109th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session 109-52
_______________________________________________________________________
EMBASSIES AS COMMAND POSTS IN THE ANTI-TERROR CAMPAIGN
__________
A Report to Members
of the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
Richard G. Lugar, Chairman
One Hundred Ninth Congress
Second Session
December 15, 2006
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
31-324 WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ÿ091800
Fax: (202) 512ÿ092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402ÿ090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Overview
Findings..................................................... 1
Recommendations.............................................. 2
Introduction
Purpose of Study............................................. 4
The Threat................................................... 5
Getting the Response Right................................... 5
Developments in U.S. Embassies
New Role for the U.S. Military............................... 6
Section 1206 Security Assistance......................... 7
Special Operations Forces................................ 8
Development and Humanitarian Assistance.................. 8
Public Information....................................... 9
Reactions from the Field..................................... 9
Problems and Challenges.................................. 11
Regional Findings
Latin America................................................ 13
Africa....................................................... 14
Asia......................................................... 15
Middle East.................................................. 16
Appendixes
Appendix I
Executive branch answers to questions submitted on June 23,
2006 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee............. 19
Appendix II
Section 1206 FY 06-Funded Programs........................... 25
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
December 15, 2006.
Dear Colleagues:
I recently sent 6 Senate Foreign Relations Committee
majority staff members to some 20 countries in Latin America,
Africa, Asia and the Middle East to examine the relationship
between the State Department and the Defense Department in our
embassies. I asked them to focus on the agencies' cooperation
on counterterrorism strategy, policies and activities, giving
special attention to foreign assistance and the military's new
Section 1206 funding.
This report is only the first chapter of what I hope will
become a continuing examination of ways in which our government
can strengthen our posture overseas and better ensure our
effectiveness against terrorism. The report points out both
pitfalls and opportunities. It makes clear the increasingly
instrumental role that the U.S. ambassador plays in making
judgment calls that will affect our success or our failure.
There is no country in the world where our Nation can afford to
send diplomats ill-prepared to understand and make the tough
choices. Nor can we as a Congress continue to undervalue the
role of the civilian agencies if we want to ensure that our
response to violent extremism is calibrated, supported by an
appropriate mix of civilian and military tools.
The report contains findings and recommendations that form
the basis for continuing committee oversight that is alert to
potential problems. It is overseas where the campaign against
terror will be won or lost. As a country, we must have the
right tools, people and programs to succeed.
Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman.
EMBASSIES AS COMMAND POSTS IN THE ANTI-TERROR CAMPAIGN
----------
Overview
Protecting Americans from terrorist attacks within the
United States depends, to a great extent, on U.S. success
overseas. The task is vast and worldwide. It requires enlisting
host country police to track and capture terrorists, uncovering
terrorist financing, sharing intelligence with foreign
partners, strengthening border surveillance in remote and
unpopulated regions and building partnerships with foreign
militaries. In the longer run, it requires convincing entire
societies to reject terrorist propaganda and recruitment. A
successful counterterrorism policy depends on strong
relationships with foreign governments and the people residing
in countries on every continent.
Embassies are on the frontline in the overseas campaign
against terror and demands on ambassadors, staffs, and physical
facilities have increased exponentially. Since September 11,
2001, embassies have hosted a continuing influx of inter-agency
personnel tasked with the full range of counterterrorism
activities.
Under the direction of Chairman Richard G. Lugar, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee majority staff visited selected
embassies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East,
as well as the headquarters of four combatant commands, to
focus specifically on the civilian/military nexus. He asked
staff to assess whether the State and Defense Departments are
working together overseas in a way that contributes to
overarching U.S. foreign policy goals in the individual
countries and in the regions.
FINDINGS
1. The number of military personnel and Defense Department
activities in non-combat countries is increasing
significantly. Left unclear, blurred lines of authority
between the State Department and the Defense Department
could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the
effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against
terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in
Washington where interagency differences on strategies,
tactics and divisions of labor are increasingly
adjudicated.
2. While finding, capturing, and eliminating individual
terrorists and their support networks is an imperative
in the war against terror, it is repairing and building
alliances, pursuing resolutions to regional conflicts,
fostering democracy and development, and defusing
religious extremism worldwide that will overcome the
terrorist threat in the long-term. It has traditionally
been the military's mission to take direct action
against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies'
mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures
through diplomacy, international information
programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a
result of inadequate funding for civilian programs,
however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being
granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps.
Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas
from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the
Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for
U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary
of Defense's focus on war fighting.
3. The increases of funding streams, self-assigned missions,
and realigned authorities for the Secretary of Defense
and the combatant commanders are placing new stresses
on inter-agency coordination in the field. Currently,
overlapping missions and inter-agency frictions are,
for the most part, refereed by the U.S. ambassador and
other State Department leadership in the embassy with
intermittent referral to headquarters for guidance.
But, as the role of the military expands, particularly
in the area of foreign assistance, embassy officials in
some countries question whether the Department of
Defense will chafe under the constraints of State
Department leadership and work for still more authority
and funding.
4. There is evidence that some host countries are questioning
the increasingly military component of America's
profile overseas. Some foreign officials question what
appears to them as a new emphasis by the United States
on military approaches to problems that are not seen as
lending themselves to military solutions. Host country
militaries clearly welcome increased professional
contact and interaction with the U.S. military.
However, some host countries have elements in both
government and general society who are highly
suspicious of potential American coercion. There is no
sense so far that foreign hosts believe the U.S.
military is dominating U.S. policy in-country, but if
such a perception were to gain hold, it would give
ammunition to U.S. adversaries. More importantly, it
would weaken the bilateral relationships that are
necessary to win the war against terror. Likewise, one
misstep or poorly calculated military or other
operation can significantly set back the full range of
U.S. counterterrorism efforts in an entire region.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Role of the Ambassador. In the campaign against terror,
the leadership qualities of the U.S. ambassador have become a
determinative factor in victory or failure.
It is imperative that the U.S. ambassador provide
strong leadership, steady oversight, and a firm hand on
the component parts of all counterterrorism activities
in U.S. embassies overseas. This includes the authority
to challenge and override directives from other
government agencies in Washington to their resident or
temporary staffs in the embassy.
The President must send to the Senate as nominees
for ambassadorships only those candidates who are
qualified for the sensitive and important post-9/11
role of U.S. ambassador.
In considering the President's nominees, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and, subsequently
the full Senate, should renew a commitment to insist on
the qualities of experienced judgment, knowledge of
inter-agency missions and activities, and a solid
grounding in the culture and politics of the region to
which the candidate is expected to be assigned.
The SFRC, during the confirmation process, should
make it clear that Members will hold the regional
assistant secretaries and the ambassador accountable
for mishaps or setbacks that could have been avoided
through informed and engaged leadership in-country.
Ambassadors should be charged with the decision
whether to approve all military-related programs
implemented in-country. That would include Section 1206
security assistance, humanitarian and development
assistance, and other programs and operations. In
countries with MISTs (Military Information Support
Teams), the ambassador must similarly approve or
disapprove all military-produced informational material
and MIST personnel should work under the direction of
the country team's public affairs officer.
In the case of special forces, the Ambassador's
authority over military activities in-country should be
made clear in a memorandum of understanding with the
relevant regional combatant commands. Such authority
would include approving any mission, monitoring its
implementation, and terminating it if necessary. An
alternate, more systemic solution would be a global
memorandum of agreement covering all special forces
activities in-country, signed by the Secretaries of
State and Defense.
2. Organizing Foreign Assistance. Some countries are now
receiving between a quarter and half of their U.S. foreign
assistance in the form of security assistance. In one country
visited, security assistance is the only form of foreign aid
being provided by the U.S. government. Section 1206 assistance,
with the exception of Lebanon and Pakistan, is not addressing
threats to the United States that are so immediate it cannot be
included in normal budget processes. The Secretary of State
should insist that all security assistance, including Section
1206 funding, be included under his/her authority in the new
process for rationalizing and prioritizing foreign assistance.
Country team meetings organized by the Director of Foreign
Assistance at the State Department should include military
representatives in cases where the country is a recipient or
potential recipient of military funding. Otherwise, there is no
guarantee that the mix of civilian and military assistance will
be effectively balanced to most directly address the terrorist
threat.
3. Rationalizing Missions and Money. The current budgets
of the civilian foreign affairs agencies do not reflect their
key role in the conduct of the war against terror. In fact, it
can be argued that the disparity in the ratio between
investments in military versus civilian approaches threatens
U.S. success.
The executive branch should undertake a disciplined,
coordinated and transparent approach to identifying
both civilian and military counterterrorism priorities
overseas, assigning appropriate roles, missions, and
divisions of labor among federal agencies, and
requesting robust funding to achieve those priorities.
The legislative branch should fund the civilian
foreign affairs agencies, particularly the State
Department and the U.S. Agency for International
Development, at a minimum to the level requested by the
President. Continuing to deny the President his foreign
affairs budget by billions of dollars below what he
requests is undermining U.S. national interests. The
current 12:1 ratio of military spending to spending on
the diplomatic and civilian foreign aid agencies risks
the further encroachment of the military, by default,
into areas where civilian leadership is more
appropriate because it does not create resistance
overseas and is more experienced.
The administration should develop a comprehensive
budget for foreign assistance that incorporates
economic, development, humanitarian, security and
military assistance. All foreign assistance programs
should be funded through the foreign assistance
accounts, as administered by the Department of State.
If foreign assistance is, contrary to this
recommendation, to be funded through both the 150
foreign affairs account and the 050 defense account,
the Secretary of State should retain primary authority
over its planning and implementation. Otherwise, there
is the risk of undermining the Secretary of State's
role both in Washington and in embassies as the manager
of bilateral relationships and as the chief arbiter of
foreign policy decisions.
4. Regional Strategic Initiative. The Secretary of State
should regularize and expand the Department's Regional
Strategic Initiative comprised of regional meetings of
ambassadors, regional assistant secretaries, and senior
interagency personnel, including the combatant commands, to
focus specifically on the terrorism threat and appropriate
counterterrorism responses. With the rapid expansion of
counterterrorism activities and the increasing need for
interagency agreement in the field on strategies as well as
tactics, such meetings should occur at the most senior level
possible, with ambassadors themselves actively engaged and
involved.
Introduction
Purpose of Study. Civilian-military cooperation has always
been important, but the breadth and complexities of the
terrorist threat make it even more essential today. In a June
23, 2006 meeting with State Department Counselor Philip Zelikow
and Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman, the two assured
Chairman Lugar that counterterrorism strategy, policies and
activities are being well coordinated at headquarters in
Washington DC. They also said that U.S. ambassadors are
exercising their full authority to support and oversee
activities in the field. To follow-up, the Chairman dispatched
six Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff to twenty
countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East
to see what was happening in the embassies and how coordination
was working on the ground.\1\ Staff also interviewed a number
of U.S. ambassadors attending the Central and East Africa
Ambassadors Conference hosted by EUCOM headquarters October 17-
19, 2006. The Chairman tasked staff with looking at the new
Section 1206 security assistance program, other military-
provided assistance, military-to-military relations, and the
deployment of special operations forces to non-combat
countries. They also assessed the ability of U.S. ambassadors
and State Department officials in key embassies to support,
provide guidance and oversee military activities in-country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Dominican Republic, Panama, Argentina, Ecuador, Guyana, Chad,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Gabon, Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal,
Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Yemen, Lebanon, and Pakistan.
The Threat. U.S. intelligence estimates that al-Qa'ida
continues to be the greatest threat posed by a single terrorist
organization. But the global terrorist movement, consisting of
al-Qa'ida, other independent terrorist groups, and some self-
generating cells operating as freelancers, is spreading and
becoming more geographically dispersed. The underlying factors
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
fueling the spread of violent jihadism are judged to be:
1. Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and
fear of Western domination, leading to anger,
humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness;
2. The Iraq ``jihad'';
3. The slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and
political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and
4. Pervasive anti-U.S. sentiment among most Muslims.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence
Estimate ``Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United
States'' dated April 2006.
Anti-U.S. and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise,
according to the intelligence community. The conjecture is made
that this could fuel other radical ideologies, prompting some
leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist
methods to attack U.S. interests. At this point, there is
little evidence in the countries visited that this is
happening, though the possibility cannot be dismissed entirely
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and warrants continuous monitoring.
Getting the Response Right. With such a diffuse threat
created by broad underlying factors, tensions arise among
competing U.S. needs and goals. Knowledgeable officials,
whether in uniform or not, can reasonably disagree on the right
course of action, especially when it comes to U.S. policy
within a specific foreign country.
For example, there is clearly a need in several countries
visited to strengthen the host country's security forces to go
after terrorists and secure borders. But there is also the need
in the same countries to support a fragile government's ability
to maintain civilian control over the armed forces, protect
civilians from abuses that have been committed in the past by
the same military, and avoid propping up a repressive
government.
In other countries, there is the need to pursue terrorists
and attack terrorist cells in areas where the government itself
is not present or able to take action. The urgency of capturing
or killing known terrorists must be considered within the
context of respect for the host country's sovereignty, the need
to retain mutual trust between the United States and the host
country, and the risk of involvement in murky local disputes.
There can also develop honest disagreements about the
threat that is being faced. In one country, some analysts see a
specific group as posing a global threat with al-Qa'ida ties,
while others see it as locally oriented, weakening, and
reaching out for any source of help as it struggles for
survival. The issue is a regular item on the embassy-team
discussion agenda. Which side of the argument prevails will
determine how urgently military action will be considered.
In cases where all agree on strategy, tactics can become a
point of contention. In one country, the embassy team is in
full agreement that it is necessary to support moderate Muslim
voices in the ongoing discussions within the Islamic faith. But
some who wanted to feature a prominent Muslim cleric in a U.S.-
produced program were opposed by others who do not want to risk
tainting an independent moderate with Western approval. The
need for robust public affairs programs is tempered in all
embassies by the equally compelling need to avoid sparking more
widespread anti-Western antipathy through heavy-handed or inept
messages.
In the area of economic and development assistance, there
is an overwhelming need in many countries to address the
poverty and slow pace of economic growth that is seen as an
underlying grievance leading to religious extremism. But there
is also an underlying tension between the desperate need for
more assistance and the risk of developing the negative image
of using such assistance as a transparent effort to gain
military access or improve local intelligence gathering.
Developments in U.S. Embassies
NEW ROLE FOR THE U.S. MILITARY
The U.S. military has taken on numerous new tasks in the
war against terror that are resulting in its having greater
presence in embassies. Following the September 11 attacks,
combatant commanders were directed by the Secretary of Defense
to develop plans within their areas of responsibility that
would identify and eliminate terrorists, as well as identify
and influence regions susceptible to terrorist influence.
Some tasks are traditional boots-on-the-ground military
missions. Some of the new tasks have military content, but are
not necessarily war fighting. For example, there is a new
security assistance program intended to boost recipient
nations' ability to partner with the U.S. military in the war
against terror. Still other new tasks go well beyond what one
would normally consider to be a soldier's job, for example
digging wells, building schools, and providing public affairs
programming.
The defense attache has long been an important member of
the embassy team. He serves as the ambassador's advisor on
military issues and the contact with the host nation's
military. Depending on the quantity of military assistance, the
embassy also hosts an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) which
is the in-country coordinator of such programs as the foreign
military financing (FMF) program, the Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI), a train-and-equip program for international
peacekeepers, and the international military education and
training program (IMET). FMF, GPOI, and IMET are funded in the
civilian foreign affairs budget, directed by the Secretary of
State, and carried out by the Defense Department. The level of
assistance available in the foreign affairs 150 account for
security assistance is a consistent source of frustration for
Defense Department officials. European Command (EUCOM)
officials pointed out that only $6 million in FMF funding was
available for their entire region of responsibility in Africa.
There has been a longstanding question as to whether such
security assistance programs should be funded from the civilian
foreign affairs budget or the military budget. When the issue
has arisen in the past, the decision has been made both in the
executive and legislative branches that they should remain in
the 150 foreign affairs account under the authority of the
Secretary of State. This is rooted in the fundamental belief
that determinations as to what countries should receive U.S.
military equipment and training, and the extent and type of
such training, is fundamentally a foreign policy decision.
Section 1206 Security Assistance. In Afghanistan and Iraq,
the executive branch requested and the legislative branch
granted the Department of Defense the authority and funding to
train and equip the militaries and police forces in both
countries without going through the State Department. The
Department of Defense also received authority to reimburse
coalition partners for logistical and military support provided
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Subsequently, the executive branch
requested that these train and equip authorities be extended
worldwide.
Department of Defense officials, uniformed and civilian,
argued that the Department needed the new authority for time-
sensitive and urgent terrorism threats to the United States
that could not wait for the normal budget process applicable to
the traditional programs under State Department authority. They
also argued that the additional amounts necessary in a post-9/
11 world would not be possible from the strapped 150 foreign
affairs budget.
In response, the legislative branch granted but
circumscribed the requested authority in the 2006 National
Defense Authorization Act. Called Section 1206 assistance after
its place in the bill, the amount of the assistance was limited
to $200 million as opposed to the $750 million requested and
allowed only for training and equipping military rather than
police forces. It mandated that the President direct the
Secretary of Defense to conduct the programs, in order to
ensure inter-agency vetting overseen by the Office of
Management and Budget. The law also requires that the
Secretaries of Defense and State ``jointly formulate'' any
program and that it be ``coordinated'' with the Secretary of
State in implementation. The law also requires that the Section
1206 program comply with various laws generally applicable to
the provision of military assistance.
In the most recent defense authorization bill, again hard-
pressed by the Defense Department, Members of Congress dropped
the requirement that Section 1206 assistance be provided only
upon direction by the President and gave the authority directly
to the Secretary of Defense. The amount was increased to $300
million.
Section 1206 security assistance is now being extended to
some 14 countries: Algeria, Chad, the Dominican Republic,
Indonesia, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Sao
Tome and Principe, Thailand, Yemen, Senegal, and Sri Lanka. A
number of the 2006 projects focus on strengthening recipient
countries' coast guard equivalents or navies. Thailand,
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, and the
Dominican Republic and Panama are receiving 1206 funding for
maritime surveillance and communications equipment and
training. The administration continues to seek partners willing
and able to participate in the Proliferation Security
Initiative, an American-led multilateral effort to coordinate
and develop procedures for intercepting smugglers of
unconventional weapons. Gaining greater control of maritime
transportation routes can reduce drug and gun trafficking,
exploitation of human beings, pirating and other illegal
activities. Other programs in Yemen and in the Trans-Sahara
focus on increasing the recipient nations' ability to secure
land borders and track and attack terrorist networks.
Overall in fiscal year 2006, $200 million in funding was
appropriated. Only $100 million of that amount has been
obligated, an indication that the initially claimed urgency for
the funding was questionable. In the 2007 budget, $300 million
has been authorized for Section 1206 funding and a request of
$750 million is expected for 2008.
Special Operations Forces. The Special Operations Command
takes the lead for planning, synchronizing, and as directed,
executing global operations against terrorists and their
networks. Beyond its instrumental role in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the Command has provided to regional commands some 1,000
special operations troops for service in 50 different
countries. Its baseline budget has increased 81 percent since
9/11 from $4 billion to almost $8 billion. According to
Commander General Bryan D. Brown, special forces are expected
to grow by some 13,000 personnel over the next five years.
Special operations forces are part of the new mix of
military personnel at U.S. embassies and provide information to
their relevant combatant commanders. They also undertake
military-to-military training, specifically for counter-
terrorism. Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) teams arrive
for short duration training of some one to three weeks and
Joint Planning and Assistance (JPAT) teams are embedded for
long-term training, with U.S. trainers rotating on a six-month
schedule.
Development and Humanitarian Assistance. In Afghanistan
and Iraq, the military has often had to take on emergency
reconstruction tasks. There has been an effort to create a more
robust civilian capability to work in hostile environments, but
the State Department-organized effort is still nascent and
civilian agencies, especially USAID, are still cobbling
together ad hoc teams that, while talented and dedicated, are
limited in number. As a result, military civil affairs teams
have built bridges, schools and hospitals, organized local
political councils, and provided humanitarian relief. Much of
the funding came from the Commanders Emergency Response Program
(CERP), initially supported by the hundreds of millions of
dollars found in Saddam Hussein's secret caches throughout
Iraq. Subsequently, the Congress appropriated funding from the
Department of Defense budget for the CERP, and included funds
for firefighting, repair of damage to oil facilities and
related infrastructure, and medical assistance to Iraqi
children.
Building on the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
Defense Department requested and received authority to broaden
a previously existing Combatant Commander Initiative Fund to
allow combatant commanders to carry out such projects in any
countries where military operations are being conducted.
Combatant Commanders are now funding joint military exercises,
military education and training, and humanitarian and civic
projects that include medical and veterinary care, construction
of transportation systems, wells, sanitation facilities, and
landmine clearance and education.
Such an expansion of military-provided humanitarian and
civic assistance is nowhere more evident than in the Horn of
Africa. U.S. Central Command oversees some 1800 troops
stationed at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, who are tasked with
building health clinics, wells and schools in remote areas
where government influence is weak and terrorists are known to
be recruiting. In an effort to provide evidence of alternatives
to religious extremism, small military teams train local
forces, gain access and gather information, and provide
practical assistance in an attempt to improve the lives of
local residents in areas that terrorists may be targeting.
Staff found that country teams in embassies with USAID
presence are far more capable of ensuring sufficient review of
military humanitarian assistance projects than those that have
no USAID office. Budgetary cutbacks at USAID, affecting both
personnel and programs, are repeatedly cited as a deficiency in
the U.S. campaign against extremism in susceptible regions of
the world.
Public Information. The Defense Department has taken on
the additional mission under the direction of the Secretary of
Defense to counter terrorist propaganda in key regions and
countries of the world. The purpose is to discourage sympathy
for terrorists and their efforts to recruit, marginalize
radical Islamic ideology, and increase popular support for U.S.
operations and multilateral counterterrorism activities. In one
of its most recent forays into the civilian world of
international public affairs broadcasting, the Pentagon has
produced a report that is highly critical of the Broadcasting
Board of Governors radio and TV broadcasting into Iran.
In embassies, military teams of 3-4 persons are being sent
to key countries to carry out informational programs. There are
currently 18 such deployments, expected to rise to 30 countries
if current plans are realized.
REACTIONS FROM THE FIELD
Ambassadors in every country pursue a wide-ranging agenda
running the gamut from managing the overall relationship with
the host country to resolving trade disputes and rescuing
Americans in trouble. All ambassadors interviewed by the staff,
with the exception of Thailand, reported an increase in
military personnel in their embassies since 9/11. One
ambassador heading a small embassy in Africa reported that
American uniformed personnel may outnumber civilian personnel
within the year.
All ambassadors interviewed see the war on terror as a top
priority and the military components of the embassy as one tool
that can be used to address it. For the most part, ambassadors
welcome the additional resources that the military brings and
they see strong military-to-military ties as an important
ingredient in a strong bilateral relationship. Nonetheless,
State and USAID personnel often question the purposes,
quantity, and quality of the expanded military activities in-
country.
Ambassadors are the President's personal representative and
top U.S. official in-country. Every ambassador has country
clearance authority. Often permission to work at the embassy is
granted routinely to inter-agency personnel coming on either
permanent or temporary assignment. But every ambassador has the
power to deny clearance or to suspend it once granted. As one
U.S. ambassador stated, ``The rule is if you're in country, you
work for the ambassador. If you don't think you work for the
ambassador, you don't get country clearance to come in.''
In most cases, ambassadors seemed informed about U.S.
military activities in-country and appeared willing and able to
provide leadership. In three embassies visited, however,
ambassadors appeared overwhelmed by the growing presence of
military personnel and insistent requests from combatant
commanders. Neither were the ambassadors as knowledgeable on
the breadth of military activity in country as they should have
been. In one case, an ambassador to a country that is receiving
Section 1206 funding had not heard of the program. In several
cases, embassy staff saw their role as limited to a review of
choices already made by ``the military side of the house.''
There are successes to report that can provide models to
new ambassadors. The ambassador to Yemen appears to have
developed one of the best procedures for initiating Section
1206 requests. The Embassy's Office of Defense Cooperation
(ODC) works closely with the Yemeni Ministry of Defense to
identify needs. The ODC vets these requests through the country
team, discussing them with the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM),
the political section chief, and a political officer who covers
counterterrorism issues full-time. The Ambassador approves the
submission to Washington.
In Thailand, though all military assistance has been
suspended due to the September 19 coup, the ambassador's deputy
chief of mission previously served as a political-military
officer, so the ambassador reports a ``front office that has a
good degree of background knowledge about and sensitivity to
the military dimensions of the bilateral relationship.''
Another ambassador warned against delegating oversight of
military programs and activities to the defense attache or
other military components of the embassy. ``The front office
must be kept informed, must know when key decisions need to be
made, and must make them,'' he said.
An ambassador to an African country described the situation
in his embassy in this way: ``We are a small number of people,
in a tight community, with a clear hierarchy. The military
respects hierarchy and clarity.'' He reports that when he has
objections to programs or activities, he says no. EUCOM has a
lot of the money to spend ``and the atmosphere is that we want
to do something with it. My attitude is, `The first principle
is do no harm'.'' He recently suspended country clearance to
one military official. The person was gone the next day.
Problems and Challenges. Despite the welcome arrival of
new money and other resources to the country team, the increase
in military presence and activities has created challenges and
raised reservations and questions.
Decisions to take action against terrorists in-country
require the approval of the Secretary of Defense and ``are
coordinated with'' the ambassadors, according to Department of
Defense guidelines. The State Department perspective is that
ambassadors have full authority over all U.S. government
activities in country. While such nuanced differences may seem
obscure, they are bound to cause problems. One route toward
clarity would be the inclusion of new military elements under
the National Security Decision Directive-38 (NSDD-38) process.
This would ``regularize'' their presence in country,
specifically placing them under the ambassador's authority,
allowing diplomatic privileges and immunities to be requested
for them, and authorizing routine compensation from the
Department of Defense for their administrative expenses. The
Department of Defense has argued against this process, noting
that some military components are part of the relevant
combatant command.
Some but not all ambassadors have insisted on having
memoranda of understanding (MOUs) signed with the regional
combatant commander to clarify lines of authority. The
situation should not be left for resolution in the heat of the
moment. All ambassadors should pursue MOUs on military presence
that reports to the combatant commander and on the broader
issue of military action in country. Or the Department of State
should pursue a more systemic solution offered by a global
memorandum of agreement between the Secretaries of State and
Defense. But it is important to get lines of authority
questions sorted out before directives from the ambassador and
the combatant commander conflict in an urgent situation.
Authority is one issue. Value-added is another. Civilian
embassy staff in a number of countries expressed skepticism
about the need for and the potential for error by new military
personnel. While those sent to work in embassies are expected
to be seasoned and experienced professionals, some are seen as
poorly trained in information-gathering and only rarely have
regional or linguistic expertise. Rotational tours of only six
months limit expertise acquired on-the-job. In several
countries, embassy officials say that the time required to
bring military personnel up to speed, monitor their activities,
and prevent them from doing damage is not compensated for by
contributions they make to the embassy team. There are notable
exceptions to such criticism. In Lebanon, new military
components in the embassy provided information on appropriate
routes in connection with the emergency evacuation of several
thousand Americans during the conflict between Hizballah and
Israel in the summer of 2006.
On the issue of Section 1206 funding, regional programs
initiated by the combatant commands are not receiving the same
embassy input as bilateral programs. In the case of the Trans-
Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative, at least one embassy did
not realize that its country had been selected to receive
assistance until well after the President announced it in May
2006. The ambassador subsequently objected to the assistance
and prevailed. In the case of the Gulf of Guinea initiative,
the embassy team that covers Sao Tome and Principe did not know
that its participation was being considered until well into the
process. EUCOM briefed the ambassador a month after the
President's announcement and gained the ambassador's
support.\1\ Further, Equatorial Guinea, a problematic country
that is situated in the strategic Gulf of Guinea, was on the
original Presidential list of Section 1206 countries before
being removed following congressional scrutiny.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Preliminary findings of GAO report on 1206 funding to be
completed in January 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether the mix of military and civilian foreign assistance
is appropriate is another issue. In the Caribbean, for example,
there will be some $7.5 million in Section 1206 funding for the
Dominican Republic for interceptor boats and maritime
communications and training, while only $800,000 in U.S. funds
is going into public diplomacy. If the terrorist threat is the
transit of people and equipment across the island and into the
United States, Senate staff questioned whether it would be
wiser to spend as much money on public information and an
informants' program as on trying to intercept a couple of boats
making their way to the United States through Caribbean waters.
In this case, as in others, it is clear that Section 1206
funding, while useful to address drug-trafficking and a future
potential terrorist threat, is not the time-sensitive, urgent
need that cannot wait for the normal budget process.
There is evidence that some host country nationals are
questioning the increasingly military component of America's
profile overseas. In Uganda, a military civil affairs team went
to the northern part of the country to help local communities
build wells, erect schools and carry out other small
development projects to help mitigate the consequences of a
long-running regional conflict. Local NGOs questioned whether
the military was there to take sides in the conflict. In
Ethiopia, military humanitarian action teams were ordered out
of the region near the Somali border due to Ethiopian
sensitivities that their presence could spark cross-border
hostilities. Whether the humanitarian task force should try to
return is still a source of disagreement within embassy team
discussions. In Latin America especially, military and
intelligence efforts are viewed with suspicion, making it
difficult to pursue meaningful cooperation on a
counterterrorism agenda.
Some ambassadors alluded to problems with broad
implications for the role of the Department of State. One
ambassador lamented that his effectiveness in representing the
United States to foreign officials was beginning to wane, as
more resources are directed to special operations forces and
intelligence. Foreign officials are ``following the money'' in
terms of determining which relationships to emphasize, he
reported. A problem cited throughout every region is the under-
staffing of the civilian side of embassies, a situation
corroborated by General Accounting Office findings.\4\ The
military has significantly more money and personnel and is so
energetic in pursuing its newly created programs and in
thinking up new ones, that maintaining a management hand on
military activities is increasingly difficult, according to one
ambassador. In posts throughout the world, civilian staff point
to the ``Iraq tax'' and cite instances of civilian job slots
emptied and remaining unfilled as personnel and resources are
funneled into the effort in Iraq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate; ``Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language
Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps''; August 2006;
GAO-06-894.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regional Findings
Latin American suspicions of American pressure and what is
seen as an unspoken threat of military intervention run deep.
Within this context, however, military-to-military ties are
often welcomed and are longstanding in many countries.
Latin Americans see themselves more as the victims of
narco-terrorism, where drug money fuels anti-government
insurgents, rather than global terrorism. Only Argentina has
experienced an actual Islamic fundamentalist attack. In July
1994, a van packed with explosives detonated in front of the
Argentine-Israeli Mutual Aid Association. The bomb killed 85
people and injured 300 others.
Currently, there is no global terrorist organization in the
region that poses a direct threat to the continental United
States. In fact, the State Department's Country Reports on
Terrorism for 2005 notes that, with the exception of the United
States and Canada, ``there are no known operational cells of
Islamic terrorists in the hemisphere.'' However, there are
scattered pockets of people--particularly in the Triborder Area
of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, as well as in Venezuela and
Guyana--who are ideological, financial and logistical
supporters of terrorist groups in the Middle East.
In the Caribbean, drug-running and gun trafficking are a
much more significant problem than is global terrorism, though
the region is clearly a potential jumping-off point into the
United States. Section 1206 funding is being used to address as
yet unidentified terrorist threats, for example against the
Panama Canal, but it will be most useful in addressing criminal
activities. Section 1206 funding can increase the expertise and
capability of military services and nascent coast guards in
case a situation arises where global terrorists are identified
as transiting or moving provisions through the region into the
United States.
Staff also traveled to the legendary ``tri-border
region''--the area where Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil
converge along the Parana River. It is traditionally an area
characterized by lawlessness and transnational crime and is
known as the contraband and smuggling capital of Latin America.
There is considerable anecdotal reporting of terrorists
transiting the area, but U.S. intelligence concludes that there
is no evidence of active Islamist terrorist operational cells.
There is growing concern that funds are being raised among the
large Muslim communities, currently numbering in excess of
30,000 individuals, for the benefit of Hizballah and Hamas.
Illegal activity ranges from money laundering to tax and tariff
evasion to the pirating and sale of counterfeit goods. Section
1206 funding is so far not focused on the region. The U.S. has,
however, taken the lead in pulling governments together to
cooperate in tracking down any signs of the use of narco-
terrorism routes by global terrorists bent on entry into the
United States.
In Latin America, stagnant legal systems need strengthening
if the potential link between criminal and global terrorist
activities is to be avoided. New legislation, reforms, and
additional resources to improve the ability of law enforcement
to track and reign in illegal activity are arguably more
important in the global war against terror than strengthening
military ties. A number of American officials throughout the
region see U.S. foreign assistance as out of balance, arguing
that counterterrorism success depends less on ``pursue and
capture'' as on viable legal and transparent financial systems
to prevent support to terrorist groups. Cuts to programs that
strengthen civil society, communicate effectively with Latin
publics, and bolster the rule of law appear lopsided and short-
sighted, especially when juxtaposed with significant increases
in security assistance.
African sensitivity to colonial imperialism and suspicion
of foreign intrigue to exploit resources runs deep. But sub-
Saharan Africa is probably the region of the world where pro-
American sentiment is strongest. The United States is not
burdened with a colonial past and the form of Islam that is
practiced in many African states is open and accepting of other
people and religious practices. There are exceptions. Somalia
is under the sway of religious extremists and Sudan is listed
as a state sponsor of terrorism. The bombings of U.S. embassies
in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 demonstrated the lethal impact
that small bands of violent extemists in Africa can have when
they target U.S. interests.
The strategic importance of West Africa is growing. It is
estimated that within a decade, some 25 percent of U.S. oil
imports may come from Africa. There is little evidence of a
significant terrorist threat in the West African countries
visited, although one group of terrorists, believed by some
experts to number as few as seventy, called the Salafist Group
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), is said to be pursuing ties
with al-Qa'ida. The GSPC is an insurgent national group seeking
the overthrow of the Algerian regime.
Section 1206 funding is supporting both the Gulf of Guinea
initiative in West Africa and the Trans Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Partnership. In neither case did embassy officials in
countries visited see Section 1206 funding as addressing an
emergency. Rather, it is seen as a new source of money for
long-desired components in a military relationship. Old wish
lists were dusted off and used to justify submitting a request
for Section 1206 funding. Military officials in the embassies
involved see the programs as a ``preventive'' effort, an
investment in bilateral and intra-regional cooperation.
Peacekeeping training, funded from the State Department
budget and implemented by the Department of Defense, is an
important component in the U.S. effort to bolster security and
stability in West Africa. It is welcomed by governments, the
regional organization ECOWAS, and the African Union.
In East Africa, on the other hand, the counterterrorism
effort is urgent. The focus is Somalia, a safe-haven for known
terrorists and a primary preparation and transit area for past
terror attacks against U.S. interests. A struggle for power in
the country pits a fundamentalist Islamist government against
an internationally supported transitional government. The
outcome is uncertain but if current trends continue, the
Islamist government could prevail and threaten self-governing
areas in Somalia as well as the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. A
sub-regional U.S. military command has been operating in the
region since 2002 and set up headquarters in Djibouti in May
2003.
Despite the urgency in East Africa, no Section 1206 funding
was approved for FY 2006. All three countries visited have
requested Section 1206 funding for FY 2007, with proposals
developed primarily through the Defense Attache's office.
Neither the Ambassadors nor the rest of the country team seemed
particularly knowledgeable about the process or the program.
None had been informed by Washington about the State
Department's role in formulating the assistance.
One Central African country in particular illustrates the
need for State Department perspective and guidance to temper
Defense Department enthusiasm. The country is unstable,
desperately poor, and run by a repressive government that is
being challenged by a persistent armed resistance. Desperate
for a military strong enough to protect it from the rebels, the
government has signed an Article 98 agreement, exempting U.S.
military personnel from International Criminal Court procedures
and thus enabling it to receive military assistance. It has
also signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United
States. With extensive ``under-governed spaces'' as potential
terrorist havens and bordering countries with equally uncertain
futures, the country was termed ``a model country for security
assistance'' by the regional combatant command. Civilian
embassy officials, however, are demonstrably less keen. They
question the rate at which military programs are rapidly
escalating and the sizable and still growing presence of U.S.
military personnel in-country. A U.S.-labeled backpack,
observed on a government soldier undergoing U.S. training,
underscored for SFRC staff the potential complications of a
too-close association with the country's military. It would be
a major setback if the United States were to be implicated in
support of operations shoring up the repressive regime,
regardless of the stated intent of such training.
The Defense Department is currently considering
establishing a separate combatant command for Africa rather
than having different subregions of the continent covered
separately by the European Command and Central Command. Such a
development would be welcomed by a number of the diplomats
interviewed as providing an opportunity for the military to
develop a coherent regional overview and more expertise in the
politics, language, and culture of individual subregions and
countries.
Asia's desire to remain independent from great power
manipulation is strong. Anti-Americanism has been tempered by
widespread approval of the U.S. emergency response to the
December, 2004 earthquake and tsunami that killed tens of
thousands of people in the region. The United States quickly
combined civilian and military teams in what is reputed both
within and outside government to be one of the most effective
international disaster responses that the U.S. government,
along with the rest of the international community, has ever
mounted.
The terrorist threat in Southeast Asia is significant.
Threats against U.S. embassies and other U.S.-affiliated
institutions are taken seriously. Terrorist plots against U.S.
and Southeast Asian interests have been foiled, and police
forces have identified, arrested and prosecuted dozens of
terrorists. Terrorist activity in the region has killed and
maimed many, Americans and non-Americans alike. Governments
work at varying levels with the U.S. government and each other
to share information and resources in combating what is
ultimately viewed as a common enemy.
In Sri Lanka, there are no direct threats to American
interests, terrorist or otherwise. An escalating conflict,
however, between the government and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is now on the verge of outright civil war.
Continual uncertainty and eruptions of violence are indirectly
affecting Americans in the country, but Americans, as of this
date, are not direct targets. As Sri Lanka is an island nation,
anti-government insurgents primarily receive smuggled military
arms and hardware via boat, from Indonesia, among other
countries. The government of Eritrea reportedly provides direct
assistance to the LTTE.
Section 1206 funding in the Asian countries visited is
dedicated to strengthening maritime capability. While this
funding is not directly addressing an urgent terrorist threat,
it is seen by ambassadors as a useful contribution to
strengthening indigenous naval capability. Both coastal and
international waters in the region are navigated by pirates,
drug-runners, and gun and human traffickers. The transshipment
of weapons of mass destruction through Asian waters, while not
yet evident, cannot be ruled out.
It is important to understand the underlying source of the
terrorist threats against U.S. citizens and interests in the
region. U.S. policies in the Middle East often serve as the
catalyst for anti-American sentiment and acts of violence
against Americans in Asian countries with Muslim populations.
All countries visited have a significant Muslim portion of
their populations, with Indonesia being the largest Muslim
country in the world. For example, there is widespread belief
that the U.S. tacitly assented to Israeli military retaliation
in Lebanon earlier this year, stirring anger and public
denunciations in the Islamic communities of Southern Thailand
and Indonesia. But, even more important, it is the ongoing war
in Iraq, alleged human rights abuses by Americans against
Iraqis, and the U.S. refusal to talk with Iran that bolsters
U.S. adversaries in the region by generating emotional sympathy
and sometimes recruitment opportunities in Indonesia, Malaysia,
southern Thailand, portions of the Philippines and other areas.
The Middle East continues to be the most turbulent and
unpredictable region of the world. While it is both the source
and central theater of global terrorism, much of the violence
in the region is inspired by local grievances and power
struggles.
Popular anger toward the U.S. and sympathy for local
political actors espousing anti-western views and violence has
increased in the wake of the U.S. invasion and occupation of
Iraq and Israel's military campaigns against the Palestinians
and the Lebanese. U.S. calls for democracy in the region are
widely viewed as insincere, in light of Washington's boycott of
the Palestinian Authority in the wake of Hamas' victory in
legislative elections in 2006, and its continuing support for
undemocratic governments in Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf states, and
the Maghreb. As a result, the overall terrorist threat level
for USG personnel stationed in the region, as well as private
Americans, has risen significantly over the past several years.
Apart from the daily attacks on U.S. military and civilian
personnel in Iraq, there have been numerous threats and several
actual attacks against U.S. officials, embassy facilities, and
private Americans in the Middle East in recent years.
The U.S. government has devoted substantial resources to
bolstering the ability of local governments to counter threats
to U.S. and allied interests in the region. Senate staff
visited Lebanon and Yemen. In Lebanon, Hizballah poses a
serious threat to the stability of a U.S.-friendly government,
and to Israel. Consequently, 1206 funding--together with other
USG security assistance--is dedicated to reducing Hizballah's
operating space by strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces
through the provision of equipment and training. In Yemen, the
birthplace of Osama bin Laden, Section 1206 is dedicated to
supporting, equipping and training Yemeni special forces and
border security units to prevent al-Qa'ida from establishing
cells in the country and to halt arms proliferation. Other U.S.
security assistance provides essential support and guidance to
the Central Security Forces/Counter-terrorism Unit and the
recently-established Coast Guard.
While these counter-terrorism efforts are important, active
U.S. diplomatic engagement to address the chief regional
grievances--most notably in Iraq and in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict--would be equally if not more effective in reducing
the terrorist threat in the long-term, undercutting the
incendiary anti-US message of radicals that has found so much
public resonance in the current unsettled environment.
A P P E N D I X E S
----------
Appendix I
Questions for the Record Submitted to State Department Counselor Philip
Zelikow, and Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman, following
``Briefing on State and Defense Department Cooperation Overseas,''
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 23, 2006
Question 1. (State and DoD) Why is a separate account for
DoD under State Department control being resisted by DoD when
it could provide all of the funding and the programs that DoD
is requesting? Why is it being resisted by the State Department
when it would allow the programs to go forward while
maintaining State Department oversight? Are there other
mechanisms that should be considered to ensure that the
Secretary of State is primarily responsible for the decisions
as to which countries receive various types of U.S. assistance?
Answer. The proposed legislation creates a separate 1206
account at State into which DoD funding would be transferred
and then released back to DoD at State's discretion. This
mechanism would create an unnecessary step and is not the
Administration's preferred approach for achieving the ultimate
goal of 1206: to provide a fast and flexible tool for use in
the GWOT. The current 1206 authority, on the other hand,
provides an excellent mechanism for cooperation between the
Departments of State and Defense.
The Department of State is comfortable with the provisions
available under the current Section 1206 authority. The
Director of Foreign Assistance has introduced a new methodology
to create and direct consolidated policy, planning, budgeting,
and implementation mechanisms to provide umbrella leadership to
U.S. foreign assistance. Current Section 1206 legislation
requires joint implementation of the assistance programs and
full coordination by the Secretary of State. By working with
the Department of Defense on the development and implementation
of the assistance programs, State ensures conformity with the
Secretary of State's overall priorities for U.S. foreign
assistance.
However, as I mentioned in my recent briefing, we view the
current 1206 authority as a temporary solution pending the
formulation of a stronger approach. Therefore, we look forward
to working with Congress on a more durable approach. We will
present such a framework in the report that is due to Congress
later this year.
Question 2. (State) In the past, there have been complaints
from the Department of Defense that the FMS program and the
IMET program, both military aid programs implemented by DoD,
are subject to bureaucratic slowdowns at the Department of
State. The cumbersome nature of deliberations over their use is
reportedly one of the drivers behind DoD's desire for its own
assistance program. The Department of State now has its first
U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance in the person of Ambassador
Randall Tobias.
What mechanisms should be put in place to make sure
that a new military assistance program under State's
authority but implemented by DoD can be flexible and
efficiently organized to respond to more urgent
situations?
How is the Political-Military Bureau working with
Ambassador Tobias to get the input of the ambassadors
and the regional bureaus before recipient countries are
named? How much time is that process taking?
Is the content of the programs also considered and
approved by Ambassador Tobias, the ambassadors, and the
regional bureaus? What is the process for this
approval? Is it separate from the decision-making on
recipients? How long has that process taken?
Answer. The FMF and IMET processes are not subject to
bureaucratic slowdowns at State. Foreign assistance decisions
are made in a deliberate manner precisely to ensure the USG
achieves the best possible result from the funds appropriated.
Implementation is often delayed, especially through the FMS
process, because of DoD's ``just-in-time'' supply system which
acquires items as needed rather than stockpiling; as well as
the long procurement times required for items sought by our
foreign allies, but also needed for U.S. forces. The
Administration's support for new authorities like 1206 reflects
the acknowledgement that our traditional, deliberate processes
are only partially suited to address the current national
security environment and the need for new mechanisms to deal
with unforeseen contingencies and opportunities.
The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has been working
closely with Ambassador Tobias and his staff to identify the
countries for which we will request military aid in FY 2008.
This process involves Department-wide ``country team meetings''
where representatives from all relevant bureaus and agencies,
including the Pol-Mil Bureau and DoD, provide input from
Ambassadors at the 154 posts which receive foreign assistance.
This process began in May and will be completed in time for a
budget submission to OMB in August. The Pol-Mil Bureau will
continue to be intimately involved through all phases of the
budget process.
The Director of Foreign Assistance has authority over all
State and USAID foreign assistance funding and programs. In
developing the budget request for FY 2008, Ambassador Tobias
and his staff are working closely with various bureaus and
offices within State and USAID and the missions in the field to
address the strategic security priorities around the world.
Program levels are being developed concomitant with the process
identifying recipient countries and should take approximately
five months to complete.
Question 3. (State and DoD) What is the mechanism through
which ambassadors oversee the implementation of a program? If
an ambassador disagrees with the direction of the program, does
he/she have the authority to terminate it? What is the likely
outcome when a combatant commander decides that a Section 1206
military assistance program is urgent and the ambassador has
doubts as to its timing or its merits?
Answer. Appropriate members of the ambassador's country
team will oversee the implementation of 1206 projects. Projects
funded through Section 1206 authority are to be approved by the
ambassador. As the President's senior representative in
country, the ambassador always has the authority to terminate
ongoing programs. Should the ambassador have concerns over the
merits or timing of an assistance program which the combatant
commander feels is urgent, the ambassador's views would
prevail.
Question 4. (DoD) Why does the Department of Defense
persist in seeking to change the existing Section 1206 program
authority grant from the President to the Secretary of Defense?
Is it an effort to give greater discretionary authority to the
Secretary of Defense? Is it intended to remove Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) program oversight?
Answer. The Administration, not simply DoD, has sought to
broaden the existing Section 1206 authority. The amendments are
needed, among other reasons, to authorize assistance more
broadly to security forces (including in some cases police
forces), to clearly articulate the role and authority of the
Secretary of State, to increase the cap on amount of assistance
that could be used, to clearly provide the Department of
Defense with grant-making authority, to allow use of any
Department of Defense O&M funds, and to provide special waiver
authority that either the President or the Secretary of State
could grant to overcome foreign aid restrictions, if
appropriate. While the initial authority is very useful, the
amended authority requested would represent a significant
improvement.
The amendment seeks to move final approval authority to the
Secretary level in order to shorten staffing timelines and use
1206 in the fast and flexible manner in which it was intended.
If passed, the amendment calls for both the Secretaries of
State and Defense to approve each program proposed under 1206,
ensuring that the two Departments concur before moving forward.
This amendment does not give any additional discretionary
authority to the Secretary of Defense; rather, it ensures the
authority of the Secretary of State and will strengthen
cooperation between State and DoD. OMB will continue to play
its essential and customary role in program approval and
oversight.
Question 5. (State) Would it be useful for the Secretary of
State to provide written guidance to the ambassadors in the
specific countries where Section 1206 military assistance is to
be provided? Our ambassadors know the people, culture, and, in
some cases, the possible pitfalls surrounding such a program.
Our ambassadors should not be passive observers but are
expected to provide vital input into their planning and
implementation. If such a communication to ambassadors is sent,
it would be useful to the record of this briefing to have a
summary of its contents.
Answer. Substantial communication, much by phone, email,
and cables, occurred between State, Defense, posts and the
combatant commands in reviewing potential uses of Section 1206
authority in FY 2006. The proposals are in fact developed in
the field, as we recognize the special knowledge and insights
of our Ambassadors and Combatant Commanders. Now that the
initial proposals have been approved, the Secretary will
continue to use the most appropriate means available to provide
guidance to each post, and will continue to take advantage of
the expertise at posts in implementing those programs, as well
as in the implementation of the FY 2007 authority.
Question 6. (State) While inter-agency coordination is
still being worked out and joint mechanisms developed for
implementing Section 1206 funding, I am concerned that this is
going on without input from the State Department's new Director
of Foreign Assistance. How will this be corrected for future
decision-making?
Answer. The first tranche of Section 1206 proposals were
being developed before the appointment of Ambassador Tobias as
Director of Foreign Assistance. However, the Resource
Management staff, which has since been subsumed into the Office
of the Director of Foreign Assistance, has been intimately
involved from the beginning. As Director, Ambassador Tobias,
and his staff have been involved in the congressional
notification process for FY 2006 proposals and will be directly
involved in the development of future proposals and their
implementation. From the beginning of this process, the
Department of State as a whole has been involved in the
development of this new authority, as well as programs carried
out under it.
Question 7. (State) What is the State Department doing to
improve its ability to oversee such programs in the field? Will
the Department be assigning the function to existing embassy
personnel or will the Department rely on DoD personnel?
Answer. The Department of State has adequate oversight
mechanisms in place to monitor the efficacy of this aid, and
will oversee it as we do in our foreign assistance programs
generally. This function will be performed by existing embassy
personnel who will report through the Chief of Mission.
Question 8. (State and DoD) Will it be the State Department
Inspector General or the military's Inspector General that will
have oversight over Section 1206 military assistance? What
metrics are being developed to measure the effectiveness of
these programs?
Answer. The State Department Inspector General will monitor
aspects of Section 1206 activities involving State employees,
but as with other foreign aid program funds, the Inspector
General of the agency to which the funds are appropriated is
generally responsible for the program oversight. In this case,
the Department of Defense would generally be responsible for
program oversight. To the extent that Section 1206 calls for
coordination between the Departments on implementation,
oversight could be shared by both Inspectors General.
DoD, in coordination with State, will use established
procedures and mechanisms to ensure proper use of all training
and equipment under Section 1206. Both DoD and State have
emphasized the importance of metrics for this program, and the
people in the best position to develop those metrics, the
operators in the field, are doing so. We would be happy to
share these metrics with you as we proceed with implementation.
Question 9. What role do ambassadors and their respective
country teams play in the JIACG within the regional COCOM?
Answer. JIACGs are advisory staff elements on COCOM staffs;
ambassadors and country teams have no direct relationships with
JIACGs. To the extent that the respective COCOM directs (or
permits), JIACG members may interact with country team members
with regard to operational planning or policy discussions.
Appendix II
.
