduct of
the reports on such program.
(c) Information Sharing Report.--Not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector
General of the Department of Homeland Security and the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall jointly
submit to Congress and the President a report on the status
of the sharing of cyber threat information, including--
(1) a description of how cyber threat intelligence
information, including classified information, is shared
among the agencies and departments of the United States and
with persons responsible for critical infrastructure;
(2) a description of the mechanisms by which classified
cyber threat information is distributed;
(3) an assessment of the effectiveness of such information
sharing and distribution; and
(4) any other matters identified by the Inspectors General
that would help to fully inform Congress or the President
regarding the effectiveness and legality of cybersecurity
programs.
(d) Personnel Details.--
(1) Authority to detail.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the head of an element of the intelligence
community that is funded through the National Intelligence
Program may detail an officer or employee of such element to
the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force or to the
Department of Homeland Security to assist the Task Force or
the Department with cybersecurity, as jointly agreed by the
head of such element and the Task Force or the Department.
(2) Basis for detail.--A personnel detail made under
paragraph (1) may be made--
(A) for a period of not more than three years; and
(B) on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis.
(e) Sunset.--The requirements and authorities of this
section shall terminate on December 31, 2012.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Cybersecurity program.--The term ``cybersecurity
program'' means a class or collection of similar
cybersecurity operations of an agency or department of the
United States that involves personally identifiable data that
is--
(A) screened by a cybersecurity system outside of the
agency or department of the United States that was the
intended recipient of the personally identifiable data;
(B) transferred, for the purpose of cybersecurity, outside
the agency or department of the United States that was the
intended recipient of the personally identifiable data; or
(C) transferred, for the purpose of cybersecurity, to an
element of the intelligence community.
(2) National cyber investigative joint task force.--The
term ``National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force'' means
the multi-agency cyber investigation coordination
organization overseen by the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation known as the Nation Cyber Investigative
Joint Task Force that coordinates, integrates, and provides
pertinent information related to cybersecurity
investigations.
(3) Critical infrastructure.--The term ``critical
infrastructure'' has the meaning given that term in section
1016 of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 5195c).
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Arcuri) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
[[Page H888]]
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York.
Mr. ARCURI. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The threat of cyberattack on our computer and Internet infrastructure
as well as the threat of cyberwarfare cannot be overstated. The need
for congressional action to assure adequate funding is in place to
guarantee that our country is prepared for any contingency that may
arrive in this relatively new area of warfare is critical. I believe,
as a nation, our investment in cybersecurity will be the Manhattan
Project of our generation.
H.R. 2701 authorizes the funding to make this investment a reality.
Cyberthreats and attacks are real, and they threaten our financial and
defense networks every day. Nearly every aspect of everyday life in our
global society is dependent on the security of our cybernetworks. We
rely on these systems to carry virtually all of our business
transactions, control our electric grid, emergency communication
systems, and even traffic lights.
The most troubling cyberthreat may be the very real prospect of
state-sponsored cyberattacks against sensitive national security
information. We must take steps to protect our cyberinfrastructure, but
to do that in such a way that we do not infringe on individuals' rights
to privacy.
We have a number of organizations in government that work on
cybersecurity, and we in Congress need to ensure that these
organizations are sharing this information with each other in an
effective, reliable, and safe manner. This must be one of our top
priorities.
Over the next few years, the administration and the intelligence
community will begin new and unprecedented cybersecurity programs to
combat these threats with cutting-edge technologies. These new programs
will present new legal and privacy challenges.
To ensure that Congress can properly oversee these programs, my
amendment requires the President to submit detailed notifications to
Congress on current and newly created cybersecurity programs so that
Congress may perform the oversight that the Constitution requires.
My amendment sets a preliminary framework for the administration and
congressional oversight to ensure that the government's national
security programs are consistent with legal authorities and preserve
individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy. It requires the
President to notify Congress of new and existing cybersecurity programs
and provide Congress with the program's legal justification, a general
description of its operation, and describe how it impacts privacy and
sensitive data and to detail any plan for any independent audit or
review of the program. This amendment is a reasonable and responsible
continuation of this effort.
Earlier this month, the House approved a Cybersecurity Enhancement
Act to expand programs to strengthen our Nation's cybersecurity and to
require a cybersecurity workforce assessment to give us a clearer
picture of our cybercapabilities in both the Federal Government and
private sector to combat future attacks.
Given the increasing number and sophistication of cyberattacks that
are being aimed at our networks and the degree to which we must expand
our cybercapabilities, we must also ensure that we maintain our
oversight abilities. My amendment is similar to the oversight
provisions included in the Senate legislation, and I ask that all
Members support these important safeguards.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. THORNBERRY. I seek to claim the time in opposition to the
amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. THORNBERRY. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chair, I don't think anyone in this House can deny the
importance of cybersecurity. Certainly the Intelligence Committee is
devoting a great deal of time and effort to understanding the threat to
our potential responses and how we go about it. I am perhaps, however,
a lonely voice expressing caution about the number of reports that
accumulate on top of one another year after year after year and weigh
down our intelligence community.
I mentioned earlier that there are 41 new reports of one kind or
another that are in the underlying bill. The manager's amendment, which
we've debated, has at least 17 more reports on top of that. And I
believe, if you look at all of the 20, 21 provisions of the manager's
amendment, there are at least two reports on cybersecurity plus a task
force.
Now, the issue is important, but surely the goodness--we have some
responsibility in Congress to pay attention to the cost in terms of
dollars, the cost in terms of manpower to do all of these reports that
get added on top of the intelligence community but often never go away,
that just stack on top of each other year after year.
So I appreciate the gentleman's interest in cybersecurity. I share
that, by the way. I think the gentleman's right on the importance of
it. But I would just encourage him and all Members, before you come
demanding another report of one sort or another, maybe it would be good
to inquire as to what it would take to actually complete that report,
how much money that costs the taxpayers. If we do, I think we are going
to be a little more hesitant to stack report upon report upon report.
With that, I would yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ARCURI. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for his comments, and
I think he's right. I think, clearly, the fact that a report is
requested simply for the sake of requesting a report is redundant and
is taxing on our intelligence community. But I think when we look at
what happened during 9/11 and the fact that some of the intelligence
branches of government were not sharing information, I think we need to
learn something from that.
In my district, I have an Air Force research lab that really focuses
a great deal on cybersecurity, and I want to make sure the information
that they're developing and the technologies that they're developing
are being shared with other branches of the military and the
intelligence community. And I think it's very important that we allow
congressional oversight and that we ensure that in our role as
Congressmen, that we are making sure that they are doing that, that
they are sharing the information the way they should.
So I certainly appreciate your point, but I think this is one of the
places where it's critically important that we ensure that the
information sharing is being done.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Arcuri).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Burton of Indiana
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8
printed in House Report 111-419.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Burton of Indiana:
Page 135, after line 12, insert the following new section:
SEC. 505. SENSE OF CONGRESS HONORING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
It is the sense of Congress to--
(1) honor the Central Intelligence Agency for its
contributions to the security of the United States and its
allies;
(2) recognize the Central Intelligence Agency's unique role
in combating terrorism;
(3) praise the Central Intelligence Agency for its success
in foiling recent terrorist plots and capturing senior
members of al-Qaeda;
(4) thank the Central Intelligence Agency for its crucial
support of United States military operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq;
(5) commend the men and women who gave their lives
defending the United States in the service of the Central
Intelligence Agency, especially noting those individuals who
remain unnamed; and
(6) urge the Central Intelligence Agency to continue its
dedicated work in the field of intelligence-gathering in
order to protect the people of the United States.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman
from Indiana (Mr. Burton) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. First of all, Madam Chair, I want to thank the
[[Page H889]]
Rules Committee for making this amendment in order. It is a very
straightforward amendment, and it's one that I think is very, very
important because the CIA has been under such intense criticism over
the last several months--maybe the last few years--that it's time to
let them know and the people of this country know that we really
appreciate what they're doing to secure the safety of this country.
What the bill does is:
It honors the Central Intelligence Agency for its contributions to
the security of the United States and our allies;
It recognizes the Central Intelligence Agency's unique role in
combating terrorism;
It praises the Central Intelligence Agency for its success in foiling
recent terrorist plots and capturing senior members of al Qaeda;
It thanks the Central Intelligence Agency for its crucial support of
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq;
It commends the men and women who gave their lives defending the
U.S.--named and unnamed; and, finally,
It urges the Central Intelligence Agency to continue its dedicated
work in the field of intelligence gathering in order to protect the
people of the United States.
I believe that all of us would agree with everything that is in this
amendment. But I'd like to add just a couple of things that I've been
watching during this debate that really concerns me.
{time} 1545
There is language in here that is going to, I think, have an adverse
impact on the Central Intelligence Agency's agents who are out in the
field and doing their job and are trying to protect us against the
terrorists. You know, some of the things that they say may be abrasive
or objectionable to some of the people they are interrogating. The way
this language reads, it could be interpreted to mean that they are
guilty of not following the intent of the law in dealing with the
terrorists.
Also, there are prison sentences for people who are involved in
terrorist or torturous activities such as ``waterboarding.'' I would
like to point out to my colleagues, many of whom don't know this,
waterboarding has been a technique that has been used in the training
of U.S. Navy SEALs and our Special Forces people over the years.
Now, let me say that one more time. Waterboarding and other
techniques have been used in the training of our Navy SEALs so they
would know how to deal with an enemy if they were captured, and it's
been used by Special Forces military personnel in their training. So it
has never been considered torture by our own military personnel.
Now, we have three Navy SEALs right now that are being court-
martialed, and they are being court-martialed because they captured an
al Qaeda terrorist in Fallujah in Iraq. And this al Qaeda terrorist
took four American contractors, tortured them, dragged them through the
streets, burned their bodies and hung them from a bridge.
He also cut off the head of a leading person that was over there
gathering news and information for the news media. This guy is really
an out-and-out horrible terrorist. Now, when he was captured he was
turned over to the Iraqi military for 2 days, and he came back and he
said that he had been hit in the stomach and they split his lip, and
because of that these three Navy SEALs are being prosecuted. They are
being prosecuted in a court martial.
What kind of a message does that send to our Navy SEALs, to the
people in the field who are capturing and fighting these al Qaeda and
Taliban terrorists? What kind of a message does that send? We are
trying to send the same kind of message to the CIA operatives who are
out there trying to get information that will protect this country and
protect the American people around the world against these people who
want to destroy us and want to destroy our way of life.
It really bothers me, and I do appreciate the House approving this
amendment that I have introduced. Obviously it's something that I think
is very important. But, in addition to that, I don't believe we ought
to be sending a message to the CIA or the Navy SEALs or our Special
Forces men and women in the field that we are not going to back them up
when they go out and get a terrorist or extract information from them
that is vital in securing the safety of the people of this country.
One of the al Qaeda terrorists they are going to bring to New York.
The main al Qaeda terrorist that was involved in the 9/11 attack, after
he was waterboarded about 80 times, and he wouldn't give up
information, he finally did. He said that there was an attempt going to
be made to fly a plane into a building in Los Angeles. Had he not
choked up and given that information, we might have lost another 2,000
or 3,000 people like we did on 9/11.
It just seems silly to me and crazy to me that we are not going to
allow our intelligence-gathering operatives to do their job. We ought
to be supporting them completely day and night in anything they do to
protect this Nation.
[From the National Review Online, Feb. 25, 2010]
While You Are Distracted by the Summit, Obama Democrats Are Targeting
the CIA
(By Andy McCarthy)
The Obama Democrats have outdone themselves.
While the country and the Congress have their eyes on
today's dog-and-pony show on socialized medicine, House
Democrats last night stashed a new provision in the
intelligence bill which is to be voted on today. It is an
attack on the CIA: the enactment of a criminal statute that
would ban ``cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.''
The provision is impossibly vague--who knows what
``degrading'' means? Proponents will say that they have
itemized conduct that would trigger the statute (I'll get to
that in a second), but it is not true. The proposal says the
conduct reached by the statute ``includes but is not limited
to'' the itemized conduct. (My italics.) That means any
interrogation tactic that a prosecutor subjectively believes
is ``degrading'' (e.g., subjecting a Muslim detainee to
interrogation by a female CIA officer) could be the basis for
indicting a CIA interrogator.
The act goes on to make it a crime to use tactics that have
been shown to be effective in obtaining life saving
information and that are far removed from torture.
``Waterboarding'' is specified. In one sense, I'm glad
they've done this because it proves a point I've been making
all along. Waterboarding, as it was practiced by the CIA, is
not torture and was never illegal under U.S. law. The reason
the Democrats are reduced to doing this is: what they've been
saying is not true--waterboarding was not a crime and it was
fully supported by congressional leaders of both parties, who
were told about it while it was being done. On that score, it
is interesting to note that while Democrats secretly tucked
this provision into an important bill, hoping no one would
notice until it was too late, they failed to include in the
bill a proposed Republican amendment that would have required
full and complete disclosure of records describing the
briefings members of Congress received about the Bush CIA's
enhanced interrogation program. Those briefings, of course,
would establish that Speaker Pelosi and others knew all about
the program and lodged no objections. Naturally, members of
Congress are not targeted by this criminal statute--only the
CIA.
More to the point, this shows how politicized law-
enforcement has become under the Obama Democrats. They could
have criminalized waterboarding at any time since Jan. 20,
2009. But they waited until now. Why? Because if they had
tried to do it before now, it would have been a tacit
admission that waterboarding was not illegal when the Bush
CIA was using it. That would have harmed the politicized
witch-hunt against John Yoo and Jay Bybee, a key component of
which was the assumption that waterboarding and the other
tactics they authorizied were illegal. Only now, when that
witch-hunt has collapsed, have the Democrats moved to
criminalize these tactics. It is transparently partisan.
In any event, waterboarding is not defined in the bill. As
Marc Thiessen has repeatedly demonstrated, there is a world
of difference between the tactic as administered by the CIA
and the types of water-torture methods that have been used
throughout history. The waterboarding method used by the CIA
involved neither severe pain nor prolonged mental harm. But
it was highly unpleasant and led especially hard cases like
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (i.e., well-trained, committed,
America-hating terrorists) to give us information that saved
American lives. The method was used sparingly--on only three
individuals, and not in the last seven years. The American
people broadly support the availability of this non-torture
tactic in a dire emergency. Yet Democrats not only want to
make it unavailable; they want to subject to 15 years'
imprisonment any interrogator who uses it.
What's more, the proposed bill is directed at ``any officer
or employee of the intelligence community'' conducting a
``covered interrogation.'' The definition of ``covered
[[Page H890]]
interrogation'' is sweeping--including any interrogation done
outside the U.S., in the course of a person's official duties
on behalf of the government. Thus, if the CIA used
waterboarding in training its officers or military officers
outside the U.S., this would theoretically be indictable
conduct under the statute.
Waterboarding is not all. The Democrats' bill would
prohibit--with a penalty of 15 years' imprisonment--the
following tactics, among others:
--``Exploiting the phobias of the individual''
--Stress positions and the threatened use of force to
maintain stress positions
--``Depriving the individual of necessary food, water,
sleep, or medical care''
--Forced nudity
--Using military working dogs (i.e., any use of them--not
having them attack or menace the individual; just the mere
presence of the dog if it might unnerve the detainee and, of
course, ``exploit his phobias'')
--Coercing the individual to blaspheme or violate his
religious beliefs (I wonder if Democrats understand the
breadth of seemingly innocuous matters that jihadists take to
be violations of their religious beliefs)
--Exposure to ``excessive'' cold, heat or ``cramped
confinement'' (excessive and cramped are not defined)
--``Prolonged isolation''
--``Placing hoods or sacks over the head of the
individual''
Naturally, all of these tactics are interspersed with such
acts as forcing the performance of sexual acts, beatings,
electric shock, burns, inducing hypothermia or heat injury--
as if all these acts were functionally equivalent.
In true Alinskyite fashion, Democrats begin this attack on
the CIA by saluting ``the courageous men and women who serve
honorably as intelligence personnel and as members of our
nation's Armed Forces'' who ``deserve the full support of the
United States Congress.'' Then, Democrats self-servingly tell
us that Congress ``shows true support'' by providing ``clear
legislation relating to standards for interrogation
techniques.'' I'm sure the intelligence community will be
duly grateful.
Democrats also offer ``findings'' that the tactics they aim
to prohibit cause terrorism by fueling recruitment (we are
never supposed to discuss the Islamist ideology that actually
causes terrorist recruitment, only the terrible things
America does to provide pretexts for those spurred by that
ideology). These ``findings'' repeat the canards that these
tactics don't work; that they place our captured forces in
greater danger (the truth is our forces captured by
terrorists will be abused and probably killed no matter what
we do, while our enemies captured in a conventional war will
be bound to adhere to their Geneva Convention commitments--
and will have the incentive to do so because they will want
us to do the same); and that ``their use runs counter to our
identity and values as a nation.''
Unmentioned by the Obama Democrats is that officers of the
executive branch have a solemn moral duty to honor their
commitment to protect the American people from attack by
America's enemies. If there are non-torture tactics that can
get a Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to give us information that
saves American lives, how is the use of them inconsistent
with our values?
Here is the fact: Democrats are saying they would prefer to
see tens of thousands of Americans die than to see a KSM
subjected to sleep-deprivation or to have his ``phobias
exploited.'' I doubt that this reflects the values of most
Americans.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I rise to claim time in opposition to the
Burton amendment, even though I am not opposed to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Texas is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chair, I want to tell the gentleman I appreciate him wanting to
honor the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. As I have said
many times on the floor, I have had the privilege of visiting with
members of the CIA and members of their families, members of the CIA
throughout the world under probably the most difficult of
circumstances. I understand the hardships that they face.
Most recently, I was with family members and survivors of the Khost
bombing, which illustrates the danger they put themselves in willingly
to protect our country. I would also remind the gentleman that we
should not mix and compare apples to oranges. There is a big difference
between a training exercise that simulates waterboarding and
waterboarding an individual for 183 times. That's a huge difference.
The other thing I would point out is that when the last
administration decided to take us down that road, that enhanced
interrogation techniques would be authorized and approved. There has
been a great amount of disagreement in terms of the legal authorization
of these techniques, considered torture by most anybody's standards. I
would also remind us that the CIA did not have any expertise in
waterboarding. They had to actually go out and contract DOD personnel
to be able to acquire that technique. It puts them in a tough
situation.
I will tell you what I hear from the men and women of the Central
Intelligence Agency. They understand the difference between politics
and bad policy. They understand the difference between doing the kinds
of things that they are expected to do to keep our country safe and
responding to the kind of political spin that, unfortunately, we hear
about their work.
But, the one thing that comes across when I hear from them is they
appreciate the support that they receive from the Congress. They
appreciate the fact that regardless of what side of the aisle we sit
on, we respect the work that they do.
We, despite all of the arguments that are proffered here in this
great Chamber, in the final analysis they know that they have a job to
do. They know that they have a duty to perform. They know that they are
committed professionals and that they expect and deserve the support of
every member of this Chamber. That's why I appreciate the gentleman's
sponsoring this amendment.
That's why I think we ought to accept it. I accept it. I think we
ought to leave it at that and leave the politics and leave the rhetoric
and remind ourselves that the message we need to send them is that we
support their work. The message we should send them is that we honor
them for their service to this great country.
The message that we deliver to the families of those victims of the
Khost bombing is that we will support them. We will have our
differences politically, we will articulate those differences, but we
will never stop supporting the great work that the men and women of the
Central Intelligence Agency do for all of us.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Holt
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9
printed in House Report 111-419.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 9 offered by Mr. Holt:
At the end of subtitle A of title V, add the following new
section:
SEC. 505. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE TO DETERMINE IF FOREIGN
CONNECTION TO ANTHRAX ATTACKS EXISTS.
(a) Review.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall conduct a review of available intelligence,
including raw and unfinished intelligence, to determine if
there is any credible evidence of a connection between a
foreign entity and the attacks on the United States in 2001
involving anthrax.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--The Inspector General shall submit to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of
the Senate a report containing the findings of the review
conducted under subsection (a).
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman
from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) and a Member opposed each will control of 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, as you may know, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation announced last week that it is formally closing its
investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks, a major bioterrorist
attack on America. Those attacks are believed to have originated from a
postbox in New Jersey, disrupting the lives and livelihoods of many of
my constituents and yours.
We already know that the FBI too quickly jumped to conclusions about
the nature and the profile of the culprit or culprits and quickly
zeroed in on one individual who later received a
[[Page H891]]
multimillion dollar settlement and apology for mistaken accusations.
Subsequently, the investigators focused on another individual, who
then killed himself. Although the FBI never produced any physical
evidence tying that individual specifically to the attacks, they closed
the case.
Indeed, this investigation was botched at multiple points, which is
why reexamining it is so important. Given that the samples of the
strain of anthrax that was used in the attacks may have been supplied
to foreign laboratories, we think it's prudent to have the Inspector
General of the intelligence community examine whether or not evidence
of a potential foreign connection to the attacks was overlooked,
ignored, or simply not passed along to the FBI.
Mr. Bartlett and I are offering an amendment that would require the
Inspector General to examine whether or not evidence of a potential
foreign connection to the attacks was overlooked, ignored or simply not
passed along. The report would be unclassified with a classified annex
and would go to Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary and Homeland
Security Committees.
To date, there has been no independent comprehensive review of this
investigation, and a number of important questions remain unanswered.
This amendment would address one of those questions.
I reserve the balance of my time. May I ask how much time is
remaining?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from New Jersey has 3 minutes
remaining.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Bartlett).
Mr. BARTLETT. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I want to thank him
very much for his initiative in this effort. Dr. Ivins was my
constituent, the laboratory at which he worked is in my district,
indeed, just a few miles from my home, so I was very much involved in
this case. His colleagues say that he would not have done it, and the
FBI said early on that he could not have done it because the spores
were weaponized, and he had no ability to do that. More recently, they
have been saying something a bit different than that.
I have here some quotes that I think will be relevant here. Jeffrey
Adamovicz, the former chief of bacteriology--``former'' is important
here, because they would not let the current scientist at Fort Detrick
talk to me. He just left. The former chief of bacteriology for the U.S.
Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases in Frederick,
Maryland, where Ivins worked, wrote to The Frederick News-Post
expressing serious misgivings about the FBI findings that Ivins sent
the deadly letters that killed 5 and sickened 17 in 2001.
``The evidence is still very circumstantial and unconvincing as a
whole,'' he wrote. ``I'm curious as to why they closed the case while
the National Academy of Science review is still ongoing. Is it because
the review is going unfavorable for the FBI?
``Ivins' death came about a month after the Justice Department agreed
to pay an out-of-court settlement valued at $5.85 million to scientist
Steven Hatfill, who had long been the key suspect in the case. Hatfill
had sued the Justice Department, which had labeled him `a person of
interest.' He alleged that the Federal Government went on a smear
campaign and leaked information that was damaging to his reputation.''
Apparently they agreed they had. They paid him $5.85 million. They
subsequently agreed, conceded that he was not involved in the case.
Gary Andrews, another former chief of the bacteriology lab in
Frederick, said it wouldn't have been unusual for Ivins to work odd
hours because he was working with animals, and it was more convenient
to do it then. He says that ``Bruce didn't have the skill to make spore
preps of that concentration. He never ever could make a spore prep like
the ones found in the letters.''
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. HOLT. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
{time} 1600
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much for your lead in this.
This has been devastating to my constituents and the scientists at
Fort Detrick. This needs to be brought to a proper close. They did not
believe he would have done it; the FBI said earlier on he couldn't have
done it. Thank you very much for leading in this.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, it is beyond question that the FBI jumped to
conclusions at least once, perhaps more than once, and many questions
remain. This amendment would address one of those questions.
Beyond this amendment, we still need a more complete examination of
our government's response to these attacks, the most serious
bioterrorist attack against the United States. This will look at
whether there is a foreign connection to those attacks that has been
overlooked, ignored, or not pursued.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time, asking support for
this amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Castle
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10
printed in House Report 111-419.
Mr. CASTLE. Madam Chairwoman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 10 offered by Mr. Castle:
Insert after section 354 (page 69, after line 15) the
following new section:
SEC. 355. REITERATION OF REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT REPORT ON
TERRORISM FINANCING.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the President, acting through the Secretary of the
Treasury, shall submit to Congress the report required to be
submitted under section 6303(a) of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118
Stat. 3750).
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman
from Delaware (Mr. Castle) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Delaware.
Mr. CASTLE. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
This amendment, offered with Mr. Lynch, requires the President,
through the Secretary of the Treasury, to submit to Congress a
comprehensive report on terrorism financing that was first mandated by
the Intelligence Reform Bill of 2004, but has yet to be submitted.
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, our government acted quickly to
combat terrorist financing. However, post-9/11 terrorist financing has
become more decentralized, and those involved are using less
sophisticated means to move money and avoid official banking systems.
Terrorist financiers are exploiting new technology to transfer money
electronically and employing money laundering schemes to cover up their
activities.
In response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations, Congress passed
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Section
6303 of this 2004 law required the President to submit to Congress a
comprehensive report evaluating and making recommendations on the
current state of U.S. efforts to fight terror financing. This important
report was due in September of 2005, but it has never been completed.
Multiple U.S. Government departments and agencies are involved in the
effort to combat terrorist financing, including Treasury, Justice
Department, Homeland Security, State Department, Defense Department,
FBI and the CIA. These various entities are to be commended for their
efforts to track and disrupt complex terrorist financing schemes since
2001. Still, with so many government entities involved in combating
terrorist financing, it is critical that we heed the lessons of the
past and undertake a thorough assessment of our progress.
The amendment I am offering today with Congressman Lynch reiterates
Congress' requirement that the President undertake a thorough
evaluation of our efforts to disrupt terrorist financing, including the
ability to coordinate our intelligence and keep pace with evolving
trends.
The bottom line is that terrorists need money to operate, and we need
to
[[Page H892]]
be fully prepared and adaptable to combating their ability to access
these funds. There is no room for delay in this endeavor, especially
since top U.S. intelligence officials indicate a possible likelihood of
another attempted terrorist attack on the United States at some time in
the relatively near future.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss my amendment. I look forward
to working with the members of the committee on these important
matters.
Madam Chairwoman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LYNCH. Madam Chair, I rise to claim time in opposition.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Massachusetts
is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. LYNCH. Madam Chair, I actually rise to support my colleague's
amendment.
As the co-chairman of the Task Force on Terrorist Financing and
Proliferation, I, too, am well aware that having an effective strategy
on targeting the sources of terrorists in financing their operations is
a very important part of our strategy.
This straightforward amendment offered by my friend, Mr. Castle of
Delaware, simply restates the basic requirement that the President,
through the Treasury Department, report to Congress on the current
status of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism financing. This reporting
requirement is not new; in fact, it was mandated in the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004. A report was due out in
2005, but here today it has yet to be submitted.
I've had an opportunity, as co-chair of the task force, to spend a
lot of time with our Treasury employees, very brave and courageous
Treasury and State Department employees, in Afghanistan and Pakistan
and Jordan and the Maghreb, North Africa; and they're doing wonderful
and courageous work. However, that much being said, Congress still
retains its oversight responsibility; and without this report we are
not able to be certain, I think, that we have an accurate picture of
the entire antiterrorist financing protocol and we are not fully
informed as to whether or not we are operating as effectively as we
could be. Only by understanding where we currently stand--what our
strengths are and, indeed, what our weaknesses are--can we ensure that
the best possible strategy for cutting out terrorist financing is
ultimately accomplished.
Again, I want to thank Congressman Castle, the gentleman from
Delaware, for his support of this amendment, and I urge my colleagues
to support it.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CASTLE. Madam Chairwoman, we hope this report can be done
relatively soon. The amendment actually allows for 180 days more from
this time in order to submit it. We have been in touch with the
administration. We know that they're aware of this, and hopefully it
can be completed. I think it may help with the safety of our country
and perhaps dealing with the financing of terrorists in this world, so
we look forward to it.
I appreciate the support. I also appreciate all the words and support
of Mr. Lynch in getting to this point.
With that, I encourage everyone to support it and yield back the
balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Walz
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11
printed in House Report 111-419.
Mr. WALZ. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 11 offered by Mr. Walz:
Page 85, after line 20 insert the following:
(d) Education on Combat-Related Injuries.--Section 3001 of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(50 U.S.C. 435b) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (j); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (h) the following new
subsection:
``(i) Education on Combat-Related Injuries.--
``(1) In general.--The head of the entity selected pursuant
to subsection (b) shall take such actions as such head
considers necessary to educate each authorized adjudicative
agency that is an element of the intelligence community on
the nature of combat-related injuries as they relate to
determinations of eligibility for access to classified
information for veterans who were deployed in support of a
contingency operation.
``(2) Definitions.--In this subsection:
``(A) Contingency operation.--The term `contingency
operation' has the meaning given the term in section
101(a)(13) of title 10, United States Code.
``(B) Intelligence community.--The term `intelligence
community' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
``(C) Veteran.--The term `veteran' has the meaning given
the term in section 101(2) of title 38, United States
Code.''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman
from Minnesota (Mr. Walz) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota.
Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And I thank the chairman of
the committee and the ranking member for your work in securing our
Nation and bringing this piece of legislation to the floor.
The amendment that I am offering, Madam Chair, serves a twofold
purpose. First, it allows us to fulfill our obligation to our returning
combat veterans coming back and integrating back into civilian life.
And it also recognizes the unique skill set that these veterans have
that are absolutely perfectly suited for intelligence and national
security work.
What I am asking for in this amendment is to make sure there is a
level playing field for these warriors. A large number of our troops
are coming back; and either through a lack of understanding or a
misunderstanding, the security adjudicators are either revoking or
denying security clearances for wounds that were received, either
physical or mental--PTSD, and others--during the conflicts that they
served in.
What this amendment asks for is it requires the intelligence
community to educate security clearance adjudicators on the nature of
these wounds. The purpose is to make sure that they have the best
knowledge available to make informed decisions and give our returning
warriors the opportunity to receive their clearances, to retain their
clearances, and then go on to further serve this Nation in these
critical capacities.
So I thank the committee for their work. The Intelligence Committee,
the Armed Services and the Veterans' Affairs Committee are all in
support of this. I think it will go a long ways toward leveling the
playing field and allowing this Nation to use the incredible skills and
resources that those wounded warriors bring back, but still have the
capacity to serve.
With that, Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to the
amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I agree with what the gentleman said about our
wounded warriors and how we ought to be giving them all the support
that we possibly can, but the reason I took this time in opposition is
because the chairman and I couldn't reach an agreement to discuss one
of the provisions in the bill.
I sincerely feel, Madam Chairman, that we are endangering our
capability of getting information from terrorists because we are
limiting our CIA and our intelligence officials with this legislation
and these procedures that they can use to elicit that information. I
know there are some differences of opinion, and I know we have in our
hearts the best security that we can think of for the American people,
but the one thing that really, really bothers me is we're telling CIA
officials--and some of our military people in the field, not with this
bill--but we are telling a lot of our intelligence officials and people
in the field that they have to be very, very careful and walk on eggs
when they are trying to get information from a terrorist, al Qaeda or
Taliban terrorist, to make sure that we aren't violating or torturing
them in any way.
[[Page H893]]
The American people certainly don't want torture, and there is a big
difference of opinion on whether or not water boarding, for instance,
is torture. But the fact of the matter is if we have another major
attack like the one we had on 9/11, the American people are going to
come down like a ton of bricks on the people in this House that put
restrictions on our intelligence-gathering capability. They're going to
say, why didn't you do whatever it took to secure the safety of the
people of this country? And because we are putting this language in
this bill, we are saying to the CIA and the other intelligence
agencies, you've got to be real careful; you've got to make absolutely
sure you don't do something that might get you in trouble and might
even put you in jail.
And when you say things like that to the people that are out there in
the field risking their lives, what you do is you intimidate them,
maybe not intentionally, but you intimidate them and you stop the
possibility of getting all the information that we need to protect this
country.
Now, I know there is a disagreement; I just talked to some people on
the other side. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was water boarded 80-something
times, I think, or something like that; and when he first started out,
he said, well, you'll find out what's going to happen. And later, after
he was water boarded, he said, yes, there was going to be a plane that
was going to fly into a building in Los Angeles. Well, that plane, had
it flown into a building in Los Angeles, might have killed another
2,000 or 3,000 people.
And so the only reason I came here is to just say, let's don't break
the legs of our intelligence officers who are trying to protect this
country. It's just too important. We ought to be doing everything we
can to back them up to make sure this country is safe. Our intelligence
people are telling us right now we're likely to have another attack
within the next 6 months or 1 year. So we ought to be giving every
intelligence agency and every officer we possibly can all the support
they need to stop that.
With that, I thank you very much for yielding and yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. WALZ. I hope I have the gentleman's support on this bill,
providing the trained and courageous veterans who are returning home.
We are not asking for preferential treatment. What we are asking is
that our adjudicators be clearly informed what these combat veterans
have gone through, making sure we are able to bring them back, place
them in their positions if they choose to continue to serve this
Nation. I would ask for the support of this body on this amendment.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Walz).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. Schauer
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12
printed in House Report 111-419.
Mr. SCHAUER. Madam Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 12 offered by Mr. Schauer:
Insert after section 354 the following new section:
SEC. 355. REPORT ON ATTEMPT TO DETONATE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ON
NORTHWEST AIRLINES FLIGHT 253.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to Congress a report on the attempt to detonate an explosive
device aboard Northwest Airlines flight number 253 on
December 25, 2009. Such report shall describe any failures to
share or analyze intelligence or other information within or
between elements of the United States Government and the
measures that the intelligence community has taken or will
take to prevent such failures, including--
(1) a description of the roles and responsibilities of the
counterterrorism analytic components of the intelligence
community in synchronizing, correlating, and analyzing all
sources of intelligence related to terrorism;
(2) an assessment of the technological capabilities of the
intelligence community to assess terrorist threats,
including--
(A) a list of all databases used by counterterrorism
analysts;
(B) a description of the steps taken by the intelligence
community to integrate all relevant terrorist databases and
allow for cross-database searches; and
(C) a description of the steps taken by the intelligence
community to correlate biographic information with terrorism-
related intelligence;
(3) a description of the steps taken by the intelligence
community to train analysts on watchlisting processes and
procedures;
(4) a description of how watchlisting information is
entered, reviewed, searched, analyzed, and acted upon by the
relevant elements of the intelligence community;
(5) a description of the steps the intelligence community
is taking to enhance the rigor and raise the standard of
tradecraft of intelligence analysis related to uncovering and
preventing terrorist plots;
(6) a description of the processes and procedures by which
the intelligence community prioritizes terrorism threat leads
and the standards used by elements of the intelligence
community to determine if follow-up action is appropriate;
(7) a description of the steps taken to enhance record
information on possible terrorists in the Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment;
(8) an assessment of how to meet the challenge associated
with exploiting the ever-increasing volume of information
available to the intelligence community; and
(9) a description of the steps the intelligence community
has taken or will take to respond to any findings and
recommendations of the congressional intelligence committees,
with respect to such failures, that have been transmitted to
the Director of National Intelligence.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Schauer) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. SCHAUER. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
As a member of the Aviation Subcommittee of the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, I believe it is critical for the Director of
National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on the attempted
bombing of Northwest Flight 253.
The failed Christmas day attack over Detroit reinforces the notion
that the threat of al-Qaeda is real and that our intelligence
community, whether under a Democratic or Republican administration,
must improve the way it protects the United States against terrorist
attacks.
{time} 1615
People in Michigan want answers.
My amendment says, not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of the act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to Congress a report on the attempt to detonate an explosive
device aboard Northwest Airlines Flight No. 253 on December 25, 2009.
This amendment will require the Director of National Intelligence to
report to Congress information about any failures to share or to
analyze intelligence within or between elements of the Federal
Government related to this failed terrorist attack.
More importantly, the Director of National Intelligence also must
submit a description of the measures that the intelligence community
has taken or will take to prevent such failures from occurring again.
This would include information on how the government intends to improve
the interoperability of terrorist screening databases and to improve
airline watch listing procedures. These tools are critical in
preventing terrorists from getting an opportunity to kill innocent
civilians.
It is imperative that Congress be fully informed so that it may
conduct rigorous oversight on this important national security concern.
I appreciate President Obama's candor and openness when speaking to
the American people about the improvements needed to our intelligence
community, and I applaud the President for taking swift action in
ordering a thorough review of the incident. President Obama has stated
his willingness to work with Congress to solve this problem. This
amendment will help ensure that Congress will be fully briefed on the
results of that review. I urge the full support of this amendment.
I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes).
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I want to say I appreciate the amendment and
the gentleman's interest.
This amendment would require the director of the DNI to submit to the
Intelligence Committees a report on the attempted bombing of Northwest
Airlines Flight No. 253.
[[Page H894]]
This report would provide an assessment on any failures to share
information within or between elements of the Federal Government and
the measures that the intelligence community has taken or will take to
prevent such failures in the future.
This report also covers issues such as analytic tradecraft, watch
listing procedures, technical deficiencies, training database
management. Many of the elements of this report mirror portions of the
review of the DNI, which they are currently doing.
Requiring the DNI to provide this report will allow the Intelligence
Committees to conduct rigorous oversight on this important national
security concern.
Additionally, this amendment requires the DNI to submit responses to
any findings or recommendations made by the Intelligence Committees.
With that, Madam Chair, I fully support this amendment.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I rise to claim the time in opposition.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I will not oppose the amendment. Although,
I do believe, and I would hope that my colleague from Michigan would
agree that, perhaps, when we are talking about the scope of this
amendment, it is broader than what is just written here.
One of the things that we are very, very concerned about which, I
believe, should be included in this--because, like you, I believe, if
the intelligence community had worked properly, perhaps we could have
stopped this attack; but this is not just a matter of connecting
databases and those types of things. It is also about missing clues
that we had that were highlighted before Christmas Day.
What am I talking about?
We have known for quite some time that Awlaki was a concern. We saw
kind of a mirror image of what happened on Christmas Day a couple of
months earlier at Fort Hood, where 14 Americans were killed and where
14 Americans died in a tragic terrorist attack, linked to Awlaki,
linked to al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula.
I had an amendment that went along those lines, but it was not
accepted by the majority, and I think it may well have fallen within
the scope of the amendment of yours, Mr. Schauer, which you are
offering, which says:
If we had had these insights into al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula,
if we had had these insights into Awlaki's involvement with Major
Hasan, if we had had these insights into the communications, the
emails, between Hasan and Awlaki, what did we do between November 5 and
Christmas Day to target Awlaki, to target al Qaeda on the Arabian
Peninsula and to use this information that these individuals and this
group might be targeting the U.S. and whether we missed opportunities
in those 2 months to identify the threat and respond to it?
Are those the kind of questions that you might see which could also
be addressed in this or are these outside of the scope of what you are
looking for?
I yield to my colleague from Michigan.
Mr. SCHAUER. Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra, and thank you for your
leadership on the Intelligence Committee.
Absolutely, my amendment deals directly with having the Director of
National Intelligence describe failures and to share or to analyze
intelligence or other information within or between elements of the
United States Government. So I think it is clearly my intent that the
dots be connected.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Reclaiming my time, I thank my colleague for that
clarification because I think that is probably the bigger untold story
here of how much and how many insights we might have had into al Qaeda
on the Arabian Peninsula and how we failed to act on that intelligence
and how we failed, as we've now been saying for a long period of time,
to connect those dots, to be able to put in preventative measures and
to actually have stopped Awlaki and al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula
from carrying out this attack on Detroit and on the State of Michigan.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHAUER. Madam Chair, how much time remains?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Schauer) has 1\1/
2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra)
has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. SCHAUER. I yield 1 minute 20 seconds to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Peters).
Mr. PETERS. Madam Chair, I rise today in support of the Schauer
amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
Like many Americans, my Christmas Day spent with family was
interrupted by the news of the attempted terrorist attack on Northwest
Flight No. 253 to Detroit.
As a lifelong Michigan resident whose friends, family, and
constituents regularly fly in and out of Detroit Metropolitan Wayne
County Airport, the Christmas Day attempt was especially chilling.
While it was certainly fortunate that no lives were lost in the
Christmas Day attempt, the attack exposed serious and unacceptable
shortcomings in our ability to gather intelligence and to connect the
dots.
I believe that protecting the American people is Congress' number one
priority and responsibility. The Christmas Day incident showed us that
security officials need to work more closely with their counterparts
overseas and within the United States intelligence community to ensure
tougher and more coordinated screening.
I appreciate my friend Congressman Schauer's leadership on this
important issue, and I am proud to support the Schauer amendment
because it will help ensure that we learn as much as possible about the
failures that allowed the events of Christmas Day 2009 to transpire.
I urge the adoption of this amendment.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I will not oppose the amendment. As a
matter of fact, I will support the amendment in its larger context,
recognizing that this report by the DNI has to include the time prior
to Fort Hood, the Fort Hood attack, and then the time from Fort Hood
until Christmas Day. That is the area that we have been trying to get
information on from the intelligence community over the last 3 or 4
months, and it has been the area that they have been most reluctant to
provide us information on.
As a matter of fact, when I was in Yemen on New Year's Day, less than
2 months ago, I was specifically prohibited from getting information on
exactly those kinds of questions as to what did the intelligence
community know about Awlaki, about al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula.
The individuals both in the intel community and with the Ambassador
were specifically instructed not to share that information, which tells
me that there is some information there, and for some reason, they have
not wanted to share that information with us.
So, with the understanding that that type of information will be
shared with Congress in this report, also then recognizing that this
may end up being a classified report which you may not have access to
unless the committee agrees to provide you access to it, I support the
amendment. I look forward to the DNI's completing this report and to
his submitting it to the committee.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHAUER. I thank Mr. Hoekstra for his support, and I urge Members
to support this amendment.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Schauer).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. SCHAUER. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
will be postponed.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Capuano) having assumed the chair, Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas, Acting
Chair of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union,
reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill
(H.R.
[[Page H895]]
2701) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2010 for intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government,
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to
no resolution thereon.
____________________
