S. Hrg. 110-636
SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: THE WAY FORWARD
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 22, 2008
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
47-095 PDF WASHINGTON : 2009
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (866) 512-1800 end_of_the_skype_highlighting;
DC area (202) 512-1800 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (202) 512-1800 end_of_the_skype_highlighting Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JON TESTER, Montana JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware TED STEVENS, Alaska
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN WARNER, Virginia
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Evan W. Cash, Professional Staff Member
Jennifer A. Hemingway, Minority Staff Director
Tara L. Shaw, Minority Counsel
Jessica Nagasako, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Akaka................................................ 1
Senator Voinovich............................................ 2
WITNESSES
Thursday, May 22, 2008
Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 6
Hon. Clay Johnson, III, Deputy Director for Management, U.S.
Office of Management and Budget................................ 7
Elizabeth McGrath, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Business Transformation, U.S. Department of Defense........ 9
John P. Fitzpatrick, Director, Special Security Center, Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.......................... 10
Kathy L. Dillaman, Associate Director, Federal Investigative
Services Division, U.S. Office of Personnel Management......... 12
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Dillaman, Kathy L.:
Testimony.................................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Farrell, Brenda S.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Fitzpatrick, John P.:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Joint prepared statement with Ms. McGrath.................... 49
Johnson, Hon. Clay III:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 48
McGrath, Elizabeth:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Joint prepared statement with Mr. Fitzpatrick................ 49
APPENDIX
Background....................................................... 59
Questions and Responses for the Record from:
Ms. Farrell.................................................. 64
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 67
Ms. McGrath.................................................. 73
Mr. Fitzpatrick with an attachment........................... 78
Ms. Dillaman................................................. 93
SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: THE WAY FORWARD
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in
Room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka and Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Good afternoon, everyone. This hearing of
the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia is called to
order.
This is our fifth hearing on security clearance reform and
testifies to the difficulty of solving this important problem.
Three years ago, Senator Voinovich and I began this series
after the Department of Defense's personnel security clearance
program was placed on the Government Accountability Office's
high-risk list. Since that time, we have uncovered several
systemic problems which demonstrate that the current security
clearance process is outdated and needs fundamental reform.
After last year's hearing, the Administration took steps to
begin that reform. All of the Federal Government stakeholders
in security clearances from the military, intelligence, and
civilian communities came together, forming what we now know as
the Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team, which is
represented here today by many members of our panel. The team
crafted a plan to finally bring the security clearance process
into the 21st Century. I look forward to hearing more about
this plan and how these reforms will move forward.
I want to applaud the hard work that has been put in over
the past year to reduce the clearance backlogs and speed up
processing. The Office of Personnel Management, who is in
charge of most investigations, has made a huge investment in
manpower to attack the backlog. The backlog finally seems to be
under control and waiting times have come down. However, I
still think that the processes and technology now in use do not
allow for very much more improvement.
There is far too much manual activity going on in the
clearance process today. Literally caves full of hundreds of
thousands of file folders along with a dozen computer programs
bolted together make up the backbone of the investigation
process at OPM. Though some may consider this system the
Cadillac of IT solutions, unfortunately, it is a 25-year-old
model, probably suited for a car museum.
More of the security clearance process should be automated
and electronic. That data must then be portable so that it can
be efficiently sent to agencies for adjudication. The current
process of shipping or printing off investigation files to
adjudicators rather than sending data to agencies is very
burdensome. The information must also be easily accessible for
reinvestigations and readjudications.
Reforming clearances is a national security issue and
increasingly a fiscal issue. Delays in the clearance process,
especially for ``Top Secret'' clearances, cost taxpayers
millions of dollars. Cleared individuals are in such high
demand that they are paid inflated signing bonuses or given
expensive cars just to work for a contracting firm hired to
support Federal agencies. Those costs are eventually borne by
the Federal Government in the form of more expensive contracts.
More importantly, however, getting people cleared is
essential for national security. Rightly or not, it is a fact
that the government relies on contractors to support critical
national security functions, from the tanker drivers in Iraq to
the intelligence analysts here at home. Whether an individual
works for the Federal Government or works as a contractor, it
is essential that we can fill positions that support our
national security.
I have great hope that what has been outlined by the Joint
Security and Suitability Reform Team are all steps in the right
direction. Their recommendations go to what we have been
pushing for over the course of these hearings. I will be
interested in what GAO has to say about the report, as they are
the ones that initially placed this issue on the high-risk
list.
However, I note that the report is still short on much
detail. I will be asking for some of those details today, and
as recommendations are implemented over time, I will continue
to ask those questions.
I am pleased that in looking at our panel, who will all
play a role in implementing these reforms, that most are career
civil servants who will still be here after January 20. I can
assure you that this Subcommittee will still be here after
January and that we will make sure that the progress made does
not get lost in the shuffle of transitioning to a new
Administration.
I now call on Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Senator
Voinovich. I appreciate your continued dedication to this issue
and look forward to continuing to work with you on moving this
along. Senator Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Senator Akaka. I first of all
want to say that one of the joys of being on this Subcommittee
with you is that the two of us have shared the same agenda for
a long period of time. There were some who were concerned that
perhaps after the leadership change and I became Ranking and
you became Chairman that some of the things that we worked on
might disappear, but the fact of the matter is that you have
stayed on top of them and have been very aggressive and
hopefully the hard work that we do will bear some fruition.
While I commend the Joint Security and Suitability Reform
Team for producing its April 30 reform document, I do have a
hard time understanding why it took the Federal Government 4
years to get to this point, a 10-page outline on how to
transform our current process, and I am hopeful that this
effort will find result and sustained reform.
Since 2004, we have been attempting to bring a performance-
based approach to how government manages access to sensitive
national security information. In June 2005, following our
first hearing on this matter after the Department of Defense
security clearance process was added to the GAO's 2005 High-
Risk List, I believed significant progress could be made in the
short-term and this management challenge would be removed from
GAO's 2007 High-Risk List. At the rate we are going, I am
afraid the process will remain on the list in 2009.
Thus far, the most meaningful reform effort appears to be
the hiring of additional investigative staff by OPM to support
a cumbersome process reliant on antiquated computer systems.
More investigative staff has helped. For our first hearing on
this matter in June 2005, GAO estimated a backlog of about
270,000 clearance investigations for DOD alone. In February
2008, OPM has reduced that number to about 42,000 pending
investigations over 180 days old for all agencies it conducts
investigations for.
However, additional reforms are needed, including the use
of 21st Century technology, as Senator Akaka made reference to.
OPM highlights its success in transferring virtual files among
agencies, but those files are printed prior to adjudication.
The automated system, which is essentially a computerized fax
machine that does not allow for online manipulation of case
files, isn't really the type of system I envisioned when
Senator Akaka and I began working on this management challenge.
Senator Akaka and I held hearings earlier this month to
examine the Federal Government's outdated hiring process. At
that hearing, witnesses tried to tout the ability of
individuals to apply for Federal jobs using an online process,
but many of those individuals, after wading through the Federal
Government's hiring process and receiving a job offer, are
being told that they have to apply on paper for a security
clearance and that process could take months.
As Senator Akaka and I discussed at that hearing,
Generation X and Y job seekers get frustrated with the lack of
response from our agencies when applying for jobs. Imagine
their level of frustration when they are told that clearances
for such jobs could take months, reinforcing their impression
of an inflexible bureaucracy. The delay in clearing individuals
simply adds to the overall hiring delay and gives the wrong
impression of those seeking to work for the Federal Government.
We need to create a seamless hiring and clearing process.
Until we do, our human capital crisis will be exacerbated. The
Federal Government is trying to find the best and brightest
people in an increasingly competitive era when we are losing
high-skilled potential employees to a private sector that
offers higher salaries and better benefits. This is a national
problem. The government is competing now with the rest of the
world and in this country with the private sector big time
because of the baby boomer retirement.
We need to move expeditiously to hire individuals with the
skill sets we need, but even when we find qualified individuals
who are willing to be public servants, we subject them to a
cumbersome hiring process and outdated security clearance
system. It is no wonder that we lose qualified potential
employees.
The February 2008 report by OMB and the Security Clearance
Oversight Group identified several obstacles which impede the
current security process. First, agencies had an April 2006
deadline to transmit all their security clearance applications
to OPM electronically. After failing to meet the deadline, the
2007 Security Clearance Oversight Group Report indicated that
all agencies had plans in place to transmit 100 percent of
their applications electronically in fiscal year 2007. However,
the 2008 report shows we failed to meet this goal, meeting 83
percent compliance government-wide.
The Department of Defense bears most of the burden for this
failure. For the first quarter of fiscal year 2008, it
submitted only 77 percent of its applications electronically to
OPM. Electronic transmission of applications can cut weeks out
of the investigation process and agencies need to fully utilize
this tool.
I was also disheartened to see that the issue of security
clearance reciprocity seems to be getting less and less
attention, when we are going into a new Administration. I
expect some of the people that work for this Administration may
work for the other Administration and take on some new security
responsibilities, but reciprocity was not listed as a priority
challenge in the February 2008 report. The word ``reciprocity''
appears only five times in that April 30 reform outline, and
that outline makes no real recommendations on how we are going
to achieve reciprocity. Gordon England has a great story about
how often he had to get security clearances as he moved from
one agency to another agency. Reciprocity is still a problem.
It is a problem, and I think that we need to address that.
The other thing that the February 2008 report highlighted
is a new shortcoming in our current piecemeal approach to
security clearance reform. Completing investigations in a more
timely manner has simply shifted the security backlog from the
investigation to the adjudication phase. At the time of that
report, DOD had more than 76,000 adjudications that were over
45 days old. I am anxious to hear how our witnesses intend to
deal with that problem.
And last, the Security Clearance Oversight Group's February
2008 report shows that our clearance system is not utilizing
readily available technology. As important as technological
growth has been in the last century, it is likely to be even
more important in the coming years. However, making full use of
new capabilities will only be possible in a system that values
the need for investment in new technology over adding band-aids
to antiquated systems, such as PIPS. Technology provides us the
opportunity to expedite the security clearance process while
minimizing time, cost, and effort.
Automation, as described in some of the testimony today,
does not mean the ability to e-mail a PDF file. It means using
a paperless system at each step to process and allow for
continuous reinvestigation based on risk. I think we have to
address all of these issues and find a way to achieve
meaningful and lasting reform of the current security clearance
process. I think failure to do so is going to cost us in many
ways.
Senator Akaka, I think you know that it costs the taxpayers
$684 per day in lost salary and benefits because of the delays
on these cases. Over 208 days' failure to complete a ``secret''
clearance for one person costs more than $140,000, almost three
times the 2006 median U.S. household income of $48,200.
I have a lot more here and I am taking the witnesses' time,
so I am just going to wrap it up and say I had really hoped
that this would be off the high-risk list and it is not. It is
very frustrating that after all this time and all this effort
that we still have major problems issuing timely security
clearance. I am glad to know that so many of you are going to
be around, and as Senator Akaka has indicated, we are going to
continue to monitor this process so that we can have a big
celebration when this goes off the high-risk list. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. You
have been a great champion in human capital and we will
continue to pursue this.
It is my pleasure now to welcome our witnesses here today:
Brenda Farrell, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management
for the Government Accountability Office; welcome back to the
Hon. Clay Johnson, Deputy Director for Management for the
Office of Management and Budget; Elizabeth McGrath, Principal
Deputy Under Secretary for Business Transformation at the
Department of Defense; John Fitzpatrick, Director of the
Special Security Center for the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence; and welcoming back Kathy Dillaman,
Associate Director of Investigations for the Office of
Personnel Management, Federal Investigative Services Division.
It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in our
witnesses. Will you please stand and raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to
this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you, God?
Ms. Farrell. I do.
Mr. Johnson. I do.
Ms. McGrath. I do.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. I do.
Ms. Dillaman. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let the record show that the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Although statements are limited to 5 minutes, I want all of
our witnesses to know that their entire statement will be
included in the record.
Ms. Farrell, will you please proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF BRENDA S. FARRELL,\1\ DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Ms. Farrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator
Voinovich, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to
discuss reforming the Federal Government's personnel security
clearance process. My remarks today are based on GAO's numerous
reports that give us a historical view of key factors that
should be considered in clearance reform. Our reviews have
identified delays and other impediments in DOD's program, which
represents 80 percent of the Federal Government's clearances.
These longstanding delays resulted in our adding DOD's
clearance program to our high-risk list in January 2005, as you
noted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Farrell appears in the Appendix
on page 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the past few years, several positive changes have been
made to the security clearance process because of increased
Congressional oversight, such as a number of clearance-related
hearings that this Subcommittee has held, recommendations from
our body of work, and new legislative and executive
requirements, most notable the passage of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
One important change is the formation of the Interagency
Team, of which members of that team are present on the panel
today. This team was established to develop a reform clearance
process that would be applicable not only to DOD, but across
the Federal Government, including the intelligence community.
As directed by the President, the Joint Reform Team submitted
its proposed design for the reform effort on April 30, 2008.
As the Joint Team moves forward, we encourage them to
consider the four factors highlighted in my statement today.
Two of the four key factors in my written statement essential
to the Joint Reform Team achieving positive outcomes, such as
greater security clearance reciprocity, involve, one,
incorporating quality control steps, and two, establishing
metrics for assessing all aspects of the process.
First, government agencies have paid little attention to
quality, despite GAO's repeated suggestions to place more
emphasis on it. For example, the government has documented
quality with a single metric on only one of the six phases of
the clearance process by using the percentage of investigative
reports returned for insufficiency during the adjudicative
phase. Further, GAO has identified this metric as being
inadequate by itself.
Prior GAO work examined a different aspect of quality, the
completeness of the documentation in investigative and
adjudicative reports. We found that OPM provided incomplete
investigative reports to DOD adjudicators, which the
adjudicators then used to determine top secret eligibility.
Almost all, 47 of 50, of the sampled investigative reports we
reviewed were incomplete based on requirements in the Federal
investigative standards. In addition, DOD adjudicators granted
clearance eligibility without requesting additional information
for any of the incomplete investigative reports and did not
document that they considered some adjudicative guidelines when
adverse information was present in some reports.
Further, our October 2007 report documented the reluctance
of some agencies, particularly DHS and FBI, to accept
clearances used by other agencies. To achieve greater
reciprocity, clearance-granting agencies need to have
confidence in the quality of the clearance process.
The second key factor I wish to discuss is establishing
metrics for assessing all aspects of the clearance process.
Many efforts to monitor the clearance process emphasize
measuring timeliness, but additional metrics could provide a
fuller picture of the process. GAO reports, as well as
Inspector General reports, have highlighted a variety of
metrics that have been used to examine clearance programs, such
as completeness of investigative and adjudicative reports,
investigators' training, staff and customers' perceptions, and
the adequacy of internal controls. Including these and other
types of metrics could add value in monitoring clearance
processes and provide better information to allow greater
Congressional oversight.
In summary, the current Joint Reform Team to develop a new
government-wide security clearance process represents a
positive step to address past impediments and manage security
reform efforts. However, past experience has shown that
Congress has every reason to remain vigilant. Much remains to
be done and GAO stands ready to assist the Congress.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I will
be happy to take questions when the members are ready.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. Farrell. Now we
will hear from Director Johnson.
TESTIMONY OF HON. CLAY JOHNSON III,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
MANAGEMENT, U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, thank you
very much for having me. A couple of comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears in the Appendix
on page 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One, the intelligence bill in December 2004 called for
security clearance reform and the issue to be addressed in this
reform was timeliness, and that has been our focus of this
reform effort, was to improve timeliness. In 2005, it took
approximately 162 days to make a security clearance
determination for all clearances, the fastest 80 percent of all
clearances. Today, it takes 112 days. Our most recent time, it
takes 112 days.
The goal as defined by the intelligence bill was 60 days,
so the intelligence bill called for us to go from 160 to 60
days. We are 50 days toward that 100 days. We are halfway there
on timeliness. I am personally very proud of the work that the
reform effort has done, has accomplished, and what we have
accomplished to reduce timeliness by almost 2 months in 2006-
2007, 2\1/2\ years that we have been working on this.
The reason there is not more, a new-fangled 21st Century
technology reform in place is because of a decision that I made
with the consent of the reform group, which was to initially
focus almost exclusively on the lack of capacity and the lack
of accountability in the process. We would not have achieved
the 50-day improvement in the process that has been achieved to
date if we had focused on developing an altogether new system,
if we had not focused before that on expanding investigative
and adjudicative capacity and adding accountability across the
government for conducting these clearances in a timely fashion.
So we have, as all have said, there is much to be
accomplished still, but I am very proud, and when I leave here,
I am going to be extremely proud for the accomplishments that
have been realized and the increases in timeliness with
continued emphasis on quality in the 3-plus years that we will
have been working on this.
A couple of additional comments. You talk about reciprocity
and Gordon England's concern, and Mike McConnell has a similar
story, and I have a similar story, and so forth. That is a very
different process. That is the White House clearance process
for Senate-confirmed positions. That is more broken than the
system that we are trying to reform, but we are working with
the White House Counsel and the investigative units that they
use to fix that system, as well. But that is a totally
different process than the security clearance suitability
determination process that we are trying to reform.
On terms of reciprocity, our belief is that there is not a
security clearance reciprocity problem. We have checks and
balances on whether reciprocity is granted or not. What does
not exist is suitability determination reciprocity, and that is
one of the reasons why we have decided and have pointed out in
this April 30 report that we can't reform clearance
determinations and not reform suitability determinations. Those
have to be thought of as similar systems with similar levels of
accountability and that we don't collect a piece of information
to make a suitability determination and then collect the same
piece of information according to a different schedule to make
a security clearance determination. We need to collect data one
time and use it for both, and then we need to have a high level
of capacity and a high level of accountability for both of
those, which is why we proposed the governance structure that
we proposed in the April 30 report.
One final comment. The reason that there is not more
specifics in the April 30 report about specifically what change
in the process we are going to implement by what specific date
and what impact it is going to have on the timeliness is the
President's charge to us was you come tell me what you know,
what you can validate, what you can support by April 30, and
then when you know more, you can come and tell me as soon as
you know it. So this April 30 is what we know by that date,
which is here is the process design, here is the kinds of
concepts we want to develop that will be our guiding feature,
the guiding light for all future specific developments, but our
challenge is and what we will deliver is by the end of this
year, there will be the detail that you look for in terms of
the specific implementations that are to be made and by when
according to this process design, who is accountable, and there
will be a governance structure in place to ensure that it
happens as promised.
So I know both of you have talked about, are we going to
have to start all over when the new Administration comes, and
the answer is no. There will be a clear path forward. There
will be a governance structure to make sure that we proceed
down that path with dates and implementation schedules and so
forth.
And so we don't know all those details by April 30. That is
why it is not included in the report. But we will know all of
that and we will divulge all of that in a series of reports
between now and the end of the year. We will have all of that
by the end of the year.
Thank you very much.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Director Johnson.
Now I will call on Ms. McGrath. I understand that you and
Mr. Fitzpatrick are giving a joint statement, but Ms. McGrath,
you may begin.
TESTIMONY OF ELIZABETH McGRATH,\1\ PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. McGrath. Yes, sir. Thank you and good afternoon, Mr.
Chairman and Senator Voinovich. I appreciate the opportunity to
discuss security clearance reform and in particular the initial
report that we provided from the Joint Team.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The joint prepared statement of Ms. McGrath and Mr. Fitzpatrick
appears in the Appendix on page 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the largest industrial organization in the world, the
size, complexity, and mission of the Department of Defense
presents unique challenges not faced by other entities
undergoing transformational change. As in other parts of its
operations, this contributes to the challenges and
opportunities presented to DOD in clearance reform. For the
past few years, the Department has built a strong foundation of
agile business practices and management that supports the
warfighter and provides accountability to the taxpayer.
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England, has devoted
extensive time and energy to this effort and the senior
leadership of the Department has been engaged and accountable
for the performance of its business operations. Under Secretary
England's leadership, we successfully established the Business
Transformation Agency (BTA) in 2005 as the accountable entity
for DOD-wide business and system improvement efforts. The BTA
has brought the best and brightest career civil servants
together with highly qualified experts hired from private
industry to apply best practices to the business of government
which we have applied to this reform effort.
As part of the larger business transformation efforts, the
Deputy Secretary identified clearance reform as one of the
Department's top 25 transformation priorities. Championed by
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Office of
Business Transformation, my office, which also oversees the
implementation, enterprise implementation of continuous process
improvement and Lean Six Sigma was asked to apply this
methodology to the clearance reform challenge.
While recent progress has been made in reducing the
security clearance backlog, it is clear that larger reforms
remain necessary, leveraging modern methods and tools which are
standards based and data driven. For example, the Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office is now meeting the
adjudication timelines established by the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act. Adjudications of those clearances
are now down to 17 days. They have also achieved a 20 percent
overall reduction in adjudication timelines for the first 6
months of this fiscal year. This improvement was achieved,
however, through increased capacity, accountability, and local
process improvements, not the broader transformation effort
that we are discussing in our report.
Opportunities exist for further improvements across the
defense enterprise through the implementation of standard
processes and information technology. The Department is taking
a holistic view of its operations to include processes and the
co-location of the 10 adjudicative facilities at Fort Meade as
part of their Base Realignment and Closure Commission. This
effort is also being led through the Office of Business
Transformation in concert with the joint reform efforts also
applying the Lean Six Sigma methodologies. The goal of our
collective effort is to eliminate arcane and arbitrary
processes and procedures that hinder progress.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. That concludes my statement.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. McGrath. Mr.
Fitzpatrick.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN P. FITZPATRICK,\1\ DIRECTOR, SPECIAL SECURITY
CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Good afternoon, Chairman Akaka, Senator
Voinovich. Thank you for this opportunity. I am pleased to
offer additional information to this Subcommittee regarding
ongoing efforts to meet the goal of making hiring and clearing
decisions more quickly, effectively, and efficiently.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Fitzpatrick and Ms. McGrath
appears in the Appendix on page 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As you are aware, the Joint Security and Suitability Reform
Team is composed of representatives of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
the Office of Personnel Management, all represented before you
today. I make particular note of the defense and intelligence
partnership in this enterprise. Our leaders and organizations
greatly desire the outcome of a reformed process, putting
people to work in support of our missions. Our commitment is
reflected in the joint manner in which we pursue reform, as
well as in our presentation of a joint statement for the record
today.
As this Subcommittee is well aware, the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 established the
first-ever legislated measures of success with regard to the
timeliness of security clearance processing, with goals for
2006 and more ambitious goals for 2009. While progress has been
made across the Executive Branch, and we note the intelligence
community (IC) agencies that conduct their own investigations
and adjudications are compliant with the current IRTPA goals,
the existing process is not in our estimation likely to allow
the U.S. Government to achieve the additional efficiencies
needed to meet the 2009 objectives. Further, improvements in
terms of timeliness, consistency, and quality require adoption
of a standard process across government using end-to-end
automation and modern technologies.
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) recognized the
need for transformational change to meet such future needs and
identified security clearance reform as a top priority in his
100- and 500-day plans. To that end, the DNI along with the
Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence, and the Deputy
Director for Management at OMB commissioned a Joint Security
Clearance Process Reform Team to systematically examine and
improve the way we process and manage security clearances as an
enterprise. Recognizing the need to align suitability and
security clearance processes where appropriate, this effort
combined forces with the Office of Personnel Management to form
the Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team, thereafter
accelerating and expanding efforts to develop transformed,
modernized, fair, and reciprocal security clearance and
suitability processes applicable across the Executive Branch.
On April 30, 2008, the Joint Team submitted its initial
plan to the President, announcing its intent to adopt and
pursue implementation of a transformed process that manages the
hiring and clearing process from an enterprise end-to-end
perspective. This plan proposes a governance structure to drive
implementation and near-term actions to develop and put into
use modern investigative tools, end-to-end information
technology, a risk management philosophy, and efficient,
standardized business practices.
Also of note, modifications to intelligence community
policies are being made to allow for the clearing of more
first- and second-generation American candidates. This effort
includes careful consideration of ways to balance risk while
increasing opportunity for such citizens to be considered by
the clearance process. We have studied existing programs within
the intelligence community that may offer a model for other IC
agencies to build upon. We fully expect the near-term outcome
of this DNI-level policy change to result in more applications
from first- and second-generation Americans and ultimately a
more robust mission capability within the IC.
While we do not underestimate the challenge that a reform
effort of this magnitude represents, we are resolute in our
determination and dedication to achieve the change necessary to
ensure effectively and timely hiring and clearing decisions.
With the continued interest and commitment from the President,
the Congress, and senior executive leadership, we are confident
that this effort will ultimately succeed.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity. This concludes
my remarks.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Fitzpatrick.
And now we will hear from Ms. Dillaman.
TESTIMONY OF KATHY L. DILLAMAN,\1\ ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES DIVISION, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT
Ms. Dillaman. Chairman Akaka, Senator Voinovich, thank you
for inviting me back to talk to you about our progress in
improving the timeliness of security clearance process and
OPM's support of continuing reform efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Dillaman in the Appendix on page
55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As you know and as you said, OPM conducts over 90 percent
of the background investigations required by agencies to
support their security clearance and suitability decisions for
civilian, military, and contractor personnel. The extent of the
investigations conducted is based on the subject's level of
clearance or access and the type of work or position they are
assigned. Investigations are completed for over 100 Federal
agencies and their security offices across the country and
around the world.
With a vast network of field investigators and our current
automated processing system, we have sufficient capacity to
handle the government's high-volume demand for background
investigations. Last fiscal year, we conducted over two million
investigations of varying types, including 850,000 for national
security positions.
Since May 17, 2007, when I last spoke before your
Subcommittee, we have continued to improve the overall
timeliness for the security clearances process. We are not only
meeting the initial goals for 2006, outlined in the
Intelligence Reform Act, we also are exceeding these goals for
investigations and have substantially reduced our pending
inventory.
In November 2005, the Performance Improvement Plan that was
provided to Congress identified critical areas that had to be
addressed. First, agency workload projections had to be
reasonably accurate to ensure that there were sufficient
resources available to meet the investigation and adjudication
staffing needs. We are noting improved accuracy in agencies'
projections, which has helped to ensure that enough resources
are in place to get the job done.
Next, we focused on the timeliness and quality of agencies'
requests for investigations. The increased use of OPM's
electronic questionnaires for investigations processing (e-
QIP), which is a web-based system that allows applicants to
submit their background information electronically, has reduced
handling and transmission time, while improving the quality of
subject-provided information. In the second quarter of Fiscal
Year 2008, 86 percent of all submissions for security clearance
investigations were made online.
The Intelligence Reform Act established a specific goal
that 80 percent of the background investigations for initial
security clearances be completed within an average of 90 days
or less by the end of 2006. We have exceeded that goal. There
is a chart in my written testimony that reports the processing
time for all initial clearance investigations and further
breaks that data down by the level of clearance. As you will
note, we are currently completing 80 percent in an average of
60 days, 84 days at the top secret level, which are much more
extensive, and 56 days at the secret-confidential level.
With a current staff of over 9,300 Federal and contractor
employees, there is no longer a backlog of initial clearance
investigations due to insufficient resources and we have seen a
substantial decrease in the time it takes to complete all types
of background investigations.
In addition to maintaining an adequate staff level, we are
working closely with Federal, State, and local record agencies
so that their records required as part of the investigations
are provided to OPM more rapidly. We also are working with the
State Department and the international community to improve the
process of obtaining required international coverage. In 2007,
we had 360 agents who were stationed abroad complete more than
24,000 international leads.
While improving the timeliness of investigations, we have
worked equally hard to retain the quality of these
investigations. The quality control processes we have in place
ensure that the investigations we conduct meet the national
standards and the needs of the adjudicating communities. I
should note that many of the metrics that Ms. Farrell described
we are now incorporating into our quality measurement process.
Once the investigation is completed, we also are tracking
the time agencies take to adjudicate and record their
adjudication actions in our record system. To speed up and
streamline that process, we developed the capacity to transmit
completed investigations to adjudication facilities
electronically rather than hard copy through the mail, and this
does allow for adjudication online, on-screen.
In October 2007, we piloted this capability with the
Department of Army. To date, over 190,000 investigations have
been sent electronically to Army for adjudication, making the
process between OPM and Army virtually paperless. Based on the
success of this pilot, the Department of Transportation and the
Federal Aviation Administration have converted to receiving
completed investigations online and we are in the final stages
of implementation with the Department of Energy and Department
of Commerce. This capability will be made available to all
agencies this fiscal year.
The initiatives I have outlined have substantially improved
the timeliness of the clearance process. However, we have taken
it just about as far as we can take it. In order to achieve the
aggressive goals outlined in the Intelligence Reform Act for
2009, additional reform is necessary. As a partner with OMB,
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the
Department of Defense, we are optimistic that the additional
reform opportunities that have been identified for the overall
security clearance process will allow us to meet these goals.
This concludes my remarks and I would be happy to answer
any questions you have.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. Dillaman.
Ms. Farrell, this Subcommittee took on the security
clearance issue in large part because of faults found with it
by GAO. You and your predecessors have testified about ongoing
problems with the process and outcomes since 2005. Could you
tell me what milestones generally would need to be met in order
for GAO to move the security clearance process off the high-
risk list?
Ms. Farrell. We would like to see that happen. There are a
number of criteria that we use to determine whether or not we
move a program off of the high-risk list. One is we look at
leadership. Often these issues need sustained top management
attention and we have seen that leadership since 2005 from OMB
and OPM in focusing top-level attention on this very important
issue.
Other criteria that we look at include an action plan that
is results oriented, that clearly identifies the roots of the
problem, what the goals are in order to correct it, and how you
are going to get there, in other words, a road map of how to
fix the problem.
Another criteria we look for is resources in terms of often
additional resources. It may be people. Ms. Dillaman talked
about the advances that have been made at OPM in terms of
building up the human capacity to handle the backlog. We look
for not only the human resources, but funding that may be
necessary, such as in the case of using the advanced
technology, what is it going to cost, visibility and
transparency over that, as well.
We currently have work underway--it has been underway for
about 6 weeks or so--looking at timeliness and quality and what
progress has been made in these areas. We will be positioned
later this year to make a determination whether or not the
Personnel Security Clearance Program remains on our January
2009 High-Risk List.
Senator Akaka. Yes. Do you think that if the Joint Team's
recommendations move forward that you may be able to get the
issue off the high-risk list in the near future?
Ms. Farrell. We look forward to looking at the plan and the
accompanying documents that Mr. Johnson mentioned in order to
make that determination. Again, we are pleased with the
leadership that has been shown and focused on this area and we
are pleased to see the concept paper that came out in April.
But we are in the process of looking at this paper and seeing
what are the details behind it to actually make these actions
happen, to show that there really is clear progress being made.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Ms. Farrell.
Director Johnson, one of the cornerpieces of the new reform
proposal, and you have told us the forthcoming Executive Order,
will be the creation of the Performance Accountability Council.
Can you tell me more about its make-up, such as who will be on
it, who will oversee the security side, and what, if any, input
there will be from non-government stakeholders?
Mr. Johnson. You have asked several questions. One, as you
know, there are two so-called Executive Agents designated, a
Suitability Executive Agent and a Security Executive Agent. OPM
now is the suitability entity and so OPM will remain the keeper
of all things related to suitability. The term ``Executive
Agent'' is a new term, but their responsibilities remain
largely the same in terms of the keeper of the policy and being
one who is officially responsible for suitability performance.
There is no Security Executive Agent today. The National
Security Council, if there is one, is the closest to being
that. There are some policy clearance processes with the
National Security Council. Some recommendations have been made
about who that Security Executive Agent should be. That
decision will be included in the Executive Order that will be
produced by the end of June and it would be premature to talk
about what has been recommended and what is under discussion,
but that will be finalized by the time that Executive Order
comes out by the end of June.
The industry is one of our most important customers on this
process because it costs them money, which means it costs us
money, and they are generally--when security clearances are
involved, they are working on really important things for our
national security, homeland security, and nobody benefits from
them taking a long time to get their people on the job. And so
we have mechanisms in place to stay in touch with them, to
compare what they perceive the situation to be to what the
reality is, and they perceive the situation to be not what our
numbers indicate, which means that there is a gap between what
they perceive to be the timeliness and what our numbers suggest
the timeliness.
But we reach out to them a lot, particularly DOD, because
that is where the industry people are. There are meetings with
all their associations. I met with a group of industry folks
the first week in May after the April 30 report came out. We
are constantly getting information from them, looking for ways
to even better communicate what the average timeliness is and
the range of timeliness is to get the clearances for the people
that they are trying to put on jobs that we are hiring them to
do.
In terms of who else is on the council, that hasn't been
determined yet. Right now, I suspect it will be very similar
to--from the security clearance standpoint, to the people that
are on our oversight group right now, which is the large
customers, DOD, Commerce, State, Transportation, Energy,
Department of Homeland Security. It will be the primary people
that are involved in the process, OPM, FBI. There will also
have to be the large suitability customers, so-called. They are
people that make a lot of hiring decisions that don't have much
need for a security clearance determination, but now that
suitability is being folded into this overall process, we have
to look at the suitability process just like we are looking at
the clearance process.
But all that determination will be made in the latter part
of June and the early part of July and our first meeting is
already scheduled. Our first meeting, I think, is July 22,
which would be the first meeting of this Performance
Accountability Council. And the name is important because it is
defining what the performance level should be and then holding
everybody accountable for doing it, being develop and implement
the new processes, new ways of making these determinations, but
then also using those processes to perform as they are designed
to be adhered to.
Senator Akaka. The Joint Team's report also says that the
new Security Executive Agent created in that council will
consolidate clearance responsibilities that are now spread out
among the members of the security community. Can you elaborate
on exactly what responsibilities you hope will be consolidated
and from who?
Mr. Johnson. No, I can't, and I don't know the answer to
that question. I don't know what is disseminated throughout the
community. So Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you will
note in the report in the area where it describes the functions
of the council, there are policy, process, information
technology, and training considerations that apply to these
processes. In the realm of the current national security
clearance policy development and oversight process, that
happens in different communities and it is rolled up to some
extent with the Security Clearance Oversight Group and the
performance measures that are in that report but are not to
date driven to operational impact in the areas of training and
technology and touching the process as it is executed in the
agencies. So I expect that in the area of the Security
Executive Agent, the council will look to that entity for
input, performance measures, an organizational approach to
achieving the training needs of that process, the information
technology needs, to ensure that they are driving towards
implementation.
In the present day, policy development happens in a series
of disconnected working groups that eventually drive a single
recommendation up to the Policy Coordinating Committee. That
could be better leveraged in the Executive Branch and singly
coordinated with the Suitability Executive Agent. One of the
keys here is to identify a single point of contact for the
security side so that when things need to be brought into
alignment with suitability operational needs, that there is a
person accountable for leading that charge.
Senator Akaka. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you. I, first of all, want to
thank all of you for the good work that you have done. I know
we are up here complaining about the fact that things aren't
exactly the way we would like them to be, but I know all of you
have conscientiously undertaken the responsibilities that you
have had and I want you to know that I appreciate it.
Mr. Johnson, I want to say to you, thank you very much for
all of your hard work staying on top of this. I don't know
whether you are going to stick around until the end--I hope you
do--and I know that between now and then you are going to put
the frosting on as much of the cake as you can so you can look
back and say, we got something done. So thank you very much.
I need some clarification here, and that is this. I think
we hired somebody from the CIA about 3 years ago after we had
the gigantic foul-up over money. We ran out of money and we had
to find the money to do the adjudication or whatever it was. I
was kind of optimistic about it, that we were going to really
take off with that hire. I am not sure whether that person was
looking at the big picture or if she was just looking at the
DNI aspect of security clearance reform, but it is my
understanding that McConnell had said that in his first 100
days and his first 500 days that modernizing the security
clearance process was a core initiative and that DNI had come
in, they looked at it and said, you know what, this system that
we have is from the dark ages and we have to get together and
change the system, and that system is different than the system
that we are talking about here where the investigations go to
OPM and then you send it back for adjudication.
Is that all--Mr. Fitzpatrick, why don't you share that with
me.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, sir. You could see me getting
ready to speak. I think it is important to note that Mr.
McConnell, along with Mr. Johnson, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, Jim Clapper, and the Director of OPM,
Linda Springer, are the four champions of this effort that is
represented by the April 30 report, and so while your
description of Mr. McConnell's initiative in his first 100 days
is entirely accurate, that interest and initiative to do
something about the security clearance process led him about 1
year ago into Mr. Johnson's office with General Clapper and
launched the security clearance reform effort that I made
reference to in my statement that quickly then joined up with
suitability and said, if we are going to tackle this, we are
going to tackle it at the Federal enterprise level and with
security and suitability together. So what you may have
discussed with Mr. McConnell in the past is this self-same
effort to affect the Federal enterprise process.
It is also important to know from the intelligence
community perspective that the standards that drive
investigations and secret and top secret clearances in all of
the Federal space are the same standards used in the
intelligence community for secret and top secret clearances----
Senator Voinovich. OK, but do they do the investigations
for everybody, including the DNI?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Within the intelligence community, there
are six agencies that handle their own investigations and
adjudications. Statistically, it is about 5 percent of the
total that Ms. Dillaman discussed in her workload, and so some
portion of the intelligence community is serviced by the OPM
model, a good portion, and the Department of Defense being the
largest customer in both the Federal stake and in the
intelligence community.
Senator Voinovich. But the part of it, that 5 percent or
whatever, that is the thing that they were going to try and--it
looks like they are trying to put a new personnel system into
DNI. In fact, one of my former staffers, Andy Rickardson, is
over there working on that. But that is internal within the
intelligence community. They have their own investigation and
own adjudication procedure.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. They operate their own, but to the same
Federal standards that we are affecting by this reform.
Senator Voinovich. OK. So the point is they are doing it on
their own, but you are trying to assimilate the standards that
they have set within this big picture that came out in this
report, is that right?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. OK. And----
Mr. Johnson. Senator, can I take a shot at this?
Senator Voinovich. Sure. Go ahead.
Mr. Johnson. The intelligence agencies not part of DOD do
their own investigations and adjudications and they do it
within the standards that were called for--timeliness standards
that were called for by the intelligence reform bill. The
intelligence agencies that are part of DOD, their
investigations are done by OPM and then they do their own
adjudications.
When General McConnell came in, it was a very rare
opportunity because the head of the DNI and the Under Secretary
for Security and Intelligence at DOD, Jim Clapper, and the
Secretary of Defense all grew up together in this in the
government and they all shared a huge dissatisfaction with the
security clearance process.
Senator Voinovich. Now you are getting at it.
Mr. Johnson. OK. There was this coming together, a
crescendo----
Senator Voinovich. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. So they came together and they said, we need
to fix this system. Tell us what you are already working on.
And so we gathered and we say, here is the concept. Here is the
process. And they said, well, when are you going to have this
done and that done and they said, July, and they said that is
not fast enough. It needs to be April. And then what are you
thinking about this and doing--well, that is not--so what they
have done is taken on the concept.
It is not what they have aspired to do and put in their top
five goals or 10 goals or whatever it is. It is not a different
process than the one that was laid out in concept in the April
30 report. They have come in and, because of their influence,
caused us to emphasize this, speed this up, do this faster, do
this coincident with this, and so forth, and they have helped
us bring government-wide attention to this, particularly within
DOD, which is 80 percent of overall.
So that short-term, for instance, one of the big problems
we laid out and challenges for this year was that industry
adjudications be conducted as quickly as employee
adjudications. It was taking 20 or 25 days longer because there
were a lot of extra steps or they had to go over here or
something and nobody could figure out why. Well, I think it is
true that as of April, the industry adjudications are being
performed as quickly as employee adjudications. That would
never have happened if the priority hadn't been placed on it by
the Secretary and the Under Secretary.
So what they have done is add impetus to it. They were the
one that argued strongly for let us get the President to
endorse this formally with his letter of February 5. So there
was a lot of attention being paid, but when the President
issues a letter and those three people say it is going to be
done, mountains start moving. And so they have been
tremendously helpful to us to provide even a greater force and
speed and timeliness, attention to this, which gives us even
greater assurance that when I am talking about where we will be
at the end of this year, in fact, we will be there.
You asked what the CIA--I think that was DOD. I think they
were talking about when they--there were adjudications--DOD a
couple of years ago stopped accepting applications for security
clearances from industry because they ran out of money. It was
like in June, I think. Nobody could understand why and there
was a hearing and it was not their most comfortable----
Senator Voinovich. So they got somebody over there to go
over and----
Mr. Johnson. So then they went and got the money and they
got it started again and then they got smarter about what they
needed to budget and so forth.
Senator Voinovich. The fact of the matter is that the
statistics are that right now, in terms of the adjudication,
they are still kind of--there is a logjam there.
Mr. Johnson. Well, as you talked about earlier, a lot of
the jam that was in the investigative world, they got through
that. It moved through there. So it is working its way through
the snake. There are--you said seventy-some-odd-thousand,
whatever the backlog was, their goal is to get it down to--and
then we talk about it in the February report what their goal
is, and they are on track to achieve that. But for a good bit
of this fiscal year, they were going to be working down that
backlog. And then we will be, starting in fiscal year 2009, we
anticipate virtually no backlogs anywhere in this process.
Senator Voinovich. OK. I just want to stay with this. They
came together and said the system has to be changed. My
assumption is that within the intelligence agencies that do
their own investigations and adjudications, there was some
frustration about the way that the system worked and the
process of doing their work within that framework. That whole
business, I would suspect, is in better shape because it is a
smaller number of people than the overall problem that you are
talking about here today.
Mr. Johnson. I will make a general comment, and then Ms.
McGrath and Mr. Fitzpatrick--who work firsthand with that--but
there were not timeliness problems with the intelligence
community the way we looked at it. What we were trying to
address was the other 95 percent of the system, because the
feeling, the feedback that was coming from the data we were
getting from the intelligence community was, by and large, the
timeliness of those clearance determinations was satisfactory.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. That is also entirely true, and the IRTPA
laid out the need to measure performance. The intelligence
community did not measure its performance before the rest of
government did and joined right along with Mr. Johnson's
oversight group when we did, and we discovered at that time
what we thought to be true, which seems like the intelligence
community agencies get this done faster, turned out to be
measurably true, in part because they own both the
investigative and adjudicative stages and are able to integrate
those better, and that is----
Senator Voinovich. Right, and the point is that in terms of
industrial people that need clearance within that, probably
there aren't that many of those people who are going to work
for the Department of Defense or do a special contract or
whatever it is. There probably aren't that many private sector
people that you are going to have to clear to do stuff within
the DNI and all the agencies.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. I am not sure what your perception of not
that many is, because it includes the National Security Agency,
the National Reconnaissance Officers, and the CIA, there are
significant industry partnerships there----
Senator Voinovich. OK, but those people that they are
hiring are not in the system you are talking about here. Those
are within the internal system of those other agencies.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. But they get cleared to the same
investigative standard and adjudicative standard as----
Senator Voinovich. Does Ms. Dillman do the work on the
investigation?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. For some.
Senator Voinovich. Yes.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. For some agencies. The CIA, for example,
handles its workload entirely. NSA, a portion of the NSA
industrial program goes to OPM. The priority cases, they keep
at home. So it is a little different. These are small in scale.
We sometimes refer to them as boutique operations----
Senator Voinovich. I am going to finish, Senator Akaka,
because I have taken too much time already, but the complaints
that I continue to get from the industry people are not people
that are within the DNI group. They are working for the
Department of Defense or somebody else and say, we got the
contract and we can't get the clearance. We are going to put
them on the payroll and they can't do intelligence work. If we
don't do that, they are going to do something else. They are
still not happy with the process because I continue to get
complaints about it. But they are the ones that are involved in
this big system that we are talking about right now.
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Ms. Dillaman.
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir.
Senator Akaka. As you know, following our hearing last
year, and from what I said here this afternoon, I believe that
the systems in use by OPM are outdated and antiquated. I do not
think that many outside experts believe that OPM is truly
leveraging more modern systems. What is OPM doing to modernize
or replace or improve its aging systems?
Ms. Dillaman. Up until the point where we joined with this
reform effort, there certainly were plans and continue to be
plans to keep our systems up to date and viable. Now partnering
with this reform effort, of course, we are going to keep any
modernization consistent with the National Enterprise Plan for
an end-to-end system.
The core system that you described as an antique Cadillac,
and I am thrilled that you at least described it as a Cadillac
and not a Pinto, but that system alone is an in-house internal
management system that much more modern systems are, in fact,
bolted to. Our electronic questionnaire is a relatively newer
system designed by industry. Our fingerprint transmission
system is actually quite a state-of-the-art system designed by
industry to support automated fingerprint processing. Our
current imaging system, which allows for transmission of data
and images and conversion of paper that we are forced to
receive from information suppliers, is a brand new system
deployed last year.
We are in various stages of antique to modern
configuration. But from this point forward, all investments--
and there are planned investments--will be made in conjunction
with where the national reform effort is taking us all.
Senator Akaka. Let me ask Ms. McGrath and Mr. Fitzpatrick,
has DOD or DNI commented or consulted with OPM on any of these
proposed improvements? Ms. McGrath.
Ms. McGrath. Every week, Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) is part of the overall joint reform effort and we meet on
a weekly basis and have detailed project plans where we go over
every, if you will, step of the end-to-end process, information
technology being one of them. If you will note in the report,
we are proposing in the near term--as a near-term opportunity
some of the next-generation application capability in addition
to automated records checks capability. Some of that technology
currently exists within the Office of Personnel Management and
we are looking to leverage those systems, if you will, and the
platforms that are currently in use to see if they can be
adopted to fit into the overall strategy. We still are not--we
have not finalized the IT strategy. We will not be in position
to do that until definitely the end of the fiscal year, but it
might be closer to the fall.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. I would only add that that is a very
complete answer.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Dillaman.
Ms. Dillaman. And if I may, sir, not only have I been
involved personally with the reform effort with Mr. Johnson and
the team from the very beginning, I have assigned a career
senior executive to work with the reform team virtually full
time on this effort. So, OPM has a very dedicated staff that
has been partnered with this from the beginning.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Dillaman, to follow up on an IT-related
issue, I wanted to mention an article that was in this
morning's Washington Post about the Investigative Services
Division.
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir.
Senator Akaka. The article focused on a billing error----
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir.
Senator Akaka [continuing]. Attributed to your case
processing and your billing systems. What role did your
investigation processing system, PIPS, play in this error, and
are we likely to see such problems with these linked-together
systems in the future?
Ms. Dillaman. I believe any automated system is capable of
having logic errors in programs that are isolated and hard to
detect. The billing error in question--the automated processing
system, PIPS, tracked it accurately. What failed to happen was
an electronic signaling. It was an odd error because it
affected certain adjustments. There were no errors in case
billing. All cases were billed accurately. But there were
adjustments that had to be made and they were not predictable
adjustments. They were ad hoc-type adjustments that an
automated signal did not relay properly into OPM's billing
system. Because it was infrequent and it happened sporadically,
it was not detected quickly. It was a manual audit that
identified it.
Can it ever happen in an automated program? Of course, it
can. The resolution of it is to have good, solid auditing
programs to identify it and fix it quickly.
Senator Akaka. Ms. McGrath, last week, the Army announced
that they would pilot a more automated investigation system
using elements found in the Joint Team's recommendations, such
as automated records check. The system is known as the
Automated Continuing Evaluation System (ACES). If the pilot is
successful, would this mean that a significant part of OPM's
investigation work could be bypassed by using this system?
Ms. McGrath. The Army pilot is actually being driven by the
Joint Team effort, so we are using the Army's case management
system, which is called Central Adjudication Tracking System
(CATS)--don't ask me for all of the DOD acronyms. But in
addition to the Army case management system, because they can
receive files electronically from OPM today, we use their
receipt of electronic files from OPM into their adjudication
system tied to the ACES capability, which I referred to as the
automated records checks. ACES is the capability that DOD has
today in a very--we use it in a very limited capacity, much
more for research than full-blown implementation. We are trying
to demonstrate what we would have from an end-to-end
perspective because there is no end-to-end solution that exists
today.
So we expect to obtain--the Joint Team expects to obtain--
to identify performance gaps, capability gaps, so that at the
end of the calendar year we would be able to put together a
comprehensive IT strategy that would be applicable broader than
the Department of the Army. As you well know, they have most of
the casework within the Department of Defense, but it is not
tied to the elimination of the investigative piece. It is the
automated receipt of the investigative material to then much
more quickly screen and make adjudicative decisions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let me ask Ms. Dillaman for any
comment on this question.
Ms. Dillaman. I think the implementation of electronic
searches in any capacity certainly could have the benefit of
reducing the amount of labor necessary to apply to background
investigations. We have seen this for the past couple of years
as we have converted other types of record checks from a labor-
intensive, feet on the street, sending an agent, knocking on a
door to get a record, to an electronic records system. We have
converted over one million law checks annually from agents
going and visiting police departments to having individuals who
have online keyboard access to State records systems and saving
a tremendous amount of investigative resources.
The types of searches envisioned in ACES or in the
automated record check system means that we will have more
electronic information available early in the process. It is
possible that some of the investigations may be able to be
cleared with electronic information up front rather than having
labor-intensive field work associated with it. But it also is
entirely possible that we will identify issues in these
electronic checks that will require an agent to go out and do
further probing and resolution.
The impact has yet to be determined. At the end of the day,
we do end up, though, with a better investigation and much
earlier in the process a clear identification of whether or not
the individual will be a risk or not.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. To get back to just the process, I am
the Defense Department. I decide that this individual that I
have hired and qualified for the job has to get a security
clearance. I suspect the Defense Department may have that
application up on a computer screen. When they make the request
to you, do they do it by computer or do they fax something to
you and then you get the piece of paper and you start to
investigate it?
Ms. Dillaman. No. It comes to us electronically, sir,
today.
Senator Voinovich. OK. You get it electronically.
Ms. Dillaman. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. OK. Now you do the research
investigation.
Ms. Dillaman. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. Is the information that you do on the
investigation inputted on that screen?
Ms. Dillaman. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. OK. And then you have done your job and
then electronically you get the information back to the
Department of Defense, is that right?
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. OK. At that stage of the game, they have
all this information in front of them, and one of the things
that Ms. Farrell said was that in many of those cases, the
information is not complete and rather than go back to you to
get the information, they just go ahead and take what they have
got and make a decision and adjudicate it based on that. Ms.
Farrell, maybe you could comment on that at this stage of the
game.
OPM is talking about some new things that you are doing
electronically, but if it was all electronic, it seems to me
that if there is something wrong with it, all you have got to
do is look at the form and say, you know what? I don't have
this information, so I will send it back to OPM, saying ``this
is not complete. Give us more information so I can do a better
job of adjudicating.'' It is all seamless, all up there.
Ms. Dillaman. If I could first address this, sir, I think
the quality of the investigation is absolutely of primary
concern to everyone. No sense doing it fast if you are not
doing it right. Ms. Farrell's study citing the investigations
they looked at were from the process during the heart of the
transition when merging DSS and OPM. When we had recognized
that there were serious problems in how OPM versus the
Department of Defense had interpreted the investigative
standards, reporting style, etc., we were quite anxious for GAO
to come in and take another look.
I think there also is a dissatisfaction in some areas of
the community. Not with the quality of the investigation, but
the investigative standards themselves. There are different
levels of investigations for different positions. Certainly
what you do at the secret level does not come anywhere near
close to what you do at the top secret level, nor should it,
because the impact is not the same.
And so, measuring the quality of the investigations,
agencies do have an option to reject an investigation that they
receive that they believe is deficient. That is, in fact, one
measure of the quality of our work. We go out annually and ask
for quality feedback from all the major clearance-granting
agencies, suitability and security. Last year, we surveyed 622
offices. Those were agency offices that had submitted at least,
I believe, 200 or 500 investigations for the year. We had about
a 50 percent response rate on the survey with a 91 percent
satisfaction rate in quality and content of the investigation.
And so I do not believe that the quality of the
investigations compared to the standards that they are
conducted is a problem today. Can we have an agent fail to do
what he or she should? Yes, we can. But I believe we have built
a very strong structure with tiered review systems and allowed
agencies immediate feedback opportunities to correct any
deficiencies that are found.
Senator Voinovich. Ms. Farrell, you have had a chance to
sit here and listen to all this. Would you share with us what
is going on in your head in terms of some of the things that
have been said here today?
Ms. Farrell. I am pleased to hear Ms. Dillaman acknowledge
that there are plans to build in quality metrics other than the
single metric that has been referred to in the past, which we
have said that is inadequate. Regarding the number of
investigative reports that are returned by the adjudicators, as
a metric, one reason why we have said it is inadequate is
because the adjudicators have told us they are reluctant to
return those reports because that will just add to the time.
Thus, in some cases, they will go ahead and determine the
eligibility without it.
We believe that not only do they need to establish metrics
for that phase of the investigation, which Ms. Dillaman
oversees, but also for the other phases. There are six phases,
as I said, from the requirement-setting phase to the
application-submitting phase to the investigation to the
adjudication to the appeals and then the renewal of the
clearances. There is very little attention that has been
focused on any of these phases. Just one phase, again, had one
metric that we had some indication of what was going on.
What you were referring to about the adjudicators, with the
timeliness issue, we are looking at this right now as we are
with the quality, and as I said, we are pleased to hear that
there are quality metrics being considered and we are going to
be looking at those very carefully to see what they are, and if
they do give a fuller picture of the timeliness, as well. In
the past, we have had concerns about how the data is presented
in terms of the timeliness. It may look like the numbers are
going in the right direction, but perhaps they aren't.
We have had concerns in the past, for example, regarding
the time that is spent sending back a report to the
investigators being counted against the adjudicators instead of
the investigators. Another concern is the time that is needed
to do additional investigative work when it is sent back by the
adjudicators, it often takes less time to redo the
investigation to satisfy the requirement, but that second time
around with the investigation is what is counted instead of the
first time. Maybe these issues have been resolved, hopefully
so, but we are going to be looking very carefully at the
timeliness to see what is behind those numbers.
Senator Voinovich. Let us go to reciprocity. And one thing
I want to make sure I clear up for the record, Mr. Johnson, you
indicated that your metric was timeliness and I don't want
anyone to think that you aren't interested in quality, too. I
think that----
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Timeliness plus you want to
make sure it is done right. Why haven't we made the progress in
terms of reciprocity that we all would like to have? What is
holding it up? Why aren't we doing more there?
Mr. Johnson. Again, our belief is that we do not have a
security clearance reciprocity problem and that problems that
did exist have been largely eliminated. Why do we know that?
Why do we think that? If somebody requests an investigation for
a security clearance in the 90 percent done by OPM, if they
already have a clearance at that level, she doesn't initiate an
investigation. So----
Senator Voinovich. OK. What you are saying is that the
system that was in place where you had to get another
investigation, or the system that was in place where Mr.
England had one clearance and then he was told, we are moving
you from here to there and----
Mr. Johnson. That is the White House. That is a another
whole world.
Senator Voinovich. OK. So the point is that it would seem
to me that within that framework, are the folks at DNI
interested in having that----
Mr. Johnson. For PAS-es? For Senate-confirmed people?
Senator Voinovich. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. We are separately from this reform effort,
separately, I am working with Ms. Dillman and working with
Presidential personnel presently and with Fred Fielding to fix
that process. But that is separate from this effort and that--
--
Senator Voinovich. OK. So that is the White House process--
--
Mr. Johnson. That is the White House.
Senator Voinovich. I am worried about the fact that we are
going to have a new Administration----
Mr. Johnson. Right. Oh, yes.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. And I suspect there are
some really good people out there that may not be of the same
party, but they are qualified people. You want to bring them on
board and you want to get them through, get them approved, but
you have to get a security clearance on them, and you are
saying that you think that----
Mr. Johnson. That process needs to be fixed, and there are
a number of things we are looking at and if we want to change
that process, we have to do that with the Senate because they
give their consent and they review people, their backgrounds,
prior to a confirmation hearing and they are used to getting
certain kinds of information at certain parts of the process.
And if we want to make that process faster and maybe give them
this information instead of that information, we have to do
that with the Senate.
Senator Voinovich. The Senate is not--the law doesn't
require the White House to come up with a separate
investigation on somebody. You look at the thing and they have
had a security clearance and--are you telling me that we are
the ones responsible----
Mr. Johnson. No, never. I would not suggest that, sir.
Senator Voinovich. Well, sometimes we are. [Laughter.]
Mr. Johnson. Well, I have heard rumors, but I personally
haven't experienced that, sir. We have to both agree, the White
House and the Senate have to agree on what constitutes a
background check for a PAS. So if any changes are going to be
made, we are going to do it with each other, not to each other,
and I am confident that nobody likes that process, either. It
takes too long to get a new team on the field, and so there
will be a lot of interest, I would suspect, in the Senate.
Senator Voinovich. Is there any work being done on it right
now?
Mr. Johnson. Not in the Senate. What we want to do is we
want to get what we think is a smart way forward and then sit
down with Senate leadership, and I would hope that you and
Senator Akaka would help us bring attention to that and get the
right people to sit down and look at this.
Senator Voinovich. Well, the sooner you get it to us, I
will get a hold of Senator McConnell and talk to Majority
Leader Reid and----
Mr. Johnson. Right.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. See if we can facilitate
that.
Mr. Johnson. Great.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Senator.
Senator Voinovich. Yes?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Could I add on the topic of reciprocity,
you made reference earlier to perhaps it is a scarce mention in
the report and I wanted to highlight a couple of aspects of the
transformed process that will serve reciprocity. Mr. Johnson is
right in that the security clearance reciprocity issue has been
addressed by standards and policy issued out of OMB subsequent
to the IRTPA. It is, however, a key component of the automation
proposed in this report that will serve the information needed
to enable reciprocal decisions. Often, agencies don't have the
ability to reach to where the answer is to see that an
individual is already cleared and so they revert to their local
habits and put someone into the process.
Senator Voinovich. In other words, if it is automated, you
get the full picture of the individual. They can look at it,
see what kind of clearance they have, and say, ah, that is
fine. But if you don't have that, then they might say, gee, we
better have him checked out or her checked out.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Yes. The transparency of that data, the
accessibility of that data. Also, the alignment of security and
suitability in this vision are critical, because sometimes an
individual is first investigated for one of those purposes and
later put into process for the other. Mobility across
government, you can go from contractor to government or back
and forth, and our goal is to allow the investigative package,
if you will, that was used in one decision to serve the other
one to reduce or eliminate the need to do re-work, and that, I
think, would also fit into the goal of reciprocity.
Senator Voinovich. Senator, when we were talking about the
REAL ID Act recently when we had the hearings on that, one of
the things that we were concerned about is the quality of the
databases. And the better they are and the more confidence you
have in them, it seems to me that, if you just accessed those
databases, that should give you a pretty good idea. In fact, I
think Admiral McConnell talked about that, that a lot of this
could be done that way. That is the way a lot of businesses
look at clearances. How is that coming along?
Mr. Johnson. Let me make a comment on that. Admiral
McConnell talks about Wall Street firms, in particular, it
takes 5 days, and it takes us multiples of 5 days to get this
done. If you lay out what Wall Street looks at versus what the
Federal Government looks at, it is multiple times longer and
there are things we would all agree are important for us to
look at for suitability determinations and security clearances
that are not concerns of Wall Street.
What Wall Street does, they conduct something that is
probably not even equivalent to a secret clearance here. They
do it very quickly and relatively automated plus--are there lie
detectors? Anyway, but it is all automated, but it is not the
same thing. It is not the same information.
But it does point out very clearly what we have all talked
about here is a lot of very relevant data can be gathered
electronically. We are doing a good bit of that now. We can do
a good bit more of that and save manpower and so forth, and
check that data and review it and adjudicate it and make some
assessment of it electronically, and we do some of that now. We
can do a lot more of it going forward.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich raised a concern that I have, as well.
Mr. Fitzpatrick, as you know, some of the computer systems that
the intelligence community uses to track investigations and
store clearance information makes our oversight more difficult
due to the classified information scattered throughout the
process. I think this is a concern.
One concern I have is that any combining of intelligence
systems with Defense and civilian systems could make it harder
for us to conduct oversight of the process. Do you believe that
it will be necessary to keep the intelligence IT system
separate from the rest of the systems in order for this
Subcommittee and GAO to continue their oversight?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Very familiar with the concerns regarding
the--what is known as the Scattered Castles database. That is
the intelligence community repository for clearance and
eligibility decisions, which exists on a classified network. We
have an initiative underway now--let me back up and say there
are three primary such repositories that are relevant to the
security clearance reform effort. They are the CVS database
operated by OPM, a Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS)
database that is operated by the Department of Defense, and
Scattered Castles.
OPM and DOD's databases are available at an unclassified
level. The intelligence community's Scattered Castles database
is on a secure network. There are several--this impairs access
to the information and impairs reciprocity that we just
discussed, so there are several initiatives underway to improve
the accessibility of this data.
Today, JPAS data is combined in Scattered Castles so that
users of Scattered Castles have access to a wider amount of
data to make the reciprocal decisions. So that puts more
information where the classified users can get to it, but it
does not address the opposite issue.
So what initiative we have ongoing now in the Special
Security Center where I am the Director is an effort to
identify the unclassified records in the intelligence
community's database for secure transmission down to the
unclassified level, to make them more broadly available to
where the greater number of users are searching for them and
can leverage them.
That raises some concerns in the intelligence community.
Aggregating data, even though it is unclassified, can lead to
conclusions that we don't want to put out there. But the intent
is to study and overcome those problems. There are technologies
that can permit databases to exchange information in more
secure ways, even at the unclassified level, and we are
pursuing those.
So I share your concern with that, but I hope to assure you
that there is attention on that and that this reform effort
lays out a standard that the intelligence community is intended
to meet to the best of its ability while still protecting those
sources and methods.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Fitzpatrick, just to follow up on that,
how could you open up more of the intelligence community
clearance process for additional oversight through changes in
your IT system?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. To ensure that I understand the question,
the emphasis is on access to the classified systems as a means
of oversight?
Senator Akaka. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. Senator, can I make a comment, I think in
answer to that question?
Senator Akaka. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. The whole security clearance community needs
to be held accountable, and for performance and quality. We,
being the community, which means Congress, can get the
information it needs from the intelligence community to track
timeliness, quality. We don't have that now to the GAO's
satisfaction or to your satisfaction. But when we want
timeliness information from the intelligence community, we get
it.
What we can't get, and I don't think should get, is what is
the status about a specific individual who is working on
something that nobody knows about or--I think we would all
agree, we don't want access to that information. That is why
getting into that database should be highly restricted. But
performance and quality information can be pulled from that
system and pulled from the managers of that system to provide
you and the community and the Executive Branch the information
it needs to hold the intelligence community accountable for how
it is granting these clearances, making these determinations,
just like it can be with DOD, the Interior, and Agriculture.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Farrell, would you make any comment on
that question?
Ms. Farrell. We are going to find out what our access is to
the intelligence community's security clearance program. We
have two requests that have been accepted from the House
Permanent Committee on Intelligence, one is to look at the
timeliness and quality of the security clearance process within
the Intelligence Committee. That is those 16 agencies. That
work parallels what we have already begun looking at timeliness
and quality with DOD.
The second request is to look at the joint reform efforts.
As you know, it is more than just a plan. There have been a
series of task force and other efforts underway for some time,
and our focus will be again looking at what is going on in the
intelligence community as well as with DOD.
Our people have clearances. There should not be any access
problem. We will test that. How reciprocal is it? But we will
be getting that work underway shortly and then we will see what
our access issues are, if any.
Mr. Johnson. The difference between what I just said and
what she said about GAO is I assume that if the intelligence
community tells me this is their timeliness and their quality
and their whatever, I don't believe I have to collect the data
myself to verify that it is true and GAO, I think, feels
differently. They have to go in and collect the data themselves
as opposed to receive summaries from the intelligence
community, so that is the difference.
Senator Akaka. Director Johnson, two of the major aspects
of the Joint Team's reform proposal is the use of more
automated record checks from commercial sources and continuous
checking of records to replace periodic investigations. Are
there any privacy concerns or safeguards envisioned to protect
the privacy of individuals that are checked against these
commercial sources?
Mr. Johnson. One of the things, and it has been a big
priority of the reform team that is officed where Mr.
Fitzpatrick is officed is to look at privacy issues, legal
issues. When someone signs an application, do they know that
they--an SF-86--do we have authorization to do periodic or
continuous reinvestigations? Do we have the authorization to go
look at these databases? And if we don't, what do we do to get
that authorization and so forth? So it is a big question for us
and we make sure that we aren't going to do anything that we
don't have the authority to do and we won't do anything where
we put the person's privacy rights at risk. It is a very
important part of this process. It is a very relevant question.
Senator Akaka. Yes. Well, in a sense, the REAL ID problem
is one of these, and that is being careful about privacy.
Mr. Johnson. Yes. There are some changes that do need to be
made in the consent form the person signs and we are in the
process of making those changes.
Senator Akaka. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. No. I have done my thing.
Senator Akaka. Well, I thank Senator Voinovich for his
abiding faith in what we are doing. We are all trying to work
together to take care of these problems.
I want to thank our witnesses today. I have other questions
that I will submit for the record. Thank you. This is a
critically important issue, without question, and it has been
now taking years for us to try to set up a system that really
cuts the time of the process. Getting the clearance processes
working is vital to our national security and we must continue
to work to get it off of GAO's high-risk list. We have heard
very valuable testimony today from all of you and I think that
this will be useful as we go forward.
The hearing record will be open for 2 weeks for additional
statements or questions from other Members, and we again thank
you very much----
Senator Voinovich. Senator Akaka, can I make just one final
point?
Senator Akaka. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. I am really anxious to get this off the
high-risk list.
Senator Akaka. So it is unanimous.
Senator Voinovich. Ms. Farrell, does everybody at this
table know what it is going to take to get it off the list?
Ms. Farrell. We have had conversations with OMB and OPM
since 2005 regarding their strategy to work toward that end,
and we have continued to have discussions and we are available
at any time for those discussions. There is a lot going on with
these reform efforts and we will have to--it is one of those
issues that you are going to have to stay tuned to see what
happens.
Senator Voinovich. Well, from my perspective, if I were in
their shoes, I would like to know what it is going to take to
get it off the list, and from my perspective in the oversight
capacity, I would like to know from you what you think--at
least I would like to know what your standards are, your
metrics, to judge whether they have done their job or not.
Ms. Farrell. Well, first, there are several criteria that I
mentioned, but the No. 1 that I think you are going to be
interested in is the work that we have ongoing looking at the
timeliness. There has been much discussion about the
improvements in the numbers. We will be going back and looking
at timeliness to see if those issues that were there in 2006,
about how those numbers were derived, are still there or if
there actually has been progress in the time it takes for the
investigation or the adjudication phase for the top secret, the
secret, and that is a key thing, real progress. That is one
thing we will be looking for in terms of those numbers.
Another one that we will be looking for that we have not
seen are the resources that it is going to take to implement
these IT plans that we have been discussing to some extent
today. We believe, if you are going to use technology, what is
it going to take in terms of resources so that you can make
decisions that are transparent and trade-offs, if necessary,
with competing demands. That is another example of what we will
be looking for.
Senator Akaka. Before I call on Director Johnson, may I
tell the rest of the panel that I am going to ask you to make
any final comments on what has happened today. Director
Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Just one comment about resources. We were, in
fact, talking about this Tuesday, I think it was. There are two
primary resources that we have access to. One, the Defense
Department has budgeted in this year and next money to reform
their database, JPAS, and because that is 80 percent of all the
system, that money can--in effect, if you reform JPAS or
replace JPAS, you in effect have a system that is used by the
entire community. So that is one major source of resources.
Another source of financial resources is the revolving
funds--is that what it is called?--a part of the fees that they
charge at OPM for their investigative work that is set up to
make refinements and reforms to their system. So those are the
two primary sources before we get into the need for additional
resources.
Now, again, we have not spec-ed out if it is going to cost
this much or that much. We haven't done that but plan to do
that by the end of the year. But right now, our belief is that
those two primary sources of financial support will be
sufficient to do it. But I can't document that. But there are
sufficient sources available to us today.
Senator Akaka. Ms. McGrath.
Ms. McGrath. Yes, sir. Thank you. I would like to thank you
for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee today and I
want to ensure, although we have had a lot of discussion around
the information technology piece, if we don't get the process
and the policies right, it won't matter what we build, which is
why we have focused the last almost year that we have been on
this joint reform effort on those things. So process first,
policy, and then information technology informed by those, and
that is where we are right now in the reform effort. We did, I
will say, issue a strategic pause within the Department on
ongoing modernization efforts to ensure alignment with the
overall strategy and the vision to at least get a handle on
most of the transactions. So thank you again for the
opportunity.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Just briefly, a chance to express
gratitude for the opportunity to come here and also for your
leadership and attention to this problem. It is holding us
accountable that will get this done. It is the goal of the
Performance Accountability Council and the governance structure
to do that, I will say amongst ourselves, but it also is in
response to your own attention to this as well as the champions
of this reform. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Ms. Dillaman.
Ms. Dillaman. I think I told you previously that I have
spent 32 years as a civil servant, all of it devoted to the
background investigations program, and in those 32 years, I
have never seen the government come together and be more
focused and more dedicated to resolving issues than they are
today. When I say I am optimistic, that is putting it lightly.
I think that we have swallowed the frog. The worst of it is
behind us now and everything we see from this point forward is
going to be great improvement.
Senator Akaka. Well, I thank you very much. You have the
last word on the record.
Senator Voinovich. I don't want to have the last word,
but----
Senator Akaka. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. One thing that bugs me
about this place, big time, is the issue of continuing
resolutions and omnibus appropriation bills. Mr. Johnson, it is
your last year. Each of you can give stories, I am sure, about
what has occurred because we don't pass our budgets on time, or
our appropriations on time. It looks like this time around,
from everything I can ascertain, that we may not do the
appropriations until after the next President is elected and
until that next President is sworn in, which means it could be
February before we finish our appropriations.
I just think that, Mr. Johnson, it would be wonderful if as
a gift to the country this Administration would talk about how
difficult it is to manage a situation where you really don't
know what your budget is for 5 months of the fiscal year,
because I don't believe we can continue to do this. And from
our oversight position, if you have this kind of budgeting
going on, or procedure, it makes it really--it gives an excuse
to some people to say, ``We can't perform. We didn't know
really what the numbers were for 5 months. We have got plans.
We think money is appropriated, we can go forward with it, but
it hasn't been authorized yet, or appropriated yet.''
I know I have been doing some work on it and it is a
nightmare. It is a nightmare for the Federal Government. It is
a nightmare for State Government. It is a nightmare for county
government. It is a nightmare as a mayor because of the Federal
budget and the impact that it has.
I just would really like, Mr. Johnson, to talk to you maybe
about that, because I think you could do this country a great
favor if you pointed out to the American people that this
system that we have been following really doesn't lend itself
to good management and delivering the services that the public
and the citizens deserve.
Mr. Johnson. I understand.
Senator Akaka. Again, thank you very much. This hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
