S. Hrg. 110-431
GOVERNMENT-WIDE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT REFORMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 29, 2008
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
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41-454 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JON TESTER, Montana JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware TED STEVENS, Alaska
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN WARNER, Virginia
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Lisa Powell, Chief Investigative Counsel
Jennifer A. Hemingway, Minority Staff Director
Thomas Bishop, Minority Legislative Aide
Jessica Nagasako, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Akaka................................................ 1
WITNESSES
Friday, February 29, 2008
Hon. David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 4
Marvin C. Ott, Professor, National Security Policy, National War
College, National Defense University........................... 6
Steven Aftergood, Director, Government Secrecy Project,
Federation of American Scientists.............................. 8
Frederick M. Kaiser, Specialist in American National Government,
Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service 9
Ronald A. Marks, Senior Vice President for Government Relations,
Oxford Analytica, Inc.......................................... 11
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Aftergood, Steven:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Kaiser, Frederick M.:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 65
Marks, Ronald A.:
Testimony.................................................... 11
Ott, Marvin C.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 54
Walker, Hon. David M.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 29
APPENDIX
CRS Report entitled ``Congressional Oversight of Intelligence:
Current Structure and Alternatives,'' February 11, 2008,
submitted for the Record by Mr. Kaiser......................... 71
CRS Report entitled ``Security Classified and Controlled
Information: History, Status, and Emerging Management Issues,''
February 11, 2008, submitted for the Record by Mr. Kaiser...... 99
Background....................................................... 135
Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to the Hon. Slade
Gorton from Senator Daniel K. Akaka, January 9, 2007........... 143
Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to the Hon. Lee
H. Hamilton from Senator Daniel K. Akaka, January 9, 2007...... 145
Letter to Senator Akaka from Lee H. Hamilton, dated January 24,
2007........................................................... 147
Letter from Mr. Walker to Senator Akaka, dated March 11, 2008, in
response to a question at the hearing.......................... 148
Letter from Mr. Walker to Senator Akaka, dated April 25, 2008, in
response to questions at the hearing........................... 149
GOVERNMENT-WIDE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT REFORMS
----------
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senator Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and
the District of Columbia to order.
Today's hearing--Government-wide Intelligence Community
Management Reforms--will examine how to improve oversight of
the Intelligence Community (IC) as it implements extensive
government-wide management reforms.
Intelligence failures before the attacks of September 11,
2001, spurred the largest restructuring of the Intelligence
Community since it was established. The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created a new position--the
Director of National Intelligence--to serve as the head of the
Intelligence Community and principal advisor to the President
on intelligence matters related to national security.
The Intelligence Reform Act provides the DNI with
centralized authorities significantly more extensive than those
formerly held by the Director of Central Intelligence. The
Director of National Intelligence oversees and coordinates the
intelligence activities of the other members of the IC, which
include 16 other components spread throughout much of the
Executive Branch.
Acting on these authorities, the DNI has proposed a host of
management reforms, including changes in IC personnel policies,
acquisitions, information sharing, and business practices. Such
management reforms would create serious transformational
challenges in any organization. The Intelligence Community,
with its new, but still decentralized structure, led by a new
director with new authorities, faces a daunting task in
carrying out these management reforms. While what the DNI is
proposing may be new for the Intelligence Community, it is not
new for the rest of the Federal Government. Many of the issues
being confronted and the solutions posed are ones other Federal
agencies have managed already.
So it is my strong belief that the Intelligence Community
could benefit from the Government Accountability Office's
expertise in reviewing organizational transformations and
management reforms. My view is shared by others, including
Representative Lee Hamilton, who was Vice Chairman of the 9/11
Commission, and Senator Slade Gorton, also a member of the 9/11
Commission. In response to my questions for the record of a
January 2007 Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affair
Committee hearing on implementing the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations, both stated that GAO should have the same
authorities with respect to the Intelligence Community as it
does with other Federal Government agencies.\1\ I will place
these responses as well as a letter from Representative
Hamilton addressing the issue into the record.\2\
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\1\ The post-hearing questions for the Record submitted to the Hon.
Slade Gorton and Hon. Lee Hamilton at the January 9, 2007 hearing from
Senator Akaka, appear in the Appendix on pages 143 and 145
respectively.
\2\ The letter from Lee H. Hamilton to Senator Akaka, dated January
24, 2007 appears in the Appendix on page 147.
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Senator Akaka. I am disappointed that despite GAO's
government-wide mandate to assist Congress in reviews, audits,
and investigations, the DNI and the CIA so far have resisted
taking advantage of GAO's assistance in the transformation of
their business practices.
The IC's cooperation with GAO is not simply a matter of
making Congress' oversight job easier; it is a matter of making
the IC's management reforms smoother, more effective, and more
efficient. GAO has expertise in virtually all of the bread-and-
butter management challenges that the Intelligence Community is
confronting.
For example, GAO has done extensive work on how to fix the
security clearance process, which is on GAO's high-risk list.
Fixing the long delays in the process is an important national
security priority. In response to a question for the record
from Senator Voinovich from a November 2005 hearing of this
Subcommittee on improving the process, GAO stated that it
lacked the cooperation needed to ensure progress on this
critical issue.
Similarly, GAO has done numerous evaluations of government
information sharing, and it has provided valuable
recommendations on improving information-sharing processes.
Nonetheless, DNI refused to comment on GAO's March 2006 report
on government sharing of sensitive but unclassified information
because of its narrow view of GAO's authority.
Moreover, GAO has been a key advisor to Congress in its
oversight of the development of new personnel systems at the
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. Given the fact
that there are no union representatives to highlight employee
concerns or implementation problems with the proposed IC
personnel reforms, it is essential that Congress have an
independent expert to review how such proposals are working.
Congress and the Intelligence Community could benefit from
GAO's expertise on all of these topics, as well as from GAO's
capacity to do crosscutting, government-wide evaluations in its
institutional and political independence.
In September 2006, I introduced the Intelligence Community
Audit Act, which I reintroduced in the 110th Congress as S. 82.
This bill would reaffirm GAO's existing authority to perform
audits and evaluations of Intelligence Community financial
transactions, programs, and activities, and to obtain the
documents needed to do so. At the same time, the bill contains
provisions to enhance the protection of classified information,
including restricting GAO work and dissemination of GAO reports
related to covert actions and intelligence sources and methods,
and affirming that GAO staff would be subject to the same
penalties for unauthorized disclosure of classified information
as IC employees.
The Intelligence Community is proposing far-reaching
transformational policies. It clearly could benefit from
independent analysis and sufficient congressional oversight.
But the response of the DNI to Congress is, in effect, ``Trust
us, we know what we are doing.'' Unfortunately, history
provides numerous examples of intelligence failures that became
evident only after it was too late to correct them. The stakes
are too high to operate just on trust.
Congress must redouble its efforts--that is what we are
trying to do--to ensure that U.S. intelligence activities are
conducted efficiently, effectively, and with due respect for
the civil rights and civil liberties of Americans, and I will
work to see that it does.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on their
perspectives of how Congress can improve oversight of the
Intelligence Community, in particular the role of the GAO. I
want to thank our witnesses for being here today to discuss
this very important issue.
I want to thank David Walker for nearly a decade of service
as the Comptroller General as he prepares to transition to
become the President and Chief Executive Officer of the newly
established Peter G. Peterson Foundation. Mr. Walker, it has
been my pleasure to work closely with you over the years, and I
cherish those memories. I wish you well in your new endeavor. I
hope that your replacement will be someone who is equally
capable and equally dedicated in his or her service to GAO and
to Congress and especially to the people of these United
States.
And so I want to welcome, again, all the witnesses to this
Subcommittee hearing. David Walker, Comptroller General of the
United States with the Government Accountability Office.
Marvin Ott, who is a professor of national security policy
at the National War College of the National Defense University.
Professor Ott also worked as a CIA analyst and as Deputy Staff
Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under
Senator Murkowski, among numerous other positions.
Steven Aftergood, Director of the Government Secrecy
Project at the Federation of American Scientists. Mr. Aftergood
has won numerous awards for his work combating secrecy,
including the James Madison Award from the American Library
Association.
Frederick Kaiser, specialist in American National
Government, at the Congressional Research Service. Mr. Kaiser
has worked at CRS for more than 30 years and has taught at
American University and the University of Maryland as well.
Finally, Ronald Marks, Senior Vice President for Government
Relations at Oxford Analytica, Founder and Director of the Open
Source Intelligence Forum and Adjunct Professor for
Intelligence and National Security at the National Defense
University. Mr. Marks formerly served as a senior CIA official
and as intelligence counsel to former U.S. Senators Bob Dole
and Trent Lott.
As you know, it is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear
in all witnesses, and I would ask all of you to stand and raise
your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that your testimony you
are about to give this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Walker. I do.
Mr. Ott. I do.
Mr. Kaiser. I do.
Mr. Aftergood. I do.
Mr. Marks. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let the record indicate that our
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
I want our witnesses to know that while your oral
statements are limited to 5 minutes, your entire statements
will be included in the record.
Mr. Walker, please proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID M. WALKER,\1\ COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Chairman Akaka. Thank you very much
for your kind comments in your introductory remarks. Let me
note that while I have several other hearings scheduled during
the balance of my 2 weeks as Comptroller General, I believe
that this will be my last hearing before this Subcommittee,
unless something changes. And I just want to let you know that
it has been an honor and a pleasure to work with you, with
Senator Voinovich and with the other Members of this
Subcommittee. And I take great pride in knowing that working
together in partnership we made a big difference.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Walker appears in the Appendix on
page 29.
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I also want to let you know that while I am changing my
position on the battlefield, I am not leaving the fight. And,
in fact, as CEO of the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, I will
have more flexibility and more discretionary financial
resources to bring on the target--namely, the need to address
our sustainability challenges and government transformation
needs. So I look forward to continue to work with you, although
in a different capacity.
With regard to today's hearing, I am pleased to be here in
order to be able to address how GAO could assist the Congress
and the Intelligence Community in connection with management
reform initiatives. As you know, Mr. Chairman, GAO has assisted
the Congress for decades in its oversight role, and we have
helped a variety of government departments and agencies with
very disparate missions to improve their economy, efficiency,
effectiveness, ethics, and equity. In addition, GAO's work has
also provided very valuable insight as to which type of
programs, functions, and activities work and which ones do not,
and also foresight as to what some of the current emerging
trends and challenges are facing the United States and its
position in the world.
There are a number of government-wide management
transformation challenges that are on our high-risk list, and
you are very familiar with that high-risk list, including such
items as human capital transformation, acquisition,
contracting, information technology, strategic planning,
organizational alignment, personnel security clearances, and
information sharing. Many of these issues affect a vast
majority of Federal agencies, including the Intelligence
Community. And I think it is important that I am here today to
talk about management reforms, not sources and methods. That is
a different issue. But there are basic management challenges
that every Federal entity faces, including the Intelligence
Community.
Second, if the ODNI assumes management of government-wide
personnel security clearances, then GAO's ability to continue
to review personnel security clearances could be impaired
unless greater cooperation is forthcoming from the Intelligence
Community.
Now, let me stop here to note that I met personally with
the Director of National Intelligence on more than one
occasion, and he is a very capable individual, and he seems to
be very reasoned and very reasonable, and so our relations are
improving. And it is not a personal issue here. Frankly, this
is an issue that goes back many years based upon access
challenges, based upon an opinion from the Justice Department
that has been there for a number of decades. So this is not
something that is new. It has been longstanding. And my
experience with the director has been positive, as well as some
of his key staff.
And as I say, we have developed and maintain a relatively
positive working relationship, which has improved in recent
times. But because of this past legal opinion, and because of
positions taken by some key players historically in the
Intelligence Community, we generally have done little to no
work in the Intelligence Community, because as you know, Mr.
Chairman, we already have a huge supply and demand imbalance.
We have way more requests for GAO to do work than we have
resources to do it. And in the absence of receiving requests to
do the work, then we are not going to use our limited
discretionary resources to do work in this community when
Congress is not asking us to do the work.
Third, with the support of the Congress and your
legislation, S. 82, GAO would be well positioned to provide the
Intelligence Community, as well as the appropriate
congressional committees, with an independent, fact-based view
and evaluation of Intelligence Community management reforms. As
you noted in your opening statement, GAO has significant
expertise with regard to a broad range of management issues. We
have knowledge of best practices as well as lessons learned.
And we have, during my tenure, tried to lead by example with
regard to a lot of these reforms and really increase the amount
of time and effort that we are spending on them to help benefit
others in a constructive way, not in a confrontational or
traditional audit role way.
We support your bill and believe that if it was enacted,
GAO would be well positioned to assist the Congress in its
oversight functions and that we, frankly, could help the
Intelligence Community, too. Ironically, our number one
competition for talent is the Intelligence Community. We win,
fortunately, on most college campuses, but they do a good job,
too. And the fact is that we are both hiring, in large part,
highly educated, committed individuals to do analytical work.
That is what we do at GAO, and to a great extent, that is what
the Intelligence Community does. So in many ways, our own
experience at GAO frankly is very applicable to a lot of the
challenges, I think, that the Intelligence Community faces.
You also have certain affirmation or reaffirmation
provisions in the bill that should help to ensure that GAO's
audit and access authorities are not misconstrued in the
future, and should responsibility for personnel security
clearances be transferred to the Director of National
Intelligence, to make it clear that we should continue to
receive access to that type of information in order to
discharge our responsibilities to the Congress and the American
people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Walker. Mr. Ott.
TESTIMONY OF MARVIN C. OTT,\1\ PROFESSOR, NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Mr. Ott. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before this Committee on a matter that is of real and
concrete importance to U.S. national security. My testimony
submitted for the record is brief. My summary comments I will
try to make informal and briefer still.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Ott appears in the Appendix on
page 54.
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Let me begin with two, I think, fairly obvious
propositions, the first of those being that high-quality
intelligence is increasingly critical to the national security
of the United States. One way to think about that is to look at
the nature of the threats we face and to contrast them with
those of the Cold War period when the Soviet threat was
military. I think it is fair to say that in a world
characterized by an al-Qaeda type of threat, diversifying
networks of terrorist groups, not to mention proliferation
issues, pandemic issues, and other systemic threats--these are
issues that naturally fit the intelligence world in many ways
much more exactly than they fit the traditional, conventional
military world. So, increasingly, the point of the spear, to
borrow a much overused metaphor, for U.S. national security
really does reside now in the intelligence world.
Second, effective oversight of the intelligence process is,
in fact, critical. People at the top of the intelligence
business who have been around and are experienced and have
judgment on these matters know that effective oversight is
critical. It is a force enabler. It is a corrective. It serves
as an advocate and a shield. In a whole variety of ways, it is
not an adversary to effective intelligence. It, in fact, is an
important support.
With regard to this, then, the question of how effectively
the Congress--and I am focusing particularly on the Senate--has
conducted intelligence oversight is very relevant. Now, here a
little background is necessary. Mr. Chairman, you cited the
fact that Senator John Glenn, introduced a bill in 1987, S.
1458, that sought to do exactly the kind of thing you are
talking about today.
And that bill was not accepted, and I think the principal
argument at the time--and I had a ringside seat, as it were--
was that in the 1980s, when Senator Glenn introduced that bill,
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence had, in fact,
become a very effective vehicle for oversight. This was not
easy. The match between the open, democratic, public processes
of a democratic legislative body, on the one hand, and the
secretive, closed, need-to-know world of intelligence--that is
an oil-and-water kind of match. And to make that process work,
to bring oil and water together, to have effective oversight
that is constructive and works in the secret world of
intelligence is a very hard thing to do.
I would argue that probably no country in the world has
done it except this country, and we did it in the 1980s, and I
can go into some detail regarding the process that made it
work.
But suffice it to say, when Senator Glenn introduced his
bill at that time, the argument was we are doing effective
oversight, not only through the oversight committee, but we are
establishing a statutory IG at the CIA, and we have reason to
believe that is going to be an effective vehicle. So the
argument was we have this problem under control. But things
have changed since 1987, and I will just tick off the major
points and leave it at that at this point.
First of all, the quality and the effectiveness of the
oversight process I have just referred to, deteriorated,
degraded, and basically disappeared in the 1990s and into the
early part of this decade. It is one of the great tragedies of
the legislative history of the United States, in my judgment.
Second, the community that is being overseen has grown in
complexity, diversity, and in size. For example, the office of
the DNI, which did not exist in 1987, has become a major
bureaucracy. I have in my testimony that it comprises of 1,600
people. I believe that is, in fact, conservative. It is
probably closer to 2,000. Nobody, including Director McConnell,
knows what is going on inside all the different components of
the current Intelligence Community.
Moreover, there is a statutory IG at the CIA, but nowhere
else in the community. Everybody else, pretty much, is under
the DOD IG. That DOD IG has got lots of other things to do on
the military procurement side, on the defense side. He is a
marginal player when it comes to intelligence oversight.
Finally, the diversity and nature of the threats we face--
and I alluded to that at the outset--has multiplied.
Bottom line, there is, in my judgment, currently a
mismatch, a serious mismatch, between the capabilities to
conduct oversight and the vehicles and the instrumentalities
for that, on the one hand, and the nature of the Intelligence
Community and the nature of the threats, on the other. And GAO
is an important potential asset in correcting that mismatch.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Ott. Mr. Aftergood.
TESTIMONY OF STEVEN AFTERGOOD,\1\ DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT SECRECY
PROJECT, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS
Mr. Aftergood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing. Because of the very importance and the
sensitivity of the intelligence enterprise, intelligence
oversight is a critical function. The public relies on the
oversight system to ensure that intelligence activities are
conducted in conformance with law, efficiently and effectively.
But the task of intelligence oversight has become significantly
more difficult in recent years for at least two reasons. One is
the enormous growth in the size of the intelligence budget. Ten
years ago, the National Intelligence Program was spending on
the order of $20 billion a year. Last year, the DNI disclosed
the National Intelligence Program budget reached $43.5 billion.
So intelligence spending on national intelligence has more than
doubled. Intelligence oversight capacity has not doubled. It
has not kept pace.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Aftergood appears in the Appendix
on page 58.
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A second complicating factor is the rise in reliance on
intelligence contractors. According to an ODNI account that I
cite in my written statement, the spending on intelligence
contractors has also doubled from 1996 to 2006. There are
literally thousands of new contractual relationships between
intelligence agencies and commercial entities that the
intelligence oversight system is poorly equipped to regulate,
oversee, or even verify that they are doing what they are
supposed to be doing.
For these reasons alone, I think that the government ought
to be summoning all the tools at its disposal to carry out the
task of intelligence oversight, and that certainly includes the
Government Accountability Office. I do not think the GAO can
solve the oversight challenge all by itself. To do that it
might take an organization the size of the GAO devoted entirely
to the Intelligence Community, and that does not seem to be a
realistic option. But certainly GAO can make a tangible
contribution as it does in almost every other area of
government oversight.
A couple other quick points. When GAO is excluded from
intelligence oversight, not only does Congress miss the
benefits of their contribution, but carving out the
Intelligence Community actually damages GAO's role in other
ways. When GAO does a study of government-wide activities, say,
on information sharing or on personnel security, it has to, in
effect, come with an asterisk saying this work does not include
the activity of the intelligence agencies. And there is no
reason for that to be the case. Not only are we not taking
maximum advantage of GAO, we are actually tying their hands and
reducing the utility of their product.
I would also note that the DNI, the CIA, and others in the
Intelligence Community have expressed opposition to your
legislation, saying that they do not want GAO to get involved.
And I would say that while that may be off-putting at first
glance, at second glance it is actually a good sign. I would
say that if the Intelligence Community did not object to your
proposal, that would be perplexing. No one voluntarily seeks
out oversight. No one looks for somebody to look over their
shoulder to see how they are doing. So if ODNI said, ``Oh, come
on, that is fine,'' then I would wonder what is wrong with this
legislation. Why aren't they objecting? The fact that they are
objecting says that this legislation embodies meaningful
change, and I would just urge you and the Subcommittee and the
Senate not to be deterred by any such opposition. If you are
persuaded, as I am, that a GAO role in intelligence oversight
is a good one, then by all means you should pursue it.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Aftergood. Mr. Kaiser.
TESTIMONY OF FREDERICK M. KAISER,\1\ SPECIALIST IN AMERICAN
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, GOVERNMENT AND FINANCE DIVISION,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Kaiser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and Mr.
Voinovich and Members of the Subcommittee for inviting me to
participate in this hearing on government-wide Intelligence
Community reforms, and with special attention to oversight of
intelligence in this evolving field. The Intelligence Community
rubric is formally applied to the 16 agencies, as you had
mentioned earlier, but there is still another Intelligence
Community that might be worth considering. And that is the
Homeland Security Intelligence Community (HSIC). It is a much
more nebulous and non-statutory organization, but, nonetheless,
there is a collective set of intelligence operations and
organizations that play a role, especially in your
Subcommittee's jurisdiction. Both of these communities require
a substantial amount of interagency cooperation and
coordination to provide for a sharing of relevant and timely
information as well as to engage in multi-agency activities and
operations. Ideally, this second or HSIC can overcome the
foreign-domestic divide that, according to the 9/11 Commission,
hampered effective intelligence gathering, evaluation, and
dissemination.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Kaiser appears in the Appendix on
page 65.
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The homeland security Intelligence Community also requires
coordination and cooperation with State, local, and tribal
organizations, so it has a wider and a different kind of
jurisdiction.
Oversight of intelligence, as we already heard and as you
well know, has always been a daunting challenge to Congress.
And it seems to be increasingly so, because of the increase of
classified national security information and new categories of
controlled information, such as sensitive but not classified
information. And this affects a range of activities here on the
Hill that limit congressional oversight. It even means that
committees cannot cooperate with one another, that there are
barriers put in between sharing information from one member to
another because of the restrictions that are placed on
receiving and responding to classified information.
National security concerns also affect other oversight
capabilities. Importantly, certain offices of Inspector General
are affected by this. The heads of six or seven departments and
agencies can prohibit or prevent an IG audit or investigation,
and those are largely in the Intelligence Community. The
reasons for this prohibition, though, have to be communicated
to your Subcommittee as well as the authorizing committees. So
it does give your Subcommittee a handle on what has developed
or why an audit has not occurred by the Office of Inspector
General. That applies to all the entities that I mentioned
except for the CIA, which reports directly then to the House
and Senate Intelligence Committees.
Oversight of intelligence has been consolidated in these
select committees, but they do not hold exclusive oversight
jurisdiction. In fact, importantly, the establishing resolution
of the House and Senate select committees repeat the same
language: ``Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as
prohibiting or otherwise restricting the authority of any other
committee to study and review any intelligence activity to the
extent that such activity directly affects a matter otherwise
within the jurisdiction of that committee.''
Examples of such oversight extend to, again, your
Subcommittee in the past. In the mid-1980s, the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations looked into the Federal
Government security clearance program. Later on, Congress
commissioned a review of the Intelligence Community workforce
that was conducted by the National Academy of Public
Administration. And in July 2001, two Subcommittees of your
counterpart at the time, the House Committee on Government
Reform, now Oversight and Government Reform, reviewed computer
security programs across the board. It relied on a GAO survey
that had been conducted earlier, and only one agency was a
holdout. That was the Central Intelligence Agency. It declined
to participate in the hearings or in the earlier GAO survey.
This is an illustration of the difficulties that GAO has
had in providing comprehensive oversight of the Intelligence
Community. The CIA has taken this position that it is, in
effect, off limits. Your bill would go far to remove that
characteristic that the CIA has adopted for itself.
I might mention in conclusion here that other entities
within the Intelligence Community do not take that same stand.
The Department of Defense, which houses the largest number of
IC units, for instance, instructs its personnel to ``cooperate
fully with the GAO and respond constructively to, and take
appropriate corrective action on the basis of, GAO reports.''
And so there is this distinction.
I might mention, too, as Mr. Ott has said, that in 1987
Senator Glenn from this Subcommittee had introduced legislation
along the lines of your bill. An earlier proposal goes back to
the mid-1970s, when the Comptroller General then, Elmer Staats,
first raised this notion formally before a couple of Select
Committees on Intelligence in the House and the Senate. Those
two committees, the Pike and Church committees, also approached
this subject and advanced proposals to increase GAO's
independent audit capabilities.
My prepared remarks go into detail on other types of
changes that Congress might consider in improving oversight of
intelligence.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Kaiser, for your
statement.
Mr. Marks, I understand that you do not have a prepared
statement to deliver, but I would ask you, if you have any
remarks you would like to make, you may make them at this time.
TESTIMONY OF RONALD A. MARKS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, OXFORD ANALYTICA, INC.
Mr. Marks. Thank you, Senator. The last one should always
be shortest, if at all possible. It is an honor to be here,
especially on something I have considered so strongly over the
years, dealt with this issue on and off during my years at CIA,
probably now 15, almost 20 years. As I was telling my wife this
morning, I may not be an intelligence expert, but I live there,
so I think I have a pretty good idea of what is going on.
The Intelligence Community always views itself in terms of
a culture of secrecy, as it should, but that secrecy also
produces a certain amount of belief of uniqueness. And in my
days at CIA--and I spent some 16 years there--five of them were
in Congressional Affairs, two of them were up here as
intelligence counsel to Robert Dole and Trent Lott. And
throughout that entire process, anytime someone mentioned GAO,
I could hear the management on the seventh floor of the Central
Intelligence Agency cringing, believing that they already had
sufficient oversight from both the Senate and the House
Intelligence Committees.
I did not necessarily want to argue with them at that time,
but I knew of the work that GAO did, and it seemed as though it
would be a good idea to introduce it. But low-level officers do
not make those kinds of recommendations at the time. The
problem I see now in particular, now that I am 10 years outside
of the process but still acting as an advisor to the community,
is that they have grown so large, so complex, so quickly, that
really the problems are well beyond them now. Someone mentioned
the contractual problems here before. That is unique to many
parts of the community in terms of buying outside contractors,
not only to do analytical work for them or other types of
engineering work, but actually having people on site,
particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, where that is
rather unique.
Workforce planning. The size of the Intelligence Community
has grown hand over fist since 2001, some estimates 40 percent,
some estimates 50 percent, but whatever, there is no real plan
in place at this point for helping these young people and
directing them through their career within the community and
hanging onto them. As someone in the private sector, I can tell
you from my own experience at this point that unless you lay
out a plan for your young people so that they can grow within
your organization, you are going to lose them fairly quickly.
And this is a group of young people now who are much less
patient, perhaps, than I was back in the 1980s.
I am particularly concerned on the issue of security and
compartmentation. This has been going on for a long period of
time, really since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the
Cold War. We are still working in many ways with a system that
was dealing with a very large Nation State, our opponent, the
U.S.S.R., who believed in compartmentation, who believed in
security, keeping control over their people. We live in a
different age. The open source information contained around the
world on the Internet alone is so many times the size, I do not
think anybody knows what that all is. Yet we still have a
system inside that does not allow those people who are
analysts, those people who are operatives to really use that
system because it is considered a security threat by virtue of
even asking the question. They are hamstringing themselves,
they are hamstringing our national security, and I think these
are a number of issues that the GAO could help them address
because, frankly, the oversight committee process, the IG
process at this point will always be viewed as somewhat biased,
fair or unfair. But GAO has established itself over the years
as a neutral outside organization, and I think it can provide
the DNI some real insight into what it is that they are doing
for these vast processes that are overseeing the community.
On that note, thank you, Senator. I will end my comments.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Marks,
for your comments.
As you know, I have introduced the Intelligence Community
Audit Act of 2007, S. 82, which would reaffirm GAO's authority
to perform audits and evaluations of financial transactions,
programs, and activities of elements of the Intelligence
Community. The bill also includes certain provisions to improve
protection of the most sensitive intelligence information. For
example, specifying that the House or Senate Intelligence
Committees or Majority or Minority Leader would have to request
any audit or evaluation of intelligence sources and methods or
covert actions.
Do these provisions adequately address the DNI's concerns
with protecting the most sensitive intelligence information? Or
are there other steps that should be taken? Comptroller General
Walker.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I see a clear
distinction between management issues and management reforms
that apply to virtually every government department and agency,
including the Intelligence Community sources and methods. Those
are fundamentally different, and obviously the need to try to
be able to provide additional restrictions and safeguards
dealing with that type of information is clear; it is
compelling.
Sometimes there can be a gray area where you are dealing
with management type issues that could touch on some of these
other issues. I think you have to keep that in mind.
I think that what you have done is to try to separate
between typical management type activities and sources and
methods. I will, in the interest of full and fair disclosure,
note that as a member of the Board of Directors of the
International Auditor Generals Organization, as head of
strategic planning for that group, one of the things I have put
to my colleagues is to what extent do they do audit and
evaluation work in the Intelligence Community, and who do they
do it for, and who has access to information.
For all the major industrialized nations, they said yes,
the counterpart GAO organization does do work, audit and
evaluation work, in the Intelligence Community. However, a
significant majority of them also said that they typically only
do it at the request of their intelligence committees and that
the information is typically only provided to their
intelligence committees.
I am not saying that is the right answer, but I feel
compelled to provide the information just for your
consideration.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Ott.
Mr. Ott. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I guess my quick
reaction is the kind of carve-out that you have identified in
the legislation makes perfect sense, and I am also inclined to
say there is a bit of a false dispute here in the sense that,
as Mr. Aftergood and Mr. Marks in particular correctly
identified, there are huge requirement for effective oversight
of management, audit, financial, and contractual activities--
all these kinds of requirements for effective oversight. GAO
will have more than enough to do if they are given authority to
go into those areas. I frankly do not see any reason why there
should be any particular demand to go into the narrow and
highly sort of compartmented area of covert action and sources
and methods. That strikes me as the logical place for the
intelligence committees to work.
So it would seem to me that this is, as Mr. Walker has
said, a pretty natural division of labor, and to some degree a
kind of false problem. It seems to me something that can be
worked fairly effectively.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Aftergood.
Mr. Aftergood. I think the distinction in the bill does
make sense, but if your question is will it satisfy the
objections of the DNI, I am afraid the answer is no, it will
not. And the reason for that is because the Intelligence
Community uses the term ``sources and methods'' with great
elasticity.
I obtained a document showing the CIA budget for 1963. It
was a declassified document showing that the budget was $500
million that year. I asked the CIA, ``Well, what was the budget
for 1964?'' And they said, ``Oh, we are not going to tell you
that because of intelligence sources and methods.''
And so basically it is a catch-all phrase for whatever they
do not want to disclose. They do not use it in the same way
that you and I might.
I would say, though, that addressing the ODNI's concerns
may not be the hardest challenge facing this legislation.
Candidly, it seems to me that the most difficult political
obstacle may be winning the consent of the intelligence
oversight committees. Speaking as an outsider, a member of the
public, it appears to me that there are turf considerations on
the part of the Subcommittee, and that just as the ODNI wants
an exclusive relationship with the intelligence oversight
committees, the intelligence oversight committees may want that
very same exclusive relationship.
So there is a tactical question about how do you gain the
acquiescence and approval of the intelligence oversight
committees to what I think is a proposal that would assist
them, if only they could be persuaded of that.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Kaiser.
Mr. Kaiser. May I add a caveat to all of this? In mid-2001,
the examination by two House Government Reform subcommittees
looked into computer security programs. They asked GAO to mount
a preliminary review. The CIA declined to participate, largely
because the CIA insisted this was a matter of sources and
methods and could not comply with the GAO or the Subcommittee's
request. The Subcommittee even invited the CIA to testify in
executive or secret session. The CIA refused to do so.
In writing a letter to the Subcommittee explaining why they
were not participating, the head of the CIA and DCI at the time
said that they would give this information to the intelligence
committees, the House Committee on Intelligence, which, as they
interpreted, had exclusive oversight jurisdiction for sources
and methods. That does not apply to the Senate side, but that
was the argument that was being given at the time. And the CIA
did point out that they had the concurrence or approval of the
intelligence committee chairman.
So there is this notion of divided oversight
responsibilities, jurisdiction, and of sources and methods;
here it was applied to computer security programs, not
information that might come from them.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Marks.
Mr. Marks. Yes. I would urge the Subcommittee very
carefully to listen to the arguments made out of the
Intelligence Community and CIA. The secrecy flag is often
raised when they do not want to necessarily have something
examined, and I have always been pleasantly surprised at how
carefully they read S. Res. 400, which established the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence.
The problem may not come from the DNI office, and the
problem may not come from the Director of Central Intelligence.
I think both Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hayden are trying to do
their best in very difficult jobs. As a friend of mine says, it
is not them, it is the iron majors underneath of them. It is
those who have grown up in that system at a lower level who are
making the recommendations. And those people in many cases
still are not convinced that oversight is necessary, again,
based on their predilection towards secrecy. And they
oftentimes would be willing to hide behind both SSCI and HPSCI,
thinking, in fact, that they would get a better deal. And that
is why I think you are seeing some of the information that is
being sent back.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. If I can, Mr. Chairman, add a couple of things
based on these comments.
First, I have learned in 9\1/2\ years as Comptroller
General that everybody is for accountability until they are the
ones being held accountable. I have also learned that when you
have information that is not classified but somebody says it is
sensitive, you can substitute the words ``probably
embarrassing'' for ``sensitive.''
I think we have a situation here where, as has been noted,
sources and methods mean different things to different people
depending upon the circumstances. And I would argue that is
probably one of the reasons why in our counterpart
organizations around the world, they have done work and
provided that work to the intelligence committees in order to
just eliminate that issue. Whether it is management work or
whether it is sources and methods work, what is important is
that it be done and it be done by somebody who is qualified,
who has the confidence of the Congress and the American people,
and that it be provided to the appropriate bodies who have the
ability to do something with it.
Now, candidly, I believe that the Select Committees on
Intelligence are part of the problem. There is no question
about that. I also believe that no matter how caring they are,
no matter how capable they are, the simple fact is, given the
growth in the size, complexity, and criticality of this area,
more needs to be done, and frankly, they do not have the
expertise in the management areas that we are talking about
here. So, they do not have the resources, and they do not have
the expertise, so as a result, we have a gap. That gap needs to
be filled. It is in the national interest for it to be filled.
And I think there is a way to bridge these issues. I really do
believe so.
Senator Akaka. Are there any further comments? [No
response.]
Let me follow up, and on behalf of GAO, looking at this
from the other side of the coin, would S. 82 adequately protect
GAO's ability to audit and evaluate elements of the
Intelligence Community?
Mr. Walker. First, Mr. Chairman, I think it would, but I
think we have to reinforce a couple of things. We believe, with
very limited exceptions, that GAO already has extensive audit
and evaluation authority over intelligence agencies, including
the CIA. We absolutely reject the position taken by the CIA and
selected others, and I think some of the legislative history
that Dr. Kaiser mentioned helps to serve to reinforce the fact
that people are trying to reinvent history here with regard to
what the intention of Congress was at the time that the Select
Intelligence Committees were created.
There is an iron triangle here between the Intelligence
Community and the intelligence committees, and there is a lot
of movement back and forth among key staff there between the
communities. They are all very qualified and they are all very
capable, but they have a limited capacity, obviously, in that
regard.
So I think it would, but I want to reinforce the fact that
you are careful in some regards in your bill to reaffirm
authority that we already believe we have. And I think it is
important that nothing be done that could somehow undercut what
we believe to already be the case, and that is, we have
authority in most of these areas. We just have not had
requests, and we have not in some circumstances had
cooperation.
Most of the Intelligence Community is not the CIA, and in a
lot of the Intelligence Community, we have had and we continue
to have cooperation. So I think it is important that we not
paint with too broad a brush here. We need to use a laser.
There are problems with regard to specific entities, but there
is not a problem necessarily with regard to the whole
community. And Director McConnell, I believe, is a very capable
person who hopefully we can work out something with.
Senator Akaka. Any other comments? [No response.]
Mr. Walker, the DNI has expressed concerns that GAO review
of intelligence agencies could compromise intelligence
information. Over the years, GAO has done significant work
involving classified information and also has written
classified reports. I find it a bit troubling that the
Intelligence Community trusts private contractors with a great
deal of intelligence information, yet it does not trust GAO to
safeguard the same information.
To your knowledge, has classified information provided to
GAO ever been leaked?
Mr. Walker. To my knowledge, never in the history of GAO,
which goes back to 1921, has there been any classified
information leaked from GAO, and that includes a lot of
entities other than the Intelligence Community. I find more
than a little bit of hypocrisy in the position of the
Intelligence Community on this.
Senator Akaka. General Walker, do you have any thoughts on
the particular challenges of evaluating government activities
where classified information is involved?
Mr. Walker. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have a number of
individuals, including myself and many others at different
levels of the organization, that have top secret clearances and
also have other ``tickets'' (Sensitive Compartmented
Information Clearances and related accesses) that would be
necessary to do a whole range of work. What I would envision is
that if the Congress did start asking us to do work in this
area, we would limit that to a relatively small group of
individuals who had the required clearances and we would want
to do that as a further safeguard in order to provide
additional assurance that nothing would be leaked and that it
was more a need to know within GAO.
But I think you have to keep in mind it is not just the
need-to-know concept, it is the right to know. The Congress has
a right to know as well as a need to know.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker, if GAO increases its work with
the Intelligence Community, with the intelligence committee, it
will have to rely on employees with security clearances, as you
mentioned. Do you currently have enough GAO analysts with high-
level clearances, in particular top secret and SCI, to increase
GAO's work with the Intelligence Community if that work were no
longer restricted?
Mr. Walker. I believe we do, Mr. Chairman, but obviously it
depends upon how many requests we receive. From a practical
standpoint, what we are talking about is reallocating existing
resources, given the current budget environment, rather than
adding resources. I would be happy to provide for the record,
if you would like, how many GAO employees we have with top
secret clearance and how many we have with special SCI.\1\
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\1\ The letter dated March 11, 2008 with the response from Mr.
Walker appears in the Appendix on page 148.
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Senator Akaka. I would appreciate that.
Congress created an Inspector General for the Central
Intelligence Agency to improve oversight of that agency. Last
fall, CIA Director Michael Hayden launched a probe into the CIA
Inspector General's work, and earlier this month, Mr. Hayden
announced that the CIA was creating an ombudsman to oversee the
IG's work.
How concerned should Congress be that the CIA is trying to
rein in the IG's independence? Or is this more a matter of
enhancing the IG's accountability? Mr. Ott.
Mr. Ott. Mr. Chairman, to answer that question fully would
require a very fine grained knowledge of exactly what is going
on in the relationship between the DCI and the IG, which I do
not pretend to have. I will say--and I noted it in my
testimony--that the current CIA IG's office is a beleaguered
office. It is continuing to conduct a series of investigations
and do its business, but at the same time is dealing with this
probe and these pressures and questions being raised by the
DCI. And you now have the creation of an ombudsman as a rival
office of some sort. And it basically just goes back to the
original proposition that the instrumentalities of oversight
that are available to deal with this hugely growing, complex
animal of the Intelligence Community, even those limited
instrumentalities like the CIA IG are, in fact, under pressure,
beleaguered, and to some degree probably hobbled.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Aftergood.
Mr. Aftergood. As you were describing the creation of the
ombudsman to review the activities of the Inspector General, I
was wondering to myself who is going to oversee the ombudsman.
But without prejudging the facts of that case, I would say two
quick things.
The Office of the Inspector General performs a crucial
function. There is a new report out from the Project on
Government Oversight this week examining the strengths and
weaknesses of the Inspector General system, and it needs to be
bolstered. But it is part of the larger issue confronting this
Subcommittee and the Congress and addressed in your bill of how
to strengthen the oversight function.
If there are currently 50 intelligence staffers in Congress
overseeing a budget of around $50 billion, that means that, on
average, each staffer is responsible for $1 billion of
government activity. And that is just not a reasonable task to
expect them to perform adequately.
So we need to strengthen all of the institutions of
oversight, including the Inspector General, most certainly
including a GAO role in intelligence.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Mr. Kaiser.
Mr. Kaiser. Yes, if I may add to what has already been
said. When the CIA Inspector General was created, it was in the
aftermath of the Iran-contra affair. Congress had already tried
to bolster the administratively created Inspector General at
the CIA but found that it was not receiving adequate reports
and information from that office. Consequently, the new office
was created in 1989, and, in fact, in a very remarkable
situation, because the Intelligence Authorization Act was
already before the Senate on the floor. It was brought back
into the intelligence committee, and this provision for a new
Inspector General, a statutory Inspector General in the CIA,
was added to it; and then the bill was re-released and sent to
the floor for approval. That tells us how important and how
conflictual that particular episode was.
According to a recent press account, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency said that he was looking at the IG
the way he would at any other management entity. But the
Inspector General is not the same as any other management
entity within an organization. Even at the CIA, it is given
certain statutory protections to prevent it being beleaguered
and manipulated, if you will.
The Inspector General also may have his investigations or
audits prevented by the head of the agency. That applies, as I
mentioned, to only six other governmental organizations.
So for the DCIA to say or to insist that the Inspector
General may have gone off on too independent of an exercise,
the DCIA has authority to prohibit or intervene in some of
those investigations.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Marks.
Mr. Marks. That has always been a fractious relationship
for as long as it has been there between the IG and the CIA,
and particularly on the operations side, which, as someone
mentioned--I mean, this was set up shortly after Iran-contra,
and the operations people were rubbed raw, as it was.
It has been a difficult position but a necessary one,
certainly the last several IGs who have been there--Britt
Snider, Fred Hitz, a few others--have taken their share of
flack. I am troubled by the ombudsman business because I think
that does send the wrong message. But at the same time, I think
the IG continues under John Helgerson, who is a long-time CIA
official at a very senior level and a very bright, independent
man, to continue to do the kinds of postmortems as well as
suggested activities that they need to do there. However,
again, I agree with the panel. I think that appointing an
ombudsman at this point sends the wrong message altogether.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
The fiscal year 2008 intelligence authorization bill would
create an Inspector General for the Intelligence Community as a
whole. I would like to hear your thoughts on how an IC-wide
Inspector General could enhance oversight of the Intelligence
Community as well as any potential problems you might see with
the proposal. Mr. Marks.
Mr. Marks. Thank you, Senator. Well, on the positive side
of it, the DNI office has grown so large now and is dealing
with such complex issues that it probably would not--it would
certainly be helpful to have an Inspector General there to
begin to look at some of the sub-processes going on there.
Certainly an Inspector General at that level could also look at
some of the interactions between the agencies and the DNI. I do
not think it is any secret at this point that many of the
agencies in the Intelligence Community have been greeted by the
DNI like a third cousin coming from out of town to borrow
money. They are unhappy with their presence there. It has, I
think, conflicted to some extent with what the 2004 bill was in
terms of creating that DNI, and probably having an Inspector
General at this point, I think, would certainly help ease that
process. It might also help as an interesting liaison to GAO as
they begin their processes within the community as well.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. Mr. Chairman, I have mixed thoughts about it.
First, I think the government has too many IGs. We have about
60 of them. Some of them are presidentially appointed, about
half. About half are appointed by the agency head, and can be
removed by the agency head. Some have hundreds of people at
their disposal, that is, professionals at their disposal. Some
have themselves and maybe one or two staff.
So I think one of the things that has to happen in this
year, which is the 30th anniversary of the IG Act, is that
Congress needs to relook at the IG community in particular and
the accountability community as well, which includes GAO, to
try to make sure that there is adequate coverage while avoiding
duplication of effort, trying to create more critical mass,
more flexibility, more synergies, and more accountability.
That being said, as has been said before, the CIA is the
only agency within the Intelligence Community that has its
sole, dedicated Inspector General. The DOD IG covers a lot of
others, but they, frankly, have got a fair amount of work to do
there. And so, I think you have to think about what do you do
with regard to other ones that exist. It is one thing to say
that you are going to have an Inspector General for the
Intelligence Community and that that person is going to report
to the Congress and maybe to the DNI, dual reporting, which the
residentially appointed Inspectors General do. But then what is
that going to do for the CIA Inspector General? And what is the
impact going to be on the DOD IG in order to prevent
duplication of effort and in order to create better clarity as
to who is responsible for what?
So I think it has some conceptual merit, but I think we
have to put it in the context of, if you have more capacity
here with an IG, what is that going to do on a micro basis to
try to make sure you do not have duplication of effort within
that community. And, second, I think we need to take a whole
look at the IG Act and rationalize the overall structure and
its relationship with GAO after 30 years.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Aftergood.
Mr. Aftergood. I would concur with that and just say that
not all IGs are created equal, and that if there is to be an
IC-wide IG, it is important that that office reflect the best
practices in government and not the least effective. So the key
touchstones really are the independence of the office, as
written into statute; the resources that it has; and the
personnel, the quality of the personnel working in the office.
With the right people, the right resources, and the right
statute, it can be a tremendous addition. Without them, it can
be insignificant or perhaps even counterproductive.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Ott.
Mr. Ott. Mr. Chairman, maybe just one point in this regard,
and I am keying on Mr. Walker's comments. Oversight works and
it works effectively when various criteria are met, and one of
those criteria is a perception among the overseen, in the
Intelligence Community in this case, that the process is
efficient, that the lines of authority and responsibility are
clear, that you are not duplicating effort, you are not being
asked to keep repeating the same thing to different people,
reinventing the wheel, dealing with conflictual authorities.
You want the process streamlined in every respect, including on
the congressional end, in terms of oversight authority. Do you
have multiple masters or is there a fairly limited demarcated
set of folks that you are responding to?
I just raise that because it is important in gaining the
cooperation and support of the community itself, which is vital
to making oversight work well.
So I would encourage the Subcommittee, to keep this in mind
as you address all these issues. Oversight is a good thing, but
oversight just willy-nilly in all sort of guises and
incarnations is not necessarily a good thing. It needs to be
efficient and streamlined.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Well, thank you for those
responses.
Mr. Walker, notwithstanding DNI's reluctance to work with
GAO, has DNI publicly identified any specific management issues
that the community is having a challenging time working
through?
Mr. Walker. There are several issues that I know we have
had conversations about. One in particular is human capital
reform. Any organization is only as good as its people. That is
clearly true in the Intelligence Community because, by
definition, you are talking about intellectual property,
intellectual capital, if you will. And so that is an area where
they are engaging in a number of reforms, and, frankly, we have
had some informal communications with the DNI's office on those
issues. And I have seen some hopeful signs that we may actually
be requested to do some work in that area because I think most
people view the GAO as the clear leader in this area in
government. And while we are not perfect, never will be, we are
clearly the leader in this area.
There are other areas that I do not know that the DNI has
personally been engaged in or spoken publicly about, but that
clearly, I think, should be areas of priority consideration in
addition to human capital: Acquisition and contracting,
information sharing, and potentially security clearances. All
these are on our high-risk list. That is the common
denominator. And I think, importantly, while a lot of people do
not like oversight, I think sometimes people misconstrue GAO's
role because we really try to employ a constructive engagement
approach. It is in all of our interest for everybody to be
successful, and so a lot of what we do is we try to bring best
practices, make the entities aware of best practices based on
our collective experience, as well as lessons learned, to
increase the likelihood that they will actually be successful.
And I think that is what sometimes gets missed. GAO did not
always have that reputation, but I think we do have that
reputation now, and I fully expect that it is likely to be
maintained.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
As Mr. Aftergood testified, ODNI has estimated that 70
percent of the Intelligence Community budget is spent on
commercial contracts. That really is an astonishing statistic.
Do any of you have insight into how IC contract management
oversight is working, both in terms of the Intelligence
Community's oversight of contractors as well as congressional
oversight? Mr. Marks.
Mr. Marks. At the risk of my business, I think one of the
challenges for them right now is simply volume. The number of
people involved with this process remains somewhat limited,
certainly versus the Defense Department, who has had much
greater experience over the years in terms of dealing with
contractors. And we have seen some of the challenges that have
come out of that as well. The creation of the DNI has added
another strain on that process. We have certainly--in my own
experience, I have certainly been well treated by those people.
They have certainly gone out of their way to attempt to help,
but they are oftentimes simply overwhelmed by the volume and,
frankly, you have many young people in there who they are
attempting to train up at this point. So while there are
inefficiencies and you sort of hope they are gaining something
on that as you are dealing with the tremendous volume of
contracts now and the very large size and the billions of
dollars of these contracts, the idea of having someone who can
look over their shoulder such as the GAO and give them
instruction on acquisition and give them instruction on the
most effective best-practice ways of dealing with contracts I
think would be greatly appreciated.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Ott.
Mr. Ott. If I can just refer to one case that I note in my
testimony, in 2001 the National Security Agency, with
considerable fanfare for a secretive agency, announced a
program called ``Trailblazer'' that was to have three prime
contractors, very large ones, and some 30 industrial partners
and a budget that ultimately well exceeded $1 billion.
``Trailblazer'' went on for a number of years and was designed
to provide a transformation of NSA capabilities to cope with
the modern information technology world.
Ultimately, it was a debacle, and then-Director Hayden
ended up testifying that--it turned out that the new
technologies were unmanageable--they were not working. NSA
never fully understood what it was getting into. It ended up
much like the infamous computer programs at the FBI, and
ultimately the plug was pulled and defeat was declared.
The point for our purposes is that in this whole episode,
there was no real effective oversight. The kind of capabilities
that a GAO might have brought to that process as it was ongoing
just simply did not happen.
So there are lots of examples like that, big examples, that
argue the point that something else needs to be put in place
here.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Aftergood.
Mr. Aftergood. This is not entirely a new problem. The
National Reconnaissance Office, which builds spy satellites,
has never actually built the spy satellites. It is always the
contractors to the NRO that have built them for the last 40-
plus years. But what is new is the explosion in contracting
activity with just an enormous growth in spending and in number
of contracts and in contracting on core intelligence functions,
including analysis and collection. And the existing oversight
system, it seems to me, is not well equipped to deal with that.
The intelligence agencies answer to Congress, but the
intelligence contractors do not. They answer to their customer,
which is the intelligence agency who hired them. And so, in
effect, the business of intelligence has been taken at least
one step away from the oversight of Congress, and in some way,
something needs to be done to rectify that. I think GAO
provides an obvious if partial solution to that problem.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Kaiser.
Mr. Kaiser. Yes. To add to the complexity of auditing,
overseeing, and evaluating the private contract operations is
the notion that many of these contracts are bundled. I do not
know if that is true in the Intelligence Community as it is
elsewhere. But that means there are a number of separate
private firms that are operating within, under a certain
contract. That means further decentralization and difficulty in
actually identifying or pinpointing who is responsible for what
part of the contract. If down the line something does go wrong,
there is a lot of finger pointing, and it is very difficult
then to identify who is actually in charge of the whole
operation or even a part of it.
Senator Akaka. Well, let me ask Mr. Walker, as Mr.
Aftergood testified, the intelligence components in the
Department of Defense traditionally have not been as resistant
as the CIA to cooperating with GAO. I understand that GAO even
had an office at the NSA. Your testimony discusses some work
related to elements of the Intelligence Community in the DOD.
In general, do you still receive good cooperation from DOD
components? Or has that changed as the IC has become somewhat
more integrated under the DNI in recent years?
Mr. Walker. We receive much better cooperation and
generally good cooperation from the components dealing with the
Department of Defense, at least most of them. We still actually
do have space at the NSA. We just don't use it. And the reason
we don't use it is we are not getting any requests. So I do not
want to have people sitting out there twiddling their thumbs.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Walker, the Intelligence Community at times uses
private contractors for outside reviews or auditing of IC
programs or activities. You have served extensively in both
government and the private sector reviewing and auditing
Executive Branch activities and programs. Do you have any
thoughts on the limitations or benefits of having private
contractors review Intelligence Community activities?
Mr. Walker. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think another area that
is in desperate need of a review by the Congress is what has
happened with regard to the proliferation of the use of
contractors in government. It has grown dramatically. We are
using contractors in many ways that we never did historically.
A lot of times, if you go to a meeting at a particular
department or agency, you have no idea who a contractor is and
who a civil servant is. You really do not know.
I think that there are certain functions and activities
that should never be contracted out, and we need to have
another discussion about that. But even if you do decide to
contract out, I think there are plenty of things that should be
contracted out. You need to have an adequate number of civil
servants to be able to oversee cost, quality, and performance.
And if you do not, you are going to get in trouble. And with
the proliferation of service contracts in particular, there is
also the additional challenge of not being able to provide
enough specificity with regard to what those service
contractors should be doing, which, in effect, gives them a
quasi-blank check to do a number of things that may not be
cost-effective for the American taxpayer.
Senator Akaka. Professor Ott and Mr. Marks, you both also
have worked as Senate staff on intelligence matters. The DNI is
preparing to undertake a series of management reforms to its
personnel systems: Contracting practices, financial systems,
and business practices, among other proposals. What is your
view on what type of expertise is needed by congressional staff
to assess the Intelligence Community's performance on core
management issues? For example, in your experience, how many
auditors or accountants would be sufficient to perform the
auditing function? Mr. Ott.
Mr. Ott. The kind of review of management practices that
you are referring to, I think it is fair to say, have never
been adequately overseen by the intelligence committees. You
are really talking about a kind of GAO type of expertise, and
to my knowledge--and I will not pretend to be completely
knowledgeable on the current set of circumstances--the
oversight committees have never had that kind of specialized
expertise.
I will also say parenthetically, to use the metaphor, in
the 1990s, Humpty Dumpty fell off the wall and was shattered
into a very large number of pieces, and it will be a very
difficult and very long-term business to try to put all those
pieces back together again, if, in fact, it can be done at all.
So just simply reconstituting what the Subcommittee once
did is going to be a very difficult enterprise. And then to add
to it a capability to oversee these kinds of management
practices that the Subcommittee has really never done in the
past will be adding additional difficulty on top of difficulty.
You can detect a skepticism in my voice. I will just note
finally that in my direct experience the Senate Subcommittee
did in the 1980s, when, as I say, it functioned effectively,
had an audit staff, and it was called that. It consisted, as I
recall of basically three people. Basically what they did was
look at very large budget items, primarily overhead systems,
and got into questions of weighing various alternative
strategies for constructing and satellite systems. And there
were some very high-level, very informed engagements between
that staff and the Intelligence Community at the time. I would
argue one of the high points of legislative history, frankly,
was the quality of debate that went on between that small
staff--and I was not part of it--and the leadership of the
Intelligence Community with regard to how to use billions of
dollars for overhead systems. But that was not the sort of
thing you are describing. That was not getting down into
management practices, personnel, knowledge management,
contracting, that sort of thing. That was big-ticket
strategies. And that worked because that staff was world class.
It was not big. It was very small. But the people on it, and
particularly the leadership of it, was absolutely first rate.
It was almost a unique thing. And it is very hard to imagine it
being reconstituted, at least in the current environment, to do
the kind of job you are talking about.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Marks.
Mr. Marks. This, Senator, is the kind of red meat that
McKinsey and Booz Allen and others make a lot of money out of.
But the problem, again, on this is to develop, as Marvin was
saying, an internal expertise, people who understand the
community, but at the same time understand these problems. And
that is a difficult thing to do. We had a fortunate period of
time and a relatively smaller community where people could
concentrate on larger contracts and do that, and Marvin and I
were acquainted with that audit staff, and they did a very good
job. I am not so sure you can re-create that now. Certainly
given the depth, you can just run the list--and Mr. Walker down
at the end of the table has run this long list of management
challenges at this point, ranging from workforce planning to
information technology to secrecy and compartmentation. And I
think, again, whether I am putting too much of a burden on GAO
at this point, these are the kinds of people that you need to
have who are going to be there on a longer-term basis and can
really engage in a long-term dialogue on this, which I do not
think you are going to get from a contractor, and you are
certainly not going to be able to get from oversight committees
that are already overburdened at this point.
Let me also add another personal note, and this was an
earlier comment that was made with regards to contractors
within the community themselves. I can remember when this
contracting business really began in terms of a much larger
scale. Obviously, it was precipitated by 2001 and trying to buy
quick expertise. The logic, however, was always one in which
you supposedly got--the government got something cheaper in the
sense of you are able to buy the expertise, but you did not
have to pay for the pension, you did not have to pay for the
insurance and all the rest of it, ignoring the profit the
companies were making on top and still thinking you were making
out in the long term. I think the term ``human capital'' has
been used here before today, and I think one of the things the
government has cheated themselves out of and to some extent
cheated the taxpayer out of is that they may be saving some
dollars, and I think there is still some debate as to how much
they are saving, but certainly in terms of having the cadre of
individuals who can deal with these kinds of issues within the
government, I think we have cheated ourselves very badly. And
maybe one or two of the places, one or two of the centers of
expertise certainly remains in GAO, and I think it is one place
that we can go back to fairly quickly to get some oversight on
this.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Walker, as I noted in my opening remarks, in response
to a question for the record from Senator Voinovich from a
November 2005 hearing of this Subcommittee, GAO stated that it
lacked the cooperation needed to ensure progress on the
security clearance process. As you know, DNI may assume more
responsibility for security clearances in the future.
Given this situation, what specifically would GAO need from
Congress and the Intelligence Community to continue making
progress on this particular issue?
Mr. Walker. Well, I think your bill, Senator, reaffirms
certain authorities that GAO believes it already has, and I
believe it also specifically may reference--if not in the
statutory language, the contemplated, legislative history--the
issue of security clearances.
Let me restate. I have had a constructive working
relationship with Director McConnell, and I think he is a very
reasoned and reasonable person. He has a tough enough job in
trying to do his job with regard to the 16 different entities
in the Intelligence Community. And they do not all have the
same attitude.
The biggest problem that we have had on a recurring basis
over many years has been the CIA, and not just with regard to
whether and to what extent we would do work there, but in their
historical unwillingness to cooperate on government-wide
initiatives, even in circumstances where other members of the
Intelligence Community did. And so I think we need to be
precise about where the problem is and where it is not, and I
do think that part of the problem is up here on Capitol Hill. I
think the intelligence committees have still not come to the
realization yet that no matter what their authorities are, no
matter how capable their staff are, this is just an area that
they are not going to be able to perform effectively, and GAO
is the logical place to go, and it really, frankly, would not
make sense to go anywhere else.
Senator Akaka. Further, Mr. Walker, what do you think might
be the result or what do you think might happen if GAO is
unable to audit the security clearance process in the future?
Mr. Walker. Well, it is already high risk. It would become
higher risk, I can assure you.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Walker, the DNI is trying to move
forward with a new personnel system to unify the Intelligence
Community. This, of course, is a lofty goal as practically each
element of the IC has been granted different personnel
flexibilities and has implemented the use of these
flexibilities in an uneven manner.
To date, have you provided any feedback to ODNI as it
designs and prepares to implement the new personnel system? If
not, would you speak a little bit more on how you could be
helpful to the DNI in this area?
Mr. Walker. Well, Ron Sanders is the chief human capital
officer for the ODNI. I have known Mr. Sanders for a number of
years. He is a very capable professional. There have been some
informal conversations that have taken place with regard to
what they are trying to do. I know that they have reached out
to us at GAO to learn from our own experience and to draw upon
some best practices.
This is an area where I think we could add a lot of value.
We have not received a formal request to look at what they have
put together. But this is an example of an area where there has
been some informal interaction and knowledge sharing, but it is
an area where I think we could add value not just to the
Congress but to the DNI.
Senator Akaka. Professor Ott and Mr. Marks, you both also
have served in the Intelligence Community working with the CIA.
In your experience, how is our national security affected if
there is inadequate oversight of the Intelligence Community?
Mr. Ott.
Mr. Ott. All right. I will venture out on thin ice here and
make what is inherently maybe a tendentious assertion, but I
will make it anyway because I believe it.
When you pose a question like this it calls to mind the
events of September 11, 2001, and the whole postmortem that was
done on that by the 9/11 Commission and the connecting of the
dots and the location of bits and pieces of information in
various parts of the security community and the Intelligence
Community in particular and the failure to bring those together
and all of that--the story that we are all very familiar with.
My argument is that if intelligence oversight by the
Congress had been functioning in the 1990s and the years
immediately up to 2001 the way it had functioned in the 1980s,
I believe that, in fact, September 11, 2001 would have been
prevented. And the reason is that an effective oversight
system, as existed in the SSCI at the time, would have reacted
to the 1993 truck bomb in the World Trade Center--and then the
subsequent embassy bombings in East Africa--by saying we are
now confronting something new, important, and dangerous. We are
going to have to dedicate two or three of our professional
staff to work this issue full-time. And if that had been done--
and I think it would have been done by a 1980s-era committee.
If that had been done, you would then have had people from the
committee ranging across the Intelligence Community, kicking
the tires, asking questions: What are you doing? What are the
programs? What do you know? And it is inherent in the nature of
oversight that a staff doing that can bridge the stovepipes
that compartmentalize information and can say, well, I was out
at the FBI last week, and they told me this. Have you heard
that? Well, no, we have not heard that.
That is the process of correcting disparate, proprietary
information which a Senate staff can do in the nature of
things, actually very easily, but the community often cannot
do. Not only that, you get the problem of orthodox thinking:
Terrorists will never use airplanes, civilian airplanes. Who
says? Well, we came to that conclusion somewhere a long time
ago, and it is now sort of set in stone.
Well, Senate staff is not beholden to or captured by
bureaucratic orthodoxies. They might react with skepticism.
Well, wait a minute. Why do you think that? I was talking to
somebody in the civil aviation world who thinks quite
differently about that. This is a service that oversight
performs if it is done well, and it helps the bureaucracy
itself bridge gaps, get outside of compartments, think outside
the box, rethink conventional wisdom, and it is an absolutely--
in the kind of world that we face today, I think it is
absolutely critical.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Marks.
Mr. Marks. I will take a slight variation on the theme,
Senator, and I will take 2001 as the example because that is
probably the best of the lot, at least for right now--maybe
Iraq judgments.
September 11, 2001, was a structural intelligence failure.
We had a system that was built to do something else, to take on
a very slow-moving, steady, Western-oriented Nation State, the
U.S.S.R., very predictable, perhaps harder to penetrate but
very predictable--hard to penetrate but very predictable. We
had structures in place that separated international and
domestic information. We had long-term laws in place that had
placed some restrictions on a number of different agencies
talking to each other. And Marvin is absolutely right. You also
had cultures that had developed over the years that really were
not dealing with each other.
What you would hope for out of any oversight--and I can
certainly see Marvin's point in terms of both the Senate and
the House Intelligence Committees. But what you would hope for
in any kind of oversight is the ability to look long term, the
ability to look over the horizon in the sense of trying to get
a handle on what is the next set of problems here. In a lot of
ways, the Intelligence Community stopped somewhere around
December 25, 1991, when the Soviet Union fell, and maintained a
lot of the same structures throughout. And obviously there were
cutbacks, etc., and that is all history now. But there are a
number of us out there who really believed that there had to be
an outside group that was saying to them, look, the situation
has changed. People certainly were smart enough to realize it
inside, but oftentimes they cannot move within their own
bureaucracy to get things done. A good oversight committee--and
again this is all hindsight, but good oversight of one form or
another would have sent out the warning at this point. We are
dealing in a different world now, the old joke being that the
best thing that could happen to us is that al-Qaeda would have
an international and a domestic desk, that they would not have
connection. But they do. And the idea that these technologies
that were developing in the 1990s that really were not taken
into account, whether it is the ability to get on the Internet,
whether it is the ability to make simply international phone
calls and communicate that way, really weren't taken into
account within the community.
So, fundamentally, I think I agree with Dr. Ott on this,
but at the same time, I do not know how much of that burden
could have been taken on by the intelligence committees, given
structure and, frankly, given the day-to-day issues that they
have to deal with.
Senator Akaka. Well, I want to thank all of you again for
the time that you spent preparing as well as presenting this
valuable information to this Subcommittee. This Subcommittee
has been very fortunate. I hear all of you clearly, and your
thoughts.
Today's hearing for me has been a highlight on the need to
improve oversight of the Intelligence Community, particularly
as it prepares to implement a host of government-wide
management reforms. It is clear to me that GAO, which has the
expertise and capacity to do cross-cutting audits and
evaluations of IC activities could provide valuable assistance
to this effort. GAO's feedback would help Congress understand
whether the Intelligence Community programs that it authorizes
and funds are working properly. But, more importantly, GAO
could help the IC work better.
We should remember that the goal of oversight is not to
point fingers at the Intelligence Community or to make
newspaper headlines. Rather, the goal is to help the
Intelligence Community function as effectively as possible to
keep the American people safe.
With that goal in mind, this Subcommittee will continue its
attention to this important issue, and you have provided us
with valuable insights and information to help us do that.
The hearing record will be open for 2 weeks for additional
comments or questions or statements other Members may have, and
with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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