S. Hrg. 110-625
AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 12, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Air Force Nuclear Security
february 12, 2008
Page
Darnell, Lt. Gen. Daniel J., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air,
Space, and Information, Operations, Plans and Requirements;
Accompanied by Maj. Gen. Douglas L. Raaberg, USAF, Director for
Air and Space Operations, Air Combat Command; and Maj. Gen.
Polly A. Peyer, USAF, Director of Resource Integration, Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installation and
Mission Support................................................ 5
Welch, Gen. Larry D., USAF [Ret.], President and CEO, Institute
for Defense Analyses........................................... 40
(iii)
AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SECURITY
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Bill Nelson,
Warner, Inhofe, Thune, and Wicker.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; John
H. Quirk V, security clerk.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T.
Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority
counsel; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn
F. Rusten, professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer,
professional staff member; and Kristine L. Svinicki,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A.
Cronin, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra
Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins;
and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. This morning we
welcome Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell, Major General Polly
Peyer, and Major General Douglas Raaberg from the Air Force,
and retired Air Force General Larry Welch, Chairman of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Weapons. Lieutenant
General Darnell, who is the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and
Operations, and General Raaberg, the Director of Plans and
Operations at Air Combat Command, conducted the initial
investigation into what happened at Minot Air Force and
Barksdale Air Force Bases last Labor Day weekend and why it
happened.
Lieutenant General Peyer, Director of Resource Integration
for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Installations, and
Mission Support, followed up with an investigation of the
entire Air Force nuclear enterprise to see if the problems at
Barksdale and Minot were part of a broader systemic Air Force
problem. General Welch, at the request of Secretary Gates,
reviewed the nuclear enterprise of the whole Department of
Defense (DOD) to see if the problem was bigger than the Air
Force, and unfortunately it is.
The issue this morning is very, very serious. Over a 2-day
period last August, the Air Force lost control and knowledge of
six nuclear warheads during what had become a routine effort to
realign nuclear cruise missiles without warheads between Minot
Air Force Base in North Dakota and Barksdale Air Force Base in
Louisiana. Through an extraordinary series of consecutive
failures of process, procedure, training, and discipline, the
nuclear warheads flew on the wings of a B-52 bomber from Minot
to Barksdale inside of cruise missiles. No one knew where they
were or even missed them for over 36 hours. The warheads were
not discovered until the missiles on which the warheads were
loaded were being prepared to be moved to the weapons storage
area after having been unloaded from the B-52 at Barksdale
after a flight of over 1,400 miles.
While historically there have been nuclear weapons
accidents with varying degrees of severity, no breach of
nuclear procedures of this magnitude had ever occurred
previously. Luckily, these weapons weren't stolen or
permanently lost, or accidentally dropped from the wings of the
B-52 bomber on which they flew, or jettisoned because of bad
weather or mechanical problems, with the pilots not even aware
that they were jettisoning nuclear weapons containing deadly
plutonium.
Each one of the warheads has the explosive power roughly
equivalent to seven times the explosive power of the Nagasaki
nuclear bomb and ten times the Hiroshima nuclear bomb. If
jettisoned and they didn't explode, incredibly dangerous
nuclear material could have been spread for miles. That's why
the safety precautions are so strict, with multiple
redundancies.
The three investigations that have been conducted as a
result of this incident have found that the underlying root
cause is the steadily eroding attention to nuclear discipline
in the Air Force and, indeed, the whole DOD. This inattention
started at the end of the Cold War and has grown substantially
worse over the last decade. From the results of General
Raaberg's initial investigation, the Commander's Directed
Investigation (CDI), it is clear that an erosion of adherence
to rigid Air Force nuclear procedures and the ``intricate
system of nuclear checks and balances were either ignored or
disregarded.''
The problems existed at both Minot and Barksdale and
reflect ``a breakdown in training, discipline, supervision, and
leadership.''
General Peyer's blue ribbon review finds that the problems
in the Air Force spread beyond Minot and Barksdale and begin
with senior leadership and a lack of commitment to the nuclear
mission and extend to shortcomings in training, inspections,
and funding.
General Welch, your report finds that the scope of
inattention goes even further and is, with a few exceptions,
pervasive within the DOD.
There are 132 recommendations from these three reports.
Some have been implemented. Most have not. This entire episode
really is a wakeup call. As long as the United States has
nuclear weapons, they must be handled with the utmost security
and attention. Many of the details of this incident, the
investigation, and corrective measures remain classified.
Given the situation on the Senate floor this morning, with
I believe nine rollcall votes on amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act legislation beginning at
approximately 10 o'clock, we're going to have, after the
statements of our witnesses, one brief round of questions and
then we will reconvene in S-407 of the Capitol for a closed
session, and that is a change in location. We're going to meet
in classified session in S-407.
So, Senator Inhofe, I believe you have an opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. I do, Mr. Chairman. Without objection, I'll
read Senator Warner's statement. I'm told he asked if I would
do that.
First of all, thank you for calling this hearing, and I
join with you in expressing my deep concern over what may have
been one of the most serious nuclear weapons handling and
stewardship incidents in the last 60 years. Since the committee
first found out about the incident, it has closely monitored in
a bipartisan manner the ongoing efforts of the Air Force and
the DOD to ensure accountability and to ensure this sort of
event does not happen again.
I join our chairman in welcoming our witnesses and thank
them for their efforts. I would like to especially thank
General Welch again for answering the call and thank them for
their efforts. I would like to especially thank General Welch
again for answering the call of our Nation to serve, proving
again that generals never really die; they just keep working.
Also, I want to welcome General Raaberg, who is a regular
fixture there at the Vance Air Force Base. When I used to fly
in my plane in there, he was kind enough to let me land there.
So we finally had to write a new chapter in the book to make
something work. Thank you.
I was impressed with the rapidity with which the Air Force
began its investigation and coordinating information to Capitol
Hill. The CDI was a logical first step. The Air Force-wide blue
ribbon review and defense-wide Defense Science Board report on
nuclear surety were also well-conceived efforts to get at the
root problems and causes.
While the CDI concludes this to have been an isolated
incident and the result of the actions of just a few airmen,
there are other conclusions that speak to long-term degradation
of discipline and adherence to established procedures. The lack
of attention to details spanned two separate military
installations. These conclusions seem at odds with each other.
The witnesses should be expected to reconcile the differences.
One of the major tenets of our military is accountability.
Our military leaders must be accountable to civilian authority
and military subordinates accountable to our military leaders.
Without a strong reliance on the chain of command, we are
weakened as a Nation. I bring this up in light of where
accountability has been assigned in this incident. The
witnesses will be asked if they are satisfied that we have
properly placed accountability where it should reside.
One of the principal conclusions of the blue ribbon review
is that the Air Force is spread thin because it has been at war
for over 17 years. While I share the concern for the stress
that our airmen have been under the past 2 decades, I would ask
how that stress was allowed to manifest itself in the
procedures used to handle our nuclear weapons and what
safeguards were sacrificed that allowed that to happen.
How did we allow our adherence to nuclear codes of conduct
to erode to this point? During the Cold War our forces handled
over 9,000 deployed nuclear warheads. Under our Moscow Treaty
obligations, we will reduce to no more than 2,200 warheads by
2012. But even if we had just one nuclear weapon, the point, as
General Welch's report states, is that the complexity of the
nuclear enterprise is not reduced. As long as we have these
weapons, their military and political nature demands the most
intense attention to their proper care. We must sharpen our
focus on the extra care required in this nuclear mission.
Of greatest concern to me is how we ensure the events of
August 2007 don't happen again. We need to focus more attention
on how our inspection processes and procedures failed to alert
us to the decline in discipline that led to the incident.
Additionally, we need to reinforce our inspections and
readiness reviews to understand and heed the signals of decline
and reverse the downturn and before such incident happens
again.
I look forward to your testimony and appreciate having this
hearing, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Chairman Levin, thank you for calling this hearing to receive
testimony on the very grave and serious incident of the unauthorized
movement of nuclear weapons from Minot Air Force Base, ND, to Barksdale
Air Force Base, LA, in August 2007.
I join with you in expressing my deep concern over what may have
been one of the most serious nuclear weapons handling and stewardship
incidents in last 60 years. Since the committee first found out about
the incident, it has closely monitored, in a bipartisan manner, the
ongoing efforts of the Air Force and the Department of Defense to
assure accountability and ensure this sort of event does not happen
again.
I join our chairman in welcoming our witnesses, and thank them for
their efforts. I would like to especially thank General Welch for once
again answering the call of our Nation to serve, proving again that
generals never really do retire.
I was impressed with the rapidity with which the Air Force began
its investigation, and coordinating information to Capitol Hill. The
Command Directed Investigation was a logical first step. The Air Force-
wide Blue Ribbon Review and the Defense-wide Defense Science Board
Report on Nuclear Surety were also well conceived efforts to get to the
root problems and causes.
While the Command Directed Investigation concludes this to have
been an isolated incident and the result of the actions of just a few
airman, there are other conclusions that speak to long-term degradation
of discipline and adherence to established procedures. The lack of
attention to detail spanned two separate military installations. These
conclusions seem at odds with each other. The witnesses should be
expected to reconcile the differences.
One of the major tenets of our military is accountability. Our
military leaders must be accountable to civilian authority, and
military subordinates accountable to our military leaders. Without a
strong reliance on the chain-of-command, we are weakened as a nation. I
bring this up in light of where accountability has been assigned in
this incident. The witnesses will be asked if they are satisfied that
we have properly placed accountability where it should reside.
One of the principle conclusions of the Blue Ribbon Review is that
the Air Force is spread thin, because it has been at war for over 17
years. While I share the concern for the stress our airmen have been
under the past two decades, I would ask how that stress was allowed to
manifest itself in the procedures used to handle our nuclear weapons,
and what safeguards were sacrificed that allowed that to happen.
How did we allow our adherence to nuclear codes of conduct to erode
to this point? During the Cold War, our forces handled over 9,000
deployed nuclear warheads. Under our Moscow Treaty obligations, we will
reduce to no more than 2,200 warheads by 2012. But, even if we had just
one nuclear weapon, the point--as General Welch's report states--is
that the complexity of the nuclear enterprise is not reduced. As long
as we have these weapons, their military and political nature demands
the most intense attention to their proper care. We must sharpen our
focus on the exquisite care required for this nuclear mission.
Of greatest concern to me is how we ensure the events of August
2007 do not happen again. We need to focus more attention on how our
inspection processes and procedures failed to alert us to the decline
in discipline that led to this incident. Additionally, we need to
reinforce our inspections and readiness reviews to understand and heed
the signals of decline, and reverse the downturn, before such incidents
happen.
I look forward to your testimony, and the question and answer
period. Our Nation deserves to be able to sleep at night knowing our
nuclear arsenal is secure, in good hands, and will remain so. Our
efforts here today and in the future must work towards that
aim.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
I understand now that General Darnell is going to make an
opening statement on behalf of our three Air Force witnesses;
is that the intent?
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DANIEL J. DARNELL, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF, AIR, SPACE, AND INFORMATION, OPERATIONS, PLANS AND
REQUIREMENTS; ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. DOUGLAS L. RAABERG,
USAF, DIRECTOR FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS, AIR COMBAT
COMMAND; AND MAJ. GEN. POLLY A. PEYER, USAF, DIRECTOR OF
RESOURCE INTEGRATION, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
LOGISTICS, INSTALLATION AND MISSION SUPPORT
General Darnell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Then, General Welch, the former Chief of
Staff of the Air Force, will make a statement about the Defense
Science Board (DSB) study.
So we'll start with you, General Darnell. Thank you all for
being here and for your work on this matter.
General Darnell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin,
Senator Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to provide you the Air Force way
ahead for our nuclear enterprise. Let me request that our
written statement be entered for the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
General Darnell. Thank you, sir.
Throughout the history of the United States Air Force, our
professionalism and dedication have guaranteed the soundness
and surety of Air Force crews and weapons. From our Service's
beginning, we have earned the trust of our national leadership
and, most importantly, the trust of the American public.
Unfortunately, in late August 2007 the Air Force flew weapons
from Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, to Barksdale Air Force
Base in an unauthorized manner.
It's important to note that during the incident there was
never any unsafe condition and the incident was promptly
reported to our national leadership, including the Secretary of
Defense and the President. These weapons were secure and always
in the hands of America's airmen. However, as airmen we are
accountable and we will assure the American people that the Air
Force standards they expect are being met.
The commander of Air Combat Command immediately initiated a
CDI. Without delay, the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force engaged and initiated a series
of specific actions: One, an immediate, successful 100 percent
stockpile verification of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Air Force
custody; two, a standdown of U.S. Air Force nuclear units for
extra training and to emphasize attention to detail; three,
Chief of Staff of the Air Force messages to all major commands
and each individual airman on standards, discipline, and
attention to detail, highlighting mission focus and checklist
discipline; four, 100 percent limited nuclear surety
inspections of all nuclear-capable units, with Defense Threat
Reduction Agency oversight; five, Secretary of the Air Force
visits to Barksdale Air Force Base, LA, and Minot Air Force
Base, ND; and lastly, a blue ribbon review of policies and
procedures focused on the entire Air Force nuclear enterprise.
This review took into account operations, maintenance, storage,
handling, transportation, and security.
The Air Force is working in partnership with other Federal
agencies both inside and outside the DOD to conduct this
analysis.
Additionally, the Secretary of Defense requested General
Larry Welch to lead a DSB review of DOD-wide nuclear surety.
The root causes identified for the specific incident were
unit level leadership and discipline breakdown among a small
group of airmen at Barksdale Air Force Base and Minot Air Force
Base. As a result of this incident, seven leaders within the
Air Force have been removed from their positions, including one
wing commander and two group commanders. Additionally, 90
people were temporarily decertified from duties associated with
the nuclear mission.
Many of the actions following the incident are still
ongoing. The blue ribbon review finds that the Air Force's
policies, processes, and procedures are sound and that the Air
Force commitment to the nuclear enterprise is strong. However,
there are opportunities for improvement in the Air Force's
nuclear enterprise.
The Air Force Nuclear General Officer Steering Group has
assessed, validated, and assigned responsibility for
implementing the recommendations from the commander-directed
investigation, the blue ribbon review, and the DSB. As of the
time of this hearing, nearly one-quarter of the recommendations
are complete. These recommendations transcend all levels of the
Air Force. Common throughout the CDI, the blue ribbon review,
and the DSB are recommendations that focus the nuclear
enterprise on the level of experience, knowledge, frequency of
training, exercises, organizations, standardization,
evaluation, and inspections.
The Air Force is committed to continuously improving its
ability to fulfill the Nation's nuclear mission, grounded on
our core values of integrity, service, and excellence, because
it is a credible nuclear deterrent that convinces potential
adversaries of our unwavering commitment to defend our Nation.
The Air Force portion of the Nation's nuclear deterrent is
sound. We will take every measure necessary to continue to
provide safe, secure, reliable nuclear surety to the American
public.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
[The joint prepared statement of General Darnell, General
Peyer, and General Raaberg follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Daniel J. Darnell, USAF; Maj. Gen.
Polly A. Peyer, USAF; and Maj. Gen. Douglas L. Raaberg, USAF
I. INTRODUCTION
Chairman Levin and distinguished members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to provide you the Air Force way ahead for our
nuclear enterprise. Since the weapons-transfer incident of 30 August
2007, we have initiated multiple levels of review to ensure we have not
only investigated the root causes of the incident, but more importantly
taken this opportunity to review Air Force policies and procedures in
order to improve the Air Force's nuclear capabilities. The Commander of
Air Combat Command commissioned the Commander Directed Investigation
(CDI), a tactical level investigation that focuses on the facts of the
incident and determines accountability. The Chief of Staff of the Air
Force (CSAF) commissioned the Blue Ribbon Review (BRR), an operational-
level review that focuses on the entire Air Force enterprise including
both the aircraft and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and
reviews policies, procedures. The Secretary of Defense commissioned the
Defense Science Board (DSB) review, a strategic-level independent
review that focuses on the Department of Defense (DOD) enterprise and
joint organizations. The Air Force takes its nuclear obligations
seriously, and will continue to take any measure necessary to deliver
this strategic capability safely. Consequently, we have identified the
actions required to both enhance our strengths and correct those areas
needing improvement.
History of Incident
The United States Air Force has underwritten the national strategy
for over 60 years by providing a credible deterrent force, and we
continue to serve as the ultimate backstop, dissuading opponents and
reassuring allies by maintaining an always-ready nuclear arm.
Throughout our history, our professionalism and dedication has
guaranteed the soundness and surety of Air Force crews and weapons on
nuclear alert. From its beginning our Service has earned the trust of
our national leadership and most importantly, the trust of the American
public.
Unfortunately, in late August 2007, the Air Force flew nuclear
weapons from Minot Air Force Base (AFB), ND, to Barksdale AFB, LA, in
an unauthorized manner. Immediately, the Commander of Air Combat
Command initiated an investigation into the incident. Soon after that
investigation began, the Air Force began to analyze its policies,
programs, procedures, and processes involving nuclear assets.
Furthermore, the Air Force is working in partnership with other Federal
agencies both inside and outside the DOD to conduct this analysis.
Without delay, the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) and the CSAF
engaged and initiated a series of eight specific actions:
(1) An immediate, successful 100 percent stockpile
verification of U.S nuclear weapons in the Air Force custody.
(2) A stand-down of U.S. Air Force nuclear units for extra
training and to emphasize attention to detail.
(3) A CDI, a tactical-level incident-related investigation,
to identify the root causes that led to the weapons-transfer
incident, which had already begun.
(4) CSAF messages to all Air Force major commands and each
individual airman on standards, discipline, and attention to
detail, highlighting mission focus and checklist discipline.
(5) 100 percent Limited Nuclear Surety Inspections of all
nuclear-capable units, with Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA) oversight. This was in addition to previously scheduled
NSIs.
(6) A SECAF letter to all airmen highlighting discipline and
responsibility.
(7) SECAF visits to Barskdale AFB, LA, and Minot AFB, ND.
(8) A CSAF-chartered BRR of policies and procedures focused
on the entire Air Force nuclear enterprise.
At the conclusion of the CDI, the SECAF and the Assistant Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements, then-Major
General Richard Newton, held a press conference to outline the incident
and summarize the findings of the initial investigation. Also during
that press conference, General Newton discussed accountability measures
that were taken as a result of the unauthorized weapons transfer. Seven
leaders within the Air Force have been removed from their position,
including one wing commander and two group commanders. Additionally, 90
people were temporarily decertified from duties associated with the
nuclear mission.
Many of the actions following the incident are ongoing. The BRR
represents a comprehensive, operational-level review of policies and
procedures of the Air Force's strategic nuclear enterprise including
aircraft, missiles, and sustainment missions. This BRR is an
opportunity for the Air Force to improve its commitment to a sound
nuclear enterprise. The nuclear surety inspections are complete with
the exception of the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot AFB, which must be
recertified for its nuclear mission. Additionally, the Secretary of
Defense requested General (retired) Larry Welch to lead a DSB review of
DOD-wide nuclear weapons surety.
II. ROOT CAUSES
We want to assure you that during the incident there was never an
unsafe condition, and the incident was promptly reported to our
national leadership, including the Secretary of Defense and the
President. These weapons were secure and always in the hands of
America's airmen. However, as Airmen, we are accountable and we will
assure the American people that the Air Force standards they expect are
being met. In addition, the wings at Barksdale AFB and Minot AFB are
units with a proud heritage. It is important that we act to restore the
confidence in these units and move ahead. Rest assured, we will.
The root causes identified for the specific incident were unit-
level leadership and discipline breakdown at Barksdale AFB and Minot
AFB. These breakdowns were due to leadership failures and a declining
focus on the strategic nuclear bomber mission. Over time, the breakdown
of leadership and discipline among a small group of Airmen at Barksdale
AFB and Minot AFB fostered an environment which eroded the strict
adherence to established procedures.
Specifically, one of the two pylons for this flight was not
properly prepared because an informal scheduling process subverted the
formal scheduling process. This was the result of a lack of attention
to detail and lack of adherence to well-established Air Force
guidelines, technical orders, and procedures.
In addition to discipline breakdowns at the unit level, a declining
focus on the strategic nuclear bomber mission was cited as a root cause
in the CDI. Since the end of the Cold War, aircraft units have taken on
conventional commitments in the midst of an ever-increasing operational
tempo and a continuously-shrinking force. Thus, the role of the
strategic nuclear mission, especially in dual-tasked aircraft units,
competed for time, attention, and focus. The turning point of this
diminished focus began when aircraft came off nuclear alert status. At
the same time, the Air Force began 17 years of continuous combat
including conventional airpower commitments across the spectrum of
regular and irregular war in numerous theaters of operation. Training
in nuclear procedures became less frequent without the daily activity
required by nuclear alert conditions coupled with the expanded
commitments of dual-tasked units. As a result, nuclear-related
experience-levels have declined within bomber and dual-capable units.
III. WAY AHEAD
The BRR is a comprehensive, thorough, operational-level review of
Air Force policies and procedures of the Air Force's nuclear
enterprise. Senior leadership in the Air Force sees the BRR as an
opportunity to improve a sound nuclear enterprise. As such, the BRR
examines the organizational structure, command authorities, personnel,
and assignment policies, and the education and training associated with
nuclear weapons. This analysis takes into account operations,
maintenance, storage, handling, transportation, and security. The BRR
finds that the Air Force policies, processes, and procedures are sound
and that the Air Force commitment to the nuclear enterprise is strong.
However, there are opportunities for improvement in the Air Force's
overall support to the nuclear enterprise. Specifically, the BRR draws
five general conclusions and offers recommendations to better organize,
train, and equip the Air Force nuclear enterprise.
The BRR's five general conclusions are:
(1) Nuclear surety in the Air Force is sound and the nuclear
weapons inventory in the Air Force is safe, secure, and
reliable.
(2) Air Force focus on the nuclear mission has diminished
since 1991, while the conventional commitment has expanded, the
operations tempo has increased, and the number of airmen has
declined. Operations Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Allied
Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom are but the most
notable examples of the operations we have undertaken since
1991.
(3) The nuclear enterprise in the Air Force works despite
being fragmented into a number of commands. For example,
nuclear surety in the Air Force is sound among both the ICBM
force under Air Force Space Command and the nuclear-strike
aircraft under Air Combat Command.
(4) The declining amount of Air Force nuclear experience led
to waning expertise. During the decline in nuclear experience,
conventional experience grew exponentially. Today, with almost
half the airmen it had during the Cold War, the Air Force
fulfills a far greater number of conventional commitments,
world-wide, than it did just 17 years ago.
(5) The Air Force nuclear surety inspection programs need
standardization.
The BRR's recommendations range in scope and scale and can be
categorized into those that can quickly be accomplished, those that are
moderately complex and require more time, and those that require
substantial resources and time. For example, strengthening the
relationship with DTRA can be accomplished with relative ease;
developing a comprehensive list of all critical nuclear-related
personnel positions in other agencies will require some time; and
resourcing a long-range replacement and recapitalization program for
aging nuclear weapon systems and nuclear support equipment will require
substantial resources and time.
The Air Force Nuclear General Officer Steering Group (AFNGOSG), an
entity with 20 general officers from all disciplines across the Air
Force nuclear enterprise and originally established in 1997, has
assessed, validated, and assigned responsibility for implementing the
recommendations from the CDI, the BRR, and the DSB. One of those
recommendations already completed is for the chair of the AFNGOSG to be
upgraded to a three-star general, specifically, the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements. Given the collective
nuclear experience on the AFNGOSG, we will depend on this group to
track and ensure broadest implementation of the outstanding
recommendations. As of the time of this hearing, nearly one-quarter of
those recommendations are complete.
These recommendations extend to all levels of the Air Force. For
example, one of the recommendations is to restructure the Air Staff to
increase the visibility and focus of the nuclear enterprise, and the
AFNGOSG is currently evaluating a number of alternatives to achieve
this goal. Other recommendations include reviewing how the Air Force
presents forces to combatant commanders, and the commonality of nuclear
forces among the different Numbered Air Forces. Common throughout the
CDI, the BRR, and the DSB are recommendations that focus on the level
of experience, knowledge, frequency of training, exercises,
inspections, standardization and evaluation, within our nuclear
enterprise.
IV. CLOSING
The Air Force is committed to continuously improving its ability to
fulfill the Nation's nuclear mission, grounded on our core values of
integrity, service, and excellence because it is a credible nuclear
deterrent that convinces potential adversaries of our unwavering
commitment to defend our Nation. The Air Force portion of the Nation's
nuclear deterrent is sound, and we will take every measure necessary to
continue to provide safe, secure, reliable, nuclear surety to the
American public.
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Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
General Welch?
STATEMENT OF GEN. LARRY D. WELCH, USAF [RET.], PRESIDENT AND
CEO, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
General Welch. Thank you, Senator Levin. I can be very
brief since your opening comments addressed many of the issues
in our report.
Our report contains specific findings and recommendations
on each of the three levels of cause factors. It was released
yesterday. It is unclassified. It is 27 pages long, including
appendices. Those three levels of cause factors are:
First, the proximate cause that is the failure to sustain
and follow credible procedures and processes. Those
deficiencies have been addressed in detail by the Air Force
reports.
Second is focus and that has to do with the dramatic
reduction in the number of senior DOD officials with dedicated
focus on the nuclear enterprise.
The third level is the environment in which the enterprise
operates, and that has to do with the perception at all levels
in the nuclear enterprise that the Nation and its leadership do
not value the nuclear mission and the people who perform that
mission.
[The information referred to follows:]
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General Welch. We have specific recommendations for
addressing each of those three and I'll be pleased to address
those during questions. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
There are only a few of us here, so we should have some
time. Let's try 6 minutes so we make sure we get in at least
one round before the first vote occurs in the Senate.
General, I'm a little taken aback by your statement that
there was never a safety issue and they were always under the
control of American pilots. Did the pilots know they had
nuclear weapons on board?
General Darnell. Sir, they did not.
Chairman Levin. So, when you say they were under the
control of the pilots, not knowing that you have nuclear
weapons on board makes a difference, doesn't it?
General Darnell. Yes, sir, it does. The intent behind that
statement is to make it clear that they never migrated off the
aircraft anywhere else.
Chairman Levin. In terms of safety, when nuclear weapons
are on a plane and those planes are on a flight line, are there
special precautions taken?
General Darnell. Yes, sir, it's increased security on the
flight line with security forces.
Chairman Levin. Was that increased security present here?
General Darnell. At Minot it was not, sir.
Chairman Levin. It was not. Why do we have increased
security when we have nuclear weapons on a plane on a flight
line? Why do we provide that additional security?
General Darnell. To ensure security of the weapon itself,
because of the gravity of, obviously, anyone taking control of
the weapon that should not have it.
Chairman Levin. The absence of that security at Minot
represents a significant shortfall, does it not?
General Darnell. It did in this case, sir, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, in terms of what happened here and the
failures that occurred, let's go through very quickly what
happened here: and stop me at any point here if what I'm saying
is not accurate. The mistake was putting a pylon, which has six
cruise missiles on it--and these cruise missiles were not
supposed to have nuclear weapons loaded in them; they were
supposed to have dummies, is that correct?
General Darnell. That's correct, sir.
Chairman Levin. So the pylon that was loaded in error had
nuclear weapons on it and these were the checks that failed us,
these were the actions that were supposed to be taken that
weren't taken. First, at Minot the payload checks were not
performed by the handling team. Second, there was a deputy
maintenance chief at Minot who noted the discrepancy and he
never reported back to his supervisor that discrepancy between
the pylon that was supposed to be on and the number of that
pylon and the one that was on there. So the second failure was
the deputy who noted the discrepancy not reporting it back to
his supervisor.
Then the deputy did not request verification of the
payload. The tow driver at Minot, who's supposed to perform
payload checks, did not do so. The munitions scheduling officer
or office at Minot failed to verify the status of the pylon as
required prior to giving permission to move the pylon. The air
crew is supposed to verify the missile status and the payload
on all missiles, and they did not do so. The aircraft commander
did not verify that each of the missiles had been checked and
did not, as required, make an entry in his pre-flight log.
Now, so far am I on target?
General Darnell. Senator Levin, I think that's pretty
accurate.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now, that's a lot of mistakes, a lot
of checks and balances here that are supposed to work. None of
those worked in this case. I think you folks in the Air Force
would be the first to acknowledge the severity of not knowing
that you're dealing with nuclear weapons and not taking the
appropriate steps to secure them. You live with this every day.
You understand the implications of the lack of security or lack
of awareness that you have a nuclear weapon on board in terms
of the potential for accident, and so I don't think you need a
lecture from me at least on that subject. You're aware that
this is a very significant failure, the likes of which we don't
think has ever occurred before and hopefully will never occur
again.
How many folks here would you say failed to carry out some
duty that they were obligated to perform? How many different
people along the line here?
General Darnell. Senator Levin, I'm going to defer to the
officer that did the investigation, but we initially
decertified 90 personnel.
Chairman Levin. How many?
General Darnell. 90. Now, as General Raaberg did his
investigation he found that not all 90 were involved and
restored their status. But initially we had 90 that were
decertified.
I'll ask General Raaberg if he'd like to add anything to
that.
Chairman Levin. How many approximately failed to perform a
duty that they were obligated to perform?
General Raaberg. Sir, as you've aptly indicated, there were
five specific procedures broken the day before and the day of
the transfer of the tow. It's approximately 10 individuals
involved in all five of those, not following the rules and not
following the procedures.
Sir, you also mentioned that there were effectively three
scheduling errors that caused them to actually transfer a
nuclear-loaded pylon set of missiles to the aircraft. Sir, at
that point the number of individuals involved in that is at
least 10 to 15 in that particular realm.
Chairman Levin. So a total of 25?
General Raaberg. Sir, that's about right, plus the greater
architect of the organizations and the units involved.
Chairman Levin. So, and this will be my last question; have
disciplinary actions been taken to date? If so, without telling
us who and what for the time being, just tell us, because these
are personnel actions which I think would appropriately leave
for a different setting. But against how many of those
approximately 25 people would you say some action has been
taken?
General Darnell. Senator, it's my understanding that 13
were administered Uniform Code of Military Justice action. A
total of 15 were administratively removed or affected by the
incident.
Chairman Levin. They've not been returned?
General Darnell. No, sir. Some have been returned, but
received punishment for what, obviously, had occurred.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner or Senator Inhofe.
Senator Warner. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Just a couple of brief questions. First of
all, I recognized General Raaberg and his fine service at Vance
Air Force Base. I didn't say anything about General Peyer at
Tinker Air Force Base. So this is old home week. I welcome you
here.
General Welch, as I said when I was reading the statement
of Senator Warner, you've come back out and I appreciate very
much all of the work and the service that you continue to
provide. Your report includes 16 recommendations to strengthen
nuclear security. One of the recommendations was that the
Secretary of Defense establish a mechanism to ensure that the
lessons from the incident on August 30 produce institutional
and environmental changes of lasting attention. My question
would be, what mechanisms do you think we need to make sure
that our successors aren't here 20 years from now addressing
this same subject?
General Welch. Let me answer that as briefly as I can. The
reason for that recommendation is that the task force that I
chair has been in business since 1992, although previously
under a different name. Over the years there have been any
number of deficiencies identified by the task force, by other
DSB reports, though none of them as serious as this. In each
case the deficiencies were addressed, corrective actions were
implemented, but they didn't endure. Over time attention faded
away, and then we encountered a new set of deficiencies.
That's the reason for the recommendation. Our
recommendations regarding the level of focus in the Department,
are to ensure there are flag officers and senior civilians at
the right place, at the right level, whose daily focus is on
the nuclear mission, and to insist that be sustained. I believe
that's what's required in order to help ensure that this
intense attention that we're seeing right now doesn't once
again fade away in the future.
Senator Inhofe. General Darnell, when this first happened
the first thing I did was draw a line between Minot and
Barksdale, and it went right over Tulsa, OK. So I'm a little
sensitive to the route there.
I think the most important question to ask, and you've all
touched on it, but it wasn't really all that specific. Were the
weapons ever armed or in danger of being armed? In other words,
were the American people ever at risk of having a nuclear
weapon get stolen or exploding?
General Darnell. Senator, the weapons were never armed.
Senator Inhofe. They were never armed. I think there's an
assumption everybody knows that, but certainly that wasn't
covered very well back in August.
General Darnell. The pylon itself was not powered up and as
a result the weapons were not armed either.
Senator Inhofe. They're never armed during transporting?
General Darnell. No, sir. This was what's called a tactical
ferry mission. Obviously, we were anticipating a dummy load on
the aircraft and there'd be no reason to power the pylon up.
Senator Inhofe. I think it's worth repeating.
I don't have any more questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Nelson and then Senator Thune. Hopefully, if you
get your rounds in we will be able to go to S-407 at that
point. If not, we'll come back here. Senator Warner's waiving
his questions?
Senator Warner. I want to do that, but I want to follow on
just one point that my distinguished colleague brought out. In
no way do we forgive, or anyone else, the sloppiness and the
breakdown in discipline and training and so forth. But the
weapons were never armed, is that correct?
General Darnell. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. As a consequence we could say that the
American public was never in danger if there'd been an
accidental dropping or otherwise of these weapons; is that
correct?
General Darnell. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Warner. Good.
General Welch, it's nice to see you again. It's a
wonderful, wonderful time we had together over these 30 years
Senator Levin and I have been on this committee. Glad that
you're still very active on behalf of the interests of our
country and your beloved Air Force.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Just to clarify something that I said. Now,
if these weapons had been jettisoned for whatever reason--there
was mechanical failure or they had been jettisoned over water
for whatever reason--could they represent a dangerous release
of plutonium? Could that happen?
General Darnell. Senator, it's not my understanding that
that would be the case, but we'll have to clarify that for you.
Chairman Levin. You're saying that if these weapons were
jettisoned over land----
General Darnell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin.--that there could not be a release upon the
destruction of these when they smashed into the ground, that
there could not be a release of plutonium? Is that what you're
saying, or you don't know?
General Darnell. Sir, I don't know. I'd have to confirm
whether that would be or not.
Chairman Levin. Does anyone here know? My understanding is
it could be dangerous.
General Peyer. I'm a logistician, not a technician. But
knowing the knowledge of how a system is developed, and that's
part of the reliability of the system, is that there is no
inadvertent detonation of the system----
Chairman Levin. No, I'm not talking about detonation. I'm
talking about could the plutonium be released inadvertently if
this weapon were smashed into the ground from 15,000 feet.
General Peyer. That piece I would not know.
[The information referred to follows:]
Plutonium dispersal is virtually impossible without a high
explosive detonation. The W80 warhead is designed to resist detonation
and remain intact in an accident or jettison scenario. The W80 utilizes
insensitive high explosive (IHE) technology. IHE is designed to
decompose rather than detonate in a fire. The weapons were never armed
and the release of plutonium would have been highly unlikely in the
event of a crash or jettisoning scenario.
Chairman Levin. Do you know, General Welch?
General Welch. Yes, sir. The plutonium can't be released
unless there's a high explosive detonation.
Chairman Levin. There's no possibility of release if
jettisoned and it smashes into the ground?
General Welch. Not unless there is a high explosive
detonation, and that's very, very unlikely.
Chairman Levin. Unlikely. Impossible?
General Welch. I'm reluctant to say anything is impossible.
Let me say I can't imagine how it could happen.
Chairman Levin. All right. Then why are these so dangerous?
Why do they need special inspection and security when they're
on a flight line? Why is it important that a pilot even know
that he has a nuclear weapon on board?
General Welch. Because with a high explosive detonation you
will indeed scatter plutonium. So the concern is to ensure that
no one can have access to these weapons in a way that they can
intentionally create a high explosive detonation. There are
ways to do that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, that's the appropriate
response. There's no assumption of detonation; however, in the
crash of two planes in the late 60s or early 70s, plutonium was
spread all over the place, and plutonium is lethal. Isn't that
correct, General Welch?
General Welch. Absolutely.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, may I have my official
opening statement put into the record?
Chairman Levin. It will be.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When I learned about the nuclear weapons
incident that occurred in August 2007, I was stunned. This is the
probably the most egregious breach of nuclear weapons procedures that
has ever occurred. Six nuclear weapons were unaccounted for, for over
36 hours.
To the Air Force's credit an investigation was immediately opened.
General Raaberg, it appears that you had full access to everything you
needed to complete your investigation and that your report was
forthright and uncensored. I hope that that is truly the case.
There have now been three reports. What all three of the reports
have revealed is that the events of August 2007 were not simply one-
time errors, but an indication of a long erosion of discipline and
attention to nuclear matters in the Air Force.
As General Welch stated in his report for the Defense Science
Board, ``The process and systemic problems that allowed such an
incident have developed over more than a decade and have the potential
for much more serious consequences.'' But, as General Welch also said
it can be a ``just-in-time rescue if lasting corrective actions are
implemented now.''
So, for this hearing today, the question is: Now what?
Senator Bill Nelson. General Darnell, these events show
that the nuclear procedures were ignored by most everyone, and
these procedures are designed to force multiple redundant
opportunities to ensure that the weapons are safe and they're
secure and that they're accounted for. In this case, the
sloppiness and the lack of discipline and the lack of respect
for the process didn't just happen overnight, and fixing the
problems are going to take a while.
How long will it take to fix the problems and once fixed
what steps should the Air Force take to ensure that we're not
going to have this problem again?
General Darnell. Senator, very good question. We have 124
recommendations that we are taking action on. 41 are complete.
I would hesitate to give you an exact time line, but obviously
we are very quickly implementing as many of the recommendations
as we possibly can.
Where we started from an organization standpoint is we put
some very key senior leaders into some key positions. As
General Welch has mentioned before, I very soon will have a
two-star general officer that will be in charge of nuclear
matters on the Air Staff that reports to me, and that will be
their sole duty.
We have a Nuclear General Officer Steering Group that I
just chaired 2 weeks ago. We had representatives from every
MAJCOM there, reviewed all of these 124 recommendations. We
were able to assign Office of Primary Responsibility, in other
words those responsible for implementing, and we're still
working through exactly what the time lines will be.
The Nuclear Weapons Center we stood up nearly 2 years ago
at Albuquerque. We'll have a brigadier general in charge of
that organization in 2 months.
So from the top down, we have put some people in some key
positions to ensure that we can get these recommendations
implemented. I'll point out also that we put some other
officers in some pretty key positions as well. Brigadier
General Jonathan George is going to the Department of Energy.
We have Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, who is our Assistant
Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force; Major General Dick Weber,
who is my deputy, as well as Brigadier General Don Alston. I
won't go through their bona fides, but they've all been
squadron, group, and wing commanders, whether it be in the
missile field or bomber organizations.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Welch, General Darnell was
talking about all how they're correcting it in the Air Force.
But in your investigation, this spills over into the DOD as
well. So what do you think DOD is going to do to make sure this
doesn't happen again?
General Welch. As you say, we found this change in the
level of focus on the nuclear enterprise to be Department-wide,
and our report has specific recommendations on what has to be
done to fix that. That is, you need flag officers or senior
civilians whose daily focus is on the nuclear enterprise. You
need it on the Air Staff, the Navy Staff, the major air
commands, U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint Staff, et cetera,
et cetera, et cetera.
Our feeling was that if you restore that level of focus,
you have gone a long way towards having a long-term reliable
fix on this discipline issue.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Darnell, there seems to be a
disconnect here between the inspections and the actual
performance. As a matter of fact, Minot usually received
favorable inspection reports. So it seems that the inspections
don't provide an accurate picture of the situation. So how does
the Air Force address that?
General Darnell. Senator, we've looked at that and,
frankly, that's a valid observation and criticism. I will tell
you that in any inspection there are going to be areas that
you've isolated and you're focused on and others that you're
not looking at as closely. A team has a finite amount of time
to do that.
We're looking at several different things actually. First
of all, limiting the notice that we provide a unit prior to
being inspected. We're looking closely at that. As you well
know, if the unit's preparing to be inspected and they know
when the inspection is and they've been given a significant
amount of time, then they're going to prepare for it in certain
ways. We think that there may be some value to a limited notice
inspection for units, so we're looking at that.
Elements of our Nuclear Security Inspection and our
Operational Readiness Inspection. We still think it's valid
that we have them separated, but we think there are things
about each inspection procedurally that could be tightened up.
There has been some discussion about combining both. I think
right now, I don't think we're leaning that way.
But I know General Sams, who is our Inspector General for
the Air Force, has a number of proposals that he is working on
that he will propose to the Chief of Staff in probably another
4 to 6 weeks.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Raaberg, you actually found
where some of the inspection teams were cherry-picked. Is this
a real problem in the Air Force?
General Raaberg. When I went back and looked at all the
inspections, all the way back to 1996, to be a little more
precise, in my report I indicated that there were in fact
findings, some noncompliance. But those are not uncommon in any
of those type inspections. In fact, generally they're cleared
up either during the inspection or shortly after the
inspection.
The key thing was there was no indicator that those
deficiencies would be identified or any deficiencies identified
in the inspections that led to this actual incident itself.
Sir, I'm not aware of the issue you were discussing just
now.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are we talking, is your answer----
Senator Warner. Has your time, I believe, expired?
Senator Bill Nelson. It probably has.
Senator Warner. I think we'd like to accommodate Senator
Thune.
Senator Bill Nelson. Of course.
Senator Warner. Then our open session will be concluded.
All the Senators are invited to put questions into the record.
So I thank the Senator very much.
Senator Thune, you could wrap it up for us, and then we'll
reconvene in S-407.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I just want one other
question for the record. Is the cherry picking limited just to
the nuclear inspections? He can supply that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The review of past inspections conducted during the Commander's
Directed Investigation (CDI) of the incident didn't reveal any evidence
of ``cherry picking.''
The CDI that I led on behalf of the Commander of Air Combat Command
did not assess the entire nuclear inspection process across the Air
Force. The investigation was focused on past inspections that may have
revealed issues to how the unauthorized transfer of nuclear warhead
incident occurred. Therefore, I am not in a position to comment on the
nature of other inspections which were outside the review's assessment.
The Air Force Blue Ribbon Review (BRR) led by Major General Peyer
documented in their report that the current Inspector General (IG)
inspection process regarding Nuclear Surety Inspections was scheduled
as much as 18 months in advance of the unit's visit. As such, local
commanders were able to plan accordingly to ensure their unit's
readiness was at peak performance for the inspection. This allowed
commanders to pick their very best people, equipment, and often
negotiate the visit schedule that best supported the unit's mission.
This, the BRR found, led to many units' ``cherry-picking'' their best
and brightest and in the opinion of the review, did not present the
true capability of the unit. The BRR thus recommended the IG address
the possibility of transitioning to a no-notice or very limited notice
inspection process.
The Air Force is reviewing the nuclear inspection regime to
determine if we need to make adjustments to the scope and timing of our
inspection process.
Senator Warner. Good.
Chairman Levin. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for being here this morning. This
is a very serious incident and I have a particular interest in
it, serving both as the ranking member of the Readiness
Subcommittee and on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. I think
this incident illustrates an important point and that is that
everyone is human and humans make mistakes.
That said, obviously we can't tolerate mistakes on a
subject that is this important. Our system has to be robust
enough to protect us from human error. While I have every
confidence in the system, while this subject is very much at
the forefront of our minds, my concern would be that as we get
farther away in time from this incident that we'll have the
same loss of focus and perhaps erosion of procedures.
So what I'd like to do briefly this morning is I have some
questions that I'd be happy to submit for the record, but I
would like to at least ask a couple of questions, and maybe
start with kind of the broad view, the 30,000 foot view, if you
will. For that question, General Welch, I would simply say that
your report discusses a long-term perception that nuclear
forces and the nuclear deterrent mission are increasingly
devalued.
I guess the question is, in your view how do we regain the
focus and value of this mission, given current events in Iraq
and Afghanistan?
General Welch. Certainly the DOD and national security
leaders have plenty to occupy their attention. But if you will
search the Internet or anyplace else you might like to search
for statements from the senior leadership emphasizing the
importance of the strategic nuclear mission, I think you will
search in vain. So that the people out in the field who
maintain these weapons are bright people. They read, they
listen. Unless they hear some statements from senior people in
this government that what they do is important, they will only
hear those who say that we should get rid of these weapons,
that they're not important, that we don't need them any more.
They hear that drum beat and it is widely publicized, and you
don't hear the counter from leaders that say: Yes, it is
important; nuclear deterrence remains a key issue.
So I don't think it's any more complicated than that, sir.
Senator Thune. How would you gauge the current health of
the DOD nuclear weapons surety and safety?
General Welch. I think we have uncovered no safety issues,
although there are some scenarios where two or three things can
go wrong and you might be concerned. But most of our concerns
have been about surety. If you look at all the areas and all
the ways that we have to store and handle these weapons in
order to perform the mission, it just requires, we believe,
more resources and more attention than they're getting.
Now, that does not mean that the weapons are not secure.
They are as secure as they have ever been. It just means that,
as the standard goes up, which it has, there are technologies
that can be brought to bear. Some are not brought to bear
because of legal concerns. There are also resource needs that
are identified, but there are other priorities.
We are not in the business of telling the Department what
their priorities should be. We are in the business of
identifying where we think the capability gaps are, and we have
done so.
Senator Thune. General Peyer, in your blue ribbon review
you note: ``A consistent observation permeating this review is
the friction between the need for surety perfection and
operating in an environment of tightly constrained resources.''
In your view, how do we best overcome that friction?
General Peyer. We've already taken many steps. Balancing
the resources and the requirement is constantly on the plate of
our senior leaders. So as we looked at the blue ribbon review
and offered very specific areas where some investment and some
resources could be applied to ensure and enhance our nuclear
surety program, we've already submitted an unfunded
requirements list. I believe that was submitted on Friday, and
that would be for an unfunded list. As we go into the fiscal
year 2010 program objective memorandum (POM), we will pick up
on those and include those in our POM. So we've already begun
that realignment of priorities within our budget.
Senator Thune. I appreciate that answer, that with
constrained resources it's a challenge, and we're all facing
the challenge of trying to do a lot of things with a lot of
competing demands and a very limited amount of resources. But
how do you think we got to where we didn't allocate enough to
ensure nuclear weapons surety and safety, even in an
environment where we have constrained resources?
General Peyer. Senator, our review found that we still have
nuclear surety and it's a strong program. The constrained
resources does drive some mitigation strategies that we have. A
lot of times, if you don't have an asset you'll apply people
instead of an asset that you don't have, for example a piece of
equipment. Our aging infrastructure, test equipment for
example, nuclear weapons test equipment, is 25 or 30 years old.
So definitely a relook at recapitalizing that.
So as we've gone forward with our resource decisions we are
always analyzing exactly where those shortfalls are and we work
mitigation strategies to be able to reduce the risk.
Senator Thune. I see my time is up. I think we have a vote
on. So, Mr. Chairman, I do have a couple other questions, but
I'd be happy to enter those for the record.
Chairman Levin. You could take another minute or 2 if you
want.
Senator Thune. Let me just, if I could, ask General
Darnell. You're in charge of day-to-day operations for the Air
Force and I understand that the Air Force recently put out a
new instruction on nuclear weapons maintenance procedures. I
guess could you talk a little bit about what that instruction
changes, as well as some of the other steps that we've already
taken that will ensure that there is an appropriate long-term
fix?
General Darnell. Senator, custody transfer and
accountability have been several areas that we've looked at, as
well as tightening up standards on logistics movements,
security, and safety. We had some procedures, scheduling
procedures, that were violated there at Minot and those have
been fixed through a different venue, through Air Force
Instruction 21-205.
Most of the focus has been there in the logistical area to
ensure we tighten up those processes.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Let me just ask a couple more questions on this issue of
whether plutonium can be spread without a detonation. Just
checking with a member of my staff, who I think is an expert on
the subject, it says that what happened in Spain in apparently
the late 1960s or early 1970s, the reference that Senator
Nelson made, was where two American planes crashed, there was
no nuclear detonation, the weapons did not go critical, but
plutonium was scattered, and they're still cleaning up that
plutonium 30 years later.
So General Darnell, we'll need you to clarify that for the
record if you would, or any of you, if you want to comment on
that for the record. But it's a very important point.
Now, we want to secure these weapons in any event because
we want to secure them against theft. We've spent a lot of time
on securing nuclear weapons around the world. We have Nunn-
Lugar, which spends billions of dollars securing nuclear
material because we don't want them to fall into the wrong
hands.
But the question of whether or not planes that either crash
or have to jettison their weight because, their cargo, because
they're going to crash or whatever, surely it makes a
difference as to whether or not those pilots know they have
nuclear weapons, and it makes a difference for a number of
reasons. But one of them is that in the case of a crash or in
case of jettisoning, according to our information, the weapons
can indeed release plutonium, which would be highly dangerous
without a nuclear or high explosive detonation or without going
critical.
I would welcome any further comment from our panelists on
that at this point if you want to add anything. But if not, I
would ask General Darnell for the record if you would clarify
this point.
[The information referred to follows:]
Plutonium dispersal is virtually impossible without a high
explosive detonation. The W80 warhead is designed to resist detonation
and remain intact in an accident or jettison scenario. The W80 utilizes
insensitive high explosive (IHE) technology. IHE is designed to
decompose rather than detonate in a fire. The weapons were never armed
and the release of plutonium would have been highly unlikely in the
event of a crash or jettisoning scenario.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, do you want to add anything
before we go over to S-407 and vote, not in that order?
Senator Warner. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I just wish to point out
that it appears that you've had some clear manifestation here
of a breakdown in culture and so forth. But the inspection
regime did not catch it. Does this now require you to go back
and examine how you're going to reestablish the inspection
regime so that we won't have a repeat of this? In other words,
if this thing had persisted, this type of breakdown in culture,
for maybe a decade or more, clearly the periodic checks that go
on just didn't work out. Now you have to write a new system of
how you're going to inspect for these potential defects again?
General Darnell. Senator Warner, that's an area that we're
looking at very closely. Obviously, inspection-wise there are
areas that could be tightened up. Lieutenant General Ron Sams,
who is our inspector general, already has several proposals
that he wants to take to the next meeting that he has with
General Moseley and review those.
But as importantly is working with our Defense Threat
Reduction Agency partners and others as well, and we're
committed to doing that and we've already begun.
Senator Warner. Anybody else want to comment on that?
General Welch. Our report found that the problem with the
inspections is the scope is just too limited. For operational
readiness inspections, over time the scope has been more and
more limited, to the point where they really don't demonstrate
operational readiness.
Senator Warner. That's a pretty dramatic observation,
General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we've had a good hearing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Now, we're going to adjourn to S-407 and we'll be coming in
and out, a number of us, because we have eight rollcall votes
scheduled in a row this morning, with 10 minutes each. So it's
going to be a little bit chaotic. We very much appreciate all
the work you've put in on this matter, and we will see you all
up in S-407 as soon as we can get there.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
SPAIN INCIDENT
1. Senator Levin. General Darnell, in the 1966 incident in Spain,
there was a mid-air collision involving a B-2 and a tanker aircraft.
When two of the nuclear weapons fell to the ground, the conventional
high explosive in the nuclear weapon detonated. This explosion
scattered the plutonium in the weapons over a broad area. A second
accident occurred in 1968 when a B-52 crashed on landing and the
resulting fire caused a detonation of the conventional explosive
resulting in plutonium being scattered, although over a smaller area
than in the accident in Spain. There was no nuclear detonation in
either accident, correct?
General Darnell. Correct, there was no nuclear detonation in either
accident.
W80
2. Senator Levin. General Darnell, although the case on the W80 is
designed not to break open, if it did, is there a possibility that the
plutonium pit would also break, thereby exposing plutonium to the
atmosphere?
General Darnell. There is a very small, albeit not zero,
probability of plutonium release by mechanical means (crush, puncture,
etc.) in an aircraft accident. However the safety features of the W80
virtually eliminates the possibility of plutonium release in normal
environments, abnormal environments, and most combinations of abnormal
environments.
3. Senator Levin. General Darnell, although the conventional
explosive on the W80 is designed not detonate in the event of a fire,
is it possible that there would nevertheless still be an adverse effect
on the plutonium, depending on the temperature and duration of the
fire?
General Darnell. The W80 contains insensitive high explosive (IHE),
as opposed to conventional high explosive (CHE) used in older designs.
Some melting of the plutonium may occur, depending on the temperature
and duration of the fire.
4. Senator Levin. General Darnell, if the case on the W80 cracked
and there were a fire, what is the possible effect on the plutonium?
General Darnell. The use of IHE in the W80 has various advantages
over CHEs used in older designs such that it is less sensitive to
abnormal environments. One such advantage is its resistance to
detonation from induced heat from a fuel fire. Some melting of the
plutonium may occur, depending on the temperature and duration of the
fire. However, since the IHE would not detonate, no plutonium dispersal
would occur.
5. Senator Levin. General Darnell, if the pylon or an individual
missile was dropped during a severe storm, are there concerns about the
effect on the W80 if the case cracked, or if the case remained intact?
General Darnell. Any such event would be viewed with concern.
However, the W80 was designed and tested to withstand conditions that
might occur in transport and handling, to include being dropped while
mounted in a cruise missile.
6. Senator Levin. General Darnell, are there any circumstances
under which the conventional explosive in the W80 would detonate?
General Darnell. The W80 contains IHE, as opposed to CHE used in
older designs. IHE was developed to reduce vulnerability to fire and
impact, and virtually eliminates the possibility of accidental high
explosive detonation in normal environments, abnormal environments, and
most combinations of abnormal environments.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTIONS
7. Senator Warner. General Peyer, recommendation 12 of the Blue
Ribbon Review calls for the consolidation of responsibilities for
conducting nuclear surety inspections (NSI) into a single Air Force NSI
team and conducting NSIs on a limited- or no-notice basis. What is the
difference between a NSI and a nuclear operational readiness inspection
(NORI)?
General Peyer. An NSI is a compliance-based inspection that
evaluates a unit's ability to manage nuclear resources and comply with
all nuclear surety standards. A ``Satisfactory'' rating is given when a
unit clearly demonstrates that it can reliably handle nuclear weapons
in a safe and secure environment. NSIs are conducted at intervals not
to exceed 18 months and include evaluations of weapons maintenance
technical operations, storage and maintenance facilities, security,
safety, and logistics movement, among others areas. Successful
completion of an NSI validates unit nuclear surety and is the basis
upon which Major Command Commanders certify their units to conduct
nuclear operations. A NORI evaluates a unit's capability to meet their
nuclear wartime operational mission requirements (i.e., operational
employment of nuclear weapons). A unit must demonstrate the capability
to safely and reliably handle nuclear weapons via an NSI before they
can perform operations required by a NORI. There are instances where
both inspections evaluate common tasks and both cover nuclear surety.
An NSI provides more frequent checks on unit compliance related to
nuclear surety rules.
8. Senator Warner. General Peyer, which inspection reviews the
entire process from when a weapon is scheduled for transportation to
when it is loaded on the aircraft prior to departure?
General Peyer. Both NSIs and NORIs look at transportation of
nuclear weapons. This is an example where NSIs and NORIs overlap one
another. Transportation to wartime (combat) aircraft is inspected
during both NSIs and NORIs. However, the peacetime transportation of
nuclear weapons is only evaluated during NSIs (i.e., movement of a
weapon via prime nuclear airlift (C-17)). Peacetime movement of nuclear
weapons is not part of a unit wartime operational mission and is
therefore not evaluated during a NORI.
9. Senator Warner. General Peyer, recommendation 12 deals only with
NSI. If the problem is potentially associated with nuclear operational
readiness, then why is there not a corresponding recommendation to
bolster NORIs, to include no-notice inspections?
General Peyer. While nuclear surety and operational readiness do
overlap, several areas of our Blue Ribbon Review (BRR) charter were
really directed toward elements that influence the likely outcome of
NSIs, such as the training associated with the operation, maintenance,
storage, handling, transport and security of U.S. Air Force nuclear
weapons systems. However, the Defense Science Board Permanent Task
Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety recently completed an independent
assessment on the August 30, 2007, unauthorized movement of nuclear
warheads. The report included a recommendation to review the scope,
scale, and duration of NSIs and NORIs. This review is currently ongoing
and the Air Force Nuclear General Officers Steering Group (AFNGOSG),
comprised of the most senior leadership within the Air Force nuclear
community, validated the need to conduct this review.
STATE OF THE NUCLEAR MISSION FORCE
10. Senator Warner. General Peyer, in your report, you state that
previous reports and studies over the past two decades identified many
of the observations and recommendations contained in your report. One
such report, the Vice Chief of Staff's Institutional Support Review/
Special Management Review from 1998 is particularly mentioned having
many parallel conclusions. If the state of the nuclear mission force
was in decline for the past two decades, yet current inspection
processes failed to demonstrate that decline, is not that an indictment
of the current inspection regime?
General Raaberg. I don't believe that to be true. NSIs assess a
specific unit's compliance with nuclear surety standards, and the
unit's ability to reliably handle nuclear weapons in a safe and secure
manner. The focus of NSIs is not on the overall nuclear mission force,
nor do they assess Air Force cultural change. I would submit though,
that despite the end of the Cold War, and the change from a nuclear-
centered Air Force to a conventionally-centered Air Force, our
inspection system has been a primary contributor toward keeping airmen
focused on nuclear surety and nuclear operations. Our nuclear-capable
units are inspected on an 18-month cycle, which is more frequent than
our conventional operations. Over the years our inspection system has
identified deficiencies and analyzed trends related to the decline in
requisite nuclear experience throughout the nuclear community, and
these deficiencies and subsequent corrective actions have been
monitored by the Air Force's most senior leadership within the nuclear
community . . . the AFNGOSG, as well as the Inspectors General
responsible for conducting the inspections.
11. Senator Warner. General Welch, in your report you also mention
several reports over the past decade that called for a refocus on the
nuclear mission. Despite the numerous studies, few, if any, inspections
showed any concerns. If the state of the nuclear mission force was in
decline for the past two decades, yet current inspection processes
failed to demonstrate that decline, is not that an indictment of the
current inspection regime?
General Welch. As noted in the report, corrective actions were
implemented for many of the findings in the reports, but the corrective
actions were not lasting as attention to the mission waned above the
wing level. The inspection teams performed their assigned functions to
the apparent satisfaction of the leadership, The problem was that there
was not a commitment to the stressing level of demand needed to
discover the deficiencies.
EROSION OF PROCEDURES OVER TIME
12. Senator Warner. General Welch, you state, ``The process and
systemic problems that allowed such an incident have developed over
more than a decade and have the potential for much more serious
consequences.'' However, both installations involved were certified
through the current inspection processes as being capable of fulfilling
their stated mission without reservation. Given the lack of ability of
the inspection processes to uncover the systemic problems, how can we
have confidence in the inspection processes?
General Welch. As noted above, the individual inspections must
stress the unit sufficiently to uncover deficiencies. In the past era,
the inspected unit was required to generate the foil war plan
capability. That stressing demand provided confidence in the inspection
outcomes. My understanding is that the Combatant Command is demanding a
return to that standard and that the Air Force will support it.
13. Senator Warner. General Welch, if this has been a systemic
problem, is culpability limited only to the two wing commanders?
General Welch. I think it is clear that the neglect of the nuclear
enterprise was widespread, there has been little push-back on that
conclusion, and most of the entities with nuclear enterprise
responsibilities are taking action to restore the proper level of
attention.
NUCLEAR CODES OF CONDUCT
14. Senator Warner. General Welch, Admiral Rickover, who is
considered the Father of the Nuclear Navy, concerned himself very
deeply and directly with establishing and maintaining the
organizational culture of the naval nuclear propulsion program. In
1982, in a speech he gave at Columbia University which he titled,
``Doing a Job'', he described the essential elements of this
organizational culture--including the following: ``The man in charge
must concern himself with details. If he does not consider them
important, neither will his subordinates . . . it is hard and
monotonous to pay attention to seemingly minor matters . . . but when
the details are ignored, the project fails. No infusion of policy or
lofty ideals can then correct the situation.''
Are you confident that the recommendations laid out in the reviews
of this matter, when implemented, will reestablish the organizational
culture necessary to carry out a mission of such high consequence?
General Welch. General LeMay established a similar culture in
Strategic Air Command and that culture continued through decades of
successors leading Strategic Air Command. That culture endures to a
large degree in the Air Force ICBM forces. That same culture endures to
a large degree in the Navy nuclear forces long after Admiral Rickover's
departure. But these parts of the nuclear enterprise maintain a single
focus on a single mission and that strongly supports a continuing
culture. However, even in these forces, the culture is impacted by a
decline in the level of senior attention to the mission and the
widespread perception that what they do is of declining value in the
public perception. In the case of the bomber forces, the decline in the
culture was greatly accelerated by the demands on the bomber force for
support of conventional operations, This demand is the product of an
extraordinarily valuable capability to support ongoing combat
operations. This demand multiplied and accelerated the impact of the
decline in senior level and national attention.
The only assurance of a culture suitable to a mission of such high
consequence is restored and lasting senior level attention and national
support. Actions are underway to provide the first. I have no
projection on the second.
DISTINGUISHING THE NUCLEAR MISSION FROM OTHER MISSIONS
15. Senator Warner. General Raaberg, General Chilton, Commander,
United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), spoke to an audience in
Washington, DC, last month and was asked to give his thoughts regarding
how the nuclear mission compares to the other missions of STRATCOM. He
gave the following answer: ``We have a lot of balls we juggle every day
in this command. All but one of them are rubber. One is crystal. Most
of them that we drop, they're going to bounce. We can pick them back
up, throw them back into the stream and juggle them. But the nuclear
mission is a crystal ball. We cannot afford to drop that. This is a
mission area where we as human beings are challenged to be perfect. We
are not perfect. That is our challenge.'' Do you believe the Air Force
has a similarly clear view of what distinguishes the nuclear mission
from its other mission?
General Raaberg. Yes, I do. The Air Force nuclear mission is a ``no
fail'' business. We have rigid procedures in place to help our airmen
in their quest to be perfect. However, my investigation revealed an
erosion of our nuclear focus in some areas. The calculus has changed
over the years as we moved away from a nuclear deterrent bomber force
on constant alert. We used to be near a 1-to-1 nuclear to conventional
ratio. Today's ratio is closer to 1-to-20. Our challenge is to take the
right measures to balance the equation and refocus our nuclear
enterprise. We're moving in the right direction to do just that as we
prosecute the collective recommendations from the recent
investigations.
As a side note, I didn't observe the same erosion in the
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base. Their
calculus has remained constant over the years.
MISSION FOCUS AND TRAINING
16. Senator Warner. General Peyer, appendix F of your review lists
the many questions you posited to the wings. If you can, please
summarize the answers you received to two of them: On mission focus,
``Are inspection results indicative of unit capability?'' and on
training, ``Do you believe Air Force training requirements adequately
prepare the members of your unit to accomplish their nuclear
responsibilities?''
General Peyer. These questions were presented to leaders at the
squadron, group and wing levels. In response to the question, ``Are
inspection results indicative of unit capability?'', there was almost
an even split between those who stated `affirmative' versus `negative.'
Those responding `affirmative' indicated the inspections are a fair
assessment. The negative responses were diverse, however, there was a
recurring suggestion to conduct unannounced inspections, and this is a
suggestion the Air Force Inspector General is exploring. While our
current policies do not preclude no-notice inspections, the Inspector
General is exploring the feasibility of requiring no-notice
inspections. In response to the question ``Do you believe Air Force
training requirements adequately prepare the members of your unit to
accomplish their nuclear responsibilities?'', most respondents stated
`affirmative'. However, there were concerns that declining experience
could potentially be linked to a reduction in training frequency and
quality. Several recommendations in our BRR addressed training needs.
One in particular recommended providing more robust training to U.S.
Air Force personnel to reinforce the primacy of the nuclear mission
(BRR Recommendation #3.2.2.3) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, Plans, and Requirements (AF A3/5) has taken this
recommendation for action and is evaluating training needs.
ENHANCING NUCLEAR SCIENCE AS A CAREER FIELD
17. Senator Warner. General Welch, your report, as well as the Blue
Ribbon Panel report, both found that the nuclear mission has been
devalued and that, as a result, it is challenging to recruit and retain
the best and brightest young airmen into nuclear-related positions. The
civilian nuclear power industry experienced similar challenges after
the Three Mile Island incident, and the subsequent cancellation of most
new power plant orders in the United States. This Nation is still
dependent, however, on existing nuclear power plants for 20 percent of
our electricity generation. How do we, as an Air Force, or as a Nation,
address the challenge of attracting young people to fields, such as
nuclear science, upon which our national security and our prosperity
depend?
General Welch. This question is well beyond the scope of the
Permanent Task Force report so my answer is a personal view informed by
more than two decades of interface with the Department of Defense (DOD)
and the Department of Energy nuclear enterprise. Those who claim we no
longer need a viable nuclear deterrent and those who oppose nuclear
power plants receive widespread attention to include editorials in
major newspapers and invitations to speak in public forums. In
contrast, those who believe that nuclear capabilities remain critically
important to national security and that nuclear power provides a safe
and clean contribution to energy independence are largely silent.
Further, when they emerge from the state of silence, they are unheard.
Those who spend their daily lives in the nuclear enterprise are bright
and well read and they are very aware of all of the above.
The supporters of a reliable, safe, and secure nuclear deterrent
and supporters of nuclear power for electricity have a more compelling
story and can claim to be more aligned with the interests of the
American public. For example, the poster child for opponents of nuclear
power is Three Mile Island. The poster child for those who support
nuclear power should be 104 nuclear power plants in the United States
that have been operating safely and efficiently for years, that meet
one-fifth of the Nation's electrical power needs, and that could be
expanded to meet a much larger share of that growing need. Yet, few
Americans are aware of this large, safe, and efficient nuclear power
industry in the United Stales. Until informed supporters of nuclear
deterrence and nuclear power speak up, it will be difficult to attract
and retain the needed talent
18. Senator Warner. General Welch, how do we revive these fields as
the prestige areas they once were?
General Welch. The answer to 17 applies. In addition, within DOD,
there must be clearly articulated and visible senior level support for
the importance of the nuclear enterprise, regardless of the shrinking
size of the enterprise needed to meet national security needs in the
current and expected global environment.
[Whereupon, at 10:25 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
