EMBASSIES AS COMMAND POSTS IN THE ANTI-TERROR CAMPAIGN

A Report to Members

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

Richard G. Lugar, Chairman

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CONTENTS

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v
Overview
  Findings ............................................................................................................. 1
  Recommendations ............................................................................................. 2
Introduction
  Purpose of Study ............................................................................................... 4
  The Threat ........................................................................................................ 5
  Getting the Response Right ............................................................................. 5
Developments in U.S. Embassies
  New Role for the U.S. Military ........................................................................ 6
    Section 1206 Security Assistance ............................................................. 7
    Special Operations Forces ........................................................................ 8
  Development and Humanitarian Assistance ............................................. 8
  Public Information ..................................................................................... 9
  Reactions from the Field ............................................................................. 9
  Problems and Challenges ......................................................................... 11
Regional Findings
  Latin America ............................................................................................... 13
  Africa ................................................................................................................. 14
  Asia .................................................................................................................... 15
  Middle East ..................................................................................................... 16

APPENDIXES

Appendix I
  Executive branch answers to questions submitted on June 23, 2006 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ................................................... 19
Appendix II
  Section 1206 FY06-Funded Programs ............................................................ 25

(III)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

DECEMBER 15, 2006.

DEAR COLLEAGUES:

I recently sent 6 Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff members to some 20 countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East to examine the relationship between the State Department and the Defense Department in our embassies. I asked them to focus on the agencies’ cooperation on counterterrorism strategy, policies and activities, giving special attention to foreign assistance and the military’s new Section 1206 funding.

This report is only the first chapter of what I hope will become a continuing examination of ways in which our government can strengthen our posture overseas and better ensure our effectiveness against terrorism. The report points out both pitfalls and opportunities. It makes clear the increasingly instrumental role that the U.S. ambassador plays in making judgment calls that will affect our success or our failure. There is no country in the world where our Nation can afford to send diplomats ill-prepared to understand and make the tough choices. Nor can we as a Congress continue to undervalue the role of the civilian agencies if we want to ensure that our response to violent extremism is calibrated, supported by an appropriate mix of civilian and military tools.

The report contains findings and recommendations that form the basis for continuing committee oversight that is alert to potential problems. It is overseas where the campaign against terror will be won or lost. As a country, we must have the right tools, people and programs to succeed.

Richard G. Lugar,  
Chairman.

(V)
EMBASSIES AS COMMAND POSTS IN THE ANTI-TERROR CAMPAIGN

OVERVIEW

Protecting Americans from terrorist attacks within the United States depends, to a great extent, on U.S. success overseas. The task is vast and worldwide. It requires enlisting host country police to track and capture terrorists, uncovering terrorist financing, sharing intelligence with foreign partners, strengthening border surveillance in remote and unpopulated regions and building partnerships with foreign militaries. In the longer run, it requires convincing entire societies to reject terrorist propaganda and recruitment. A successful counterterrorism policy depends on strong relationships with foreign governments and the people residing in countries on every continent.

Embassies are on the frontline in the overseas campaign against terror and demands on ambassadors, staffs, and physical facilities have increased exponentially. Since September 11, 2001, embassies have hosted a continuing influx of inter-agency personnel tasked with the full range of counterterrorism activities.

Under the direction of Chairman Richard G. Lugar, Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff visited selected embassies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as the headquarters of four combatant commands, to focus specifically on the civilian/military nexus. He asked staff to assess whether the State and Defense Departments are working together overseas in a way that contributes to overarching U.S. foreign policy goals in the individual countries and in the regions.

FINDINGS

1. The number of military personnel and Defense Department activities in non-combat countries is increasing significantly. Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated.

2. While finding, capturing, and eliminating individual terrorists and their support networks is an imperative in the war against terror, it is repairing and building alliances, pursuing resolutions to regional conflicts, fostering democracy and development, and defusing religious extremism worldwide that will overcome the terrorist threat in the long-term. It has traditionally been the military’s mission to take direct action against
U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies’ mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on war fighting.

3. The increases of funding streams, self-assigned missions, and realigned authorities for the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders are placing new stresses on inter-agency coordination in the field. Currently, overlapping missions and inter-agency frictions are, for the most part, refereed by the U.S. ambassador and other State Department leadership in the embassy with intermittent referral to headquarters for guidance. But, as the role of the military expands, particularly in the area of foreign assistance, embassy officials in some countries question whether the Department of Defense will chafe under the constraints of State Department leadership and work for still more authority and funding.

4. There is evidence that some host countries are questioning the increasingly military component of America’s profile overseas. Some foreign officials question what appears to them as a new emphasis by the United States on military approaches to problems that are not seen as lending themselves to military solutions. Host country militaries clearly welcome increased professional contact and interaction with the U.S. military. However, some host countries have elements in both government and general society who are highly suspicious of potential American coercion. There is no sense so far that foreign hosts believe the U.S. military is dominating U.S. policy in-country, but if such a perception were to gain hold, it would give ammunition to U.S. adversaries. More importantly, it would weaken the bilateral relationships that are necessary to win the war against terror. Likewise, one misstep or poorly calculated military or other operation can significantly set back the full range of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in an entire region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Role of the Ambassador.** In the campaign against terror, the leadership qualities of the U.S. ambassador have become a determinative factor in victory or failure.

   - It is imperative that the U.S. ambassador provide strong leadership, steady oversight, and a firm hand on the component parts of all counterterrorism activities in U.S. embassies overseas. This includes the authority to challenge and override directives from other government agencies in Washington to their resident or temporary staffs in the embassy.
   - The President must send to the Senate as nominees for ambassadorships only those candidates who are qualified for the sensitive and important post-9/11 role of U.S. ambassador.
• In considering the President’s nominees, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and, subsequently the full Senate, should renew a commitment to insist on the qualities of experienced judgment, knowledge of inter-agency missions and activities, and a solid grounding in the culture and politics of the region to which the candidate is expected to be assigned.

• The SFRC, during the confirmation process, should make it clear that Members will hold the regional assistant secretaries and the ambassador accountable for mishaps or setbacks that could have been avoided through informed and engaged leadership in-country.

• Ambassadors should be charged with the decision whether to approve all military-related programs implemented in-country. That would include Section 1206 security assistance, humanitarian and development assistance, and other programs and operations. In countries with MISTs (Military Information Support Teams), the ambassador must similarly approve or disapprove all military-produced informational material and MIST personnel should work under the direction of the country team’s public affairs officer.

• In the case of special forces, the Ambassador’s authority over military activities in-country should be made clear in a memorandum of understanding with the relevant regional combatant commands. Such authority would include approving any mission, monitoring its implementation, and terminating it if necessary. An alternate, more systemic solution would be a global memorandum of agreement covering all special forces activities in-country, signed by the Secretaries of State and Defense.

2. Organizing Foreign Assistance. Some countries are now receiving between a quarter and half of their U.S. foreign assistance in the form of security assistance. In one country visited, security assistance is the only form of foreign aid being provided by the U.S. government. Section 1206 assistance, with the exception of Lebanon and Pakistan, is not addressing threats to the United States that are so immediate it cannot be included in normal budget processes. The Secretary of State should insist that all security assistance, including Section 1206 funding, be included under his/her authority in the new process for rationalizing and prioritizing foreign assistance. Country team meetings organized by the Director of Foreign Assistance at the State Department should include military representatives in cases where the country is a recipient or potential recipient of military funding. Otherwise, there is no guarantee that the mix of civilian and military assistance will be effectively balanced to most directly address the terrorist threat.

3. Rationalizing Missions and Money. The current budgets of the civilian foreign affairs agencies do not reflect their key role in the conduct of the war against terror. In fact, it can be argued that the disparity in the ratio between investments in military versus civilian approaches threatens U.S. success.

• The executive branch should undertake a disciplined, coordinated and transparent approach to identifying both civilian and military counterterrorism priorities overseas, assigning ap-
propriate roles, missions, and divisions of labor among federal agencies, and requesting robust funding to achieve those priorities.

- The legislative branch should fund the civilian foreign affairs agencies, particularly the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, at a minimum to the level requested by the President. Continuing to deny the President his foreign affairs budget by billions of dollars below what he requests is undermining U.S. national interests. The current 12:1 ratio of military spending to spending on the diplomatic and civilian foreign aid agencies risks the further encroachment of the military, by default, into areas where civilian leadership is more appropriate because it does not create resistance overseas and is more experienced.

- The administration should develop a comprehensive budget for foreign assistance that incorporates economic, development, humanitarian, security and military assistance. All foreign assistance programs should be funded through the foreign assistance accounts, as administered by the Department of State. If foreign assistance is, contrary to this recommendation, to be funded through both the 150 foreign affairs account and the 050 defense account, the Secretary of State should retain primary authority over its planning and implementation. Otherwise, there is the risk of undermining the Secretary of State’s role both in Washington and in embassies as the manager of bilateral relationships and as the chief arbiter of foreign policy decisions.

4. Regional Strategic Initiative. The Secretary of State should regularize and expand the Department’s Regional Strategic Initiative comprised of regional meetings of ambassadors, regional assistant secretaries, and senior interagency personnel, including the combatant commands, to focus specifically on the terrorism threat and appropriate counterterrorism responses. With the rapid expansion of counterterrorism activities and the increasing need for interagency agreement in the field on strategies as well as tactics, such meetings should occur at the most senior level possible, with ambassadors themselves actively engaged and involved.

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of Study. Civilian-military cooperation has always been important, but the breadth and complexities of the terrorist threat make it even more essential today. In a June 23, 2006 meeting with State Department Counselor Philip Zelikow and Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman, the two assured Chairman Lugar that counterterrorism strategy, policies and activities are being well coordinated at headquarters in Washington DC. They also said that U.S. ambassadors are exercising their full authority to support and oversee activities in the field. To follow-up, the Chairman dispatched six Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff to twenty countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to see what was happening in the embassies and how coordi-
nation was working on the ground. Staff also interviewed a number of U.S. ambassadors attending the Central and East Africa Ambassadors Conference hosted by EUCOM headquarters October 17–19, 2006. The Chairman tasked staff with looking at the new Section 1206 security assistance program, other military-provided assistance, military-to-military relations, and the deployment of special operations forces to non-combat countries. They also assessed the ability of U.S. ambassadors and State Department officials in key embassies to support, provide guidance and oversee military activities in-country.

The Threat. U.S. intelligence estimates that al-Qa’ida continues to be the greatest threat posed by a single terrorist organization. But the global terrorist movement, consisting of al-Qa’ida, other independent terrorist groups, and some self-generating cells operating as freelancers, is spreading and becoming more geographically dispersed. The underlying factors fueling the spread of violent jihadism are judged to be:

1. Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness;
2. The Iraq “jihad”;
3. The slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and
4. Pervasive anti-U.S. sentiment among most Muslims. 2

Anti-U.S. and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise, according to the intelligence community. The conjecture is made that this could fuel other radical ideologies, prompting some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack U.S. interests. At this point, there is little evidence in the countries visited that this is happening, though the possibility cannot be dismissed entirely and warrants continuous monitoring.

Getting the Response Right. With such a diffuse threat created by broad underlying factors, tensions arise among competing U.S. needs and goals. Knowledgeable officials, whether in uniform or not, can reasonably disagree on the right course of action, especially when it comes to U.S. policy within a specific foreign country.

For example, there is clearly a need in several countries visited to strengthen the host country’s security forces to go after terrorists and secure borders. But there is also the need in the same countries to support a fragile government’s ability to maintain civilian control over the armed forces, protect civilians from abuses that have been committed in the past by the same military, and avoid propping up a repressive government.

In other countries, there is the need to pursue terrorists and attack terrorist cells in areas where the government itself is not present or able to take action. The urgency of capturing or killing known terrorists must be considered within the context of respect

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1 Dominican Republic, Panama, Argentina, Ecuador, Guyana, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Gabon, Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Yemen, Lebanon, and Pakistan.

2 Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States” dated April 2006.
for the host country’s sovereignty, the need to retain mutual trust between the United States and the host country, and the risk of involvement in murky local disputes.

There can also develop honest disagreements about the threat that is being faced. In one country, some analysts see a specific group as posing a global threat with al-Qa’ida ties, while others see it as locally oriented, weakening, and reaching out for any source of help as it struggles for survival. The issue is a regular item on the embassy-team discussion agenda. Which side of the argument prevails will determine how urgently military action will be considered.

In cases where all agree on strategy, tactics can become a point of contention. In one country, the embassy team is in full agreement that it is necessary to support moderate Muslim voices in the ongoing discussions within the Islamic faith. But some who wanted to feature a prominent Muslim cleric in a U.S.-produced program were opposed by others who do not want to risk tainting an independent moderate with Western approval. The need for robust public affairs programs is tempered in all embassies by the equally compelling need to avoid sparking more widespread anti-Western antipathy through heavy-handed or inept messages.

In the area of economic and development assistance, there is an overwhelming need in many countries to address the poverty and slow pace of economic growth that is seen as an underlying grievance leading to religious extremism. But there is also an underlying tension between the desperate need for more assistance and the risk of developing the negative image of using such assistance as a transparent effort to gain military access or improve local intelligence gathering.

DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. EMBASSIES

NEW ROLE FOR THE U.S. MILITARY

The U.S. military has taken on numerous new tasks in the war against terror that are resulting in its having greater presence in embassies. Following the September 11 attacks, combatant commanders were directed by the Secretary of Defense to develop plans within their areas of responsibility that would identify and eliminate terrorists, as well as identify and influence regions susceptible to terrorist influence.

Some tasks are traditional boots-on-the-ground military missions. Some of the new tasks have military content, but are not necessarily war fighting. For example, there is a new security assistance program intended to boost recipient nations’ ability to partner with the U.S. military in the war against terror. Still other new tasks go well beyond what one would normally consider to be a soldier’s job, for example digging wells, building schools, and providing public affairs programming.

The defense attache has long been an important member of the embassy team. He serves as the ambassador’s advisor on military issues and the contact with the host nation’s military. Depending on the quantity of military assistance, the embassy also hosts an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) which is the in-country coordinator of such programs as the foreign military financing (FMF)
program, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a train-
and-equip program for international peacekeepers, and the inter-
national military education and training program (IMET). FMF,
GPOI, and IMET are funded in the civilian foreign affairs budget,
directed by the Secretary of State, and carried out by the Defense
Department. The level of assistance available in the foreign affairs
account for security assistance is a consistent source of frustra-
tion for Defense Department officials. European Command
(EUCOM) officials pointed out that only $6 million in FMF funding
was available for their entire region of responsibility in Africa.

There has been a longstanding question as to whether such secu-
rity assistance programs should be funded from the civilian foreign
affairs budget or the military budget. When the issue has arisen
in the past, the decision has been made both in the executive and
legislative branches that they should remain in the foreign af-
fairs account under the authority of the Secretary of State. This is
rooted in the fundamental belief that determinations as to what
countries should receive U.S. military equipment and training, and
the extent and type of such training, is fundamentally a foreign
policy decision.

Section 1206 Security Assistance. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the
executive branch requested and the legislative branch granted the
Department of Defense the authority and funding to train and
equip the militaries and police forces in both countries without
going through the State Department. The Department of Defense
also received authority to reimburse coalition partners for logistical
and military support provided in Iraq and Afghanistan. Subse-
sequently, the executive branch requested that these train and equip
authorities be extended worldwide.

Department of Defense officials, uniformed and civilian, argued
that the Department needed the new authority for time-sensitive
and urgent terrorism threats to the United States that could not
wait for the normal budget process applicable to the traditional
programs under State Department authority. They also argued
that the additional amounts necessary in a post-9/11 world would
not be possible from the strapped 150 foreign affairs budget.

In response, the legislative branch granted but circumscribed the
requested authority in the 2006 National Defense Authorization
Act. Called Section 1206 assistance after its place in the bill, the
amount of the assistance was limited to $200 million as opposed to
the $750 million requested and allowed only for training and equip-
ing military rather than police forces. It mandated that the Presi-
dent direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct the programs, in
order to ensure inter-agency vetting overseen by the Office of Man-
agement and Budget. The law also requires that the Secretaries of
Defense and State “jointly formulate” any program and that it be
“coordinated” with the Secretary of State in implementation. The
law also requires that the Section 1206 program comply with var-
ious laws generally applicable to the provision of military assist-
ance.

In the most recent defense authorization bill, again hard-pressed
by the Defense Department, Members of Congress dropped the re-
quirement that Section 1206 assistance be provided only upon di-
rection by the President and gave the authority directly to the Secretary of Defense. The amount was increased to $300 million.

Section 1206 security assistance is now being extended to some 14 countries: Algeria, Chad, the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe, Thailand, Yemen, Senegal, and Sri Lanka. A number of the 2006 projects focus on strengthening recipient countries’ coast guard equivalents or navies. Thailand, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, and the Dominican Republic and Panama are receiving 1206 funding for maritime surveillance and communications equipment and training. The administration continues to seek partners willing and able to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative, an American-led multilateral effort to coordinate and develop procedures for intercepting smugglers of unconventional weapons. Gaining greater control of maritime transportation routes can reduce drug and gun trafficking, exploitation of human beings, pirating and other illegal activities. Other programs in Yemen and in the Trans-Sahara focus on increasing the recipient nations’ ability to secure land borders and track and attack terrorist networks.

Overall in fiscal year 2006, $200 million in funding was appropriated. Only $100 million of that amount has been obligated, an indication that the initially claimed urgency for the funding was questionable. In the 2007 budget, $300 million has been authorized for Section 1206 funding and a request of $750 million is expected for 2008.

Special Operations Forces. The Special Operations Command takes the lead for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorists and their networks. Beyond its instrumental role in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Command has provided to regional commands some 1,000 special operations troops for service in 50 different countries. Its baseline budget has increased 81 percent since 9/11 from $4 billion to almost $8 billion. According to Commander General Bryan D. Brown, special forces are expected to grow by some 13,000 personnel over the next five years.

Special operations forces are part of the new mix of military personnel at U.S. embassies and provide information to their relevant combatant commanders. They also undertake military-to-military training, specifically for counter-terrorism. Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) teams arrive for short duration training of some one to three weeks and Joint Planning and Assistance (JPAT) teams are embedded for long-term training, with U.S. trainers rotating on a six-month schedule.

Development and Humanitarian Assistance. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the military has often had to take on emergency reconstruction tasks. There has been an effort to create a more robust civilian capability to work in hostile environments, but the State Department-organized effort is still nascent and civilian agencies, especially USAID, are still cobbling together ad hoc teams that, while talented and dedicated, are limited in number. As a result, military civil affairs teams have built bridges, schools and hospitals, organized local political councils, and provided humanitarian relief.
Much of the funding came from the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), initially supported by the hundreds of millions of dollars found in Saddam Hussein’s secret caches throughout Iraq. Subsequently, the Congress appropriated funding from the Department of Defense budget for the CERP, and included funds for firefighting, repair of damage to oil facilities and related infrastructure, and medical assistance to Iraqi children.

Building on the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Defense Department requested and received authority to broaden a previously existing Combatant Commander Initiative Fund to allow combatant commanders to carry out such projects in any countries where military operations are being conducted. Combatant Commanders are now funding joint military exercises, military education and training, and humanitarian and civic projects that include medical and veterinary care, construction of transportation systems, wells, sanitation facilities, and landmine clearance and education.

Such an expansion of military-provided humanitarian and civic assistance is nowhere more evident than in the Horn of Africa. U.S. Central Command oversees some 1800 troops stationed at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, who are tasked with building health clinics, wells and schools in remote areas where government influence is weak and terrorists are known to be recruiting. In an effort to provide evidence of alternatives to religious extremism, small military teams train local forces, gain access and gather information, and provide practical assistance in an attempt to improve the lives of local residents in areas that terrorists may be targeting.

Staff found that country teams in embassies with USAID presence are far more capable of ensuring sufficient review of military humanitarian assistance projects than those that have no USAID office. Budgetary cutbacks at USAID, affecting both personnel and programs, are repeatedly cited as a deficiency in the U.S. campaign against extremism in susceptible regions of the world.

Public Information. The Defense Department has taken on the additional mission under the direction of the Secretary of Defense to counter terrorist propaganda in key regions and countries of the world. The purpose is to discourage sympathy for terrorists and their efforts to recruit, marginalize radical Islamic ideology, and increase popular support for U.S. operations and multilateral counterterrorism activities. In one of its most recent forays into the civilian world of international public affairs broadcasting, the Pentagon has produced a report that is highly critical of the Broadcasting Board of Governors radio and TV broadcasting into Iran.

In embassies, military teams of 3–4 persons are being sent to key countries to carry out informational programs. There are currently 18 such deployments, expected to rise to 30 countries if current plans are realized.

REATIONS FROM THE FIELD

Ambassadors in every country pursue a wide-ranging agenda running the gamut from managing the overall relationship with the host country to resolving trade disputes and rescuing Americans in trouble. All ambassadors interviewed by the staff, with the
exception of Thailand, reported an increase in military personnel in their embassies since 9/11. One ambassador heading a small embassy in Africa reported that American uniformed personnel may outnumber civilian personnel within the year.

All ambassadors interviewed see the war on terror as a top priority and the military components of the embassy as one tool that can be used to address it. For the most part, ambassadors welcome the additional resources that the military brings and they see strong military-to-military ties as an important ingredient in a strong bilateral relationship. Nonetheless, State and USAID personnel often question the purposes, quantity, and quality of the expanded military activities in-country.

Ambassadors are the President's personal representative and top U.S. official in-country. Every ambassador has country clearance authority. Often permission to work at the embassy is granted routinely to inter-agency personnel coming on either permanent or temporary assignment. But every ambassador has the power to deny clearance or to suspend it once granted. As one U.S. ambassador stated, "The rule is if you're in country, you work for the ambassador. If you don't think you work for the ambassador, you don't get country clearance to come in."

In most cases, ambassadors seemed informed about U.S. military activities in-country and appeared willing and able to provide leadership. In three embassies visited, however, ambassadors appeared overwhelmed by the growing presence of military personnel and insistent requests from combatant commanders. Neither were the ambassadors as knowledgeable on the breadth of military activity in country as they should have been. In one case, an ambassador to a country that is receiving Section 1206 funding had not heard of the program. In several cases, embassy staff saw their role as limited to a review of choices already made by "the military side of the house."

There are successes to report that can provide models to new ambassadors. The ambassador to Yemen appears to have developed one of the best procedures for initiating Section 1206 requests. The Embassy's Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) works closely with the Yemeni Ministry of Defense to identify needs. The ODC vets these requests through the country team, discussing them with the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), the political section chief, and a political officer who covers counterterrorism issues full-time. The Ambassador approves the submission to Washington.

In Thailand, though all military assistance has been suspended due to the September 19 coup, the ambassador's deputy chief of mission previously served as a political-military officer, so the ambassador reports a "front office that has a good degree of background knowledge about and sensitivity to the military dimensions of the bilateral relationship." Another ambassador warned against delegating oversight of military programs and activities to the defense attache or other military components of the embassy. "The front office must be kept informed, must know when key decisions need to be made, and must make them," he said.

An ambassador to an African country described the situation in his embassy in this way: "We are a small number of people, in a tight community, with a clear hierarchy. The military respects hi-
erarchy and clarity.” He reports that when he has objections to pro-
grams or activities, he says no. EUCOM has a lot of the money to spend “and the atmosphere is that we want to do something with it. My attitude is, ‘The first principle is do no harm.’” He recently suspended country clearance to one military official. The person was gone the next day.

Problems and Challenges. Despite the welcome arrival of new money and other resources to the country team, the increase in military presence and activities has created challenges and raised reservations and questions.

Decisions to take action against terrorists in-country require the approval of the Secretary of Defense and “are coordinated with” the ambassadors, according to Department of Defense guidelines. The State Department perspective is that ambassadors have full authority over all U.S. government activities in country. While such nuanced differences may seem obscure, they are bound to cause problems. One route toward clarity would be the inclusion of new military elements under the National Security Decision Directive–38 (NSDD–38) process. This would “regularize” their presence in country, specifically placing them under the ambassador’s authority, allowing diplomatic privileges and immunities to be requested for them, and authorizing routine compensation from the Department of Defense for their administrative expenses. The Department of Defense has argued against this process, noting that some military components are part of the relevant combatant command.

Some but not all ambassadors have insisted on having memo-
randa of understanding (MOUs) signed with the regional combat-
ant commander to clarify lines of authority. The situation should not be left for resolution in the heat of the moment. All ambas-
sadors should pursue MOUs on military presence that reports to the combatant commander and on the broader issue of military ac-
tion in country. Or the Department of State should pursue a more systemic solution offered by a global memorandum of agreement between the Secretaries of State and Defense. But it is important to get lines of authority questions sorted out before directives from the ambassador and the combatant commander conflict in an ur-
gen situation.

Authority is one issue. Value-added is another. Civilian embassy staff in a number of countries expressed skepticism about the need for and the potential for error by new military personnel. While those sent to work in embassies are expected to be seasoned and experienced professionals, some are seen as poorly trained in infor-
mation-gathering and only rarely have regional or linguistic exper-
tise. Rotational tours of only six months limit expertise acquired on-the-job. In several countries, embassy officials say that the time required to bring military personnel up to speed, monitor their ac-
tivities, and prevent them from doing damage is not compensated for by contributions they make to the embassy team. There are no-
table exceptions to such criticism. In Lebanon, new military compo-
nents in the embassy provided information on appropriate routes in connection with the emergency evacuation of several thousand Americans during the conflict between Hizballah and Israel in the summer of 2006.
On the issue of Section 1206 funding, regional programs initiated by the combatant commands are not receiving the same embassy input as bilateral programs. In the case of the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative, at least one embassy did not realize that its country had been selected to receive assistance until well after the President announced it in May 2006. The ambassador subsequently objected to the assistance and prevailed. In the case of the Gulf of Guinea initiative, the embassy team that covers Sao Tome and Principe did not know that its participation was being considered until well into the process. EUCOM briefed the ambassador a month after the President’s announcement and gained the ambassador’s support. Further, Equatorial Guinea, a problematic country that is situated in the strategic Gulf of Guinea, was on the original Presidential list of Section 1206 countries before being removed following congressional scrutiny.

Whether the mix of military and civilian foreign assistance is appropriate is another issue. In the Caribbean, for example, there will be some $7.5 million in Section 1206 funding for the Dominican Republic for interceptor boats and maritime communications and training, while only $800,000 in U.S. funds is going into public diplomacy. If the terrorist threat is the transit of people and equipment across the island and into the United States, Senate staff questioned whether it would be wiser to spend as much money on public information and an informants’ program as on trying to intercept a couple of boats making their way to the United States through Caribbean waters. In this case, as in others, it is clear that Section 1206 funding, while useful to address drug-trafficking and a future potential terrorist threat, is not the time-sensitive, urgent need that cannot wait for the normal budget process.

There is evidence that some host country nationals are questioning the increasingly military component of America’s profile overseas. In Uganda, a military civil affairs team went to the northern part of the country to help local communities build wells, erect schools and carry out other small development projects to help mitigate the consequences of a long-running regional conflict. Local NGOs questioned whether the military was there to take sides in the conflict. In Ethiopia, military humanitarian action teams were ordered out of the region near the Somali border due to Ethiopian sensitivities that their presence could spark cross-border hostilities. Whether the humanitarian task force should try to return is still a source of disagreement within embassy team discussions. In Latin America especially, military and intelligence efforts are viewed with suspicion, making it difficult to pursue meaningful cooperation on a counterterrorism agenda.

Some ambassadors alluded to problems with broad implications for the role of the Department of State. One ambassador lamented that his effectiveness in representing the United States to foreign officials was beginning to wane, as more resources are directed to special operations forces and intelligence. Foreign officials are “following the money” in terms of determining which relationships to emphasize, he reported. A problem cited throughout every region is the under-staffing of the civilian side of embassies, a situation cor-

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1 Preliminary findings of GAO report on 1206 funding to be completed in January 2007.
roborated by General Accounting Office findings. The military has significantly more money and personnel and is so energetic in pursuing its newly created programs and in thinking up new ones, that maintaining a management hand on military activities is increasingly difficult, according to one ambassador. In posts throughout the world, civilian staff point to the “Iraq tax” and cite instances of civilian job slots emptied and remaining unfilled as personnel and resources are funneled into the effort in Iraq.

REGIONAL FINDINGS

Latin American suspicions of American pressure and what is seen as an unspoken threat of military intervention run deep. Within this context, however, military-to-military ties are often welcomed and are longstanding in many countries.

Latin Americans see themselves more as the victims of narco-terrorism, where drug money fuels anti-government insurgents, rather than global terrorism. Only Argentina has experienced an actual Islamic fundamentalist attack. In July 1994, a van packed with explosives detonated in front of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Aid Association. The bomb killed 85 people and injured 300 others.

Currently, there is no global terrorist organization in the region that poses a direct threat to the continental United States. In fact, the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2005 notes that, with the exception of the United States and Canada, “there are no known operational cells of Islamic terrorists in the hemisphere.” However, there are scattered pockets of people—particularly in the Triborder Area of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, as well as in Venezuela and Guyana—who are ideological, financial and logistical supporters of terrorist groups in the Middle East.

In the Caribbean, drug-running and gun trafficking are a much more significant problem than is global terrorism, though the region is clearly a potential jumping-off point into the United States. Section 1206 funding is being used to address as yet unidentified terrorist threats, for example against the Panama Canal, but it will be most useful in addressing criminal activities. Section 1206 funding can increase the expertise and capability of military services and nascent coast guards in case a situation arises where global terrorists are identified as transiting or moving provisions through the region into the United States.

Staff also traveled to the legendary “tri-border region”—the area where Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil converge along the Parana River. It is traditionally an area characterized by lawlessness and transnational crime and is known as the contraband and smuggling capital of Latin America. There is considerable anecdotal reporting of terrorists transiting the area, but U.S. intelligence concludes that there is no evidence of active Islamist terrorist operational cells. There is growing concern that funds are being raised among the large Muslim communities, currently numbering in excess of 30,000 individuals, for the benefit of Hizballah and Hamas. Illegal activity ranges from money laundering to tax and tariff evasion to
the pirating and sale of counterfeit goods. Section 1206 funding is so far not focused on the region. The U.S. has, however, taken the lead in pulling governments together to cooperate in tracking down any signs of the use of narco-terrorism routes by global terrorists bent on entry into the United States.

In Latin America, stagnant legal systems need strengthening if the potential link between criminal and global terrorist activities is to be avoided. New legislation, reforms, and additional resources to improve the ability of law enforcement to track and reign in illegal activity are arguably more important in the global war against terror than strengthening military ties. A number of American officials throughout the region see U.S. foreign assistance as out of balance, arguing that counterterrorism success depends less on “pursue and capture” as on viable legal and transparent financial systems to prevent support to terrorist groups. Cuts to programs that strengthen civil society, communicate effectively with Latin publics, and bolster the rule of law appear lopsided and short-sighted, especially when juxtaposed with significant increases in security assistance.

African sensitivity to colonial imperialism and suspicion of foreign intrigue to exploit resources runs deep. But sub-Saharan Africa is probably the region of the world where pro-American sentiment is strongest. The United States is not burdened with a colonial past and the form of Islam that is practiced in many African states is open and accepting of other people and religious practices. There are exceptions. Somalia is under the sway of religious extremists and Sudan is listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. The bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 demonstrated the lethal impact that small bands of violent extremists in Africa can have when they target U.S. interests.

The strategic importance of West Africa is growing. It is estimated that within a decade, some 25 percent of U.S. oil imports may come from Africa. There is little evidence of a significant terrorist threat in the West African countries visited, although one group of terrorists, believed by some experts to number as few as seventy, called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), is said to be pursuing ties with al-Qa’ida. The GSPC is an insurgent national group seeking the overthrow of the Algerian regime.

Section 1206 funding is supporting both the Gulf of Guinea initiative in West Africa and the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership. In neither case did embassy officials in countries visited see Section 1206 funding as addressing an emergency. Rather, it is seen as a new source of money for long-desired components in a military relationship. Old wish lists were dusted off and used to justify submitting a request for Section 1206 funding. Military officials in the embassies involved see the programs as a “preventive” effort, an investment in bilateral and intra-regional cooperation.

Peacekeeping training, funded from the State Department budget and implemented by the Department of Defense, is an important component in the U.S. effort to bolster security and stability in West Africa. It is welcomed by governments, the regional organization ECOWAS, and the African Union.
In East Africa, on the other hand, the counterterrorism effort is urgent. The focus is Somalia, a safe-haven for known terrorists and a primary preparation and transit area for past terror attacks against U.S. interests. A struggle for power in the country pits a fundamentalist Islamist government against an internationally supported transitional government. The outcome is uncertain but if current trends continue, the Islamist government could prevail and threaten self-governing areas in Somalia as well as the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. A sub-regional U.S. military command has been operating in the region since 2002 and set up headquarters in Djibouti in May 2003.

Despite the urgency in East Africa, no Section 1206 funding was approved for FY 2006. All three countries visited have requested Section 1206 funding for FY 2007, with proposals developed primarily through the Defense Attaché's office. Neither the Ambassadors nor the rest of the country team seemed particularly knowledgeable about the process or the program. None had been informed by Washington about the State Department’s role in formulating the assistance.

One Central African country in particular illustrates the need for State Department perspective and guidance to temper Defense Department enthusiasm. The country is unstable, desperately poor, and run by a repressive government that is being challenged by a persistent armed resistance. Desperate for a military strong enough to protect it from the rebels, the government has signed an Article 98 agreement, exempting U.S. military personnel from International Criminal Court procedures and thus enabling it to receive military assistance. It has also signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States. With extensive “undergoverned spaces” as potential terrorist havens and bordering countries with equally uncertain futures, the country was termed “a model country for security assistance” by the regional combatant command. Civilian embassy officials, however, are demonstrably less keen. They question the rate at which military programs are rapidly escalating and the sizable and still growing presence of U.S. military personnel in-country. A U.S.-labeled backpack, observed on a government soldier undergoing U.S. training, underscored for SFRC staff the potential complications of a too-close association with the country’s military. It would be a major setback if the United States were to be implicated in support of operations shoring up the repressive regime, regardless of the stated intent of such training.

The Defense Department is currently considering establishing a separate combatant command for Africa rather than having different subregions of the continent covered separately by the European Command and Central Command. Such a development would be welcomed by a number of the diplomats interviewed as providing an opportunity for the military to develop a coherent regional overview and more expertise in the politics, language, and culture of individual subregions and countries.

Asia’s desire to remain independent from great power manipulation is strong. Anti-Americanism has been tempered by widespread approval of the U.S. emergency response to the December, 2004 earthquake and tsunami that killed tens of thousands of people in
the region. The United States quickly combined civilian and military teams in what is reputed both within and outside government to be one of the most effective international disaster responses that the U.S. government, along with the rest of the international community, has ever mounted.

The terrorist threat in Southeast Asia is significant. Threats against U.S. embassies and other U.S.-affiliated institutions are taken seriously. Terrorist plots against U.S. and Southeast Asian interests have been foiled, and police forces have identified, arrested and prosecuted dozens of terrorists. Terrorist activity in the region has killed and maimed many, Americans and non-Americans alike. Governments work at varying levels with the U.S. government and each other to share information and resources in combating what is ultimately viewed as a common enemy.

In Sri Lanka, there are no direct threats to American interests, terrorist or otherwise. An escalating conflict, however, between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is now on the verge of outright civil war. Continual uncertainty and eruptions of violence are indirectly affecting Americans in the country, but Americans, as of this date, are not direct targets. As Sri Lanka is an island nation, anti-government insurgents primarily receive smuggled military arms and hardware via boat, from Indonesia, among other countries. The government of Eritrea reportedly provides direct assistance to the LTTE.

Section 1206 funding in the Asian countries visited is dedicated to strengthening maritime capability. While this funding is not directly addressing an urgent terrorist threat, it is seen by ambassadors as a useful contribution to strengthening indigenous naval capability. Both coastal and international waters in the region are navigated by pirates, drug-runners, and gun and human traffickers. The transshipment of weapons of mass destruction through Asian waters, while not yet evident, cannot be ruled out.

It is important to understand the underlying source of the terrorist threats against U.S. citizens and interests in the region. U.S. policies in the Middle East often serve as the catalyst for anti-American sentiment and acts of violence against Americans in Asian countries with Muslim populations. All countries visited have a significant Muslim portion of their populations, with Indonesia being the largest Muslim country in the world. For example, there is widespread belief that the U.S. tacitly assented to Israeli military retaliation in Lebanon earlier this year, stirring anger and public denunciations in the Islamic communities of Southern Thailand and Indonesia. But, even more important, it is the ongoing war in Iraq, alleged human rights abuses by Americans against Iraqis, and the U.S. refusal to talk with Iran that bolsters U.S. adversaries in the region by generating emotional sympathy and sometimes recruitment opportunities in Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, portions of the Philippines and other areas.

The Middle East continues to be the most turbulent and unpredictable region of the world. While it is both the source and central theater of global terrorism, much of the violence in the region is inspired by local grievances and power struggles.

Popular anger toward the U.S. and sympathy for local political actors espousing anti-western views and violence has increased in
the wake of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq and Israel’s military campaigns against the Palestinians and the Lebanese. U.S. calls for democracy in the region are widely viewed as insincere, in light of Washington’s boycott of the Palestinian Authority in the wake of Hamas’ victory in legislative elections in 2006, and its continuing support for undemocratic governments in Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf states, and the Maghreb. As a result, the overall terrorist threat level for USG personnel stationed in the region, as well as private Americans, has risen significantly over the past several years. Apart from the daily attacks on U.S. military and civilian personnel in Iraq, there have been numerous threats and several actual attacks against U.S. officials, embassy facilities, and private Americans in the Middle East in recent years.

The U.S. government has devoted substantial resources to bolstering the ability of local governments to counter threats to U.S. and allied interests in the region. Senate staff visited Lebanon and Yemen. In Lebanon, Hizballah poses a serious threat to the stability of a U.S.-friendly government, and to Israel. Consequently, 1206 funding—together with other USG security assistance—is dedicated to reducing Hizballah’s operating space by strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces through the provision of equipment and training. In Yemen, the birthplace of Osama bin Laden, Section 1206 is dedicated to supporting, equipping and training Yemeni special forces and border security units to prevent al-Qa’ida from establishing cells in the country and to halt arms proliferation. Other U.S. security assistance provides essential support and guidance to the Central Security Forces/Counter-terrorism Unit and the recently-established Coast Guard.

While these counter-terrorism efforts are important, active U.S. diplomatic engagement to address the chief regional grievances—most notably in Iraq and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—would be equally if not more effective in reducing the terrorist threat in the long-term, undercutting the incendiary anti-US message of radicals that has found so much public resonance in the current unsettled environment.
Appendix I

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO STATE DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR PHILIP ZELIKOW, AND UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ERIC EDELMAN, FOLLOWING “BRIEFING ON STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT COOPERATION OVERSEAS,” BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, JUNE 23, 2006

Question 1. (State and DoD) Why is a separate account for DoD under State Department control being resisted by DoD when it could provide all of the funding and the programs that DoD is requesting? Why is it being resisted by the State Department when it would allow the programs to go forward while maintaining State Department oversight? Are there other mechanisms that should be considered to ensure that the Secretary of State is primarily responsible for the decisions as to which countries receive various types of U.S. assistance?

Answer. The proposed legislation creates a separate 1206 account at State into which DoD funding would be transferred and then released back to DoD at State’s discretion. This mechanism would create an unnecessary step and is not the Administration’s preferred approach for achieving the ultimate goal of 1206: to provide a fast and flexible tool for use in the GWOT. The current 1206 authority, on the other hand, provides an excellent mechanism for cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense.

The Department of State is comfortable with the provisions available under the current Section 1206 authority. The Director of Foreign Assistance has introduced a new methodology to create and direct consolidated policy, planning, budgeting, and implementation mechanisms to provide umbrella leadership to U.S. foreign assistance. Current Section 1206 legislation requires joint implementation of the assistance programs and full coordination by the Secretary of State. By working with the Department of Defense on the development and implementation of the assistance programs, State ensures conformity with the Secretary of State’s overall priorities for U.S. foreign assistance.

However, as I mentioned in my recent briefing, we view the current 1206 authority as a temporary solution pending the formulation of a stronger approach. Therefore, we look forward to working with Congress on a more durable approach. We will present such a framework in the report that is due to Congress later this year.

Question 2. (State) In the past, there have been complaints from the Department of Defense that the FMS program and the IMET...
program, both military aid programs implemented by DoD, are subject to bureaucratic slowdowns at the Department of State. The cumbersome nature of deliberations over their use is reportedly one of the drivers behind DoD’s desire for its own assistance program. The Department of State now has its first U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance in the person of Ambassador Randall Tobias.

- What mechanisms should be put in place to make sure that a new military assistance program under State’s authority but implemented by DoD can be flexible and efficiently organized to respond to more urgent situations?
- How is the Political-Military Bureau working with Ambassador Tobias to get the input of the ambassadors and the regional bureaus before recipient countries are named? How much time is that process taking?
- Is the content of the programs also considered and approved by Ambassador Tobias, the ambassadors, and the regional bureaus? What is the process for this approval? Is it separate from the decision-making on recipients? How long has that process taken?

Answer. The FMF and IMET processes are not subject to bureaucratic slowdowns at State. Foreign assistance decisions are made in a deliberate manner precisely to ensure the USG achieves the best possible result from the funds appropriated. Implementation is often delayed, especially through the FMS process, because of DoD’s “just-in-time” supply system whichacquires items as needed rather than stockpiling; as well as the long procurement times required for items sought by our foreign allies, but also needed for U.S. forces. The Administration's support for new authorities like 1206 reflects the acknowledgement that our traditional, deliberate processes are only partially suited to address the current national security environment and the need for new mechanisms to deal with unforeseen contingencies and opportunities.

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has been working closely with Ambassador Tobias and his staff to identify the countries for which we will request military aid in FY 2008. This process involves Department-wide “country team meetings” where representatives from all relevant bureaus and agencies, including the Pol-Mil Bureau and DoD, provide input from Ambassadors at the 154 posts which receive foreign assistance. This process began in May and will be completed in time for a budget submission to OMB in August. The Pol-Mil Bureau will continue to be intimately involved through all phases of the budget process.

The Director of Foreign Assistance has authority over all State and USAID foreign assistance funding and programs. In developing the budget request for FY 2008, Ambassador Tobias and his staff are working closely with various bureaus and offices within State and USAID and the missions in the field to address the strategic security priorities around the world. Program levels are being developed concomitant with the process identifying recipient countries and should take approximately five months to complete.

**Question 3.** (State and DoD) What is the mechanism through which ambassadors oversee the implementation of a program? If an
ambassador disagrees with the direction of the program, does he/she have the authority to terminate it? What is the likely outcome when a combatant commander decides that a Section 1206 military assistance program is urgent and the ambassador has doubts as to its timing or its merits?

Answer. Appropriate members of the ambassador’s country team will oversee the implementation of 1206 projects. Projects funded through Section 1206 authority are to be approved by the ambassador. As the President’s senior representative in country, the ambassador always has the authority to terminate ongoing programs. Should the ambassador have concerns over the merits or timing of an assistance program which the combatant commander feels is urgent, the ambassador’s views would prevail.

Question 4. (DoD) Why does the Department of Defense persist in seeking to change the existing Section 1206 program authority grant from the President to the Secretary of Defense? Is it an effort to give greater discretionary authority to the Secretary of Defense? Is it intended to remove Office of Management and Budget (OMB) program oversight?

Answer. The Administration, not simply DoD, has sought to broaden the existing Section 1206 authority. The amendments are needed, among other reasons, to authorize assistance more broadly to security forces (including in some cases police forces), to clearly articulate the role and authority of the Secretary of State, to increase the cap on amount of assistance that could be used, to clearly provide the Department of Defense with grant-making authority, to allow use of any Department of Defense O&M funds, and to provide special waiver authority that either the President or the Secretary of State could grant to overcome foreign aid restrictions, if appropriate. While the initial authority is very useful, the amended authority requested would represent a significant improvement. The amendment seeks to move final approval authority to the Secretary level in order to shorten staffing timelines and use 1206 in the fast and flexible manner in which it was intended. If passed, the amendment calls for both the Secretaries of State and Defense to approve each program proposed under 1206, ensuring that the two Departments concur before moving forward. This amendment does not give any additional discretionary authority to the Secretary of Defense; rather, it ensures the authority of the Secretary of State and will strengthen cooperation between State and DoD. OMB will continue to play its essential and customary role in program approval and oversight.

Question 5. (State) Would it be useful for the Secretary of State to provide written guidance to the ambassadors in the specific countries where Section 1206 military assistance is to be provided? Our ambassadors know the people, culture, and, in some cases, the possible pitfalls surrounding such a program. Our ambassadors should not be passive observers but are expected to provide vital input into their planning and implementation. If such a communication to ambassadors is sent, it would be useful to the record of this briefing to have a summary of its contents.
Answer. Substantial communication, much by phone, email, and cables, occurred between State, Defense, posts and the combatant commands in reviewing potential uses of Section 1206 authority in FY 2006. The proposals are in fact developed in the field, as we recognize the special knowledge and insights of our Ambassadors and Combatant Commanders. Now that the initial proposals have been approved, the Secretary will continue to use the most appropriate means available to provide guidance to each post, and will continue to take advantage of the expertise at posts in implementing those programs, as well as in the implementation of the FY 2007 authority.

Question 6. (State) While inter-agency coordination is still being worked out and joint mechanisms developed for implementing Section 1206 funding, I am concerned that this is going on without input from the State Department’s new Director of Foreign Assistance. How will this be corrected for future decision-making?

Answer. The first tranche of Section 1206 proposals were being developed before the appointment of Ambassador Tobias as Director of Foreign Assistance. However, the Resource Management staff, which has since been subsumed into the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, has been intimately involved from the beginning. As Director, Ambassador Tobias, and his staff have been involved in the congressional notification process for FY 2006 proposals and will be directly involved in the development of future proposals and their implementation. From the beginning of this process, the Department of State as a whole has been involved in the development of this new authority, as well as programs carried out under it.

Question 7. (State) What is the State Department doing to improve its ability to oversee such programs in the field? Will the Department be assigning the function to existing embassy personnel or will the Department rely on DoD personnel?

Answer. The Department of State has adequate oversight mechanisms in place to monitor the efficacy of this aid, and will oversee it as we do in our foreign assistance programs generally. This function will be performed by existing embassy personnel who will report through the Chief of Mission.

Question 8. (State and DoD) Will it be the State Department Inspector General or the military’s Inspector General that will have oversight over Section 1206 military assistance? What metrics are being developed to measure the effectiveness of these programs?

Answer. The State Department Inspector General will monitor aspects of Section 1206 activities involving State employees, but as with other foreign aid program funds, the Inspector General of the agency to which the funds are appropriated is generally responsible for the program oversight. In this case, the Department of Defense would generally be responsible for program oversight. To the extent that Section 1206 calls for coordination between the Departments on implementation, oversight could be shared by both Inspectors General.
DoD, in coordination with State, will use established procedures and mechanisms to ensure proper use of all training and equipment under Section 1206. Both DoD and State have emphasized the importance of metrics for this program, and the people in the best position to develop those metrics, the operators in the field, are doing so. We would be happy to share these metrics with you as we proceed with implementation.

**Question 9.** What role do ambassadors and their respective country teams play in the JIACG within the regional COCOM?

**Answer.** JIACGs are advisory staff elements on COCOM staffs; ambassadors and country teams have no direct relationships with JIACGs. To the extent that the respective COCOM directs (or permits), JIACG members may interact with country team members with regard to operational planning or policy discussions.
## Section 1206 FY06-Funded Programs
(GAO Briefing for Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff, December 14, 2006)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Section 1206 Project</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Combatant Command (COCOM)</th>
<th>Expected Equipment Delivery Completion Date</th>
<th>FY06 Section 1206 Funds Obligated</th>
<th>FY06 FMF Funding Estimate</th>
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1 When the Thailand project was cancelled because of a coup, $5.3 million had already been contracted for equipment. According to OSD, the disposition of this equipment had not been determined as of 11/28/06.
2 The Caribbean Basin 1206 Project supports Operation Enduring Freedom, which was first funded through FMF in FY06 and which provides support to countries in Central America and the Caribbean to combat transnational crime and terrorism.