[Congressional Record: May 27, 2010 (House)]
[Page H4025-H4064]
{time} 1745
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011--Continued
Amendment No. 42 Offered by Ms. Eshoo
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 42
printed in House Report 111-498.
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 42 offered by Mr. Eshoo:
At the end of subtitle C of title IX, add the following new
section:
SEC. 923. AUDITS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BY GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE.
(a) Audits.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``audits of intelligence community by government accountability office
``Sec. 508. (a) In General.--Except as provided in
subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall
ensure that personnel of the Government Accountability Office
designated by the Comptroller General are provided with
access to all information in the possession of an element of
the intelligence community that the Comptroller General
determines is necessary for such personnel to conduct an
analysis, evaluation, or investigation of a program or
activity of an element of the intelligence community that is
requested by one of the congressional intelligence
committees.
``(b) Audits of Programs Involving Sources and Methods.--
(1) If the Director of National Intelligence determines that
a portion of an analysis, evaluation, or investigation to be
conducted by the Comptroller General that is requested by a
committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the subject of
such analysis, evaluation, or investigation involves a matter
that is subject to the reporting requirements of section 503
or intelligence sources or methods, such portion may be
redacted from such analysis, evaluation, or investigation and
provided exclusively to the congressional intelligence
committees.
``(2) If the Director of National Intelligence redacts a
portion of an analysis, evaluation, or investigation under
paragraph (1), the Director shall inform the committee of
Congress that requested such analysis, evaluation, or
investigation of the redaction.
[[Page H4033]]
``(c) Notice of Analysis, Evaluation, or Investigation and
Procedures.--Not later than 15 days before initiating an
analysis, evaluation, or investigation of an element of the
intelligence community, the Comptroller General shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a notice that
includes--
``(1) a description of the analysis, evaluation, or
investigation to occur and the purposes of such analysis,
evaluation, or investigation;
``(2) the names of the personnel who will conduct such
analysis, evaluation, or investigation and the level of
security clearance possessed by such personnel; and
``(3) the procedures to be used in the course of such
analysis, evaluation, or investigation for examining
classified information, including a description of all
facilities and materials that will be used.
``(d) Discussion of Procedures.--(1) Prior to initiating an
analysis, evaluation, or investigation of an element of the
intelligence community, the Comptroller General, in
consultation with the congressional intelligence committees,
shall discuss with the Director of National Intelligence the
procedures for conducting such analysis, evaluation, or
investigation.
``(2) Not later than five days after the discussion
referred to in paragraph (1), the Director of National
Intelligence may submit to the Comptroller General a written
comment suggesting any changes or modifications to the
procedures referred to in paragraph (1).
``(e) Confidentiality.--The Comptroller General shall
maintain the same level of confidentiality for a record made
available during the course of an analysis, evaluation, or
investigation involving sources or methods as is required of
the head of the element of the intelligence community from
which such record is obtained. An officer or employee of the
Government Accountability Office shall be subject to the same
statutory penalties for unauthorized disclosure or use of a
record as an officer or employee of the element of the
intelligence community that provided the Comptroller General
or such officer or employee of the Government Accountability
Office with access to such record.
``(f) Workpapers.--All workpapers of the Comptroller
General and all records and property of any element of the
intelligence community that the Comptroller General uses
during the course of an analysis, evaluation, or
investigation involving sources or methods shall remain in
facilities provided by the element of the intelligence
community providing such records and property.
``(g) Provision of Supplies.--The head of each element of
the intelligence community that is a subject of an analysis,
evaluation, or investigation by the Comptroller General
involving sources or methods shall provide the Comptroller
General with suitable and secure offices and furniture,
telephones, and access to copying facilities, for purposes of
such analysis, evaluation, or investigation.
``(h) Procedures for Protection of Information.--The
Comptroller General, in consultation with the congressional
intelligence committees, shall establish procedures to
protect from unauthorized disclosure all classified and other
sensitive information furnished to the Comptroller General in
the course of conducting an analysis, evaluation, or
investigation involving sources and methods.
``(i) Submission of Names of Personnel Conducting Analysis,
Evaluation, or Investigation.--Prior to initiating an
analysis, evaluation, or investigation involving sources and
methods, the Comptroller General shall provide the Director
of National Intelligence and the head of each element of the
intelligence community that is a subject of such analysis,
evaluation, or investigation with the name of each officer
and employee of the Government Accountability Office who has
obtained appropriate security clearance and to whom, upon
proper identification, the head of such element shall make
available records and information during the course of such
analysis, evaluation, or investigation.
``(j) Cooperation.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community that is a subject of an analysis,
evaluation, or investigation shall cooperate fully with the
Comptroller General and provide timely responses to requests
by the Comptroller General for documentation and information
made pursuant to this section.
``(k) Rule of Construction.--Except as provided in
subsection (b), nothing in this section or any other
provision of law shall be construed to restrict or limit the
authority of the Comptroller General to audit, evaluate, or
obtain access to the records of an element of the
intelligence community absent specific statutory language
restricting or limiting such audits, evaluations, or access
to records.''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1404, the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Eshoo) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer my amendment No. 42 to this
National Defense Authorization Act.
Mr. Chairman, what brings me to the floor is something that I think
should concern every single Member of the House. We all know that our
number one obligation as Members of Congress is to secure our country.
And as a member of the House Intelligence Committee, it matters not
Republican or Democrat, we stand shoulder to shoulder. We may debate
different things. We all know, and the full House knows, that this is
our first and top obligation. In order to carry that obligation out,
that duty done well, as a member of the House Intelligence Committee we
must do effective oversight. We have to do investigations. It is the
way we do our work.
The reason I offer this amendment is because, unlike all the rest of
the committees of the House who can use the GAO, dispatch the
Government Accountability Office into the executive branch to make the
kinds of determinations on financial issues, financial management,
personnel, acquisitions, information technology, whatever it might be,
the House Intelligence Committee is not allowed to do that. And in
attempting to do it, it has drawn the ire of the administration.
Now, I am a Democrat. We have a Democratic administration. I think
the administration is ill-advised in this. These are the prerogatives
of the Congress and the jurisdictions of our committees. I think that
we need to be able to have the tools that the GAO has, with all of the
safeguards in place relative to sources and methods and those things
that are the most sensitive in the intelligence community. But I don't
believe that the executive branch should be telling the legislative
branch what tools we should have and to make that decision for us. That
speaks to the separation of powers, and it also speaks to what we, as
Members of Congress, in terms of our duty have to carry out and to do.
So my amendment really corrects this flaw, and I think it's an
important provision that would restore the GAO's role in congressional
oversight. I don't think this is a question of whether the information
is too sensitive for the GAO. They have the security clearances. They
have dealt with things before, and nothing has ever happened.
So as I said, I believe this issue goes directly to the heart of one
of the most important functions of the Congress, and that is effective
oversight. That's what this amendment is about.
I want to thank, in particular, Chairman Howard Berman for his work
on this issue from the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and also my
colleagues from the House Intelligence Committee who are sponsoring
this amendment: Congressman Holt, Congressman Tierney of Massachusetts,
Congressman Thompson of California, and Congresswoman Schakowsky of
Illinois.
I rise to offer my amendment #42, to the FY2011 National Defense
Authorization Act. This Amendment would require the Director of
National Intelligence to cooperate with GAO inquiries initiated by
committees of jurisdiction.
Oversight of matters in the intelligence community--including
financial management, personnel systems, acquisitions, and information
technology--is a fundamental prerogative of Congress. GAO plays a
critical role helping committees examine the functions of government
agencies in an objective, thorough manner.
But despite this expertise, the intelligence community refuses to
allow GAO in the door, even when the intelligence committees--the
committees that have jurisdiction over them--have asked them to
investigate. The Administration has even threatened to veto the
Intelligence Authorization Bill because it contained a provision that
would restore GAO's role in Congressional oversight.
The co-sponsors of this amendment have joined me in rejecting the
Administration's flawed legal analysis that would exempt the
intelligence community from GAO's review--even though they review every
other federal agency.
This is not a question of whether the information is too sensitive
for GAO. GAO has evaluated a number of national security programs,
including ones that have sensitive intelligence implications like
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance programs which are known
as ISR platforms. GAO has issued classified reports on the Iraq war and
parts of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative. Their
personnel have the appropriate security clearances and they know how to
safeguard sensitive information.
In an abundance of caution, the amendment lays out additional
safeguards that GAO must follow to be able to have access to our
nation's intelligence information.
[[Page H4034]]
I believe this issue is one that goes directly to the heart of one of
the most important functions of the Congress, and that is oversight.
This also goes to the very core of the principle of Separation of
Powers.
My amendment would make clear to the intelligence community that they
cannot bar the door to Congressional oversight, and it is Congress, not
the Executive branch that determines which tools we get to use.
In particular, I'd like to thank Chairman Berman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and HPSCI members Representatives Holt, Tierney,
Thompson of California, and Schakowsky for co-sponsoring this
amendment. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
At this point I would like to yield to Mr. Berman, my trusted and
distinguished colleague from California.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for the 1\1/2\ minutes
remaining in favor of the amendment.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, the Eshoo amendment cuts right to the heart
of our constitutional authority: Congressional oversight of matters, in
this case, within the intelligence community--basic functions,
financial management, acquisitions, information technology--a
fundamental prerogative of this body, a prerogative that should not be
limited to the intelligence committees.
Bottom line, GAO plays a critical role in helping the committees
examine day-to-day functions of government agencies within their
jurisdiction, and its expertise needs to be brought to bear on the
intelligence community. This is particularly true after the 2004
reforms that established the ODNI. There is no community that has
undergone more bureaucratic overhaul and tumult, any agency within the
Federal Government, than within the intelligence community.
The notion that committees of appropriate jurisdiction are blocked
from investigating areas within their domain for oversight purposes,
having nothing to do--we clearly exempt the sources and methods issues
from this oversight--makes no sense. It is an insult to the
prerogatives of the Congress. And to the extent that the administration
argues this should be solely within their prerogative, they don't fully
understand our institutional role in Congress.
I don't understand how anyone in this body who is interested in
dealing with waste, with fraud, with duplication would want to limit
the GAO's authority to go into appropriate areas within the
intelligence community.
I urge an ``aye'' vote.
{time} 1830
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I seek the time in opposition.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I think the first and probably most
important point to make on this amendment is that it does not belong on
this bill and it imperils the whole bill.
This issue about whether to expand GAO's authority to be able to
investigate the intelligence community, which has been an issue in the
fiscal year 2010 intelligence authorization bill, has been the subject
of veto threats from the administration and is one of, if not the
reason, here 4 months before the end of the fiscal year we still do not
have an intelligence authorization bill.
So it does not belong here. This is the DOD authorization bill. It is
being discussed in another forum where it should, the intelligence
authorization bill, and if it gets added to the DOD authorization bill,
it puts in danger this entire bill because just today, the
administration sent another email which confirmed the veto threat over
this provision.
So however Members feel about the particular issue one way or
another, I would suggest that you ought to be very careful about
endangering the whole bill over this provision.
Second point I'd make is this is not a change to be taken lightly. As
the gentlelady, my colleague on the Intelligence Committee mentioned,
the GAO has not had this power, authority before since the modern
intelligence community has existed. Congress after Congress of both
parties, President after President of both parties have rejected this,
I would suggest, for some very good reasons.
So this is not a step to be taken lightly.
I think the only argument one can make is that the current
intelligence committees are incapable of performing their oversight
responsibilities and therefore they have to get this other entity, GAO,
in to help them do that. I don't agree with that position. I think the
intelligence committees in the House and the Senate are capable of
performing their job. Now, I get frustrated. I don't agree with
everything that the majority chooses to do, but I believe that the
committee is perfectly capable of oversight of the intelligence
community as we were tasked to do in the House rules and by statute.
These committees were created in the 1970s to fill a very unique
role, and to undermine them by saying they are incapable of performing
their job which, without bringing GAO and investigators and so forth, I
think is a mistake.
I also believe, Mr. Chairman, that this amendment may undermine the
role of the DNI at a time that is very sensitive for the role of the
DNI. Because if you look at the amendment itself, it says the
Comptroller General decides what he needs access to, has control over
how these investigations will be conducted. Now, the amendment says
that you can have discussions with the DNI, but the decision is with
the Comptroller General, further undermining the DNI's control over
classified material. I think that's a mistake.
There are other flaws, in my view, in this amendment. But the bottom
line is it undermines the bill. It does not belong here. And it is a
step that previous Congresses, previous Presidents have not chosen to
take because of the sensitivity of the material and the unique role
that the select committees on intelligence play.
Therefore, I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will
reject this amendment. I urge them to do so.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. All time for debate on the amendment has expired.
Mr. ANDREWS. Is it in order to propound a unanimous consent request
at this point?
The Acting CHAIR. Any request to extend time must be congruent on
both sides.
Mr. ANDREWS. I would make a unanimous consent request to extend for
each side 1 minute.
The Acting CHAIR. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman
from New Jersey?
There was no objection.
Mr. ANDREWS. I would yield 1 minute to the Speaker of the House, the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
Ms. PELOSI. I thank the gentleman for yielding and his leadership on
this important bill before us.
I commend Congresswoman Eshoo for her attention to this important
matter, her leadership in bringing this amendment to the floor.
Mr. Chairman, as you all know, protecting American people is our
first responsibility. Their security is what we take an oath to uphold,
protect, and defend. In order to do that, we recognize the importance
of intelligence gathering to preventing violence and to protecting the
American people, especially in this age when we're fighting terrorism
at home and abroad.
The issue before us is if the responsibilities of Congress can be
honored without the knowledge that we are entitled to. This is a very
important issue. We all recognize, as the gentleman said, the
importance of having information be kept secret when it's in our
national security interest to do so. Not to overdo that to the extent
of having Congress not have the information it needs to do its job of
proper oversight to protect the American people.
We are preventing harm. And if we're going to prevent harm, we have
to have information to do so. And the members of the Intelligence
Committee have a responsibility to hold that information close. This
doesn't apply to every piece of information of intelligence that comes
to the committee, but it does say that the GAO has a proven track
record of conducting thorough and professional investigations. Their
work has informed the Congress and led to significant changes that have
enhanced our government's effectiveness. GAO staff are professionals
who protect information held by the intelligence community. A vote for
this amendment is a vote for enhancing intelligence oversight. It is a
vote for Congress.
[[Page H4035]]
I urge our colleagues to support the Eshoo amendment.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I certainly agree with the
distinguished Speaker about the importance of our role in national
security and the importance of Congress' role in overseeing the
intelligence community. I agree that national security is the first job
of the Federal Government.
I also agree with both the gentleladies from California that
oversight can be improved from the Congress. As a matter of fact, I've
had legislation, which has not been allowed to be voted on the floor,
to make clear the notification requirements and statute about what any
administration must notify Congress about, the information it must give
us.
I'd also have to point out that the
9/11 Commission made a number of very important recommendations on how
we can improve oversight in this Congress. Unfortunately, that have not
been adopted. Now, they adopted a kind of a hybrid panel of the
Appropriations Committee, but that was not at all what the 9/11
Commission, the WMD Commission recommend we do to improve oversight.
I think we should focus on making our committees of oversight more
effective rather than bringing in this other entity, the General
Accounting Office, that has historically never had a role with the
intelligence community, and that the President says he will veto the
bill over if we allow it to happen.
Let's look at ourselves, improve ourselves first before we start
bringing in others.
Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chair, as Chairman of the Oversight and Government
Reform Committee, I support the amendment offered by Ms. Eshoo because
it will strengthen government accountability and enhance critical
oversight of the intelligence community. The amendment provides
necessary clarification regarding the authority of the General
Accountability Office, GAO, to receive information from the
intelligence community. Congress relies on the GAO as a force
multiplier in carrying out the investigative and oversight functions
vested in the Legislative Branch. The GAO helps inform the Congress and
all Executive agencies about areas and programs within the federal
government that are performing well, and those that need to be improved
or are vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse.
This amendment will allow GAO to carry out these vital functions
without unwarranted interference from intelligence community agencies.
As Acting Comptroller General Gene Dodaro previously noted, this
authority does not represent an overhaul of existing oversight
mechanisms for the intelligence community. Instead, ``The proposed
legislative provisions in essence reaffirm GAO's existing authority in
order to address the lack of cooperation GAO has received from certain
elements of the IC [intelligence community] in carrying out work at the
specific request of the intelligence committees, and other committees
of jurisdiction as defined by the rules of the Senate and House.'' The
intelligence community will function more effectively, and better
protect the security of this country if this amendment is adopted.
Despite my strong support for the amendment and its important goals,
I should note my concern with the way in which the amendment is
drafted. This provision should clearly identify the authority of any
committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the identified subject to
request evaluation or analysis of an intelligence community component,
not only the congressional intelligence committees, except in the case
of matters concerning intelligence sources and methods.
I thank Ms. Eshoo and the other sponsors of this important amendment
for bringing it before the House, and I urge all Members to support it.
Mr. THORNBERRY. I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California
will be postponed.
[...]
Amendment No. 42 Offered by Ms. Eshoo
The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Eshoo) on which further proceedings were postponed and
on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 218,
noes 210, not voting 10, as follows:
[Roll No. 315]
AYES--218
Ackerman
Aderholt
Adler (NJ)
Andrews
Arcuri
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Bordallo
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Bright
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carson (IN)
Castor (FL)
Chandler
Christensen
Chu
Clarke
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Costa
Courtney
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Driehaus
Duncan
Edwards (MD)
Ehlers
Ellison
Engel
Eshoo
Faleomavaega
Farr
Fattah
Foster
Frank (MA)
Fudge
Garamendi
Giffords
Gordon (TN)
Grayson
Green, Al
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Heinrich
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hinchey
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kilroy
Kind
Kingston
Kirkpatrick (AZ)
Kissell
Klein (FL)
Kosmas
Kratovil
Kucinich
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Maffei
Maloney
Markey (CO)
Markey (MA)
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McClintock
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McNerney
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (NY)
Nadler (NY)
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Norton
Nye
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Pallone
Pascrell
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Platts
Polis (CO)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rangel
Richardson
Rodriguez
Rohrabacher
Rothman (NJ)
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schauer
Schiff
Schrader
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Space
Speier
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Titus
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Waxman
Weiner
Welch
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Yarmuth
NOES--210
Akin
Alexander
Altmire
Austria
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Barrett (SC)
Bean
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boccieri
Boehner
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Broun (GA)
Brown (SC)
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Cao
Capito
Carney
Carter
Cassidy
Castle
Chaffetz
Childers
Clay
Cleaver
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cole
Conaway
Cooper
Costello
Crenshaw
Culberson
Dahlkemper
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Djou
Donnelly (IN)
Dreier
Edwards (TX)
Ellsworth
Emerson
Etheridge
Fallin
Filner
Flake
Fleming
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Granger
Green, Gene
Griffith
Grijalva
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hall (TX)
Halvorson
Harper
Hastings (WA)
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hill
Himes
Hinojosa
Hoekstra
Hunter
Inglis
Issa
Jenkins
[[Page H4062]]
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan (OH)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Lamborn
Lance
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lee (NY)
Lewis (CA)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Marshall
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul
McCotter
McHenry
McIntyre
McKeon
McMahon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Minnick
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Patrick
Murphy, Tim
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Olson
Ortiz
Owens
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Pence
Perriello
Peterson
Pitts
Poe (TX)
Posey
Price (GA)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rahall
Rehberg
Reichert
Reyes
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Salazar
Scalise
Schmidt
Schock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Sires
Skelton
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snyder
Stearns
Sullivan
Taylor
Teague
Terry
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Visclosky
Walden
Wamp
Watt
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--10
Boren
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Davis (AL)
Davis (KY)
Graves
Hastings (FL)
Melancon
Pierluisi
Ryan (WI)
Sablan
Announcement by the Acting Chair
The Acting CHAIR (during the vote). There are 2 minutes remaining in
this vote.
{time} 2134
Messrs. LEWIS of California, CLEAVER, BOCCIERI, and DICKS changed
their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. MOLLOHAN and CAPUANO changed their vote from ``no'' to
``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
