S. Hrg. 108-161
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
of the
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
__________
FEBRUARY 11, 2003
__________
89-797 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah CARL LEVIN, Michigan
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri RON WYDEN, Oregon
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine EVAN BAYH, Indiana
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Ex Officio
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
------
Bill Duhnke, Staff Director
Christopher K. Mellon, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held in Washington, D.C., February 11, 2003
Statement of:
Ford, Hon. Carl W. Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research.................................. 72
Jacoby, Vice Admiral Lowell E, USN, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency........................................ 66
Mueller, Hon. Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation.................................... 44
Tenet, Hon. George J., Director, Central Intelligence Agency. 25
Supplemental Materials:
Letter to Hon. George J. Tenet transmitting Questions for the
Record..................................................... 107
Letter to Hon. Robert Mueller transmitting Questions for the
Record..................................................... 113
Letter to Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby transmitting Questions
for the Record............................................. 117
Letter to Hon. Carl Ford transmitting Questions for the
Record..................................................... 122
Response to QFRs from CIA.................................... 127
Response to QFRs from State.................................. 162
Response to QFRs from DIA.................................... 203
Response to QFRs from FBI.................................... 225
HEARING ON THE WORLDWIDE THREAT
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Pat
Roberts, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Roberts, DeWine, Bond,
Lott, Snowe, Chambliss, Warner, Rockefeller, Levin, Feinstein,
Wyden, Edwards, and Mikulski.
Chairman Roberts. The committee will come to order. Ladies
and gentlemen and my colleagues, it's been a longstanding
tradition for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to
begin its annual oversight of the U.S. intelligence community
by conducting a public hearing to present to our members and to
the American public the intelligence community's assessment of
the current and projected national security threats to the
United States and our interests abroad.
Appearing before the Committee today are the Director of
Central Intelligence, Mr. George Tenet; the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Bob Mueller; the Director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Admiral Jake Jacoby; and
the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research,
Mr. Carl Ford.
Now, while the United States faces a staggering array of
new and growing threats around the world, unfortunately none of
the traditional threats commonly discussed prior to September
11 have abated. We still face very significant long-term
potential threats from emerging powers in Asia that continue to
build increasingly powerful military forces with the potential
to threaten their neighbors.
International drug smuggling rings linked to the guerrilla
armies and the proliferators of ballistic missiles and advanced
conventional weapons and unscrupulous international arms
merchants who are willing to sell almost anything to anyone are
but a few of the continuing challenges that we face worldwide.
We must also confront the acute threats from what is less
traditional and often referred to as ``asymmetrical.'' As we
are all painfully aware, our country faces a great and
continuing threat from international terrorism, especially the
group of mass murderers of the al-Qa'ida network.
As we will hear from our witnesses today, while our
intelligence agencies and our military forces have won some
very tremendous and important victories against al-Qa'ida
during the last year and a half, there is much, much left to
do. As we have all recently heard, plans to attack us and our
interests abroad are continuously in motion. We are on high
alert.
The threats that are related to the proliferation of
nuclear and chemical and biological weapons, in particular in
Iraq and North Korea, are not really new threats. Serious
observers have seen these crises looming for years, and
increasing in direct proportion to our unwillingness and that
of our allies to confront them more forthrightly. But today
these threats are especially severe, as Secretary of State
Powell made very clear in his speech last week before the U.N.
Security Council.
That is why today's hearing is so important and why I am
glad that my colleagues and our distinguished witnesses have
been able to come here today for a frank discussion of these
threats in front of the American people. Given the need to
protect our intelligence sources and methods, there will be
much that we cannot discuss in public. But there is still much
that we can and we will. There will be a classified hearing
this afternoon starting at 3:00.
This past year has not been an easy one for the U.S.
intelligence community, whose job it is to provide our leaders
what we call an adequate warning of the threats that face our
country. And the community has come under criticism--a lot of
brickbats from the Congress and others in regard to its
``inability to provide specific warning prior to September
11th.''
As I have emphasized repeatedly since the attack on the
destroyer USS Cole in October of 2000, our intelligence
agencies have too often failed to provide the timely, the
cogent and the comprehensive analysis that our national
security requires.
As Chairman of this Committee, I intend to conduct vigorous
oversight of the intelligence community to ensure that it
provides our leaders with the quality of intelligence they need
to ensure the security of the American people whether at home
or abroad. We intend to look at structural reform; we intend to
assist the IC community with regard to shortfalls that now
exist; and we intend to take a very hard look at the immediate
and very serious threats that confront our nation today; and we
intend to work closely with the independent commission that now
is taking a look at the tragedy of 9/11.
But I also want to make clear that our intelligence
agencies have for the most part--for the most part--reacted to
the crises of September 11 in ways that should make all
Americans proud. Whatever problems may have existed before, the
community today is a very different place than it was before
the attacks upon the Pentagon and the World Trade Center.
In my view the community today is taking important strides
to identify, to disrupt and to dismantle terrorist cells at
home and abroad. This is ongoing. Additionally, our individual
agencies are reforming their internal processes in order to
make it possible for continued success in the future. And they
are doing this in ways that I would not have thought possible
only two years ago.
Now, necessity, they say, is the mother of invention. And
although their record of performance since September 11 has not
been perfect--and it's never perfect in the intelligence
community--it is a very significant and impressive one. Despite
the critics--and there are many--we are a safer country.
I believe it is our job in Congress to continue to press
for improvements in how our intelligence community operates,
but to do so while bearing in mind the vital missions that
these agencies must fulfill day in, day out, every day of the
year, across the country and around the world. As the
possibility of war with Iraq grows nearer, as petty dictators
flaunt their nuclear weapons programs in East Asia, and as
other threats continue and develop around the world, we need
our intelligence services more today than ever before. With
that in mind, it is our responsibility to give these agencies
and their personnel our support, our encouragement and, most of
all, the resources to perform their demanding and at times
dangerous missions. Their lives are on the line.
As the new Chairman of this Committee, I have joined my
colleague, Vice Chairman Rockefeller, the distinguished Senator
from West Virginia, in beginning a series of visits to all of
our major intelligence agencies. We are having what I call
meaningful dialogue.
I have not visited every agency yet, but I will. There are
13. The Vice Chairman and I feel it is important to meet the
people who are fighting this fight, who are collecting this
information, who are analyzing it, and who are running the
institutions that make all of this possible.
So far I have been, along with Senator Rockefeller and
Senator DeWine, very impressed in these visits by the quality
and comprehensiveness of the work that our intelligence
services are doing. If it were possible to describe all of this
work in public, the man or woman on the street, whether in
Dodge City, Kansas, my hometown, or Charleston, West Virginia,
or in Washington, D.C. would be thoroughly impressed. But the
men and women who do this work must labor in secret, and it is
only rarely, as in Secretary Powell's speech last week, that
the world gets a chance to see the products of their labors
with anything approaching the detailed appreciation that they
deserve. Secretary Powell revealed just the tip of our
intelligence iceberg.
I know of two individuals here today to whom I would like
to extend appreciation for their intelligence work. They are on
the professional staff of this Committee. Mr. Tom Corcoran--and
Tom, would you stand--is an intelligence officer in the Naval
Reserve. He was mobilized soon after September 11, spent the
next year doing very sensitive and valuable work for his
country. Now he is back on the staff and sharing his knowledge
with his colleagues and the members of this Committee. Thank
you for your service, Tom.
I would also like to thank another professional staff
member, Mr. Matt Pollard--Matt, would you please stand? Matt is
an intelligence officer in the Army reserve who like many
others has just received his mobilization orders. He departs
next week for duty at a classified location. Matt, I think it's
a safe bet you're not going to go to Fort Riley, Kansas. I wish
you were. Matt, you keep your head down, come back to us sooner
rather than later. Your expertise will be missed. And good
luck.
Ladies and gentlemen, our hearing today will enable the
public to learn more about the products which the personnel in
our intelligence community, like Matt Pollard and Tom Corcoran,
are producing. We will hear from the heads of our intelligence
agencies about what their analysis has identified as being the
most important threats our country faces. I hope that their
testimony will also provide the public with some perspective
upon how their intelligence agencies are adapting to our new
challenges and threats.
I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished
witnesses. I welcome you all to our first open hearing of the
108th Congress. I now turn to the Committee's very
distinguished Vice Chairman, Senator Rockefeller, for any
remarks that he would like to make.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
congratulate you and welcome all new members of the committee,
our witnesses, the press and the public, because this is not an
ordinary occurrence but an extremely important one.
In the '90s America seemed to be in an unprecedented period
of success, the stock market soared, and the possibility of
democracy spreading around the world seemed to be almost
unstoppable. The Intelligence Committee's annual threat
hearings during that period were, I suspect, not listened to
closely enough and did not get the attention they deserved.
That obviously will not be the case today.
In recent weeks we have seen the country move closer to war
with Iraq, North Korea taking steps toward resuming the
production of nuclear weapons, increased threats by al-Qa'ida
in dimensions that we can only imagine, and, meanwhile, poverty
and desperation, a subject which I want to discuss a little bit
this morning, continue to spread in most parts of the world.
Polling data shows increased hostility to the U.S. in many
regions, especially in the Middle East. Europe seems to be
splitting. NATO is in at least some form of public relations
disaster if not deeper than that.
So the American people obviously have to look to you. You
are not policymakers in the classic sense, but you create
policy by the excellence of your intelligence and the work that
you do--I am talking about our witnesses.
Given the many threats that we are faced with from North
Korea to al-Qa'ida, to Iranian support for terrorism--and the
list goes on endlessly--we clearly need to understand why Iraq
has risen to prominence to the point where we are contemplating
an invasion and a longer presence there to help rehabilitate
the country.
With that in mind, there are four questions that I would
pose, and you can answer if you choose: What is the purpose of
Iraq's WMD programs? That would be the first one. Are they
intended first and foremost to try to secure the regime's
survival and deter attacks from the United States and from
other countries? Or does the evidence suggest that Saddam
intends to become a supplier of weapons of mass destruction to
terrorist organizations, even if he has not been in the past?
And, on that subject, he has not in the past generally been a
supplier. So what reason do we have to believe that the past is
not prologue and that his habits may change? What evidence is
there, to the extent that you can talk about that?
Secondly, many observers of the Middle East, including many
friends and allies, believe that the administration's fears
regarding terrorism, WMD, weapons of mass destruction, and Iraq
will become a self-fulfilling prophecy if the United States
invades Iraq. Clearly, once an invasion begins Saddam will have
nothing to lose. Moreover, many of our allies fear that an
invasion of Iraq, especially one which proceeds without
explicit U.N. authorization, if that's the way it turns out,
will further radicalize and inflame the Muslim community,
swelling the ranks, and therefore the recruiting grounds, for
terrorist groups for years and years to come.
In that context, some analysts suspect that Usama bin Ladin
is eagerly anticipating a U.S. invasion of Iraq. In short, do
you believe a U.S. invasion of Iraq will in fact increase, in
spite of testimony which has already been given, the terrorist
threat to the United States and the nuances of that?
Third, as you know, a serious proposal has recently been
advanced that appears to offer an alternative--alternative
passive inspections, outright inspections, sort of a little bit
more militarized and intense inspections by some of our NATO
allies. And that involves U.N. authorization for much expanded
inspection to compel Iraq to comply with U.N. Resolution 1441.
What is your assessment of this compromise, if you feel you are
in a position to give that? Could an expanded force succeed in
disarming or causing regime change prior to a war? I'm
skeptical myself, but that doesn't matter. I'm interested in
what you think; you're the professionals. If you have not
performed an assessment of this, then I think the committee
would be interested in hearing nevertheless what your thoughts
would be in written form.
Finally, we need your best assessment of the costs and
duration and risks associated with American presence in Iraq,
should there be a war, after the war. I think we will agree
that it doesn't make a lot of sense to invade Iraq and then
walk away from it, if we are not willing to undertake the
costly and painstaking work required to help rebuild the
country and put it on a path to a better future. Seven years
and billions of dollars later, we still have troops in Bosnia.
Our commitment continues to exist and even expand in Kosovo.
Our financial commitment to Afghanistan is expanding, and there
is no end in sight to our military presence. In sum, we hope
that you can help us to understand the likely cost and duration
and any other consequences of the commitment we would need to
take in Iraq should we invade Iraq.
I thank you for appearing. I thank you for your service.
And to you, Mr. Tenet, you have my profound and all of our
American people's profound sympathies for the duties that you
and John McLaughlin will do this afternoon in attending the
funeral service of one of your members.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. I thank the distinguished Senator from
West Virginia and the Vice Chairman.
We will now go to the witnesses in the following order: the
DCI, George Tenet; the Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller;
Admiral Jacoby, who is the head of the DIA; and Assistant
Secretary Ford.
Gentlemen, I feel compelled to say that most Senators can
read. All staff can read. Staff can then read to Senators and
they, for the most part, can understand. Please feel free to
read each and every word of your statement. Let me emphasize
that each and every word will be made part of the record. If
you so choose to summarize in your own words so eloquently as
you have done in the past, to make your statement somewhat
shorter, that would be allowed.
Please proceed, George.
[The prepared statement of Director Tenet follows:]
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GEORGE TENET, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
Director Tenet. Undaunted. I'll read a little bit, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, last year in the
wake of the September 11 attack on our country, I focused my
remarks on the clear and present danger posed by terrorists who
seek to destroy who we are and what we stand for.
The national security environment that exists today is
significantly more complex than a year ago. I can tell you that
the threat from al-Qa'ida remains, even though we have made
important strides in the war on terrorism. Secretary of State
Powell clearly outlined last week the continuing threats posed
by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, its efforts to deceive
U.N. inspectors, and the safe haven that Baghdad has allowed
for terrorists in Iraq.
North Korea's recent admission that it has a highly-
enriched uranium program, intends to end the freeze on its
plutonium production facilities, and has stated its intention
to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty raises serious new
challenges for the region and the world. At the same time, we
cannot lose sight of those national security challenges that,
while not occupying space on the front pages, demand a constant
level of scrutiny.
Challenges such as the world's vast stretches of ungoverned
areas, lawless zones, veritable no man's lands, like some areas
along the Afghan-Pakistani border, where extremist movements
find shelter and can win the breathing space to grow.
Challenges such as the numbers of societies and peoples
excluded from the benefits of an expanding global economy,
where the daily lot is hunger, disease, and displacement,
produce large populations of disaffected youth who are prime
recruits for our extremist foes.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the United States last week
raised the terrorist threat level. We did so because of the
threat reporting from multiple sources with strong al-Qa'ida
ties. The information we have points to plots aimed at targets
on two fronts--in the United States and on the Arabian
Peninsula. It points to plots timed to occur as early as the
end of the Hajj, which occurs late this week. And it points to
plots that could include the use of a radiological dispersal
device, as well as poisons and chemicals. The intelligence is
not idle chatter on the part of terrorists or their associates.
It is the most specific we have seen, and it is consistent with
both our knowledge of al-Qa'ida's doctrine and our knowledge of
plots this network and particularly its senior leadership has
been working on for years.
The intelligence community is working directly and in real
time with friendly services overseas and with our law
enforcement colleagues here at home to disrupt and capture
specific individuals who may be part of this plot. Our
information and knowledge is the result of important strides we
have made since September 11 to enhance our counterterrorism
capabilities and to share with our law enforcement colleagues--
and they with us--the results of disciplined operations,
collection, and analysis of events inside the United States and
overseas.
Raising the threat level is important to our being as
disruptive as we possibly can be. The enhanced security that
results from a higher level of threat can buy us more time to
operate against the individuals who are plotting to do us harm.
And heightened vigilance generates additional information and
leads. This latest reporting underscores the threat that the
al-Qa'ida network continues to pose to the United States. The
network is extensive and adaptable. It will take years of
determined effort to unravel this and other terrorist networks
and stamp them out.
Mr. Chairman, the intelligence and law enforcement
communities aggressively continue to prosecute the war on
terrorism, and we are having success on many fronts. More than
one third of the top al-Qa'ida leadership identified before the
war has either been killed or captured, including the
operations chief for the Persian Gulf area who planned the
bombing of the USS Cole, a key planner who was a Mohammad
Atta's confidant and a conspirator in the 9/11 attacks, a major
al-Qa'ida leader in Yemen, and key operatives and facilitators
in the Gulf area and other regions, including South Asia and
Southeast Asia.
The number of rounded-up al-Qa'ida detainees has now grown
to over 3,000, up from 1,000 or so when I testified last year.
And the number of countries involved in these captures has
almost doubled to more than one hundred. Not everyone arrested
was a terrorist. Some have been released. But the worldwide
rousting of al-Qa'ida has definitely disrupted its operations,
and we've obtained a trove of information we're using to
prosecute the hunt still further.
The coalition against international terrorism is stronger,
and we are reaping the benefits of unprecedented international
cooperation. In particular, Muslim governments today better
understand the threat al-Qa'ida poses to them and day by day
have been increasing their support. Ever since Pakistan's
decision to sever ties with the Taliban, so critical to the
success of Operation Enduring Freedom, Islamabad's close
cooperation in the war on terrorism has resulted in the capture
of key al-Qa'ida lieutenants and significant disruption of its
regional network.
Jordan and Egypt have been courageous leaders in the war on
terrorism. I can't say enough about what Jordan has done for
this country in taking on this scourge.
A number of Gulf states, like the United Arab Emirates, are
denying terrorists financial safe haven, making it harder for
al-Qa'ida to funnel funding for operations. Others in the Gulf
are beginning to tackle the problem of charities that front for
or fund terrorism. The Saudis are providing increasingly
important support to our counterterrorism efforts--from arrests
to sharing debriefing results. Southeast Asian countries like
Malaysia and Indonesia, with majority Muslim populations, have
been active in arresting and detaining terrorist suspects. And
we mustn't forget Afghanistan, where the support of the new
leadership is absolutely essential. Al-Qa'ida's loss of
Afghanistan, the death and capture of key personnel, and its
year spent mostly on the run have impaired its ability,
complicated its command and control, and disrupted its
logistics.
That said, Mr. Chairman, the continuing threat remains
clear. Al-Qa'ida is still dedicated to striking the U.S.
homeland, and much of the information we've received in the
past year revolves around that goal. Even without an attack on
the U.S. homeland, more than 600 peoplearound the world were
killed in acts of terror last year, and 200 in al-Qa'ida related
attacks--19 were U.S. citizens. Al-Qa'ida or associated groups carried
out a successful attack in Tunisia and since October 2002 attacks in
Mombasa, Bali, Kuwait, and off Yemen against the French oil tanker
Limburg. Most of these attacks bore such al-Qa'ida trademarks as
entrenched surveillance, simultaneous strikes, and suicide-delivered
bombs.
Combined U.S. and allied efforts have thwarted a number of
related attacks in the past year, including the European poison
plots. We identified, monitored, and arrested Jose Padilla, an
al-Qa'ida operative who was allegedly planning operations in
the United States and was seeking to develop a so-called dirty
bomb. And along with Moroccan partners we disrupted al-Qa'ida
attacks against U.S. and British warships in the Straits of
Gibraltar.
Until al-Qa'ida finds an opportunity for the big attack, it
will try to maintain its operational tempo by striking softer
targets. And what I mean by ``softer,'' Mr. Chairman, are
simply those targets al-Qa'ida planners may view as less well
protected. Al-Qa'ida has also sharpened its focus on our allies
in Europe and on operations against Israeli and Jewish targets.
Al-Qa'ida will try to adapt to changing circumstances as it
regroups. It will secure base areas so that it can pause from
flight and resume planning. We place no limitations on our
expectations on what al-Qa'ida might do to survive.
We see disturbing signs that al-Qa'ida has established a
presence in both Iran and Iraq. In addition, we are concerned
that al-Qa'ida continues to find refuge in the hinterlands of
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Qa'ida is also developing or
refining new means of attack, including the use of surface-to-
air missiles, poisons, and air and surface and underwater
methods to attack maritime targets. If given the choice, al-
Qa'ida terrorists will choose attacks that achieve multiple
objectives--striking prominent landmarks, inflicting mass
casualties, causing economic disruption, and rallying support
through shows of strength. The bottom line here, Mr. Chairman,
is that al-Qa'ida is living in the expectation of resuming the
offensive.
We know from the events of September 11 that we can never
again ignore a specific type of country--a country unable to
control its own borders and internal territory, lacking the
capacity to govern, educate its people, or provide fundamental
societal services. Such countries can, however, offer
extremists a place to congregate in relative safety. Al-Qa'ida
is already a presence in many parts of the world, Mr. Chairman,
and I'll stop my discussion on terrorism there, where I go on
to a very careful discussion of our concerns about their
acquisition of chemical and biological weapons and what the
history shows.
I want to move to Iraq, sir, and then China and Iran and
I'll get out. There's a lot in my statement, and you can read
it. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to comment on Iraq, and I will come
back and answer Senator Rockefeller's questions as best I can.
Last week Secretary Powell carefully reviewed for the U.N.
Security Council the intelligence we have on Iraqi efforts to
deceive U.N. inspectors, its programs to develop weapons of
mass destruction, and its support for terrorism. I do not plan
to go into these matters in detail, but I will summarize some
of the key points.
Iraq has in place an active effort to deceive U.N.
inspectors and deny them access. The effort is directed at the
highest levels of the Iraqi regime. Baghdad has given clear
directions to its operational forces to hide banned materials
in their possession. Iraq's BW program includes mobile research
and production facilities that will be difficult, if not
impossible, for the inspectors to find. Baghdad began this
program in the mid '90s, during a time when U.N. inspectors
were in the country.
Iraq has established a pattern of clandestine procurements
designed to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. These
procurements include but go well beyond the aluminum tubes that
you have heard so much about. Iraq has recently flight-tested
missiles that violate the U.N. range limit of 150 kilometers.
They have tested unmanned aerial vehicles to ranges that far
exceed both what it declared to the United Nations and what it
is permitted under U.N. resolutions.
Iraq is harboring senior members of a terrorist network led
by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a close associate of al-Qa'ida. We
know Zarqawi's network was behind the poison plots in Europe,
and we discussed earlier as well--Secretary Powell discussed--
the assassination of a U.S. State Department employee in
Jordan.
Iraq has in the past provided training in document forgery
and bomb-making to al-Qa'ida. It has also provided training in
poisons and gases to two al-Qa'ida associates. One of these
associates characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi
officials as successful.
Mr. Chairman, this information is based on a solid
foundation of intelligence. It comes to us from credible and
reliable sources. Much of it is corroborated by multiple
sources. And it is consistent with the pattern of denial and
deception exhibited by Saddam Hussein over the past 12 years.
Mr. Chairman, on proliferation, it's important to talk
about this for a few moments. We have entered a new world of
proliferation. In the vanguard of this new world, we are
knowledgeable about non-state purveyors of WMD materials and
technology. Such non-state outlets are increasingly capable of
providing technology and equipment that previously could only
be supplied by countries with established capabilities. This is
taking place side by side with the continued weakening of the
international non-proliferation consensus. Control regimes like
the NPT Treaty are being battered by developments such as North
Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and its open repudiation of
other agreements.
The example of new nuclear states that seem able to deter
threats from more powerful states simply by brandishing nuclear
weaponry will resonate deeply among other countries that want
to enter the nuclear weapons club. Demand creates the market.
The desire for nuclear weapons is on the upsurge. Additional
countries may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it becomes
clear their neighbors and regional rivals are already doing so.
The domino theory of the 21st century may well be nuclear. With
the assistance of proliferators, a potentially wider range of
countries may be able to develop nuclear weapons by leap-
frogging the incremental pace of weapons programs in other
countries.
Mr. Chairman, my statement on proliferation is far more
extensive, talking about developments of chemical and
biological weapons, threats from ballistic missiles, land
attack cruise missiles, and UAVs. I will want to talk briefly
about North Korea.
The recent behavior of North Korea regarding its long-
standing nuclear weapons program makes apparent all the dangers
Pyongyang poses to its region and the world. This includes
developing a capability to enrich uranium, ending the freeze on
its plutonium production facilities, and withdrawing from the
Nonproliferation Treaty. If, as seems likely, Pyongyang moves
on to reprocess spent fuel at the facilities where it recently
abrogated the 1994 IAEA-monitored freeze, we assess it could
recover sufficient plutonium for several additional weapons.
North Korea also continues to export complete ballistic
missiles and production capabilities, along with related raw
materials, components and expertise.
Kim Jong-ll's attempts this past year to parlay the North's
nuclear weapons program into political leverage suggests that
he is trying to negotiate a fundamentally different
relationship with Washington, one that implicitly tolerates
North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Although Kim calculates
that the North's aid, trade and investment climate will never
improve in the face of U.S. sanctions and perceived hostility,
he is equally committed to retaining and enlarging his nuclear
weapons stockpiles.
Mr. Chairman, I go through an interesting discussion of
China, Russia and Iran. Perhaps we can come back to those
during the question and answer period. I would note the one
area of the world thatcontinues to worry us, as we worry about
all these other problems, is South Asia, where we've averted a conflict
but soon could return to one, and it's something that we may want to
talk about but continues to bear careful scrutiny.
The statement goes through a number of transnational
threats, Mr. Chairman, and I want to talk about something
untraditional. You know we recently published an NIE, an open
NIE, on AIDS. I want to talk about HIV/AIDS because it has
national security implications beyond health implications.
This pandemic continues unabated, and last year more than
three million people died of AIDS-related causes. More than 40
million people are infected now, and southern Africa has the
greatest concentration of these cases. That said, the
intelligence community recently projected that by 2010 we may
see as many as 100 million HIV-infected people outside of
Africa. China will have about 15 million cases and India, 20 to
25 million cases. And cases are on the rise in Russia as well.
The national security dimension of the virus is plain. It
can undermine economic growth, exacerbate social tensions,
diminish military preparedness, create huge social welfare
costs, and further weaken beleaguered states. And the virus
respects no border.
We rarely talk about Africa, Mr. Chairman, but it's
important. Sub-Saharan Africa's chronic instability will demand
U.S. attention. Africa's lack of democratic
institutionalization, combined with its pervasive ethnic rifts
and deep corruption, render most of the 48 countries vulnerable
to crises that can be costly in human lives and economic
growth. The Cote D'Ivoire is collapsing, and its crash will be
felt throughout the region, where neighboring economies are at
risk from the falloff in trade and from refugees fleeing
violence.
Mr. Chairman, I'll end my statement there. There's a
discussion about Venezuela and Colombia we may want to pursue
in the questions and answers. And I thank you for your
patience, and I've set a new standard for not reading my whole
statement.
Chairman Roberts. It's an excellent standard and a
marvelous precedent. Director Mueller.
[The prepared statement of Director Mueller follows:]
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER III, DIRECTOR,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Director Mueller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As we enter the second year of the global war on terrorism,
the United States and its allies have inflicted a series of
significant defeats on al-Qa'ida and its terrorist networks,
both here at home and abroad. The terrorist enemy, however, is
far from defeated. Although our country's ultimate victory is
not in doubt, we face a long war whose end is difficult to
foresee.
Accordingly, the prevention of another terrorist attack
remains the FBI's top priority. The Bureau's efforts to
identify and dismantle terrorist networks have yielded
successes over the past 17 months. We have charged 197
suspected terrorists with crimes, 99 of whom have been
convicted to date. We have also facilitated the deportation of
numerous individuals with suspected links to terrorist groups.
Moreover, our efforts have damaged terrorist networks and
disrupted terrorist-related activities across the country--in
Portland, in Buffalo, in Seattle, in Detroit, in Chicago, and
in Florida, to name but a few. Furthermore, we have
successfully disrupted the sources of terrorist financing,
including freezing $113 million from 62 organizations and
conducting 70 investigations, 23 of which have resulted in
convictions.
But despite these successes, the nature of the terrorist
threat facing our country today is exceptionally complex.
International terrorists and their state sponsors have emerged
as the primary threat to our security, after decades in which
the activities of domestic terrorist groups were a more
imminent threat.
And the al-Qa'ida terrorist network is clearly the most
urgent threat to U.S. interests. The evidence linking al-Qa'ida
to the attacks of September 11 is clear and irrefutable. And
our investigation of the events leading up to 9/11 has given
rise to important insights into terrorist tactics and
tradecraft which will prove invaluable as we work to prevent
the next attack.
There is no question, though, that al-Qa'ida and other
terrorist networks have proven adept at defending their
organizations from U.S. and international law enforcement
efforts. As these terrorist organizations evolve and change
their tactics, we too must be prepared to evolve. Accordingly,
the FBI is undergoing substantial changes, including the
incorporation of an enhanced intelligence function that will
allow us to meet these terrorist threats. I'd like to briefly
outline these changes, but first, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to
address the most significant threats facing this country today.
We start with the al-Qa'ida threat. The al-Qa'ida network
will remain for the foreseeable future the most immediate and
serious threat facing this country. Al-Qa'ida is the most
lethal of the groups associated with the Sunni jihadist cause,
but it does not operate in a vacuum. Many of the groups
committed to international jihad offer al-Qa'ida varying
degrees of support. FBI investigations have revealed Islamic
militants in the United States, and we strongly suspect that
several hundred of these extremists are linked to al-Qa'ida.
The focus of their activity centers primarily on fundraising,
recruitment and training. Their support structure, however, is
sufficiently well developed that one or more groups could be
mobilized by al-Qa'ida to carry out operations in the United
States homeland.
Despite the progress the United States has made in
disrupting the al-Qa'ida network overseas and within our own
country, the organization maintains the ability and the intent
to inflict significant casualties in the United States with
little warning. Our greatest threat is from al-Qa'ida cells in
the United States that we have not yet been able to identify.
Finding and rooting out al-Qa'ida members once they have
entered the United States and have had time to establish
themselves is our most serious intelligence and law enforcement
challenge.
But in addition, the threat from single individuals
sympathetic or affiliated with al-Qa'ida, acting without
external support or surrounding conspiracies, is increasing.
Al-Qa'ida's successful attacks on September 11 suggest the
organization could employ similar operational strategies in
carrying out any future attack in the United States, including
those cell members who avoid drawing attention to themselves
and minimize contact with militant Islamic groups in the United
States. They also maintain, as we have found in the past,
strict operational and communications security.
We must not assume, however, that al-Qa'ida will rely only
on tried and true methods of attack. As attractive as a large-
scale attack that produces mass casualties would be for al-
Qa'ida, and as important as such an attack is to its
credibility amongst its supporters and its sympathizers, target
vulnerability and the likelihood of success areincreasingly
important to the weakened organization. Indeed, the types of recent
smaller scale operations al-Qa'ida has directed, and aided against a
wide array of Western targets outside the United States could be
readily reproduced within the United States.
I'll tell you, Mr. Chairman, my greatest concern is that
our enemies are trying to acquire dangerous new capabilities
with which to harm Americans. Terrorists worldwide have ready
access to information on chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear weapons via the Internet. Acquisition of such
weapons would be a huge morale boost for those seeking our
destruction while engendering widespread fear among Americans
and amongst our allies.
Although the most serious terrorist threat is from non-
state actors, we remain vigilant against the potential threat
posed by state sponsors of terrorism. Seven countries
designated as state sponsors of terrorism--Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea--remain active in the
United States and continue to support terrorist groups that
have targeted Americans.
As Director Tenet has pointed out, Secretary Powell
presented evidence last week that Baghdad has failed to disarm
its weapons of mass destruction, willfully attempting to evade
and deceive the international community. Our particular concern
is that Saddam Hussein may supply terrorists with biological,
chemical, or radiological material.
Let me turn, if I could, Mr. Chairman, to some of the
changes that we've brought about within the Bureau in the last
year.
For nearly a century, the FBI has earned a well-deserved
reputation as one of the world's premier law enforcement
agencies, and for decades the FBI has remained flexible in
addressing the threats facing the nation at any given time--
whether it be gangsters, civil rights violations, racketeering,
organized crime, espionage, and, of course, terrorism. Since
September 11, 2001, the men and women of the FBI have
recognized the need for change and have embraced it. I assure
this Committee and the American people that, just as the FBI
earned its reputation as a world class law enforcement agency,
so is it committed to becoming a world class intelligence
agency. As evidence of that commitment, Mr. Chairman, I would
like to spend a moment outlining some of the specific steps we
have taken to address the terrorist threats facing the United
States today.
To effectively wage this war against terror, we have
augmented our counterterrorism resources and are making
organizational enhancements to focus our priorities. On top of
the resource commitment to counterterrorism we made between
1993 and 2001, we have received additional resources from
Congress. We have as well shifted internal resources to
increase our total staffing levels for counterterrorism by 36
percent. Much of this increase has gone towards enhancing our
analytical cadre.
We have implemented a number of initiatives, including
creating the College of Analytical Studies which, in
conjunction with the CIA is training our new intelligence
analysts. We also have created a corps of reports officers.
These officers will be responsible for identifying, extracting
and collecting intelligence from FBI investigations and sharing
that information throughout the FBI and to other law
enforcement and intelligence agencies.
I have taken a number of other actions which we believe
will make the FBI a more flexible, more responsive agency in
our war against terrorism. To improve our systems for threat
warnings, we have established a number of specialized
counterterrorism units. These include a threat monitoring unit,
which among other things works hand in hand with its CIA
counterpart to produce a daily threat matrix; a 24-hour
counterterrorism watch to serve as the FBI's focal point for
all incoming terrorist threats; two separate units to analyze
terrorist communications and special technologies and
applications; another section devoted entirely to terrorist
financing operations; a unit to manage document exploitation--
whether the documents come from Afghanistan or Pakistan or
elsewhere around the world; and other such units. And to
protect U.S. citizens abroad, we have expanded our legal
attache and liaison presence around the world to 46 offices.
To strengthen our cooperation with state and local law
enforcement, we are introducing counterterrorism training on a
national level. We will provide specialized counterterrorism
training to 224 agents and training technicians from every
field division in the country so that they in turn can train an
estimated 26,800 federal, state and local law enforcement
officers this year in basic counterterrorism techniques.
To further enhance our relationship with state and local
agencies, we have expanded the number of joint terrorism task
forces from a pre-9/11 number of 35 to 66 today. The joint
terrorism task forces partner FBI personnel with hundreds of
investigators from various federal, state and local agencies in
field offices across the country and are important force
multipliers aiding our fight against terrorism within the
United States.
The counterterrorism measures I have just described
essentially complete the first phase of our intelligence
program. We are now beginning the second phase that will focus
on expanding and enhancing our ability to collect, analyze and
disseminate intelligence. The centerpiece of this effort is the
establishment of an Executive Assistant Director for
Intelligence, who will have direct authority and responsibility
for the FBI's national intelligence program.
Specifically, the Executive Assistant Director for
Intelligence will be responsible for ensuring that the FBI has
the optimum strategies, structure, and policies in place, first
and foremost for our counterterrorism mission. That person will
also oversee the intelligence programs for our
counterintelligence, criminal and our cyber divisions. Lastly,
in the field, intelligence units will be established in every
office and will function under the authority of the Executive
Assistant Director for Intelligence.
If we are to defeat terrorists and their supporters, a wide
range of organizations must work together. I am committed to
the closest possible cooperation with the intelligence
community and with other government agencies, as well as with
state and local agencies--and I should not leave out our
counterparts overseas. I strongly support the President's
initiative to establish a terrorist threat integration center
that will merge and analyze terrorist-related information
collected domestically and abroad.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying that the nature of
the threats facing the United States homeland continues to
evolve. My complete statement, which has been submitted for the
record, emphasizes that we are not ignoring the serious threat
from terrorist organizations other than al-Qa'ida, from
domestic, home-grown terrorists, and from foreign intelligence
services. To successfully continue to address all of these
threats, the FBI is committed to remaining flexible enough to
adapt our mission and our resources to stay one step ahead of
our enemies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to make this
statement.
Chairman Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Director. Let the record
show that all members of the Committee have been provided a
list of FBI entities that have been created to address the
terrorist threat since 9/11, 2001, and I would certainly
recommend that to my colleagues and to all present.
Admiral, you're next.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Jacoby follows:]
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STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL LOWELL E. JACOBY, USN, DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Admiral Jacoby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My more detailed
statement for the record addresses a number of substantive
threats and concerns, many of which were covered by Director
Tenet in his opening statement. I look forward to further
discussions on those subjects during the question-and-answer
session to follow.
What I'd like to do with these brief opening remarks is
give my perspective on the state of defense intelligence today
and outline plans for transforming our capabilities, personnel
and processes to better address the security--the very quickly-
changing security environment.
As I said in my written statement, defense intelligence is
at war on a global scale, and all of our resources, people and
systems are completely engaged. I would also note, Mr.
Chairman, that the two members of your staff that you
recognized at the beginning of the hearing are representative
of a tremendous number of intelligence reservists who are
serving and have served and are still to be called to support
these efforts.
Given the current state of the world and the likely future,
I expect that these conditions will continue indefinitely.
We're committed in support of our military forces fighting the
war on terrorism in Afghanistan and other locations, such as
the southern Philippines, where that war might take us. We
support our military forces deployed worldwide, even as they
increasingly are targeted by terrorists.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, detailed intelligence is
essential long before our forces actually deploy. This effort,
termed intelligence preparation of the battle space, has been
ongoing for many months to support potential force deployment
in Iraq. Meanwhile, other defense intelligence resources are
committed to a careful assessment of the dangerous situation on
the Korean peninsula.
Beyond these obvious priorities, defense intelligence is
providing global awareness, meaning that we are watching every
day for developments that might be of concern or might require
U.S. military employment. These situations include such varying
things as internal instability and the threat of coups that
could require evacuation of American citizens, and interdiction
of shipments and material associated with weapons of mass
destruction.
We recognize that we must know something about everything
or are expected to know something about everything, and that is
a daunting task when we're already at war on a global scale.
Our prolonged high level of commitment is straining personnel,
equipment and resources and is reducing capacity for sustaining
activities such as training, education, data-base maintenance
and longer-term research and analysis.
I'm increasingly concerned that defense intelligence is
being stretched too thin and we have no choice but to sacrifice
important longer-term efforts to respond to today's
requirements. These longer-term efforts include weapons
proliferation, instability in several key states and regions,
and assessments with respect to Russia, China, South Asia,
parts of Europe, Latin America and the Middle East.
The old defense intelligence threat paradigm, which focused
primarily on the military capabilities of a small set of
potential adversary states, no longer applies. More
importantly, today's concerns are not lesser-included cases. In
the emerging environment, traditional concepts of security,
deterrence, intelligence, warning and military superiority are
not adequate. We must adapt our capabilities to these new
conditions just as potential adversaries pursue new ways to
diminish our overwhelming power.
While the challenges facing us are daunting, I am
enthusiastic about the opportunity we have to fundamentally
change our defense intelligence capabilities. Defense
intelligence transformation will be the center point of my
tenure as Director.
To be successful, we must move out in a number of areas.
First, we must improve our analytic capabilities. We must be
able to rapidly convert information into knowledge. That is
what we pay our analysts to do, and we must ensure that they
have immediate access to all sources of data and are supported
by cutting-edge information technologies.
To be successful, we must shift our collection paradigm
from reconnaissance to surveillance, discard the notion that
the collectors own the information they collect, and create a
collection strategy that ensures all relevant capabilities--
national, theater, tactical and commercial--are developed and
applied as a system of systems to ensure targeted, intrusive
and persistent access to an adversary's true secrets.
We also must field information management tools that
encompass the best commercial-sector practices and
applications.
Finally, recognizing that knowledge in the heads of our
people is our most precious commodity, we must recruit, train
and retain intelligence professionals with the right mix of
experience, skills, abilities and motivations. The importance
of the human dimension will only increase as our reliance on
judgment and predictive analysis is challenged by an
increasingly ambiguous security environment and significantly
larger quantities of information.
We're working hard to address these issues and to develop
the processes, techniques and capabilities necessary to address
the current threat and deal with emerging challenges. With your
continued support, I'm confident we'll be able to provide our
warfighters, policymakers and planners assured access to the
intelligence they need.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the question
session.
Chairman Roberts. Okay, we thank you, Admiral.
And now we look forward to the statement by Assistant
Secretary Ford.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CARL W. FORD, JR., ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would very much
appreciate just simply putting my testimony into the record and
moving on to the question and answers.
Chairman Roberts. Are you sure you're feeling all right?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Ford. Yes, sir.
Chairman Roberts. All right, we thank you very much for
your cooperation.
The order of questions is as follows, with a five-minute
time period, the Chair, the Vice Chair Senator Rockefeller,
Senator Warner, the distinguished Chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, Senator Levin, Senator Bond, Senator
Feinstein, Senator DeWine--and while I mention Senator DeWine,
I want to thank him for accompanying me in visiting six or
seven of the 13 agencies where we hope we are learning more,
and we can really feel some shortfalls in terms of the assets
that we see them--Senator Chambliss, Senator Snowe, Senator
Mikulski and Senator Lott.
Let me start with Bob Mueller. Bob, I got a call this
morning about 10 minutes before I came to the hearing room from
my wife. And she indicated--she said, ``Dear, what did you do
with the duct tape and the plastic sheet that used to cover the
El Camino?''
And I was quoting an article on the front page of the
localnewspaper, the fountain of all knowledge in Washington, and it's
down on the left-hand side--I think you've read it--where some nameless
official indicated that people should start collecting bottled water,
food and duct-tape one particular area of their home, and also have
plastic sheeting. She was quite concerned that as Chairman of the
Intelligence Committee, I didn't tell her to do this prior to this
event.
And we've heard a lot of news about the increased dangers
of the terrorist attacks; all three of you--all four of you;
Secretary Ford's statement. And I know this has really
disturbed many Americans, and I suspect many members of the
public are wondering what they can or should do in light of the
increased danger.
So what advice would you offer to the man or woman on the
street, other than to get out of the street?
Director Mueller. I would start, I believe, Mr. Chairman,
by saying we have to put this in perspective, that we are in a
period of heightened risk based on intelligence, and we will go
through additional periods like this in the future.
I do believe that our day-in, day-out life has changed
since September 11. We do have a heightened risk of attack from
terrorist organizations, most particularly al-Qa'ida. And
during certain periods, we believe--and this is one of them--
there is a heightened risk of an attack, both overseas and in
the United States.
By saying that, we also must indicate our belief that
Americans should go about their business, not cancel plans that
they had, because we have no specifics as to the particular
places or timing, but that we all should be more alert. Rarely
does a day go by that we do not get a call from a concerned
citizen who has seen something out of the ordinary, that has
called a police department or has called the FBI and said this
is a little bit out of the ordinary; perhaps you ought to look
at this.
And on several occasions, and probably more than several
occasions, those alert citizens have brought to our attention
individuals or patterns of activity that have led us to take
action that would lessen the risk in a particular community or
in the United States. And so, while we're in this period of
heightened risk, it is important for each of us to be more
alert than we ordinarily would be, but not to change our
patterns.
Chairman Roberts. I thank you for your response. George, do
you have anything to add to that?
Director Tenet. Sir, the only thing I would say is that the
strategic targeting doctrine of this organization is well
understood by us. And as a consequence, translating that
document to homeland security and Governor Ridge in terms of
protective measures that specific sectors of the country have
to undertake to make them more immune to the attack, and to do
this on a consistent basis, and to make marked improvement over
time, is the most important thing we can be doing.
How they think and what they think about targets, what
they've previously tried to do, and their planning, as a result
of an enormous amount of work, we have a lot of data. We have
to beat them to the punch in terms of narrowing their
approaches and narrowing the availability of targets and
infrastructure that give them the mass-casualty symbolic impact
that they will try to achieve. All the while you're dealing
with softer targets. And there's where--Bob's right--your
vigilance and your awareness pays a price.
But the strategic concept we have to bear in mind is, we
shouldn't focus on date, time and place of an event. We should
be focused on our strategic knowledge of their targeting
doctrine and buttoning up the country systematically so that,
over the course of time, raising alert levels become more and
more effortless, less painful for people because all of these
sectors have responded accordingly and are taking measures and
building into the security of the country over time.
Chairman Roberts. I have 30 seconds left. I think, in the
interest of time, I'm going to yield to the distinguished Vice
Chairman.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This
question could be for Mr. Tenet, the Admiral or the Secretary.
One posits that if we go into Iraq, that a regime change will
not be enough and that the follow-up is what will really tell
the story for the future.
Now, there are several positions put forward. One is that
if we stabilize the country, that would be good. Another is
that if we stabilize the country, that will speak to the rest,
or at least a large part of the rest of the Arab world, to say
that we're not in it for our own colonialization, domination,
but we're in it because we're trying to bring a better way of
life to that part of the world.
And there's a third position which has been expressed, and
that is that we can do that--in fact, we can do that in several
countries--but there will always be an element in the radical
world which will discount whatever we do and which will
continue to come after us as if we had done nothing at all. I'd
be interested in any of your points of view.
Director Tenet. Senator, the speed with which, if you want
to talk about a post--if there's a conflict, a post-conflict
environment, the speed with which the infrastructure of the
country is stood up, the speed with which food supplies, health
supplies and the speed with which you make a transition to a
group of Iraqis to run this country all are enormously
important.
There are three major groups--Shi'as, who account for about
60 percent or 65 percent of the population of this country;
Sunnis, who may be about less than 20 percent; and the Kurds--
who all have to be integrated in some way in some kind of
confederated structure that allows equal voices to emerge. But
the speed with which you can get to those points will, I think,
make a big impact on the rest of the Arab world.
I am not one who believes that--you asked a question about
is terrorism from al-Qa'ida more likely, for example. Al-Qa'ida
and terrorist groups are going to launch their terrorist
attacks at dates and times and places of their choosing, based
on operational security matters. Naturally, he would be
interested in the propaganda windfall of tying it to an Iraq,
but that's not how al-Qa'ida operates on a day-to-day basis.
You may never get credit from other parts of the world, and
I don't want to be expansive in, you know, a big domino theory
about what happens in the rest of the Arab world, but an Iraq
whose territorial integrity has been maintained, that's up and
running and functioning, that is seen to be functioning in a
different manner outside the rubric of a brutal regime, may
actually have some salutary impact across the region.
But every country is different and everybody's got
different views about their own internal situation, but it may
well create some dynamic and interesting forces that, quite
frankly, I can't predict to you. But there may be some positive
things that come out of it.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Mr. Director, or Admiral or
Secretary.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, I think the three things you hit
all have to be done, and they probably could be done
simultaneously to stabilize the country. We may have quite a
bit of infrastructure damage inflicted by the regime
potentially creating humanitarian assistance, particularly in
the South, against the Shi'a population.
At the same time, the longer sort of effects and direction
of the country are dependent on freeing up the Iraqi people to
bring their energy to bear on putting in place a better way of
life, which would be obviously tied back quite directly to the
stabilization piece.
And the third part is, sir, I would have no expectation
that the radical elements elsewhere, particularly the
fundamentalist elements elsewhere in the world, would in any
way alter their views based on this set of circumstances.
That's obviously a longer-term war that we're engaged in that's
based on factors other than specifically the post-regime period
in Iraq.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Mr. Tenet.
Director Tenet. Senator, just one more point. I want
toreturn to the territorial integrity point and the unified nature that
must be maintained. Every country that surrounds Iraq has an interest
in what the political end game is.
The country cannot be carved up. If the country gets carved
up and people believe they have license to take parts of the
country for themselves, that will make this a heck of a lot
harder. This country must remain whole and integrated, and
while these three groups----
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. I understand, Mr. Tenet. But my
point was to try to establish that even if we do all these
things correctly, there will still probably be a fundamental
terrorist element which would be unaffected even as we do a
superb job, if we do, in bringing stabilization and growth to
that country.
Director Tenet. We will not impact al-Qa'ida's calculation
against the United States, Senator.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you.
Chairman Roberts. The distinguished Chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I recognize the
strong leadership this Committee now has and commend both of
you with your responsibilities.
Director Mueller, the question this morning raised by the
Chairman--he utilized the report about the duct tape and so
forth--well, I take that seriously in all respects, and I think
it was a conscientious decision by our administration to set
that out publicly.
But here's what concerns me. When the public sees that,
they say to themselves, well, do we have in place today the
laws that are necessary to enable law enforcement, principally
yourself, to search out these terrorists and apprehend them?
Now, is the administration contemplating any further
legislation to strengthen the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act or modify the Patriot Act?
Director Mueller. Well, there are discussions ongoing, I
know, in the Department of Justice relating to changes in the
FISA Act. And, in fact, there have been some bills that were
suggested in the last Congress which would address several of
the problems that were left unaddressed when the Patriot Act
was passed, one being, as an example, our problem in having to
prove that an individual was an agent of a foreign power where
we have individuals who may not have ties to a particular
recognized organization, whether it be al-Qa'ida or a nation-
state, and yet still presents a threat to the United States and
still presents a threat of a terrorist attack.
Senator Warner. So, in summary, there is a package being
worked on by the administration, and it is for the purpose of
strengthening the existing laws. And, in your judgment, does
that represent some further invasion of our rights to privacy
and exercise of freedom as individual citizens, which
compromise may have to be made in view of the continuing and
rising threat situation?
Director Mueller. Well, with regard to what has been
suggested as modifications to the FISA Act, I do not believe
that that would be undermining the privacy of our citizens at
all and is a much-needed improvement to the FISA Act. There may
be other pieces of legislation that are currently under
discussion that I am not fully aware of.
And as each of those pieces of legislation is reviewed, I
know that both we in the Bureau, but most particularly in the
Department of Justice, we look to balance the impact of that
particular piece of legislation on privacy rights with how it
would better enable us to address terrorism in the United
States.
Senator Warner. In a short sentence, in your own personal
professional assessment of the laws as they exist today, do
they need to be strengthened, in your judgment, to enable you
and others in law enforcement to protect our citizens?
Director Mueller. Certain of them do.
Senator Warner. Thank you. Director Tenet, this morning we
heard another statement from a foreign country--I believe
France in this case--to the effect that they don't even think
Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. I'm not
here to attach credibility to that statement.
We also saw a poll early this morning--at least I did--
where in Great Britain they're anticipating the largest turnout
in the streets of anti-war demonstrations; in fact, several of
us on the Armed Services Committee yesterday had a question-
and-answer session with British parliamentarians here in the
Senate.
All this leads me to the following question. I support the
President and I anticipate I will continue to support the
President. But there seems to be a gap widening in Europe, and
perhaps somewhat here at home. But in my judgment, we cannot
postpone any longer the non-compliance of Iraq, even though,
bit by bit, they're saying they'll do certain things. I think
there comes a time when this situation has to be addressed, and
if diplomacy fails, force must be used.
In the event that force is used, and after the dust settles
and the world press and others can go in and assess the
situation, is it your judgment that there will be clearly
caches of weapons of mass destruction which will dispel any
doubt with regard to the fair and objective analysis that the
United States and such other nations that have joined in the
use of force did the right thing at the right time?
Director Tenet. Sir, I think we will find caches of weapons
of mass destruction, absolutely.
Senator Warner. And such diminution of our credibility,
which we've maintained for these 200-plus years as a nation not
to use a preemptive type of strike--I don't think it's
preemptive; others do, so we have to do that--that can be
reconciled and that credibility restored to the extent it's
diminished. Do you believe that?
Director Tenet. Sir, I'm not going to make policy
judgments. I'll stick to what my job is and focus on the
intelligence.
Chairman Roberts. The distinguished Senator's time has
expired.
Senator Warner. I thank the Chair.
Chairman Roberts. The distinguished Senator from Michigan
is recognized.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Jacoby has
made the following statement in his written presentation,
Director Tenet, and I am wondering if you agree, that
Pyongyang's open pursuit of additional nuclear weapons is the
most serious challenge to U.S. regional interests in a
generation. The outcome of this current crisis will shape
relations in Northeast Asia for years to come. Do you agree
with that statement?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir, it's very serious.
Senator Levin. I think it's really useful that at least our
intelligence community is willing to describe the problem with
North Korea as a crisis. The administration has avoided that
word. They've said it's not a crisis. And the fact that our
intelligence community describes it accurately as a crisis, it
seems to me, is at least a beginning of a fair assessment of
how serious that is.
Director Tenet, in early January we started sharing with
U.N. inspectors intelligence on sites in Iraq that we have
suspicions about. I assume that we are sharing information with
all the limitations of inspections, because our intelligence
community believes that U.N. inspections have value--at least
there's a possibility that those inspections would provide
evidence of the presence of weapons of mass destruction or of
Iraqi deception, or of violations of the resolutions of the
United Nations. Do you agree that there is some value to those
inspections?
Director Tenet. Sir, there's value in these inspections so
long as the partner in these inspections, Saddam Hussein,
complies with U.N. resolutions. And thus far he has been
singularly uncooperative in every phase of this inspection
process.
Senator Levin. What you are saying is they have no value
then unless he cooperates, that there's no chance that they
will find evidence of weapons of mass destruction, even without
his cooperation?
Director Tenet. Sir, unless he provides the data to build
on, provides the access, provides the unfettered access that
he's supposed to, provides us with surveillance capability,
there's little chance you are going to find weapons of mass
destruction under the rubric he's created inside the country.
The burden is on him to comply and us to do everything we can
to help the inspectors. But the inspectors have been put in a
very difficult position by his behavior.
Senator Levin. Have they been given unfettered access?
Director Tenet. By Saddam Hussein?
Senator Levin. Yes.
Director Tenet. Sir, I don't know in real-time. Everything
that happens on every inspection----
Senator Levin. As far as you know, were they given
unfettered access?
Director Tenet. I don't believe so, sir.
Senator Levin. All right. Now, we have only shared a small
percentage of the sites so far that we have suspicions about. I
am going to use the word ``small percentage'' because I am not
allowed to use the actual numbers of sites that you have
suspicions about. I am not allowed to use the actual number of
sites that we have shared with the U.N. inspectors. All I'm
allowed to say is that there has been a ``small percentage'' of
sites that we have shared the information with the inspectors.
My question to you is: When will we be completing the sharing
of information with the U.N. inspectors?
Director Tenet. Sir, we have given the U.N. inspectors and
UNMOVIC every site that we have that is of high or moderate
value, where there is proven intelligence to lead to a
potential outcome--every site we have.
Senator Levin. Would you say what percentage of the sites
that we have on our suspect list that you have put out in that
estimate we have----
Director Tenet. Sir, the--I'm sorry, sir. I apologize.
Senator Levin. Would you give us the approximate percentage
of the sites that we have in your classified National
Intelligence Estimate that we have shared information on with
the U.N. inspectors, just an approximate percentage?
Director Tenet. I don't remember the number.
Senator Levin. Just give me an approximation.
Director Tenet. I don't know, but let me just--can I just
comment on what you said, sir?
Senator Levin. Would you agree it's a small percentage?
Director Tenet. Well, sir, there is a collection priority
list that you are aware of, and there is a number that you
know. And this collection priority list is a list of sites that
we have held over many, many years. The vast majority of these
sites are low priority and against which we found little data
to direct these inspectors. All I can tell you is we have given
them everything we have and provided every site at our
disposal, and we cooperate with our foreign colleagues to give
them--we have held nothing back from sites that we believe,
based on credible intelligence, could be fruitful for these
inspections.
Senator Levin. I just must tell you that is news. That is a
very different statement than we have received before.
Director Tenet. Sir, I was briefed last night, and I think
that we owe you an apology. I don't know that you have gotten
the full flavor of this. But in going through this last night,
I can tell you with confidence that we have given them every
site.
Senator Levin. Now, Mr. Tenet, another question relative to
al-Qa'ida's presence in Iraq. Does al-Qa'ida have bases in
Iraq?
Director Tenet. Sir, you know that there is--there's two
things that I would say.
Senator Levin. And would you summarize it by saying al-
Qa'ida has bases in Iraq?
Director Tenet. Sir----
Senator Levin. That is, the part of Iraq that is controlled
by Saddam?
Director Tenet. Sir, as you know--first of all, as you know
by Secretary--well, we won't get into northern Iraq, but I can
tell you this. Bases, it's hard for me to deal with, but I know
that part of this--and part of this Zarqawi network in Baghdad
are two dozen Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which is
indistinguishable from al-Qa'ida, operatives who are aiding the
Zarqawi network, and two senior planners who have been in
Baghdad since last May. Now, whether there is a base or whether
there is not a base, they are operating freely, supporting the
Zarqawi network that is supporting the poisons network in
Europe and around the world.
So these people have been operating there. And, as you
know--I don't want to recount everything that Secretary Powell
said, but as you know a foreign service went to the Iraqis
twice to talk to them about Zarqawi and were rebuffed. So there
is a presence in Baghdad that is beyond Zarqawi.
Chairman Roberts. The Senator's time has expired.
Senator Bond.
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a
pleasure to be joining this Committee at a very interesting and
challenging time.
There was a question--I would like to address the question
to Director Tenet and Admiral Jacoby. There was a question
asked earlier on whether the invasion of Iraq would increase
the threat of weapons of mass destruction terrorist attacks in
the United States. And I believe Director Tenet has given an
answer. My question would be: What is the danger of an attack
with weapons of mass destruction by terrorists if we continue
with the hide-and-seek game and the proposed actions given by
our French and German brave allies and leave Saddam Hussein in
control of both caches and means of creating more weapons of
mass destruction? Director Tenet would you, or Admiral Jacoby,
wish to share your opinion?
Director Tenet. Sir, let me just differentiate for a
moment. You know al-Qa'ida has an independent means it has
developed inside of Afghanistan. It's in my classified
statement--you can take a look at the BW, CW, and even interest
in nuclear capabilities. So that's quite something they have
been pursuing and we are trying to get on top of around the
world. So there's an ongoing concern with or without.
The concern, of course, that Secretary Powell enumerated in
his speech at the U.N. was the concern that there have been
some contacts, that there has been some training provided by
the Iraqis--this according to a senior detainee that we have in
our custody. So how expansive that is beyond that, sir, I want
to stick to the evidence and the facts that we have, but we are
living in a world where proliferation of these kinds of
materials to second parties and third parties, and then their
subsequent transition to terrorist groups is obviously a
separate issue we have to be very careful about.
Admiral Jacoby. My follow-up would be, sir, obviously al-
Qa'ida independently was pursuing these kinds of capabilities.
And in my mind there are sort of two tracks running
simultaneously, and the one track is sort of an independent al-
Qa'ida WMD threat that probably operates on their timeline,
their planning, their access to materials, and is independent
of the discussion about the Iraqi contingency operation.
Senator Bond. Admiral, in your written statement--and other
statements--you've mentioned the challenges facing allies in
Southeast Asia, Malaysia, Indonesia and other countries have
beeninvolved in--actually Indonesia has obviously had a very
serious and deadly terrorist attack. I would like your assessment,
number one, of the importance of relationships with our friendly
governments in the region which are subjected to the presence of
terrorists.
Number two, there has been an effort to impose sanctions on
Indonesian military activity such as cutting off IMET and other
military exchanges. I have some very strong views on that. I
would like to know your views as to whether these are effective
means for remedying what we see as shortcomings or do you think
these Congressional initiatives may have the danger of
disrupting these institutions and further lessening our ability
to maintain a defense in the area?
Admiral Jacoby. Senator Bond, obviously our relationships
with these countries are extremely important, and I would only
point to the operations and the cooperation, bilateral work
that was done in the southern Philippines as an example with
the Abu Sayyaf group. I mean, I think it demonstrates the
capability and mutual effects of working together.
Without getting into the policy part on the IMET slice, I
would just say that my observation over time in dealings with
my counterparts in other countries is that those who have had
the opportunity to interact with Americans, whether it's in our
schools or other kinds of fora, then become very good partners
down the road when they have the opportunity to make decisions.
I think it's desperately important that we keep those kinds of
ties in place wherever we can.
Senator Bond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. The distinguished Senator from California
is recognized.
Senator Feinstein: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Jacoby, let me thank you for your written
statement. You didn't mention it in your oral remarks, but one
thing really jumps out to me. Because it's brief, I want to
read it. You say, ``The prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflict
is furthering anti-American sentiment, increasing the
likelihood of terrorism directed at United States interests,
increasing the pressure on moderate Middle East regimes, and
carries with it the potential for wider regional conflict, with
each side determined to break the other's will. I see no end to
the current violence.''
It seems to me that this is our greatest omission of
putting that crisis on the back burner and not moving it
forward to resolution. And I am just going to leave you with
that. But I want to thank you for putting it in your statement.
Mr. Mueller, I want to thank you for your robust steps to
move your department into counterterrorism and specifically
domestic intelligence gathering. I think you've taken real
action, and I am just delighted to see it.
Mr. Tenet, I also want to thank you. I had the privilege of
going to your agency on Friday, and had an excellent briefing
from a number of people, some of whom I see here this morning.
And I thank you for that. And also I know you have been working
very long hours along with Mr. Mueller and others, and I
appreciate that.
Let me begin with this question: What is the Agency's best
estimate of the survival and whereabouts of Usama bin Ladin?
Director Tenet. Senator, I don't think I'm going to get
into all that in open session.
Senator Feinstein. I will ask you that question this
afternoon.
Director Tenet. I would be pleased to respond.
Senator Feinstein. Fine. Thank you very much. Perhaps I can
ask one that you might be willing to answer. In the past you
have mentioned on several occasions that the A Team of
terrorists is Hizbollah. Putting aside capability, could you
comment upon their assessment of their plans and intentions,
whether they represent a domestic threat, whether there are
signs of them increasing their activities in the Middle East,
and what you believe would trigger a greater involvement in the
United States?
Director Tenet. I will let Director Mueller talk about the
United States. Of course this is a very capable organization
that the Iranians have backed for a long time. It's a
particularly difficult organization because of their feeding
relationship with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas and
others who have directed terrorist attacks against Israelis for
many years. They have a worldwide presence. We see them
actively casing and surveiling American facilities. They have
extensive contingency plans that they have made, Senator. We
haven't seen something directed against us in a long time--that
would be a decision they make based on their own internal
calculation.
But this is certainly a group that warrants our continued
attention around the world because of their capability. And
truthfully, Senator, one of the things we have to be mindful of
and be very alert to is how all of these groups mix and match
capabilities, swap training, use common facilities. So the days
when we made distinctions between Shi'ites and Sunnis and
fundamentalists and secularists in the terrorism world are
over.
Senator Feinstein. I wanted to ask you a question, and this
has been asked many times of us now by the press. Hopefully you
can answer some of this in this session. When Secretary Powell
laid out the information about the camps in northeastern Iraq,
I wondered how long we have known about it, how we found
evidence, the people coming and going from it with the innuendo
that they were moving poisonous materials. And if all of that
is true, there is abundant authority, if it is a threat to us,
to take out that camp. Why in fact did we not do that?
Director Tenet. Senator, that's a policy question that I
shouldn't answer. And, you know, I don't want to comment on
what plans or contingencies were in place, what was considered
or not considered, but that's something you may want to come
back to with some other people and not me.
Senator Feinstein. Can you publicly comment on the level of
intelligence, whether it's--the nature of the specific
intelligence that indicated----
Director Tenet. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Feinstein. [continuing]. the poison factories?
Director Tenet. I believe that we have a compelling
intelligence story based on multiple sources that we have high
confidence in understanding this network, how it's operated in
Europe, the connections that Secretary Powell talked about.
It's something that we obviously will talk to you more about
this afternoon in terms of----
Senator Feinstein. But let me narrow it down. It's not just
British intelligence?
Director Tenet. No, ma'am.
Senator Feinstein. It's our own specific intelligence?
Director Tenet. That would be correct. That would be
correct.
Chairman Roberts. The time of the distinguished Senator has
expired. Let me say for the benefit of Members that next is
Senator DeWine, and then Senators Chambliss, Snowe, Mikulski,
Lott and Edwards. The distinguished Senator from Ohio.
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Mueller,
thank you very much for supplying us with this two-page
summary. I think it is a very good summary of what you have
done, the FBI, has created to address the terrorist threat. I
would commend it to my colleagues in the Senate.
You have talked about what the FBI is doing to attempt to
reform itself and really change the overall direction. To play
the devil's advocate for the moment, there are some people,
Director, as you know, who believe that the FBI never really
will be able to make that transformation, and that you can't do
domestic intelligence. And I knowyou and I have talked about
this, and of course you believe that you can make that. Let me ask you
a couple questions.
One, can you describe for us how well the computer upgrade
process is going? The computer system at the FBI has been a
mess, very antiquated. How much is it going to cost to upgrade
it? How long is that upgrade going to take?
Director Mueller. We started the essential upgrading of our
computer system by bringing the team on board of former CIOs,
individuals from private industry who have gone through this
process before. And we, over the last year, have been lucky to
recruit a number of individuals who, regardless of the salary
they are paid, want to serve their country. Rather than just
the one or two individuals who have been in the industry
before, we have upwards of 15 who are shepherding our upgrade
in technology. And having that team on board was absolutely
essential.
With regard to the hardware, we have put in over 20,000
desktops and computers over the last year to give us the
capability at the desktops, with Pentiums as opposed to 386s or
486s. Critical to our improvement is having the local area
networks and, more importantly, the wide area networks, the
bandwidth to exchange information, and the very technically
challenging networks that are necessary should be in place by
the end of March.
We have over 600 points around the country that have to be
served by these networks and we expect those to be done by the
end of March. Our principal software application called Virtual
Case File, which is being developed by a number of agents as
well as contractors, should be on board and on everybody's desk
by December.
Senator DeWine. Which is quite an exciting prospect, as
you've explained it to me. My time is very limited. When do you
think that will be up?
Director Mueller. It will be up in December.
Senator DeWine. That will be up in December.
Director Mueller. November and December.
Senator DeWine. And the total cost for this will be what,
do you think?
Director Mueller. I would have to check the figures. It's
several hundreds of millions of dollars, but I would want to be
specific. I can get you, quite obviously, the total cost.
Senator DeWine. And this whole process should be completed
by when?
Director Mueller. Well, it's an ongoing process. The bulk
of it will be completed by December of this year. But what we
wanted to do was put into place computer and information
technology that won't serve us just in the next six months or
the next year, but put in place technology that can be upgraded
yearly. So, it will be an ongoing process. But the bulk of it I
expect to be done by December of this year.
Senator DeWine. Director, for those critics who say that
you can't make this transformation, when is a fair time for us
to, as the oversight committee, to look back and say--to make
the judgment of whether you have made the transformation or
not?
Director Mueller. I think it's----
Senator DeWine. This is a tremendous sea change for the
FBI.
Director Mueller. I think in some respects it is, and in
other respects it is not. I think it's fair to ask what have we
done since September 11. I think the Bureau, the agents, have
always had the collection capabilities, and indeed have been
some of the best collectors of information in the world.
What we have lacked in the past is the analytical
capability, both in terms of the analysts as well as the
information technology. And we have since September 11 almost
doubled the number of analysts. We have developed a College of
Analytical Studies. George Tenet has helped us with 25 analysts
to help us in the meantime on the analytical capability of the
Bureau. The analytical capability will be much enhanced by
having the databases, the analytical tools with which to search
those databases, and I would expect by the end of the year
we'll be much enhanced.
But the fact of the matter is, since September 11 I think
every individual in the Bureau understands that it is of
foremost importance that the Bureau protect the United States
against another terrorist attack. And that mind shift came as
of September 11. And the Bureau, I believe, has welcomed the
opportunity to meet this new challenge, as it has in the past
met previous challenges.
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Director, very much.
Chairman Roberts. The Senator who has the privilege of
representing the nation's number one football team has expired.
[Laughter.]
I would now like to recognize Senator Chambliss. And I
would like to say for the benefit of committee members, having
served with Senator Chambliss in the House of Representatives
and watched him closely on his service on our House counterpart
committee, it was Senator Chambliss and Congressperson Jane
Harman who the Speaker of the House appointed to form up a
select committee on homeland security. He brings to the
committee a great deal of expertise. We are very happy to have
him on board. Senator, you are recognized.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And even though
we finished third in rankings, we'll be there next year.
[Laughter.]
Gentlemen, as all of you know, a main focus of my work over
on the House side over the last two years has been on the issue
of information sharing. And I don't want to get into any of
that now because I'm going to continue to pound this issue with
you every time we get together.
Bob, I see you've got--I know you're putting this bulletin
out every week. I think that's a major step in the right
direction. I hope it's not old news by the time it gets down to
the state and local level. There is still a feeling out there,
I will tell you, among local law enforcement officials about
some hesitancy on the part of your field officers to dialogue
with them on a regular basis, and we've still got some
overcoming to do there. But I commend you on making the effort
to make this dialogue more open.
The other comment I want to make before I get to my
question, George, you alluded to this in your statement with
reference to the connection between al-Qa'ida and Iraq. I felt
like that was the weakest part of the argument that Secretary
Powell was going to be able to make last week, and I was,
frankly, pleased to see that he came forward as much as he did
with the Zarqawi pronouncement.
Your statement today with respect to the Egyptian Jihadists
who are operating openly in Iraq I think it just adds to the
evidence there that there is a direct link between not just al-
Qa'ida and Saddam Hussein but the entire terrorist community
and Saddam Hussein. I think that that particular issue, in and
of itself, is going to be the most sensitive issue that we've
got to deal with because we know that those weapons are right
there, we know that the terrorist community is there.
Do they have their hands on these weapons, and are they
going to use them? I think that's something that frankly I'm
going to want to talk with you a little bit more about this
afternoon.
I want to ask you a question, though, that I get asked at
home. And I hope you can all comment on this. That is, once
again, Senator Warner alluded earlier to the statements that
were made in the paper again today by some of our colleagues in
other parts of the world, heads of other countries, relative to
their not being convinced there are weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq. They're obviously not on board with the full force
that our President is. I know our President is right. We all
know our President is right.
We all know that there is a relationship in the
intelligence community between each of your organizations and
your counterpart in France, in Germany, in Russia, and in every
other country. Is there something we know that they don't know?
Are we not sharing information with them? Why would these
countries not be as strong as we are, because the evidence is
almost overwhelming? And if there is some lack of information
sharing there, we need to know that. And I'd appreciate the
comment of each of you on that issue.
Director Tenet. Sir, I don't know the answer precisely. I
will say that we produced a white paper that became a matter of
public knowledge. The British produced a white paper. The
Secretary of State has laid out a fairly exhaustive case at the
United Nations. I know that we talk to our counterparts, so
there is an enormous amount of data that flows back and forth.
I can't take you farther than that, sir.
Senator Chambliss. So, the answer to the question is that
the information that we have has been freely and openly
disseminated with our supposed allies around the free world?
Director Tenet. Sir, we have provided a great deal of
information to everybody on this case, and that's as far as I
can take it.
Senator Chambliss. Has there been any attitude or do you
notice any hesitation on the part of any of those countries
with respect to the information that we've given them?
Director Tenet. I just can't comment on that, sir. I don't
know.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for your testimony here today.
Obviously the purpose of this hearing is to measure the
extent to which we have made progress, particularly in the 16
months since September 11, and whether or not there are systems
in place to make America safer and to prevail in the war on
terrorism. And towards that end, I'd like to have you discuss
to some extent about how the information sharing is working.
I was concerned to read that a senior official from the
White House indicated that much of the information sharing that
is occurring between the FBI and CIA is on an informal basis
and by brute force. And I would like to know whether or not we
have made significant improvements. I know the President has
recommended the terrorist threat integration center, which I
think is a great idea and a move in the right direction, but is
that going to become operational sooner rather than later? To
what extent has urgency been applied to making this functional
and making sure the information is flowing in all directions,
vertically and horizontally?
To that point as well, on Friday I happened to be at the
Portland, Maine Airport, and I was talking to the federal
security director, who had heard at 11:00 on CNN that there
would be an announcement about raising the alert level to code
orange. And the attorney general's press conference was going
to be at 12:30. So he hears about it on CNN an hour-and-a-half
before the Attorney General is going to have a press
conference, two hours before he will receive an official
directive. I also talked to some federal law enforcement
officials as well as local who had the same experience.
And I'm just hoping that we are in a better position to
disseminate this information than the way we're doing it,
especially when we're talking about the second highest alert
and the second time it has been instituted. And also because
security conditions maybe have to be attached to that, and
these officials need to know first and foremost. So, we're
saying to wait and watch it on TV. And I just hope that we can
improve upon this system.
And I mention that to you today to ensure that that doesn't
happen, but also to know where we are in information sharing,
because last week, before the code orange alert was issued--now
these media reports may not be entirely accurate, but it seems
to me that there are a lot of questions as to whether or not to
even issue the alert. And I know, Director Tenet, you said that
this chatter was significant, but I gather it wasn't specific
enough to encourage the alert. And where were you both in terms
of whether or not this alert should be issued?
Director Tenet. Well, I think it's fair to say that, with
regard to the issuance of alert, we were both--we both believed
that this was something that should be done. I mean, this is a
story that's been pieced together. It was very specific and
credible information. It was sourced well. There were multiple
sources. So, I think from Bob's and my perspective, we had to
issue this alert.
We made our case. Obviously, the Director of Homeland
Security and the Attorney General make the policy decisions,
but from where we sat, putting us at a heightened state of
alert, being disruptive, throwing people off their feet,
generating additional operational opportunities in this
environment is important.
Now, people will come back and say, Senator, well, if it
doesn't happen in this time period, what does that mean? It's
really irrelevant to the point of there was enough credible
data that takes us to a time period and it increases our
vigilance, and we have a plot line that we will continue to run
and follow. So, I think--Bob can speak for himself--but we were
both in the same place.
Director Mueller. We absolutely were both in the same
place, both of us, both institutions having access to the same
intelligence. And the intelligence was not just foreign
intelligence but also domestic intelligence. And I believe we
draw the same conclusions as to the necessity of raising the
alert based on our common understanding of that intelligence.
And this process, I think speaks volumes about the information
sharing capabilities now as opposed to before September 11.
When a situation like this comes along, not only do our
individual offices exchange information that is culled from our
investigations within the United States but also information
that comes from the intelligence community overseas. But also,
as this process goes along, we--individually and together--
discuss the import of the intelligence and what steps should be
taken as a result of that intelligence.
I will also say that the process goes on daily. In other
words, once the alert is raised, every day we look at it and
look at those underpinnings or those threads of intelligence
that led us to believe that the alert should be raised to
determine whether or not the time has changed and that things
have changed significantly enough so that the alert should be
reduced to the lower level.
Director Tenet. I'd say, Senator, the FBI has done a great
job of playing off what we provided and then giving it back to
us in a real operational, real-time transparency on all this
has been exemplary. So, you know, I would say that we're making
steady and important progress on data sharing. The Director's
got an important initiative there in terms of digital
communications, the packaging of data, the sending it forward.
And I think it's going to get better and better. But we have a
very important and seamless lash-up today that's going to get
stronger over the course of time with the reforms that Bob has
put in place and things we're trying to do with our law
enforcement colleagues.
Chairman Roberts. The Senator's time has expired. Senator
Mikulski.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, to everyone at the table, I know that with us being
on such a high alert--and actually we've been on a high alert
for a long time; we just got the color called orange--I just
know that under all the professional demeanor at this table the
emotional stress that you're underas you're working so hard to
try to protect our country, and we want to say that to everybody who
works for you, we know what you're going through. And I just want to
say thank you.
Director Tenet. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Mikulski. And in terms of the coordination, you
know, we've already been in a high alert several weeks ago; it
was called the sniper attacks. And, first of all, Mr. Tenet,
Mr. Mueller, and all other agencies that were involved, I want
to say, as the Senator from Maryland, first of all, thank you.
The coordination in the federal government with local law
enforcement was outstanding in the way it worked, the way we
could find the sniper, the way we could track down the killer
with every federal agency doing what it needed to do, the way
we were able to work with the local law enforcement, and also
to be sure that this was not an international threat.
So, we don't need to go into the mechanics, but I believe
that what was done there was really a model of communication
and cooperation, not only in finding the killers but also the
way you worked with the local government, and also managed the
fear. And I thank Mr. Duncan, Mr. Moose, Agent Bald, the ATF.
So, having said that, let me then go now to agent--agent
orange. I feel like it's agent orange, there is such a toxic
atmosphere. With the threats that have been announced, the
question is now what should Americans do? There is a great
anxiety here in the capital region about what we've heard in
the media--you know, tape up your windows, et cetera, buy your
water--to what is happening with the local law enforcement.
And I wonder if, Mr. Mueller, you could comment on this,
which is, number one, given this threat now, what is the FBI
doing in terms of working with the locals? Using other examples
now as models, what more could we be doing? Because while
you're doing the threat assessment and communicating the
information, the response needs to be local, and also the
vigilance needs to be local--whether it's the Baltimore City
Police Department, whether it's the Department of Natural
Resources Police policing the bay around Calvert Cliffs, our
nuclear power plant, along with our Coast Guard. What could you
share with me about what's being done and how we could also
improve it, and also do it in other parts of the country? But
I'll tell you, your agent Gary Bald was really prime time.
Director Mueller. Well, thank you.
Senator Mikulski. And all the agents.
Director Mueller. I do believe that, when it comes to
information sharing, that is yet another example of how we are
changing as an organization and better utilizing our joint
capabilities--and by joint capabilities I mean the capabilities
of the federal law enforcement with state and local.
When it comes to responding to the threat, last Friday we
sent out another what we call another what we call NLETS with a
package of suggestions in terms of what might be done to
additionally harden potential targets. Through our joint
terrorism task forces, we work closely with state and local law
enforcement to identify potential targets in the region and to
assure that those who are responsible for the security of those
targets understand the threat alert and harden their
facilities.
As we go through this process of looking at whether or not
to raise the alert, we try again through our joint terrorism
task forces to keep them apprised of the intelligence that is
coming in. Some of it, quite obviously, is very sensitive in
terms of sources and methods, but we keep the joint terrorism
task forces generally alerted.
I will tell you that whenever we have a threat to a
particular place, we immediately put that threat out to the
joint terrorism task force and alert, through the joint
terrorism task force and through the U.S. Attorney's office,
the state and local law enforcement, as well as, most often,
the political hierarchy of the city or the town or the
community where we have this information. We believe that those
individuals who are responsible for the safety, the first
responders, should have access to that information. And then we
coordinate afterwards in trying to run the threat down and
determine whether indeed it is credible or not.
The most important thing that comes out of this enhanced
vigilance, as I briefly stated before, is the alertness of the
citizenry. We have on a number of occasions been alerted to
things that are out of the ordinary that indeed, we come to
find, gave us some insight and gave us a lead to persons who
were associated with terrorist groups and enabled us to take
some action against them. And consequently, through this
process of both raising the alerts but also in discussing what
should be done through our various joint terrorism task forces,
we have, I believe--and I believe intelligence would support
this--deterred terrorists from attacks because of the enhanced
vigilance.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Mueller, I think I'm going to follow
up on this in the closed session, and questions that I have for
the CIA and the other agencies I'll save for the closed
session.
Chairman Roberts. Senator, we will have a second round. And
the distinguished Senator's time has expired. Senator Lott.
Senator Lott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for the work you do in your respective positions,
and for what you're doing to protect our country.
You know, in Congress we have turf conflicts and
disagreements between committees, the House and Senate,
individual Senators and Congressmen. Human nature is not always
to share or cooperate. I think I'm encouraged by what I hear
you're saying, and you know, you are trying to change this
culture; several others have referred to that. But I think to
the average American, when they were told, in effect, that you
know, that sometimes the FBI and the CIA, and maybe DIA, all of
you weren't exchanging, and coordinating, and cooperating in
handling of information, the average person couldn't understand
that. So I want to emphasize again the importance of your
continuing to work to get that accomplished.
Because of our limited time, let me try to get to a couple
of specific questions. One of the areas I've been concerned
about is security of seaports and the capabilities of the Coast
Guard and the threat of how some weapon of mass destruction
could be brought into ports, big or small, whether it's
Gulfport, Mississippi or Baltimore.
So elaborate on how you're going to deal with that threat,
if you can, as much as you can in open session. And how is the
relationship with Coast Guard? And you might just tie into
that, there was a lot of discussion when we were passing the
homeland security legislation about the categories that would
go into homeland security. And what kind of progress are you
making in terms of cooperation with this new Department?
Director Mueller. Let me just start, if I could, Senator,
with the ports. Each of the major ports, at least almost every
one of the ones I know about, has, as an adjunct to a joint
terrorism task force in Norfolk or Charleston or elsewhere, a
group that looks at port security. In that group is the FBI. In
that group is the Coast Guard and the local police chiefs. If
it's a federal facility, members from the federal facilities
come together as a task force to address the security of ports.
Since September 11, we have had certainly in excess of 10,
probably more than 20, and perhaps more than that, threats of
ships coming into various ports with anything from nuclear
weapons to bombs. And on each of those occasions where we have
received such a threat we have worked closely together with the
Coast Guard to identify the vessel or vessels, to search the
vessel or vessels, and to assure that the threat was not
credible.
We are working exceptionally well with the Coast Guard,
have been since September 11, and I expect that that will
continue as the Coast Guard transfers to the Department of
Homeland Security. We certainly have seen no diminution in
efforts to coordinate and cooperate whenever we get a threat
against a port.
Senator Lott. Director Tenet, maybe Admiral Jacoby, there's
been discussion about this in the past, and I presume there's
an ongoing aggressive effort--and I'm not sure exactly who's in
charge of it--to try to keep up with and track fissionable
material that could be used, obviously, in nuclear weapons.
What can you say publicly about how aggressively we're pursuing
that dangerous material?
Admiral Jacoby. Senator Lott, actually, it's very much
combined, Defense and CIA effort in that regard. And I think it
would be better to follow up with some detail in the closed
session. But it also joins up with your last question about
seaports.
Obviously the concern is the movement of such materials.
And there's a real good-news story in here. The Navy, through
the Office of Naval Intelligence, has the intel community's
responsibility for Merchant Marine and tracking of materials
that are in those ships. That is a coordinated, consolidated,
integrated effort with the Coast Guard. And there's some
linkages in here that are really good-news stories in terms of
information-sharing.
Senator Lott. I've been surprised at some of the technology
I've found that we have. I'll ask more questions about that
this afternoon.
One final question, because I'm afraid that my time is
going to be gone. You know, Members of Congress are supposed to
get briefings, and we do on occasion. Some of them are
classified and very sensitive. But I've found recently that I
find out more about what's happening with the intelligence
community in a book than I'd ever gotten in a briefing about
what happened in Afghanistan, ``Bush at War.''
Now I think there's a lot of material in that book that
probably shouldn't have been there. Do we have some process of
trying to control leaks like that or deal with information like
that that is disclosed and it shouldn't be? I guess I'm looking
at you, Mr. Tenet.
Director Tenet. It's an interesting book, sir.
Senator Lott. Interesting book. Yeah, very interesting
information in there, too.
Director Tenet. And I think that obviously any time
operational detail and other issues are given away, it causes
us concern. It's one of the issues we work at all the time. So
it's a complicated and difficult problem to deal with.
Senator Lott. Well, I think you need to have an ongoing
effort to try to stop that kind of information from getting
into that type of medium.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. The time of the distinguished Senator has
expired. If the Senator has any suggestions on how we could put
that duct tape on the mouths of Congressmen and Senators,
perhaps it wouldn't happen as often as it does.
Senator Edwards.
Senator Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Tenet, I have seen reports that a new bin Ladin
tape will be broadcast today. Can you tell us, first, whether
that's true, and second, what you know about it?
Director Tenet. I've heard that on the way in, sir. I don't
know what the contents will be. We'll just have to wait and see
what is on this tape.
Senator Edwards. You've not seen the tape yourself?
Director Tenet. No, sir, I have not.
Senator Edwards. Nor have you received any reports about
what's contained on the tape?
Director Tenet. I had some reports last night, sir, about
the possibility that this would exist. But in preparing for
today, I honestly have not spent any time looking at it. So
we'll see whether it runs and what it sounds like.
Senator Edwards. Director Mueller, you and I have discussed
the subject of the FBI's reform efforts and a fundamental
disagreement that you and I have about this. Over 17 months, we
have learned and the American people have learned about case
after case where the FBI missed clues or failed to connect
dots, ranging from the failure to follow up on the Phoenix memo
to failing to get the Moussaoui computer to failing to track
two of the hijackers who the FBI knew were in the United
States.
And during that 17 months since September 11, the FBI
obviously has had a chance to reform itself. As we've
discussed, I don't believe the FBI has met that challenge. I
think there are two fundamental reasons for that. One is, I
think there's bureaucratic resistance within the FBI. The FBI
is by nature a bureaucracy. There are people within the FBI who
work to protect their own turf and they resist change, which is
the nature of bureaucracy.
And second, I think the Bureau is just the wrong agency to
do intelligence work. I think there's a fundamental conflict
between law enforcement and intelligence-gathering. And law
enforcement is about building criminal cases and putting people
in jail and indicting people.
The FBI is clearly very good at law enforcement; there's no
doubt about that. But law enforcement is not intelligence.
Intelligence isn't about building a case; it's about gathering
information and putting it together and seeing how it fits into
a bigger picture.
Now, as you know, I'm not the only one to reach this
conclusion; there are many others. In fact, I believe all of
the objective reviews have found that the FBI is not up to this
task. Let me just quote some of them first.
The Markle task force, which was October of 2002, said,
``There is a resistance ingrained in the FBI ranks to sharing
counterterrorism information. The FBI has not prioritized
intelligence analysis in the areas of counterterrorism.''
The Gilmore Commission, December of 2002: ``The Bureau's
longstanding tradition and organizational culture persuade us
that, even with the best of intentions, the FBI cannot soon be
made over into an organization dedicated to detecting and
preventing attacks rather than one dedicated to punishing
them.''
The Joint Congressional Inquiry; the report came out in
December. ``The FBI has a history of repeated shortcomings
within its current responsibility for domestic intelligence.
The FBI should strengthen and improve its domestic capability
as fully and expeditiously as possible by immediately
instituting a variety of recommendations.''
And finally the Brookings Institution, in January of this
year, said, ``There are strong reasons to question whether the
FBI is the right agency to conduct domestic intelligence
collection and analysis.''
My view, and I've expressed to you, is that the FBI's
effort at reform is too little, too late. I also think, because
of the nature of the FBI, that it will never be able to reform
itself to do this job.
The New York Times reported from the second-ranking
official at the Bureau--this is in November, November 21--that
he told field-office chiefs in a memorandum that he was--I'm
quoting him--``amazed and astounded by the failure of some
unidentified FBI field offices to commit essential resources
and tools to the fight against terrorism.''
I will introduce legislation this week--I'm going to give
you an opportunity to respond. I will introduce legislation to
take the domestic intelligence function out of the FBI and put
it into a new agency. I think it'll improve our ability to
fight terrorism. I also think it will improve, because of the
structure that I'm proposing, our ability to protect freedoms
and liberties here within our country.
I do want to ask you about----
Chairman Roberts. The Senator's time has expired.
Senator Edwards. I think we should give him a chance to
respond.
Chairman Roberts. I think that's pretty obvious. Let me
just say to the distinguished Senator, Senator Rockefeller and
I have agreed that, prior to the budget hearings, the first
hearing we will have will be on FBI reform so the Director can
come before us and certainly tell his side of the story. And I
will now recognize the Director to respond to the comments made
by the Senator.
Director Mueller. Senator, you have overlooked a great deal
of the good work that the FBI has done in the last 17 months in
connecting the dots. You also, I think, have overlooked the
capability of the Bureau to collect facts through
investigations, through interrogations, as it has done for 90
years.
The only other point I would make, Senator, is I've offered
you an opportunity personally to come down to the Bureau and be
briefed on the changes that we have made since September 11.
You have declined----
Senator Edwards. I'd be happy to do that.
Director Mueller [continuing]. To come down. And I asked
you in particular, before you introduced the legislation, that
you come down and see the changes we have made to augment the
intelligence-gathering capability of the Bureau, both the
gathering as well as the analytical capability of the Bureau.
So I ask you to do that before you submit that legislation.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Edwards. May I just respond briefly to the
Director? I will be happy to do that. I would like to see what
changes you've made. But I think there is a fundamental issue
here, which I, again, will be happy to talk with you about.
Director Mueller. If I can make one more point, you have
quoted pieces from a number of reports. I also know that you
have received letters from state and local law enforcement who
do not share your view that the Bureau cannot undertake this,
and, to the contrary, believe that the Bureau ought to
undertake this responsibility because so much of it relies on
the integration of the federal government with state and local
law enforcement.
Senator Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. If we can adhere to the five-minute rule
in the future, it would be appreciated. The Senator from
Oregon.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Tenet, if no military action is taken against
Saddam Hussein this winter and spring and U.N. inspectors
continue their work in Iraq through the summer, I would like to
know if you believe Hussein will be a greater threat to our
country and our allies in the fall.
The question is relevant to me, because obviously we're
going to keep the U.N. inspectors there, canvassing the
country. And we're concerned about his military and weapons of
mass destruction capability. And I'm wondering if you think,
given that, if no action is taken this winter and this spring,
whether Hussein will be a greater threat to our nation in the
fall.
Director Tenet. Senator, if the inspections regime
continues on its current course, with the non-cooperation and
non-compliance of the Iraqis, essentially their continued
effort to deceive and make it possible for these inspectors to
work--and there's not much of a record to indicate that that's
going to change--that's something you have to factor into your
calculations.
The one thing you have to remember is Saddam Hussein built
the WMD program with inspectors living in his country for
years. He understood how to acquire chemical and biological
capabilities. He understood how to establish a clandestine
procurement network. He understands how to cross borders.
Now the policy decision you make or others make is not my
purview. He will continue to strengthen himself over time, and
the greatest concern is how fast he gets to a nuclear
capability, which then magnifies the impact of his already
large chemical and biological program. So, from a professional
perspective, it never gets any better with this fellow, and
he's never been a status quo guy.
Senator Wyden. We'll get into it some more in the closed
session, I appreciate, just because time is short.
Gentlemen, let me ask you about the Total Information
Awareness program. This, of course, is a Defense Department
program. I'm sponsor of an amendment now on the omnibus bill to
put some restrictions there so we can have some safeguards for
the civil liberties of the American people. And of course, the
technology from the Total Information Awareness program as
envisaged would be given to various agencies so they could
track various databases. I'd like to know from you all what
your view is of the Total Information Awareness program's
planned capabilities, and whether you have any concerns about
privacy and, if so, what safeguards you think are necessary?
Perhaps, Mr. Mueller, it would be better to start with you
on this.
Director Mueller. I am not totally familiar with all
aspects of what has been called the Total Awareness--I guess,
Total Awareness Program?
Senator Wyden. Total Information Awareness.
Director Mueller. Total Information Awareness program. We
have had discussions with DARPA with regard to utilizing
certain of their tools with our information but have not
discussed participating in what is called the Total Information
Awareness program. I don't know enough about it to really
comment about the impact on privacy. I would say that whenever
we have databases that are interrelated, the impact on privacy
should be considered as we move forward. And to the extent that
we institute new databases within the Bureau, we look at the
privacy aspects of those databases.
Senator Wyden. Well, I certainly hope so, because this is a
program that involves the question of snooping into law-abiding
Americans on American soil. It's something I feel strongly
about. And we're talking about the most expansive surveillance
program in American history, and this is something we've got to
nail down the safeguards before we go forward, and suffice it
to say there is substantial bipartisan concern up here on this.
One last question, if I might, for you, Director Tenet. The
terrorist tracking system, the TIC system, the Terrorist
Identification Classification System, was something I wrote in
the intelligence authorization bill, so we could store and
retrieve the critical information on known or suspected
terrorists and essentially track them on an ongoing basis. I'd
like to know what the status of this is and particularly what's
been done to improve the sharing of information regarding these
known and suspected terrorists, and whether it's now getting to
the state and local level, because, again, I'm hearing at home
concerns on this point.
Director Tenet. Sir, I know that we're hard at work in
building this database. One of the things that is involved in
this Threat Integration Center that we're trying to establish
and we hope to establish soon is that this will be the
repository to make sure that these databases are kept and
updated here. We are building. We're making progress. I'd ask
Director Mueller to comment about the transferral of the data.
Senator Wyden. That would be good. And particularly,
Director Mueller, tell us how the TIC system--and I'll finish
right up, Mr. Chairman--is going to be integrated with the
terrorist threat center that the President is talking about.
Director Mueller. Excuse me. Just one second.
[Pause.]
Chairman Roberts. It's called TTIC.
Director Tenet. We know that. We know that.
Director Mueller. The question, again, was, Senator--I
apologize----
Senator Wyden. The question was, where are we withrespect
to the Terrorist Identification Classification System, and how is going
to be fit into the center that the President envisages?
Director Mueller. I would have to get back to you on that.
I'm not, off the top of my head, familiar with where we are in
the TIC and how it will relate to the TTIC.
Director Tenet. Sir, if I can just fill in for a moment,
one of the organizing principles here will be to have this
database developed and maintained in this center, and this will
be something that we provide accessibility to, to federal,
state and local levels. And we'll put it in the center.
Senator Wyden. We'll do more in closed session.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. I thank the Senator.
We are ready for the second round. There will be the
Chair--we will strictly adhere to the five-minute rule.
Senators who go over five minutes will be taken to Dodge City,
put in the local jail and, after five days, hung by the neck
until they are dead. [Laughter.]
That may be a bit harsh. We'll consider amnesty.
I have some observations. I know that the Senator from
North Carolina made mention of several commissions. There's the
Bremer Commission, the Gilmore Commission, the Aspin-Brown
Commission, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the CSIS study--all
made possible by Senator Warner when he set up the Emerging
Threats Subcommittee in the Armed Services Committee and I was
the chairman. It was like a fire hose in your face. This is
before 9/11.
Most of what has been said about connecting the dots, and
the oceans no longer protect us, et cetera, et cetera, not a
matter of if but when, access denial, asymmetrical warfare--all
the buzz words that we hear were said back then in 1999. I even
said some; I was even prescient. Somebody said I was even
intelligent.
And the thing that I would say is that after all of that
and all of this discussion, still we have the question, does
the situation in Iraq merit the United States going to war? And
the observation that I would like to make, that in the last
decade 6,000 Americans have lost their lives either overseas or
in this country, and have been killed by terrorist cells,
either state-sponsored or non-state-sponsored, we are at war.
That's the key. Now, what we do as a result of that, what would
be the best way to win this war over the long term, it seems to
me that is the question. And I don't question any Senator's
intent, but I think we ought to make that very clear.
And it seems to me that all this is related. We have a
tendency to say, you know, Admiral, you're right, you rated
North Korea as the number one issue. And then Director Tenet
says it's al-Qa'ida that's the number one issue. And then the
President says it's Iraq that's the number one issue. They're
all interrelated. And if we start drawing a line in the sand
and then drawing a new line in the sand and a new line in the
sand, as we saw in the Balkans with Slobodan Milosevic, we end
up in the sandbox. I don't think we can afford to draw about
six or seven lines in the sand because of the message that that
sends to somebody like Kim Jong-Il, who is a ruthless
theological dictator--very bizarre man, very surreal man, very
surreal country.
So I think it's all interrelated. And I think we make a
dangerous assumption by trying to rate one over the other. They
are all equally extremely important in regards to our vital
national security.
George, if the U.S. takes military action against Iraq,
what is the likelihood that Saddam will use weapons of mass
destruction against the U.S.? But if the U.S. does not take
military action against Iraq, what is the likelihood that
Saddam will use weapons of mass destruction against the U.S.,
especially with consideration to that poison center in
northeast Iraq that the Secretary of State so detailed in his
testimony before the Security Council?
Director Tenet. Sir, you asked a couple of questions. I
think you need to go back to the Secretary's statement and look
at how carefully crafted that language was in terms of the
linkages that are made.
I ask everybody to do that. This is a story we're
developing very carefully. So before you lead to operational
direction and control, the safe haven and harboring piece, it
is very sound and established. And how much they know and what
they know is something you're still developing, although we're
certainly aware that the Iraqi Intelligence Service is
knowledgeable about the existence of this capability. So people
have to be very careful about how we used our language and how
far we take the case.
Now, you know that when we wrote our national intelligence
estimate, I guess in October, we talked about the fact that if
he believed at the time that--well, I'll paraphrase here--that
hostilities were imminent or his regime was going down, we had
a great concern that he would use weapons of mass destruction.
The truth is, we don't know what he's going to do. And now
we're at a different point in time. And this is some things we
need to talk in classified session.
Chairman Roberts. I'll be happy to do that. I've just got a
couple more questions.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Chairman Roberts. I've got 46 seconds, and I may be taken
to Dodge City if I'm not careful.
Director Tenet. Sorry, sir.
Chairman Roberts. All right.
Admiral, what do we have new on Scott Speicher, the man
that we left behind?
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, we have a number of leads and we've
done notification on those. And so we're continuing to pursue
very aggressively. Right now we have no conclusive information,
and so our assessment is we are pursuing it as if Captain Scott
Speicher is alive and being held by the Iraqis. We continue
with our assessment that the Iraqis know of his fate and that
they are not forthcoming with the information that they have
available.
Chairman Roberts. I thank you for your efforts, and please
relay my heartfelt thanks to your team, the Speicher team, to
determine that's the case. I am out of time. And don't bring
the sheriff yet.
I'd like to ask of you just one real quick question. We've
heard a lot about--and I'm going to submit for the record to
you, George, and to you, Bob, more especially--whether we need
a director of national intelligence, whether the FBI should be
involved in counter terrorism, and a series of things that came
from the joint investigative staff investigation on 9/11. And
you can respond, and you don't have to do it next week. Or we
can talk about it in the classified session.
Senator Lott, who is not with us here today, pointed out--
or, actually, it was Senator Warner that actually pointed it
out--in July prior to 9/11 that we had 14 committees in the
Senate alone--14 committees; Lord knows how many
subcommittees--that had jurisdiction over homeland security and
national security. Senator Lott informed me after 9/11, about
several months ago, there are now 80, if you combine the House
and the Senate. I don't know which door you knock on. You're
going to have to give this same presentation to Armed Services,
and you should, because of the different tenor of that.
Would you all think that it might be a good idea for the
House and Senate to reform itself so that you would know which
door to knock on and you could give a cogent answer and there
would be a one-stop shopping center, or at least a belly
button-kind of committee that at least would, you know, be able
to do the job rather than trying to report to 80 different
committees and listen to 80 different speeches, times about 10
members of each committee? I think the answer is yes. Is that
correct?
Director Tenet. Sir, I don't think any of us would tell you
how to reform the Congress. [Laughter.]
We'll work on reforming ourselves.
Chairman Roberts. Well, whisper in my ear. You could sort
of nod your head or raise your eyebrow or something like that.
Director Tenet. Maintaining very good discipline, I'm being
disciplined at this moment, sir.
Chairman Roberts. I got it, George, I got it. [Laughter.]
All right. Senator Rockefeller.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, on your excellent preparation, testimony, you
talked about North Korea being fundamentally destabilizing
potentially and probably. And you talked about its missile
system, Taepo-Dong II. If it's a two-stage thing, it reaches
parts of America; if it goes to three-stage, it can reach all
of America; that is, plutonium, a nuclear bomb. All the others
at the panel table have mentioned all of the other kinds of
threats around. North Korea I have in my own mind.
Is South Korea going to seek a different kind of
relationship? It would be my judgment that it would over the
next 10 to 20 years. That either can be, you know, handled by
redeployment of forces, or there is something going on in South
Korea which is more than just young people going to coffee
shops and saying un-nice things about America, but a
fundamental desire of that country to establish itself on its
own, to beseen as less than, you know, a part of our protection
posture in Asia, in South Asia.
You have, in addition to that, the problem that you spoke
of, Admiral, of poverty worldwide, of 95 percent, I think you
said, of all the people who are in poverty will be in
undeveloped nations in the population growth that occurs. So
you have this enormous array, and each of you have ticked off
all the countries that you worry about.
My question is to this point. And it's not a softball
question or a set-up question, but it's one that needs to be
asked. You can combine, coordinate, we can have a DNI or not
have a DNI; at some point you have to have the resources and
the people to be able to do all of this. Now, we're focused on
Iraq, but we have to be--I mean, we haven't even talked about
South America.
Various ones of you in the past have talked to me about
fatigue, the fatigue factor, that people just have--they're
overworked, they're overloaded, they have so much that they
simply make mistakes, like we do, because they're tired and
there aren't any replacements, or they're 24/7, all the time.
And I'm interested in, one, the answer to the first.
And secondly, what are we in danger of not being able to
cover? Your responsibility is everything. You cannot perform on
everything. That becomes a serious national security question.
Director?
Director Tenet. Well, Senator, I think it is a very
important question. Where we are today is, in building our
budgets and thinking through the future we basically have been
made whole in terms of problems we were fixing and worries that
we had, and there's an enormous infusion of dollars that have
come to the community over the last two years with the
President and the Secretary of Defense's support, so we're
beefing up capabilities. People are an issue; we can't bring
them on fast enough. And we're doing everything we can to bring
them on.
The key question that we're now thoughtfully talking about
with the Secretary of Defense and others is, in the world that
you're headed to where information is going to have absolute
primacy, do we really have the global coverage that we need? Do
you really have the redundancy that you need? Is the
architecture that we designed for collection in the early '90s
sufficient? I think we all believe that there are dramatic
improvements that have to be made. We're thinking about that
very, very hard and what the resource implications are.
But it's very clear that the kind of global coverage, the
connectivity--just the one issue that I talked about in my
testimony, this issue of safe havens that are derived in states
that basically can't deliver goods and services to their
people, thereby creating new safe havens for terrorist
organizations; coverage of these places is a nontrivial event.
We can't tell you that we cover it with any speed or grace
today. We make every effort we can. You put your finger on
something that's very important and we're thinking about it
right now as we make ourselves whole from lots of shortfalls in
the '90s, and we're now asking the same question you're asking.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. I'll stop there. I'll just say
that the world of intelligence is incredibly important and,
therefore, it has to be done properly and thoroughly. That's
your responsibility, that's also our responsibility to make
sure it can happen.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rockefeller raised the important question about
North Korea. And I want to make this point. This President is
working as hard as any President could to get to a diplomatic
solution in both areas. And people say, well, there's no
difference between the threats of North Korea or they're
equally as--some say North Korea's more of a threat. But I
think we should point out that the issue with North Korea
basically--under this presidency, has just begun, and he's
dealing with it diplomatically, as he should.
In the case of Iraq, we've been at it with the world for 12
years and 17 resolutions, and we're now at the point where
other nations are thinking of prolonged inspections, doubling
or tripling the size of the inspectors for an indefinite period
of time--and I'll return to that.
But also, the Chairman brought up this question of weapons
of mass destruction. And I think the importance of these
hearings in the open is that the public can look each of you in
the eye through the cameras and hear your response.
In response to the Chairman, Mr. Tenet, you say, frankly,
you don't know whether Saddam Hussein would or would not employ
weapons of mass destruction. But the troops deploying from my
state by the tens of thousands, their families, I think we have
to go a step further and point out there is a risk because he
has a known record of having used them, and it is not simply
that we don't know that.
Director Tenet. Sir, if I may----
Senator Warner. Let me just finish. And then, Admiral, the
same question.
Now, you made no reference, Director Tenet, to the weapons
in your opening statement, that is, the prepared statement. But
the Defense Intelligence Agency did, and I read it: ``Saddam's
conventional military options and capabilities are limited, and
we know that. They're significantly degraded since 1991. But I
expect him''--this is I, you--``to preemptively attack the
Kurds in the north, conduct missile and terrorist attacks
against Israel and U.S. regional and worldwide interests,
perhaps using WMD and the regime's link with al-Qa'ida.''
So you seem to go a step further. Is there unity of
thinking between DIA and CIA on this issue? Or, frankly, do you
have a difference of view? Because I think in fairness, here in
open we should tell the men and women of the armed forces,
indeed, the civilians employed, and the families, exactly what
your professional opinions are.
Director Tenet. Sir, I think you have to plan on the fact
that he would use these weapons.
Now, I was remarking--do I know what's in his head? I don't
know. Do I know whether his subordinates will take the orders?
I don't know. There are some unknowables, but you must plan as
if he will use these weapons.
Senator Warner. Clear.
Admiral Jacoby. And, Senator, my comments are that in a
period of time when he believes that the regime is going down,
he will take every effort to divert attention, whether it's an
attack on the north, an attack in Israel, or use the
capabilities that are available to him in his own arsenal. And
that's the projection they're based on, that situation.
Senator Warner. So there are parallel views of the two
principal agencies, correct?
Admiral Jacoby. I believe so.
Senator Warner. The second question, Mr. Tenet, and to the
Director of the Bureau, my constituents say: Well, let's look
at this proposal maybe of extended time and enlarging the
regime because Saddam Hussein is 6,000 miles away; he's no risk
to us.
But I reply to them that these weapons of mass destruction
in his possession can be disseminated through the worldwide
terrorist groups and brought to the shores of the United
States, in perhaps small quantities. One envelope, which was
never opened, resulted in the deaths attributed to anthrax
here, of courageous postal workers, and in some ways
debilitated the Congress to operate for a significant period of
time.
Now, what evidence can you share publicly that Iraq is
disseminating through worldwide terrorist organizations or in
other ways any of their alleged cache of literally tons of
these chemicals and biological agents which can bring about
mass destruction of our people?
Director Tenet. Sir, we have provided the Committeewith a
number of classified papers that are well written and well done. And I
think it documents the extent of what we have learned today. Obviously
we have some concerns about the safe haven that's been created, and I
did not suggest operational direction and control. But over time you
learn more things.
How that plays out and whether, you know, these things get
to second- or third-hand players is something that you're
always worried about. So I think we've taken these cases as far
as we can and given all these papers to you. And I'd like to
let it rest with that. As we develop more data on this, I think
what----
Senator Warner. But that is a threat to the security here
at home. Am I correct?
Director Tenet. Sir, you have to worry about how those
things can ultimately be transported in the hands of multiple
groups to affect the security of the American people.
Senator Warner. The views of the Bureau?
Director Mueller. I fully support that. I am concerned
always about the threat of WMD in an attack on the United
States. You look at what would have happened if we had not gone
into Afghanistan when we did to go after al-Qa'ida. Once we go
into Afghanistan, we do find that they have research into
developing WMD capabilities. And had we not gone in then, those
capabilities could have matured to the point now where we would
be in desperate, desperate shape.
Senator Warner. Lastly, Mr. Ford, do----
Chairman Roberts. The Senator's time has expired, if I
could----
Senator Warner. Could I just ask him if the Department of
State--he's been very silent here--give him a chance to
participate--on this alleged resolution coming up through
France and others, that triple, quadruple inspectors, leaving
them for an indefinite time, does that merit consideration by
the U.S., or are we prepared to try and go into that Security
Council and knock that down?
Mr. Ford. Senator Warner, the question and response of
Director Tenet earlier about whether or not the inspectors or
inspection process is effective I think is relevant in
answering your question.
Senator Warner. Yes.
Mr. Ford. At least from an intelligence officer's
perspective, you can keep those inspectors in there forever.
You can triple or quadruple them. You can give them all kind of
new rules, and you can't guarantee me that you can deal with
the question of chemical, biological and nuclear programs of
Saddam Hussein.
It's a case where the inspections have allowed these
weapons of mass destruction to exist, and anyone who doesn't
believe there's not enough evidence about these weapons of mass
destruction hasn't looked or doesn't want to see; it's there.
And sure, if there's a diplomatic way to solve this
problem, I, for one, would like to take it. The problem is is
that we've had 12 years and all kinds of suggestions from
friends and allies. Well, give him another day; give him
another week. What I see as an intelligence officer, he's taken
full advantage of that week, that day, that month, that year,
those 12 years. So, when you come to me and say inspections;
sure. It's a great idea; it's good; they have a hard job. But
I'm not--as far as I'm concerned, it doesn't solve the problem
of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
Senator Warner. I thank the Chair.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Mr. Tenet, until your statement this morning
that all valuable intelligence information in our possession
has now been shared with U.N. inspectors, two public statements
of the administration have been the following.
One, Secretary Powell on January 9, saying that we began
sharing information, significant intelligence information, on
Iraqi weapons programs a few days before--that's early January.
He also said that we were withholding some of the sensitive
information, waiting to see if inspectors are able to handle it
and exploit it.
And then later in the month, at the end of the month,
Secretary Rumsfeld and others said the following. That
inspectors have been given as much information as they can
digest.
Very different from what you are now saying, which is that
as of today, all relevant information has now been provided to
the U.N. that has intelligence value. My question to you is,
have the U.N. inspectors been notified that they have been
given all that they're going to get from us?
Director Tenet. Sir, all that they're going to get is as we
may----
Senator Levin. All that we believe is of significant
intelligence value. Have they been notified----
Director Tenet. I believe they have in our daily
conversations. In fact, sir, we've given them a large packet of
sites and then we have conversations with them every day.
Senator Levin. My question is have they been notified that
we have no more packets of information that we plan on giving
them----
Director Tenet. Sir, we may develop more packets over time.
Senator Levin. As of what we have, have we notified----
Director Tenet. I believe so, sir. I'd have to check. I
haven't been the person in direct dialogue with them.
Senator Levin. Secondly, do you support U.N. inspectors
using U-2 surveillance planes over Iraq?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Pardon?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Why?
Director Tenet. Because in the absence of surveillance
before, during and after an inspection--and I want to be
careful about what I say here--you really have little ability
to understand what they've done.
SEnator Levin. So the U-2s would help the inspectors?
Director Tenet. I believe so, sir, yes.
Senator Levin. So you support giving the inspectors those
U-2s.
Director Tenet. Yes, I do.
Senator Levin. Now, relative to the relationship--by the
way, I'm glad to hear that. That's sort of positive towards the
possibility of inspections that we hear from the State
Department representative that they can't guarantee anything,
which is obvious. The question is whether they have a use or
might actually provide some information that is available. I'm
glad you acknowledge that providing them with the U-2s does, in
fact, make sense. That's the first hint of support we've heard
this morning for the inspection process, but it's welcome.
Would you say, Mr. Tenet, that the Zarqawi terrorist
network is under the control or sponsorship of the Iraqi
government?
Director Tenet. I don't know that, sir, but I know that
there's a safe haven that's been provided to this network in
Baghdad.
Senator Levin. So you're not--well, you're saying that you
don't know if they're under the support, that they are under
the control or direction?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir. We have said--what we've said is
Zarqawi and this large number of operatives are in Baghdad.
They say the environment is good. And it is inconceivable to us
that the Iraqi intelligence service doesn't know that they live
there or what they're doing.
Senator Levin. In the February 7 Washington Post, senior
U.S. officials contacted by telephone by the reporter said that
although the Iraqi government is aware of the group's activity,
it does not operate, control, or sponsor. Do you disagree with
that?
Director Tenet. I'm sorry, sir; it's--on the basis of what
I know today, I can't say ``control'' in any way, shape or
form, but I will tell you, there's more data coming in here. So
what you just read, I will stand by today, maybe not tomorrow,
but we'll see where the data takes us.
Senator Levin. All right.
Next. Is Zarqawi himself a senior al-Qa'ida terrorist
planner? -
Director Tenet. He's a senior al-Qa'ida terrorist
associate, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. No, is he a planner?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir. He's met with bin Ladin.
Senator Levin. So he works for al-Qa'ida?
Director Tenet. He's been provided money by them. He
conceives of himself as being quite independent, but he's
someone who's well known to them, has been used by them, has
been contracted by them.
Senator Levin. Is he under their control or direction?
Director Tenet. He thinks of himself as independent, sir,
but he draws sustenance from them.
Senator Levin. All right. Do you disagree, then, with the
senior administration officials in The Washington Post quoted
on February 7 who say that although Zarqawi has ties to bin
Ladin, he is not under al-Qa'ida's control or direction?
Director Tenet. Sir, I don't agree with that statement. I
believe they're witting about what he's doing. I believe they
provide him sustenance, and I believe they use him effectively
for their purposes and they know precisely what he's up to.
Senator Levin. And therefore you do not agree with the
senior officials who said this?
Director Tenet. No, sir. I think the relationship with him
is more intimate than that.
Senator Levin. Unnamed. These are unnamed officials, of
course. But even when they come from the CIA, they're unnamed.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. The reason I asked you about the statement
whether or not they have bases--al-Qa'ida has bases in Iraq--is
because of the statement this morning of Mr. Ford. He said you
couldn't say that they have bases one way or the other. But I
just want to let you know, on page 3 of Mr. Ford's testimony,
he says that Saddam has allowed al-Qa'ida increasingly to
secure bases from which to plan terrorist attacks.
Director Tenet. Well, sir, you said to me--well, of course,
in regard to this Kurdish--these----
Senator Levin. No, no. He's allowed. Saddam has allowed.
That's not the Kurdish area.
Director Tenet. Yeah. Well, he's allowing them to operate
in Baghdad. Whether it's a base or not, I----
Senator Levin. But tell Mr. Ford you don't know whether
they're a base so his next testimony will reflect some
consistency with the CIA.
Director Tenet. It would be a base of operation, sir, is
the way I'd characterize it.
Mr. Ford. We've never had an agreement that we had to be
consistent with the CIA. We give our own view.
Senator Levin. That sounds good. There's not unanimity
about these issues in the intelligence community. That's a
useful bit of information.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Well, let the record show that each
Senator on the committee has a different view about what is
going on.
Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Director Tenet, in regard to Afghanistan,
talk to me a little bit about al-Qa'ida and other terrorist
groups. What impact are they having there now?
Director Tenet. I think, sir, that the area of our greatest
worry, as you know, are the eastern provinces that abut the
northwest frontier with Pakistan. And that's where we think
that they continue to try and either Taliban remnants or al-
Qa'ida remnants continue to operate.
I think we'd paint a picture of a country that, in relative
terms, is pretty secure in the rest of the country. That
doesn't obviate warlordism, factionalism that's occurring, but
this is the part that of the world that creates--these eastern
provinces and the northwest Pakistani frontier are the area
where we have our greatest worry, greatest insecurity, greatest
number of attacks on our forces and our people on the ground.
So it's something that we have to work on pretty hard.
Senator DeWine. Has that changed? I mean, what's the
progress there?
Director Tenet. Sir, I think the progress is----
Senator DeWine. Is it worse than 60 days ago or----
Director Tenet. I wouldn't say--no, I don't say it's worse.
I will say it's something that is a steady state of worry for
all of us.
Senator DeWine. Admiral, do your analysts have, do you feel
now, today, after the changes that we have seen made, do you
feel your analysts have access across the community to the
information that they need?
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, we've made steady progress. I'm not in
a position to know sort of what I don't know at this point,
but----
Senator DeWine. It's a problem, isn't it?
Admiral Jacoby. It is, sir. And it's a point of ongoing
discussion and work.
Senator DeWine. Where are we with the FISA information?
Director Mueller. The FISA information is disseminated to
the community in real time now in ways it had not been before
September 11. And I would let Mr. Tenet speak to that.
Senator DeWine. I asked about dissemination about FISA.
Director Tenet. Yeah, we get this material real time now as
a result of the PATRIOT Act. So it's been quite beneficial to
both of us.So there's a real-time access so that we can mine it
for operational data, and Bob uses it for other purposes, for
operational data as well. But it's moving very quickly.
Senator DeWine. What about you, Admiral?
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, we see it as part of product, very
carefully and clearly identified with the appropriate handling
requirements attached to it.
Senator DeWine. Director Mueller, your written testimony
mentioned the FBI's efforts to work with suppliers and
manufacturers of WMD materials to coordinate their voluntary
reporting of any suspicious purchases or inquiries. How broadly
is this effort being conducted, and have the suppliers and
manufacturers actually been cooperative?
Director Mueller. It's an effort throughout all of our
field offices, and indeed they have been cooperative. We've had
a number of investigations initiated because a manufacturer
will come to us, having received an order from, say, two or
three separate countries, and the order for this particular
product will be a product that can be used to develop some form
of WMD product, and they'll see that the order is all the same.
And it may come from countries in the Middle East or the Far
East. It will raise some suspicion, and we've had a number of
investigations that have been triggered by just such
information coming from manufacturers in the United States.
Senator DeWine. So this is working?
Director Mueller. It is working.
Senator DeWine. Progress?
Director Mueller. Yes.
Senator DeWine. Admiral, your written testimony also
describes the long-term trends with respect to weapons of mass
destruction and missile proliferation. You describe this as
``bleak''--this is your words. You note that 25 countries
either possess now or are actively pursuing WMD or missile
programs.
At this point we're focusing, of course, on preventing
further proliferation and limiting the ability of rogue nations
and unstable regimes from obtaining these weapons. But it's
only a matter of time before these technologies are widely
spread around the globe.
Let me just ask any members of the panel, how are we
planning for that future time, when we get up to that number?
Twenty-five countries would certainly change the dynamics of
that. And I wonder if anyone wants to comment on that.
Director, you're nodding. Anybody that nods gets to go
first.
Director Tenet. Okay. Sir, I think, as I talked about in
my statement, one of the things that worries me the most is the
nuclear piece of this. I talked about the domino theory may be
the nuclear piece. And you've got networks based on a country's
indigenous capability, individual purveyors, and I think that
we need to think--and this is a very important policy question,
not my question--we need to think about whether the regimes we
have in place actually protect the world any more.
In time periods where you could contain this problem to
states with regimes, that's one thing. Today I'm afraid the
technology and the material and the expertise is migrating in
manners in a networked fashion that belies a theory that's
based on borders and states. And I think this is a problem
because it will play right into ballistic missile
proliferation, the mating of nuclear weapons to missiles, and
the proliferation piece, when mated to issues like terrorism, I
think is the most difficult and most serious threat the
country's going to face over the next 20 or 30 years.
Senator DeWine. Thank you.
Chairman Roberts. The Director must leave very quickly to
go to attend services for a fellow colleague, an intelligence
officer. And at this juncture, on behalf of the entire
Committee I would like to express our condolences. And if you
would pass that to the family, and our prayers, and our
heartfelt thanks.
Director Tenet. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Snowe is next. If you feel--
Senator Snowe, did you have a specific question of the
Director?
Senator Snowe. Well, it's just one. I'd just ask one
question.
Chairman Roberts. Okay.
Senator Snowe. And it's just on Iraq's potential nuclear
capability. And I think that that is an issue that I would hope
that, to the extent that you can, to give your perspective. I
think we've seen, you know, nuclear-capable regimes and the
complexities and challenges they represent to us and to the
entire world. And I know you mentioned in your statement that--
referring to procurements that had been made or attempted to be
made by Iraq, that they go beyond the aluminum tubes. And there
was a question, a dispute about the aluminum tubes and whether
or not it's used for rockets--could you just explain that?
Thank you.
Director Tenet. Yes, ma'am. First, some history is
important. At the time of the Gulf war the Iraqis were pursuing
over five different routes to a nuclear weapon. In fact, when
people walked into a facility after the Gulf war, they didn't
even realize that there was a nuclear capability there until a
defector told us to go look there. So he's had a concerted
interest and an abiding interest in developing this capability,
all while we have this period of inspections.
Now, aluminum tubes are interesting, and I know there's
controversy associated with it.
Except that when you look at the clandestine nature of the
procurement, and how they've tried to deceive what's showing up
and then you look at the other dual-use items that they're
trying to procure, we think we've stumbled onto one avenue of a
nuclear weapons program. And there may be other avenues that we
haven't seen. But that he is reconstituting his capability is
something that we believe very strongly. If he had fissile
material, we believe he could have a nuclear weapon within a
year or two; that's our analytical judgment and our estimate.
The question that we have to worry about in this regard as
you look at developments in his ballistic missile force, the
delivery systems, is are you going to be surprised on the short
side of that estimative process, with or without fissile
material, because he's pursuing other routes that we have not
yet understood?
So, for him, the whole game is about acquiring this nuclear
capability. He's not someone--he's acquired these capabilities
because he's aggressive and he intends to use them. And the
question is, what do you do about somebody who continues to
march down the road? Policy choices are yours, but no one
should deceive themselves about what he intends to do.
And he's living in a region that's different than the
region Kim Jong-Il lives in. His standing army is larger--even
though it's a third the size that it was during the Gulf War,
it's still larger than all the GCC states and fellow Arab
nations combined. And he's used force in the region twice. So,
what is this all about for him? Domination of a region where
there are vital national security interests at stake for us and
where you have very fragile regimes.
And that's a context that's a little bit different than the
North Korean context, where facing down the South Koreans with
American presence, the Japanese, the Chinese, or the Russians
is a little bit different--not to mitigate the importance and
seriousness of what's going on on the peninsula of North Korea.
But you have to be able to think about these things in somewhat
separable terms and in terms of how policymakers think about
it. That's all I'd say.
Senator Snowe. But where is he most likely to acquire this
fissile material?
Director Tenet. Well, this is the $500 question that maybe
we can talk about in closed session.
Senator Snowe. But I think the important thing is here he
could have the capability within a year----
Director Tenet. If he had the material. And of course,
we're looking for signs that he's acquired it. We haven't seen
it yet, but this is a whole other issue and area that's of deep
concern to us in terms of how this material moves around the
world.
Senator Snowe. Thank you. Thank you.
Chairman Roberts. I would like to thank all of the
witnesses for your patience and your time and what you're doing
for our country.
Let me say again that outside the budget hearings, which we
must hold to address some asset deficiencies, we will have a
structural reform series of hearings, with the FBI going first
and the community second. There will be public hearings and
there will be private.
And with that, again, I thank the witnesses, and the
committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
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