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109th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
                            COMMITTEE PRINT                     
 2d Session                                                      109-52




                          A Report to Members

                                 of the


                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                       Richard G. Lugar, Chairman

                       One Hundred Ninth Congress

                             Second Session

                           December 15, 2006


31-324                      WASHINGTON : 2006
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                  RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island         PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia               CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee           BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska               BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
                 Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
              Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director


                            C O N T E N T S


Letter of Transmittal............................................     v


    Findings.....................................................     1

    Recommendations..............................................     2


    Purpose of Study.............................................     4

    The Threat...................................................     5

    Getting the Response Right...................................     5

Developments in U.S. Embassies

    New Role for the U.S. Military...............................     6

        Section 1206 Security Assistance.........................     7

        Special Operations Forces................................     8

        Development and Humanitarian Assistance..................     8

        Public Information.......................................     9

    Reactions from the Field.....................................     9

        Problems and Challenges..................................    11

Regional Findings

    Latin America................................................    13

    Africa.......................................................    14

    Asia.........................................................    15

    Middle East..................................................    16


Appendix I

    Executive branch answers to questions submitted on June 23, 
      2006 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.............    19

Appendix II

    Section 1206 FY 06-Funded Programs...........................    25

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL


                                                 December 15, 2006.

Dear Colleagues:

    I recently sent 6 Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
majority staff members to some 20 countries in Latin America, 
Africa, Asia and the Middle East to examine the relationship 
between the State Department and the Defense Department in our 
embassies. I asked them to focus on the agencies' cooperation 
on counterterrorism strategy, policies and activities, giving 
special attention to foreign assistance and the military's new 
Section 1206 funding.
    This report is only the first chapter of what I hope will 
become a continuing examination of ways in which our government 
can strengthen our posture overseas and better ensure our 
effectiveness against terrorism. The report points out both 
pitfalls and opportunities. It makes clear the increasingly 
instrumental role that the U.S. ambassador plays in making 
judgment calls that will affect our success or our failure. 
There is no country in the world where our Nation can afford to 
send diplomats ill-prepared to understand and make the tough 
choices. Nor can we as a Congress continue to undervalue the 
role of the civilian agencies if we want to ensure that our 
response to violent extremism is calibrated, supported by an 
appropriate mix of civilian and military tools.
    The report contains findings and recommendations that form 
the basis for continuing committee oversight that is alert to 
potential problems. It is overseas where the campaign against 
terror will be won or lost. As a country, we must have the 
right tools, people and programs to succeed.

                                          Richard G. Lugar,




    Protecting Americans from terrorist attacks within the 
United States depends, to a great extent, on U.S. success 
overseas. The task is vast and worldwide. It requires enlisting 
host country police to track and capture terrorists, uncovering 
terrorist financing, sharing intelligence with foreign 
partners, strengthening border surveillance in remote and 
unpopulated regions and building partnerships with foreign 
militaries. In the longer run, it requires convincing entire 
societies to reject terrorist propaganda and recruitment. A 
successful counterterrorism policy depends on strong 
relationships with foreign governments and the people residing 
in countries on every continent.
    Embassies are on the frontline in the overseas campaign 
against terror and demands on ambassadors, staffs, and physical 
facilities have increased exponentially. Since September 11, 
2001, embassies have hosted a continuing influx of inter-agency 
personnel tasked with the full range of counterterrorism 
    Under the direction of Chairman Richard G. Lugar, Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee majority staff visited selected 
embassies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, 
as well as the headquarters of four combatant commands, to 
focus specifically on the civilian/military nexus. He asked 
staff to assess whether the State and Defense Departments are 
working together overseas in a way that contributes to 
overarching U.S. foreign policy goals in the individual 
countries and in the regions.


 1. The number of military personnel and Defense Department 
        activities in non-combat countries is increasing 
        significantly. Left unclear, blurred lines of authority 
        between the State Department and the Defense Department 
        could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the 
        effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against 
        terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in 
        Washington where interagency differences on strategies, 
        tactics and divisions of labor are increasingly 

 2. While finding, capturing, and eliminating individual 
        terrorists and their support networks is an imperative 
        in the war against terror, it is repairing and building 
        alliances, pursuing resolutions to regional conflicts, 
        fostering democracy and development, and defusing 
        religious extremism worldwide that will overcome the 
        terrorist threat in the long-term. It has traditionally 
        been the military's mission to take direct action 
        against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies' 
        mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures 
        through diplomacy, international information 
        programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a 
        result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, 
        however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being 
        granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. 
        Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas 
        from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the 
        Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for 
        U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary 
        of Defense's focus on war fighting.

 3. The increases of funding streams, self-assigned missions, 
        and realigned authorities for the Secretary of Defense 
        and the combatant commanders are placing new stresses 
        on inter-agency coordination in the field. Currently, 
        overlapping missions and inter-agency frictions are, 
        for the most part, refereed by the U.S. ambassador and 
        other State Department leadership in the embassy with 
        intermittent referral to headquarters for guidance. 
        But, as the role of the military expands, particularly 
        in the area of foreign assistance, embassy officials in 
        some countries question whether the Department of 
        Defense will chafe under the constraints of State 
        Department leadership and work for still more authority 
        and funding.

 4. There is evidence that some host countries are questioning 
        the increasingly military component of America's 
        profile overseas. Some foreign officials question what 
        appears to them as a new emphasis by the United States 
        on military approaches to problems that are not seen as 
        lending themselves to military solutions. Host country 
        militaries clearly welcome increased professional 
        contact and interaction with the U.S. military. 
        However, some host countries have elements in both 
        government and general society who are highly 
        suspicious of potential American coercion. There is no 
        sense so far that foreign hosts believe the U.S. 
        military is dominating U.S. policy in-country, but if 
        such a perception were to gain hold, it would give 
        ammunition to U.S. adversaries. More importantly, it 
        would weaken the bilateral relationships that are 
        necessary to win the war against terror. Likewise, one 
        misstep or poorly calculated military or other 
        operation can significantly set back the full range of 
        U.S. counterterrorism efforts in an entire region.


    1. Role of the Ambassador.  In the campaign against terror, 
the leadership qualities of the U.S. ambassador have become a 
determinative factor in victory or failure.

   It is imperative that the U.S. ambassador provide 
        strong leadership, steady oversight, and a firm hand on 
        the component parts of all counterterrorism activities 
        in U.S. embassies overseas. This includes the authority 
        to challenge and override directives from other 
        government agencies in Washington to their resident or 
        temporary staffs in the embassy.

   The President must send to the Senate as nominees 
        for ambassadorships only those candidates who are 
        qualified for the sensitive and important post-9/11 
        role of U.S. ambassador.

   In considering the President's nominees, the Senate 
        Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and, subsequently 
        the full Senate, should renew a commitment to insist on 
        the qualities of experienced judgment, knowledge of 
        inter-agency missions and activities, and a solid 
        grounding in the culture and politics of the region to 
        which the candidate is expected to be assigned.

   The SFRC, during the confirmation process, should 
        make it clear that Members will hold the regional 
        assistant secretaries and the ambassador accountable 
        for mishaps or setbacks that could have been avoided 
        through informed and engaged leadership in-country.

   Ambassadors should be charged with the decision 
        whether to approve all military-related programs 
        implemented in-country. That would include Section 1206 
        security assistance, humanitarian and development 
        assistance, and other programs and operations. In 
        countries with MISTs (Military Information Support 
        Teams), the ambassador must similarly approve or 
        disapprove all military-produced informational material 
        and MIST personnel should work under the direction of 
        the country team's public affairs officer.

   In the case of special forces, the Ambassador's 
        authority over military activities in-country should be 
        made clear in a memorandum of understanding with the 
        relevant regional combatant commands. Such authority 
        would include approving any mission, monitoring its 
        implementation, and terminating it if necessary. An 
        alternate, more systemic solution would be a global 
        memorandum of agreement covering all special forces 
        activities in-country, signed by the Secretaries of 
        State and Defense.

    2. Organizing Foreign Assistance.  Some countries are now 
receiving between a quarter and half of their U.S. foreign 
assistance in the form of security assistance. In one country 
visited, security assistance is the only form of foreign aid 
being provided by the U.S. government. Section 1206 assistance, 
with the exception of Lebanon and Pakistan, is not addressing 
threats to the United States that are so immediate it cannot be 
included in normal budget processes. The Secretary of State 
should insist that all security assistance, including Section 
1206 funding, be included under his/her authority in the new 
process for rationalizing and prioritizing foreign assistance. 
Country team meetings organized by the Director of Foreign 
Assistance at the State Department should include military 
representatives in cases where the country is a recipient or 
potential recipient of military funding. Otherwise, there is no 
guarantee that the mix of civilian and military assistance will 
be effectively balanced to most directly address the terrorist 

    3. Rationalizing Missions and Money.  The current budgets 
of the civilian foreign affairs agencies do not reflect their 
key role in the conduct of the war against terror. In fact, it 
can be argued that the disparity in the ratio between 
investments in military versus civilian approaches threatens 
U.S. success.

   The executive branch should undertake a disciplined, 
        coordinated and transparent approach to identifying 
        both civilian and military counterterrorism priorities 
        overseas, assigning appropriate roles, missions, and 
        divisions of labor among federal agencies, and 
        requesting robust funding to achieve those priorities.

   The legislative branch should fund the civilian 
        foreign affairs agencies, particularly the State 
        Department and the U.S. Agency for International 
        Development, at a minimum to the level requested by the 
        President. Continuing to deny the President his foreign 
        affairs budget by billions of dollars below what he 
        requests is undermining U.S. national interests. The 
        current 12:1 ratio of military spending to spending on 
        the diplomatic and civilian foreign aid agencies risks 
        the further encroachment of the military, by default, 
        into areas where civilian leadership is more 
        appropriate because it does not create resistance 
        overseas and is more experienced.

   The administration should develop a comprehensive 
        budget for foreign assistance that incorporates 
        economic, development, humanitarian, security and 
        military assistance. All foreign assistance programs 
        should be funded through the foreign assistance 
        accounts, as administered by the Department of State. 
        If foreign assistance is, contrary to this 
        recommendation, to be funded through both the 150 
        foreign affairs account and the 050 defense account, 
        the Secretary of State should retain primary authority 
        over its planning and implementation. Otherwise, there 
        is the risk of undermining the Secretary of State's 
        role both in Washington and in embassies as the manager 
        of bilateral relationships and as the chief arbiter of 
        foreign policy decisions.

    4. Regional Strategic Initiative.  The Secretary of State 
should regularize and expand the Department's Regional 
Strategic Initiative comprised of regional meetings of 
ambassadors, regional assistant secretaries, and senior 
interagency personnel, including the combatant commands, to 
focus specifically on the terrorism threat and appropriate 
counterterrorism responses. With the rapid expansion of 
counterterrorism activities and the increasing need for 
interagency agreement in the field on strategies as well as 
tactics, such meetings should occur at the most senior level 
possible, with ambassadors themselves actively engaged and 


    Purpose of Study.  Civilian-military cooperation has always 
been important, but the breadth and complexities of the 
terrorist threat make it even more essential today. In a June 
23, 2006 meeting with State Department Counselor Philip Zelikow 
and Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman, the two assured 
Chairman Lugar that counterterrorism strategy, policies and 
activities are being well coordinated at headquarters in 
Washington DC. They also said that U.S. ambassadors are 
exercising their full authority to support and oversee 
activities in the field. To follow-up, the Chairman dispatched 
six Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff to twenty 
countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East 
to see what was happening in the embassies and how coordination 
was working on the ground.\1\ Staff also interviewed a number 
of U.S. ambassadors attending the Central and East Africa 
Ambassadors Conference hosted by EUCOM headquarters October 17-
19, 2006. The Chairman tasked staff with looking at the new 
Section 1206 security assistance program, other military-
provided assistance, military-to-military relations, and the 
deployment of special operations forces to non-combat 
countries. They also assessed the ability of U.S. ambassadors 
and State Department officials in key embassies to support, 
provide guidance and oversee military activities in-country.
    \1\ Dominican Republic, Panama, Argentina, Ecuador, Guyana, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Gabon, Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Yemen, Lebanon, and Pakistan.

    The Threat.  U.S. intelligence estimates that al-Qa'ida 
continues to be the greatest threat posed by a single terrorist 
organization. But the global terrorist movement, consisting of 
al-Qa'ida, other independent terrorist groups, and some self-
generating cells operating as freelancers, is spreading and 
becoming more geographically dispersed. The underlying factors 
fueling the spread of violent jihadism are judged to be:

 1. Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and 
        fear of Western domination, leading to anger, 
        humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness;

 2. The Iraq ``jihad'';

 3. The slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and 
        political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and

 4. Pervasive anti-U.S. sentiment among most Muslims.\2\
    \2\ Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence 
Estimate ``Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United 
States'' dated April 2006.

    Anti-U.S. and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise, 
according to the intelligence community. The conjecture is made 
that this could fuel other radical ideologies, prompting some 
leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist 
methods to attack U.S. interests. At this point, there is 
little evidence in the countries visited that this is 
happening, though the possibility cannot be dismissed entirely 
and warrants continuous monitoring.

    Getting the Response Right.  With such a diffuse threat 
created by broad underlying factors, tensions arise among 
competing U.S. needs and goals. Knowledgeable officials, 
whether in uniform or not, can reasonably disagree on the right 
course of action, especially when it comes to U.S. policy 
within a specific foreign country.
    For example, there is clearly a need in several countries 
visited to strengthen the host country's security forces to go 
after terrorists and secure borders. But there is also the need 
in the same countries to support a fragile government's ability 
to maintain civilian control over the armed forces, protect 
civilians from abuses that have been committed in the past by 
the same military, and avoid propping up a repressive 
    In other countries, there is the need to pursue terrorists 
and attack terrorist cells in areas where the government itself 
is not present or able to take action. The urgency of capturing 
or killing known terrorists must be considered within the 
context of respect for the host country's sovereignty, the need 
to retain mutual trust between the United States and the host 
country, and the risk of involvement in murky local disputes.
    There can also develop honest disagreements about the 
threat that is being faced. In one country, some analysts see a 
specific group as posing a global threat with al-Qa'ida ties, 
while others see it as locally oriented, weakening, and 
reaching out for any source of help as it struggles for 
survival. The issue is a regular item on the embassy-team 
discussion agenda. Which side of the argument prevails will 
determine how urgently military action will be considered.
    In cases where all agree on strategy, tactics can become a 
point of contention. In one country, the embassy team is in 
full agreement that it is necessary to support moderate Muslim 
voices in the ongoing discussions within the Islamic faith. But 
some who wanted to feature a prominent Muslim cleric in a U.S.-
produced program were opposed by others who do not want to risk 
tainting an independent moderate with Western approval. The 
need for robust public affairs programs is tempered in all 
embassies by the equally compelling need to avoid sparking more 
widespread anti-Western antipathy through heavy-handed or inept 
    In the area of economic and development assistance, there 
is an overwhelming need in many countries to address the 
poverty and slow pace of economic growth that is seen as an 
underlying grievance leading to religious extremism. But there 
is also an underlying tension between the desperate need for 
more assistance and the risk of developing the negative image 
of using such assistance as a transparent effort to gain 
military access or improve local intelligence gathering.

                     Developments in U.S. Embassies

                     NEW ROLE FOR THE U.S. MILITARY

    The U.S. military has taken on numerous new tasks in the 
war against terror that are resulting in its having greater 
presence in embassies. Following the September 11 attacks, 
combatant commanders were directed by the Secretary of Defense 
to develop plans within their areas of responsibility that 
would identify and eliminate terrorists, as well as identify 
and influence regions susceptible to terrorist influence.
    Some tasks are traditional boots-on-the-ground military 
missions. Some of the new tasks have military content, but are 
not necessarily war fighting. For example, there is a new 
security assistance program intended to boost recipient 
nations' ability to partner with the U.S. military in the war 
against terror. Still other new tasks go well beyond what one 
would normally consider to be a soldier's job, for example 
digging wells, building schools, and providing public affairs 
    The defense attache has long been an important member of 
the embassy team. He serves as the ambassador's advisor on 
military issues and the contact with the host nation's 
military. Depending on the quantity of military assistance, the 
embassy also hosts an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) which 
is the in-country coordinator of such programs as the foreign 
military financing (FMF) program, the Global Peace Operations 
Initiative (GPOI), a train-and-equip program for international 
peacekeepers, and the international military education and 
training program (IMET). FMF, GPOI, and IMET are funded in the 
civilian foreign affairs budget, directed by the Secretary of 
State, and carried out by the Defense Department. The level of 
assistance available in the foreign affairs 150 account for 
security assistance is a consistent source of frustration for 
Defense Department officials. European Command (EUCOM) 
officials pointed out that only $6 million in FMF funding was 
available for their entire region of responsibility in Africa.
    There has been a longstanding question as to whether such 
security assistance programs should be funded from the civilian 
foreign affairs budget or the military budget. When the issue 
has arisen in the past, the decision has been made both in the 
executive and legislative branches that they should remain in 
the 150 foreign affairs account under the authority of the 
Secretary of State. This is rooted in the fundamental belief 
that determinations as to what countries should receive U.S. 
military equipment and training, and the extent and type of 
such training, is fundamentally a foreign policy decision.

    Section 1206 Security Assistance.  In Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the executive branch requested and the legislative branch 
granted the Department of Defense the authority and funding to 
train and equip the militaries and police forces in both 
countries without going through the State Department. The 
Department of Defense also received authority to reimburse 
coalition partners for logistical and military support provided 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Subsequently, the executive branch 
requested that these train and equip authorities be extended 
    Department of Defense officials, uniformed and civilian, 
argued that the Department needed the new authority for time-
sensitive and urgent terrorism threats to the United States 
that could not wait for the normal budget process applicable to 
the traditional programs under State Department authority. They 
also argued that the additional amounts necessary in a post-9/
11 world would not be possible from the strapped 150 foreign 
affairs budget.
    In response, the legislative branch granted but 
circumscribed the requested authority in the 2006 National 
Defense Authorization Act. Called Section 1206 assistance after 
its place in the bill, the amount of the assistance was limited 
to $200 million as opposed to the $750 million requested and 
allowed only for training and equipping military rather than 
police forces. It mandated that the President direct the 
Secretary of Defense to conduct the programs, in order to 
ensure inter-agency vetting overseen by the Office of 
Management and Budget. The law also requires that the 
Secretaries of Defense and State ``jointly formulate'' any 
program and that it be ``coordinated'' with the Secretary of 
State in implementation. The law also requires that the Section 
1206 program comply with various laws generally applicable to 
the provision of military assistance.
    In the most recent defense authorization bill, again hard-
pressed by the Defense Department, Members of Congress dropped 
the requirement that Section 1206 assistance be provided only 
upon direction by the President and gave the authority directly 
to the Secretary of Defense. The amount was increased to $300 
    Section 1206 security assistance is now being extended to 
some 14 countries: Algeria, Chad, the Dominican Republic, 
Indonesia, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Thailand, Yemen, Senegal, and Sri Lanka. A 
number of the 2006 projects focus on strengthening recipient 
countries' coast guard equivalents or navies. Thailand, 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, and the 
Dominican Republic and Panama are receiving 1206 funding for 
maritime surveillance and communications equipment and 
training. The administration continues to seek partners willing 
and able to participate in the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, an American-led multilateral effort to coordinate 
and develop procedures for intercepting smugglers of 
unconventional weapons. Gaining greater control of maritime 
transportation routes can reduce drug and gun trafficking, 
exploitation of human beings, pirating and other illegal 
activities. Other programs in Yemen and in the Trans-Sahara 
focus on increasing the recipient nations' ability to secure 
land borders and track and attack terrorist networks.
    Overall in fiscal year 2006, $200 million in funding was 
appropriated. Only $100 million of that amount has been 
obligated, an indication that the initially claimed urgency for 
the funding was questionable. In the 2007 budget, $300 million 
has been authorized for Section 1206 funding and a request of 
$750 million is expected for 2008.

    Special Operations Forces.  The Special Operations Command 
takes the lead for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, 
executing global operations against terrorists and their 
networks. Beyond its instrumental role in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the Command has provided to regional commands some 1,000 
special operations troops for service in 50 different 
countries. Its baseline budget has increased 81 percent since 
9/11 from $4 billion to almost $8 billion. According to 
Commander General Bryan D. Brown, special forces are expected 
to grow by some 13,000 personnel over the next five years.
    Special operations forces are part of the new mix of 
military personnel at U.S. embassies and provide information to 
their relevant combatant commanders. They also undertake 
military-to-military training, specifically for counter-
terrorism. Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) teams arrive 
for short duration training of some one to three weeks and 
Joint Planning and Assistance (JPAT) teams are embedded for 
long-term training, with U.S. trainers rotating on a six-month 

    Development and Humanitarian Assistance.  In Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the military has often had to take on emergency 
reconstruction tasks. There has been an effort to create a more 
robust civilian capability to work in hostile environments, but 
the State Department-organized effort is still nascent and 
civilian agencies, especially USAID, are still cobbling 
together ad hoc teams that, while talented and dedicated, are 
limited in number. As a result, military civil affairs teams 
have built bridges, schools and hospitals, organized local 
political councils, and provided humanitarian relief. Much of 
the funding came from the Commanders Emergency Response Program 
(CERP), initially supported by the hundreds of millions of 
dollars found in Saddam Hussein's secret caches throughout 
Iraq. Subsequently, the Congress appropriated funding from the 
Department of Defense budget for the CERP, and included funds 
for firefighting, repair of damage to oil facilities and 
related infrastructure, and medical assistance to Iraqi 
    Building on the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
Defense Department requested and received authority to broaden 
a previously existing Combatant Commander Initiative Fund to 
allow combatant commanders to carry out such projects in any 
countries where military operations are being conducted. 
Combatant Commanders are now funding joint military exercises, 
military education and training, and humanitarian and civic 
projects that include medical and veterinary care, construction 
of transportation systems, wells, sanitation facilities, and 
landmine clearance and education.
    Such an expansion of military-provided humanitarian and 
civic assistance is nowhere more evident than in the Horn of 
Africa. U.S. Central Command oversees some 1800 troops 
stationed at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, who are tasked with 
building health clinics, wells and schools in remote areas 
where government influence is weak and terrorists are known to 
be recruiting. In an effort to provide evidence of alternatives 
to religious extremism, small military teams train local 
forces, gain access and gather information, and provide 
practical assistance in an attempt to improve the lives of 
local residents in areas that terrorists may be targeting.
    Staff found that country teams in embassies with USAID 
presence are far more capable of ensuring sufficient review of 
military humanitarian assistance projects than those that have 
no USAID office. Budgetary cutbacks at USAID, affecting both 
personnel and programs, are repeatedly cited as a deficiency in 
the U.S. campaign against extremism in susceptible regions of 
the world.

    Public Information.  The Defense Department has taken on 
the additional mission under the direction of the Secretary of 
Defense to counter terrorist propaganda in key regions and 
countries of the world. The purpose is to discourage sympathy 
for terrorists and their efforts to recruit, marginalize 
radical Islamic ideology, and increase popular support for U.S. 
operations and multilateral counterterrorism activities. In one 
of its most recent forays into the civilian world of 
international public affairs broadcasting, the Pentagon has 
produced a report that is highly critical of the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors radio and TV broadcasting into Iran.
    In embassies, military teams of 3-4 persons are being sent 
to key countries to carry out informational programs. There are 
currently 18 such deployments, expected to rise to 30 countries 
if current plans are realized.

                        REACTIONS FROM THE FIELD

    Ambassadors in every country pursue a wide-ranging agenda 
running the gamut from managing the overall relationship with 
the host country to resolving trade disputes and rescuing 
Americans in trouble. All ambassadors interviewed by the staff, 
with the exception of Thailand, reported an increase in 
military personnel in their embassies since 9/11. One 
ambassador heading a small embassy in Africa reported that 
American uniformed personnel may outnumber civilian personnel 
within the year.
    All ambassadors interviewed see the war on terror as a top 
priority and the military components of the embassy as one tool 
that can be used to address it. For the most part, ambassadors 
welcome the additional resources that the military brings and 
they see strong military-to-military ties as an important 
ingredient in a strong bilateral relationship. Nonetheless, 
State and USAID personnel often question the purposes, 
quantity, and quality of the expanded military activities in-
    Ambassadors are the President's personal representative and 
top U.S. official in-country. Every ambassador has country 
clearance authority. Often permission to work at the embassy is 
granted routinely to inter-agency personnel coming on either 
permanent or temporary assignment. But every ambassador has the 
power to deny clearance or to suspend it once granted. As one 
U.S. ambassador stated, ``The rule is if you're in country, you 
work for the ambassador. If you don't think you work for the 
ambassador, you don't get country clearance to come in.''
    In most cases, ambassadors seemed informed about U.S. 
military activities in-country and appeared willing and able to 
provide leadership. In three embassies visited, however, 
ambassadors appeared overwhelmed by the growing presence of 
military personnel and insistent requests from combatant 
commanders. Neither were the ambassadors as knowledgeable on 
the breadth of military activity in country as they should have 
been. In one case, an ambassador to a country that is receiving 
Section 1206 funding had not heard of the program. In several 
cases, embassy staff saw their role as limited to a review of 
choices already made by ``the military side of the house.''
    There are successes to report that can provide models to 
new ambassadors. The ambassador to Yemen appears to have 
developed one of the best procedures for initiating Section 
1206 requests. The Embassy's Office of Defense Cooperation 
(ODC) works closely with the Yemeni Ministry of Defense to 
identify needs. The ODC vets these requests through the country 
team, discussing them with the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), 
the political section chief, and a political officer who covers 
counterterrorism issues full-time. The Ambassador approves the 
submission to Washington.
    In Thailand, though all military assistance has been 
suspended due to the September 19 coup, the ambassador's deputy 
chief of mission previously served as a political-military 
officer, so the ambassador reports a ``front office that has a 
good degree of background knowledge about and sensitivity to 
the military dimensions of the bilateral relationship.'' 
Another ambassador warned against delegating oversight of 
military programs and activities to the defense attache or 
other military components of the embassy. ``The front office 
must be kept informed, must know when key decisions need to be 
made, and must make them,'' he said.
    An ambassador to an African country described the situation 
in his embassy in this way: ``We are a small number of people, 
in a tight community, with a clear hierarchy. The military 
respects hierarchy and clarity.'' He reports that when he has 
objections to programs or activities, he says no. EUCOM has a 
lot of the money to spend ``and the atmosphere is that we want 
to do something with it. My attitude is, `The first principle 
is do no harm'.'' He recently suspended country clearance to 
one military official. The person was gone the next day.

    Problems and Challenges.  Despite the welcome arrival of 
new money and other resources to the country team, the increase 
in military presence and activities has created challenges and 
raised reservations and questions.
    Decisions to take action against terrorists in-country 
require the approval of the Secretary of Defense and ``are 
coordinated with'' the ambassadors, according to Department of 
Defense guidelines. The State Department perspective is that 
ambassadors have full authority over all U.S. government 
activities in country. While such nuanced differences may seem 
obscure, they are bound to cause problems. One route toward 
clarity would be the inclusion of new military elements under 
the National Security Decision Directive-38 (NSDD-38) process. 
This would ``regularize'' their presence in country, 
specifically placing them under the ambassador's authority, 
allowing diplomatic privileges and immunities to be requested 
for them, and authorizing routine compensation from the 
Department of Defense for their administrative expenses. The 
Department of Defense has argued against this process, noting 
that some military components are part of the relevant 
combatant command.
    Some but not all ambassadors have insisted on having 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs) signed with the regional 
combatant commander to clarify lines of authority. The 
situation should not be left for resolution in the heat of the 
moment. All ambassadors should pursue MOUs on military presence 
that reports to the combatant commander and on the broader 
issue of military action in country. Or the Department of State 
should pursue a more systemic solution offered by a global 
memorandum of agreement between the Secretaries of State and 
Defense. But it is important to get lines of authority 
questions sorted out before directives from the ambassador and 
the combatant commander conflict in an urgent situation.
    Authority is one issue. Value-added is another. Civilian 
embassy staff in a number of countries expressed skepticism 
about the need for and the potential for error by new military 
personnel. While those sent to work in embassies are expected 
to be seasoned and experienced professionals, some are seen as 
poorly trained in information-gathering and only rarely have 
regional or linguistic expertise. Rotational tours of only six 
months limit expertise acquired on-the-job. In several 
countries, embassy officials say that the time required to 
bring military personnel up to speed, monitor their activities, 
and prevent them from doing damage is not compensated for by 
contributions they make to the embassy team. There are notable 
exceptions to such criticism. In Lebanon, new military 
components in the embassy provided information on appropriate 
routes in connection with the emergency evacuation of several 
thousand Americans during the conflict between Hizballah and 
Israel in the summer of 2006.
    On the issue of Section 1206 funding, regional programs 
initiated by the combatant commands are not receiving the same 
embassy input as bilateral programs. In the case of the Trans-
Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative, at least one embassy did 
not realize that its country had been selected to receive 
assistance until well after the President announced it in May 
2006. The ambassador subsequently objected to the assistance 
and prevailed. In the case of the Gulf of Guinea initiative, 
the embassy team that covers Sao Tome and Principe did not know 
that its participation was being considered until well into the 
process. EUCOM briefed the ambassador a month after the 
President's announcement and gained the ambassador's 
support.\1\ Further, Equatorial Guinea, a problematic country 
that is situated in the strategic Gulf of Guinea, was on the 
original Presidential list of Section 1206 countries before 
being removed following congressional scrutiny.
    \3\ Preliminary findings of GAO report on 1206 funding to be 
completed in January 2007.
    Whether the mix of military and civilian foreign assistance 
is appropriate is another issue. In the Caribbean, for example, 
there will be some $7.5 million in Section 1206 funding for the 
Dominican Republic for interceptor boats and maritime 
communications and training, while only $800,000 in U.S. funds 
is going into public diplomacy. If the terrorist threat is the 
transit of people and equipment across the island and into the 
United States, Senate staff questioned whether it would be 
wiser to spend as much money on public information and an 
informants' program as on trying to intercept a couple of boats 
making their way to the United States through Caribbean waters. 
In this case, as in others, it is clear that Section 1206 
funding, while useful to address drug-trafficking and a future 
potential terrorist threat, is not the time-sensitive, urgent 
need that cannot wait for the normal budget process.
    There is evidence that some host country nationals are 
questioning the increasingly military component of America's 
profile overseas. In Uganda, a military civil affairs team went 
to the northern part of the country to help local communities 
build wells, erect schools and carry out other small 
development projects to help mitigate the consequences of a 
long-running regional conflict. Local NGOs questioned whether 
the military was there to take sides in the conflict. In 
Ethiopia, military humanitarian action teams were ordered out 
of the region near the Somali border due to Ethiopian 
sensitivities that their presence could spark cross-border 
hostilities. Whether the humanitarian task force should try to 
return is still a source of disagreement within embassy team 
discussions. In Latin America especially, military and 
intelligence efforts are viewed with suspicion, making it 
difficult to pursue meaningful cooperation on a 
counterterrorism agenda.
    Some ambassadors alluded to problems with broad 
implications for the role of the Department of State. One 
ambassador lamented that his effectiveness in representing the 
United States to foreign officials was beginning to wane, as 
more resources are directed to special operations forces and 
intelligence. Foreign officials are ``following the money'' in 
terms of determining which relationships to emphasize, he 
reported. A problem cited throughout every region is the under-
staffing of the civilian side of embassies, a situation 
corroborated by General Accounting Office findings.\4\ The 
military has significantly more money and personnel and is so 
energetic in pursuing its newly created programs and in 
thinking up new ones, that maintaining a management hand on 
military activities is increasingly difficult, according to one 
ambassador. In posts throughout the world, civilian staff point 
to the ``Iraq tax'' and cite instances of civilian job slots 
emptied and remaining unfilled as personnel and resources are 
funneled into the effort in Iraq.
    \4\ GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
U.S. Senate; ``Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language 
Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps''; August 2006; 

                           Regional Findings

    Latin American suspicions of American pressure and what is 
seen as an unspoken threat of military intervention run deep. 
Within this context, however, military-to-military ties are 
often welcomed and are longstanding in many countries.
    Latin Americans see themselves more as the victims of 
narco-terrorism, where drug money fuels anti-government 
insurgents, rather than global terrorism. Only Argentina has 
experienced an actual Islamic fundamentalist attack. In July 
1994, a van packed with explosives detonated in front of the 
Argentine-Israeli Mutual Aid Association. The bomb killed 85 
people and injured 300 others.
    Currently, there is no global terrorist organization in the 
region that poses a direct threat to the continental United 
States. In fact, the State Department's Country Reports on 
Terrorism for 2005 notes that, with the exception of the United 
States and Canada, ``there are no known operational cells of 
Islamic terrorists in the hemisphere.'' However, there are 
scattered pockets of people--particularly in the Triborder Area 
of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, as well as in Venezuela and 
Guyana--who are ideological, financial and logistical 
supporters of terrorist groups in the Middle East.
    In the Caribbean, drug-running and gun trafficking are a 
much more significant problem than is global terrorism, though 
the region is clearly a potential jumping-off point into the 
United States. Section 1206 funding is being used to address as 
yet unidentified terrorist threats, for example against the 
Panama Canal, but it will be most useful in addressing criminal 
activities. Section 1206 funding can increase the expertise and 
capability of military services and nascent coast guards in 
case a situation arises where global terrorists are identified 
as transiting or moving provisions through the region into the 
United States.
    Staff also traveled to the legendary ``tri-border 
region''--the area where Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil 
converge along the Parana River. It is traditionally an area 
characterized by lawlessness and transnational crime and is 
known as the contraband and smuggling capital of Latin America. 
There is considerable anecdotal reporting of terrorists 
transiting the area, but U.S. intelligence concludes that there 
is no evidence of active Islamist terrorist operational cells. 
There is growing concern that funds are being raised among the 
large Muslim communities, currently numbering in excess of 
30,000 individuals, for the benefit of Hizballah and Hamas. 
Illegal activity ranges from money laundering to tax and tariff 
evasion to the pirating and sale of counterfeit goods. Section 
1206 funding is so far not focused on the region. The U.S. has, 
however, taken the lead in pulling governments together to 
cooperate in tracking down any signs of the use of narco-
terrorism routes by global terrorists bent on entry into the 
United States.
    In Latin America, stagnant legal systems need strengthening 
if the potential link between criminal and global terrorist 
activities is to be avoided. New legislation, reforms, and 
additional resources to improve the ability of law enforcement 
to track and reign in illegal activity are arguably more 
important in the global war against terror than strengthening 
military ties. A number of American officials throughout the 
region see U.S. foreign assistance as out of balance, arguing 
that counterterrorism success depends less on ``pursue and 
capture'' as on viable legal and transparent financial systems 
to prevent support to terrorist groups. Cuts to programs that 
strengthen civil society, communicate effectively with Latin 
publics, and bolster the rule of law appear lopsided and short-
sighted, especially when juxtaposed with significant increases 
in security assistance.

    African sensitivity to colonial imperialism and suspicion 
of foreign intrigue to exploit resources runs deep. But sub-
Saharan Africa is probably the region of the world where pro-
American sentiment is strongest. The United States is not 
burdened with a colonial past and the form of Islam that is 
practiced in many African states is open and accepting of other 
people and religious practices. There are exceptions. Somalia 
is under the sway of religious extremists and Sudan is listed 
as a state sponsor of terrorism. The bombings of U.S. embassies 
in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 demonstrated the lethal impact 
that small bands of violent extemists in Africa can have when 
they target U.S. interests.
    The strategic importance of West Africa is growing. It is 
estimated that within a decade, some 25 percent of U.S. oil 
imports may come from Africa. There is little evidence of a 
significant terrorist threat in the West African countries 
visited, although one group of terrorists, believed by some 
experts to number as few as seventy, called the Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), is said to be pursuing ties 
with al-Qa'ida. The GSPC is an insurgent national group seeking 
the overthrow of the Algerian regime.
    Section 1206 funding is supporting both the Gulf of Guinea 
initiative in West Africa and the Trans Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Partnership. In neither case did embassy officials in 
countries visited see Section 1206 funding as addressing an 
emergency. Rather, it is seen as a new source of money for 
long-desired components in a military relationship. Old wish 
lists were dusted off and used to justify submitting a request 
for Section 1206 funding. Military officials in the embassies 
involved see the programs as a ``preventive'' effort, an 
investment in bilateral and intra-regional cooperation.
    Peacekeeping training, funded from the State Department 
budget and implemented by the Department of Defense, is an 
important component in the U.S. effort to bolster security and 
stability in West Africa. It is welcomed by governments, the 
regional organization ECOWAS, and the African Union.
    In East Africa, on the other hand, the counterterrorism 
effort is urgent. The focus is Somalia, a safe-haven for known 
terrorists and a primary preparation and transit area for past 
terror attacks against U.S. interests. A struggle for power in 
the country pits a fundamentalist Islamist government against 
an internationally supported transitional government. The 
outcome is uncertain but if current trends continue, the 
Islamist government could prevail and threaten self-governing 
areas in Somalia as well as the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. A 
sub-regional U.S. military command has been operating in the 
region since 2002 and set up headquarters in Djibouti in May 
    Despite the urgency in East Africa, no Section 1206 funding 
was approved for FY 2006. All three countries visited have 
requested Section 1206 funding for FY 2007, with proposals 
developed primarily through the Defense Attache's office. 
Neither the Ambassadors nor the rest of the country team seemed 
particularly knowledgeable about the process or the program. 
None had been informed by Washington about the State 
Department's role in formulating the assistance.
    One Central African country in particular illustrates the 
need for State Department perspective and guidance to temper 
Defense Department enthusiasm. The country is unstable, 
desperately poor, and run by a repressive government that is 
being challenged by a persistent armed resistance. Desperate 
for a military strong enough to protect it from the rebels, the 
government has signed an Article 98 agreement, exempting U.S. 
military personnel from International Criminal Court procedures 
and thus enabling it to receive military assistance. It has 
also signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United 
States. With extensive ``under-governed spaces'' as potential 
terrorist havens and bordering countries with equally uncertain 
futures, the country was termed ``a model country for security 
assistance'' by the regional combatant command. Civilian 
embassy officials, however, are demonstrably less keen. They 
question the rate at which military programs are rapidly 
escalating and the sizable and still growing presence of U.S. 
military personnel in-country. A U.S.-labeled backpack, 
observed on a government soldier undergoing U.S. training, 
underscored for SFRC staff the potential complications of a 
too-close association with the country's military. It would be 
a major setback if the United States were to be implicated in 
support of operations shoring up the repressive regime, 
regardless of the stated intent of such training.
    The Defense Department is currently considering 
establishing a separate combatant command for Africa rather 
than having different subregions of the continent covered 
separately by the European Command and Central Command. Such a 
development would be welcomed by a number of the diplomats 
interviewed as providing an opportunity for the military to 
develop a coherent regional overview and more expertise in the 
politics, language, and culture of individual subregions and 

    Asia's desire to remain independent from great power 
manipulation is strong. Anti-Americanism has been tempered by 
widespread approval of the U.S. emergency response to the 
December, 2004 earthquake and tsunami that killed tens of 
thousands of people in the region. The United States quickly 
combined civilian and military teams in what is reputed both 
within and outside government to be one of the most effective 
international disaster responses that the U.S. government, 
along with the rest of the international community, has ever 
    The terrorist threat in Southeast Asia is significant. 
Threats against U.S. embassies and other U.S.-affiliated 
institutions are taken seriously. Terrorist plots against U.S. 
and Southeast Asian interests have been foiled, and police 
forces have identified, arrested and prosecuted dozens of 
terrorists. Terrorist activity in the region has killed and 
maimed many, Americans and non-Americans alike. Governments 
work at varying levels with the U.S. government and each other 
to share information and resources in combating what is 
ultimately viewed as a common enemy.
    In Sri Lanka, there are no direct threats to American 
interests, terrorist or otherwise. An escalating conflict, 
however, between the government and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is now on the verge of outright civil war. 
Continual uncertainty and eruptions of violence are indirectly 
affecting Americans in the country, but Americans, as of this 
date, are not direct targets. As Sri Lanka is an island nation, 
anti-government insurgents primarily receive smuggled military 
arms and hardware via boat, from Indonesia, among other 
countries. The government of Eritrea reportedly provides direct 
assistance to the LTTE.
    Section 1206 funding in the Asian countries visited is 
dedicated to strengthening maritime capability. While this 
funding is not directly addressing an urgent terrorist threat, 
it is seen by ambassadors as a useful contribution to 
strengthening indigenous naval capability. Both coastal and 
international waters in the region are navigated by pirates, 
drug-runners, and gun and human traffickers. The transshipment 
of weapons of mass destruction through Asian waters, while not 
yet evident, cannot be ruled out.
    It is important to understand the underlying source of the 
terrorist threats against U.S. citizens and interests in the 
region. U.S. policies in the Middle East often serve as the 
catalyst for anti-American sentiment and acts of violence 
against Americans in Asian countries with Muslim populations. 
All countries visited have a significant Muslim portion of 
their populations, with Indonesia being the largest Muslim 
country in the world. For example, there is widespread belief 
that the U.S. tacitly assented to Israeli military retaliation 
in Lebanon earlier this year, stirring anger and public 
denunciations in the Islamic communities of Southern Thailand 
and Indonesia. But, even more important, it is the ongoing war 
in Iraq, alleged human rights abuses by Americans against 
Iraqis, and the U.S. refusal to talk with Iran that bolsters 
U.S. adversaries in the region by generating emotional sympathy 
and sometimes recruitment opportunities in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
southern Thailand, portions of the Philippines and other areas.

    The Middle East continues to be the most turbulent and 
unpredictable region of the world. While it is both the source 
and central theater of global terrorism, much of the violence 
in the region is inspired by local grievances and power 
    Popular anger toward the U.S. and sympathy for local 
political actors espousing anti-western views and violence has 
increased in the wake of the U.S. invasion and occupation of 
Iraq and Israel's military campaigns against the Palestinians 
and the Lebanese. U.S. calls for democracy in the region are 
widely viewed as insincere, in light of Washington's boycott of 
the Palestinian Authority in the wake of Hamas' victory in 
legislative elections in 2006, and its continuing support for 
undemocratic governments in Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf states, and 
the Maghreb. As a result, the overall terrorist threat level 
for USG personnel stationed in the region, as well as private 
Americans, has risen significantly over the past several years. 
Apart from the daily attacks on U.S. military and civilian 
personnel in Iraq, there have been numerous threats and several 
actual attacks against U.S. officials, embassy facilities, and 
private Americans in the Middle East in recent years.
    The U.S. government has devoted substantial resources to 
bolstering the ability of local governments to counter threats 
to U.S. and allied interests in the region. Senate staff 
visited Lebanon and Yemen. In Lebanon, Hizballah poses a 
serious threat to the stability of a U.S.-friendly government, 
and to Israel. Consequently, 1206 funding--together with other 
USG security assistance--is dedicated to reducing Hizballah's 
operating space by strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces 
through the provision of equipment and training. In Yemen, the 
birthplace of Osama bin Laden, Section 1206 is dedicated to 
supporting, equipping and training Yemeni special forces and 
border security units to prevent al-Qa'ida from establishing 
cells in the country and to halt arms proliferation. Other U.S. 
security assistance provides essential support and guidance to 
the Central Security Forces/Counter-terrorism Unit and the 
recently-established Coast Guard.
    While these counter-terrorism efforts are important, active 
U.S. diplomatic engagement to address the chief regional 
grievances--most notably in Iraq and in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict--would be equally if not more effective in reducing 
the terrorist threat in the long-term, undercutting the 
incendiary anti-US message of radicals that has found so much 
public resonance in the current unsettled environment.

                          A P P E N D I X E S


                               Appendix I

Questions for the Record Submitted to State Department Counselor Philip 
    Zelikow, and Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman, following 
  ``Briefing on State and Defense Department Cooperation Overseas,'' 
      before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 23, 2006

    Question 1. (State and DoD) Why is a separate account for 
DoD under State Department control being resisted by DoD when 
it could provide all of the funding and the programs that DoD 
is requesting? Why is it being resisted by the State Department 
when it would allow the programs to go forward while 
maintaining State Department oversight? Are there other 
mechanisms that should be considered to ensure that the 
Secretary of State is primarily responsible for the decisions 
as to which countries receive various types of U.S. assistance?

    Answer. The proposed legislation creates a separate 1206 
account at State into which DoD funding would be transferred 
and then released back to DoD at State's discretion. This 
mechanism would create an unnecessary step and is not the 
Administration's preferred approach for achieving the ultimate 
goal of 1206: to provide a fast and flexible tool for use in 
the GWOT. The current 1206 authority, on the other hand, 
provides an excellent mechanism for cooperation between the 
Departments of State and Defense.
    The Department of State is comfortable with the provisions 
available under the current Section 1206 authority. The 
Director of Foreign Assistance has introduced a new methodology 
to create and direct consolidated policy, planning, budgeting, 
and implementation mechanisms to provide umbrella leadership to 
U.S. foreign assistance. Current Section 1206 legislation 
requires joint implementation of the assistance programs and 
full coordination by the Secretary of State. By working with 
the Department of Defense on the development and implementation 
of the assistance programs, State ensures conformity with the 
Secretary of State's overall priorities for U.S. foreign 
    However, as I mentioned in my recent briefing, we view the 
current 1206 authority as a temporary solution pending the 
formulation of a stronger approach. Therefore, we look forward 
to working with Congress on a more durable approach. We will 
present such a framework in the report that is due to Congress 
later this year.

    Question 2. (State) In the past, there have been complaints 
from the Department of Defense that the FMS program and the 
IMET program, both military aid programs implemented by DoD, 
are subject to bureaucratic slowdowns at the Department of 
State. The cumbersome nature of deliberations over their use is 
reportedly one of the drivers behind DoD's desire for its own 
assistance program. The Department of State now has its first 
U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance in the person of Ambassador 
Randall Tobias.

   What mechanisms should be put in place to make sure 
        that a new military assistance program under State's 
        authority but implemented by DoD can be flexible and 
        efficiently organized to respond to more urgent 

   How is the Political-Military Bureau working with 
        Ambassador Tobias to get the input of the ambassadors 
        and the regional bureaus before recipient countries are 
        named? How much time is that process taking?

   Is the content of the programs also considered and 
        approved by Ambassador Tobias, the ambassadors, and the 
        regional bureaus? What is the process for this 
        approval? Is it separate from the decision-making on 
        recipients? How long has that process taken?

    Answer. The FMF and IMET processes are not subject to 
bureaucratic slowdowns at State. Foreign assistance decisions 
are made in a deliberate manner precisely to ensure the USG 
achieves the best possible result from the funds appropriated. 
Implementation is often delayed, especially through the FMS 
process, because of DoD's ``just-in-time'' supply system which 
acquires items as needed rather than stockpiling; as well as 
the long procurement times required for items sought by our 
foreign allies, but also needed for U.S. forces. The 
Administration's support for new authorities like 1206 reflects 
the acknowledgement that our traditional, deliberate processes 
are only partially suited to address the current national 
security environment and the need for new mechanisms to deal 
with unforeseen contingencies and opportunities.
    The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has been working 
closely with Ambassador Tobias and his staff to identify the 
countries for which we will request military aid in FY 2008. 
This process involves Department-wide ``country team meetings'' 
where representatives from all relevant bureaus and agencies, 
including the Pol-Mil Bureau and DoD, provide input from 
Ambassadors at the 154 posts which receive foreign assistance. 
This process began in May and will be completed in time for a 
budget submission to OMB in August. The Pol-Mil Bureau will 
continue to be intimately involved through all phases of the 
budget process.
    The Director of Foreign Assistance has authority over all 
State and USAID foreign assistance funding and programs. In 
developing the budget request for FY 2008, Ambassador Tobias 
and his staff are working closely with various bureaus and 
offices within State and USAID and the missions in the field to 
address the strategic security priorities around the world. 
Program levels are being developed concomitant with the process 
identifying recipient countries and should take approximately 
five months to complete.

    Question 3. (State and DoD) What is the mechanism through 
which ambassadors oversee the implementation of a program? If 
an ambassador disagrees with the direction of the program, does 
he/she have the authority to terminate it? What is the likely 
outcome when a combatant commander decides that a Section 1206 
military assistance program is urgent and the ambassador has 
doubts as to its timing or its merits?

    Answer. Appropriate members of the ambassador's country 
team will oversee the implementation of 1206 projects. Projects 
funded through Section 1206 authority are to be approved by the 
ambassador. As the President's senior representative in 
country, the ambassador always has the authority to terminate 
ongoing programs. Should the ambassador have concerns over the 
merits or timing of an assistance program which the combatant 
commander feels is urgent, the ambassador's views would 

    Question 4. (DoD) Why does the Department of Defense 
persist in seeking to change the existing Section 1206 program 
authority grant from the President to the Secretary of Defense? 
Is it an effort to give greater discretionary authority to the 
Secretary of Defense? Is it intended to remove Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) program oversight?

    Answer. The Administration, not simply DoD, has sought to 
broaden the existing Section 1206 authority. The amendments are 
needed, among other reasons, to authorize assistance more 
broadly to security forces (including in some cases police 
forces), to clearly articulate the role and authority of the 
Secretary of State, to increase the cap on amount of assistance 
that could be used, to clearly provide the Department of 
Defense with grant-making authority, to allow use of any 
Department of Defense O&M funds, and to provide special waiver 
authority that either the President or the Secretary of State 
could grant to overcome foreign aid restrictions, if 
appropriate. While the initial authority is very useful, the 
amended authority requested would represent a significant 
    The amendment seeks to move final approval authority to the 
Secretary level in order to shorten staffing timelines and use 
1206 in the fast and flexible manner in which it was intended. 
If passed, the amendment calls for both the Secretaries of 
State and Defense to approve each program proposed under 1206, 
ensuring that the two Departments concur before moving forward. 
This amendment does not give any additional discretionary 
authority to the Secretary of Defense; rather, it ensures the 
authority of the Secretary of State and will strengthen 
cooperation between State and DoD. OMB will continue to play 
its essential and customary role in program approval and 

    Question 5. (State) Would it be useful for the Secretary of 
State to provide written guidance to the ambassadors in the 
specific countries where Section 1206 military assistance is to 
be provided? Our ambassadors know the people, culture, and, in 
some cases, the possible pitfalls surrounding such a program. 
Our ambassadors should not be passive observers but are 
expected to provide vital input into their planning and 
implementation. If such a communication to ambassadors is sent, 
it would be useful to the record of this briefing to have a 
summary of its contents.

    Answer. Substantial communication, much by phone, email, 
and cables, occurred between State, Defense, posts and the 
combatant commands in reviewing potential uses of Section 1206 
authority in FY 2006. The proposals are in fact developed in 
the field, as we recognize the special knowledge and insights 
of our Ambassadors and Combatant Commanders. Now that the 
initial proposals have been approved, the Secretary will 
continue to use the most appropriate means available to provide 
guidance to each post, and will continue to take advantage of 
the expertise at posts in implementing those programs, as well 
as in the implementation of the FY 2007 authority.

    Question 6. (State) While inter-agency coordination is 
still being worked out and joint mechanisms developed for 
implementing Section 1206 funding, I am concerned that this is 
going on without input from the State Department's new Director 
of Foreign Assistance. How will this be corrected for future 

    Answer. The first tranche of Section 1206 proposals were 
being developed before the appointment of Ambassador Tobias as 
Director of Foreign Assistance. However, the Resource 
Management staff, which has since been subsumed into the Office 
of the Director of Foreign Assistance, has been intimately 
involved from the beginning. As Director, Ambassador Tobias, 
and his staff have been involved in the congressional 
notification process for FY 2006 proposals and will be directly 
involved in the development of future proposals and their 
implementation. From the beginning of this process, the 
Department of State as a whole has been involved in the 
development of this new authority, as well as programs carried 
out under it.

    Question 7. (State) What is the State Department doing to 
improve its ability to oversee such programs in the field? Will 
the Department be assigning the function to existing embassy 
personnel or will the Department rely on DoD personnel?

    Answer. The Department of State has adequate oversight 
mechanisms in place to monitor the efficacy of this aid, and 
will oversee it as we do in our foreign assistance programs 
generally. This function will be performed by existing embassy 
personnel who will report through the Chief of Mission.

    Question 8. (State and DoD) Will it be the State Department 
Inspector General or the military's Inspector General that will 
have oversight over Section 1206 military assistance? What 
metrics are being developed to measure the effectiveness of 
these programs?

    Answer. The State Department Inspector General will monitor 
aspects of Section 1206 activities involving State employees, 
but as with other foreign aid program funds, the Inspector 
General of the agency to which the funds are appropriated is 
generally responsible for the program oversight. In this case, 
the Department of Defense would generally be responsible for 
program oversight. To the extent that Section 1206 calls for 
coordination between the Departments on implementation, 
oversight could be shared by both Inspectors General.
    DoD, in coordination with State, will use established 
procedures and mechanisms to ensure proper use of all training 
and equipment under Section 1206. Both DoD and State have 
emphasized the importance of metrics for this program, and the 
people in the best position to develop those metrics, the 
operators in the field, are doing so. We would be happy to 
share these metrics with you as we proceed with implementation.

    Question 9. What role do ambassadors and their respective 
country teams play in the JIACG within the regional COCOM?

    Answer. JIACGs are advisory staff elements on COCOM staffs; 
ambassadors and country teams have no direct relationships with 
JIACGs. To the extent that the respective COCOM directs (or 
permits), JIACG members may interact with country team members 
with regard to operational planning or policy discussions.

                              Appendix II