Answers to Advance Questions

Dr. Stephen A. Cambone

Nominee for the Position of
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Defense Reforms

More than a decade has passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms.

Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms? I fully support the implementation of the reforms.

What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented? The reforms called for by the Goldwater-Nichols Act have been widely implemented.

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms? From my point of view, the most important aspects include the clear responsibility, authority, and accountability given the combatant commanders for mission accomplishment; the increased attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning; and the creation of a strong, direct, and unambiguous chain of command.

The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in Section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Do you agree with these goals? Yes, I support the goals of the Congress in enacting the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and, if confirmed, will support their continuing implementation.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence? My understanding is that, if confirmed, my primary responsibility will be to assist the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities under Title 10 and Title 50 U.S.C.:

• to serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense and, at his direction, to exercise authority, direction and control of intelligence organizations within the Defense Department to ensure that they are manned, trained, equipped and organized to support the missions of the department;

• to serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense in the discharge of his responsibility to ensure that defense intelligence organizations that are elements of the national intelligence community are responsive to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the execution of the DCI’s authorities;

• to support the Secretary of Defense in his role as the DCI’s counterpart in the Intelligence Community Executive Committee.

Other responsibilities of the USD/I are to ensure, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, that:

• the intelligence agencies within the Department are able to provide effective and timely support in response to tasking by the Director of Central Intelligence;

• the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant forces are provided with the intelligence and related support needed to discharge their responsibilities;

• the senior leadership of the Department, civilian and uniformed, is provided information needed to make decisions affecting long-term capabilities of US forces, including development of weapons systems, posture, basing, deployment and employment;

• information--including tactical information--useful to Defense intelligence consumers, and to other users identified by the DCI, is collected, analyzed and distributed by defense intelligence organizations in a timely fashion and in formats appropriate to users’ needs;

• the conduct of counter-intelligence operations is overseen to defend the security of Defense personnel, facilities, processes, information and systems, to include computer and network-based systems;

• recommendations are made to the Secretary of Defense and the Department’s intelligence and intelligence-related policy, plans, programs, requirements, and resource allocations are coordinated, to include preparation of Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities budgets as well as DoD activities included by the DCI in his submission to the Congress of the NFIP.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? If confirmed, I believe my past experience qualifies me to perform the duties of USD/I. I was a consumer of intelligence while serving on the staff of the Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory in the early 1980s and as the Director of Strategic Defense Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the early 1990s. I served as Staff Director for two Congressional commissions--The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998) and The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (2000). This collective experience has provided me a broad foundation of knowledge on the collection, analysis and production of intelligence, as well as the organization, technical capabilities and operations of the intelligence community.

The positions I have occupied in the Department since January of 2001 -- the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Principal Deputy to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and now as Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation -- have given me day-to-day experience with Defense intelligence as well as the broader intelligence community both as a consumer and in preparation of policy and programmatic guidance. For example, in my current position, I have been actively engaged in the development of elements of the FY 2004 budgets for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities aggregate.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence? If confirmed, the single most important action will be to rely on and appoint individuals from throughout the DoD and the intelligence community who are highly skilled and experienced in intelligence and in intelligence resource management and acquisition, operations and policy to positions of responsibility and authority within the OUSD/I. They will be critical to the tasks of identifying information resident in the intelligence community of interest to Defense users and finding ways to ensure the timely delivery of that information.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you? If I am confirmed, I expect that I will:

• Work closely with the DCI and his Community Management Staff to ensure that there is no misunderstanding between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI on intelligence matters of high importance and consequence to the nation, on the development of intelligence-related policies, plans, programs, requirements, and resource allocations and in the day-to-day management of intelligence;

• Recommend to the Secretary of Defense policies, plans and intelligence requirements related to the execution of contingency operations and preparation of deliberate plans by combatant commanders;

• Assist the Secretary of Defense and other senior Defense officials in reducing the likelihood of surprise by remodeling the Defense intelligence culture and capabilities to continue the efforts within Defense intelligence to be more responsive to its users, quicker to identify emerging threats, and enabled to employ the most efficient information management systems;

• Ensure that Defense activities of the Department that may support national intelligence efforts are transparent to the DCI so that he can build the National Foreign Intelligence Program with the full knowledge of the potential contribution of these activities to support his requirements;

• Oversee execution of Defense intelligence resources;

• Consult, and coordinate as required, with other DoD elements to ensure that Defense intelligence and NFIP activities are not unintentionally duplicative of other DoD activities;

• Work closely with the Congress in the remodeling of Defense intelligence.

Relationships

In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following?

The Secretary of Defense
• If confirmed, I would serve as his principal adviser on matters related to intelligence in the conduct of his responsibilities under Title 10 and Title 50 U.S.C. to provide authority, direction and control over intelligence capabilities of the DoD, including those DoD agencies and elements considered part of the national intelligence community.

• Exercise, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, authority, direction, and control over DoD intelligence activities.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense
• If confirmed, I would work with the Deputy Secretary of Defense (as alter ego of the Secretary of Defense) as his principal adviser on matters related to intelligence in the conduct of his responsibilities under Title 10 and Title 50 U.S.C. to provide authority, direction and control over intelligence capabilities of the DoD, to include those DoD agencies and elements considered part of the national intelligence community,

• I would assist the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the discharge of any responsibilities related to intelligence delegated to him by the Secretary of Defense, to include planning, programming, and budgeting responsibilities.

The Under Secretaries of Defense

USD/AT & L

• In recommending policy, plans, programs, requirements and resource allocations for DoD intelligence and intelligence-related activities, I would consult, and coordinate as required, with USD/AT&L on programs and requirements for intelligence and intelligence-related systems acquired by DoD. Coordination would include any offices to which USD/AT&L may have delegated authority, e.g., the Under Secretary of the Air Force, who is the DoD Executive Agent for Space.

• In addition, I would ensure the timely delivery of intelligence information to USD/AT&L to permit him to adjust, as appropriate, DoD S&T, RDT&E and procurement in response to extant or emerging threats.

USD/Policy
• If confirmed, in recommending policy, plans, programs, requirements and resource allocations for DoD intelligence and intelligence-related activities, I would consult, and coordinate as required, with USD/P to ensure DoD-related intelligence activity supports the goals, objectives, and policies of the national security strategy of the United States and of the defense strategy and policy of the DoD, the deliberate and contingency plans of the combatant commanders and the operational activities of those commanders.

• I would ensure timely delivery of intelligence information to USD/P to permit him to propose changes to the policy, strategy, plans, structure, posture, deployment or employment of U.S. military forces and to anticipate emerging challenges and threats.

• I would support USD/P, as required, in the discharge of his responsibilities as DoD’s representative within the interagency process and in his interactions with allied, friendly, and other governments.

USD/Comptroller
• If confirmed, in recommending policy, plans, programs, requirements, and resource allocations for DoD intelligence and intelligence-related activities, I would consult, and coordinate as required, with USD/C on preparation of the DoD program and budget for its intelligence and intelligence-related activities, including preparation of those DoD items contained within the NFIP.

• I would work with USD/C to ensure, on behalf of the DCI and DoD intelligence activities, the prompt and proper distribution of funds by USD/C in support of those activities.

USD/Personnel & Readiness
• If confirmed, in recommending policy, plans, programs, requirements, and resource allocations for DoD intelligence and intelligence-related activities, I would consult, and coordinate as required, on directives, instructions and policies that would affect DoD personnel engaged in those activities.

• I would ensure timely delivery of intelligence information to USD/P&R to assist him in the discharge of his responsibilities for the well being of members of the defense establishment, the readiness of U.S. forces and the capacity of the department’s health care system to meet emerging needs.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
• The USD/I will have responsibility for intelligence and intelligence-related activities currently resident in C3I.

• If confirmed, I would consult with the successor to the ASD/C3I, and coordinate with him where required, concerning information and other C3 system requirements. ASD/C3I will continue to have oversight responsibility for DoD-wide C3 and computer requirements programs and budgets.

• I would provide the successor to the ASD/C3I intelligence information in a timely fashion that will permit him to adjust defense-wide capabilities to meet emerging challenges and to support the combatant commanders, especially in time of hostilities.

The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence Directors
• If confirmed, I would engage the service secretaries and their directors of intelligence and intelligence-related operations in three ways:
  • On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I would provide guidance to them with respect to policy on manning, equipping, training, and organization within their military departments that contribute either to defense-related intelligence or to the Intelligence Community.

  • On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, and in coordination with the DCI, I would provide guidance and oversight to the military departments related to intelligence activities conducted by elements of the military departments for the intelligence community pursuant to existing and future agreements.

  • On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I would synchronize service intelligence agency and Defense programmatic, acquisition, and doctrinal efforts to meet warfighter needs.

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense
• If confirmed, I would seek advice and coordination as appropriate of the General Counsel in the exercise of authorities by the USD/I as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

The Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agencies
• The directors of the defense intelligence agencies -- e.g., the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency -- operate within the DoD and, as such, under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for ensuring these agencies and others are capable not only of performing their defense missions, but also of responding in a timely fashion to the tasking of the DCI as elements of the Intelligence Community.

• At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, who works in coordination with the DCI, the USD/I will provide the authority, direction and control to the defense intelligence agencies to ensure they are capable of fulfilling both of the above-mentioned missions. In addition, and by direction of the Secretary of Defense, the USD/I will evaluate the performance of these agencies in their support to Defense missions.

The Under Secretary of the Air Force
• The Under Secretary of the Air Force (USecAF) has been designated by the Secretary of Defense as the DoD Executive Agent for Space. The USecAF is also the Director of the NRO.

• If confirmed, I will work with the USecAF to ensure that those space and other systems for which he is responsible and which are dedicated to, or may substantially contribute to, intelligence are developed, integrated, and deployed to meet the intelligence needs of the DoD and the intelligence community.

The Director of Central Intelligence
• The DCI is responsible to the President for the provision of national intelligence. He has the authority to task those DoD intelligence agencies that are part of the Intelligence Community. The Secretary of Defense is charged with assuring that DoD intelligence agencies support the DCI.

• If confirmed, I would exercise authority, direction, and control of these agencies at the direction of the Secretary of Defense and would coordinate in his behalf with the DCI those policies, plans, programs, requirements and resource decisions relative to these agencies (or other DoD components and activities) to ensure the ability of the DCI to discharge his responsibilities.

• The USD/I will, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, coordinate with the DCI concerning support from the intelligence community required by the DoD and support required by the DCI from the DoD.

• The USD/I will ensure the DCI has insight into and benefits from DoD tactical activities that can contribute to intelligence.

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management
• The staffs of the OUSD/I and DDCI/CM will ensure that the defense intelligence and national intelligence missions are coordinated on a routine basis.

• If confirmed, I will ensure that matters requiring coordination between the DCI and Secretary of Defense, e.g., policy, plans, programs, requirements, and resources, are staffed to resolve differences that might arise between their organizations. Furthermore, in coordination with the DDCI/CM, the USD/I will staff the Secretary of Defense/DCI Executive Committee meetings and oversee the implementation of direction resulting from the Intelligence Community Executive Committee.

Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with intelligence responsibilities
• If confirmed, I will consult, and coordinate as required, with the Department of Homeland Security regarding all DoD intelligence activities and any others assigned to OUSD/I in support of or supported by the Department of Homeland Security.

• I would ensure that the Department of Homeland Security is provided, via means mutually agreed upon within the interagency process, with information relevant to its mission in a timely manner to permit it to successfully discharge its responsibilities.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence? If confirmed, I believe I will have three major challenges:

• Continuing to ensure that intelligence information is provided to the senior civilian and uniformed leadership of the Department in a timely manner and in useful formats, that is predictive in character to permit them to take appropriate action to avoid surprises, mitigate surprise when it occurs, and otherwise arrange U.S. military forces to meet evolving challenges;

• Ensuring that intelligence information is provided to combatant forces in a timely manner and in formats useful to them;

• Ensuring that DoD assets are defended from attack by foreign and hostile intelligence services.

  Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? If confirmed, I believe the key to addressing these challenges is the organization of the OUSD/I. The Secretary of Defense has given guidance that he expects it to be “output” oriented. That is, the OUSD/I will not seek to direct the processes by which intelligence is collected, analyzed and disseminated by the intelligence community. Instead, it will engage the leadership of the intelligence community to convey the needs of senior Defense officials, civilian and uniformed, and evaluate the timeliness, relevance, and utility of the resulting product. That evaluation would be used to recommend, as appropriate, changes in policy, plans, programs, requirements, and resource allocations to meet the needs of DoD officials.

  What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence? The most pressing challenge facing the DoD is arranging itself to operate in an environment where surprise is commonplace. Defense intelligence has an important role to play in helping to avert surprise and mitigating its effects when it occurs. Defense intelligence is critical to enabling the Department to adjust its policies, structure, posture, and capabilities and plans to operate in this environment. Those activities need to be attentive to the possibility of surprise and will need to improve its ability to warn of impending surprises.

  One area in which increased attention may be needed is in the field of counterintelligence. The end of the Cold War did not reduce appreciably the efforts of hostile espionage services to target DoD activities. DoD counterintelligence efforts need both to protect DoD activities and, in collaboration and coordination with the intelligence community and law enforcement, work to deny and disrupt the efforts of foreign services to target the DoD.

  In addition, the advent of the homeland defense and security tasks requires that DoD intelligence contribute to those tasks. In so doing, however, great care must be taken to ensure that DoD activities are fully in accord with the law and conducted under the supervision of competent authority.

  If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems? If confirmed, the single most important action I will take is to find, immediately, highly capable professionals to assess warning methodologies and lead the OUSD/I CI effort.

Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues that must be addressed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence? If confirmed, I will establish the following priorities:

• Immediately, to ensure that combatant commanders receive the information they require, in a timely manner and useful format, to successfully conduct current operations. In addition, OUSD/I would review and, as appropriate, revise methodologies for assessing the immediacy and magnitude of threats to U.S. interests and the manner in which warnings are prepared and delivered to senior civilian and uniformed Defense officials.

• In the mid-term, to address DoD counterintelligence activities to ensure a balance between the counterintelligence support managed by military departments and the counterintelligence support to force protection that is conducted, per Goldwater-Nichols, under the command of combatant commanders.

• Over the long term, to work to remodel the DoD intelligence structure and its human and technical capabilities as part of the broader DoD effort to transform itself to meet emerging challenges of coming decades.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

The establishment of your position would appear to have a significant impact on the future organization of ASD/C3I. Clearly, there is a close association between the “C3” functions and intelligence.

How would you propose that the “C3” functions, including information technology management, interoperability, and cybersecurity policy be integrated into the Department’s overall organization? Under a plan being developed for the Secretary of Defense, it is being proposed that the successor to the ASD/C3I would remain a direct report to the Secretary of Defense. The successor to the ASD/C3I would retain responsibility for the C3 network, to include its interfaces, system applications and information management on the network. The defense agencies and activities overseen by USD/I will be users of that network and would rely heavily on the successor to ASD/C3I. As a result, there will be a continuous interchange between OUSD/I as a service user and the prospective C3 as service provider.

How do you anticipate that the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence would change once an Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is appointed? Under a plan being developed for the Secretary of Defense, it is being proposed that the successor to the ASD/C3I would focus on Department-wide information integration, on building the foundation for network-centric operations utilizing information systems and management, and on network oversight among other areas. This is an area of increasing importance to the DoD. And, because DoD networks support other departments and agencies, this is an important area to the overall U.S. Government as well.

Information Superiority

Many have described the major responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence as “information superiority.”

Which aspects of information superiority will be under the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and which will remain under the ASD/C3I? Under a plan being developed for the Secretary of Defense, it is being proposed that the successor to the ASD/C3I would retain responsibility for oversight of information integration and for the C3 networks on which DoD and other U.S. Government agencies depend (to include ensuring the integrity of the information on the system).

USD/I will have oversight of the employment of those networks for operational purposes by DoD intelligence activities, the data that rides those networks, and the deconfliction of those activities with information operations conducted by DoD entities.

Terrorist Threat Integration Center

In his recent State of the Union speech, President Bush announced the establishment of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center to facilitate the fusion of information about terrorist threats from various intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

What role do you envision for the Department of Defense in this new organization? DoD should play an important role in staffing, supporting and deriving significant benefit from the TTIC. The new center is envisioned as the top of the analytic pyramid, a facility where all terrorist information is pulled together and then distributed, perhaps without source attribution, to those working on the front lines of confronting and defeating terrorism. DoD has offered to assist in any way appropriate to support the TTIC. DoD has examined facilities, communications, data handling systems, and training, to name just a few. As the TTIC system is further developed, DoD will be ready to plug into it in whatever manner is prescribed, while ensuring that DoD activities are fully in accord with the law and conducted under the supervision of competent authority.

In your view, what has changed within defense intelligence agencies since 9/11 to enable them to better share information among themselves, within the larger intelligence community, and with appropriate law enforcement agencies? The expansion of the National Counter Terrorism Center, located at CIA, the FBI’s Counter Terrorism Division and the standing up of the Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Task Force to Counter Terrorism have demonstrably improved the sharing of information on the terrorism threat. The National Security Agency and National Imagery and Mapping Agency also have made marked improvements to their terrorism collection and reporting efforts. To highlight a significant difference, pre-9/11 information-sharing judgments often highlighted why something couldn’t be shared. Today the emphasis is on figuring out how we can share the information. Every day, terrorism-related products of these organizations demonstrate that interagency cooperation and information sharing have improved significantly. The creation of the TTIC is a sign that there is room for further improvement. We should not rest until we are convinced that every stone is being turned over to root out international terrorism and defeat this threat to our peace and security.

In your view, what additional changes, if any, are needed? To the degree allowed by law and proper security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies must be able to access each other's databases. The intelligence community and law enforcement agencies continue to report not only what they know, but also how they know it. This “source-specific” analysis presentation has a tendency to drive up the classification levels of analytic products, emphasizes the distinctions and differences in how information is obtained and perpetuates the sense of ownership of certain forms of information. In some cases the attribution is necessary, but in most cases it could be eliminated. The intelligence community should push for greater emphasis on reporting what is known about terrorist threats without specifics about how the community came by the knowledge. Greater effort is needed to inform appropriately cleared officials about what is not known.

Homeland Defense

Over the past year, with the establishment of the positions of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the Department of Defense has been fundamentally reorganized to better address the critical homeland defense mission.

In your view, what challenges lie ahead in integrating the intelligence capabilities of the Department of Defense with those of the Department of Homeland Security and other associated federal, state and local agencies? The challenge facing DoD intelligence, and other intelligence entities, is primarily cultural. Intelligence entities have developed ways and means of doing things that satisfied their own purposes and those of their primary customers. The need to integrate information for homeland defense and security requires adopting new policies and, most importantly, new cultures.

Does the Department of Defense’s existing requirements process adequately support the establishment of an intelligence requirement for the homeland defense mission? The establishment of both ASD/Homeland Defense and Northern Command will bring homeland defense and security requirements into the programming and resourcing processes within DoD. The defense intelligence needs of ASD/HLD and NorthCom will be addressed through the OUSD/I.

Transformation

Secretary Rumsfeld has established transformation of the Armed Forces to meet 21st century threats as one of his highest priorities.

What is the role of intelligence in the overall transformation process? Transformation is driven in significant ways by intelligence. The intelligence community provides the advance warning needed to design defense capabilities and effects-based results that can overcome future threats, to arrange the structure, posture and deployment of U.S. forces and to inform the deliberate and contingency planning efforts of the combatant commanders for the employment of the force.

Specifically for the defense intelligence community, what do you believe transformation should mean? For defense intelligence, it means developing, in coordination with the intelligence community as a whole, the means needed to provide “exquisite” intelligence – to know our adversaries’ secrets without their knowing we know them. This is essential to avoiding surprise, especially in this era of widespread proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In addition, it means taking advantage of information management techniques and modern communications to provide military users with the information they require, when they require it, and in formats useful to them. It is particularly important to provide critical, near-real-time information to forces engaged in operations.

It also means closing the gap—in concept, time and cultures—between intelligence and military operations. To do so is to enable a seamless transition from the collection of information to its employment to assessments of the effects of that employment. This seamlessness is key to military success on the modern battlefield.

In your view, what transformation capabilities does our intelligence community require? Transformation for the intelligence community as a whole is taking place now, as agencies increasingly employ existing intelligence capabilities as a single system of multiple parts.

This transformation can and should be accelerated by an infusion of new technology to permit analysts to be more effective, to substitute machines for people in performing certain tedious but critical tasks such as database construction, translations, network analysis, etc., and to develop and deploy new collection capabilities to penetrate adversaries’ denial and deception efforts in order to provide “exquisite” intelligence and to survive in increasingly hostile environments.

Defense Intelligence Agencies

The defense intelligence structure has evolved over the years, most recently with the creation of the Defense Human Intelligence Service in 1996 and the establishment of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in 1997.

In your view, is the current organizational structure of defense intelligence the best structure to support military and national intelligence needs? The existing system is engaged in a war and confronting simultaneous crises, and the need, it seems to me, is to do the very best with what we have in hand while taking every opportunity to maximize the current system's performance. If confirmed, I will not hesitate to recommend changes that would expedite achievement of those objectives so long as the changes did no harm to our ability to win the war on terrorism and to counter proliferation.

If not, what changes would you recommend to the current structure? If confirmed, my examination of current structure will focus on the future. I am most interested in those intelligence capabilities of the Department and the nation that must be created and managed to deal with threats that will have to be faced over the next decades. I think it will take considerable study, leadership and a foundation of consensus amongst the next generation of intelligence professionals (Congressional and Executive) to achieve the kind of reform that must be enacted.

Human Intelligence

The Secretary of Defense has indicated that he would like to have enhanced human intelligence capabilities within the Department of Defense.

What are the goals and overall mission of defense human intelligence? The most immediate objective of the Secretary of Defense in seeking enhanced intelligence provided by human beings is to improve the knowledge that enables effective decision making -- information useful down to the tactical level in the conduct of a military operation and that will permit U.S. forces to act with speed and decisive force. Technical collection is not always sufficient for these purposes.

In your view, what changes or additional capabilities, if any, are needed in the Department’s human intelligence organization? DoD needs to associate those defense elements capable of providing “actionable intelligence” more closely with those assets under the DCI’s control to provide a seamless transition from collection in support of the U.S. Government and to manage crises, to intelligence preparation of the battle space to advance force operations, and then to the support of operations and post-conflict operations.

Need for Independent Intelligence Analysis

There is an absolute requirement that intelligence analysis be independent and free of political pressure to reach a certain conclusion including a conclusion that fits a particular policy preference.

If confirmed, are you committed to ensuring that all intelligence analysts within the DoD, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are free from such pressure? Yes.

Total Information Awareness (TIA) Program

The Defense Advance Research Project Agency (DARPA) has developed a “Total Information Awareness” program, to develop and integrate information technologies that would enable the government to sift through multiple databases and sources to detect, classify and identify potential terrorist activities.

If confirmed, what would be your intentions for fielding an operational capability for such a program if the TIA technology project were to complete a successful development? The TIA program is a research program to help develop tools to track terrorists. It is not a collection program. If this DARPA research program were to develop tools that could be usefully provided to other agencies, including some within the DoD, we would be bound by existing statutory and regulatory restrictions, subject to the oversight of the Congress placed upon the handling of the data those tools would be designed to sort and better organize.

Control of Intelligence Agencies Within the Department of Defense

Some have suggested that the Director of Central Intelligence should be given sole control over all programming and budget execution of Federal Government intelligence programs, including those within the Department of Defense.

What are your views about whether the Secretary of Defense should retain his current authority for developing and implementing intelligence programs with the Defense agencies? The National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) and Executive Order 12333 created the existing arrangement between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible to the President for national intelligence and, therefore, has specified authorities relative to the assets capable of providing that intelligence. A number of those assets reside within the DoD. They do so not out of convenience but because DoD, down to the tactical level of operations, is a primary consumer of the information provided by those assets. This is underscored by the designation of these agencies as combat support agencies.

The Secretary of Defense is tasked under Title 50 U.S.C. to ensure that these agencies are capable of supporting and are responsive to the tasking of the Director of Central Intelligence.

There is a process for apportioning the resources of these agencies to meet the needs of both the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. Absent that process, each would find himself compelled to recreate, separately, the same or similar capabilities to meet their responsibilities.

That each will have needs particular to his circumstances is understandable. Provisions exist for each to meet those needs without disrupting the larger relationship. The Intelligence Community Executive Committee is the venue for resolving any issues that may arise.

In my view, the Secretary of Defense should retain his authority. The USD/I is being created to assist the Secretary of Defense in discharging his responsibilities under Title 10 and 50 U.S.C.

Acquisition Programs

Both the National Security Agency and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency have sizeable development and procurement programs underway intending to modernize their abilities to support their customers’ intelligence needs.

What role would you play, if confirmed, in overseeing major acquisition programs within the Defense intelligence community? If confirmed, I will be responsible for guidance on DoD intelligence policy, plans, programs, requirements, and resources and for coordination of the same within the DoD and between the DoD and the Director of Central Intelligence.

Technical support to the USD/I would be provided by, among others, DoD’s USD/AT&L, ASD/C3I, and the Under Secretary of the Air Force as well as by the Deputy Director for Community Management and the Central Intelligence Agency’s Director of Science and Technology.

Department of Homeland Security

Administration officials have indicated that the Department of Homeland Security, while being a customer of the new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), will also have an analysis group with an operational role aimed at obtaining a picture of threat situation in the United States and addressing vulnerabilities. Additionally, processing intelligence information collected from components of the Department of Homeland Security, such as the Coast Guard, INS, and Border Patrol, will be one of the tasks that must be accomplished.

What role, if any, do you anticipate that the Department of Defense will play in the Department of Homeland Security’s intelligence collection and assessment function? DoD intelligence organizations already have a variety of relationships with various components of the new Department of Homeland Security, including the Coast Guard, Secret Service, Customs and others. If confirmed, I would anticipate continued support to these activities and, in coordination with the ASD/Homeland Defense, an immediate initiative to work out arrangements for information sharing, as appropriate, with the intelligence organization established within the new department. The defense focus is traditionally toward foreign and overseas threats, but with much of our military based inside the United States and our role in protecting the nation, there are likely to be many areas of common concern and potentially coordinated action. In any such actions, great care will be taken to ensure that DoD activities are fully in accord with the law and conducted under the supervision of competent authority.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress? Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence? Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? Yes.