MAKING HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL
PARTNERS: AN INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT COORDINATION GROUP (ITACG)
PROGRESS REPORT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING,
AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 13, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-101
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Lamar Smith, Texas
Norman D. Dicks, Washington Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Jane Harman, California Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Tom Davis, Virginia
Nita M. Lowey, New York Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia David G. Reichert, Washington
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
Islands Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Bob Etheridge, North Carolina David Davis, Tennessee
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Henry Cuellar, Texas Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania
Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Al Green, Texas
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
Jane Harman, California, Chair
Norman D. Dicks, Washington David G. Reichert, Washington
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Thomas M. Finan, Director and Counsel
Brandon Declet, Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Deron McElroy, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment............. 1
The Honorable David G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 3
Witnesses
Mr. Thomas E. ``Ted'' McNamara, Program Manager, Information
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), Office of the Director of
National Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Michael E. Leiter, Acting Director, National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC):
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. Charles E. Allen, Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Mr. Wayne M. Murphy, Assistant Director, Directorate of
Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of
Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
MAKING HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL
PARTNERS: AN INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT COORDINATION GROUP (ITACG)
PROGRESS REPORT
----------
Thursday, March 13, 2008
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman [chair
of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Harman and Reichert.
Ms. Harman [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``Making Homeland Security Intelligence Work for State, Local
and Tribal Partners: an Interagency Threat Assessment
Coordination Group, ITACG, Progress Report''.
Good morning. Back at the start of the 110th Congress, this
subcommittee made it a priority to represent the views of State
and local law enforcement partners. We wanted to peer through
the looking glass from the bottom up.
Nothing frustrates me more than the stovepipe culture and
battles over turf that plague our Government. I think no one
has missed this grandmother's rant on that subject. The
inability of our national security agencies to share
intelligence information was one of the root causes of our
failure to stop the 9/11 attacks.
Knocking down stovepipes was the goal of much of the post-
9/11 legislation, including the Intelligence Reform Act, in
which I played a fairly significant role, and the Homeland
Security Act. When it became clear that we face these problems
in DHS, and still face these problems in DHS, Congress passed
legislation last summer that embraced the recommendations of
the 9/11 commission.
The 9/11 Act was the earthquake needed to change the
ingrained culture of our intelligence bureaucracy. Since I come
from California, I know how powerful earthquakes can be, and I
hope we don't need any more earthquakes to keep us moving
forward. Changing cultures is hard. It has been a very slow
process, but I see a break in the clouds, especially through
section 521 of the
9/11 Act, which established the ITACG at the National
Counterterrorism Center.
The ITACG gives State and local partners a voice and an
opportunity to help create intelligence products that make
sense to their communities. Over the course of the next few
months, the small staff of the ITACG will continue to work hard
to improve information sharing.
I think, and I think our witnesses will confirm today, that
the chances for success are increasing. I have changed my mind
about this. I have spoken to our witnesses over the course of
the last few months, and I see real signs of progress. But now
that we are beginning to make progress, we have to continue to
make progress, and we have to continue to define carefully what
are the roles and responsibilities of the organizations that
our witnesses head.
ITACG is tasked with providing America alerts, warnings,
and notifications of terrorist threats. It will also provide
strategic assessments of these threats. Big deal, strategic
assessments. We don't just want to have a number of false
alarms. We want to have true understanding in the State, local
and tribal communities about what the information they are
receiving means, what they should look for, and what they
should do.
Law enforcement, as everybody knows, stands on America's
front lines. They know how threats may affect their individual
towns and cities. We need to help them understand how the ITACG
can lend a hand. The ITACG has to be marketed more
aggressively. Its products must be effectively and efficiently
disseminated. A ``tagline'' note on ITACG products will help,
and I understand from Ambassador McNamara that there is such a
thing now, but maybe it needs to be put in a form that is very
easy to notice.
State and local partners must also understand how to access
the information ITACG produces. It might be, as my staff has
pointed out, that there are just too many ways to distribute
information and people don't know what the best way is. Once it
overcomes the struggle just to push intelligence reports out
the door, ITACG staff and the advisory council can improve
communication and feedback with our partners on the front
lines. Part of the problem, too, is that the classification
process is incredibly difficult to navigate. As the ITACG
evolves, State and local input will improve. Virtual networks
show promise for uniting State and local intelligence
communities and law enforcement.
Attracting the next group of police and sheriffs' officers
to the ITACG detail has also proven extremely difficult. It is
true that it is a hardship for many to move to Washington. I
would observe as a Member of Congress that sometimes it is a
hardship to serve in Washington. But nonetheless, I think that
if awareness is raised, there will be a number of hardy souls
out there who think that it will be an important experience and
who can accommodate moving here for a year or 2 with their own
families.
Next week, I will be speaking, and maybe some of you will
be too, at the National Fusion Center Conference in San
Francisco. NCTC is evolving into its own sort of national
fusion center of which the ITACG is becoming a crucial
function. I just want to salute Mike Leiter for the work that
he has done to move that agency forward.
I look forward to the testimony this morning, and now yield
to the Ranking Member for opening comments.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair. Good morning.
Thank you, distinguished panel, for being here this morning
and giving us some of your time.
Director Leiter, welcome.
Ambassador McNamara, Under Secretary Allen and Assistant
Director Murphy, welcome back. We appreciate your taking the
time to be here this morning.
We meet today to look at the stand-up of the Interagency
Threat Assessment Coordination Group, or ITACG for short. The
ITACG was created by the president in 2006 and codified by
Congress in order to improve the sharing of information with
State, local, tribal and private sector officials. Most
importantly, it was created to help satisfy the needs of State,
local, tribal and private sector entities.
I believe all of us want to hear how ITACG is satisfying
these needs and how all of you are working to improve the
products being sent to State and local officials. As you all
know, I served in law enforcement for 33 years prior to coming
here. I am not sure I would consider joining your team, though,
and spending my entire life here in Washington, DC after this
job. But I strongly believe that there are people out there
willing to serve, qualified people that we should be reaching
out to join your team to help bring State and local officials
together in your efforts.
We really need the cop's perspective on terrorism. It is
essential to our State and our local and tribal police
department to prevent terrorist attacks. It is essential for
them to feel like they are part of the effort. They sometimes
don't feel a part of the effort. We must incorporate cops in
the production of terrorism products. The ITACG work is to be
commended for helping to move this effort forward, but we also
like to note that there is a lot that we can do to make this
work better.
Additionally, the highly classified nature of terrorism
information can cause problems with sharing with uncleared
State and local personnel so that ITACG also helps rapidly
declassify and release information to the State, local, tribal
and private sector officials. This is an essential role that
will help speed information to the front lines and the hands of
our first-preventers.
We have all heard concerns about how long it took to get
the ITACG up and running. But what I am really interested in is
how we move forward to make sure that we have a robust ITACG
that fully incorporates the perspectives and expertise of our
local cops and other counterterrorism officials.
You have two members here this morning with differing
experiences that I think really provide a great marriage of
experience in the Chair's experience here in Congress and her
experience in the intel world, and then mine coming from the
local perspective. I just have to say, again from a cop's
perspective, and I have felt, and I know they still do feel,
outside. There is a great deal of work to do for all of you to
reach out.
The Federal system seems so overwhelming and cumbersome and
overly bureaucratic and very secretive to the local sheriff,
the local police chief and the local cop or deputy on the beat.
It is going to take a lot of hard work, dedication and really
being sincere about what your mission is in order to overcome
that, and finally and eventually and hopefully create a system
that really is designed to keep our country safe.
I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Harman. I thank you, Dave, for those comments. I do
think our experience meshes well and everyone should know that
this subcommittee proceeds on a bipartisan basis. Our
legislation is bipartisan. Our view of these issues is
bipartisan, and we are trying to take a bottom-up view of this
issue of information-sharing. Your perspective is invaluable as
we discuss these issues.
Other members of the subcommittee will be arriving later.
If they have opening statements, they will be inserted in the
record, and they will be recognized for questions in the order
that they arrive.
I welcome our witnesses this morning. Our first witness,
Ambassador Ted McNamara, is the program manager of the
information-sharing environment called ISE, a position
established by the Intelligence Reform and Intelligence
Prevention Act of 2004. Ambassador McNamara is a career
diplomat who originally retired--originally retired--from
government service in 1998, after which he spent 3 years as
president and CEO of the America Society and the Council of the
Americas in New York. Following the September 11 attacks, he
was asked to return to government service as senior advisor for
counterterrorism and homeland security at the Department of
State.
Our second witness, Mike Leiter, is the acting director of
the National Counterterrorism Center, NCTC. Prior to joining
the NCTC, Mr. Leiter served as the deputy chief of staff for
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. In this
role, he assisted in the establishment of the ODNI and
coordinated all internal and external operations for the ODNI.
Mr. Leiter was also involved in the development of national
intelligence centers, including the NCTC and the National
Counterproliferation Center, and their integration into the
larger intelligence community. Again, I commend you for that. I
think these are crucial organizations, as we try to make
certain that we connect the dots next time. Mr. Leiter served
as the deputy general counsel and assistant director of the
president's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Our third witness, who seems to be living at that witness
table, is Under Secretary Charlie Allen. He is the Department
of Homeland Security's chief intelligence officer. Under
Secretary Allen leads the Department's intelligence work
through the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, I&A, and
focuses on improving the analysis and sharing of terrorist
threat information.
He is responsible for ensuring that information is gathered
from Department component intelligence units, as well as
Federal, State, local, tribal and private sector partners. It
is also his job to ensure that this information is fused with
intelligence from other parts of the intelligence community to
produce analytic products and services for the Department's
customers.
Our fourth witness, Wayne Murphy, is an assistant director
at the FBI. He joined the bureau with more than 22 years of
service at the NSA, the National Security Agency, in a variety
of analytic, staff and leadership positions. The bulk of his
career assignments have involved direct responsibility for
SIGINT analysis, signals intelligence analysis and reporting,
encompassing a broad range of targets.
I am done with all of my acronyms for the morning, and from
now on I will speak in some other language.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. We will now begin 5 minutes each of
summarizing your statements.
Ambassador McNamara, you are first.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. ``TED'' MCNAMARA, PROGRAM MANAGER,
INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT (PM-ISE), OFFICE OF THE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. McNamara. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Ranking
Member Reichert. I am pleased to be here today, and I welcome
the opportunity to provide the subcommittee with the
information that it needs with respect to the Interagency
Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, the ITACG--a rather
clumsy name, but nonetheless we work with it.
I am pleased to be here with Misters Allen, Leiter and
Murphy, who are charged, as you know, with the overall
responsibility for managing this new organization. As required
by law, I recently submitted to the Congress a report regarding
the efforts to establish the ITACG and I would like to request
that that report be included as part of the record.
Ms. Harman. Without objection.* By the way, thank you for
briefing us just a few days ago on the contents of that report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information is included in the witness statement which
follows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. McNamara. You are very welcome.
Each of my colleagues will be providing you with the
details of the progress we have made as they are charged with
managing this effort. What I would like to do, accordingly, is
to look at it from the perspective that I have as the program
manager, whose job it is to coordinate and oversee the creation
of the ITACG and to monitor and assess and report to you
annually on the progress of that group.
What I would like to do is first talk about where we are
now. What began 2 years ago as a concept sketched on a piece of
graph paper is now institutionalized by statute and
presidential directive. For the past year, the four of us
seated at this table have worked even more intensively,
particularly since the August passage of the 9/11 Act, to make
the ITACG a reality. It is a reality today.
I think all of us agree that it hasn't been easy, but it is
never easy, as you mentioned, Madam Chairwoman, to bring about
major change. The ITACG, though modest in size, represents a
major change in how we share information with State, local and
tribal authorities. The information-sharing environment
requires Federal officials to become knowledgeable about the
intelligence and information needs of State and local and
tribal officials, and in establishing the ITACG, I think we
have accelerated the process that makes us smart about the
needs of those officials.
I think it also requires that we have a greater
understanding of how State and local and tribal governments
operate, because in protecting our communities from terrorism,
the responsibilities of these authorities differ from those of
the Federal Government, and therefore their information needs
are different.
The current ITACG is another step forward in realizing the
goal of full information partnership at all levels of
government. For the first time, State and local representatives
with direct access to national intelligence will help shape the
intelligence products that go out to protect our Nation's
communities large and small.
I am pleased, but not yet satisfied, with the progress we
have achieved. We have more to do and the four of us are
committed to doing what is necessary to achieve the goal of a
full partnership as laid out in the 9/11 Act and in the
president's national security strategy for information sharing.
What needs to be completed is to integrate the ITACG detail.
You will be hearing more about that from my colleagues.
Let me make three points in closing. There has been some
confusion about the activities of the ITACG. The first point I
would make is the ITACG is an integral part of the Federal
Government's effort to develop, draft and package terrorism-
related intelligence products intended for State and local
authorities.
The second point is that the ITACG detail is an active
participant in the production process and the ITACG advisory
council exists to advise with respect to that production
process and other aspects that are a responsibility of the
ITACG.
Third, I want to note here the importance of the Congress
in getting the ITACG up and running, and in particular we can
see that in the structure of the ITACG, which reflects quite
accurately, I think, the intent of the 9/11 Act of last August.
In conclusion, I have a couple of other points, but I am
running out of time. Well, I do have 30 seconds, so I will put
the third point in, and that is that we have had problems----
Ms. Harman. You can keep complimenting the role of the
subcommittee if you would like. We will give you extra time for
that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. McNamara. Okay.
The next point I would make is that there are problems in
recruiting, as you mentioned, Madam Chair. The challenge is to
overcome that, and I think with the help of the local officials
themselves, particularly those on the advisory council, we are
going to overcome that problem.
In conclusion, let me note that I have spent half of my
career devoted to our Nation's efforts to fight terrorism.
Including State and local partners in those efforts has
dramatically enhanced the safety of Americans. As we move
forward in this area, as we include them more, make them true
full partners in this, I expect that our security will be
enhanced even more.
We have accomplished much, and much, much more needs to be
done. I thank you for the time.
[The statement of Mr. McNamara follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas E. ``Ted'' McNamara
Chairwomen Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and Members of the
subcommittee, let me begin by taking this opportunity to thank you for
your continued support of our efforts to build an information-sharing
environment, and more specifically for your commitment to making the
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) a reality.
The President has issued Guidelines and his National Strategy for
Information Sharing, Congress has provided both oversight and statutory
authority, and our State and Local partners are committed. The Federal
partners in this effort, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Counterterrorism Center,
and the PM-ISE, must meet the President's and Congress's intent. Much
progress has been made to this end, but more can be done.
In Section 521 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, Congress directed me to provide an update on
the progress made in implementing the ITACG. The attached report
contains our current assessment of the ITACG function and its
contribution to the terrorism-related products being disseminated, as
well as the challenges that we must address in the near term to make it
fully functional and relevant to the way we share information with our
State, local and tribal partners. Our key findings can be summarized as
follows:
1. The ITACG Detail has achieved an Initial Operating Capability.
2. Efforts are ongoing to incorporate ITACG Detail participation
into the product coordination processes of NCTC, DHS, FBI and
other Federal producers of terrorism-related information
intended for dissemination to State, local, tribal governments
and the private sector.
3. Recruitment and selection of State, local and tribal (SLT)
personnel for the ITACG detail continues.
4. The ITACG Advisory Council has been established and has held two
meetings as of the date of this report.
5. Measuring the impact and effectiveness of the ITACG Detail and
Advisory Council at this early stage of development is not an
easy task.
Attachment.--Establishing the Interagency Threat Assessment and
Coordination Group
report for the congress of the united states, march 2008, prepared by
the program manager, information sharing environment
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Page
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1. INTRODUCTION.............................................. 2
1.1. 9/11 ACT REQUIREMENTS............................... 2
1.2. KEY FINDINGS........................................ 2
1.3. BACKGROUND.......................................... 3
1.3.1. Components of the ITACG....................... 5
1.3.2. Operational Framework of the ITACG............ 5
2. CURRENT STATUS OF THE ITACG............................... 7
2.1. THE ITACG DETAIL.................................... 7
2.1.1. Staffing...................................... 7
2.1.2. Facilities & Logistics........................ 8
2.1.3. Information Technology Support................ 8
2.1.4. Activities to Date............................ 8
2.2. ADVISORY COUNCIL.................................... 11
2.2.1. Membership.................................... 11
2.2.2. Funding....................................... 12
3. NEXT STEPS................................................ 13
3.1. RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION CHALLENGES................ 13
3.2. APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF ASSIGNEES TO THE DETAIL....... 14
3.3. ESTABLISHING FORMAL FEEDBACK MECHANISMS............. 14
3.4. BROADEN THE DETAIL'S PARTICIPATION IN THE PRODUCT 15
COORDINATION PROCESS....................................
3.5. HOW PROGRESS WILL BE MEASURED....................... 15
APPENDIX ONE: ITACG ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS................. 16
APPENDIX TWO: STATE AND LOCAL ASSIGNEES TO THE ITACG DETAIL.. 17
APPENDIX THREE: ITACG INPUT ON SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS 18
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. introduction
1.1. 9/11 Act Requirements
Pursuant to Section 521 of the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (the act), the Program Manager for the
Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), in consultation with the
Information Sharing Council (ISC), is responsible for monitoring and
assessing the efficacy of the Interagency Threat Assessment and
Coordination Group (ITACG). Specifically, the Act requires the PM-ISE
to issue an annual report on the progress of the ITACG to the Secretary
of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Director of National
Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the U.S. Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of
the U.S. House of Representatives.
1.2. Key Findings
1. The ITACG Detail has achieved an Initial Operating Capability.
Federal, State, and local personnel, along with contractor support,
are working in dedicated workspace with full connectivity to systems
available within National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) workspaces.
ITACG personnel regularly attend all relevant meetings at the NCTC and
are becoming engaged in its daily activities and production processes.
2. Efforts are ongoing to incorporate ITACG Detail participation
into the product coordination processes of NCTC, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and other Federal producers of terrorism-related
information intended for dissemination to State, local, and
tribal governments and the private sector.
a. DHS, FBI, and NCTC are working to develop a process to ensure
that the Federal Intelligence Community speaks with ``one-
voice'' when communicating with State, local, and tribal
(SLT) governments and the private sector regarding
terrorism-related threats. In developing this process, all
parties involved recognize there are circumstances in which
the rapid issuance of time-sensitive threat advisories is
necessary. While extensive interagency coordination in the
drafting and production of such advisories is preferred, it
is not always possible.
b. There are already several examples of the ITACG Detail providing
valuable input to products intended for State, local,
tribal, and private sector (SLTP) entities. In addition to
the ITACG working primarily to assist NCTC production as
required by the act, the ITACG Detail is becoming more
involved in the product coordination processes of
individual agencies, in particular the DHS and FBI. The
ITACG Detail is actively working with the DHS and FBI
production teams to determine the appropriate level of
coordination required.
3. Recruitment and Selection of State, Local, and Tribal Personnel
for the ITACG Detail Continues.
a. SLT representation on the ITACG Detail currently consists of
four State and local law enforcement officers. The Advisory
Council has identified the need for broader State, local,
and tribal representation. This includes a representative
from a tribal government; the fire service; and individuals
with background and experience in homeland security
planning and operations at the State and local level.
b. Lessons learned during initial efforts to recruit SLT assignees
for the ITACG Detail have informed the methods and
administrative processes used to raise SLT awareness of the
ITACG, and to identify SLT personnel for future assignment
to the ITACG Detail.
c. Recruiting efforts continue to address the need for broader SLT
representation and to ensure adequate overlap when there is
turnover of SLT assignees within the ITACG Detail.
4. The ITACG Advisory Council has been established and has held two
meetings as of the date of this report.
The Advisory Council has determined that for this first year, there
is a need to meet every 60 days. In addition, the Council will meet in
``special session'' via teleconference as required to address selected
topics that require immediate attention.
5. Measuring the impact and effectiveness of the ITACG Detail and
Advisory Council at this early stage of development is not an
easy task.
a. The ITACG Detail has developed an outreach plan to broaden
awareness of the Detail's mission. The outreach plan is
intended to expand awareness within the Federal Government
and among SLT governments of the mission and capabilities
of the ITACG Detail.
b. Appropriate performance measurements for the ITACG Detail
regarding impact and effectiveness are currently under
discussion by the Advisory Council. We expect such measures
to be approved by 3rd quarter fiscal year 2008.
1.3. Background
The President and Congress directed establishment of the ITACG to
improve the sharing of information with SLTP officials within the scope
of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE).\1\ As stated in the
administration's National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes
and Challenges In Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing, the
``ITACG supports the efforts of the National Counterterrorism Center to
produce `federally coordinated' terrorism-related information products
intended for dissemination to SLTP partners through existing channels
established by Federal departments and agencies by:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The ISE was established under section 1016 of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Enabling the development of intelligence reports on terrorist
threats and related issues that represent a `federally
coordinated' perspective regarding those threats and issues and
that satisfy the needs of State, local, tribal, and private
sector entities until such time as the ISE matures
organizationally and culturally to satisfy those needs as a
normal part of doing business;
2. Providing advice, counsel, and subject matter expertise to the
Intelligence Community regarding the operations of State,
local, and tribal officials, including how such entities use
terrorism-related information to fulfill their counterterrorism
responsibilities as part of the core mission of protecting
their communities;
3. Enabling the production of clear, relevant, official, `federally
coordinated' threat information in a timely and consistent
manner;
4. Facilitating the production of `federally-coordinated' situation
awareness reporting for State, local, tribal, and private
sector entities on significant domestic and international
terrorism or terrorism-related events that have the potential
to have an impact on local or regional security conditions in
the United States;
5. Ensuring that terrorism-related information intended for State,
local, tribal, and private sector entities is rendered in a
usable format that is, to the extent possible, unclassified, to
facilitate further dissemination;
6. Informing and helping to shape Intelligence Community products
for State, local, tribal, and private sector entities by
providing advice, counsel, and subject matter expertise; and
7. Facilitating the production and posting by NCTC of `federally
coordinated' terrorism-related information intended for
augmentation, as appropriate, and subsequent dissemination to
State, local, tribal, and private sector entities by other
Federal departments and agencies. Accordingly, the ITACG will
advise the Intelligence Community on how to tailor its products
to satisfy the needs of DHS, FBI, and other Federal entities so
that they in turn can better serve their consumers.''
1.3.1. Components of the ITACG
The Act requires the ITACG be comprised of a Detail and an Advisory
Council, both of which are in place.
A. ITACG Detail.--The Act established ``an ITACG Detail comprised
of State, local, and tribal homeland security and law
enforcement officers and intelligence analysts detailed to work
in the NCTC with Federal intelligence analysts for the purpose
of integrating, analyzing, and assisting in the dissemination
of federally-coordinated information within the scope of the
information sharing environment, including homeland security
information, terrorism information, and weapons of mass
destruction information.''
The ITACG Detail (Detail) provides advice, counsel, and subject
matter expertise to the Intelligence Community regarding the
operations of SLT government entities, including how such
entities use terrorism-related information to fulfill their
counterterrorism responsibilities as part of their core mission
of protecting their communities. The efforts of the Detail
complement and supplement Federal analytic, production, and
dissemination efforts. The desired goal of the Detail is to
further enable the production of clear, tailored, relevant,
official federally-coordinated threat information in a timely,
consistent, and usable manner.
B. ITACG Advisory Council.--The ITACG Advisory Council (Council)
sets policies and develops processes for the Detail to
facilitate the integration, analysis, and dissemination of
federally coordinated information within the scope of the ISE,
including homeland security information, terrorism information,
and weapons of mass destruction information. The act requires
at least 50 percent of the Council's membership be executive
level law enforcement and intelligence officials from SLT
governments. The Council membership shall also include
representatives from DHS, FBI, NCTC, Department of Defense,
Department of Energy, Department of State, and the PM-ISE; and
meet not less than quarterly at the NCTC.
1.3.2. Operational Framework of the ITACG
A. ITACG Detail.--The daily operations of the Detail include
identifying, reviewing, and assessing relevant material of
interest to SLTP entities, and supporting the appropriate
dissemination of such material through existing channels of the
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security and other
agencies, as appropriate. Additionally, the Detail recommends
which products should be posted concurrently on appropriate
NCTC websites to establish common situational awareness and
enhance coordination across all elements of the Federal
Government. Specifically, the Detail focuses on three types of
reporting:
1. Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications.--ITACG identifies time-
sensitive terrorism threats to locations within the United
States.
2. Situational Awareness Reporting.--ITACG reviews significant
events and activities occurring at the international,
national, State, and local levels to determine if these
events and activities have the potential to raise concern
among SLTP partners regarding a possible domestic terrorist
attack.
3. Terrorism-Related Strategic and Foundational Assessments.--ITACG
reviews analytical intelligence products to identify
suitable strategic and foundational assessments as
candidates for downgrading or tailoring for dissemination
to SLTP consumers.
B. ITACG Advisory Council.--The Council develops policies,
processes, procedures, standards, and guidelines for the
Detail. The Council supports efforts of the Secretary of
Homeland Security to carry out his responsibilities as defined
in the Act by supporting the development of policies and
processes pertaining to the operation of the Detail. Section
521 of the Act (6 USC 121) requires the Secretary, in
coordination with the Council and NCTC to: (1) create policies
and standards for the creation of products; (2) evaluate and
develop processes for timely dissemination of these products to
SLTP; (3) establish criteria and methodology for indicating
reliability of information being disseminated to SLTP; (4)
educate the intelligence community about the requirements of
SLTP homeland security, law enforcement, and other emergency
response providers; (5) establish and maintain the ITACG
Detail; (6) detail a senior intelligence official from DHS to
NCTC to manage the daily operations of the Detail; and (7)
develop a mechanism to select SLT officials for the Detail. As
part of this final responsibility, the Secretary shall use
criteria developed by the Council for the selection of a
broadly representative group of homeland security and law
enforcement officers and intelligence analysts for placement in
the ITACG Detail.
2. current status of the itacg
2.1. The ITACG Detail
The ITACG Detail has achieved an initial operating capability.
Federal, State, and local personnel, along with contractor support, are
working in dedicated workspace with full system connectivity onsite at
the NCTC. Members of the Detail regularly attend key meetings at the
NCTC and are becoming engaged in NCTC's daily activities and production
processes.
2.1.1. Staffing
A. Federal Staff.--As of 29 October 2007, all Federal
representatives had reported for duty. This includes two DHS
representatives (Detail Director and a senior intelligence
analyst) and two FBI representatives (Deputy Director and a
senior intelligence analyst).
B. State, Local and Tribal Staff.--As of 4 February 2008 four State
and local law enforcement officials have reported for duty on
the ITACG Detail. The number of State and local assignees is
not limited to four individuals, nor is participation limited
to only law enforcement personnel. The State and local
assignees currently working on the Detail represent the
totality of individuals who applied for assignment to the
Detail. All four applicants were vetted, nominated, and
forwarded to DHS and FBI. DHS and FBI approved all four after
certifying their security clearances. The number of applicants
and State and local assignees reflects the difficulty of
finding individuals who possess the requisite experience, have
an active TS/SCI clearance, and who would be willing and able
to relocate to Washington, DC for a 12-month tour.\2\ Names and
report dates of the current State and local assignees can be
found in Appendix Two to this report. While the ITACG supports
efforts to produce ``federally coordinated'' terrorism-related
information products intended for dissemination to SLTP
partners, private sector participation on the Detail is not
considered at this time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The ITACG Detail Implementation Team determined staffing
requirements for the ITACG Detail. The implementation team was
comprised of Federal representatives from DHS, FBI, NCTC, DoD, and PM-
ISE, and State, local and tribal representatives from Major Cities
Police Chiefs Association, the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, National Sheriffs Association, Homeland Security Advisors
Council of the National Governors Association, National Native American
Law Enforcement Association, and the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating
Council of the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Contract Support.--Two NCTC contractors with law enforcement and
intelligence community experience were assigned to the Detail
in advance of the arrival of the SLT assignees and continue to
provide support.
2.1.2. Facilities & Logistics
The Detail currently occupies ten work stations in a dedicated area
at the NCTC.
2.1.3. Information Technology Support
All Detail members have access to NCTC UNCLASSIFIED, SECRET, and
TOP SECRET/Special Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) systems, as well
as relevant Law Enforcement databases and homeland security information
systems. FBI networks and systems are fully available to the Detail,
while work continues to provide full DHS connectivity.
Prior to the establishment of the Detail, there was no existing
connectivity to DHS information systems within NCTC workspaces. DHS and
NCTC, in coordination with appropriate network security offices, are
engineering and accrediting support solutions at the DHS UNCLASSIFIED
and TS/SCI levels. As of the date of this report, UNCLASSIFIED services
are in place, and work continues to establish access to the DHS TS/SCI
system.
FBI sponsored Detail members and personnel currently have access
and print capability to FBI UNCLASSIFIED, SECRET, and TS/SCI systems.
Access to IT systems follows standard procedure at the NCTC, where
all employees have access to NCTC managed systems and individual
employees additionally have specific access to their home or
``sponsoring'' agency systems.
2.1.4. Activities to Date
A. Review of Current Intelligence and Threat Reporting.--The Detail
searches all available systems and databases daily for finished
intelligence of potential interest to SLTP. From 29 October
2007 through 6 February 2008, members of the Detail reviewed
over 34,000 published intelligence products at all levels of
security classification (many of these products were available
to State and local officials who have access to NCTC Online at
the SECRET classification level, NOL-S). From that review, the
Detail identified and posted directly to NOL-S for SLT
officials an additional 23 intelligence products at the SECRET
classification level, and requested that the security
classification be downgraded for 26 more Intelligence Community
products classified above the SECRET level. Currently, 16 of
those 26 have been disseminated to SLT authorities; nine are in
the process of being downgraded; and one product was determined
to not be appropriate for downgrading. In addition, NCTC has
put a process in place and is now routinely downgrading
classified products to the SECRET or unclassified level to ease
their dissemination to non-Federal entities. This includes not
only Situational Reports and Threat Matrix reports, but also a
new NCTC Directorate of Intelligence product, Terrorist
Intelligence Production Sharing (TIPS).
B. Threat Reporting.--From 29 October 2007 through 6 February 2008,
the Detail reviewed 1,864 separate worldwide threat reports
concerning U.S. interests, identifying 77 of these as possible
threats to the Homeland. The Detail conducted further review of
these potential threats and identified five threat reports of
questionable credibility, two of which required better
characterization of the threat or the source. As a direct
impact of the Detail's involvement in those two cases, DHS and
FBI tailored the characterization of the threat and issued a
joint bulletin that addressed the needs of State and local
authorities.
C. Dissemination of Products Influenced or Enabled by the Detail.--
The Detail is becoming increasingly involved in the review and
editing of informational and intelligence products developed by
DHS, FBI, and NCTC.\3\ UNCLASSIFIED products are primarily
disseminated to SLT officials via email, the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN), and Law Enforcement Online (LEO).
All products up to the classification of SECRET that are
identified or influenced by the Detail are also posted on NOL-
S. Currently, 35 State and major urban area fusion centers can
access NOL-S through the DHS Homeland Security Data Network
(HSDN) and FBI's FBINet, and therefore benefit from the ITACG's
ability to post products to NOL-S. Efforts are underway to
provide designated \4\ State and major urban area fusion
centers access to NOL-S. Accordingly, the NCTC, in coordination
with DHS and FBI, has begun providing instruction to SLT
officials regarding the use of NOL-S and the safeguarding of
information provided through access to it, including privacy
guidelines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ An inventory of products influenced and/or developed through
the efforts of the ITACG Detail is contained in Appendix Three to this
report.
\4\ In a letter dated Nov 28, 2007, the Attorney General and
Secretary of Homeland Security requested that each Governor designate a
primary fusion center ``to serve as the State-wide or regional hub to
interface with the Federal Government to coordinate the gathering,
processing, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism, law enforcement,
and homeland security information in an all-crimes approach''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Additional Activities.--The Detail has been involved in several
administrative and collaborative efforts with SLTP and Federal
partners to further the establishment of the ITACG. Highlights
of these activities include:
i. November 2007.--Participated in Congressional briefing regarding
ITACG status.
ii. December 2007.--
1. Briefed the ITACG Advisory Council during its
inaugural meeting.
2. Provided an awareness briefing to the Chiefs
of Staff of all NCTC components;
3. Met with NCTC's Office of Strategic
Communications to discuss public relations associated
issues and to provide information for an article about
the ITACG, subsequently published in the ODNI
``Spotlight'' newsletter for the IC;
4. Delivered a status report to the ODNI Civil
Liberties and Privacy Office;
5. Met with NCTC Chief of Budget and Plans to
develop a budget;
6. Met with NCTC Information Sharing and
Knowledge Development (ISKD) to improve the handling of
Virtual Threat Information and Virtual Walk-Ins.
iii. January 2008.--
1. Met with DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties to assist with the ITACG Privacy Impact
Assessment;
2. Briefed ITACG's mission and function and how
it relates to SLTP information-sharing activities to
NCTC's Directorate of Intelligence and the DNI Analysis
101 course;
3. Met with NCTC Mission Systems to develop a
video which will provide SLT an overview of NOL-S and
its capabilities;
4. Met with FBI National Security Reports and
Requirements Section about source description used in
Intelligence Information Reports as well as the
priority of downgrading SECRET reporting to
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO) for SLT;
5. Met with DHS (Intelligence Watch and Warning)
and the FBI (Directorate of Intelligence) to streamline
the dissemination of DHS Chief Intelligence Notes (CINT
Note) and FBI Terrorist Alert and Advisory Messages via
the Strategic Information and Operations Center Law
Enforcement Alert Messaging System (SLAM).
iv. Ongoing.--
1. Finalizing the Detail's Operating Framework;
2. Developed an awareness brochure on the ITACG
that is currently being reviewed by the Advisory
Council and others prior to distribution to SLTP and
Federal partners;
3. Participating in the NCTC Outreach Advisory
Group, specifically ITACG's involvement in the calendar
year 2008 NCTC outreach plan. The Detail continues to
work with NCTC's National Partnership Branch,
Information Sharing Knowledge Development (ISKD), and
the PM-ISE regarding SLTP outreach and to develop a
coordinated communications plan for the ITACG;
4. Working with NCTC to enhance NOL-S Web portal
for SLT use, including content and cosmetic changes;
5. Reviewing and posting intelligence documents
directly to NOL-S, specifically for SLT use.
2.2. Advisory Council
2.2.1. Membership
The Secretary of Homeland Security has designated the Under
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis as chair
of the Advisory Council. In accordance with the Act, at least 50
percent of the members of the Council are executive level SLT
officials.
Because the Council will set policies, develop processes, and
review intelligence, members are required to have a SECRET clearance.
SLT members of the Council are nominated by the Global Justice
Information Sharing Initiative/Criminal Intelligence Coordinating
Council (CICC) and the National Governors Association/Governors
Homeland Security Advisors Council and hold a leadership position in a
nationally-recognized professional association representing State,
local, or tribal interests in homeland security, counterterrorism, or
emergency response. As a member of the Council, these SLT
representatives are expected to represent their peers from across the
Nation.
The Council has held two meetings. The inaugural meeting was held
at NCTC on 6 December 2007. The second meeting of the Advisory Council
was held on 15 February 2008, during which it reviewed current efforts
of the Detail, the ITACG budget for fiscal year 2008 through fiscal
year 2013, and recruiting and outreach efforts.
The Council currently consists of representatives from the
following organizations:
A. State, Local and Tribal Members.--Includes one representative
from each of the following organizations:
1. Global Justice Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council
(CICC);
2. International Association Chiefs of Police (IACP);
3. International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC);
4. International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence
Analysts (IALEIA);
5. Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU);
6. Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC);
7. Major County Sheriff's Association (MCSA);
8. National Governors Association (NGA);
9. National Native American Law Enforcement Association (NNALEA);
10. National Sheriff's Association (NSA).
B. Federal Members.--Includes one representative from each of the
following organizations:
1. Department of Homeland Security--Chair;
2. Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence;
3. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and
Analysis;
4. Department of Defense, Joint Intelligence Task Force--Combating
Terrorism;
5. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence & Research;
6. Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Branch;
7. Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment;
8. National Counterterrorism Center;
9. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Office of
Homeland Security and Law Enforcement.
The Council membership list is attached as Appendix One to this
report.
2.2.2. Funding
A. ITACG Detail Start-up.--Approximately $1 million in startup
costs associated with facilities (renovations, rent, equipment,
etc.), information system connectivity and contract support
have been funded by the PM-ISE. Personnel costs (Federal,
State, and local), information system design, accreditation,
and deployments costs, and ITACG Detail travel expenses have
been funded by DHS and FBI.
B. ITACG Advisory Council Start-up.--Travel costs to date for SLT
members of the Advisory Council have been funded by the PM-ISE.
DHS provides administrative support to the Council.
Detailed budget-related information will be addressed under
separate cover.
3. next steps
Ensuring the effective operations of the ITACG Detail and Advisory
Council remains a priority. DHS, FBI, NCTC, and the PM-ISE are mindful
that continued joint effort is required to achieve full ITACG
functionality and sustainment.
3.1. Recruitment and Selection Challenges: The recruitment and
selection of State, local and tribal personnel for the ITACG
Detail presents several challenges.
The Act states that the ITACG Detail shall consist of SLT homeland
security and law enforcement officers and intelligence analysts. The
four current assignees were nominated either by the Criminal
Intelligence Coordinating Council of the Global Justice Information
Sharing Initiative or by the Homeland Security Advisors Council of the
National Governors Association. Three of the four are law enforcement
personnel from large city police departments and the fourth is from a
State police agency. The Detail position announcements were advertised
by both of these organizations through established channels and
nominations were forwarded to either DHS or the FBI, who formally
selected the Detail assignees. The administrative process currently
used for those nominees selected by the FBI is to bring them into the
Federal Government via the FBI's Law Enforcement Fellowship Program.
Those nominees selected by DHS are given Federal status via the
Interagency Personnel Agreement (IPA) process.
Lessons learned during initial efforts to recruit and
administratively process SLT assignees have led to a reevaluation of
the methods and administrative processes used to both raise awareness
about this opportunity, as well as to identify and nominate SLT
personnel for the Detail. The entire process proved to be more complex
and time-consuming than originally anticipated. For example, all
parties to the effort initially agreed that SLT personnel assigned to
the Detail should be of ``senior rank'' (lieutenant or above), serve a
12-month tour of duty, and possess an active TS/SCI clearance. In
addition, working at NCTC also requires that personnel successfully
complete a Counter Intelligence Polygraph. For Detail personnel, that
polygraph is administered subsequent to an individual being selected
for the assignment and prior to reporting for duty.
As the search process began, it became clear that there were a
limited number of SLT officials of senior rank with the requisite
experience and an active TS/SCI clearance who would be willing and able
to relocate to Washington, DC for a 12-month tour. The criteria were
broadened to ensure that eligible candidates with appropriate
experience but less-senior rank could apply. The CICC and NGA Advisory
Group then readvertised the position and four law enforcement personnel
applied. Those four professionals were vetted, nominated, and forwarded
to DHS and FBI, who approved all four after certifying their security
clearances.
The ITACG Advisory Council, working with the ITACG Detail, is
actively evaluating the recruitment process in order to ensure greater
diversification and representation among assignees from various
geographic regions and disciplines (e.g., tribal, law enforcement,
homeland security, fire service, public safety, emergency management,
etc.). The Advisory Council has endorsed additional recruiting efforts
to identify suitable candidates representing these areas. DHS, FBI, and
NCTC are working with the ITACG Advisory Council to modify the
recruitment process and identify incentives that would encourage a
greater level of interest by SLT personnel. The Advisory Council is
also reviewing how best to ensure adequate overlap during turnover
between current Detail members and their successors.
3.2. Appropriate Number of Assignees to the Detail: How best to
determine the appropriate number of State, local, and tribal
assignees to the ITACG Detail.
Four law enforcement professionals volunteered for the ITACG Detail
and were accepted. The original plan was to have five (5) in the
initial set of personnel and to reevaluate the number needed as the
Detail developed. While finding qualified SLT participants will likely
remain a challenge, efforts are underway to expand State and local
participation to include a representative from a tribal government, a
representative from the fire service and an individual with experience
in State or local homeland security operations.
The methods by which DHS and FBI sponsor the assignees differ and
have presented some inequities in reimbursement for salary and travel.
As a result, the Advisory Council and the Detail recognize the need to
streamline and standardize the Fellowship Program(s) supporting State
and local assignees. The Council, the Detail, DHS, FBI, and NCTC are
working closely to ensure that the current set of State and local
assignees are properly supported, and that future candidates will be
encouraged and assured that a tour at the ITACG will not adversely
affect them financially or professionally. It should be noted that
expansion of the Detail from its current size of ten personnel will
require additional facility space, computer support, and salary
funding.
3.3. Establishing Formal Feedback Mechanisms: Existing feedback
mechanisms for SLTP officials to inform the ITACG Detail of
their information needs are ineffective and need improvement.
While there are established feedback mechanisms supporting
terrorism-related information products disseminated by the Federal
Government to SLTP audiences, there is some question as to their
current effectiveness. DHS, FBI, NCTC, and the Detail rely primarily
upon informal feedback to determine customer satisfaction, including
seeking Advisory Council guidance. The Council can also provide
guidance regarding how best to establish a feedback mechanism. The
Council endorsed the Detail's proposed Outreach Plan, designed to
educate SLT organizations as to the functions of the Detail and solicit
specific information requirements for which the ITACG should advocate
within the Federal community. The DHS, FBI, and ITACG Detail are also
developing a survey mechanism to identify SLT needs and desires for
information.
3.4. Broaden the Detail's Participation in the Product Coordination
Process: There are already several examples of the ITACG Detail
providing valuable input to intelligence products, and efforts
to broaden the ITACG Detail's participation in NCTC, DHS and
FBI product coordination processes continue.
DHS, FBI, and NCTC in consultation with the Council, continue
efforts to define how the mission and role of the Detail will be
carried out. Efforts to fully incorporate the Detail into the product
coordination processes of DHS and FBI, particularly for time-sensitive
issues, are ongoing; senior officials from DHS, FBI, and NCTC are
working to develop processes for this. In addition, to ensure
visibility of ITACG involvement in such processes, the ITACG Detail and
Advisory Council are drafting appropriate language to reflect the
Detail's involvement in the coordination of Federal homeland security,
terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction information.
3.5. How Progress Will Be Measured
At this early stage of development, measuring the impact of either
the ITACG Detail or Advisory Council is not an easy task. As the Detail
begins operations, the Council is actively assessing the Detail's
performance to influence the Federal counterterrorism community's
production of terrorism-related information intended for SLT customers.
To date, progress has been measured based on the achievement of
milestones related to staffing the Detail and ensuring that mission
activity, facilities, and logistical requirements are met. As part of
its mandate to ``monitor and assess the efficacy of the ITACG,'' the
PM-ISE, in consultation with DHS, FBI, NCTC, and the Council, is
working to define those performance measures that will best reflect the
value-added provided by the Detail, i.e. both output and outcome
measures that effectively allow for evaluation of its impact and any
adjustments that need to be made.
Appendix One: ITACG Advisory Council Members
member organizations
Chair, Dept of Homeland Security; National Native American Law
Enforcement Association (NNALEA); Major Cities Chiefs Association
(MCC); GLOBAL Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Criminal
Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC); National Sheriffs'
Association (NSA); International Association Chiefs of Police (IACP);
International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts
(IALEIA); Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU); International
Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC); National Governors Association
(NGA); Major County Sheriffs' Association (MCSA); Department of
Homeland Security; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of
Defense; Department of Energy; National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC);
Department of State; Program Manager for the Information Sharing
Environment (PM-ISE); Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Appendix Two: State and Local Assignees to the ITACG Detail
1. Representative, Phoenix Police Department, reported to NCTC on 6
November 2007.
2. Representative, Metropolitan Police Department of the District of
Columbia reported to NCTC on 16 January 2008.
3. Representative, Boston Police Department, reported to NCTC on 4
February 2008.
4. Representative, New Jersey State Police, reported to NCTC on 29
January 2008.
Note: All State and Local assignees are deputized as Federal
employees and do not represent any single State or Local agency.
Appendix Three: ITACG Input on Specific Intelligence Products
I. Products Coordinated by ITACG Prior to Dissemination.--ITACG
currently receives advance drafts of DHS and FBI homeland
counterterrorism products (Bulletins, Intelligence Assessments, CINT
Notes, SLAMs) for coordination.
A. ITACG coordinated and provided substantive input on one
UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO) FBI threat
assessment prior to dissemination.
B. ITACG coordinated on seven U//FOUO joint DHS/FBI products prior
to dissemination, but provided no substantive input and
concurred with the products as written.
II. Threat Reporting.--ITACG is reviewing all Intelligence
Community threat reporting, to ensure those threats pertinent to the
homeland have been properly characterized for S&L. From 23 October 2007
to 6 February 2008, 1,864 threat reports were reviewed, of those 77 had
homeland implications; however, in most cases no further action was
required. ITACG coordinated and provided substantive input on one U//
FOUO joint DHS/FBI threat report prior to dissemination.
III. Products Reviewed by ITACG Post Dissemination.--ITACG reviews
already disseminated reporting to identify products suitable for S&L.
A. Since 23 October 2007, reviewed over 34,000 intelligence
products. Many of those products were either: already
disseminated to S&L via established SECRET and U//FOUO systems,
not terrorism-related, had no homeland relevance, or were too
highly classified to downgrade. Twenty-five terrorism-related
products of potential benefit to S&L were identified, of those:
1. Sixteen terrorism-related products have been downgraded with no
additional substantive input; and
2. Nine are in the downgrade process.
B. Since 31 January 2008, ITACG has posted 24 intelligence
community products directly into NOL-S.
A complete list of product titles for all documents listed above is
available through U//FOUO channels upon request.
Ms. Harman. Thank you for coming back into government
service.
Mr. Leiter.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. LEITER, ACTING DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (NCTC)
Mr. Leiter. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Mr. Reichert.
Thanks for having us here today.
In your very kind introduction, you forgot what might be my
most relevant experience, which is for 7 years I served in fire
services and emergency medical services. So I think I do at
least have some appreciation, certainly what you have, Mr.
Reichert, of what first responders have to go through.
I would like to cover two areas in my opening statement
today, the first being how ITACG is actually operating, and the
second, some of the challenges that I think we still see.
The first component of the operations is making sure that
the ITACG detail has full access to information. We have done
that. Today, the ITACG detail, whether or not they are Federal
or State and local representatives, has full access to all
levels of classification for national intelligence, regardless
of whether or not that information comes from the FBI, DHS,
DOD, CIA or elsewhere. They have that access.
In addition to the computer access that they have, they are
fully integrated into the situational awareness procedures that
we have for the entire Federal Government. So for example, the
ITACG detail sits just a few feet from me every day as I chair
a daily secure video teleconference which convenes all of the
agencies involved in the counterterrorism efforts.
They also participate in programs such as the National JTTF
meetings, the turnover of the FBI Counterterrorism Division
watches--all the things that the Federal Government does to
maintain situational awareness, the ITACG is there.
Now, the second part of the ITACG operations which I think
are key is their participation in the production of situational
awareness products. That is when something breaks, that they
are there. In fact, they are. They participate very early in
the collaboration process between FBI and DHS and NCTC to make
sure that their perspective is included in these products.
Now, finally, Madam Chair, you mentioned the foundational
intelligence. This is a key piece because this isn't just about
the immediate alert when something happens. It is about giving
State and local officers an idea of what is going on in the
world of counterterrorism from the Federal Government's
perspective. ITACG already participates fully in the production
of products at NCTC, advises NCTC analysts on which products
should be downgraded first and how those products can be
written for the State and local customers, and works with the
FBI and DHS to do the same.
Equally important, they are spearheading our efforts to
streamline and improve our delivery of those products to the
State and local governments through NCTC online.
Now, that is a lot of theory. I want to give you a quick
example of how this has already worked. I am sure you remember
from a couple of weeks ago reports of a ricin incident in Las
Vegas. DHS and FBI came up with an outstanding product very
quickly to address what had happened in Las Vegas. The ITACG,
though, brought a bit of expertise which I think improved that
product.
First, the initial product talked about 240 to 400
micrograms of ricin, which to us people in the Federal
Government might mean something, but to the sheriff in King
County means very little. So the ITACG told them, well, let's
tell them what 240 to 400 micrograms actually looks like, so an
officer could visualize that. That was included in the report.
Second, it talked about ricin in cake, powder and liquid
forms, and the ITACG suggested they also say what it typically
looks like and what it smells like, again for the State and
local officers.
Finally, the product talked about wearing personal
protective equipment, and the ITACG suggested that they should
provide slightly more detail on that, so a State and local
officer would have a better sense of if they saw something,
whether or not they could do it with gloves or whether or not
they would have to call in a hazardous material group. From my
perspective, this is exactly what the ITACG should be doing and
it is what they are already doing.
Now, I do want to note some areas which I think are
challenges because it is important to remember that this is an
early process and it should change because we are learning by
doing. I want this to change. If we are static now where we
are, we probably will not be addressing the needs in the
future.
So to begin, the question is, how stand-alone an entity
should the ITACG be? From my perspective, it should be fully
integrated into the NCTC and it should not write products
itself. Rather, it should inform all the products that the
Federal Government writes to support State and local officials.
Second, the question is, what does it mean to have a fully
coordinated product? This means a lot of things for a lot of
people. My bottom line, though is, although we want to
coordinate things, we don't want to delay them in a way that
they are no longer useful. We have to coordinate, but we have
to get things out quickly because otherwise the products won't
meet the needs.
Third, the size of the ITACG. It is modest now, with four
State and local representatives and two contractors who also
represent State and local interests. We already plan now on
growing that by about five people to include fire, health and
the like, as a recommendation from the advisory council. I
think that that is probably a good start, and we will see where
we go as the mission actually evolves.
Finally, I want to note--and I am sorry I am over time, I
will be just a moment--I want to note that this isn't just
about the ITACG telling the Federal Government what to do. This
is also about using the ITACG as a body of experts to help us
understand what States and locals can do so we make sure the
State and local information is getting up and being used
effectively by the Federal Government.
I think all of these are challenges, but certainly not
insurmountable. They are simply challenges inherent to
operationalizing a new entity, and I look forward to your
counsel on how we can best to that.
[The statement of Mr. Leiter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael E. Leiter
March 13, 2008
Chair Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, Members of the committee,
thank you for the invitation to offer my assessment of the Interagency
Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG).
I am pleased to be accompanied today by the Program Manager for
Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), Ambassador Thomas E.
McNamara, Mr. Wayne M. Murphy, Assistant Director of the FBI's
Directorate of Intelligence, and Mr. Charlie Allen, DHS Under Secretary
Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
The Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG)
brings Federal, State, local and tribal intelligence and law
enforcement personnel together to enhance information sharing between
the Intelligence Community, State, local, tribal, and private (SLTP)
partners. NCTC is focused on meeting the ITACG statutory purpose of
``integrating, analyzing, and assisting in the dissemination of
federally-coordinated information within the scope of the information-
sharing environment, including homeland security information, terrorism
information and weapons of mass destruction information, through
appropriate channels identified by the ITACG Advisory Council.''\1\ The
ultimate goal, of course, is to better protect the homeland against
terrorism through increased information sharing. In our vision, the
ITACG will complement, but not supplant, the intelligence production
and information-sharing efforts of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other executive
departments and agencies. Today, I would like to address three
principal areas: ITACG operations, improving information flow to SLTP
partners, and some of the challenges we expect to face in this area in
the coming months and years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Public Law 110-53--Aug. 3, 2007 Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
itacg operations
The ITACG, established both by presidential order in December 2006
and by statute in August 2007, reached initial operating capability at
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in October 2007. ITACG
advocates for Federal and non-Federal partners, without duplicating,
impeding, or otherwise interfering with existing and established
counterterrorism roles, and responsibilities.\2\ In its role of
providing support to non-Federal partners, the group identifies
reporting of potential interest to SLTP partners, ensures that the
message is cast appropriately, and that the information is
disseminated. In its role of providing support to Federal partners, the
ITACG provides the State, local, and tribal perspectives to the
Intelligence Community, and brings non-Federal information to Federal
analysts. These actions are intended to increase the probability of
appropriate responses to genuine terrorism threats, while diminishing
the possibility of disproportionate reactions to terrorism incidents of
low or questionable credibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Guideline 2--Develop a Common Framework for the Sharing of
Information Between and Among Executive Departments and Agencies and
State, Local, and Tribal Governments, Law Enforcement Agencies, and the
Private Sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A ``learn by doing'' strategy has been implemented whereby ITACG
members interact with elements throughout NCTC and across the community
on behalf of non-Federal partners. And although we continue to learn,
ITACG is already fully participating in appropriate interagency fora,
reviewing analytical products, ensuring appropriate context, adding
comment, facilitating dissemination and, in general, serving as the
eyes and ears for State, local and tribal constituents. Our approach to
ITACG operations has three core components: (1) ITACG access to a broad
range of Federal counterterrorism information; (2) ITACG participation
in production of alerts, warnings, and situational awareness reporting
for SLTP partners; and (3) ITACG participation in production of
finished, ``foundational'' intelligence for SLTP partners. I address
each of these three areas in greater detail below.
1. ITACG Access to a Broad Range of Federal Counterterrorism
Information
A key aspect of the ITACG role is to identify and promote effective
dissemination of intelligence products at the lowest possible
classification. A foundational aspect of this responsibility is that
the ITACG representatives have access to a broad range of Federal
counterterrorism information. This has been fully accomplished.
The group--regardless of whether the individual is from a Federal,
State, or local agency--has broad access to top secret, special
compartmented, collateral, and unclassified Intelligence Community and
Federal Law Enforcement systems, databases, reporting, and analysis.
This includes access to native DHS, FBI, and NCTC systems. This
inclusive access enables the ITACG to review terrorism information, and
thereby facilitate its release to SLTP partners.
This access to information systems and sensitive databases is
further enhanced by the ITACG's attendance at daily Intelligence
Community and Law Enforcement briefings. Of note, I would point out
that an ITACG representative sits just a few feet from me as I chair
the daily, 8 a.m. U.S. Government-wide secure video teleconference that
includes 18 different offices--to include the FBI, DHS, CIA, Terrorist
Screening Center, Department of Defense, National and Homeland Security
Councils, and many others. In addition, the ITACG participates in the
FBI Counterterrorism Watch shift change, the National Joint Terrorism
Task Force brief, as well as other similar events.
This high level of access permits ITACG to monitor the assessments
made, and actions taken, by the National Intelligence Community and
Federal Law Enforcement in response to terrorism-related activities. In
addition, and perhaps more important, ITACG can subsequently--as in
fact it already has--propose adjustments or additional actions on
behalf of SLTP partners, understanding that those decisions regarding
what DHS, FBI, or other Executive Departments and Agencies communicate
and how to do so, remain exclusively with those organizations. Of note,
ITACG recently identified a threat item which may have caused undue
concern at the State and local level, given the source and content of
the reporting. ITACG reached out to Federal partners and recommended
further scrutiny of the threat and source. The product was redrafted,
taking ITACG's recommendations into consideration, and delivered to
State and local officials.
2. ITACG Participation in Production of Alert, Warning and Situational
Awareness Reporting for SLTP Partners
The ITACG works with DHS, FBI, and NCTC during the drafting phase
of counterterrorism ``alert, warning and situational awareness''
reporting. This early collaboration ensures that terrorism-related
products are relevant to SLTP partners, account for the non-Federal
perspective, provide suitably characterized source descriptions, and
assess the reliability of the information. The intent is to properly
qualify reporting which should assist our State, local, and tribal
partners in taking the most informed course of action possible in
response to threats to their jurisdictions.
More specifically, a proposal is in front of the ITACG Advisory
Council for ITACG to participate in the drafting of a ``just the
facts'' timely product--wherein DHS, FBI, and NCTC alert our non-
Federal partners of a significant event, within hours of its
occurrence. These ``just the facts'' reports are planned to be produced
at the lowest possible level of classification--``UNCLASSIFIED and FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY.'' If these events have an international terrorism
nexus, then these products would be the first of many NCTC products
being produced and provided to our non-Federal partners.
Also I would like to note that the ITACG members will be co-
authoring NCTC's daily SECRET-level situational reports (NCTC Secret
SITREPs) which will highlight, every 24 hours, significant terrorism-
related reporting for our State, local and tribal partners. In
disseminating these products, SLTP partners will--albeit at a lower
level of classification--be provided with the same situational
awareness reporting that is currently relied upon by Federal officials.
3. ITACG Participation in Production of Finished, ``Foundational''
Intelligence Reporting for SLTP Partners
ITACG reviews counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of
mass destruction finished intelligence--that which might be considered
key ``foundational'' intelligence that is not related to a particular
breaking event--to ensure that such intelligence speaks to, and can be
accessed by, SLTP partners. More specifically, the ITACG helps to
identify reporting of potential interest not already available to SLTP
partners, proposes language for the benefit of SLTP consumers of
intelligence, and facilitates the ``classification downgrade'' and
broadest possible dissemination of such products. In many cases, this
may include disseminating reports which have terrorist tactics,
techniques, and procedures that are beneficial to law enforcement,
infrastructure security, and first responders. Of note, ITACG serves
this function for both NCTC-specific products, as well as products from
other parts of the intelligence community.
In addition to their involvement with disseminated intelligence
products, the ITACG coordinates with intelligence directorates at DHS,
FBI, and NCTC, during the initial production phase, enabling the ITACG
to provide the State and local perspective to Federal intelligence
products prior to dissemination.
With respect to the broad range of finished intelligence produced
by NCTC, ITACG reviews all NCTC products and identifies their
suitability for broader dissemination. To assist ITACG, our analysts in
the Directorate of Intelligence identify and downgrade highly
classified assessments to a more manageable secret level via the NCTC
Terrorism Information Product Sharing (TIPS) product line. These TIPS
are subsequently disseminated at the SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, and
UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY levels, depending on the nature of
the material and the utility of lesser classification.
With respect to finished intelligence produced by intelligence
community components other than NCTC, ITACG works on my behalf in my
role as the DNI's Counterterrorism Mission Manager. In this regard, the
ITACG reviews and comments on DHS and FBI terrorism and homeland
security-related products to offer their perspective on how those
products might best serve SLTP partners. In addition, and on a daily
basis, ITACG reviews in excess of 400 intelligence reports from
throughout the intelligence community--to include CIA, DOD, and others.
Finally, the group also works with the intelligence community's primary
analytic coordination team that NCTC manages, the Interagency
Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (the IICT), to identify new topics
of interest or re-visit previous topics of particular interest to
State, local and tribal partners.
improving sltp partner access to counterterrorism information
Having information access and participating in the production of
situational awareness reporting and finished intelligence is only a
part of the ITACG's challenge. For regardless of how much intelligence
is ``pushed'' by the ITACG and our interagency partners at FBI and DHS,
it is only helpful if it can be accessed by SLTP partners. In this
regard, UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY products are vital. But
these products, by their very definition, cannot delve into sensitive
information. And for these sensitive products--generally classified at
the SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL levels--we must continue to improve
delivery to SLTP partners.
In this regard I cannot overstate the importance of NCTC Online
Secret (NOL(S)). From my perspective, NOL(S)--a secure, classified Web
site designed to mirror the Top Secret version that is used broadly by
Federal officials--is a, if not the, key access point to
counterterrorism information for SLT. I believe this because we have
been told repeatedly by senior SLT officials that the information
already contained on NOL(S) meets the vast majority of their
counterterrorism needs. Thus, from my perspective, we must increase the
utility of NOL(S) as well as increase SLT awareness of NOL(S). I
believe that ITACG must play a key role in both endeavors.
With respect to increasing the utility of NOL(S), ITACG is
spearheading an effort to overhaul the look, feel and content of NOL(S)
to be more directly relevant to non-Federal actors. Moreover, we are
working with our Federal partners to post far more products to NOL(S)
to ensure an even richer data set. This will include reporting related
to breaking events, daily terrorism related situational reports, as
well as an array of foundational reports produced by the Federal
Community. The ITACG is working with the FBI to spread the word of
NOL(S) to its field and headquarters personnel. As a result, FBI Field
Office products can now be found on NOL(S), and the FBI Headquarters
will shortly begin posting its own products to NOL(S).
ITACG has also identified the need for posting NCTC TIPS and other
``For Official Use Only'' reporting on systems with greater access by
State, local, and tribal partners. ITACG has brokered an agreement
between production managers at DHS, FBI, and NCTC to post these NCTC
products to Law Enforcement Online (LEO) and the recently revamped
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).
To address the overall issue of ITACG awareness, the ITACG is
preparing an outreach plan in conjunction with Federal partners, to
alert Federal, State, local, tribal and private sector intelligence,
law enforcement, and homeland security professionals of the importance
of disseminating terrorism-related information as widely as possible.
Part of this effort will be focused on demonstrating the value of
NOL(S), as well as providing instructions on how to access the
intelligence. As part of the outreach effort, ITACG representatives
will deliver presentations, provide informational brochures, and
solicit feedback on how ITACG can be of even greater value to our non-
Federal partners.
Finally, I must note that like all Web sites, NOL(S) is only
accessible if one has the right ``pipes''--in this case, DHS, DoD, or
FBI SECRET-level networks that connect to our State, local and tribal
partners. Although I cannot speak directly to such issues, it is my
understanding that such systems are being rapidly deployed.
complexities and challenges
As I hope is readily apparent, NCTC is taking the ITACG effort very
seriously and I applaud the FBI and DHS on their collective efforts to
support the ITACG. We continue to devote a tremendous amount of time,
both that of my senior staff as well as my own, to getting this right.
I am personally convinced that the ITACG will ``learn by doing.'' I'm
also convinced that the entire Government agrees with the general
proposition that the ITACG needs to address issues like consistency and
clarity of message, as well as accurate content--and that it must do so
while ensuring that reporting is provided to our non-Federal partners
in a timely matter.
On the good side, we already have concrete examples of ITACG
facilitating the flow of information and enhancing information sharing
between Federal and State, local and tribal entities. Much, however,
remains to be done. As is the case with any standup effort, we are
collectively working through the procedures to accomplish the goals set
forth quite clearly in the relevant legislation. But we must recognize
that we will continue to work through several challenges discussed more
fully below.
First, we continue to see that there are competing visions for the
ITACG. We have been told by some that the ITACG needs to be much bigger
and that it needs to serve as a stand-alone production and analysis
shop. While I believe that the size of the element is about right for
now, as it evolves so too may its size and therefore I reserve judgment
as to the long-term size of the group. On the latter point, however, I
am more adamant. ITACG should not--and in fact cannot--be a stand-alone
production and analytic entity. Rather, the ITACG's strength flows from
its access to information and its involvement in the production of
intelligence by existing analytic entities within NCTC and elsewhere.
Again, my view as noted above focuses on the need for the group to
bring the State, local and tribal perspective to bear to build on the
existing Federal talent and expertise and ensure that the Federal
Government is leveraged to meet the needs of SLTP partners.
Second, the ITACG must help clarify differing views of the phrase
``Federally coordinated'' that finds the correct balance between
multiple agency participation and timeliness of dissemination. The last
thing we want would be ``National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-like''
timelines associated with pushing time-sensitive, situational awareness
products.
Third, although ITACG is relatively new, we are already looking at
future staffing. As of early March, the ITACG is staffed with four
State and local representatives, six Federal intelligence professionals
and contractors, and a part-time tribal representative. As I have
already noted, future growth will be dictated by mission needs. Beyond
addressing current staffing, funding, space and IT issues, we have also
begun planning the succession process for our State and local
participants to ensure long-term continuity of ITACG operations.
Working across Departmental and Agency boundaries, however, invariably
brings to the surface a host of administrative issues. The selection
process for getting people to NCTC, the differences in the FBI and DHS
fellowship programs, and the adequate level of support external to NCTC
are all issues that we are addressing in order to ensure the long-term
viability of the program.
Finally, I believe the ITACG should not only play an important role
in providing advice and counsel to the Federal community as to what
information flows to SLTP partners, but also advice and counsel on how
information can best flow from SLTP partners. Currently, mechanisms to
ensure that Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) or analytic products
emanating from State Fusion Centers are made available to the Federal
Intelligence Community are, in my view, less than systematic.
Collectively we have a great deal of work to do in this regard and we
should, in the future, use the ITACG's expertise as we seek to
implement better approaches.
None of these are insurmountable challenges, and some of them
simply stem from a new program. They are, however, real issues with
which we are addressing as we attempt to ``operationalize'' statutory
language. I would caution against attempts to be excessively
prescriptive about what the ITACG should do or how it will accomplish
its mission. I cannot stress enough that we are in absolute agreement
on the need to improve the quality of support to our non-Federal
partners and we are working extremely hard to achieve this critical
goal. And in that respect, I very much look forward to continuing to
work closely with the committee as we move forward.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much, Mr. Leiter. I hope that
your oral testimony will be reproduced here and sent on every
network we can think of. I thought it was excellent, but it
also will tell people how far we have come just in the last few
months. Congratulations.
Under Secretary Allen, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE
AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Allen. Madam Chair Harman, Ranking Member Reichert,
thank you for the opportunity to appear here with my
colleagues, with Mr. Leiter, Mr. Murphy, as well as Ambassador
McNamara, because we work each day to ensure actionable and
intelligible terrorism-related information is provided to
State, local and tribal authorities.
The ITACG plays a vital role in this whole process. It
helps shape products to make them more useful for State and
local levels. The ITACG is truly, in my view, a value-added.
When I came to the Department 2 years ago, the Department had
little analytic capability and produced little for our domestic
partners at the State and local levels. I think today it has
changed.
We have a whole line of products that we produce within the
Department for our State and local partners. We have developed
a close and productive relationship, as demonstrated here, with
the National Counterterrorism Center, and with the FBI. Ted
McNamara and his staff and my staff meet regularly to ensure
that we are working concurrently to ensure fuller information
sharing at State and local.
As you know, I have embedded officers in 25 fusion centers
across the country to facilitate the flow of information, as
you indicated, down to State and local, and also to harvest
information at that level and bring it back to the Federal
Government that is vital. I will also, like some of my
colleagues here, be at the National Fusion Conference in San
Francisco next week, just to reinforce that.
The ITACG's role, however, is at the apex of this
information-sharing effort, whether it is we or whether it is
our colleagues. Although it has only begun operations, and
reached its initial operating capability in late January, I
think it promises not only to improve the quality of our
messaging to our domestic audiences, but to make the Federal
contribution security posture more sustainable over time.
The ITACG, as my written statement enumerates, is
supporting many actions that we are pursuing. I would just like
to talk about what we are pursuing with the ITACG, as well as
with the advisory council. First, the ITACG advisory council is
quickly becoming a major player as it should be. It is a key
enabler to the success of the ITACG. We have a very ambitious
agenda.
We meet face-to-face either by telephone or in person every
month. We are required under the legislation to meet quarterly,
but we are meeting monthly, and we are putting a significant
amount of the effort is going to be carried by the advisory
council. They really do want to participate, and we can talk
about that in the question-and-answer period.
We are also continuing to engage, as I think Mr. Leiter
said, with the advisory council until we have some additional
officers there at the State and local who will represent not
only the tribal, but who will also represent other areas and
other disciplines such as homeland security management, fire
and safety, public health service, law enforcement,
intelligence analysis, and even others if appropriate. We see
at least five additional individuals coming to work at the
State and local.
We are also working very hard to ensure that we develop
standard operating procedures and policies to sustain the
ITACG's contributions over time. We are rapidly unifying the
way we disseminate information down to State and local at both
the classified and unclassified levels. In this case, the work
that we are doing with NCTC, with NCTC online, and of course
working very jointly in joint advisories with the FBI I think
is remarkable.
In closing, I want to convey my personal sense of the
importance of providing actionable intelligence to State, local
and tribal officials to address threats to the homeland at the
State and local level. I share your commitment to the ITACG's
role in that process. We have made significant investments in
the operations and success of both the ITACG and its advisory
council.
None of us, whether Federal, State or local, can
unilaterally help in this process. We cannot do this alone on
threat and threat assessment. We have to work in unison with
our State and local partners to mitigate the risks to this
country, which are very serious. We also, in my view, are
working very hard to ensure that the privacy and civil rights
of the public whom we are sworn to protect are still considered
in all of our work.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles E. Allen
March 13, 2008
introduction
Chair Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, Members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to speak with you about the Interagency
Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG), which was stood up in
October 2007 and has been operational under the management of the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) since January 2008.
I want to speak to you on the progress that we have made in
implementing the vision set forth in the President's National Strategy
for Information Sharing and the 9/11 Act of 2007. The information-
sharing framework described therein placed an advocate for State,
local, and tribal interests at the hub of the counterterrorism
community to ensure federally coordinated information and intelligence
is robustly made available to our domestic law enforcement and homeland
security partners.
I am also pleased to appear alongside my partners here from NCTC,
FBI, and the PMISE. I know they share my commitment to the ITACG's
success. Every day we work together to ensure actionable and
intelligible, terrorism-related information is provided to State,
local, and tribal authorities. The ITACG, moreover, is playing an
increasingly important role in shaping those products and making them
more useful at the State, local, and tribal levels.
dhs' commitment to the itacg
I know this subcommittee has concerns about the level of DHS
support to building a robust presence of State, local, and tribal
representatives in the group. As I have stated previously, I remain
fully committed to making the ITACG a vital element in information
sharing to our State, local, and tribal partners. Secretary Chertoff
shares this commitment, and there are no barriers, stovepipes, or other
impediments to hinder DHS efforts to ensure the ITACG's success. DHS
sees the ITACG as a vital complement to our Department's protective
mission and information sharing initiatives across a range of
departmental efforts.
Moreover, our actions demonstrate this commitment. We are working
with our Federal partners to build an effective ITACG as rapidly and as
broadly as possible. We have experienced bureaucratic delays along the
way, but we moved swiftly to overcome these delays as they were
identified. In one case, I personally intervened with the Acting Deputy
Secretary to ensure that State and local officials could be fully
funded by the Department while posted to the ITACG.
Further, I am holding regular sessions with the ITACG Advisory
Council--monthly for now rather than quarterly as required by its
charter. The Advisory Council, half of whose membership is comprised of
State, local, and tribal members and half Federal members is central to
the ITACG's success. I will speak more specifically to the Council's
actions later in this testimony, but let me address two efforts
currently underway. We are working to:
Harmonize DHS and FBI sponsorship programs so that State and
local organizations do not have to pay a financial price for
sending their officials to serve in the ITACG, and
Expand the ITACG's State, local, and tribal representation
to include a broader set of homeland security disciplines than
are presently represented, to include tribal, fire & safety,
health, law enforcement intelligence analysis, and State-level
homeland security management.
It remains challenging to find sufficient numbers of officials
willing to go through the required security clearance processing and
then uproot their families for a year or more to move to Washington. We
rely heavily on the State, local, and tribal professional associations
represented on the Advisory Council to identify highly qualified
candidates for the ITACG.
standing up the itacg element at nctc
I sent, in close partnership with the FBI, several senior
intelligence officials over to NCTC to co-lead (with the FBI) an
Implementation Team to lay the foundations for the ITACG--well before
policies to govern the ITACG were agreed upon. My staff explored
potential ITACG configurations, roles, and responsibilities with their
NCTC hosts as the ITACG concept was submitted to interagency,
administration and congressional reviews. The Implementation Team's
hard work resulted in the ITACG reaching initial operating capability
in the first of this year when four State and local law enforcement
representatives arrived to begin their tour of duty within NCTC.
Today the ITACG consists of 10 staff officers: the DHS Director, an
FBI Deputy, four State and local law enforcement officials, two
counterterrorism analysts from DHS and the FBI, and two support
contractors with significant experience in State and local law
enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence. I have provided two of
my most capable intelligence officers to the ITACG, one a former deputy
division manager, and the other a highly qualified senior intelligence
analyst. Together, they bring valuable experience in the analysis and
coordination of terrorism-related products intended for release to
State, local, and tribal customers. They are working seamlessly under
NCTC management with their FBI and State and local partners.
itacg impact
In my budget presentation last month, I noted the ITACG's evolving
practice of scanning incoming current reporting, terrorism-related
events, and finished assessments for items of potential value to
domestic homeland security officials. I am pleased to report that these
efforts are bearing real fruit--not only by identifying items with
homeland interest--but also by helping DHS, FBI, and NCTC tailor our
respective and joint products to meet State, local and tribal
officials' needs, fulfilling its mandate in the National Strategy for
Information Sharing, pp. 18-19.
From October 2007 through February 2008 the ITACG did an initial
familiarization review of more than 34,000 intelligence reports and
products at all classification levels--most with no bearing on the
homeland. The ITACG worked to get a number of highly classified
products relating to the Homeland downgraded for release to domestic
customers at the SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED levels, developing a
production ``packaging'' process at NCTC for routine downgrading and
publication of such products to the NCTC ONLINE-SECRET (NOL-S) web
repository, and whenever possible, to the UNCLASSIFIED level to
facilitate the widest possible distribution. Please note that the bulk
of those 34,000 reports and products are routinely available to State
and local officials over HSDN and NOL-S. The ITACG assisted with
identifying those with homeland impacts that could be further
downgraded for wider release. I cannot overemphasize the importance of
this process--moving information as far down the classification chain
as possible is of paramount utility to our State, local, and tribal
customers.
Over that same period, the ITACG also familiarized itself with
nearly 2,000 worldwide threat reports concerning U.S. interests,
identifying 77 of these as possible threats to the homeland. Conducting
further reviews of these potential threats, it worked with NCTC, DHS,
and FBI to tailor threat characterizations in terms State, local, or
tribal officials could easily interpret, as opposed to the sometimes
arcane language used by the Federal Intelligence Community. These
reviews provided marked improvements to joint DHS/FBI advisories and
assessments on behalf of State, local, and tribal users.
Finally, the ITACG has drafted a ``tagline'' to indicate to State,
local, and tribal audiences those Federal terrorism products that have
received ITACG review and coordination with respect to their concerns.
The ITACG Advisory Council is currently reviewing the proposed language
for inclusion on affected Federal products.
integrating the itacg into community production processes
Today the ITACG reviews all homeland threat reporting and
terrorism-related assessments produced by NCTC, DHS, and FBI. We are
actively working together on how best to interact with the ITACG to
factor in its perspectives for joint DHS/FBI or single-agency (but
still coordinated) time-sensitive threat notifications and assessments,
as well as a range of other terrorism-related products we routinely
provide to State, local, tribal, and critical infrastructure security
officials.
We are guided in this effort by the seven requirements for ITACG
operations set forth in the National Strategy for Information Sharing:
1. enabling a ``federally coordinated'' perspective,
2. providing advice, counsel, and subject matter expertise,
3. enabling production of clear, relevant ``federally coordinated''
information in a timely manner,
4. facilitating ``situation awareness'' reporting on events with
potential terrorism aspects,
5. ensuring all such information is rendered in a usable format,
6. informing and shaping Intelligence Community products, and
7. facilitating the production and posting by NCTC of ``federally
coordinated'' terrorism-related information.
the itacg advisory council is key to itacg success
On behalf of the Secretary, I am pleased to chair the ITACG
Advisory Council, which has nine Federal members of the
counterterrorism community, and 10 State, local, and tribal members
representing a wide array of security or law enforcement professional
associations. I have assembled the Council at NCTC twice in the last 3
months, and hosted a teleconference this past week to discuss widening
its efforts to recruit additional State, local, and tribal disciplines
into the ITACG. In addition, I have already scheduled three more
Council meetings at NCTC for this fiscal year. We will meet as often as
necessary during this first year of the ITACG's startup.
I have set an ambitious agenda for the Council, centering on our
discussion of a number of priority challenges that the ITACG faces--
from recruitment and support of State, local, and tribal personnel--to
establishing a formal mechanism and feedback process for State, local,
and tribal customers, who are key to strengthening the ITACG's value
and evaluating its success.
dissemination
While DHS and FBI continue to have extensive department-specific
dissemination practices for sharing law-enforcement or regulatory
information with their respective constituencies, DHS, FBI and NCTC, in
consultation with our partners in the ISE, are rapidly converging to
unify information-sharing for general purpose terrorism-related
products at both the classified and unclassified levels. We are also
equipping our domestic partners at record levels to join in this new
way of doing business.
classified products
While working through the ITACG implementation, it became
imperative that we provide a central online repository for classified
products that State, local, and tribal officials--once properly
accredited--could access in a timely and reliable fashion. Rather than
create a competing online repository on the DHS network, I have
partnered with NCTC, in coordination with the FBI, to endorse the use
of NCTC Online-SECRET (NOL-S) as the principal venue for hosting
classified intelligence materials intended to reach our State, local,
and tribal partners. Today all SECRET level terrorism-related products
written by NCTC, DHS, or FBI and issued as single-agency, joint, or
fully-vetted community products are posted to the NOL-S repository.
Please note that regardless of whether a product is issued singly,
jointly, or by the full community--all products destined for State,
local and tribal audiences are increasingly coordinated among all
principal agencies--with ITACG assistance.
Furthermore, NOL-S is increasingly accessible by State, local, and
tribal homeland security professionals over the DHS-provided Homeland
Secure Data Network (HSDN) and the FBI's FBINET. DHS is on track to
deploy HSDN to 41 State and local fusion centers (SLFCs) by the end of
fiscal year 2008. HSDN provides SLFCs with a critical capability not
only to access federally supplied threat information, but also as a
means to communicate with each other in a classified setting--thus
contributing to the vision of establishing a national network of fusion
centers called for in the President's National Strategy for Information
Sharing.
unclassified products
The ITACG also continues to drive community producers to prepare
appropriate terrorism-related materials at the UNCLASSIFIED level
whenever possible. That way they can be posted not only to NOL-S, but
also to the DHS-hosted Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence
Community of Interest (HS SLIC) Web repository--an unclassified
intelligence component of the Homeland Security Information Network
(HSIN)--as well as transmitted over other channels to State, local, and
tribal officials. As you are also aware, terrorism-related materials at
the UNCLASSIFIED level are also accessible on the FBI's Law Enforcement
Online (LEO) information-sharing data repository.
This year, the HS SLIC has experienced remarkable growth with large
numbers of State and local fusion centers joining in the community. As
of February 2008, 41 States have signed up and are actively using this
community to share law enforcement intelligence, terrorism, emergency
response, and other security information between and among themselves,
DHS and other Federal partners--including the Department of Interior,
Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, U.S. Northern Command, and the
ITACG.
All DHS and FBI unclassified intelligence reports are posted to the
HS SLIC community of interest repository--providing a unified location
where registered security officials can reliably access UNCLASSIFIED
Federal products relating to terrorism threats to the homeland.
conclusion
In closing, I want to convey to you my personal sense of urgency
and commitment to the mission we all share, that of ensuring that the
Federal Government vigorously provides actionable intelligence to
State, local, and tribal officials who must address threats to the
homeland at the local level. I share your commitment to the ITACG--and
place a high priority on rallying support for this new element--for
which I have opened every door at DHS. I have also made a significant
investment in the operations and success of the Advisory Council--where
I meet regularly with State, local, and tribal officials to further
more seamless information-sharing practices. I take that relationship
and their trust very seriously.
None of us--whether in Federal, State, local or tribal service--can
unilaterally predict the threat, warn our stakeholders, and take action
to mitigate the risks. Our success depends on our ability to work
together, while never losing sight of the privacy and civil liberties
of the public that we are sworn to protect. Besieged by constant threat
from foreign and domestic actors, we require vigilance and shared
awareness to secure our Nation. Our success will depend on how
relentlessly we collaborate, a calling to which I remain singularly
dedicated.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Allen.
We now recognize Mr. Murphy to summarize his testimony for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF WAYNE M. MURPHY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE
OF INTELLIGENCE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
Mr. Murphy. Madam Chair Harman and Ranking Member Reichert,
thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today and
provide a report on our shared progress toward strengthening
the security of our Nation by increasingly seamless integration
between Federal, State, local and tribal partners, most
recently in the stand-up of the ITACG.
It is a privilege for me to carry this responsibility on
behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but having been
part of this effort since it was first conceived, I know that
any progress we have made to date has been the result of a
professional working partnership with my colleagues on this
panel and the agencies that they represent.
I believe the ITACG is well postured to meet both the
letter and the spirit of the direction we have received from
the president and from this Congress. The ITACG is already
demonstrating a potential beyond that purposeful intent. In my
view, it is an effective and complementary adjunct to other
positive developments in the information-sharing environment.
The path to where we are today has included its share of
debates and disagreements, but I believe that dialog was a
necessary element of building the way forward, and a way
forward that would take hold. In the end, the path forward was
illuminated by the clear direction from the president and from
this Congress, in particular, through the work of this
subcommittee and the 9/11 Act of 2007.
Backed by your continued support and persistent attention
to this important issue, I am confident that we are on a path
to empower the ITACG in a way that will make it relevant to the
fight, in a way that will add value and not just volume, in a
way that will extend full and necessary access without
compromising the independence of State, local and tribal
members of the group, and in a way that preserves the
responsibility that all of us share to protect the rights and
civil liberties of the American people.
That dialog and the stand-up of the ITACG has created an
opportunity for all of us to move past anecdotes and
preconceived notions, into a live, operationally relevant
laboratory where the State, local and tribal point of view
intersects directly with the corpus of counterterrorism
information held by the U.S. Government.
Although the National Counterterrorism Center only recently
shifted from the role of host to owner of the ITACG, I want to
commend the leadership and proactive spirit with which the
ITACG has been embraced. Acting Director Leiter has taken
affirmative steps to extend access and set expectations from
the very top of his organization that resulted in an
extraordinarily rapid assimilation of the team.
He has given ITACG a seat in one of the intelligence
community's most important forums, the Daily Counterterrorism
Conference. Within this forum, they can gain an awareness and
context on threats at the same time those perspectives are
being shared with him for the first time. This same forum sets
much of the community's daily agenda for the counterterrorism
issue, and now by extension through the ITACG, we have the
potential to better synchronize the respective focus between
national and local response.
In my view, the ITACG advisory council chaired by Under
Secretary Allen is an effective and open forum for the exchange
of ideas, the timely approval of decisions, and the necessary
pressure to impart urgency for participating members to deliver
on expectations. One need only look at the diversity of
membership, and in particular the names of the individuals
representing State and local interests, to see that there are
no shrinking violets on the advisory group.
Although the work of the ITACG is only a few months
underway, the council is already taking up lessons learned from
the stand-up as they relate to recruiting and identifying State
and local and tribal members, obtaining their security
clearances in a timely manner, addressing administrative
requirements for their assignment, and the best way in which to
receive feedback on the work of this important group.
Similarly, the Office of the Program Manager for the
information-sharing environment, and in particular Ambassador
McNamara, has been an objective and appropriately forceful
voice in moving this important step toward real results. I am
proud of the role and contribution of the FBI since this idea
first surfaced, but I am in no way complacent. Much remains to
be done, but I believe there is a will and a spirit that will
sustain the current momentum.
While measures of access, numbers of reports, and the
impact of those reports will be a necessary and early dimension
in demonstrating the value for this investment, I believe in
the end the most important measure of success for the ITACG
will be the extent to which their work has an impact in
shifting mindsets and culture throughout the information-
sharing environment.
When the practices enabled through the ITACG become
systemic, when we no longer have to ask the question ``did the
ITACG see this,'' because we know the dialog and exchange is
full and pervasive, then we will have achieved the level of
success matched to the challenge that we face. This will take
time, but it is a goal I believe we should continue to aspire
toward.
In closing, let me again thank this committee for your
leadership, creativity and persistence in setting high
standards and accountability for this unprecedented
undertaking. Let me also thank my colleagues here for working
to reflect the spirit that is expected of all of us by the
citizens we are sworn to serve and protect. The FBI stands
ready to continue to do its part to honor by our actions the
memory of those who have sacrificed so much since September 11,
2001.
Thank you, and I look forward to continuing our engagement.
[The statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Wayne M. Murphy
March 13, 2008
Chair Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to
provide a report on our shared progress to strengthen the security of
our Nation by increasingly seamless integration between the Federal
Government and our State, local and tribal partners, most recently in
the stand up of the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination
Group or ``ITACG''.
It is a privilege for me to carry this responsibility on behalf of
the FBI, but having been part of this effort since it was first
conceived, I know that any progress we have made has been the result of
a professional working partnership with my colleagues on this panel:
the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, Ambassador
Thomas E. McNamara, Acting Director for the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), Mr. Michael Leiter and Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Charlie Allen.
I believe the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group
(ITACG) is well-postured to meet the letter and spirit of the direction
we have received from the President and this Congress. The ITACG is
already demonstrating a potential beyond that purposeful intent, and in
my view is an effective and complimentary adjunct to other positive
developments in the information-sharing environment.
The path to where we are today has included its share of debates
and disagreements, but in my view that dialog was a necessary element
of building a way forward that would take hold. That dialog helped
clarify and strengthen our shared resolve to empower the ITACG in a way
that would make it relevant to the fight; in a way that would add value
and not just volume; in a way that extended full and necessary access
without compromising the independence of the State, local and tribal
members of the group, and in a way that preserves the responsibility we
all share to protect the rights and civil liberties of the American
people. That dialog and the stand-up of the ITACG has created an
opportunity to move past anecdotes and preconceived notions into a
live, operationally relevant laboratory where the State, local and
tribal point of view intersects directly with the corpus of
counterterrorism information held by the U.S. Government.
Most importantly, I believe the stand-up of the ITACG and the
structuring of its roles and responsibilities requires striking the
right balance between enabling information sharing without building
bureaucracy or layers that would only cloud an already complex and
dynamic environment. While measures of access, numbers of reports, and
the impact of those reports will be a necessary and early dimension of
demonstrating value for investment, I believe the most important
measure of success for the ITACG will be the extent to which their work
has an impact in shifting mindsets and culture throughout the
information-sharing environment. When the practices enabled through the
ITACG become systemic, when we no longer have to ask ``did the ITACG
chop on this'' because we know the dialog and exchange is full and
pervasive, then we will have achieved the level of success that is
matched to the challenges we face. This will take time, but it is a
goal I believe we should continually aspire toward.
As you have heard from my colleagues, the access of ITACG personnel
is well-matched to their mission. They have the ability, through that
access, to discover and surface items of interest; to impact
priorities; to shape the course of a developing narrative; and to
revisit previously-published information--including information
produced by intelligence agencies independent of NCTC involvement.
NCTC leadership has given ITACG a seat in one of the Intelligence
Community's most important forums--the daily counterterrorism video
conference. Within this forum ITACG can gain awareness and context on
threats and trends at the same time those perspectives are being shared
with the Director of NCTC. This same forum sets much of the community's
daily agenda for counterterrorism matters and now--by extension through
the ITACG--we have the potential to better synchronize the respective
focus between the national and local response.
The ITACG has also impacted and informed more effective means to
make information available to the constituents they represent. Acting
Director Leiter highlights in his statement a number of actions that
will continue to enhance the availability of information that has been
highlighted or shaped by the ITACG. This extends to providing
information that is releasable and actionable for law enforcement and
public safety officials on the street.
In my view the ITACG Advisory Council, chaired by Under Secretary
Allen, is an effective and open forum for the exchange of ideas, the
timely approval of decisions and the necessary pressure to impart
urgency for participating members to deliver on expectations. Although
the work of the ITACG is only a few months underway, the Council is
already taking up lessons learned from the stand-up as they relate to
recruiting and identifying State, local and tribal members, obtaining
their security clearances in a timely manner; addressing the
administrative requirements of their assignment to the ITACG and how
best to receive feedback. There are a number of other issues that need
to be addressed, many of them captured well in the statements by Acting
Director Leiter and Under Secretary Allen. I believe we have the forum
and mindset to address them expeditiously and in keeping with the goals
of the ITACG. The FBI is committed to working in the established forum
to resolve these issues in a manner that provides clarity, but does not
inhibit the need for flexibility.
A secondary benefit of the activities related to the stand-up and
sustenance of the ITACG has been the forcing function and forums this
has created to work through issues that are relevant in other
information-sharing domains. The ITACG is clarifying the way forward in
other areas, like our goal for a common approach to integration with
Fusion Centers.
In closing, let me again thank this committee for your leadership,
creativity and persistence in setting high standards of accountability
for this unprecedented undertaking. Let me also thank my colleagues
here for working to reflect the spirit that is expected of all of us by
the citizens we are sworn to serve and protect. The FBI stands ready to
continue to do its part to honor, by our actions, the memory of those
who have sacrificed so much since September 11, 2001.
I look forward to our continued engagement.
Ms. Harman. Thank you all for what was excellent testimony.
I surely agree with you, Mr. Murphy, that we should keep
our eye on two things: No. 1, those who have made the ultimate
sacrifice to keep us safe; and No. 2, the American people who
could be in harm's way if we don't get this right. So I thank
you for that.
I also thank you for your ability to compliment everybody
else. It is rare to see that these days in this toxic town, and
I am sure they appreciate it, and I appreciate it.
Listening to the four of you, I couldn't help recall the
movie ``Meet the Parents.'' Here you are. You are the parents
of a new information-sharing culture. You are a lot less
dysfunctional than the other parents in the movie, but I want
to be sure you have met the grandparents. Here we are. Grandpa
over here has six grandchildren and grandma has three,
hopefully more to come. But at any rate, we are all in this
together. We are one family, and the consequences of failure
are absolutely huge. Let me just say that again. The
consequences of failure are absolutely huge.
There are folks out there--we all know about this--plotting
day and night to cause grievous harm to America. We are not
sure what community it will be in next, but it could be in
almost any community. If we don't share information--accurate,
actionable and timely information--in real time with the folks
who are in those communities, they won't know what to look for
or what to do. I cannot stress that more than I have, and I
have stressed it to each of you over and over and over again. I
know you agree with me. So please keep this going and make
certain that anything more that can be done is done.
Mr. Leiter. I really appreciated your testimony about the
contribution of some of these States and locals to the ITACG
products, especially the one on ricin. It makes a lot of sense
hearing about that. You know, a view from 30,000 feet is not
going to be very helpful, so you do need people who walk the
beat telling you exactly what the product should say so that
they know, if they are in some hotel room in their communities,
what ricin looks like, and can make the appropriate calls, and
can protect themselves against it, so that was a useful piece
of information.
My question to all of you is, you have talked about sharing
down, vertical sharing down of products that you are producing.
Give us some examples of sharing up, and how you can
incorporate that meaningfully in the products you produce. Let
me just give you one example of sharing up. It didn't come
directly to you, but the Torrance Police Department a few years
back--you all know about this--connected the dots about a
string of gas station robberies and figured out that something
must be going on, some folks must be trying to fund something.
They got the appropriate warrants and checked out the
apartment of some of these guys, and guess what? They found a
terror cell in a community in my congressional district. That
terrorist cell wasn't fully operational, but certainly had
casing drawings and plans to cause harm to military recruiting
centers and synagogues. A string of arrests was made and it
goes forward.
But at any rate, that is an example to me of sharing up. I
think we should have more on the record about the importance of
this vertical sharing starting at the State and local level and
going up.
Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Yes, let me just give one example, which I think
was remarkable. It was last August and September where the
Washington Joint Assessment Center out in Seattle--Ranking
Member Reichert knows it well--citizens reported seeing what
they thought were surveillance activity on ferries in the Puget
Sound. The center there wrote an extraordinarily good
assessment which they sent to the Federal level which we then
used in finished intelligence which Secretary Chertoff used at
the highest levels of government.
In response, both Federal officials and the FBI were
engaged in that, along with other teams from the operating
components of DHS. State and local law enforcement for a period
of days surged into the Puget Sound. The Coast Guard in
particular was very active. It was an example where I think
pre-surveillance was occurring on the ferries out in the Puget
Sound, and I think that is where a State fusion center did a
remarkable job of assessing what was going on, and then the
Federal Government became aware of it and responded. The
secretary used it again at the highest levels of government. It
is a stunning example of the way things ought to be.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Other comments? Mr. Leiter.
Mr. Leiter. Chairwoman Harman, I would simply note that we
do think that the ITACG is quite important for this because
their perspective on what could be there will help influence
our analysts to think about it and turn to DHS and FBI or the
JTTF's fusion centers to try to get that information.
The two are interrelated in that what goes up, goes down,
and then what comes back up. State and local officers need to
be informed about threats and the procedures and the tactics
that we see out there, so they know what to look for. I know I
have had this conversation with you. I use the anecdote of the
early days of the fight against methamphetamines. Before
officers knew what to look for, they might well walk into a
methamphetamine lab, see something, and not know what it was.
Over time, as that fight against methamphetamine has
progressed, they have been informed, and now if they walk in
the house, they know like that, and they can talk to their
narcotics people and the DEA and stop that. In the same way, we
have to get that information down, so when the officer walks in
or the fire official walks in, they know what should get
reported back up.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Any other comments? Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. My colleagues have done an excellent job
covering the areas that I think represent that sharing up.
Certainly, a fundamental foundational component of our
relationships in the JTTFs and in the fusion centers is about
taking advantage of the access that we have to information and
perspectives from the State and local environment, and the
national data exchange system, which the FBI is standing up
will enhance that even further to provide from department to
department the opportunity for the kind of discovery you talked
about.
I think one of the key areas that we need to focus on is
communicating back the value and the results of the information
that is provided by State and locals so that they have a
message they can reinforce to their leadership at the local
government level about the important contribution they are
making to the larger fight.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. Excellent comments.
Ambassador McNamara.
Mr. McNamara. Let me not necessarily move up to the 30,000-
feet level, but maybe 500 feet up. Instead of talking about
specific examples, I want to talk about a tool that is now in
the toolbox of the local police to enable them to share
information up much better. It is known generally as SAR, which
is suspicious activity reporting.
Until recently, every police agency around the country
reported their SARs in their own fashion. What we have just
done, and I issued the document just a few weeks back, is to
issue a set of standards that were arrived at by consultation
with Federal, State and local law enforcement authorities,
mostly police, but also including prosecutors and others, to
establish a single standard for doing those reports.
So what were thousands of snowflakes can now be turned into
a snowball and maybe even a snowman. That is not necessarily a
specific example of moving the information up, but what it is
is a tool that now allows us to bring that information all the
way up, for example, to the people that are working in the
ITACG. That is something that the information-sharing
environment is designed to do, and I think it is a good example
of how we are going about doing it.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
I now yield to Mr. Reichert for questions. We will have a
second round of questions following his questions.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you again for your testimony.
I do like the analogy of the four of you as parents of this
effort. I have actually taken some notes here kind of wondering
along those lines. The four of you are really the leaders of
this effort. I know, as the sheriff, when I was the sheriff
with 1,100 employees and you are trying to make a change within
an organization even that small, and you give directives to
your lieutenants, your chiefs, your majors, et cetera down the
chain of command, that sometimes there is resistance within the
organization that you represent.
I am just curious, as you are trying to manage this change,
because I do agree with Mr. Murphy, it is a cultural change
that is sometimes overwhelming to even think about. I am
wondering what, if any, resistance you are experiencing within
a specific organization, especially, Mr. Murphy, in the FBI. I
do know that--well, why don't we answer that question first?
Mr. Murphy. Thank you for that question. It made me think
about really the issue for me, and I am sure for my colleagues
on the panel, it goes beyond mere leadership. We can be
persistent in our message. We can be persistent in our
expectations, but given the size and scope of our organizations
and really the transcendent nature of what we are asking them
to change toward in terms of way of thinking, I think it is
incumbent upon us, particularly in this early period, to follow
our direction all the way down to the point of delivery, and to
ensure that our expectations are actually being met on the
frontlines.
You can communicate a message, but to actually follow up on
a persistent basis, much like this subcommittee has done with
us, is a reinforcing message that ingrains into the groove of
any bureaucracy, this is real, this is going to stick around
for a long time, and the boss is paying attention to it at a
level of detail that has us all jumping around when they show
up in the office. So I think that is a very important point, to
go beyond mere leadership on an issue of this importance and to
make sure we ingrain it in.
I would say that the biggest challenges that we face are
really about overcoming the anecdotes and urban legends that
crop up when you do something new like this, that the idea of
sharing information will compromise our ability to operate
effectively; that sharing information could affect future
investigations; that there are ``legal'' impediments to certain
sharings of information.
The early engagement in this process of people who
understand privacy issues, people who understand authorities
that relate to information-sharing has given us really a list
by which, or a set of guidelines by which we can very quickly
put those anecdotes to rest. But you can't assume that if you
have cleared the message once it is going to stick every time,
and that is where that reinforcement comes through.
I have not found any institutional impediments. In many
ways, this is a reinforcement of a relationship that we have
always valued with State, local and tribal partners. It has not
always been a perfect relationship, and that is why we can't be
complacent about the nature of the exchange that we have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Anyone else.
Mr. Leiter. Yes, sir, if I could speak to that? I would
agree. I believe the institutional impediments within the
Department have lessened significantly. I view my role as,
first, of course supporting the secretary and the Department,
but of equal level I think is supporting State and local. Under
the Homeland Security Act, we are directed to do that, so that
is very important.
Third, we are certainly part of the intelligence community,
but we really are working now in my role as the under secretary
with the operating components to ensure that they understand
the criticality, because they have a lot of data to help
support us and State and local information sharing. Many of
them are very law enforcement-oriented, and have not
classically done this necessarily except on a case-by-case
basis.
So I believe that a whole new transformation is occurring
in the Department on how we share at State and local levels,
and we are going to continue to pursue that. As Wayne points
out, it is not overnight, but it is occurring and I see it, as
I said, over the last 1\1/2\ years, I think there has been a
real change in the Department.
Mr. Reichert. Let me just say that, coming from the
sheriffs' organization, they can be difficult sometimes. There
are 3,100 sheriffs across the country, and then add the police
chiefs to that, and they certainly have their views on how
things should work. So I know there is some work there that
they have to do, too. It is a two-sided effort here.
The other important piece, if I could just mention it very
quickly, are the personalities involved. I remember working a
task force years ago, a major case, and the agents that came in
from all over had a great relationship with the current staff
of ATF--Calvin Crenshaw and other agents in Federal agencies,
especially in the Northwest area. In working the case, there
were agents that came in from all over the United States, and
you connected with certain people who were there as
ambassadors, really, and others were not. They were just there.
I think that as you look at how you use people and
personnel, it really is key on the people that you choose to
send out to interact with locals. On the other side, it is key,
from the sheriff's point of view and the police chiefs as to
who they put in those positions.
One more point, from my view of this effort over the years,
it is hard to make progress when the Federal Government
transfers their employees so much because they don't become
integrated into the community effort and they don't become a
part of the community, and therefore trust is very hard to
build. So when SACs come in and they move every 2 years, they
can't build the relationship with the police chiefs and the
sheriffs.
When agents come in and they begin to build a relationship
with investigators in the fusion centers or in their efforts to
help in other white-collar crime efforts, et cetera, in
gathering intelligence. In working with our sheriff's office
intel when I was the sheriff, there were people moving in and
out. It makes it very difficult. So just something for you to
know from my point of view, and I am sure it is not the first
time that you have heard it.
I will yield, and get back to you on some other questions I
have in the second round.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Reichert.
My questions now are mostly directed to Mr. Leiter. I am
interested in how you get more good people from State, local
and tribal agencies into the NCTC, into the ITACG. You
mentioned that your plan is to get five more in. I think I
heard you say five more contractors. We are looking for five
more officers. You are shaking your head, so good. I am glad to
hear that.
But how can you do the broadest possible outreach and make
certain that this program achieves its potential? I mean, let's
just think about this. You could generate in a short period of
time hundreds of ambassadors around the countryside who both
talk about the quality of this Federal effort--that wouldn't
hurt--but also bring back skills that they didn't have from
this effort, and contribute to products that reflect their
perspectives, that are much better than the products you would
send out otherwise.
So what I want to know is the mechanics of this. How are
you going to get as many good people in there as possible? How
are you going to maximize outreach? If you have a problem with
desks and pencils, please come here. We will provide some.
Mr. Leiter. Well, Madam Chair, first, my apologies if I
misspoke. We currently have four State and local, and then we
have two contractors augmenting them who have State and local
experience. We are adding five. We would like to add five State
and locals. We are not adding contractors to this. We think
this has to be actual State and local people.
In terms of how we are going to get them, it has been a
challenge so far. The good news is that we have worked out some
of the bureaucratic administrative challenges on the Federal
end, so now it is simply doing that outreach. I think the
advisory council is absolutely key. We need the advisory
council to be the advocates, to go out and help us recruit.
Frankly, this committee also we need you to be advocates to
go out and help us recruit them. We need to make sure that the
people who come are rewarded in their careers when they go back
to their departments and agencies, just like we need to require
people who do joint duty within the Federal system. So this
needs to be an attractive opportunity both financially, but
also in terms of career.
In terms of outreach, I think you have a copy as of this
morning of the trifold that we are sending out to several
hundred State, local agencies exactly, with a cover letter
signed by members at this table, explaining what the ITACG
does. We have representatives from NCTC. My chief deputy who
works on this is going out to address the fusion center. As you
know, I am going out to address the Los Angeles Regional
Intelligence Conference.
I am also going out 2 days before, and this is just
coincidence, I am spending the day in Seattle with the
executive committee of the JTTF there, with the State homeland
security advisor. NCTC has initiated in conjunction with FBI
and DHS, working as a tripartite effort, an extensive
outreach----
Ms. Harman. We want to commend you for your brilliant
choice of cities.
Mr. Leiter. Yes. I am also heading to Las Vegas. We don't
have any representation there--but to do an effort for all
three components--DHS, NCTC and FBI--to key locations
throughout the United States, to sit down with the JTTFs, to
sit down with the fusion centers, the homeland security
advisors, explain what we do, and also explain how their
principal contacts remain DHS and FBI.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Does anyone else want to comment on this?
Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. I would just like to say in the teleconference
we held last week with the ITACG advisory council, it was
remarkable how all of the 10 people representing the State and
local officials, people like Russ Porter who represents the
Global Justice Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council,
people like Sheriff Richard Stanek, who represents major county
sheriffs' associations--all agreed that they would work through
their associations to help find and recruit and bring in highly
qualified people with these other disciplines like public
health. We already are identifying someone who will represent
the tribals.
So I think in many respects--and Jim McMahon, who is with
the International Association of Chiefs of Police--
extraordinarily active in this advisory council. So I think we
are on the right track. We have just now got to make it happen.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Let me just ask another follow-up question, and then I will
yield to Mr. Reichert. I am looking at this handout. On the
back it says intelligence products, and lists a number of
networks. It says, products up to the secret classification can
be accessed via NOLS, DHS, FBINet, et cetera. Then there is a
list of sensitive, but unclassified networks. My question is,
how do you navigate this if you are a cop on the beat and you
don't have a security clearance?
Mr. Leiter. Well, if you have no security clearance, you
are fundamentally going to rely on LEO and HSIN, and defer to
my colleagues. But the important thing on the secret network
is, as long as they go to NCTC online, we have worked with FBI,
DHS, and the Department of Defense, that they just have to have
the connection, and that is their Google site for intelligence.
It will have all of the intelligence.
So all they need to do is get to that site, and we are
improving that site because frankly it needs improvement. But
they get there, they do their searches, they can tailor
searches, and that is where their information will be at the
secret level.
Mr. Allen. As far as homeland security, for the
unclassified areas, that is where we are putting our major
efforts--right to release, getting it so that we can get the
kind of in-depth assessments at times from our Critical
Infrastructure Threat Assessment Division. We write most of
those at the official use level, so that first responders can
have those and look at them.
It goes into depth on issues like chemicals, poisons, other
kinds of data that would be very helpful at the local levels.
That is under homeland security information network
intelligence. We have an intelligence portal on HSIN, which I
think is starting to work very well. As I said earlier, we have
weekly conferences at the analytic level just to exchange
threat information. That is handled at the official use/
unclassified level.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Mr. Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
One of the questions we have is what other efforts are you
making outside of ITACG to communicate with the locals? I
think, Mr. Leiter, you touched on some of those. But the 26
people that we have assigned across the country to various
cities, what is their role in working with ITACG and the
locals? I know they are assigned to fusion centers and joint
analytical centers, and they have different requests from
different cities as to what their qualifications might be or
their use might be, but can you kind of generally describe how
these 26 people are being integrated into the system?
Mr. Allen. Those are the 26 officers that I have sent out,
and by the end of September, we will have them in 35 fusion
centers. They are very well aware of the ITACG and they are
well-oriented and -trained on just its role and mission. As
information and joint advisories flow between Wayne and myself,
working in coordination, and developing coordinated information
to flow down there, they know because it is referenced on those
advisories that this has also been reviewed and commented on as
necessary and value-added by the ITACG.
So our officers flow the information out. They handle
requests for information coming from State and local. When you
have a remarkable individual like Joel Cullen, my embedded
officer in Los Angeles, the JRIC there, the Joint Regional
Intelligence Center, it works very well. He is very much in
touch with the ITACG on a very frequent basis.
Mr. Murphy. Similar to DHS, we have an extensive investment
in the fusion center environment, with personnel in 48 of the
60 established fusion centers here in the country. It is 195
FBI personnel who are invested. Again, they are a conduit. They
are a resource of communicating information about the
relationship with the ITACG and how we can better service their
needs as a representative of the Federal Government.
In many cases in partnership with the DHS, we share our
presence there. As you know, part of the direction we have
received in national strategy and in some of the legislation is
to enhance that environment of the Federal presence within the
fusion centers. There is a whole separate infrastructure in
terms of the relationship Charlie and I have, and Ambassador
McNamara, to developing and building that out.
This is in addition to the extensive presence that we have
commingled with State and locals on the joint terrorism task
forces environment.
Mr. Reichert. We have been a part of that effort for many
years, the Joint Terrorism Task Force and the violent criminal
apprehension team, and some of those other Federal task force
efforts.
I really want to compliment all of you on the marriage of
these DHS personnel, the FBI. The fusion center in Seattle I
think is a great example of some success there where we have
not quite reached the Los Angeles level, but I visited there--
--
Ms. Harman. Keep on dreaming.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Reichert. They are truly the model to follow. Seattle,
I think, is making a great effort. It really is due, I really
believe, to your efforts in placing people there who are
committed. So I just wanted to thank you for that. I do see
some great changes there and some success. There have been some
little bumps here and there, as we are all going to experience,
but a great job on that. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. I, too, want to thank the parents for some
valuable collaboration and testimony. I think our hearing
record is quite specific now on some of these issues, where it
was not in the past. I think there has been real progress. Keep
it up.
I also would mention to you that obviously other members
were not able to come. If they have written questions, I would
ask you to answer them expeditiously.
Let me just close on a couple of notes that I think need
more work. One is our classification system. I know Ambassador
McNamara shares this. I know our subcommittee shares this. We
are working on some legislation in this regard, but it is
difficult for people to get cleared, a reason why we hope that
these officers you recruit--officers, not contractors--will
come with clearances, but a reason why we need to make the
system work better as well. That is one thing.
The second thing, at least the way I hear it, we have too
many different ways to communicate information, too many
networks. We may need them for some specific applications, but
it should be easier for busy people to log onto one thing--at
least it seems to me this is true, and this is something we
heard in many fusion centers, including Los Angeles--to log
onto one thing and get the data dump they need quickly, to know
what to look for and know what to do. I think that will still
take some work as well.
With that, I want to thank you all for your testimony.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
