A REPORT CARD ON HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION
SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 24, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-141
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Lamar Smith, Texas
Norman D. Dicks, Washington Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Jane Harman, California Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Tom Davis, Virginia
Nita M. Lowey, New York Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia David G. Reichert, Washington
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
Islands Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Bob Etheridge, North Carolina David Davis, Tennessee
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Henry Cuellar, Texas Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania
Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Al Green, Texas
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
I. Lanier Lavant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
Jane Harman, California, Chair
Norman D. Dicks, Washington David G. Reichert, Washington
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Thomas M. Finan, Director and Counsel
Brandon Declet, Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Deron McElroy, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment............. 1
The Honorable David G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 2
WITNESSES
Panel I
Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Russell M. Porter, Director, Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center
and Intelligence Bureau, Iowa Department of Public Safety:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. John McKay, Professor from Practice, Seattle University
School of Law:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Panel II
Mr. Charles E. Allen, Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 47
Prepared Statement............................................. 49
Mr. Michael E. Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism
Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 57
Prepared Statement............................................. 60
A REPORT CARD ON HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING
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Wednesday, September 24, 2008
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman [Chair
of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Harman, Dicks, Langevin, Carney,
Reichert, Shays, and Dent.
Ms. Harman. The subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``A Report Card on Homeland Security Information Sharing.''
Earlier this month, we all sent our greatest American
assets, our children and our grandchildren, back to school. One
of the first things that new students need to do each year is
to reflect upon what they have learned the prior year. This
adage might also apply to Members of Congress, perish the
thought, and the Executive branch. So, as godmother of the
Department of Homeland Security and as Chair of this
subcommittee, I think it is time for the Federal Government and
Congress to reflect on what has been done to ensure that
timely, accurate and actionable information is shared with
America's first preventers.
Information sharing is a two-way street. While there has
been some progress in breaking down information stovepipes at
the Federal level and some promising efforts initiated by State
and local leaders themselves, much work remains to be done.
On September 11 of this year, Secretary Chertoff's Homeland
Security Advisory Council made this clear in a report that
assessed the top 10 challenges facing the next Secretary of
Homeland Security. Among other things, the council, headed by
William Webster, concluded that DHS must strengthen and
continue to build partnerships with organizations outside DHS,
such as State, local and tribal governments, as well as the
private sector. Where have we heard this before?
The report also cited concerns about the broken
classification process and recommended that common standards be
built for fusion centers and that funding be sustained. Where
have we heard this before?
These are concerns obviously shared by this subcommittee on
a unanimous basis, and they are concerns which could impair
connecting the dots in time to prevent the next attack.
If anybody thinks that we are home-free here, I would just
remind us all that last weekend in Islamabad, a city that takes
great steps to protect its infrastructure and its tourist sites
and so forth, there was a massive car bomb at the Marriott
hotel that killed over 50 people and wounded hundreds.
This subcommittee has been and will continue to be a
champion for the needs of State and local law enforcement, an
unusual practice in Washington. We are your champion. We think
that we are representing you here, rather than representing
Washington in our own neighborhoods.
We have demanded that threat information be shared with
cops on the beat who need it in a form that they can use, while
also ensuring that information worth sharing is not overly
classified. We have challenged DHS to help State and local law
enforcement in their efforts to think about the threats we face
in a way that can improve their police work by approaching all
crimes and hazards with a critical eye while also respecting
privacy and civil liberties.
We understand that it is a tough assignment, given the
number of bureaucratic hurdles that exist and the fact that
America's law enforcement system is highly decentralized. But
our police and other first preventers are most attuned to their
local communities and are directly accountable to the concerns
of those communities. They are the ones, you are the one, not
some bureaucrat or politician, who will know if something is
suspicious.
Our first panel includes first preventers from around the
country who are on the receiving end of DHS information. Our
question to you is: Are DHS and its partner agencies creating
intelligence products that meet your needs? If those products
aren't perfect, what gaps do you see? The ultimate question
before us today is: How can we better serve you?
In a few short months, the President-elect will need to set
his priorities. Implementing lessons learned on information
sharing should, in my opinion, be among them.
I want to thank our Ranking Member, Sheriff Reichert, as
well as all of our members, some of whom are arriving a bit
late in this hearing, for their focus and dedication to the
hard work of our subcommittee of the past 2 years. Many of you
have traveled with me to see fusion centers around the country
and the impressive command centers which were stood up for both
political conventions.
Some enormously critical and necessary activity is under
way, and our goal is to nurture and sustain it and to make sure
that it does comply with privacy and civil liberties needs.
Millions of schoolkids and their families are depending on
us to keep them safe. As I mentioned, that recent attack last
weekend and recent attacks in Yemen and elsewhere and attacks
planned around the globe remind us that the world remains
vulnerable. It is up to us and especially up to you to make
sure that the American public is protected.
I now yield time to the Ranking Member, Sheriff Reichert,
for opening remarks.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
It is good to be here today. It has been a busy couple of
weeks, and most of our Members, at least I know on our side
here, are busy this morning, listening to the Under Secretary
on some of our economic issues. So I just left that meeting; it
is still on-going.
But, first of all, I want to take this opportunity to thank
you, Madam Chair. This is most likely our last hearing of this
Congress. I would like to start my remarks by publicly thanking
you for your bipartisan leadership of this subcommittee and for
working with me to get many of our priorities through the House
and into law.
I also want to applaud you for your willingness to focus on
the State and local enforcement community, of which I used to
be a longtime member. It is essential that, going into the next
Congress, we continue to shine the light on their efforts and
their needs, because we need them more than ever in the fight
against terrorists. So thank you very much.
I also want to take a moment--Mr. Porter, welcome to you--
but I have two great friends on the panel this morning, another
sheriff that I have had the opportunity to grow to know. We
attended NEI, National Executive Institute, together. It seems
like 100 years ago, but I am sure it wasn't that long ago.
And my good friend, John McKay, who worked hard during the
time that I was the sheriff, the two of us working together,
trying to implement a system called the LInX System, which
would greatly enhance the ability of local law enforcement in
our community and across the Nation. I know Sheriff Baca is
also looking at the LInX System as a part of his regional
security information-sharing system.
We ran into some difficulties in the Seattle area with
trying to implement that system, but I will tell you, John
McKay was a champion for us there and was a great salesman who
finally brought together local, Federal, State enforcement
agencies, recognizing the need for us to work together and
share information. For that, I greatly appreciate his patience
with me and my skepticism at first in working with a Federal
Government.
As we all know, the famous line is, ``I am from the Federal
Government. I am here to help.'' Sheriffs sometimes don't
believe that, but now I find myself saying that. So I am hoping
that local law enforcement and those around the country begin
to believe that more and more. Because this committee, I know,
this subcommittee, I know, is very dedicated to bringing people
together around this country, from the smallest police
department, smallest sheriff's office, with the State police or
State patrol and with any Federal agency that has
responsibility for keeping this Nation safe.
I was going to read a statement, but I won't do that. It is
just so essential that we work together, here in Congress, with
all of you who represent local law enforcement and for those
who, in the next panel, represent the Federal side of things.
For this country to be safe, we have to work together, both
Democrats, Republicans, Federal agencies and local agencies.
We have made great progress, in my opinion, from when I
took office as sheriff in 1997 and came here in January 2005.
Great partnerships and friendships have been developed. I
really, truly believe, on a personal level, that those
relationships, those friendships and those partnerships are
absolutely key in making any system that we put in place, any
plan that we have in place, any technology that we want to
share with each other--none of that will work unless the people
sitting at the table in front of us today make a conscious
decision that they will be the change agent, that they will be
the ones holding the responsibility to keep this country safe.
I thank you all for being here today. I look forward to
your testimony. Good to see my good friends here.
I thank you, Madam Chair. I yield my time.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Reichert. Thank you for your
nice words about our relationship.
Just what you said to our witnesses applies to Congress, as
well. If we don't figure out how to work together in a
bipartisan basis, nothing will happen. I am especially proud of
the track record of this subcommittee over the last 2 years. We
have authored a lot of legislation; a lot of it has passed the
House.
Just yesterday, we got some progress on your bill, which I
strongly support, to provide sustained funding for fusion
centers and another bill, authored by Mr. Perlmutter, which we
all support, to provide some assist for public sources as a
critical part of our intelligence information.
We have two more bills that we are going to push hard to
get. One is on declassification. I think all of you are going
to speak to that today; I know you are. Another is on reducing
the number of pseudo classification markings on Federal
documents, another critical activity. It seems to us that all
of these go in the same direction, and that is to help push
information out, to change a need-to-know culture to a need-to-
share culture. We will not connect the dots if you don't have
the dots, because you are the ones who will figure out what the
dots mean.
So let me say hello to our witnesses, all of whom I know. I
will now introduce each of you briefly, and look forward to
your testimony, and then we will ask you questions.
Let me point out for the record that other Members of the
subcommittee, under committee rules, may provide opening
statements for the record.
Now, let me welcome first my sheriff, Sheriff Lee Baca. The
last time I saw him was on Venice Beach, California, where he
and I and Secretary Chertoff did a little R&R early in the
morning. He is the oldest of the three of us, but he may be the
most fit; I hate to admit it. But we will catch up.
At any rate, Sheriff Lee Baca leads the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department, the largest sheriff's department in the
United States, with a $2.4 billion budget. He supervises over
18,000 sworn and professional staff who serve over 4 million
people living and working in 40 incorporated cities, 90
unincorporated communities and 9 community colleges in southern
California.
Sheriff Baca is the director of homeland security-mutual
aid for California Region I. Among his accomplishments, he
developed the Office of Independent Review, comprised of six
civil rights attorneys who manage all internal affairs and
internal criminal investigations. A strong advocate of
education, he developed LAFD University in conjunction with 13
universities, where over 950 of his officers are enrolled in
bachelor and master's degree programs.
He earned his own doctorate from the University of Southern
California.
Our second witness, Russell Porter, is the director of Iowa
Fusion Center and Intelligence Bureau and the Iowa Department
of Public Safety. He is also a member of the Operating Council
for Safeguard Iowa Partnership, a voluntary coalition of the
State's business and government leaders who combine efforts to
prevent, protect, respond and recover from catastrophic events.
Mr. Porter serves as general chairman of the Law
Enforcement Intelligence Unit and is a member of the Executive
Advisory Board for the International Association of Law
Enforcement Intelligence Analysts. He is also the current
chairman of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council and
the Global Intelligence Working Group, which is part of DOJ's
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative.
In addition, Mr. Porter serves as a member of the
Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group, ITACG,
Advisory Council. He was in San Francisco, I think, a few
months ago, at a major international conference which I
attended, which was focused on this same set of issues.
Our third witness, John McKay, is a professor from practice
at Seattle University School of Law where he teaches national
security law and the constitutional law of terrorism. He
previously served as United States Attorney for the Western
District of Washington, where he successfully prosecuted the
terrorist Ahmed Ressam, the so-called Millennium Bomber,
someone well-known to people who live in and around my
district, because Ressam, had he been able to enter the United
States, was intending to come down to Los Angeles International
Airport, LAX, and blow it up.
During his tenure, Mr. McKay also oversaw a pilot program
for an information-sharing network called LInX, which Sheriff
Reichert has just mentioned, which linked the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service with State, local and tribal law
enforcement. For his success with LInX, he earned the United
States Navy's highest civilian honor.
He also previously worked as a White House fellow during
the Bush 41 administration, where he worked as the special
assistant to the director of the FBI. For several years, he
served as president of the Legal Services Corporation, a
private, nonprofit corporation in Washington, DC, established
to ensure equal access to justice under the law for low-income
Americans.
Let me commend you for that, in addition to everything else
you have done.
We, the subcommittee, traveled to Mr. Reichert's district
and we saw Mr. McKay there, as we evaluated the fusion center
in Washington State. Congressman Dicks was there, and we now
have Congressman Dicks and Congressman Carney in attendance.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. I would now ask each witness to
summarize your statement for 5 minutes, starting with Sheriff
Baca.
STATEMENT OF SHERIFF LEROY D. BACA, LOS ANGELES COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
Sheriff Baca. Thank you, and good morning. It is an honor
to be here to testify before you. I want to compliment all of
you for the hard work that you have been doing. This is
certainly something that all of you are familiar with, this
subject. I will try to make my comments as brief as I can.
Los Angeles, with the Los Angeles Police Department and the
FBI and 45 other police agencies, does have a Joint Regional
Intelligence Center. You know about what the intelligence
centers are all about. We are fortunate to have a
representative from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as
a part of that operational center. It is an all-fusion center,
all-crimes. We do an awful lot of work there, but we do need
help.
Second, we have a Terrorism Liaison Officer Program that
connects all of our 45 regional police departments together. We
have a cop LInX System, along with the LInX System that Mr.
Reichert was alluding to, that ties together all of the
southern counties of California, including the metropolitan Las
Vegas area. That gives us the opportunity to serve 18 million
people in a network of intelligence gathering, unclassified. Of
course, the classified section of that is with the FBI.
We have a California Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment
Center system, and that is California itself putting together
three additional regional centers. Fourth, we have a Homeland
Security Advisory Committee made up of businessmen who are key
leaders throughout our national and international business
community.
Fifth, we have a Muslim-American Homeland Security Congress
that has the key leaders of the Muslim communities, including
the Chair of the Sharia Council, as part of a nonprofit
educational institution to show patriotic support against
terrorism.
Sixth, we use in Los Angeles County, in the sheriff's
department particularly, a public trust policing concept.
Information is not going to be given right to law enforcement
officers from sources that do not trust who they are giving
this information to. So there is a comprehensive amount of
public trust policing strategies that are necessary to engage
the public to share what they know.
Now, let me tell you about the present concerns. Sharing
information for local operational training, this is really
where the issue is. A local deputy sheriff or police officer is
not interested in the source of the information nor the means
that were used to obtain it. The deputy or officer does need
the tactic, technique, the procedures and method or resources
of being reported on to ensure that he or she recognizes the
precursors of an attack and when the situation is encountered
on the street. However, without operational knowledge, that
person may or may not be able to report this to the Joint
Regional Intelligence Center for analysis and potential piece
of information that may be missed.
So, therefore, what we are saying is, take whatever we have
in the way of specific case intelligence, and scrub it up, and
allow us to use what is a generalized form of information that
can help us train ourselves to be better prepared and have the
street cop in a position where he would have a greater sense of
what is going on.
Second, we do need a Department of Homeland Security
analysis capability in our fusion centers. So we are supporting
the idea that analysts are critical, but we want DHS analysts
in our fusion center.
Third, the security clearances still have to be on a more
timely basis. When you are dealing with various forms of
analysis work, whether classified or unclassified, we certainly
can do a better job in that respect.
Fourth, the lack of sustained funding for the local JRICs.
This is a Federal, State and local program, and we pump a lot
of our own dollars into these operation centers, and we need a
little more help from the Federal funding source.
Fifth, the LETPP funds should be administered by the
assistant secretary for State and local law enforcement. There
is a constant shifting of prioritization when it comes to local
funds and local grant programs. We just think that law
enforcement, as much as being a preventer of terrorism, along
with a responder to terrorism, should have a lot more priority,
and the FEMA system is not adequate.
Sixth, more local input to Federal policy. Currently, local
leaders do not have enough influence in development of policy
that we will eventually be tasked to implement. Therein is the
telling of the story. I have had many discussions with the
major city police chiefs throughout the United States,
including the great NYPD. Our common concern is that everybody
is subject to a set of policies that we don't quite often
understand. We want to have a greater voice. We are not
suggesting that we have the total voice.
Seventh, our national law enforcement agencies must
function as a nationally policed system. This is where I run
into a lot of challenge when you are dealing with foreign
countries, because most nations abroad have a law enforcement
system that can be construed as a national police model. We
have 19,000 police and sheriff's departments in the United
States.
I will tell you, if our voice is heard in the White House
or in some higher level of governance, it isn't because we are
invited in, it is because we basically are needed to be brought
in. Yet, it should be systemically established that all the
JRICs, all of the police departments in America and sheriff's
departments are networked, and you can network these systems
through the major JRICs throughout the States that are existing
today.
Last, let me say this. There has to be an international
police diplomacy program. I have been to so many countries in
the Middle East, and in my testimony you will see all of them.
I have spoken to President Musharraf, I have spoken to King
Abdullah, I have spoken to the intelligence director of Saudi
Arabia, including Qatar. These individuals are not reluctant to
tell us the kind of information we need to know so that we in
the United States can have a greater sensitivity as to how the
terrorists are operating in countries that I have mentioned.
So, clearly, what I am saying is that there is a need to
expand our international reach through perhaps a committee or a
group of major-city chiefs and sheriffs, and minor-city chiefs
and sheriffs for that matter, who would do what has to be done
to create the inter-communicative skills that we need with our
counterparts internationally. Currently my department has an
international liaison unit, and we work 100 consulates.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Sheriff Baca follows:]
Prepared Statement of Leroy D. Baca
September 24, 2008
Although more than 7 years have elapsed since the tragedy of 9/11,
the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department remains committed to
institutionalizing the lessons learned that day. Together with our
Federal, State and local partners, we are aggressively pursuing new
ways to integrate our disparate agencies into a seamless network of
information sharing cooperatives. This approach creates a national
police system that can be respected internationally as well as locally.
To understand where the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department is
headed as a national partner, there must be an understanding of where
we have been.
los angeles joint regional intelligence center
Recognizing the value of cooperation between Federal, State and
local agencies, leaders from the FBI, United States Attorney General's
Office, State Office of Homeland Security, Los Angeles Police
Department, and Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department decided more
than 5 years ago to join together and create a model for intelligence
fusion and sharing. The dream became a reality in July 2006, with the
grand opening of the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center
(JRIC). Using the unique analytical processes originally developed by
the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group, the efforts of law
enforcement, fire service, public health personnel, and analysts from a
variety of agencies and disciplines were combined to create an
expansive view of trends and potentials which could indicate a pending
terrorist attack. This information is shared with the ``cop on the
street'' through such publications as the JRIC Daily Report and the
monthly ``Force Multiplier'' (a monthly newsletter directed at field
deputies/officers).
The United States Department of Homeland Security is also present
in the JRIC and provides direct connectivity to other Federal agencies
within their Department. These institutions possess critical
information that must be synthesized with local products to provide the
clearest possible forecast of potential threats. In fact, to ensure the
best possible analysis, I continue to strongly encourage the
participation of any public agency involved in issues of Homeland
Security with its local fusion center. The JRIC is unique in that it
operates independently of its contributing agencies with oversight
provided by a steering committee of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, the Los Angeles Police Department and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. This cooperative management team of local and Federal
partners is a concept designed to overcome the traditional bureaucratic
inertia in the field of intelligence sharing.
terrorism liaison officer program (tlo)
One program operating out of the JRIC that has national relevance
is the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program. Originated shortly
after 9/11, this program seeks to create a network of trusted agents
within each law enforcement, fire and health agency in Los Angeles
County. These TLOs are committed to passing critical information from
the JRIC to their field personnel as well as answering requests for
information. Numerous leads of investigative interest have been
generated by local police officers, firefighters and health
professionals as a result of this program. This level of information
sharing and connectivity between field personnel and the fusion center
is unprecedented and has enabled the JRIC to achieve the highest levels
of situational awareness possible. Information provided by the TLO
network contributes to the development of intelligence that is
disseminated weekly to the executive staff of participating agencies,
field operators and line personnel.
california regional terrorism threat assessment centers
The State of California quickly realized the value of such
intelligence cooperatives and funded three additional Regional
Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers (RTTACs), which are based on the
Los Angeles JRIC model.
homeland security advisory committee (hsac)
Outreach from the JRIC is not limited to public safety personnel.
Shortly after 9/11, I established the Homeland Security Advisory
Council (HSAC) in an effort to network corporate leaders with the work
of the JRIC. HSAC is comprised of senior corporate leaders from Los
Angeles and Orange Counties. Its affiliation with the Business
Executives for National Security (BENS) has greatly benefited both of
our organizations. Members of the HSAC provide technical, political and
financial support to our counter-terrorism and emergency management
missions. Through their large sphere of influence they also provide
thousands of eyes and ears via corporate security departments who have
shared dozens of incidents of investigative interest to the JRIC.
muslim-american homeland security congress (mahsc)
The world's nations will never win the war against terrorism
without the diverse Muslim society's participation. To this extent, the
Sheriff's Department helped form our Nation's first patriotic Muslim-
American, not for profit, organization composed of leaders of all
Islamic organizations within Southern California. Asians, Middle-East,
African, and South Asian religious leaders and organizations are the
leadership core of MAHSC's Board of Directors.
The executive director of the Shura Council is also on the Board,
all mosques in Southern California are represented.
As MAHSC continues to mature, visits to Detroit, Dearborn, Dearborn
Heights, Chicago, and New York have been made. MAHSC is an educational
institution designed to fight extremism. As it grows, it will become a
promising program to acquire organized Muslim-American participation to
prevent a homegrown terrorist attack.
public trust policing
A fundamental reality of intelligence is the willingness of the
public to share what they perceive or factually know with those they
trust. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department has extensive
relationships, advisory councils and programs with diverse people,
including Muslim-American organizations, citizens and leaders.
All leaders of these communities can easily reach the Sheriff on a
24/7 basis. This trust-based attention to details facilitates easy
access to critical information that often travels through a series of
people to the public safety community.
present concerns
Sharing Information For Local Operational Training
With all the positive things that have occurred in the past several
years, there are still lingering impediments to unobstructed
information sharing between the Federal Government and local law
enforcement agencies. I applaud the efforts of Congresswoman Harman
with respect to the issue of overclassification of intelligence. HR
4806 is a logical response to the Federal Government's tendency to keep
pertinent information from deputies and officers on the beat.
The local deputy or officer is not interested in the source of the
information nor the means that were utilized to obtain it. The deputy
or officer does need the tactic, technique, procedure, method, or
resource being reported on to ensure he or she recognizes precursors of
an attack when encountered on the streets. However; a lack of
operational knowledge will impact the ability to report such activity
to the JRIC for analysis, and a potentially vital piece of information
may be missed. Classification must protect the integrity of National
Security investigations and the personal privacy guaranteed by the
Constitution.
However, I submit that most classified reporting can be
``scrubbed'' so that crucial operational information is available for
dissemination to local law enforcement.
Need for DHS Analysis in Local Fusion Centers
A second shortcoming is the lack of Department of Homeland Security
analysts available to fusion centers. In the JRIC, we are fortunate to
have a bright and extremely capable DHS I&A analyst. His input into the
analytical process is invaluable, but he is only one person. The JRIC
would benefit from having several DHS analysts. The assignment of
additional personnel from DHS would be a visible sign of the
Department's commitment to local public safety while continuing the
process of breaking down the barriers to information sharing. The
founding members of the JRIC have committed significant numbers of
personnel even during times of critical staffing shortages within our
agencies. Our commitment is proven. We challenge the DHS to match that
commitment.
Untimely Security Clearances
Third, the security clearance process is still not timely.
Routinely, deputies, officers and analysts wait a year to receive a
National Security clearance that required to have a Top Secret
clearance prior to employment in the workspace. This was done to ensure
that classified systems would be available to all personnel in an open
environment. The lack of a timely background investigation results in
un-cleared personnel (or those in the process) being excluded from
access to critical information sharing. For a local agency to augment
or replace personnel, the clearance process is a disincentive and has
resulted in a net loss of personnel assigned to the JRIC. I suggest
that the sponsoring agencies set a reasonable goal of 3 to 6 months to
complete a background investigation.
Lack of Sustained Funding for Local JRICS
One other impediment to information sharing is the lack of
sustained funding for the JRIC. Each year, the JRIC struggles with
accumulating enough funding from the local participants and various
UASI and SHSGP grants just to remain functional. In the past, funds
from the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) were also
available as a separate funding source for this purpose. However; with
the existing grant restrictions on personnel and operational needs, and
the elimination of LETPP as a separate funding source, the future
sustainment of the JRIC is uncertain. I believe that only sustainable
funding through the Department of Homeland Security will ensure the
critical efforts of the JRIC, and fusion centers across the Nation are
not in danger of curtailment. Therefore; I am recommending to Congress
that the LETPP grant be reestablished under the authority and
administration of the Department of Homeland Security's Assistant
Secretary for State and Law Enforcement. This will ensure that vital
funding for our prevention efforts are no longer diluted within the
existing grant structure, and the future of fusion center operations
will be secure.
As an example, there is a critical need for the sustained funding
of contract analysts and the Terrorism Liaison Officer program
contained within the JRIC. Currently, there are only two full-time
personnel assigned to the TLO program.
These two individuals are responsible for the coordination of
information flow from 7 counties comprised of 89 independent agencies
in an area of 8,000 square miles. As you can imagine, this is a near-
impossible task.
LETPP Funds Should Be Administered by the Assistant Secretary for State
and Local Law Enforcement
I propose that with fewer restrictions on the guidelines for LETPP
(ability to hire personnel), these additional positions can be filled
to ensure the critical information from the beat cop does not go
unreported. The administration of LETPP funds under the Assistant
Secretary for State and Local Law Enforcement's purview will facilitate
the ability to formulate and implement a suitable national vision for
law enforcement prevention efforts. A standardized training and
education program will improve information sharing, as well as serve as
an effective means to enhance the connectivity among fusion center
operations across the Nation. Specific funding for strategic planning
for terrorism prevention for law enforcement on a national scale will,
in effect, allow the nearly 19,000 police agencies to function as one
in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
More Local Input to Federal Policy
The common theme among all of our efforts is the sharing of
information from police, fire, health, and corporate or community
sources, which must be analyzed and shared. We have begun to overcome
the distinction between Federal, State and local priorities. However;
an issue yet to be resolved is the better integration of local input
into Federal mandates. Currently, local leaders do not have enough
influence in the development of policy that eventually we will be
tasked to implement. We must ensure that policies we are asked to
foster are not in conflict with local laws, ordinances, or values. Only
through unified planning and policy development with direct
participation by local authorities can the legitimate policy be
developed. I believe that all available means whether technological,
social, political or operational must be considered in order to ensure
that the events of 9/11 are not repeated. I fully support Congresswoman
Harman's call to replace the intelligence community's requirement of
the ``need to know'' with the ``need to share.''
Our Nation's Law Enforcement Agencies Must Function as a National
Police System
As the elected leader of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, I am committed to expanding cooperation with all Federal,
State and local agencies in our efforts to combat terrorism. The
citizens of Los Angeles County and the Nation deserve a secure
homeland. No single entity can provide that security. Only by working
together in a collaborative, mutually supportive environment can we
provide the security we all felt prior to September 11. Our Nation,
Sheriff and police department and Federal agencies must function as a
national police system when it comes to international crime such as
terrorism.
International Police Diplomacy
The Sheriff's Department, the N.Y.P.D., and the L.A.P.D. have
engaged in extensive international police relations activity. America
has no national police. Major counties and cities are doing this work.
To further effective counter-terrorism strategies, I have met with
key political and police leaders of Pakistan, Jordan, Israel, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia, England, Italy, France,
Sweden, the Netherlands, China, Taiwan, Russia, and Canada. These
contacts are invaluable for best practices development, cross-country
training and technology support.
The Sheriff's Department has an International Liaison Unit that
interacts with more than 100 consulates in Los Angeles County. My
strategy is to work closely with our foreign partners in the fight
against terror. Assistant Secretary Ted Sexton traveled with me to
Pakistan.
Our Nation must lead in trust-based solutions with other nations
and not leave local major counties and cities behind as we build a
global solution with local applications of success. I thank you for the
opportunity to address the committee.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Sheriff Baca.
Mr. Porter, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RUSSELL M. PORTER, DIRECTOR, IOWA INTELLIGENCE
FUSION CENTER AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, IOWA DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY
Mr. Porter. Madam Chair, Ranking Member Reichert, Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for convening this hearing and
for all of your important work. I appreciate it very much. I
appreciate this opportunity to provide you with a perspective
of a local and State law enforcement person of 30 years'
experience, 24 of which are assigned to the intelligence
discipline.
Earlier this month, I informally surveyed members of the
Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, the oldest association of
law enforcement intelligence units in this country, as well as
fusion center directors. I asked them to share their views as
it relates to what works, what needs improvement and what kind
of recommendations they would offer as a way forward. Those are
detailed in my written statement, but I do want to highlight a
few of those this morning in my remarks.
First of all, for what works: As a community, we have seen
incremental but significant improvements in many areas of
homeland security information sharing: leveraging of existing
programs; certainly there has been a great emphasis on privacy
and civil liberties protection and training in that area, which
is critical to our success. We have to do that and make it
first things first. There has been development of regional
meetings and the development of personal contacts across the
country to strengthen the fabric for information sharing; and
co-located environments that have facilitated information
sharing.
I want to highlight a couple of them, though, that are
particularly salient and relevant for what works. One of them
is the outreach that has been done by the Terrorist Screening
Center. The Terrorist Screening Center, since the National
Fusion Center Conference that was held in March in San
Francisco, as the Chair pointed out, has started an outreach to
State and local fusion centers to provide them with an
aggregate picture of the Terrorist Screening Center hits, the
positive hits that are occurring within their jurisdiction.
This provides a great situational awareness for those
jurisdictions, and it has been a very positive thing toward
what works.
A second item I wanted to highlight is the Homeland
Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest,
which is run by DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis. This
is a network primarily of State and local fusion center
analysts in 45 States, the District of Columbia, and seven
Federal agencies, who share sensitive homeland security
information and analytic products on a daily basis through a
secure portal, but they also teleconference once a week to
share information in that context, which forms this community.
By all accounts provided to me by my colleagues around the
country, those who participate in the HS SLIC, as it is called,
find it to be a highly valuable initiative. Many of the
participants attribute the success of this initiative to the
dedicated staff members that are assigned to it. But I will say
it is a limited community in its size. These are key people who
participate, but it is a smaller group.
One of the good things about that particular system is they
have started to leverage other existing capabilities that had
already been developed to integrate that with other systems. I
will give you an example. When you log in to this particular
system, you can not only use the HS SLIC log-on and
authentication procedure, but you can also use something called
the Global Federated Identity and Privilege Management, or
GFIPM, framework, which was developed by Global, mentioned
earlier by the Chair. So that has been a positive entity that
helps share information and is starting to streamline some of
the access points.
What can be improved? My colleagues pointed out several
challenges to information sharing.
First of all, and the one that was a strong, consistent and
emphatic theme: Uncertain sustainment funding for fusion
centers. Local and State officials have raised this
consistently as perhaps the most significant threat to
effective homeland security information sharing.
In fact, I will read one quote from one fusion center
director. ``Frankly, our fusion center is coming down to the
wire regarding the 2008 grant. Our local agencies, who have
staff in the fusion center, have told us if they are held to
the requirement of promising to sustain staff beyond the 2008
grant period in order to accept funding, then they will opt
out.''
The House of Representatives has responded by passing H.R.
6098. Thank you. But we have not heard anything regarding
movement in the Senate on this issue. For our fusion center,
time is running out, with a pending deadline for the local
agencies to make application and no idea yet what to tell them,
other than, ``There has been no change.'' This poses a serious
threat not only to the existence of fusion centers, but to
strong information-sharing across the country.
A second theme that our colleagues pointed out was a
continued lack of coordination across and among national
information systems. Many local and State officials decry the
multitude of systems that the local and State agencies must
access to use and stay informed. Ultimately, it results in
inefficiency and information overload.
National security clearances continue to be raised as an
issue, in terms of the time that it takes to get them; the
reciprocity issue; and also the overclassification issue.
Similarly, a respondent shared his concerns that some in
the Federal Government believe incorrectly that they are
sharing information widely with State and local law enforcement
through classified channels, such as HSDN and NCTC Online. But
unfortunately most law enforcement agencies in this country do
not have those systems, and many in the local and State
communities believe that they never will.
Here were the recommendations that my colleagues offered,
and I will highlight just a few of those.
First of all, support and build on the existing
partnerships and systems that have been effective. These
include things like the Global Justice Information Sharing
Initiative and the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council,
as well as HS SLIC that I mentioned earlier.
Continue to make the protection of privacy and civil
liberties a top priority. As we continue to establish a
national integrated network of fusion centers, it is essential
that we put first things first.
Simplify the funding. It is mysterious and even nonsensical
to many in the State and local community as to why they cannot
use funding to support some of the necessary activities.
Finally, aggressively promote intelligence-led policing.
Consistent with an earlier proposal contained in this
subcommittee's LEAP report, which was published in 2006,
homeland security information-sharing would benefit from a
coordinated, consortium-like approach rather than individual,
disconnected efforts to foster and promote intelligence-led
policing.
Focusing on two areas is what I would suggest: Establishing
and coordinating information needs from local and State
agencies, much like a criminal intelligence priorities
framework that the Federal Government could receive to know
what the State and local information needs are; and, second,
emphasizing and strengthening the analytic capacity in local,
tribal and State agencies.
The last thing I would point out is the need to move
faster. Following the attacks of 9/11, we moved with a great
deal of urgency, and today, in some areas, we are moving much
more slowly. A renewed sense of urgency would help us all
maintain that momentum.
With all other issues in homeland security, this is
critical, and there is much to do. I pledge my continued
support and those with whom I work.
[The statement of Mr. Porter follows:]
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Mr. Porter. Thank you for your time.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Porter.
Mr. McKay, you have the 7 minutes that each of the other
witnesses took to summarize your remarks.
STATEMENT OF JOHN MCKAY, PROFESSOR FROM PRACTICE, SEATTLE
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Mr. McKay. Thank you, Madam Chair. It is an honor for me to
be here at the committee. I keep reminding your very capable
staff that I am a former law enforcement official, that I was
fired as United States attorney, and I wasn't sure what I had
to contribute, as a humble Irish----
Ms. Harman. Let me interrupt right there. We know what you
have to contribute, and we are very happy that you are here.
Mr. McKay. Well, thank you. Having been schooled by
Congressman Dicks as a young congressional aid, I must say
there is nothing like speaking to Congressman Dicks and
briefing him on a bill that he thought rightly he should have
been briefed on before I sat in his office. Mr. Shays and I
worked together, when I was president of legal services, and it
is a privilege to be here.
As a law professor and not owning any of the funding that
some of the Federal agencies provide, I can be blunt and a
little less kind, I think. I would give a grade, which is now
my profession, of maybe at best a C-minus to Federal partners
in law enforcement information sharing. I would reserve an A-
plus for one little agency in the Department of Defense called
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service who have led the way
in the national leadership on the LInX program, which I know
Mr. Dicks is well-aware of because the first place in which it
was launched was in his district.
I give a C-minus--and I think I am being generous--because
one might ask the question: Who is in charge in the Federal
Government in building regional law enforcement information-
sharing systems? The answer is: No one. The question of who is
designing the standards which are implementable, which can
actually be implemented, is that they are not in existence
other than in the LInX program.
No one gets the geography in Federal agencies. They do not
seem to understand that the real leadership is seated to my
right and to the people who they represent here in the fusion
centers as sheriffs, police chiefs, and heads of State police.
The Federal approach has been a DC-centric planning experience
and not one that recognizes the leadership of individuals such
as our former sheriff and the Ranking Member here, Sheriff
Reichert, who understated his role dramatically in the build-
out of the first LInX program in the Northwest.
What is it? Information sharing is now a buzzword,
unfortunately. What I believe it is, is the synthesizing and
exploiting of all shareable data. That means that, through a
single click, like we do with Google, we in law enforcement
should have the ability to have a single composite record. It
is the local leaders who are actually leading the way here.
My concern about fusion centers is that they do not have
fused data. The data systems are disparate. As Sheriff Baca has
pointed out, 18,000, 19,000 State and local agencies have no
legal obligation to share their data with the Federal
Government, none.
Now, that means that if we are going to build real
information-sharing systems that will help us solve all crimes
first but lead the way in identifying potential terrorists,
then we have to do so in a shared, cooperative, partnership
basis. I believe the Federal Government must fund these
systems, and they must be co-owned in equal partnership with
State and local partners. That is the basis of the LInX
program.
I am not here to sell the committee LInX. I am here to say
there are basic standards that should be agreed upon. I listed
those in my statement.
This is also not about buying technology. This is about
real partnerships. This is about solving crimes. I challenge
any Federal official to indicate what efforts they have made to
work interdepartmentally. This shouldn't be owned by the
Homeland Security Department, it shouldn't be owned by the
Department of Justice, and it surely cannot be owned by the
Department of Defense. The public has a right to be protected
in civil liberties, civil rights.
As I tell my students in a final lecture that I give,
called ``Doomsday Lecture,'' we are not going to like each
other very much when we are attacked next and we haven't
strengthened our systems within the law to keep people safe.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
[The statement of Mr. McKay follows:]
Prepared Statement of John McKay
September 24, 2008
Good morning Madam Chair and members of the Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk
Assessment. I am John McKay, the former United States Attorney for the
Western District of Washington. I am currently Professor from Practice,
at Seattle University School of Law, where I teach Constitutional Law
of Terrorism and National Security Law. I am pleased to appear before
you to present information regarding ``A Report Card on Homeland
Security Information Sharing.''
I had the privilege of testifying before the subcommittee during
its hearings in the district of the Ranking Minority Member, Mr.
Reichert, in March 2007 on the topic of law enforcement information
sharing and warned that meaningful law enforcement information sharing
was blocked by turf and failed coordination among Federal agencies.
While local sheriffs and police chiefs have risen to the occasion in
the implementation of the standards-based exploitation of law
enforcement information sharing, DHS, DOD and DOJ have missed a golden
opportunity to make this possible on a national scale by funding and
leading implementation of the Law Enforcement Information Exchange
(LInX). As I reported to the subcommittee:
``I am convinced that the standards of senior executive law enforcement
leadership, a cost efficient technology, and a fervent commitment to
share all legally sharable law enforcement records is the recipe for
successful information sharing among our 18,000 law enforcement
agencies in our country. This is an effort which must be led from the
most senior ranks of government, and one which must meet the
operational needs of our sworn law enforcement officers and analysts
who are on the front line every day attempting to find the proverbial
needle in the haystack that might lead them to a terrorist support
network, or to quickly capture a serial pedophile, random rapist or
violent criminal. Neither crime, criminals nor terrorists know any
borders. In fact, they now know how to exploit our geographical borders
and bureaucratic jurisdictions to their own advantage. We need a new
weapon in our fight to preserve our freedoms, and I believe we may have
found such a weapon in the deployment of the LInX program.''
why law enforcement information sharing is critical to our security and
safety--and how we are failing
In the aftermath of September 11, a consensus emerged that American
law enforcement had to dramatically improve the sharing of law
enforcement information among Federal, State, and local agencies.
This consensus has led to the elevation of the concept of
``information sharing'' as an unquestioned priority in virtually every
Federal agency. Today, information sharing committees abound in Federal
departments and professional associations, and information sharing is
used to justify the majority of the technical systems being budgeted
and deployed in Federal agencies.
``Offices of Information Sharing'' have made their way into most
law enforcement agencies, as have new job descriptions for information
sharing officers and specialists. Information sharing committees within
agencies are fast at work developing strategies, reviewing and revising
policy, designing technical approaches, and studying vexing problems
associated with security, privacy laws, and overcoming other
traditional obstacles for effective information sharing. In short, the
post 9/11 consensus has given the term ``information sharing'' a
prominent place in the management of Federal law enforcement agencies.
Unfortunately, this near frenetic activity has not produced the
results we all expected. Let me be more specific. The assumption
following the events of September 11 was that the ``stove-piped''
character of American law enforcement would be transformed and that
difficulties of sharing information among the approximately 20,000
independent police agencies in the United States would soon be
overcome. It was also assumed that refusal of Federal agencies like the
FBI, DEA, ATF, and ICE to share their information with one another and
with their State and local partners on matters of shared interest would
give way.
A tradition of ``need to know'' would actually be replaced by a
mutually agreed upon doctrine that emphasized the ``need to share''.
The assumption that the post-9/11 era would be characterized by a
new term--transparency--has unfortunately proven to be unfounded. And
efforts to make you and other Members of Congress think otherwise is
untrue and, in my view, unethical.
You have heard, and you will continue to hear Federal officials and
their supporters in associations boast of fusion centers,
interdepartmental information sharing systems, national networks, and
grant funds made available for regional information sharing systems.
I urge you to probe carefully the assertions that such initiatives
are providing the expected transparency or enhancing law enforcement
effectiveness. In my view, the initiatives have cost a lot of money,
put lots of people to work, put new technologies into the public
service, and given agency officials political cover with the illusion
of progress, but have not produced meaningful information sharing and
have had virtually no operational impact.
Despite their lofty claims, Federal officials are misleading you if
they have caused you to believe that fusion centers are actually
``fusing'' any data, that interdepartmental systems in DOJ, DHS, or DOD
are integrating anything but inconsequential records, or that Nation-
wide networks like N-DEX and HSDN are systematically transporting data
that is being used by State and local police departments.
If you accept these assertions at face value, you will be
misinformed.
Those of us willing to honestly address this issue will conclude
that ``information sharing'' has no clearly understood meaning, is
poorly managed, and has been made overly complicated. From a national
perspective, there is no concept of success, no agreed-upon
jurisdiction, no designated authority, no effective leadership. And
despite the large sums of money being spent over the past decade and
many, many promises, there remains no consensus on the way to proceed.
Let me quote from a June 2008 Status Report from the Government
Accountability Office on the progress of Federal Information Sharing
Environment (ISE), which was mandated by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The report was critical of the lack
of progress in implementing the ISE, declaring that, `` . . . the
desired results to be achieved by the ISE . . . have not yet been
determined''.
This conclusion, which is entirely accurate, should not be
acceptable to this subcommittee 7 years after 9/11 and 4 years after a
law mandating information sharing.
federal efforts fail to focus on strategic planning and coordination
with state and local law enforcement
Part of our challenge is the ISE focus on Federal records, which
does little to add to the information sharing capabilities of State and
local police. From a national perspective, law enforcement information
sharing should have two distinct, but related, objectives.
First, for State and local law enforcement, information sharing
should eliminate problems associated with the limited jurisdictions and
separate, incompatible record systems of most city and county police
departments. The various departments all have different record systems
and rarely permit one department unlimited access to another's records.
But as every deputy sheriff and police officer knows, law enforcement
files often contain otherwise innocuous records--parking tickets,
associates, addresses, phone numbers--that don't show up on incident
reports but often provide the critical information that solves the
case. While some jurisdictions are taking steps to integrate their
records, progress here is woefully slow and there is no prospect of a
comprehensive solution for years.
Second, a national information sharing system should ensure that
Federal agencies have access to information maintained in State and
local agencies that may be pertinent to terrorist threats and complex
drug, organized crime, and fraud investigations. As I have said many
times, evidence of a potential terrorist threat or organized criminal
enterprise is far more likely to be found in the incidental contact
with the 10,000 police officers in the State of Washington, than by the
less than 150 FBI agents assigned to the Seattle Field Division.
This is no more clearly evidenced than by the fact that the
Arlington, VA Police Department issued a speeding ticket to Hani
Hanjoor, the pilot of Flight No. 77 which attacked the Pentagon, 6
weeks prior to the 9/11 attack. The information collected by the
Arlington Police, if automatically shared with the FBI, most probably
would have alerted the FBI that a suspected al Qaeda operative was
present only miles from our Capital and seat of Government. Imaging the
possibilities had we embarked upon a real commitment of law enforcement
information sharing among all local, county, State and Federal
agencies.
From a national perspective, making State and local law enforcement
records available to Federal agencies is a critical component of 21st
Century public safety. How could the stakes be any higher? What Federal
official would testify before this or some other committee to explain--
after a devastating terrorist event--that information which might have
prevented the attack was found, after the fact, in the files of a
municipal police department? I'm sure you will agree that the scene
would be ugly, the consequences profound, and the blame would be earned
by all. Progress since September 11 has been minimal. And we are, I
strongly believe, unnecessarily vulnerable.
Moreover, the gains to be made by synthesizing and systematically
exploiting both Federal and State/local data are clear to every Federal
agent and police officer I have spoken with on the subject. Yet they
also share a profound pessimism that this will come about any time
soon--a sentiment I find very sobering. The benefit that would accrue
to U.S. national security in having police records integrated in a
strictly controlled fashion with sensitive Federal data and would be
nothing short of remarkable.
learning the lessons of linx
The one notable exception to this general assessment has been the
strong contribution made by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
funding and deploying LInX to areas of U.S. Navy interest.
As the committee is aware, I was an active leader in the
development and early implementation of the LInX system. Prior to my
2007 dismissal as United States Attorney in Seattle, I worked with law
enforcement agencies in the State of Washington to develop a
comprehensive strategic plan to enhance our capacity to address
terrorist threats, to more effectively attack a growing drug
trafficking problem in the Pacific Northwest, and to address an
emerging problem associated with criminal enterprises in my district. A
key part of the strategy called for new and innovative approaches to
sharing information among Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies in the Puget Sound area.
NCIS had also just completed a strategy that called for aggressive
action to develop strategic partners and to share information in areas
of NCIS interest and jurisdiction. Since the Seattle area, specifically
Bremerton, Washington within the district of subcommittee member Mr.
Dicks, is home to the Pacific Nuclear Submarine Fleet it seemed natural
that NCIS would become a key participant in an area information sharing
effort. Keep in mind, at this time we had no settled technology, nor
any specific approach. However, together with innovative local law
enforcement leaders such as then King County Sheriff Dave Reichert, we
shared a commitment to improve our collective capabilities in the face
of very real threats.
I was fortunate to work with a team that addressed all of the
legal, policy, technical, and cultural obstacles that continue to limit
information sharing efforts, and produced--in an unbelievable short
time and for an incredibly low cost--an information sharing system that
now serves as a model for regional intelligence systems.
The Northwest LInX project is an unqualified success, and has been
critically examined and reviewed by all Federal departments. It is now
used by virtually all law enforcement agencies in the State of
Washington and is producing examples of operational impact that would
not otherwise have occurred. Moreover, 5 years later, the NCIS has
deployed LInX to 13 States (26 percent of the Nation), involving more
than 500 agencies, and serving more than 10,000 users. It includes
interfaces to DOJ and DHS systems and is piloting interconnectivity to
N-DEX.
five standards of successful information sharing
The key to the success of Northwest LInX was in clarifying the
objectives of the project, directly addressing legal, policy, and
cultural concerns, and developing and implementing clear program
standards that were designed to ensure effectiveness. Technology is not
the answer to the information sharing problem, but just one part of the
solution. There are five standards which are essential for any program
to work. Let me summarize them for you.
First, developing an information sharing project with the law
enforcement community at the regional level requires strong leadership
and effective governance. While the decentralized system of local law
enforcement has generally served our Nation well, it is a serious
obstacle for efforts that require close coordination, detailed
oversight, and transparency. Law enforcement in any community involves
Federal, State, and local agencies each with different jurisdictions
and different missions. The only entity with the jurisdiction, the
authority, and the power to bring this disparate group together is the
United States Attorney who, in my view, must function as the Chief Law
Enforcement Officer for his or her District.
Leadership is not only personal, it must have structure, and we
immediately decided that a formal body must be incorporated to provide
authoritative decisions, to act on behalf of the member agencies, and
to be accountable for the operation of the system. Part of the problem
had been the lack of any organized entity to discharge the management
responsibilities of this complex project. Organizing dozens of police
agencies, designing a technical architecture, integrating their data,
and executing the legal and policy documents required will simply not
happen by itself.
The establishment of the LInX Governance Board is viewed by many,
including DHS, as the critical success factor in the success of the
LInX project. It has been the foundation of all nine LInX sites. And it
has been the vehicle that ensures interdepartmental collaboration among
Federal officials, local chiefs and sheriffs, and the U.S. Attorney.
Second, in order for an information sharing system to ``connect the
dots'', there must be dots to connect. There is currently no standard
and minimal guidance about what records should be included in an
information sharing system. Decisions are left to the discretion of the
participating agencies. In Seattle, we viewed this as untenable--why
have a system designed to prevent terrorism if agencies had the
discretion to limit the data they chose to share? So we included a
requirement in the LInX Charter--signed by the heads of all
participating agencies--that requires the inclusion of ``all legally
sharable data''. This ensures that the system will produce a composite
record of any search that reflects all knowledge maintained by
community.
Third, while this is not about technology, the technology is
clearly an enabler. From an information sharing perspective, the system
must be able to retrieve the needed records with a single search and
produce an accurate composite picture in seconds that reflects the
information maintained by all participants, must provide the ability to
exploit the data to discover otherwise unknown associations, and must
instantly produce documents of interest to all participating agencies.
The technology is complex, and of course there are many considerations
here. But from a project perspective--these three requirements should
drive the performance of the system.
Fourth, to overcome the legitimate concerns of police officers to
protect the integrity of their investigations, the system must be
secure. In initiating the LInX project, we believed that all
participants and potential participants must have no concerns that data
might be compromised. So the LInX system was designed to provide all
necessary audit trails, system security that can meet TOP SECRET level
security requirements, and physical security by housing and maintaining
the system in the Seattle office of the FBI. It is my understanding
that most of the LInX sites have followed this model and have housed
the system in a secure Federal facility. The effects of this have been
clear--during the 5-years of LInX operations, not one report of
compromised information has been reported.
Fifth, rigid oversight must be provided in the form of regular
audits and evaluations to ensure that the system is reliable,
performing as expected, and producing the anticipated impact. Put
simply, we must have a system like LInX that helps us arrest the bad
guys and catch terrorists.
These five project standards provide the foundation for the success
of LInX and should serve as the basis for a national model under any
name or administered by any agency or department. These standards were
developed in an effort to directly address and overcome all of the
traditional issues that were being cited to limit information sharing;
the ability of NCIS to incorporate these five standards into their
model Charter and to obtain the signatures of 500 Chiefs of Police who
support the program clearly validates the correctness of this approach.
I strongly suggest that this subcommittee consider adopting these
standards as the basis for a national plan and imposing these or
similar standards as a condition for Federal funding of information
sharing systems in the future.
federal agencies and departments are failing to lead
Federal Agencies, with the exception of NCIS, have taken a totally
different and ultimately ineffective approach to information sharing.
Where the focus of the LInX program is on data maintained in specific
communities, Federal efforts have focused on process and technical
standards, not operational outcomes that would positively impact our
communities. This is understandable, though not forgivable, when one
considers that DEA addresses drug trafficking, ICE illegal smuggling,
ATF guns, FBI terrorism, organized crime, and fraud--and that their
concern is specifically limited to areas within their mission
responsibilities. The real shortcomings of the various Federal efforts
post 9/11 have been their predominant focus on process over operational
concerns.
This is exactly the difference between the LInX program and every
other LE information sharing efforts. The LInX program is a partnership
between Federal, State, county and local agencies, with clearly
identified leaders, accountable for success or failure. Local leaders
such as Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca with whom I am proud to
appear today are providing the real leadership in these efforts and
underscore Federal failures to lead and fund effective information
sharing systems. Without Federal leadership, clear accountability and a
passion to achieve operational results, all such future endeavors by
DHS or DOJ acting alone will achieve mediocre results, at best.
I have been able to identify no Federal official or staff member
who feels that it is his or her job to integrate the law enforcement
records of local law enforcement, in spite of the universal
understanding of the critical need to integrate and analyze these
records for the security and safety of our homeland. In fact, senior
executives in both DOJ and DHS have shunned this responsibility and
have offered no coherent approach to solve these problems. No one has
developed a plan or a strategy, or an approach, or even suggested
standards like those in the LInX program. Today, the Federal Government
is silent on the issue, in spite of an opportunity to provide the
leadership that today, would have integrated most law enforcement
records for analysis by security and intelligence agencies within the
purview of this subcommittee.
toward a national information sharing system and a meaningful role for
dhs
In 2004, I joined with four United States Attorneys to develop a
white paper suggesting that the model we developed in Seattle be
expanded to include other jurisdictions, and that the U.S. Attorneys
from Hampton Roads, Jacksonville, Corpus Christi, and Honolulu join in
a pilot program to assess the concept on a wider scale. Then Deputy
Attorney General Jim Comey was intrigued by the issue, and after
discussions with Gordon England, Dave Brant, and the heads of the DOJ
law enforcement agencies, agreed to support the project. Mr. Comey
issued definitive guidance on a pilot, specifically calling for the
involvement of the FBI and other DOJ components.
FBI and DOJ staff came back with a counterproposal suggesting that
DOJ should concentrate on integrating internal DOJ records first,
before embarking on participating on project of sharing information
with State and locals. The result--nearly 4 years later--is that only
very limited and highly screened information is being provided to State
and local agencies through these systems. These systems are so
cumbersome that, where available, DEA and FBI users are strong
supporters and have become prolific users of the LInX system--to the
exclusion of the DOJ information sharing systems.
In 2006, I was asked by the incoming DOJ Deputy Attorney General
Paul McNulty to head a working group of U.S. Attorneys and to devise a
plan for wider application of information sharing on a regional basis.
My working group consisted of more than fifteen U.S. Attorneys
interested in participating in an information sharing system for their
districts. The resulting plan endorsed the LInX system and recommended
significant roles for all three Departments and leading to the
convening of a seminal meeting during the summer of 2006, of the Deputy
Attorney General, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy
Secretary of Homeland Security. While the plan met with the concurrence
and ``handshakes'' of all participants, it was ultimately opposed by
the DOJ and DHS staff and the effort lost the support of their
Departments.
Following collapse of the interdepartmental effort, the Navy
continued to pursue development in areas of its strategic interest.
Over the next 3 years, new sites were initiated in New Mexico, the
National Capital Region, North Carolina, and--just a week ago--in
Southern California as Sheriff Baca will testify. And the demand for
LInX throughout the country continues to grow.
In spite of the failure of DOJ, DHS and DOD to create an
interdepartmental effort, the local successes of LInX has proved four
things: (1) A transformational project can be implemented quickly and
efficiently; (2) it can have tremendous impact; (3) it will not break
the budget; and, (4) no single department can do it alone. I cite the
LInX experience not merely because I was intimately associated with it,
but because it has been widely acclaimed and has produced a near
consensus among law enforcement officials that it provides a successful
model for effective information sharing. Among other things, the LInX
experience has proven that meaningful information sharing:
can have a substantial impact on crime and national
security;
is technologically feasible, and not expensive;
should be funded federally;
will require positive collaboration and cooperative
management by the three Departments that share jurisdiction in
this area--DHS, DOJ, and DOD.
As I said at the outset, in this environment, no one Federal
official admits responsibility for the development of a meaningful and
effective law enforcement information sharing program or whether it
happens in upstate New York, or Houston, or San Francisco, or Chicago.
I have found no one in the Federal Government who cares sufficiently
about this to assume responsibility for designing, funding,
implementing and managing a national system--despite the clear value to
the American people.
This subcommittee and the Congress play a critical role in
stimulating the leadership which has been lacking at DHS and the other
departments who share the responsibility and the blame.
In my view, the Congress should clarify the jurisdiction issues by
declaring that law enforcement information sharing is the joint
responsibility of the three Departments, and that specific
responsibility resides as follows:
(1) DOD/NCIS should assume responsibility to continue to extend its
LInX program along the coastal United States. The LInX approach
to management, its technical approach, and governance process
should be taken as the model for the rest of the country.
(2) DOJ should reestablish the organizing and coordinating role of
U.S. Attorneys that have been so critical to the success of the
LInX program. DOJ should ensure that the FBI, DEA, ATF, USMS
and BOP are full participants, and should explore new ways to
involve sensitive Federal data in these efforts. DOJ should
identify 10 regional sites around the country in which it will
assume the leadership role played by NCIS in the LInX projects.
DOJ should assume the role of organizing information sharing
governance processes in those regional sites in full
coordination with DHS grant funding while leveraging the DOD
expertise and lessons learned.
(3) DHS should provide startup funding, technical support, and the
restriction of grant funding only to those information sharing
projects that will meet the LInX project standards. DHS
agencies such as ICE, CBP, Secret Service, U.S. Coast Guard and
others should fully participate in all sites. ICE has shown
through its law enforcement leaders such as Seattle Division
SAC Leigh Winchell that it plays a critical LE role in
information sharing. ICE should assume the same leadership role
for DHS as that played by NCIS in deploying the LInX projects.
DHS will assume the role of coordinating the grants for, and
the deploying of information sharing programs in those areas
not addressed by NCIS.
(4) The Congress should also authorize the creation of an
Intergovernmental Governance Board--to support Federal
integration, networking, development and execution of a
national plan. Different from the ISE, this would consist of
the heads of Federal law enforcement agencies, and would have
as its primary objective, the full integration of law
enforcement records of State and local law enforcement
throughout the country. The Board would be led by the Director
of a major Federal law enforcement agency who would serve on a
rotating basis for a 2-year assignment. The Governance Board
should clarify definitions, roles and responsibilities, and
develop a national implementation plan within 90 days of its
establishment. The plan would seek to place LInX like
information sharing projects throughout the country within a 3-
year period, with at least five new regional projects funded
for 2009. I do not believe that this type of aggressive
leadership is taking place anywhere.
(5) Congress should assure the standards of a national law
enforcement information-sharing program, while safeguarding the
civil liberties and civil rights of all Americans. This would
include incorporating the five LInX program standards as
requirements for Federal funding. Most importantly, the
committee should adopt the standard of ``all legally sharable
information'' as a requirement for any Federal assistance.
Information sharing in this age should be viewed as
``synthesizing and exploiting'' all sharable data, thereby
providing a composite record that does not otherwise exist.
This is perhaps the single most important attribute of
information sharing systems and one that is not now in
existence outside of the LInX program. This will greatly narrow
the competing approaches to information sharing and begin to
provide consistent guidance.
(6) Finally, success breeds success. Take information sharing out
of the Beltway meeting rooms and into the community. In 2009,
begin funding programs in interior sites. Develop them as
pilots to be refined over time. But realize that within 120
days of a decision to deploy a system, law enforcement in the
community has been dramatically enhanced, crimes are solved
that wouldn't otherwise be solved. Child predators are
apprehended that would still be on the loose. Lives will be
saved. Communities ranging from Syracuse to Houston, to Santa
Clara County are ready now.
This subcommittee will make a major contribution by addressing the
lack of leadership on this issue and mandate the development of a
national plan, minimal information sharing requirements, and funding
some regional startup projects in 2009.
I am enormously proud of the many State and local leaders who have
joined with a few brave Federal compatriots to address an issue
critical to the security and safety of our country. Now is the time for
action. We are vulnerable to the attack of our enemies and the
exploitive tactics of criminals. Congress will play a critical role in
assuring these challenges are met.
Thank you, Madam Chair and Members of the subcommittee for the
opportunity to share my views with you today.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much for a very brief and
succinct statement that was hard-hitting, and that is exactly
what we are inviting today.
I now yield myself 5 minutes for questions.
To all of you, we put your panel on before the Federal
panel for a reason. We want your messages to be responded to by
Charlie Allen and Mike Leiter. So I want to be sure that they
are crystal-clear.
I want to invite each one of you to make a comment or pose
a question to Charlie Allen and Mike Leiter. That is what my
question is. It is an opportunity for you to think about what
you have already said in your testimony and anything else you
want to say. What is your one top message to them?
It should be constructively critical. I think that is fair,
and I think that is what they would welcome.
My second question--I might as well ask these at the same
time; both Mr. Porter and Mr. McKay mentioned privacy and civil
liberties--is that every time we talk about making fusion
centers more robust, either in terms of fusing data that is
there, adding people, sustaining funding, sustaining focus,
some of these civil liberties group, some of our favorites
chime up and say, ``Oh, no, this is harmful.'' I have said
every single time, I am asked, that what fusion centers do--and
you just said it, Mr. McKay--has to be consistent with the
strict regard for the law.
But I would like each of you--because, Sheriff Baca, I
don't think you addressed this at all in your testimony--to,
No. 1, to pose your toughest question to Allen and Leiter, but,
No. 2, clarify for all of us precisely what, in your case, you
do, Sheriff Baca, or you, Mr. Porter, and, in your case, Mr.
McKay, what you now teach, about the need for fusion centers to
comply strictly with the law and respect privacy and civil
liberties.
Let us start with Sheriff Baca.
Sheriff Baca. Okay. The first question to Mr. Allen is
certainly, No. 1, saying he has a great, big job that all of us
have to depend on for leadership.
The question would be, regarding intelligence theory--
local, national, international--what authority does he have to
incorporate the fusion centers into a policy discussion as to
how we can do this job better with what we each have to do?
The second question would be, relative to making fusion
centers more robust, what restrictions does the Department of
Homeland Security have in allocating its funds in a
concentrated way to build out the fusion center network
throughout the United States? Which would mean that major
fusion centers--New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, DC and cities
like that--could have the core responsibility for networking
with smaller communities so they wouldn't have to, ``Put up
another fusion center''?
So, thus, the question would be: How can the State and
local fusion center concepts be wedded into a national strategy
under Charlie Allen's guidance?
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Mr. Porter.
Mr. Porter. My colleagues would like to know: When are we
going to get serious about domestic terrorism issues and
reaching information all the way out to the officer on the
street concerning those things that happen here in the United
States?
Madam Chair, I didn't understand the second question with
respect to the privacy issue.
Ms. Harman. I just wanted more specific information about
how your agencies comply with laws respecting privacy and civil
liberties.
Mr. Porter. Extensive training for all of our people, and
we encourage transparency. We had Fox News network in our
offices, and we are not afraid of that. We certainly want to
protect the information that is within there to protect privacy
and civil liberties. We hang a 7-foot-tall Bill of Rights on
the front door to make sure people see it every day when they
come in.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Porter.
Mr. McKay.
Mr. McKay. Madam Chair, I am stunned that the Department of
Homeland Security, the White House, the Department of Justice
have not articulated anywhere that I have seen the urgent need
to migrate local law enforcement information in a coherent form
to Federal agencies.
At the back of my statement is what we term the LInX Logic
Model. You will see something we are right up front with local
leaders in the Seattle area, that in the end the Federal
Government has a very important mission in acquiring this data
for purposes of keeping us safe, in particular from terrorist
attacks.
What I mean by this is there are a number of agencies that
can integrate this data into classified settings. So while this
data coming from law enforcement is unclassified, there are
classified environments where the application of even a traffic
ticket can make the difference, as it might have in the 9/11
attacks.
So I am stunned that there has not been an articulation for
Federal leadership, in working with State and local partners,
to integrate this data and make it movable. There are 18,000 to
19,000 different record systems in the United States. But we
know through LInX and systems like LInX that they can be
combined if they are owned by the locals.
Madam Chair, that is the answer to your second question, I
believe. That is, local ownership of law enforcement records is
overseen by local city councils, local county councils, local
judges who apply State privacy laws. Where there is Federal
leadership, as we had in LInX, where United States attorneys
assured that no information violated Federal privacy laws, all
data was owned by the locals, nothing migrated that didn't come
attached to it with all State laws on privacy, all Federal laws
on privacy and all ownership staying with the locals.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. McKay. My time has expired. Next
time Mr. Dicks gives you any trouble, just let me know.
Mr. McKay. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Reichert is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. McKay, you mentioned that, in your opinion, no one was
in charge, no one had responsibility for the overall
intelligence community in sharing information. I was just
wondering, who would you think, in your opinion, should be the
lead in the Federal Government?
Mr. McKay. Well, I would say that DNI clearly has that
role. What I mean is that no one has taken responsibility for
building with the locals the information-sharing system that we
have been talking about. There is no way to migrate, as you
know, the local law enforcement information into the Federal
system unless the Federal system helps build regional systems.
What I am saying is no one at DNI, to my knowledge, has
taken responsibility for this, no one at the Department of
Homeland Security has taken responsibility for it, and no one
at the Department of Justice has taken responsibility for it.
Only DOD has done it, in the LInX System.
So my proposal simply is that there be an interdepartmental
program management office. We made this proposal in the summer
of 2006. It was agreed to by the deputies of all three
departments, and then they all dropped the ball. So we don't
have an interdepartmental PMO. That is what we should have, or
the FBI is going to start fighting ICE tomorrow over who gets
these records. I don't want to pick on my friends at the FBI
because you could insert any other agency.
We have a model, and the model is OCEDEF, ``OCEDEF''
meaning the counter-drug agency. I know you are very familiar
with it. But there is precedent for interdepartmental PMOs, and
we could name others. That is what I believe is needed here.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you. I remember the struggle we had
back in 2006 with those issues.
But I wanted to ask also Sheriff Baca and Mr. Porter, is it
your feeling, too, that there is no one responsible? Is anyone
taking responsibility? Is there a person that you see as taking
the lead role here for the Federal Government? Do you have the
same opinion as Mr. McKay?
Sheriff Baca. To an extent, yes. The thing about the job
that was given to Assistant Secretary Allen, I think they are
asking him to do too much, in a sense that, how far does his
authority reach? That is why my question is posed the way it
is. That if he can't reach out and coordinate a national system
of intelligence gathering and have a classification
modification that lets you scrub specific cases for local
training purposes, then who does? If we don't know the answer
to that, then this is probably the subject of a congressional
piece of legislation.
Mr. Reichert. Mr. Porter.
Mr. Porter. I believe in the field there is a lack of
clarity about the lanes in the road in the Federal Government
and who has the authorities and roles for some of these various
functions. So, as a result, yes, there is a lack of clarity as
to who has the lead responsibility for this.
With the revisions to Executive Order 12333, that
information I don't think has caught up to most of the people
in the field. But I understand there has been some adjustment
to authorities there. Mr. Allen, in my meetings with him, he
has been very open to listening and wanting to hear what State
and local law enforcement officials want from his office in my
recent meetings with him.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Very quickly, in regard to your comment on the legislation
that has passed the House, we mentioned earlier, the Chair
mentioned, that this piece of legislation has actually passed
through the Senate. Hopefully--we don't know how long we are
going to be here, but hopefully before we leave the President
will sign that legislation regarding the funding for intel
analysts.
So we are pushing hard on that. The Chair is helping us out
with that, and we are hoping for some success there in the next
few days.
Mr. Porter. Thank you. We have appreciated your leadership
of this subcommittee on getting that through. Thank you.
Mr. Reichert. We would allow the sheriff to respond. Did
you have a comment?
Sheriff Baca. Yes. I would say that, clearly, in one of my
points, FEMA is not the right place for intelligence funding,
and yet all of what we do in the law enforcement sector is
administered through the FEMA prism.
So I just want to make a distinction that, the first 5
years, first responders got quite a bit of equipment and
training and sets of information they needed. But when you are
going to prevent terrorism, that is a whole different strategy.
Therefore, it involves purely the law enforcement and the
Federal law enforcement systems with the local systems to be
fully integrated. To say is it worth more to prevent the
terrorist attack, at the same time we have done a lot to help
first responders.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you for making that clear again,
because that has been a consistent, common complaint, even back
when I was the sheriff. So it is something I think that we need
to address here in this committee, hopefully next year.
Thank you for your comments, and I yield.
Ms. Harman. I thank you, Mr. Reichert.
Let me point out to our Members that, following this panel,
we will have our Federal panel, with the head of the NCTC and
the head of Intelligence and Analysis at DHS. Mr. Allen, the
head of I&A, has to be at the White House at noon, something I
just learned. So if anyone here wants to pass on questions for
this panel, you will be recognized first, in the order you
arrived, to ask questions of the next panel. That way, we may
be able to get more testimony there.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the Chair, especially for holding
this hearing.
I want to thank our panel here this morning. I had a couple
of question areas I wanted to focus on.
Some say that a central mission of the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis at DHS should be pulling intelligence
from the State and local fusion centers and then combining it
with Federal intelligence to create situational awareness of
threats at a national level.
Do you agree? To your knowledge, to what extent is this
happening already, and where? What direction would you like to
see this kind of work take?
Let me start with that, and then I have one other question.
Sheriff Baca. Well, currently, in talking with my
colleagues in New York and here in Los Angeles--well, in Los
Angeles--we have a direct relationship with the FBI. The FBI is
considered to be the funnel whereby we push up everything we do
in JRIC, especially if it leads to active cases. It has done so
in Los Angeles, and I am confident that New York has had the
same experience.
The issue of passing up information has been one that I
think we have closed with the major JRICs. That is the purpose
of the Federal JRIC system that has been funded federally but
it has been operated locally, that we would share information
without any restrictions.
The key of the issue, however, is not what do we generate
locally. It is, how does the Federal-generated intelligence
come down? I think that is where we have a need for more
questioning, as is currently being done.
Mr. Porter. I would like to see the Department of Homeland
Security focus on identifying information needs of State and
local agencies, so that there is clarity for them as to what
types of information are important for a given jurisdiction, be
it information about several other countries from around the
globe that they might be able to help provide context to when
developments occur on the other side of the world and provide
that back to that local community. I think that would be of
great help.
Mr. McKay. I think that it should go the other way,
frankly. I think that State and local law enforcement agencies
have information that is much more valuable to the Federal
Government than the Federal Government has for locals.
I think that the aggregate information contained in the
records of 18,000 police agencies around the country, when
utilized by an appropriate analyzing agency--and there are
several in our Federal Government--that that is a more pressing
issue, frankly, than what goes the other direction.
Sheriff Baca. May I add one thing?
Mr. Langevin. Sure.
Sheriff Baca. My issue is not information alone. It is: How
do you get it? You see? The theories of intelligence gathering
from a domestic point of view have not been fleshed out. We are
all operating on our own experiences.
But I believe, when I mentioned earlier that public trust
is the key to any kind of information that will pop in to the
system. A system that is most self-serving is not going to get
what it needs on the local level.
Mr. Langevin. So are you saying that we have to scrap at
the Federal level what they have created and----
Sheriff Baca. Absolutely not. I think the Federal system is
intact and doing quite a bit. But what I am saying is that the
likelihood of a terrorist plot is going to come forth in a
variety of sources. It could come forth from a Federal source,
it could come forth from a local source.
But the local sourcing, as how to find proper information,
is what we are lacking. We don't have a national strategy on
local intelligence gathering.
Mr. Langevin. Let me ask you this. Fusion centers are
obviously a major focus of the information-sharing effort
nationally. The Department of Homeland Security, earlier this
year, issued grant guidance that really limited what funds
could be used for what purposes at fusion centers.
Contrary to the White House's own statements about
sustainment funding for these centers, what observations do you
have about the funding issues and how are folks coping? Why is
the Department not getting the message?
Sheriff Baca. Clearly, the Department will fund the
creation of a fusion center, but will rarely staff a fusion
center. Los Angeles has one person from the Department of
Homeland Security. We are asking for more analysts.
We believe that the Department of Homeland Security should
have local analysts in the major fusion centers throughout the
Nation. Those analysts will help bridge whatever Federal
sourcing is with local sourcing and help train local sourcing
techniques into what the local cops should be able to do.
Mr. Porter. This is a key issue for survival of some fusion
centers, a critical issue to keep them in existence. We are
hoping--and one of the things we have done in the last 2 weeks
is finalize and approve the baseline capabilities for State and
major urban-area fusion centers, so that that can hopefully, we
understand, help provide focused funding toward those
capabilities at fusion centers in a directed way.
Mr. Langevin. I want to thank the panel for your answers to
the questions this morning.
I have always believed that the good information, good
intelligence is always going to be our best and first line of
defense. We obviously have a lot of work to do to get this
right. Your testimony here has been very helpful. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
What we have worked out is that Mr. Dicks wants to make a
brief comment and Mr. Dent has a brief question. We will then
move to our second panel. I hope all of you can stay around. We
will begin questions of that panel with Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. I just wanted to say, Madam Chairman, that I
wanted to welcome John McKay, who has been a longtime friend,
and I have enjoyed working with him.
Your leadership in creating LInX and giving it security and
making it work have been truly extraordinary. For the good of
the order here, I am going to forego questions. But I look
forward to continuing on our working relationship on this issue
and many others.
Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dent, for one question.
Mr. Dent. I will be real brief to accommodate the
schedules.
Sheriff Baca. you mentioned in your testimony that our law
enforcement agencies must function as a national police system.
Would you quickly elaborate on what you mean by ``national
police system''?
Then I will yield back my time. Thank you.
Sheriff Baca. In a limited context of intelligence-sharing
and gathering--and the theory, of course, is that all terrorist
activity can occur at any part of our country. Conspiracies of
cells are not going to be occurring at the target area
exclusively. They could be in rural America, they could be in
urban America, they could be in the major cities.
So, if we are going to do prevention strategies with
intelligence as a key source of prevention, we need to federate
all of the 19,000 law enforcement agencies into the JRICs that
are currently in place operating and those that are about to be
implemented.
So what it would do is it would cause for seamless
participation by smaller agencies, who we know have a vital
role to play, as well as the major cities.
That is basically what it is about. It is taking
technology, giving it a greater capacity, tying all the
agencies together in America and then let it go under a
standard that hopefully we can all subscribe to so that we
don't step outside of the boundaries of the civil rights issues
and pick on particular societies for the sake of being clumsy
in what we do.
So I think standards, technology, and sharing what we have
together is the key to what we call a national counterterrorism
strategy.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I will yield my time to Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Just one question. When we are consolidating information--
local, State, Federal and all the agencies--are we also--what
is the role of public information? Because, frankly, if we had
had integrated public information, there are a lot of us--and I
am one--who believes that 9/11 never would have happened.
Mr. Baca. Clearly, public cautiousness on this issue----
Mr. Shays. I am not talking about the public. I am talking
about information that is available that is not classified.
Mr. Baca. I think that any information that we have that
indicates certain key critical targets are public information
as it stands. What is the key to your question is, what do we
share when it comes to suspicious activity or investigations of
those engaged in suspicious activity? That kind of information
definitely has to be confidential. The public----
Mr. Shays. I am sorry to interrupt. But what I am really
trying to add is this: The 9/11 terrorists were saying things
publicly that no one paid attention to. Had we integrated that
in, we would have seen relationships and we would have been
more alert to what happened on September 11. That is true in a
lot of attacks that have taken place around the country.
I want to know--and maybe the answer is this. On the State
facilities, we aren't doing that, and maybe we are just doing
it on the Federal level. If that is the answer, I just need to
know that.
Mr. Baca. I think we are doing it at both levels.
I think you are absolutely right. Suspicious activity is
something that we all can be trained to do more of. That is, be
sensitive to it. But I think your point about how the public
can be helpful is something that we need to further develop in
the way of this intelligence theories.
Mr. Shays. Okay. I am just going to make this last point.
It is not just the public. It is what is on the Internet. It is
the open source information that is there. It stares us in the
face. Sometimes I look at classified information and say, that
is less valuable then some of the open source. But because it
is open source, we don't value it. I think that on the national
level we are trying to do that. I am wondering if that is
happening on the State and local level.
Mr. Baca. Yes, it is.
For example, there are web sites that we know extremists
communicate on, maybe 300 or 400. We also know where they are
being served. We also believe it is better to monitor than to
just shut them down. So there is a consistent strategy between
the Federal, State and local level when it comes to examining
that kind of open source information.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
The time of the gentleman has expired, and I want to thank
this panel for enormously important testimony which has been
listened to either in the audience or in the back room by our
two next witnesses. That is why I hope you can stay for their
testimony.
Our goal, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, is to help
you get the information you need to do your jobs better. Our
goal means our subcommittee's goal. Nobody gave us a grade, but
I would give us one, and it is fairly high, at least for the
effort to make that happen, both through additional legislation
if necessary, but certainly cajoling and pointing out gaps if
legislation isn't necessary.
So let me excuse you but welcome you to stay here and call
our next panel, our Federal panel.
To Mr. Allen, we know you have to leave at 11:45. Is that
about right? What time do you need to leave, Mr. Allen?
Mr. Allen. I can stay until at least 11:50.
Ms. Harman. Okay. So we will have time for all Members to
ask their full allotment of questions to these witnesses, and
we will start with Mr. Dicks in this case. But the others will
stick around, so there will be a possibility, if necessary, to
ask some of them to respond, too, which I think will make for a
better hearing record.
So on this second panel our first witness is Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Charles Allen, the
Department of Homeland Security's chief intelligence officer.
Under Secretary Allen leads the Department's intelligence work
through the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, I&A. He is
responsible for ensuring that information is gathered from
Department component intelligence units as well as Federal,
State, local, tribal and private sector partners. It is also
his job to ensure that this information is fused with
intelligence from other parts of the Intelligence Community to
produce analytic products and services for those partners.
Under Secretary Allen has provided decades of distinguished
service to his country within the intelligence community and
has led several key initiatives during his tenure at DHS.
As you know, Charlie, we have tried to be your partner. We
have also tried sometimes to be your mother. But, at any rate,
it has been an intense collaboration; and we do, all of us, see
a lot of progress. We want to be sure you know that.
Our second witness, Michael Leiter, is the Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center. Mr. Leiter previously served
as the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, where he assisted in the establishment
of the ODNI and coordinated all of its internal and external
operations.
Mr. Leiter also has been involved in the development of
national intelligence centers, including the NCTC and the
National Counterproliferation Center, and their integration
into the larger intelligence community. In addition, he served
as an intelligence and policy advisor to the DNI and his
principal deputy director.
Before coming to ODNI, Mr. Leiter served as deputy general
counsel and assistant director of the President's commission on
the intelligence capabilities of the United States regarding
weapons of mass destruction. He in a prior life was a law clerk
to Associate Justice Stephen Breyer on the Supreme Court and to
Chief Judge Michael Boudin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit.
It has been impressive, Mr. Leiter, to see how NCTC has
changed over recent years under your leadership and our
prodding to be a much more active advocate for local law
enforcement and, actually, as the ITACG has been stood up to
include law enforcement in the designing of intelligence
products.
So welcome to both of you.
We will start with Mr. Allen for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN, UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Chairman Harman, Ranking Member
Reichert, other Members of the committee.
My written statement I asked to be put in the record.
Ms. Harman. Without objection.
Mr. Allen. It is far more extensive. So I will just briefly
summarize what my thoughts are on intelligence information
sharing.
As you know, previously, prior to September 11, interaction
with State and local was limited or nonexistent. We did not
look at that as a partnership. September 11 changed the
paradigm, and that created the Department eventually, and it
also created my job as chief intelligence officer to integrate
and develop programs for the intelligence programs of the
Department.
I have been at this almost 3 years. My effort, of course,
is to develop a vision for, design the architecture of, and
implement a comprehensive homeland security intelligence
program where one really did not exist at all.
I have had to integrate this program within the traditional
intelligence community. But I want to emphasize that, in
addition to working within the Department, equally important
has been my outreach and efforts to share information with my
partners at the State and local government as well as with the
private sector.
My priorities when I came aboard were to improve
intelligence analysis. Analysis was not the strong point of the
Department. Integrating DHS intelligence across the Department,
which you have assigned to me, as you noted in some of the
legislation, the 9/11 Implementation Act makes it very clear
that I have to implement an integrated intelligence program for
the entire Department, to build a strong information-sharing
relationship with State and local and to take our place as a
full member of the intelligence community and, of course, to
develop an open and transparent relationship with you and the
Congress.
The breadth and depth of our customer set is vast and
unique. It is truly unique within the intelligence community.
We have to support the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the
headquarters, elements and the components, the operating
components of the Department with intelligence and information.
But equally vital and crucial is our support to State and local
partners, ensuring that they have access to key intelligence
and information, while ensuring the Department has access to
information obtained at the local level.
I just heard comments, the need to share information, to
harvest that which is at the State and local and bring it to
the Federal level. We are doing that.
Third is the support for the intelligence community's
priorities and requirements.
Let me talk about information sharing. Building and
deepening our relationship with State, local, tribal, and
private sector is a cornerstone of the Department's
intelligence and information-sharing efforts. Fusion centers
are an essential part of our entire intelligence effort. I
serve as the Department's executive agent for its program to
support fusion centers Nation-wide. I am the executive agent
for information sharing on behalf of the Secretary. I am
responsible for deploying officers to fusion centers Nation-
wide.
The core activities of these officers include providing
daily intelligence support in a multitude of ways, routinely
communicating, exchanging information with other fusion
centers. Because we do want to develop what was referenced
earlier, a network of fusion centers both regionally and
nationally across this country routinely communicating and
exchanging information broadly with all fusion centers.
Writing for and with--our analysts sitting and writing with
State and local partners. We have a lot of common seals,
sometimes up to eight common seals in our products which will
be fusion centers, maybe NCTC and the FBI, but it would also be
primarily State seals on the product.
Collaborating on research, delivering intelligence products
to the customers.
Our deployed officers also provide analytic training
opportunities real time to analysts down at the fusion center.
I heard the need for this. We have mobile training teams that
go around across this country at fusion centers doing training
of intelligence officers in the fusion centers. We have 25
officers and 23 fusion centers. We will have 35 by the end of
this year. My goal is to have 70 officers in the field, one to
each State designated fusion center as well as officers in the
larger cities.
Building strong bonds with State and local partners is
really the watchword of what I am trying to do. I am very
pleased to hear Mr. Porter talk about SLIC, the Homeland
Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest. It
is a virtual community of Federal, State and local intelligence
analysts focused on homeland security issues. This group meets
weekly by teleconference, and we have hundreds of officers
attend those.
SLIC is available to 45 States. Only five States are not
part of SLIC. We have the District of Columbia and seven
Federal agencies involved, and we also have a secret level
conference every 2 weeks over a homeland security data network
which I have established and which I am putting across the
country.
The HSDN has something that is really unique. It not only
has our products that we produce but it has NCTC's on-line
products, secret level products. We are talking about hundreds
if not thousands of assessments that come from Mike Leiter
here.
On the ITACG, we are a full partner in it. We are a leader
in it and a staunch supporter of the ITACG. We could talk about
the ITACG and what we have done over the last 9 months in great
detail; and if you have questions, I will be happy to answer
them. But let it be said, it is up and operating. I meet
monthly either by teleconference or in person with the advisory
council of the ITACG, half of whom have to come from State and
local governments. Believe me, we have worked at this issue
hard so that we will not only expand the current stable of
detailees but more than double it. We will take over full--the
FBI is sharing some of the funding now, but we will take over
full funding in fiscal year 2010. If you have questions on the
ITACG, I think it is extremely robust; and I am very pleased
with what we have done.
DHS intelligence programs are young and growing. We are
working hard and increasing our effectiveness to integrate
homeland security with State and local. I will be happy in a
question period to try to respond to some of the questions
posed by the first panel.
Thank you, Chair.
[The statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles E. Allen
September 24, 2008
introduction
Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and Members of the
subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the progress that the Department of Homeland Security has
made, and will continue to make, on its intelligence and information
sharing programs.
As you know, the intelligence community's focus traditionally has
been aimed at foreign threats and its customer set focused on
international level partners. The community's interaction with State,
local and tribal law enforcement and other first responders
intentionally was limited or non-existent. But homeland security, in a
post-9/11 world, requires a new paradigm for intelligence support. My
task as Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and the Chief
Intelligence Officer for the Department has been to lead the effort to
develop the vision for, design the architecture of, and implement a
comprehensive homeland security intelligence program that is fully
integrated into the traditional intelligence community but which
equally reaches out to new, essential partners at all levels of
Government and within the private sector.
This was no small task and required new authorities, new
structures, and new kinds of cooperation across the community. I
commend Congress for providing key authorities to the DHS intelligence
efforts in support of our mission, particularly through the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. By
elevating the head of Intelligence and Analysis to an Under Secretary
level and significantly expanding the position's authorities to
integrate and standardize the intelligence components, products, and
processes of the Department, these authorities have provided an
essential foundation for development of an effective Department-wide
intelligence effort.
the dhs intelligence mission
DHS intelligence authorities were first established in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, with additional authorities provided later in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and, as
mentioned previously, the 9/11 Commission Act. The specific mission of
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)--DHS' primary
representative in the intelligence community--has been reinforced since
the Homeland Security Act, including in the recent amendments to
Executive Order 12333.
The Secretary personally defined the role of intelligence in the
Department as a result of his 2005 Second Stage Review, in which he
emphasized that, ``intelligence is at the heart of everything we do.''
One central conclusion from this review was that the Department
required a strong intelligence arm to focus on Departmental needs. As a
result, the Secretary established the position of Chief intelligence
Officer to lead and manage the integration of the Department's
intelligence programs.
When I arrived at DHS in late 2005 after the conclusion of the
Second Stage Review, I committed to delivering results against the
critical priorities identified by the Secretary. My overarching
priorities for the DHS intelligence Enterprise have been:
Improving the quality of intelligence analysis across the
Department;
Integrating DHS intelligence across its several components;
Strengthening our support to State, local, and tribal
authorities as well as to the private sector;
Ensuring that DHS intelligence takes its full place in the
intelligence community; and
Solidifying our relationship with Congress by improving our
transparency and responsiveness.
Before providing you the details of the progress we have made on
these priorities, I want to emphasize the breadth of the customer set
we serve. It is unique in the intelligence community. The DHS
Intelligence Enterprise must effectively serve all homeland security
customers, including all of DHS, our State, local, tribal, territorial,
and private sector partners, and the intelligence community. Each of
these customers has different needs.
Let me start by discussing our fundamental responsibility to
support our primary customer--the Department--including both
headquarters as well as operational components. The Secretary defines
the Department's mission as keeping dangerous people and dangerous
goods from crossing our air, land, and sea borders and protecting our
critical infrastructures. This requires having reliable, real-time
information and intelligence to allow the Department to identify and
characterize threats uniformly, support security countermeasures, and
achieve unity of effort in the response. As you will see when I discuss
our analytic efforts, I have aligned our intelligence efforts to
support these needs.
An equally important customer is our State and local partners--we
must meet the intelligence needs of our State, local, tribal, and
territorial customers. We are ensuring these stakeholders have access
to our key intelligence and information capabilities, and the
Department, in turn, has access to information obtained by these
partners in the course of their operations.
In addition, DHS Intelligence and Analysis is reaching out to a
broad spectrum of private sector representatives. We have learned that
private sector information requirements are not only numerous, but have
become more complex as our private sector partners have become more
knowledgeable about our capabilities to support them. As a result we
have focused products and services to meet these particular needs.
Finally, the intelligence community remains a key customer. DHS
Intelligence and Analysis is a trusted member of the intelligence
community, under the leadership of the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI). My Office is taking its place in all the senior
intelligence community forums, including serving as a member of the
DNI's Executive Committee. We also contribute to the President's
National Intelligence Priorities Framework, and prepare analytic
assessments for the President's Daily Brief and the National Terrorism
Bulletin.
integrating the intelligence mission across dhs
As noted above, one of my key priorities has been to create an
integrated intelligence enterprise that unites the efforts of the
entire Department. I have taken significant steps to build such an
enterprise, for example, establishing the Homeland Security
Intelligence Council composed of the heads of the intelligence
components in the Department. It is the principal decisionmaking forum
for ensuring effective integration of all of the Department's
Intelligence activities. I also directed the creation of the DHS
Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan. First issued in January 2006,
it established a strong, unified, and long-term direction for our
enterprise. We have just updated this plan to reflect our new
authorities and responsibilities.
These efforts were enhanced by the issuance of the DHS Policy for
Internal Information Exchange and Sharing that was signed by the
Secretary in February 2007. Referred to as the ``One DHS'' memorandum,
its purpose is to promote a cohesive, collaborative, and unified
Department-wide information-sharing environment. The Secretary expanded
this policy in May 2008 when he issued the DHS Information Sharing
Strategy, which provides strategic direction and guidance for all DHS
information-sharing efforts, both within DHS and with our external
partners.
improving intelligence analysis
Intelligence analysis is at the very core of what we do and is why
I made improving our analysis my top priority. It is driven by a
dynamic threat environment; the need to support legacy, new, and ever-
expanding homeland security customers; and the need to respond quickly
to emerging threats that require synthesizing intelligence from both
traditional and non-traditional sources.
Our analysis is focused on five critical areas that are closely
aligned with the Secretary's mission priorities:
Border security to keep out dangerous people and materials;
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
threats as well as other health threats;
Critical infrastructure protection;
Demographics to understand the flow and movement of
potentially dangerous people; and
Radicalization in order to understand the development of
potentially dangerous ideologies in the domestic arena.
Let me provide a little more detail about each of these.
Border Security
I created a Border Security Branch--the first of its kind in the
intelligence community--to fulfill a critical need for strategic
intelligence on threats to our country's borders. To keep out dangerous
people, my analysts track the full range of threats to our borders,
including terrorists, special interest aliens, narco-traffickers, alien
smugglers, and transnational gangs.
CBRN
To help protect our Nation against dangerous materials brought
across U.S. borders, I have established a CBRN Branch, that assesses
the threats in-bound and globally. My analysts support other Department
and interagency offices and programs, such as DHS' Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, the National Bio-Surveillance Integration System, and
the National Center for Medical Intelligence. We provide detailed
assessments that are incorporated into the design and development of
high-tech sensors for harmful CBRN materials at airports and other
sites. Our analysts also assess threats from pandemic diseases, such as
avian influenza, and biological threats such as foot-and-mouth disease
that could cross our borders and devastate our agricultural economy.
Critical Infrastructure
To protect our critical infrastructure, our analysts assess the
threats to each of the 18 critical infrastructure/key resource sectors
in this country. We produce detailed assessments characterizing the
threats to critical infrastructure in all 50 States, the National
Capital Area, and U.S. territories, including baseline assessments on
each of the 18 critical sectors. These assessments are routinely
written with and shared with our State and local stakeholders.
Demographic Movements
Our analysts also assess demographic movements around the world and
into the United States to develop an accurate picture of dangerous
people who might come to our borders. Using the mandate from the 9/11
Commission Act, the DNI designated DHS as the lead intelligence
community entity responsible for biennial Visa Waiver Program
assessments. We independently assess the integrity and security of
travel processes and documentation for each country in or applying to
the program to address the potential for illicit actors--including
transnational criminals, extremists, and terrorists--to exploit travel
systems and the security environment that can facilitate unlawful
access to the United States.
Radicalization
Our analysts also are concerned about dangerous people inside our
borders, especially those who are trying to recruit for or engage in
violent extremism. We focus primarily on the process of radicalization,
or how individuals adopt extremist belief systems that lead to their
willingness to support, facilitate, or use violence to cause social
change. I should add that we are concerned with all types of violent
extremists, including racial supremacists, anarchists, eco-terrorists,
Islamic extremists, and animal rights radicals. All of our analysis is
performed while abiding by applicable rules that protect our citizens'
rights to privacy and civil liberties.
information sharing
Central to our intelligence responsibilities is the sharing of
intelligence and information with the State and local partners as well
as the entire intelligence community. DHS has a statutorily mandated
role in information sharing as prescribed by the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 and ensuing legislation. It has taken important steps to
fulfill this role. I have already mentioned the important One DHS
Memorandum that provides an essential foundation for the Department's
information-sharing efforts. Other foundational pieces include the
Department's Information Sharing Governance Board (ISGB) that serves as
the executive level steering committee and decisionmaking body for all
information sharing activities within the Department. I serve as chair
for the ISGB. We also formed the DHS Information Sharing Coordinating
Council (ISCC), an advisory, action-oriented body that is fully
representative of the Department's many organizational elements.
We are also establishing Shared Mission Communities (SMCs) within
DHS. The SMCs are cross-cutting information-sharing efforts that
address the need to build integrated cultures, processes, and policies
that facilitate information sharing across organizational boundaries. I
am pleased to share with the committee our efforts with the Law
Enforcement Shared Mission community (LE SMC). The LE SMC was the first
shared mission community to be established and unites the full breadth
of DHS law enforcement elements to enhance information sharing among
components, other Federal agencies, and State, local and tribal law
enforcement elements.
State and Local Program Office
Building and improving our relationships with State, local, tribal,
and private sector partners is the cornerstone of the Department's
information-sharing efforts. As the 9/11 Commission Act and the
President's National Strategy for Information Sharing make clear,
fusion centers are an essential part of this information flow and
framework. As you know, I am the Department's Executive Agent for its
program to support fusion centers Nation-wide. DHS is committed to
providing fusion centers with the people and tools they need to
participate in the Information Sharing Environment.
DHS recognized the importance of these fusion centers and
established a State and local fusion center program office in 2006,
even prior to the enactment of the 9/11 Commission Act. Our program
office is responsible for deploying intelligence officers to fusion
centers Nation-wide. These officers are my representatives in the field
who ensure that DHS is fulfilling its information-sharing
responsibilities. Core activities of our intelligence officers include
providing daily intelligence support; routinely communicating and
exchanging information with other fusion centers; writing products for
and with State and local partners; collaborating on research; and
delivering intelligence products to all customers. Deployed officers
provide analytic training opportunities and real-time threat warning
guidance directly to State and local partners. These officers can also
collaborate with FBI analysts to develop joint products.
As of today, my Office has deployed 25 intelligence officers to 23
fusion centers Nation-wide. Our goal is to deploy 35 officers by the
end of 2008. DHS would like to eventually deploy up to 70 officers to
the field, one to each State-designated fusion center as well as
officers in several major cities. The presence of these important DHS
personnel assets in the field has served to create strong personal
relationships with our State and local partners. They serve as the
front line of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise and help ensure that DHS
is meeting these important customer needs.
In addition, to meet specific State and local information needs, we
have developed a national set of SLFC Priority Information Needs (PINs)
that reflect the critical mission needs of fusion centers. We are using
these PINs to expand analytic exchanges between fusion centers and I&A
analysts and to drive I&A production planning.
Information Sharing Networks for State, Local, and Tribal Customers
My office also provides these non-Federal authorities direct access
to DHS intelligence and information through both classified and
unclassified networks. A critical part of our efforts at the
unclassified level is the Homeland Security Information Network's
``Intelligence'' portal. Known as HSIN-Intelligence, this portal
provides more than 8,000 people with access to unclassified
intelligence products. More significantly, my office has created the
Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest
(HS SLIC). The HS SLIC is the first Nation-wide network of Federal,
State, and local intelligence analysts focused on homeland security
ever created in the United States. The HS SLIC is a virtual community
of intelligence analysts that fosters collaboration and sharing of best
practices and lessons learned through access to a special portal within
the HSIN network. Through the HS SLIC, intelligence analysts
collaborate via weekly For Official Use Only level threat
teleconferences and biweekly Secret-level secure video teleconferences.
Members are able to share intelligence and information in appropriately
secure and privacy-sensitive environments. The community also sponsors
regional and national analytic conferences based on the interests of
its members. As evidence of its value and success, its membership has
grown dramatically from a 6-State pilot in 2006 to now having members
representing 45 States, the District of Columbia, and seven Federal
Agencies. In addition, I have established an HS SLIC Advisory Board
that includes State and local partners to advise me on issues relating
to intelligence collaboration with our non-Federal partners.
For our classified networks, we are in the process of deploying the
Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) at fusion centers across the
country. With this network, we are delivering, for the first time,
classified threat information to State and local authorities on a
regular basis. I believe this unprecedented type of communication will
lead to a sea change in relations between Federal and State analysts.
To date, we have deployed HSDN to 24 fusion centers Nation-wide and are
working to have it in 40 centers by the end of this year.
To further expand State and local connectivity to the intelligence
community, HSDN provides access to NCTC On-line--a classified portal
that maintains the most current terrorism-related information at the
Secret level. Our long-term goal is for each fusion center to have not
only HSDN access but its own web page to which relevant products can be
posted and made available to other fusion centers and the broader
intelligence community.
Protection of Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties
My office continually is taking preventative steps to ensure that
the rights of American citizens are safeguarded; this is especially
true as it relates to the State and Local Fusion Center program. DHS
requires all deployed intelligence officers to take an annual
intelligence oversight and information handling course that addresses
proper handling of U.S. person information. DHS also collaboratively
developed and is implementing privacy and civil liberties training for
all its deployed intelligence officers, in accordance with the 9/11
Commission Act.
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group
DHS remains a full partner in, a leader within, and a staunch
supporter of the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group
(ITACG). This group has become a critical mechanism for serving the
information needs of our State, local, tribal, and private sector
partners. Established at the direction of the President in his
Guideline 2 report and the 9/11 Commission Act, it pulls together
Federal and non-Federal homeland security, law enforcement, and
intelligence officers from a variety of disciplines to guide the
development and dissemination of Federal terrorism-related intelligence
products through DHS and the FBI to our non-Federal partners. While the
ITACG is integrated into NCTC, its mission is more expansive than the
scope of the NCTC mission. The ITACG officers monitor sensitive
databases, and screen hundreds of highly classified finished
intelligence reports each day to determine what should be sanitized
and/or enhanced for sharing with our non-Federal partners.
The ITACG consists of two elements: The ITACG Detail and the
Advisory Council. The Detail is the group of individuals who sit at the
NCTC and conduct the day-to-day work of the ITACG. The Council sets
policy and develops processes for the integration, analysis, and
dissemination of federally coordinated information, as well as
overseeing the ITACG Detail and its work.
The Detail achieved initial operating capability just 8 months
ago--on January 30, 2008. While fully integrated into the work and
leadership at NCTC, the Detail is led by one of my senior intelligence
officers who serves as the ITACG Director. The Deputy Director is a
senior analyst from the FBI. The FBI and my Office have each provided
an additional senior analyst to help with the operation of the Detail.
Currently there are four law enforcement officers from State and local
police departments, a tribal representative who works at NCTC, and two
NCTC contractors with extensive experience in the intelligence
community and State and local law enforcement assigned to the Detail.
These non-Federal participants provide critical insight into the needs
and perspectives of our State, local, tribal, and private sector
partners. We are working hard to expand the number of non-Federal
participants to 10 in order to include a broader range of State and
local expertise.
The members of the Detail have essential systems connectivity in
NCTC, participate in key briefings, and are engaged in the NCTC
production processes and activities that provide broad perspectives of
the intelligence community. They then act as advocates for State, local
tribal and private sector partners by informing and shaping
intelligence community products to better meet the specific needs of
State, local, tribal and private sector entities. They support the
production of three types of reports: alerts; warnings; notifications;
as well as updates of time-sensitive information related to terrorist
threats to the United States; situational awareness reports regarding
significant events or activities occurring at all U.S. levels and
internationally; and strategic and foundational assessments of
terrorist threats to the United States. In the event of conflicting
reporting or as the need arises, the ITACG facilitates Federal
coordination to ensure that reporting on threat information is as clear
and actionable as possible.
We have also established the ITACG Advisory Council that I chair on
behalf of the Secretary. The Council, at least 50 percent of whose
members must represent State, local, and tribal organizations, has
become a robust organization with participation of its non-Federal
members in all of its decisionmaking processes. Although the 9/11
Commission Act requires that it meet a minimum of four times a year,
its work is too important and too pressing to meet so infrequently.
Instead, I directed that we meet in person or by teleconference
monthly. Five face-to-face meetings have been held to date with the
sixth scheduled for late October. Meetings in other months are
conducted via teleconference--the next one is scheduled for this week.
These meetings address a priority challenge that this new organization
faces--especially recruiting outstanding State, local, and tribal
personnel to serve on the Detail, establishing an attractive Fellowship
Program for the selected detailees, developing formal mechanisms to
ensure that information is getting to the right customers, and creating
a feedback process tailored for State, local, tribal, and private
sector customers. I am extremely proud of the team we have assembled--
both for the Detail and the Advisory Council--and expect great things
from their continuing contributions to this critical work. I also am
grateful for the strong support that I receive from Mike Leiter and
NCTC in the overall management of the ITACG program.
other accomplishments of dhs intelligence
I recognize that this hearing is geared toward establishing a
``report card'' on information-sharing activities of the Department.
Information sharing, however, supports and is interwoven into key
enabling programs managed by DHS intelligence. Therefore, I want to
share with the committee the progress we have made in creating an
integrated DHS intelligence program beyond just sharing information.
Quite candidly, we are building a new departmental intelligence
organization where one did not exist 3 years ago. We have had to
recruit and train new cadres of intelligence officers, integrate
existing departmental and external intelligence and information sharing
functions, comport Department practices with intelligence community
standards, and fundamentally define the realm of homeland security
intelligence.
Our intelligence is distinct from that of CIA, the FBI, NCTC, and
elsewhere in the intelligence community as it encompasses the totality
of threats to the homeland--not just terrorism.
Collection Responsibilities and Reforms
I&A collection activities have improved support to our customers
and enhanced our readiness posture relative to the Department's all-
hazards threat environment. We are the Department's collections focal
point for delivery of intelligence community capabilities to the
Department and to other Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector,
and international partners.
My office's mission is unique within the intelligence community as
we are at the crossroads of the intelligence community and the
Department's law enforcement organizations. For example, in
coordination with the National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center, we
have developed the southwest and northern border National HUMINT
Collection Directives (NHCDs) in support of U.S. southwest border
enforcement initiatives. Collection directives provide the Department's
components with the critical HUMINT reporting required to support
Homeland Security operations. The border collection directives
represent the first time DHS has led development of a national
collections strategy.
As part of our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
architecture, my office completed an ISR baseline for and in
coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection. This baseline
will help identify gaps and redundancies in order to facilitate the
most informed ISR resource decisions, while allowing the Department to
develop new capabilities and create enterprise-level collection
management processes that meet tactical, operational, and strategic
intelligence needs.
The DHS Open Source Enterprise has been established to acquire and
disseminate domestic open source information on homeland threat issues,
and represents departmental and State and local interests in the
National Open Source Enterprise's National Open Source Committee.
I released the DHS Open Source Enterprise Strategic Vision on
September 12 at the National Open Source Conference, which we co-hosted
with the Office of the DNI and the Open Source Center. Our Open Source
vision clearly establishes DHS' intelligence role as a focal point for
open source among the homeland security law enforcement and first-
preventer communities. We are now implementing it and are in the
process of formally documenting our actions through an Implementation
Plan.
We have a close and mutually supportive relationship with the
intelligence community on Open Source. I have a senior executive who
represents the homeland open source community on the National Open
Source Committee (NOSC) and all sub-committees. We continue to provide
open source reporting on the DHS homepage in Intelink-U, the DNI's
unclassified information network, and began providing actionable open
source reporting on the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence
Community of Interest web portal in March 2008. In sum, we have a
robust program underway that is focused on State and local government
support.
DHS Intelligence Products
My office has successfully adjusted our production in response to
communicated stakeholder needs. I streamlined my office's finished
intelligence product line from more than 25 types of products to 6
distinct, standardized products that are customer-friendly and better
aligned to our core missions. Since 2005, we have disseminated 1,470
finished intelligence products, the majority at the Unclassified/For
Official Use Only level. Many of the most important products are
collaborative joint products it co-authors with State and local fusion
center personnel.
My production elements house the reports officer program, which
facilitates the timely sharing of homeland security-related information
obtained by DHS components, State, local, and tribal partners, and the
intelligence community. Currently, 19 reports officers are located at
I&A headquarters; 18 others support DHS components and elements,
including the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. In addition, two
officers are deployed to State and local elements along the Southwest
border and in Florida.
My reports officers access and share valuable intelligence and
information on topics such as transnational threats from the Caribbean
and Latin America and sensitive information from ports of entry. This
information is produced and distributed in the form of Homeland
Intelligence Reports, or HIRs, and is precisely the granular level of
information that is of greatest value to State and local authorities.
Since 2005, I&A has produced, and disseminated 8,777 HIRs to State,
local, and tribal partners and the intelligence community.
Intelligence Enterprise Training and Recruitment
Intelligence training is critical to develop an all-source cadre of
DHS intelligence professionals who have standardized knowledge and
competencies across the enterprise. The keystone of the learning
roadmap is our Basic Intelligence and Threat Analysis Course (BITAC),
which provides a foundational understanding of intelligence and
analysis tradecraft. We have piloted four iterations of the 5-week
course to date, reaching students from across the Department's
intelligence components. As a complement to BITAC, I am proud to
announce that our Mid-level intelligence Threat Analysis Course (MITAC)
started on September 15. This pilot is a 10-day course targeted at DHS
intelligence components' mid-career (GS 12-14) personnel.
additional dhs intelligence programs of note
National Applications Office
The National Applications Office (NAO) will be on the cutting edge
for supporting key DHS stakeholders. DHS has acquired and installed
lawful and appropriate intelligence capabilities to allow the NAO to
access commercial satellite data and national technical means. In
preparation for production, the NAO has developed performance
management metrics; a training plan to comply with the NAO charter
requirements to train staff and affiliates regarding privacy and civil
liberties safeguards; and a communications strategy. As a training
exercise, NAO analysts assisted the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency's preparation for the Democratic and Republican National
Conventions and in support and response to Hurricanes Hanna and Ike.
The NAO was designed with strong protection of privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties. DHS has worked with the Homeland Security
Council and across the Federal Government to develop the now-signed
charter for the NAO. The Secretary certified that the NAO charter
complies with all existing laws, including all applicable privacy and
civil liberties standards. Further, by law the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a review of the Secretary's
certification. DHS has incorporated GAO's two recommendations into
various policy and procedural documents of the NAO. Thus, the NAO is
prepared to begin operations to support the civil and homeland security
domains.
Counterintelligence
In January 2007, Secretary Chertoff directed the establishment of a
DHS Counterintelligence Program to detect and deter the growing threat
posed by foreign intelligence services, terrorists, and foreign
criminal enterprises. At the Secretary's direction, I stood up a
counterintelligence policy office within I&A. In conjunction with the
DHS Office of Security, we have drafted a strategic plan and
counterintelligence concept of operations, and sought review--working
with the DNI's Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive--to
ensure that the departmental counterintelligence program benefits from
the intelligence community's experience and best practices.
Integrated Border Intelligence Program
I&A's Integrated Border Intelligence Program (IBIP) fills a unique
role within the Department as the only program that can collectively
leverage State and local fusion center, intelligence community, and the
Department's own dedicated intelligence collection, analysis, and
reporting staff to strengthen intelligence support to and promote
information sharing among border security and interior enforcement
stakeholders.
The Homeland Intelligence Support Team (HIST)--a key component of
the IBIP--is co-located with the El Paso intelligence Center. The HIST
serves as a conduit for providing stakeholders along the U.S. southwest
border with reachback to intelligence collection, analytic expertise,
and access to the intelligence community. The HIST's cadre of
professional intelligence analysts and program managers uses its unique
and routine access to information in order to pull specific, relevant
information for the border mission stakeholders, and produce and
disseminate reports with mission-specific comments and context.
Partnering with Operations
I&A has been supporting the new DHS Office of Operations
Coordination and Planning (known as OPS) since its inception in July
2008. The Intelligence Division of OPS is a unit detailed from I&A to
optimize and provide daily intelligence support to departmental and
Federal interagency planning and operational coordination efforts. The
Division's mission is to facilitate--at the departmental ``strategic
operational'' level--development of a common threat picture and
prioritized intelligence requirements, resources, and capabilities in
support of contingency planning and operations coordination across DHS
components.
Highlights of the OPS Intelligence Division's efforts include
identifying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance personnel to
support the DHS actions relating to Hurricanes Gustav, Hannah, and Ike;
and leveraging DHS and intelligence community products to support
incident response and recovery efforts.
Cybersecurity
As a member of the intelligence community, my office supports the
planning and execution of the administration's National Cyber Security
Initiative, serving as a member of the Cyber Study Group. We have also
placed intelligence analysts at the National Cyber Security Division's
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) to enhance this
partnership between DHS and its stakeholders to protect the Nation's
cyber infrastructure. Our analysts provide threat assessments and fuse
intelligence community information with daily intrusions monitored by
US-CERT. We are developing plans for Homeland Intelligence Reports to
include unique DHS information gleaned from US-CERT reports of
intrusions and attacks against Federal networks.
challenges and the way ahead
Despite the gains we have made, we need to remember that challenges
continue as DHS intelligence remains a start-up effort and is still
evolving. I see these challenges in four critical areas: Facilities;
recruitment and retention; excepted service; and procurement and
acquisitions.
As our mission and work force have grown, we are working with DHS
Facilities to ensure we provide adequate facilities and infrastructure.
Throughout the Department and in the intelligence community, there
has been a significant effort to recruit and retain an outstanding
intelligence work force. As a result of the number of vacancies
throughout the intelligence community and the private sector, I&A and
its counterparts throughout the DHS Intelligence Enterprise are facing
great challenges to fill our vacancies and retain the staff we have
onboard.
At times, our progress in recruiting and retaining the best and
brightest has struggled because we cannot compete effectively with
intelligence community agencies that have excepted service status. I
recognize that several authorization bills contain language to grant
DHS intelligence the same excepted service flexibility available to its
partner organizations in the intelligence community. I strongly urge
the committee to support enactment of excepted service authority for
DHS intelligence to help us create the more unified and mobile
intelligence work force envisioned by the 9/11 Commission Act and
intelligence community reform.
Another significant challenge for my office has been the ability to
achieve timely planning, development, and execution of procurement and
acquisitions. Working closely with the DHS Office of Procurement
Operations we have made significant improvements in our acquisitions
program and continue to work toward establishing the right contractual
vehicles to meet our ever changing needs.
Continuing the task of building a quality intelligence organization
that can overcome these challenges is of critical importance as we move
to a new administration. We are on the right track; we must now execute
these programs.
conclusion
On September 11, 2008, Secretary Chertoff wrote `` . . . [on
September 11, 2001,] our country was senselessly attacked and nearly
3,000 lives were tragically lost. That fateful day changed our Nation
and our lives.'' Even though that day was over 7 years ago, the threat
has not passed and our adversaries remain committed to doing us harm.
They have been foiled by many factors, including the dedicated men and
women of the Department of Homeland Security who defend our Homeland
every day.
To enable and support our critical departmental mission, we are
developing and honing homeland security intelligence. DHS intelligence
programs are young and growing, but we are working hard and with
increasing effectiveness to create integrated homeland security
structures where the operating components and DHS headquarters elements
work together. We are also making good progress to provide a unifying
role--developing and integrating the Department's Information Sharing
activities. My intention today was to crystallize these major
accomplishments in such a short time as well as to focus on the
challenges that we still need to overcome.
We remain committed to protecting the homeland, to improving our
analysis and information sharing--especially with our State and local
partners--and to integrating DHS intelligence programs. In doing so, we
scrupulously adhere to the protection of our cherished privacy and
civil liberties rights. Protecting our Nation from the myriad of
threats that we face requires courage and resolve. It is my steadfast
belief that our accomplishments show we are up to the task.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Allen. I understand that the
clock is malfunctioning and is not visible. But you did quite a
good job of keeping to the time, and I expect Mr. Leiter will
do the same.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. LEITER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Mr. Leiter. Thank you, Chair Harman and Mr. Reichert, Mr.
Dicks.
Actually, in an effort to get to a discussion rather than
having this be a hearing, adversarial or not, I am going to
skip over a lot of what I had prepared. I want to give you five
areas where I think we have improved significantly, because it
is supposed to be a scorecard and a grade. I want to tell you
what we have done in the last 6 months, and then I want to at
least briefly touch on some of the questions that were posed by
my three State and local colleagues.
First, 6 months ago, the National Counterterrorism Center
did not actually have a daily product at a secret level. We had
it at top secret and compartmented that went out to State,
local, tribal, private sector. Today, we do. Today, every day,
Monday through Friday, we produce a secret document that is
available in State local fusion centers and JTTF outlining all
of the major activities that are going on in terrorism
throughout the world. That is an improvement, and I think it is
a very good thing.
Second, 6 months ago, frankly, the interface that State and
local government had to get secret level documents from NCTC,
NCTC online secret was lousy. It was antiquated. It didn't look
like Google. It looked like kind of AOL 1.0. Today, it is
vastly improved; and, frankly, it is better than what Federal
officials get. It is user friendly, and people can find what
they need. That is tangible improvement, if you ask me.
Third, expanding access to unclassified material. NCTC does
not focus on the unclassified. Understanding the value and
importance of that, we focus our work at the top secret for the
Federal Government and then down to the secret and confidential
for State and local officials with some unclassified. But we do
produce unclassified material. The fact is, we didn't have any
way to actually get that out to State and local officials 6
months ago. Today, we now have agreements, and we are currently
posting it through both the Homeland Security Information
Network and FBI's law enforcement on-line so they can get those
documents that we are actually producing.
Four, we had started the ITACG 6 months ago, and it was
good, and we had quality people, but it was not firmly
established. Today, we already have plans and have begun the
recruiting and have succeeded in some of that recruiting to
expand to 10 local officials, not just police but homeland
security, Health and Human Services. We just hired our first
firefighter from Seattle, I would add. These are people who are
sitting full-time time in our spaces. Frankly, I see them
virtually every day; and I think they are doing an outstanding
job.
Finally, fifth, and this may sound bureaucratic, but it is
incredibly important. We had a hard time recruiting 6 months
ago to get team people to come to the ITACG. We have changed
that radically. With the cooperation of DHS and FBI, we have
made equivalent the pay that these people are getting; and we
provided them, frankly, with more incentives to come work for
the Federal Government than I think any other position in the
Federal Government.
I just spoke with the FBI yesterday. Members of the ITACG
will now have preference when they apply to the FBI National
Academy, critical for State and local law enforcement officers.
Charlie and I are now working on a system to get them
credit to integrate them into George Washington University's
programs for advanced educational credits. So we have done
everything we can in this Government and, frankly, some very
innovative things to make this a place that they want to come.
Now, those are just some things we have done, and I wanted
to give you the tangible examples. There are a lot of things we
still have to do. We have to continue to grow and expand the
breadth, scope and number of our terrorism information and
product sharing. These are the documents the ITACG helps shape
specifically for State and local governments. We have to get
more of them.
But I do want to note in the last year, from June of last
year to July of this year, NCTC has increased by 250 percent
the number of secret level reports that we have issued for
State and local use. Two hundred and fifty percent in a year
isn't too bad, and it is because of a concerted effort to get
that information out.
Second, one thing that we are working on and I think will
help is for the first time we are actually going out and
surveying State and local governments to understand what they
need. Although we imagine what they need, we don't always know.
So we are going to ask that question. We are doing that in
conjunction with DHS, FBI and the ODNI; and I think that will
be positive.
Finally, something I mentioned to Ms. Harman recently, we
have produced the first-ever user's guide to Federal
intelligence for State and local partners, and it is user-
friendly. It doesn't have nearly as many acronyms that are,
frankly, in most of our testimony and covers how you use
Federal intelligence, explaining sourcing, what types of
products are available. I believe this will be a useful tool.
Last, I want to note that we have expanded our outreach
largely using the ITACG significantly. We are looking for ways
to bring State and local officials into the Federal Government.
So one initiative, Ms. Harman, that we have spoken about
previously is the LAPD obviously has done a fantastic job; and
we have now fundamentally poached their lead on the suspicious
activity reporting and bringing them to NCTC. Working with
Chief Bratton and Deputy Chief Downing, we have now recruited
to have Commander McNamara come from the LAPD to NCTC to help
us understand what would be useful.
Now in a brief minute of time--because I will note that
Charlie went over by 2 minutes, so I also get another minute
and 30 seconds----
Mr. Dent. You are very astute.
Mr. Leiter [continuing]. I do want to note very quickly
three questions.
First, Sheriff Baca, how do we incorporate fusion centers
into a comprehensive national solution? I think this is a very
fair question and one that Charlie and, very importantly, the
FBI and I have been discussing more. Because, frankly, it is
not just about State and local fusion centers. It is also
making sure that they are integrated regionally and they are
well and effectively coordinated with the corresponding Joint
Terrorism Task Forces.
So I think it is a fair criticism to say we are not there
yet, but this is something that we have been building. So you
have to have it built before you know exactly what you are
going to do with it.
Second--I am going to skip to Mr. McKay--the question of
how do we incorporate State and local tribal information into a
Federal model. Let me just note there are huge civil liberties
associated with this; and we can't dive into it too quickly
because not all information, from my perspective, is
counterterrorism information. We simply have to move this
intelligently because, otherwise, we can put ourselves in a
very bad position.
Third--and I left my friend, Russ Porter, for the last--is
when are we going to get serious about domestic terrorism and
getting info to the street? Accepting the last part of that,
when are we going to get serious about getting information to
the street? I have tried to explain some of the ways we are
doing that. But I will challenge him on the premise of when are
we going to get serious about domestic terrorism.
I can tell you, from my perspective, every day, I don't
care if it happens in Pakistan, Peshawar, or Philadelphia, it
is terrorism. It is not going to make a bit of difference to me
if Americans are killed by someone from Pakistan or domestic
terrorists in Philadelphia. There is no question in my mind
that the Department of Homeland Security, FBI and NCTC are
deadly serious about domestic terrorism.
Thank you for your time.
[The statement of Mr. Leiter follows:]
Prepared Statement Michael E. Leiter
September 24, 2008
introduction
In October 2007 the President issued his National Strategy for
Information Sharing. This strategy sets forth his vision for
establishing a more integrated information sharing capability aimed at
ensuring that those who need information to protect our Nation from
terrorism receive that information. The Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), in his role as the leader of the intelligence
community, has guided the community's implementation of key parts of
the President's strategy to include the establishment of the
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group at the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Under the leadership of the DNI, NCTC,
along with our partners at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), continues to make the timely
flow of accurate information to our State, local, and tribal (SLT)
partners a critical mission priority and focus. Through a variety of
activities, including meetings with city, State and regional law
enforcement and security officials, presentations at key law
enforcement conferences and training centers, as well as briefings and
training sessions at State and Local Fusion Centers, NCTC informs SLT
partners of the Center's mission, its capabilities and the range of
intelligence products available to them. Working closely with our key
Federal partners, we provide SLT organizations with terrorism
intelligence analysis and other appropriate information needed to
fulfill their missions. Finally, we inform and help shape intelligence
community products by providing advice, counsel, and subject-matter
expertise to better meet the needs of our SLT partners. Let me briefly
elaborate on some ways in which NCTC has facilitated improved
information sharing with our State and local partners.
nctc's perspective on information sharing
The NCTC understands the importance of preparing intelligence
products that address the counterterrorism concerns of SLT agencies. As
a result, the NCTC launched the Terrorism Summary (TERRSUM)--a SECRET
collateral digest of terrorism-related intelligence of interest to
Federal and non-Federal law enforcement, security and military
personnel. Produced Monday through Friday, the Terrorism Summary
includes terrorism-related intelligence available to NCTC and other
intelligence community elements. The product is posted on NCTC Online-
Secret (NOL-S) and is available to State and Local Fusion Centers
Nation-wide via a number of SECRET-level networks. Thanks to DHS, there
are 300 State and local analysts with access to NOL-S through their
accounts on the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) system installed in
fusion centers around the country. The Terrorism Summary joins existing
products designed to support SLT entities, including the Threat
Review--a SECRET collateral compilation of terrorist threat reporting
received at the Federal level and the Terrorism Intelligence Product
Sharing (TIPS) product line. TIPS products provide SLT consumers
increased access to NCTC finished intelligence analysis through the
accelerated review and sanitization of highly classified products for
publication at the SECRET level.
We recognize the need for improved dissemination of products and
making our intelligence as accessible as possible to our SLT partners.
The ITACG has worked closely with NCTC's software developers to improve
the NOL-S portal to ensure that the ``look and feel'' of the portal is
conducive to SLT partners' needs especially at the State and Local
Fusion Centers Nation-wide. As a result, the new interface is more
intuitive and easier to use. In addition, the portal contains a greater
number of products and more up-to-date counterterrorism information
from throughout the intelligence community. We have begun incorporating
additional recommendations from the ITACG into the next version of the
portal interface.
To better understand the needs of SLT authorities, the ITACG has
prepared a survey in coordination with the FBI, DHS, and the Program
Manager--Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). The survey will help
the intelligence community understand how well its intelligence
products are received by SLT consumers of intelligence, the
difficulties that SLT organizations may encounter trying to receive
intelligence products, and how to better address the SLT need for
intelligence. The survey is undergoing final review, and will be
disseminated to the field shortly.
The ITACG has also identified several instances where intelligence
community ``For Official Use Only'' (FOUO) products were not easily
accessible to SLT organizations. These products were perfectly suited
for SLT consumers of intelligence, but were not previously available on
official UNCLASSIFIED systems. The ITACG negotiated the posting of
these products onto DHS' Homeland Security Information Network--
Intelligence (HSIN-I) and FBI's Law Enforcement Online (LEO), the
primary vehicles through which SLT entities access unclassified
counterterrorism, homeland security and WMD information. Today, our SLT
partners, particularly State and Local Fusion Centers around the
country, can access information from NCTC, the Department of Defense,
and other agencies via HSIN-I and LEO.
The ITACG is also drafting a reference guide for SLT consumers of
intelligence. This SLT Glossary will help SLT entities better
understand source statements and estimative language found in
intelligence community threat products, so that SLT decisionmakers can
appropriately address threat reporting within their jurisdictions. This
glossary contains a list of acronyms, abbreviations, and terminology
typically found in intelligence reporting and used within the
intelligence community that will assist SLT intelligence consumers
better understand the context of the reports they receive.
The ITACG will continue to evolve. In consultation with our
Federal, State, local and tribal counterparts on the ITACG Advisory
Council, we are in the process of expanding representation on the ITACG
Detail. The Detail currently consists of four State and local law
enforcement officers and one part-time tribal representative. We hope
to increase those numbers to a total of ten State and local personnel,
including a full-time tribal representative, a firefighter, a health
and human services representative, a homeland security officer, and a
State and local intelligence analyst. This will allow ITACG to provide
perspectives beyond law enforcement to intelligence community
reporting. Additionally, having given greater consideration to the
level of responsibility of the ITACG Director, we have proposed making
the ITACG Directorship a Senior Intelligence Service-level position.
This will place the ITACG leadership on a more even playing field with
its intelligence community and SLT partners, and reflects the level of
commitment the intelligence community has made to ensure the success of
ITACG.
the way ahead
NCTC, indeed the entire intelligence community, understands that we
must continue to stress the dissemination and access of
counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) information to our SLT consumers of intelligence. Increased
access will allow SLT entities to more effectively identify, pre-empt,
and respond to terrorist threats. To accomplish this goal, we will
collectively need to expand the number of SECRET clearances granted to
SLT partners; we also need to continue to build upon the work that has
already been done to streamline and expedite the security clearance
adjudication process. SLT consumers of intelligence will also require
greater access to SECRET intelligence information technology systems.
DHS has and continues to increase the number of HSDN sites Nation-wide.
Intelligence community leaders will need to continue encouraging
their analytic organizations to prepare FOUO versions of their products
whenever possible. Additionally, we must continue to encourage the
production of intelligence reporting which directly addresses the needs
and concerns of SLT entities. The ITACG will continue its outreach to
intelligence community analytic entities to promote the production of
intelligence products written at the FOUO level and tailored for SLT
consumers of intelligence.
NCTC also believes that increased Federal and State and local
analytic interaction, especially with State and local fusion centers,
has shown demonstrable and positive results and should be further
expanded. Periodic, formal, intelligence community-sponsored, SLT-
focused forums serve to enhance information sharing by cementing the
Federal and SLT intelligence partnership. Analytic forums--such as
NCTC's ``Current Terrorist Enemies of the United States: Prospects for
a New U.S. Administration'' and DHS' Homeland Security--State and Local
Intelligence Community of Interest (HS-SLIC) ``National Analytic
Conference: Domestic Extremist Subcultures in America''--are crucial to
developing our SLT analytic counterparts. Continued and expanded
outreach to SLT agencies is vital to everyone's success in this
critical mission.
Information sharing is among NCTC's and our intelligence community
partners' highest priorities, and significant progress has been
achieved. Challenges to information sharing remain as we seek the
proper balance between and among a host of technical, legal, security
and privacy issues; however, as NCTC and our partners at DHS, and FBI
and PM-ISE are committed to ensuring information sharing between the
Federal Government and our SLT partners continues to improve.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Leiter.
Thank you both for addressing questions posed by the prior
panel. The subcommittee sees enormous progress in both of your
operations. I said that at the beginning, and I think your
testimony has really nailed it in terms of what has changed.
I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Dicks for questions.
Mr. Dicks. Charlie, let me ask you this. On the fusion
centers, is it a question about funding this, how it is
financed? I mean, I know you are sending out an agent to each
one of these things. But hasn't there been some concern by the
locals? They think the Fed should fund this? Or can you tell me
about that?
Mr. Allen. I certainly can, Congressman.
The funding issue is a policy decision that is reached by
the Secretary and by the Department in consultation, obviously,
with the Office of Management and Budget. Our job, of course,
is to provide the information, put the officers out. In some
fusion centers we have more than one officer. In fact, we hope
to put multiple officers in some of the major fusion centers.
But the funding issue is a very serious one. We do the
threats. We do the domestic threat working with NCTC, working
with the FBI. We look at the grants, urban assistance grants.
There are State grants, port grants, transportation grants. We
participate fully in the threat side, but the decisions
ultimately are made at the policy level as to what money should
flow.
The UASI grants are very vital for the fusion centers to
stay on. I took a position that after 2 years the Federal
Government was not going to fund intelligence analysts. The
Secretary did a recon with OMB, and we have extended that for 3
years. We are very sensitive to that. There is a lot of--some
of these fusion centers are very immature, some are very
mature, and they do need assistance.
Mr. Dicks. I just think that somehow we have to work this
out, to make it as easy as possible for the States to use their
grants. Or maybe we ought to have--maybe we ought to authorize
it and fund it. I mean, this is such an important part of our
approach here to have these things work effectively locally. I
believe that you are going to get a lot of the potential
threats, suspicious activities.
You know, we had the situation in California where these
guys were in prison and then they came out and there was some
good police work locally that maybe stopped a terrorist attack.
To me, we have got to make these fusion centers work. It is not
that much money. I mean, think about all the money we are
spending on homeland security. We have got to figure out a way
to do it. I just think it is unacceptable.
Ms. Harman. If you will just yield to me, and I will give
you additional time. The bill that we offered in the
subcommittee on sustainment funding is now poised to pass the
Senate. So we are making a dent in this problem.
Mr. Dicks. I just think we have to figure out an answer to
it. I know this administration has been very tight on money. I
am a subcommittee chairman on Appropriations. I know what they
have done to my bill. It is not easy, and we have a major
problem here with the budget. So I take that seriously.
The other thing is, I am glad to hear that you are taking
this seriously. I mean, we just heard three individuals testify
before you, people who have had enormous experience, and they
still are saying to us, we have a ways to go yet. We haven't
finally gotten there.
But it seems to me, Mr. Leiter, what you just said in your
five points is that we are making some serious progress on
this. I just think that this information sharing and working
this thing out and then having it sustained so that everybody
can be confident that it is in place and the information is
going to flow and it is going to be funded, somehow we have
to--we just can't dump this back on the locals. I mean, this is
like an unfunded mandate, I think. I mean, this is a national
problem; and we are asking them to help us work in these fusion
centers. I think we have to step up and make it possible for
the grants and other things to be utilized or directly funding
this initiative.
That is all I have. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Shays is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Before September 11, the committee I chaired was called the
National Security Subcommittee of Government Reform; and one of
the things that we were struck with was that there was so much
information that was available that was not classified. Then we
have had hearings where some think that we overclassify 90
percent. In other words, we should classify 10 percent of what
we classify. Then we even had DOD say at least 50 percent of
what they classify probably shouldn't be. Then we have ``for
official eyes only'' and so on. Can each of you speak to the
danger of overclassification? Not in any great length. But tell
me what is the danger. There is a danger to overclassification.
I want to know how you define the danger.
Mr. Allen. Well, historically, Congressman, we have
protected sources and methods; and we have overprotected them
even during the Cold War. We have found that in information
sharing, you can shred out the basic facts, hide and protect
sources and methods and get the information out. This is the
reason ITACG is so valuable to us. This is a reason my embedded
officers----
Mr. Shays. Thank you. But I just want to make sure that I--
but is that the only danger? It seems to me another danger--
well, let me hear from you, Mr. Leiter, first.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, the preeminent danger to me and
this is a danger----
Mr. Shays. Of overclassifying?
Mr. Leiter. Yes--was in some ways much less important pre-
9/11. Is if the information is not getting to the operators in
the field who get need to get it----
Mr. Shays. Yes. So isn't it a fact that--this isn't a trick
question. This is just the reality. Isn't it a fact that with
your fusion centers we are dealing with classified information;
and so, in some cases, they may know things that they can't
tell their fellow coworkers because it is classified?
Isn't one of the dangers of overclassification--I mean, you
said it, I think. But let me emphasize it. Isn't the real
danger of overclassification is that too few people end up
knowing what they need to know and too many people don't know
what they need to know?
Mr. Leiter. It is. But let me raise two points. One, this
is not something which is different in national security
matters than any other law enforcement investigation. People
may be working with an undercover that they don't want every
police officer on the street to be aware of. You have to create
systems whereby you can run those operations, protect your
sources----
Mr. Shays. I understand why you have to protect your
source. I understand why you have classified material. But, in
our hearing, outside sources thought--who used to be in
intelligence thought we were overclassifying.
Mr. Leiter. I agree wholeheartedly, Congressman.
Mr. Shays. So it would strike me that those in intelligence
have to keep working at ways to make sure that we are not
overclassifying.
Ms. Harman. Would you yield to me for 1 second, Mr. Shays?
I will give you additional time.
That is just to say that we passed a bill here, the House
passed it about a month ago, on overclassification. Because we
feel so strongly that the only reason to classify is to protect
sources and methods and not to protect somebody from political
embarrassment or protect turf, a point made repeatedly.
I just wanted to--sir, I think it is different in
counterterrorism than it is in a classic law enforcement case,
because the stakes are so high. I mean, if overclassification
prevents one of these cops on the beat from uncovering the plot
to put the huge fertilizer bomb on the truck that blows up LAX,
I think that that is a horrible consequence. I just wanted to
state--and I will yield back to you--my view that this is a
hugely important issue; and I am very disappointed that, at
least as of yet, the Senate hasn't seized this issue.
Mr. Shays. Well, if anyone knows about this, it would be
someone like yourself who has been on the Intelligence
Committee and with such an active and central----
Yes, Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Congressman, things have changed I think
dramatically, because we are getting that information out. We
published and reviewed by the ITACG hundreds of advisories,
some may be threat warnings, threat assessments like we did on
the weekend because of the Marriott bombing. But we put out a
lot of foundational work, working with the NCTC and the ITACG
and the FBI, which is very useful; and we have got a lot of
stuff out there for official use which can be brought down to
the lowest first responder.
On clearances, when I came there we weren't clearing anyone
at the State and local. I have cleared at the secret level
1,500 officers.
Mr. Shays. Let me congratulate you on that. Because that is
another problem, and it is hugely important.
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Let me just quickly ask Mr. Leiter. It is my
sense that when we are talking about open source data where we
can use computers to, you know, to just see relationships, that
would happen more likely I would think in the National
Counterterrorism Center than it would in the different fusion
centers around the country. Can I feel comfortable that open
source data is getting integrated?
Mr. Leiter. I have representatives from the open source
center embedded in the National Counterterrorism Center, and we
routinely use it both domestically and overseas to link with
classified information, yes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Thank you both.
Mr. Allen, I just have to say, you have that classical look
of someone in intelligence; and it makes me feel very
comfortable that you are there.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, may I ask--and this is not a trick
question, either--are you suggesting that I don't provide you
with that?
Mr. Shays. I am just saying you both are a wonderful team
and collectively you carry the whole gamut. Good question.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Shays. Your time has expired. We
all think you give us confidence, too. So we want to observe
this.
Mr. Reichert is now yielded time for 5 minutes of
questions.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Great to have you both again, and thank you for taking time
to come and visit with us and answer further questions.
You do make a great team, and I just want to take a moment
to specifically thank Mr. Allen for his service to our Nation.
You didn't have to take on this challenge over the past 3
years, but you did, and the Nation is better for it. So thank
you, sir.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Congressman. My wife agrees. I didn't
have to take this on.
Mr. Reichert. Maybe we should call her as a witness next
time.
Just to touch on that topic a little bit more, you know, as
you heard the first panel testify, they suggested that there
might be a disconnect to your leadership to the field. I can
certainly understand that, that that is a national--you are one
man, and this is a national effort. So a disconnect I think
would be a natural phenomena that people would experience. But
Sheriff Baca mentioned specifically that you might need some
help.
Mr. Allen. Sheriff Baca is one of the very wiser
individuals across this country in law enforcement and
information sharing. I think I do have the authorities and
responsibilities to be able to work with my colleague here and
with the FBI in particular to get the information out. It is
just that we are very early in this process. The 9/11 bill that
was passed gave me significant authority to direct that
information sharing on behalf of the Department and to unify
the Department intelligence activities.
Bureaucracy grinds slowly in Washington sometimes. So I
have not achieved as much as I wanted to in the last couple of
years, particularly in integrating intelligence across the
Department. But I am working on it very hard.
But I think I have the authorities, and I certainly have
the support of Secretary Chertoff. So it is just a matter of
grinding on, working with the NCTC, working with the ITACG,
working with my officers out in the fusion centers and working
with my good friends at the FBI, where we have a very rich
relationship.
Mr. Reichert. I just want to ask one more question, Madam
Chair; and that is related to also some comments that were made
by Sheriff Baca that have been a concern of mine and were a
concern of mine when I was the sheriff in Seattle. That is the
grant process. As it is set up, it is housed now essentially
under the FEMA side of Homeland Security and does create some
consternation for the law enforcement world in not feeling like
there is enough attention paid to the needs of those sheriffs
and police chiefs across the country. Do you see that as an
area where we need to do some additional work? Have you
listened those concerns and taken a look at a solution that
might apply?
Mr. Allen. I have listened to those concerns, and I have
similar concerns. I do believe that part of it is--my
responsibility is to reach out to Chief Paulson, Under
Secretary at FEMA, and to his Deputy Director. We are building
closer relationships so that--and we brief them regularly on
the threat, foreign and domestic, so that they know as they
make decisions and make recommendations of the Secretary, final
funding decisions, that the threat is fully represented.
In my view, we need to get the threat a little higher in
the overall algorithm by which those decisions are made. That
is my personal view, and I am going to push toward that goal.
Mr. Reichert. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Reichert.
I now yield myself 5 minutes of questions.
Again, I want to observe that enormous progress has been
made; and this hearing record is very different from the
hearing record we would have had 2 years ago. I am sure both of
you agree. You are nodding your heads. I think a lot of the
credit for that goes to State, local, and tribal entities who
have helped us push in the right direction not as your
adversary, Mr. Leiter, but as your partner, which is I think
our correct role, to make this more seamless. We have all
pointed out that if the information about what to look for and
what to do is not in local hands, the chances of our unraveling
the next plot are far slimmer. No one is disagreeing with this.
I want to now come back to privacy and civil liberties,
because it is a conundrum. Clearly, what we want to do is
collect the right information that is accurate and actionable
and timely in these fusion centers. They are not spy units.
That has been alleged. That is false. They are units that fuse
information collected elsewhere, hopefully in products that are
useful. So we want to do that correctly.
I think most of us believe that one size does not fit all
because different regions have different needs. I personally
have been to a number of these places. They all look different
for a reason, I believe, because the needs are different. But,
on the other hand, everyone believes that strict privacy and
civil liberties protections have to apply.
Now Sheriff Baca asked you both this question: How do we
build a more robust national capability that is closer to a
one-size-fits-all capability? You, Mr. Leiter, said, ooh,
problem, civil liberties problem.
Could I ask you both to elaborate on this? Are we better
off trying to standardize and impose Federal standards that are
existing Federal standards on this? Or are we better off not
doing that and making sure there is rigid training at the local
and State levels? Or is a hybrid a better model?
Mr. Leiter. Madam Chair, if I suggested that a network of
fusion centers posed significant civil liberties concerns I
think that leaves you with the impression that I think fusion
centers pose such a problem to start. I think the record of the
fusion centers is outstanding. They are collecting information.
They are not spying. They are conveying it.
I do think that there are potential civil liberties issues
with every bit of information concerning every traffic stop,
for example, being sent to the National Counterterrorism
Center. That is, I think, far beyond our mandate and more
information sharing than we should actually seek.
Sheriff Baca's point, I took it to be: Do we have a clear
plan to make sure that all the fusion centers out there--which
undoubtedly in my view will have to stay hybrid. There is no
one size fits all. You are absolutely right. What works in L.A.
is different than what works in Seattle, different from Kansas
City and so on. But that whatever models you have out there,
they are all linked together in a sensible way and then linked
back to Washington.
That is the challenge. We have built these fusion centers.
We have built JTTFs. They work incredibly well together. But do
we then have a regional system that then feeds back to
Washington consistent with civil liberties protections? From my
perspective, Sheriff Baca is correct. Charlie and I and the
Director of the FBI and the like have to work harder at coming
up with that sensible system to link all of this together
consistent with civil liberties.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Madam Chair, I support what Mike has said as far
as privacy, civil rights, civil liberties. That is very much on
our mind. There are massive amounts of data at the local level
that are not necessarily related to our security.
But there are a lot of data that we harvest, and I have
about 40 reports officers assigned around the country in
addition to my embedded officers who do report information that
is lawful and legally collected that is of a national security
and particularly of terrorism interest. We are moving out to
build a national fusion center network. It is happening
naturally, as fusion centers begin to work together, as regions
begin to work together.
For that reason, in addition to my embedded officers, I
have now appointed regional coordinators or circuit writers. I
have an officer who focuses only on the Southeast, one that
focuses on the Northeast, one that focuses on the Midwest.
Ms. Harman. Are all of them aware of civil liberties and
privacy concerns?
Mr. Allen. They are all rigorously trained in civil rights
and civil liberties. I have four lawyers who hover around me
every day. So we absolutely do give them rigorous training.
They know what can be harvested and what can't.
We have put out about 3,000 homeland intelligence reports,
HIRs, which is a raw intelligence report. Some of them, I and
my senior officers say, no, that doesn't quite meet the
standard. We do not have reasonable belief in this case for
reporting this out to our Federal partners.
But I think we have a very high standard for privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties. I am very comfortable in that
arena. We have a lot of work to do to build this network of
fusion centers and regional centers, as was pointed out by Mr.
McKay. But we are on our way, and we are doing the right thing
right now.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Allen.
I often say that privacy and civil liberties are not a
zero-sum game. We either get more of both or less of both.
Actually, the first fellow who said that was named Ben
Franklin.
I would just like to remind you and our Members and our
audience of what Mr. McKay said, that if some other attack
comes, the first thing that goes is going to be our
Constitution and some of our rules, and that is not something I
want to see. We have got to get this right, right now.
We are now going to do something unorthodox.
Mr. Allen, I know you have, I think you said, 5 more
minutes. Our first panel is still here; and in the spirit of
information sharing, I am offering to our first panel the
opportunity to take the mic and make any additional
observations you would like to make since you have heard the
testimony of the two Federal witnesses. You can be shy and hide
out, but I knew Leroy Baca wouldn't be shy. Do identify
yourselves for the record.
Mr. Allen, let me add that we will understand that you have
to leave in 5 minutes. But I appreciate your staying to hear
any comments focused on the conversation we have been having.
Mr. Baca. Let me say, first of all, the testimony of our
colleagues is one of not only collegial admiration amongst all
of us here, it is the fact that we, both from the local and
Federal levels, believe that our Nation can always do better.
That is the spirit of this conversation.
Policy relative to shifting from a first responder strategy
to a more balanced prevention strategy is the issue as I see
it, and the only way we are going to prevent any form of a
terrorist attack is if the local resources are fully integrated
with the Federal resources when it comes to intelligence
information. This means that the national policy that is under
the control of Mr. Allen and the Secretary of Homeland Security
should be intact and remain as it is. But the advice of the
local law enforcement officials throughout our Nation needs to
be brought to the table.
Clearly, funding becomes an arguable strategy as to how to
best spend the dollars. I say that our response community--we
are a part of it, law enforcement is--has been well-served and
so has our firefighting systems and our medical systems. But if
we are going to economize our dollars nationally, we have to
say, what is cheaper, preventing a terrorist attack or
responding to one? At what point do we start moving more
dollars into the prevention side?
I think that local law enforcement through the LinX program
has clearly proven that traffic stops are a critical part of
gathering this kind of information. That can be easily pushed
up into a national system without violating anyone's civil
rights, because we have clearly the right to stop people when
they violate the law, even if it is traffic law.
The complexity of the task is that there are not 20 dots or
100 dots. There are millions of potential dots that have to be
connected. You can't do that without this full build-out of the
regional intelligence centers as nodes to all the other police
departments.
I am not asking for a small police department to have an
intelligence center. They don't need one. But they should be in
partnership with those of us that have an intelligence center,
and their liaison officers can work in a trained fashion to
make sure that civil rights are not violated and that
information is gathered in a format that is sensible.
Analysts will be able to look at that data for the sake of
preventing a terrorist attack or alerting an investigation.
Those are the two things. Alerting an investigation. As was
indicated by all panel members of this committee, when do you
do something that is obvious, when someone asks for flight
training in a flight school and says I am not interested in
taking off or landing. All I want to know is how to fly the
plane when it is--I mean, that is such an obvious thing that it
defies common sense that that wouldn't be acted upon. But
somehow that got lost because of the lack of robust analytical
participation.
The backup system is you have got more than one analyst
looking at the same stuff, and the policy issue is you have got
more than one reviewer at the top looking at the same stuff.
All we are saying at the local level is we want to be part of
the process of reviewing some of the more critical stuff,
especially if it affects New York, especially if it affects
Chicago, especially if it affects the District of Columbia, and
especially if it affects Los Angeles. Because the theory is the
more you know and the more who have the responsibility to know
know, then everyone gets blamed if it goes wrong.
But, currently, if we don't know locally, I can assure you
when the next one occurs and it is in Los Angeles and I don't
know and Chief Bratton doesn't know, then we are going to blame
the Feds.
Ms. Harman. Okay.
Mr. Baca. So intelligence gathering is not only good
theory, it is good management theory.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
I would just amend that to say this isn't about who we are
going to blame next time. It is about how we are going to
prevent the next one. Then we don't have to blame anyone.
Mr. Porter, Mr. McKay, do you have any additional thoughts?
We have a vote on the floor, but we have enough time to hear
from each of you.
Mr. Porter. A brief rejoinder to Mr. Leiter. But let me
introduce it by noting that I am in probably a unique position
where I meet with Mr. Allen probably monthly as a State and
local official, and I also meet with Mr. Leiter on a bimonthly
basis at the ITACG Advisory Council meetings. As I pointed out
earlier, they do listen. They take notes as we speak.
But I think sometimes we all get caught up in the business
of the agenda, and we sometimes don't hear one another.
Sometimes we speak past one another.
My colleagues at the State and local level still tell me we
have a long way to go to get information out to the outer
reaches, and it is a challenge with respect to the domestic
issues, and I look forward to further communication about that.
Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Mr. McKay.
Mr. McKay. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I think that the prior panel has underscored the point that
I tried to make to the subcommittee earlier. I would just urge
those who are making decisions in Washington, DC, to look at
the LinX system. Because the question of civil liberties that
you asked both of the speakers in the prior panel is we have
run this already. We have taken the records locally. They have
been--they have migrated into a Federal system. They are in the
MTAC now, which is the analytical center at NCIS. They have
passed every legal review of every municipality, county, State
and the Federal Government. There are no civil liberties issues
associated with the law enforcement records that are being
analyzed.
Intelligence products and perhaps open source information
is different, and those have to be carefully reviewed and
absolute strict scrutiny paid to the civil liberties and civil
rights of individuals if they are targeted without a reasonable
suspicion of a crime. That is the issue.
Put privacy aside for a moment. We know this can be done
legally. It has already been carried out in the model program
in the LinX.
So I agree with my colleague to my right. I mean, we are
talking past each other.
Again, the question I asked before I think remains
unanswered. Who is in charge of building the local systems and
migrating them to the Federal Government?
The first person who told me that the most important record
of any investigator is the small record. It is the seatbelt
violation, believe it or not. It is the traffic offense. That
was Sheriff Baca. I think every Federal agent would agree with
him.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
If any panel member wants to make one additional sentence
or comment, please go ahead.
I just want to thank all of our witnesses. I think this has
been a conversation, which is rare, in a hearing format. Our
goal is to make that conversation as robust as possible and
make it two ways, from Federal down to local and from local
back to Federal.
The ITACG is a huge improvement over where we were. I will
see our first four ITACG members later today as they leave. But
growing to 10 is a good start, Mr. Leiter. Growing to more than
10 is a better idea, Mr. Leiter. But I do want to congratulate
you, not just pick on you, for visible progress under your
watch.
Any other comments?
Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. I just want to say thank you. It has been very
enlightening. We still have a lot of work to do, but I think we
are making progress. I think we have got the attention of both
sides.
I agree. I think some of this is we are talking past each
other. We have got to figure out a way not to do that and to
end that and to come to grips with the remaining issues.
Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you all. The hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
