The following is the actual dialog of the Question and Answer
Session:
SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you very much, Director Deutch.
We will proceed now to ten minute rounds of questions.
Director Deutch, I begin with the issue of the use by the intelligence
community, alleged use by the intelligence community, of newspaper
reporters, representatives of the media. There had been a generalized
view that the intelligence community was not using newsmen, newswomen
for intelligence-gathering operations. Recently an issue was
raised in the media about an exception to that general rule where
there were some extraordinary circumstances.
The concern has been articulated that if the newspapers and
media generally are to retain their unique status with the protection
of the First Amendment freedom of speech, freedom of press, that
those kinds of activities ought not to be engaged in.
A counter-argument has appeared publicly, the weight of it I
do not know, that some circumstances are so extraordinary as to
warrant an exception to that generalized rule.
We would be interested to know, first of all, whether there has been a rule that the intelligence community would not use newspaper and media personnel generally for intelligence operations. If that rule has been in existence, are there exceptions? If so, what are they? And your view as Director as to the philosophy behind it and whether any circumstance might be so extraordinary as to warrant an exception to that rule.
Now I've asked you a series of questions because they're inter-related,
and customarily the best procedure is to ask questions one at
a time. But I give you that composite picture and ask you to
address it.
DR. DEUTCH: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by saying that my sympathy on this matter is very,
very much with the journalistic community. I absolutely appreciate
and understand the reasons that lead them to urge no interference
or no cooperation with espionage services. I understand the relationship
to the special character of the newspapers and other media according
to the First Amendment. And frankly, as a former provost, I understand
the similar kinds of concerns that academics have about potential
use by the intelligence community of academics in intelligence
matters.
But I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you and the citizens of this country
can appreciate that Directors of Central Intelligence have to
also concern themselves with perhaps very unique and special threats
to national security where American lives are at risk; where very
important unique access can be given to protect American interests
abroad; where it would be necessary to consider the use of an
American journalist in an intelligence operation...
SENATOR SPECTER: So you're saying there are some extraordinary
circumstances where the U.S. intelligence community would call
upon journalists?
DR. DEUTCH: That's correct, Mr. Chairman. Let me make a remark
about our policy that has been in existence since 1977. I believe
when that policy was adopted that it was publicly announced, so
it's not been a secret policy. The policy says that we will not
use American journalists except under very, very rare circumstances
where...
SENATOR SPECTER: How would you define those "rare"
circumstances, as you articulate it?
DR. DEUTCH: Those rare circumstances are defined by considerations
by the Director of Central Intelligence or the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence where they would consider the information
to be of such importance, or the access to be of such tremendous
importance, to the interests of the United States and to American
citizens, that they would waive consideration and use an American
journalist.
SENATOR SPECTER: That's a fairly generalized statement, Director
Deutch, the interests of the American people. Can you be more
specific? Perhaps even illustrate that policy, if possible, without
disclosing methods, sources, or something that is sufficiently
far in the past not to compromise any ongoing matter?
DR. DEUTCH: Let me try to respond this way.
SENATOR SPECTER: Obviously this is a matter of great importance,
and this is something that this committee, I know, will want to
evaluate, and I'm not prepared to say one way or another. This
is something which is of sufficient seriousness that we ought
to think it through. But I do believe we need a little more specification
as to under what circumstances the Director of CIA thinks the
rule ought to be excepted.
DR. DEUTCH: I'd be happy to try and give you two hypothetical
examples. One would be where you had a journalist involved in
a situation where terrorists were holding U.S. hostages, where
that journalist might have tremendously unique access in such
a situation, or where there was particular access to a nation
or a group who had an ability to use weapons of mass destruction
against the U.S. These are the kinds of circumstances where I
think it would be very difficult not to take advantage of every
possible way of defending American lives.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well then would you define the exception as
circumstances where there's an imminent risk to the lives of American
citizens or the lives of others?
DR. DEUTCH: Well I'm not prepared at the present time to lay
out a set of criteria for when these exceptions might be granted,
but I'd be happy to work on that and to consider that. But that's
the kind of situation where I believe that exceptions would be
legitimate.
Now I want to say again, sir. I do understand and stress that
our general rule is we do not use American journalists, we do
not use American news organizations. That is our general policy.
It is only in very rare circumstances that we would consider exceptions,
when there are particular situations which involve risk to American
lives or particular questions of absolute access on matters of
important or critical national security matters. We would not
do it as a matter of policy, in general, to gain foreign intelligence.
And I want to say again, that my sympathy is very much with those
groups who are concerned about their integrity being compromised
in some way by this kind of covert involvement.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well you have carefully articulated in the
disjunctive circumstances where American lives were at risk or
lives of other were at risk, or circumstances where there were
particular national security interests involved. And there is
a fair distance between those two categories.
What we would ask you to do would be to consider a more precise
definition of the second category. If you have hostages or if
you have an imminent threat of use of weapons of mass destruction,
that's understandable. If you talk about the generalized national
security interests, that can have a pretty broad sweep. So we
would ask you to be more definitive on that.
DR. DEUTCH: And I would be very comfortable doing that. My
intention here is not to leave a very broad category, but indeed,
to narrow it as much as possible. So we would be happy to do
that. And what I'd like to do is give you a written statement
of what I propose those criteria to be.
SENATOR SPECTER: Would it be realistic to further limit the
authority to the Director himself or herself as opposed to the
Deputy Director, unless the Director was incapacitated?
DR. DEUTCH: Frankly, my strong view about management is that
a Director and his Deputy have got to be alter egos, and so I
think that as it is stated now is exactly appropriate. I think
the current criteria is proper.
SENATOR SPECTER: As a possible additional safeguard, if that
is to be the policy of the CIA, and I'm not saying that I agree
that it ought to be, would it be appropriate to further condition
that on consultation notice or perhaps concurrence with the Chairman
and Vice Chairman of the respective intelligence committees?
Or does that diffuse the power too much?
DR. DEUTCH: I certainly would resist concurrence, but I do believe
that the current practice is and has been since the beginning,
that there is notice given when it occurs.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well that's a pretty good sign, because no
notice has been given to this Chairman.
DR. DEUTCH: We don't want to talk about that, though, sir, I
don't think.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, the absence of notice I think you can
talk about.
Director Deutch, let me broach the next item on my agenda of
questions while the yellow light is on, and that is the issue
of terrorism in the Mideast. You've touched upon it with respect
to a number of countries there. The United States has made substantial
commitments, as have other countries of the world, to the PLO
to rebuild the PLO territories, conditioned on a couple of factors
-- the PLO renouncing the destruction of Israel, and the PLO renouncing
terrorism and doing everything within its power to avoid terrorism.
In your judgment, has the PLO and its Chairman, Yasser Arafat,
made every conceivable, realistic, practical effort to stop terrorism
against Israel?
DR. DEUTCH: My general impression is that the PLO has ceased
to sponsor terrorism, and I would like to provide a more detailed
classified answer to that, but my answer would be in the affirmative
as a general impression.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well I understand your use of the word sponsor,
but that has a considerable gulf between affirmative action in
every possible way. But we'll await...
DR. DEUTCH: On that point I would have to inform myself before
giving you a reply, and I would want to do it later if that's
possible, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR SPECTER: All right. Thank you very much.
Senator Kerrey?
SENATOR KERREY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Director Deutch, given the way that we've lined this up, I may
have referenced some of the testimony that will come after you
if you don't mind, but I'd like to engage you at the start in
a more general discussion.
It seems to me that it's fair and accurate to say that every
military action, since Desert Storm, taken by the United States
of America has been in response to the deterioration of some nation
state. As a consequence of that deterioration there is a political
military problem that either becomes of humanitarian interest
or of vital national interest to the United States, the most recent
one being in the former Yugoslavia where we led a negotiation
in Dayton and then followed that negotiation with a deployment
of U.S. forces as a part of IFOR.
Is that the way you see the world? It seems to me your testimony,
Ms. Gati's testimony, as well as General Hughes' testimony implies
that what we're likely to see out there in the future, even in
the case of North Korea, the implication is, the possibility is
that the greatest threat may not be military, but could in fact
be the implosion and the deterioration of that nation state and
what consequences that might bring would become a threat to the
United States. Is that...
DR. DEUTCH: Exactly, Senator Kerrey. My message is that's the
kind of military situations we'll face. And the other message
I bring with it is there's lots of them.
SENATOR KERREY: Does that imply that we are going to see an
increasing importance of what you might call preventative diplomatic
economic efforts?
DR. DEUTCH: Absolutely.
SENATOR KERREY: In other words, deterring threats to the United
States through our own military efforts may not be as easy as
it had been in the past?
DR. DEUTCH: The threats are not only to the United States.
The threats are to peace and stability in regions of the world.
But in general I think that the military as a military activity
only, by itself, is not going to be a unique instrument for dealing
with these problems, like Bosnia, for example.
SENATOR KERREY: But it is fair to say though, is it not, that
we're not going to be able simply through... And I'm not suggesting,
by the way, that I've reached a conclusion that we ought to disassemble
our military. I'm just saying that we are going to be frustrated
if we have an expectation that the strength of our own military
is going to, on its own, provide us with the kind of security
that we've expected it to do in the past.
DR. DEUTCH: Actually, Senator, I turn that around and I say
that we have to be prepared now as a country to meld together
the diplomatic, military, and economic, humanitarian support instruments
that we have in the foreign policy...
SENATOR KERREY: Let me take an entire continent. Africa, at
the moment, where it's hard to pick up a newspaper and read a
report of some country in Africa and not pull the word, as General
Hughes has done in his testimony, "chaos." That we're
apt to see chaotic situations where our military will have no
impact at all. I mean the kind of investments that we make, the
kind of training that we do and so forth in our military is not
apt to have much of an impact upon events in Africa, though you
could describe a scenario where we may have to deploy as a consequence
of that chaos, as we have done in Bosnia. In other words, the
strength of our military in Yugoslavia had no impact upon the
deterioration of Yugoslavia. It deteriorated independent of our
military capability. Our military capability was required and
we had to deploy our military capability, and I believe wisely
so, inside the NATO deployment as a consequence of the deterioration
of the nation state.
DR. DEUTCH: Absolutely.
SENATOR KERREY: And it is fair to say that, as I listen to the
debate about what happened in Yugoslavia, many are of the opinion
that there might have been something that we could have done had
we been wiser, more prophetic, in anticipating the events, let's
say, of 1989, '90, '91, in that era. I mean, there's some suggestion
that perhaps diplomatic efforts might have headed that off.
I'm not asking for a response, I'm just saying... Let me tie
it back to Congress. We're going to turn over in the United States
Senate 14 members, there will be 14 new members under the minimal
circumstances; there may be more new members entirely. And we're
aware that statements that we make can have an impact upon what's
going on in the rest of the world.
So it occurs to me that one of the things that we need to be
thinking about as a country is preparing ourselves to take stronger
diplomatic roles than we have in the past. Is that a fair...
DR. DEUTCH: Absolutely, sir. I cannot tell you how important
it is from our perspective to have strong and effective and certain
American foreign policy leadership in all these areas that I mentioned
in the beginning of my testimony -- in India, in China, everywhere.
SENATOR KERREY: Let me see if I can take another cut at this,
Director Deutch. What I'm saying in general terms is that throughout
most of the Cold War, we depended upon our military to protect
us. We had diplomats who were engaged in efforts, and we had
intelligence efforts that were contributing to the military's
capability, but we had this balance of power between ourselves
and the Soviet Union, between the Western world and the Soviet
Union, between NATO and the Soviet forces. It seems to me that
in the post-Cold War era that we're not going to be able to depend
as much on the military. I mean after we've made a decision what
the threats are and what kind of military capability is necessary
to meet those threats -- and they're still considerable -- I'm
not suggesting that they're not considerable, I'm just saying
that increasingly, it's going to fall not just to the people's
representatives, but the people of this country themselves to
understand what's going on out there in the world, in order to
be able to figure out in some, hopefully coherent fashion, what
we need to do to make the world safer.
DR. DEUTCH: Well Senator, I believe that I'm in agreement with
you. I would say that the foreign policy of the United States
is going to be successful, largely because of our diplomatic efforts.
We are in a massively fortunate time in our history where our
military is strong and our military is able to protect our interests
against all the adversaries that we can see for the future. And
I don't think it's a choice of either/or. But I do agree with
you that at the present time the diplomatic efforts, the diplomatic
strength is what is tremendously important in avoiding some of
these deteriorating conflict situations that you point to.
SENATOR KERREY: Briefly stated, it seems to me that one of the
things that would alarm me, were I in your shoes, would be a willingness
on the part of the people still to presume that somehow the military
is going to bail us out of all of these problems, as opposed to
investments in the United Nations, as opposed to investments in
State Department efforts, as opposed to investments in the people's
understanding of what's going on in the world.
If we elect, let's say 14 new members of the United States Senate
who don't understand what our policy has been with China since
1949, it's possible for us -- particularly since the Shanghai
Accords of 1972 -- it's possible for the United States Senate,
for example, to make some rather stupid moves. In fact it may
be possible for us even without 14 new members to make rather
stupid moves.
DR. DEUTCH: Of course I could not agree with that comment, Senator.
(Laughter)
SENATOR KERREY: It may seem to some in humorous moments that
we members of the Senate have arrived here from outer space, but
we've not. We've arrived here from the country. We can only
be as good as the country itself. And one of the concerns that
I guess I would have, in a world that's becoming increasingly
chaotic, in a world where power is being diffused away from central
governments, in a world where there is a possibility of asymmetric
attacks upon our interests using weapons of mass destruction or
using some other terrorist effort, that if we don't understand
and if we aren't making a full scale effort to not only educate
and prepare our citizens -- whether they're serving us here or
whether they're serving merely in the capacity of trying to decide
which presidential candidate to select it seems to me that the
United States could arrive at a point where once again we've got
to send our soldiers to do something that we should have been
able to prevent in the first place.
I'm not suggesting that we could have been able to prevent Bosnia
or the deterioration of that particular nation state, but I am
suggesting that it's not coincidental that U.S. forces have been
sent since Desert Storm every single time to take action as a
consequence of deterioration of a nation state. And of all the
things that alarm me, our own citizen capacity to be able to answer
questions about what's going on in the world is perhaps the most
alarming of all.
Let me ask you, Director Deutch, what your confidence level is
of being able to identify nuclear programs and to, in a preventive
fashion, be able to tell whether or not someone has the capacity
to develop and use nuclear weapons.
DR. DEUTCH: That's, of course, a very central concern that we
have. I would say that we are more confident on nuclear programs
than we are on chemical or biological programs, because it's easier
to start those kinds of weapons of mass destruction programs with
dual-use technology. Nuclear programs have the unique signature
of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, which makes it somewhat
easier to track them and identify them.
The experience of Iraq before Desert Shield, when we found that
there was a tremendous and huge program which had not been known
really and internalized by the intelligence community, gives us
some humility in this. But we have redoubled our efforts, and
I would say that I am relatively confident but not secure that
we can track nuclear weapons programs throughout the world. I
would be much less confident with chemical or biological programs.
SENATOR KERREY: So you would state that you feel confident today
that you can detect a nuclear missile program prior to its use
in a military situation.
DR. DEUTCH: You said nuclear missile. Now those are two different
things. A nuclear weapons program I'd say I'm reasonably confident,
and a nuclear missile -- a missile program -- I would say there
I'm also reasonably confident. Reasonably confident.
SENATOR KERREY: Thank you.
SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you, Senator Kerrey.
Senator Robb?
SENATOR ROBB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Deutch, I don't want to beat a dead horse here, but I'm concerned
about the colloquy between yourself and the Chairman with respect
to his first question, and it may be that there is some confusion
that we should clear up here in open session, because I think
the failure to do so leaves an ambiguity that may place journalists
and others at unnecessary risk.
Is there a distinction to be made between interrogating a journalist who may happen to have come into the possession of information that might be useful, as you would interrogate any other potential source of intelligence information, and a determination before any intelligence is gathered, to place someone who is either in the employment of the federal government as an agent of the government or with non-official cover, whatever the case may be? It seems to me that's the distinction that would, at least to me, be very troubling if it's not one that you can make a fairly clean break.
If I may preface it, certainly if we can say so that journalists
and others who are working in an objective, non-aligned capacity
would not be subjected to unnecessary suspicion and perhaps other
tactics that would make their job more difficult, that we are
not putting anyone in the field with that cover, but might take
the opportunity to inquire from journalists and anyone else about
information that might be relevant to the whole intelligence-gathering
process. Is that a fair distinction, or am I off base?
DR. DEUTCH: I think the distinction is a good distinction.
But I think that what is at issue here has to do with the policy
of either using an individual U.S. journalist as a witting agent,
or having a U.S. intelligence asset use U.S. journalistic cover.
Those are the two points that are at issue, sir, the latter two
points.
SENATOR ROBB: Well I think this is a matter that we as a committee
want to address in greater detail, and I don't think this is the
appropriate place to do it. I understand...
DR. DEUTCH: Senator, again, I want to come back and say I'm
pleased to hear your concern and the committee's concern on this
issue. I want to say again that I am not interested in advocating
broad areas here. I think that the journalists have a tremendously
important and effective argument and one of substance and merit.
My problem is that my responsibility is also to imagine those
rare cases where our interests or our people may be at risk, their
lives may be at risk. So I have to continue to say that I favor
continuing our current, publicly-known policy since 1977 on this
matter, and I think that upon reflection, many Americans would
agree with that exception. Properly drawn and narrowly drawn,
sir.
SENATOR ROBB: Again I don't believe there's anything more that
I could inquire about in open session that would be useful, but
I do think that the distinction is one that ought to be examined,
and we can do so at a later time.
DR. DEUTCH: Yes, sir.
SENATOR ROBB: Let me shift. You gave us quite a smorgasbord
of areas in the world where intelligence-gathering is of critical
importance to policymakers here in this country. I happen to
have just returned from a very brief visit to the Middle East
in pursuit of additional information about the peace process.
The very small group, including another member of this committee,
Senator Inhofe, and I had occasion to get briefings from some
of the official U.S. personnel in the intelligence community,
and for that I am grateful.
Another U.S. national made a more recent trip to that region,
and his visits were not confined to the current participants in
the peace process, if you will. Minister Farrakhan has, at least
according to news media, visited several of the heads of state
and others in that particular region.
The only question I would ask you at this point is how you believe
the various countries that were visited interpreted that particular
visit.
DR. DEUTCH: Senator Robb, I have no comment on that. I don't
think it's appropriate for me to comment on the travels of an
American citizen abroad. I don't have any comment, and I have
not really reflected on it either, sir.
SENATOR ROBB: All right, I'll pursue that in a different forum
then.
Let me ask you a question about China. You described very briefly
the concerns in that area, and there are many, and the relationships
with the reversion of Hong Kong, with the missile technology,
with the control of -- with the export of various items that are
certainly destabilizing, in the very least, some more assertive
actions in and around the Spratleys, South China Sea, etc., and
certainly the relationship with Taiwan at this point.
I wonder if you could characterize your view or the intelligence
community's view of the understanding on the part of the current
leadership in China with respect to miscalculation about intentions
of either the United States or any of the other regional participants.
Do you think their understanding of what would fall within the
scope of permitted self interests in terms of security and other
matters is sufficient to give us some assurance that an irrational
decision would not be made with respect to any particular activity
that might take place in the arena?
DR. DEUTCH: Senator, my own view is that the current Chinese
leadership is almost completely preoccupied with two questions.
The first is the leadership transition which is taking place
after Deng Xiaoping; and the second is how to maintain political
control of that enormous country during a time of economic opening,
maintain still very strict and tight political control. All their
actions, I believe, have to be interpreted with respect to those,
through those two vantage points. So when we talk about the Spratleys
and we talk about Taiwan, we should assess them, first of all,
not in terms of bilateral from the Chinese perspective, U.S.-Chinese
relations, but rather with respect to how the Chinese interpret
these things from the point of view of their internal political
dynamic. Therefore, I would say to you that we do not have an
adequate common understanding with the Chinese on these matters.
Because I'm approaching it from a different point of view, I
do not believe that we have an adequate common understanding of
these issues that are dividing us.
SENATOR ROBB: But is it fair to say that you believe that the
struggle that you just indicated in terms of the top two preoccupations
of China at the moment would reasonably foreclose any miscalculation
that would create difficulties beyond those two particular problems
that they're attempting to deal with?
DR. DEUTCH: Not at all, sir, and let me give you a particular
example.
We do anticipate having exercises in the Taiwan Straits across
from Taiwan by the Chinese before the upcoming election. A miscalculation
or an accident, unintended, could lead to some very, very serious
hostilities there. It's a particular example of where a miscalculation
could lead to a very serious consequence.
SENATOR ROBB: Let me move just east of that area, generally
speaking, to North Korea. Recently a decision was made to provide
$2 million worth of emergency supplies in terms of the famine
and floods and whatever have been declared by the leadership,
in a somewhat unusual expression to the outside world that some
assistance was needed. There have been a number of mixed signals.
Based on the economic intelligence that we have, how would you
characterize the situation with respect to the severity of the
drought, potential famine, flood damage, etc. in North Korea and
their ability to respond to that need internally?
DR. DEUTCH: The answer there is quite clear. We think that
the economic conditions are worsening and worsening quite dramatically,
and that they have very little capability to reverse the consequences
of that in terms of starvation and further deprivation of their
people.
SENATOR ROBB: With respect to the response that they gave initially
to offers of help from the South -- the South Koreans and other
regional entities -- would you characterize the basis upon which
that less than positive response was made?
DR. DEUTCH: It's very difficult for me to do so because we do
not have, and I do not have, a satisfactory understanding of what
is governing the North Korean leadership's thinking process during
this time of tremendous economic hardship. So I cannot give you
what I would consider a confident answer to what is dominating
their replies -- their response to some of these offers of assistance.
I just don't have, we do not have a good enough understanding
of the inner workings of North Korea to give you a confident answer
to that.
You mentioned the leadership. Would you care to address the
reason for not vesting two of the three titles held by his father,
in Kim Jung Il?
DR. DEUTCH: I don't. I personally do not believe that there
is tremendous significance to that. The tensions that we see,
or the indications that we see, are that he is compiling power
in his own hands there similar to what his father had. Especially
with the military.
SENATOR ROBB: Would it be reasonable to assume that the second
anniversary of his father's death might be an appropriate time
to vest those particular...
DR. DEUTCH: We'll have to watch, sir. I can't. I don't have
any information on that.
SENATOR ROBB: My time is up, Director Deutch, and I thank you.
DR. DEUTCH: Thank you, Senator.
SENATOR ROBB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you very much, Senator Robb.
Director Deutch, I know you are well aware of the fact that if
any of the questions go beyond what you feel comfortable with,
we can reserve them for a closed session, but I think it appropriate
to comment for the record that we're aware on this side of the
podium of that limitation.
I now want to take up with you questions of the national reconnaissance,
the NRO, and the concerns about the NRO having so much more money
available than this committee and the Congress generally understood
them to have.
This ties into the overall issue as to how much secrecy is necessary
for the U.S. intelligence community. Not too long ago the Senate
passed, by a slim margin, an amendment to make public the total
figure of the intelligence community. That was changed in a conference
report. I believe that you have testified, or perhaps let me
just ask you, what is your view about the propriety of making
public the bottom line figure of what the appropriations are for
the U.S. intelligence community?
DR. DEUTCH: Mr. Chairman, I am well aware of this debate, and
it's happened in the past. I am looking forward to the recommendation
of Harold Brown's panel on this question. I think a group of
outside Americans of great probity, including some members of
Congress, have served on that commission, and my intent would
be to allow my thinking to be influenced on what their recommendation
is on this point. I believe that they will be making a recommendation,
and I'm inclined to go with it. We should know what their recommendation
is here on March 1st when their report is made public.
So if I could, sir, I would say to you that that is going to
heavily influence my position.
SENATOR SPECTER: You have some thinking on the subject at the
moment don't you, Dr. Deutch?
DR. DEUTCH: I have testified on the subject. I think the way
I've testified on the subject is that I do not believe there is
any great loss by making the top line of the Defense Department's
budget public, but there has been some heated questioning from
members of your committee about the ability to hold the line there
and not have additional information on sub-categories of the budget
also made public, and at that point, I think one would run very
serious risks of revealing sources and methods which would not
be helpful for the country's national interests. So the top line,
yes; below that, no. The overall budget...
SENATOR SPECTER: The overall budget for the U.S. intelligence
community?
DR. DEUTCH: Yes, sir. Yes. And then going below that, no,
has been what I've testified to in the past, and I've received
very heated questions from members of this committee about whether
that's plausible that one could maintain such a position, but
I would leave that to Congress' judgment.
SENATOR SPECTER: Why do you say that a disclosure of figures
for the national intelligence community would be involved in sources
and methods? We have a very serious issue with the NRO, and it
is illustrative with the problem of secrecy. If there is a reason
for secrecy, then we ought to observe it; but I believe we're
going to have to do more than simply generalize on sources and
methods. But perhaps the best way to approach this subject within
the confines of our time restrictions today is to talk about the
NRO.
Is there any reason why the public should not know how much the
National Reconnaissance Organization had in its account that was
excessive?
DR. DEUTCH: Mr. Chairman, first of all, I could not agree with
you more that secrecy is not -- cannot -- be used as a cover for
poor management and for poor financial management, in particular.
But there is a very good reason why the National Reconnaissance
Office budget has been maintained secret from year to year, and
that is by tracking that budget over time, it would be possible,
depending upon what level of detail, but even in the top line,
the number of national reconnaissance satellites that are launched.
That is not a subject which I think should be publicly-known
-- the number or types of satellites that are launched.
So I want to absolutely associate myself with you and with the
members of this committee, the minority member especially, that
financial -- lack of financial quality management is not permissible
because a program is secret. But I also believe that going below
the top line will begin to, getting finer and finer in detail,
give information about the kinds of intelligence efforts that
we have underway that will not benefit our national security.
SENATOR SPECTER: That's a marvelous answer, Dr. Deutch, fit
for the Manchester debates in New Hampshire or the ones coming
up in Arizona, but I don't think you've come near my question.
My question is, is there any reason to conceal the excessive
amounts the NRO had. Now I'm not talking to you about mismanagement...
DR. DEUTCH: The excessive amounts...
SENATOR SPECTER: Excuse me, excuse me. I'm not talking to you
about mismanagement, and I'm not talking to you about their overall
budget which might give some insights into the numbers of satellites
launched, which I want to pursue with you because I don't see
a necessary connection. Let me candidly state to you that too
often when we get into these discussions we come up with sources
and methods and we come up with items about satellites launched,
and we come up with generalized national security issues. But
we have seen in a free society when the facts and figures are
on the table, there are many people who take a look at it. It's
available under the Freedom of Information Act so that citizens
can take a look at it; it's available for investigative reporting;
it's more available for congressional inquiry. There's simply
not enough inspectors general or members of oversight committees
or directors, even as competent as directors are, to take a look
at all of this.
Now coming back to my question, how they had excessive funds,
the NRO did. Is there any reason why the American people should
not know the figure of the excessive funds? There's been a lot
in the newspapers. Any reason why we shouldn't tell the American
people how much excessive funds the NRO had?
DR. DEUTCH: The reason that one should not do that, Mr. Chairman,
is that by itself -- by itself -- that single figure does not
place in perspective what the size of the program is and how that
program is financed and how that event occurred, as inappropriate
as it was.
SENATOR SPECTER: But you're saying that...
DR. DEUTCH: So, the American people will not have the correct
impression of the National Reconnaissance Office from only revealing
that single figure. That figure has to be seen in context to
understand how it happened, where the money built up, what has
been done about it, because it has been -- by the Department of
Defense and my myself -- put back and given back to Congress when
it was not needed and placed back in a program where it was needed.
And to give you more...
SENATOR SPECTER: Director Deutch, I don't want to interrupt
you unduly, but we're not getting to the point.
DR. DEUTCH: Yes, sir.
SENATOR SPECTER: We're not on the point about what you've done
or what the Department of Defense has done. I'm on the point
as to why the American people shouldn't know what the excessive
amount was.
Now you've said the total budget of the NRO ought not to be known
because it might have some indication as to the number of satellites
set off. I don't know why that is and we'll come back to it.
But then I say how about the number in itself and you say well,
we shouldn't disclose that because without knowing what the overall
budget of the NRO was, we shouldn't say what the excess was.
I don't understand that answer at all.
But suppose it were a trillion dollars. Suppose it is so excessive,
which I believe it to be, and has independent standing all by
itself. I haven't asked you yet what the figures is, and I haven't
decided whether I'm going to ask you what the figure is...
DR. DEUTCH: I'm thinking.
SENATOR SPECTER: ...because I want to hear for the record what
your reasons are that the total figure ought not to be announced.
Now if you say you shouldn't announce it because you can't --
it doesn't have any understanding in the absence of knowing what
their budget is, and then you can't tell us the budget because
of the perhaps disclosures of satellite launchings, what you're
saying is you can't say anything.
DR. DEUTCH: Mr. Chairman, I will be very candid with you. I
think you can't tell a story with one sentence. You can't just
say that...
SENATOR SPECTER: We haven't asked you to do that.
DR. DEUTCH: My point is, Mr. Chairman, that that number by itself
will provide a misleading impression to the American people.
Your judgment has to be do you want to tell them everything about
the National Reconnaissance Office, not just one isolated fact,
I must say, a fact which is very damaging and not something that
I condone. But the question is do you give a full impression
or one number? I would argue to you you have to make the decision
to give them a full story, but one number alone is misleading.
That's my position...
SENATOR SPECTER: What's the damage to national security if someone
knows how many satellites have been launched?
(Pause)
DR. DEUTCH: I think that there is an answer that I would want
to give in a classified setting. But let me tell you, that knowledge
of where satellites are and how many there are allow people to
take actions to deny or deceive those satellite operations. So
there's great merit to not having people know the nature of the
satellites, where they are, or how many there are. Because...
SENATOR SPECTER: The nature and where they are are totally different
from how many there are.
DR. DEUTCH: No, but the point is, all three variables are important.
SENATOR SPECTER: The budget doesn't necessarily tell you where
they are. It tells you... How does it even tell you how many
there are?
DR. DEUTCH: Estimates can be made, and it is the variations
in the budget that will tell you about launch rates and the like.
Again, it depends on how much you know.
SENATOR SPECTER: How likely is it that somebody is going to
figure it out, and how likely is it that that's going to harm
national security, compared to a live example of the NRO having
flagrantly excessive amounts of money which have been accumulated
because of our rules on secrecy?
Dr. Deutch, my red light is on and I'm going to stop, but I think that you and the intelligence community and this committee have got to do a much better job in coming to grips with the hard reasons for this security, if they exist. And if they exist, I'm prepared to help you defend them. But I don't see that they exist. I don't think they have been articulated or explained. And as you know in this hearing there was a suggestion that we ought to have the NRO people in here because the consequences of having the NRO secrete a tremendous sum of money are minimal.
Has there been any shakeup in the leadership of the NRO so far?
DR. DEUTCH: No.
SENATOR SPECTER: What has happened... Well, I'll get into this
in the next round as to what has happened in the NRO. But one
of the therapeutic qualities of the hearing process is for oversight
hearings to come in, bring people in, and say what happened, and
why did it happen, and explain about it on C-SPAN. Then other
people who might have similar inclinations might want to avoid
explaining about it on C-SPAN. And when the light shines in,
it's the best therapy of all about having it avoided. I personally
am very dissatisfied with what little the public knows about the
NRO. I even wonder how much I know about the NRO. I won't go
so far as to say I wonder how much you know about the NRO, but
I would go so far as to say that we found out the NRO didn't know
very much about the NRO.
DR. DEUTCH: I should tell you, sir, that I am very concerned
about what I knew about the NRO, because I would have expected
to have been told more -- either as Deputy Secretary of Defense
or as Director of Central Intelligence. I think...
SENATOR SPECTER: Did the NRO itself even know how much money
it had squirreled away?
DR. DEUTCH: Well, they certainly knew the size of these accounts.
They certainly did, as was reported to Congress on every occasion.
They reported to Congress. The problem was that they did not
propose actions consistent with these large balances.
Let's remember, these balances were reported every year to Congress.
The issue was did they draw significance when they were asking
for new appropriation to the existence of these large balances,
these excessive balances.
SENATOR SPECTER: How about to the DCI? They were reported to
the DCI too, weren't they?
DR. DEUTCH: They absolutely were, and they should have been
reported to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. They were not.
Or they were not...
SENATOR SPECTER: They weren't reported to...
DR. DEUTCH: Sorry, let me put it differently. We certainly
did not see them. We did not act on it.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, they had good reason not to report them
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Senator Kerrey, your turn.
SENATOR KERREY: Dr. Deutch, actually I've been interested in
getting to the couple of witnesses that are going to follow you.
I would concur in much of what the Chairman has just said. I
do, myself, believe not only the top line but several of the other
lines of the budget not only could but should, for the purpose
of giving taxpayer citizens confidence that their money's being
well spent. Indeed, I've spoken with you and I've spoken to the
citizens at home about the remarkable success of the Corona project.
Now that we know what Corona has done, it's easy for us to see
the connection between those early electrical-optical efforts
and the policymakers' ability to be able, for example, to conclude
that preemptory nuclear attacks were unnecessary, that the Soviet
nuclear program is smaller than what we had initially thought.
In other words, that there is a connection between the intelligence
and our efforts, and that very often those connections aren't
seen as a consequence of the secrecy that unquestionably is needed
in many cases.
But I do think, and particularly in the post-Cold War era, that
increasingly we're going to have to justify these expenditures
to taxpayers. And I think it's getting harder and harder to do
it. The stories about the NRO have largely used phrases such
as "slush fund" and "money wasted" and so
forth. We know that money wasn't spent. We know that in fact
repeatedly, over the past couple of years, there have been public
disclosures of instances where the efforts of the NRO, whether
it's the identification of the North Korean nuclear program or
the identification of Saddam Hussein's violation of the sanctions
-- violation of the Security Council's agreement, or providing
our diplomats with the information they needed to get a good agreement
at Dayton, that time and time again, or for that matter, whether
it's providing you with the information that you need and that
others need to come to us and say, in an open session, here's
what we think the threats are.
So I think that the look at this Corona project in an open way
has, at least for me, enabled me to do a better job of going home
and saying okay, this is open now. Look at what it did for the
period of time in the 1960s and '70s when it was operating, look
what it did for your safety and your security, look at the lives
that it saved, look at the dollars that it saved, and so forth.
You can show it in an open fashion and it gives people confidence.
Whereas in an environment of excessive secrecy, and I just think
it's very difficult to make the case, and you're not making the
case that the overall budget should be withheld from the American
people, I think it's increasingly difficult to withhold other
lines.
If we have a case to make that sources and methods need to be
protected, I'm 100 percent with you. Let's protect sources and
methods. Let's not reveal something that's going to make it counterproductive
and difficult for us to carry out the missions of your agencies
or other intelligence agencies.
Mr. Deutch, I don't want you to respond to it right now, because
I do want to get to the other witnesses, and I know you would
like to leave as well. But I am very much concerned about your
views, and I've gotten them privately and would like to get them
on the record prior to the recommendations of the Brown Commission
as to what additional powers you think you need.
I do think that President Clinton has provided the nation with
an historic opportunity, given your relationship with the Secretary
of Defense, given your understanding and knowledge of the technology,
I think the President has given the country an historic opportunity
to change our laws so that in the future, given that we are a
nation of laws not of people, not of personalities, that if we
change our laws today, that we might be able to provide future
DCIs with the kind of authority and power that they need in order
to be able to do the sorts of things that you're identifying need
to be done in your testimony.
DR. DEUTCH: Senator Kerrey, I look forward to that discussion
with you and other members of the committee. I'd like to say
something to you and to Senator Specter.
I am perfectly happy to enter into a discussion about how much
of these activities should become declassified, these financial
programs. That is an absolutely legitimate question for you to
pose. As usual, Mr. Chairman, and Senator, you make your case
on this very well, and I will be happy to discuss that with you.
Perhaps we should move more in that direction, and I look forward
to continuing discussions on this point of how much of the program
should become unclassified.
I also appreciate, Senator, your remarks about the NRO. They
have done tremendous things for the country. The only thing you
left off your list is they also have shown ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia from their efforts from satellite photography. So it's
a great organization, but I look forward to discussing with you
and the Chairman how far one should go here. I take your point,
Mr. Chairman and Senator.
SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Robb?
SENATOR ROBB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, will be brief
because I'm looking forward to hearing the other witnesses, and
I do thank you.
Just a couple of items that I think are appropriate for discussion
in open forum. We talked a little bit about the situation in
China. I don't believe we've made specific reference to the relationship,
between Russia and China at this point, the warming of that relationship
and what that portends. Could you comment briefly on where you
believe that is headed and what implications it may have for U.S.
policymakers?
DR. DEUTCH: Well, I will just mention two. I think you're correct
to note a warming of political relationships. There is also an
increase in trade, military armament supplies from Russia to China,
and I think that is probably the most significant aspect of the
warming of those relations. I don't see them taking place in
the near term or for the foreseeable future in a way that would
really lead to a strategic realignment, but they are providing
the Chinese with advanced conventional weapons such as modern
fighter aircraft that they couldn't have access to elsewhere.
SENATOR ROBB: Let me ask you one other question, speaking about
the analysis of Russia. It reminds me there was a fair amount
of criticism of the intelligence community's economic analysis
generally speaking, but specifically pertaining to the former
Soviet Union. One of our colleagues not on the intelligence panel
has had more than a little to say about the accuracy and usefulness
of some of the economic intelligence activities, and certainly
the analytical portion.
Is it your sense at this point that the community has the kinds
of resource-gathering agents, entities, at its disposal to give
a fairly accurate economic analysis of virtually any of the areas
or countries or regions in the world, or do we need to think about
some other means of obtaining some of that information, much of
it, obviously, available in a public forum on a regular basis?
DR. DEUTCH: Well, our analytic capability and economic analysis
of nations is completely dependent on how open they are and how
well they conform to international standards of statistics production.
Little of it, but sometimes important parts of it, are influenced
by clandestine intelligence-collecting. So our efforts to, for
example, monitor economic change in Russia is much improved by
the fact that they're a more open society. But there are countries
in the world where we still have very important absence of information
which we would need to make the kinds of economic assessments
that we would...
SENATOR ROBB: Could it be summarized as "trust but verify,"
a term that is familiar from that recent past period?
DR. DEUTCH: Yes, I think that's an interesting way of putting
it. The more that it's in the public, the better off we are in
our estimates. Occasionally we have some clandestine information
in particular circumstances which are important. But trust plus
verify is a good way of putting it, Senator.
SENATOR ROBB: One last little matter, it's not a little matter,
but one specific item, that with respect to the presence and strength
of the Iranian Republican Guard in Bosnia, there have been newspaper
reports on that topic. What can you tell us in open forum about
that situation and how it is progressing, given the fact that
under the terms of the Dayton Agreement they were all supposed
to be out mid January.
DR. DEUTCH: Senator, that's exactly right. Under the terms
of the Dayton Accord, the Bosnian government had the responsibility
for getting rid of the Iranian Republican Guards which are there
in Bosnia. We continue, I continue to be absolutely concerned
about this matter. Not a day goes by that I don't discuss the
progress that is being made with at least the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of State. So I consider this still a very,
very important matter with respect to the safety of our troops
and the IFOR troops in Bosnia.
SENATOR ROBB: How confident are you of our ability to monitor
that situation accurately?
DR. DEUTCH: I'd rather take a pass on that, sir.
SENATOR ROBB: I understand and I think I won't pursue any other
questions at this time.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you very much, Senator Robb.
Director Deutch, turning to the War Crimes Tribunal in the Netherlands,
at the outset on this subject, I thank you for your cooperation.
Senator Shelby, who is the presumptive Chairman next year, if
we have a Republican Majority, and I had occasion to travel together
recently, and the final stop on our trip was in the Netherlands
at the Hague to talk to the prosecutors on the War Crimes Tribunal.
There is the potential, I think, for an enormous achievement
in establishing a War Crimes Tribunal as a prelude to having an
international criminal court, which institutionally could be the
event of the century, if we're able to carry it through. A good
bit of the success is going to depend upon the ability of the
U.S. intelligence community to provide key evidence, which may
be usable against some very key people.
I wrote to you on January 18th after we had had a chance to talk
on January 5th, which was just a day after the day I got back,
having had a meeting just the day before, on January 4th. And
it is a very touchy situation internationally, because to carry
out the Dayton Accords there has to be cooperation from Serbia
and there has to be cooperation from the Bosnian Serbs, and there's
a very unusual situation where the President of the Bosnian Serbs,
Radovan Karadzic, is under indictment, as is the military leader
of the Bosnian Serbs, Ratko Mladic. The current arrangement is
a curious one where the Dayton Agreement provides that the NATO
forces will not seek out these individuals under indictment, but
if the NATO forces come upon them, they will be taken into custody
and turned over to the War Crimes Tribunal.
Recently there was an international incident where two men were
turned over to the War Crimes Tribunal not under indictment, with
the conclusion being that if the War Crimes Tribunal had them
under indictment they could be turned over. That, of course,
has an enormous potential impact on the cooperation of the Bosnian
Serbs and Serbia generally.
My question to you, before getting into the intelligence aspect,
is a broader one, and that is, what is our overall capability
to gather intelligence in support of indictments already issued
against these two top Bosnian Serbian leaders? So there's already
sufficient evidence for an indictment, but the prosecution team
there wants to have what they call a Rule 61 hearing for the international
criminal court, and that takes more evidence.
Could you comment on that issue?
DR. DEUTCH: First, Mr. Chairman, as I've mentioned to you and
it's certainly the policy of our government, the assistance that
we can provide to the War Crimes Tribunal from intelligence is
going to be given. That is something that I've stressed and I
think is very important for the same reasons that you do.
I do not believe that it is likely that we would find, and we
have looked, or could collect material which would be compelling
in a legal proceeding. That is not the kind of information that
we would normally be able to get. Were we to come across it,
we would provide it.
SENATOR SPECTER: It would be corroborative evidence when you
talk about the grave sites far removed from the battle lines,
so that there's no question about those deaths having been inflicted
in combat.
DR. DEUTCH: We are perfectly in a position to provide that information
and we, as far as I know, and I've spoken to Justice Goldstone
just a couple of weeks ago, I think that this is not only being
provided in a way that they find useful for their investigatory
efforts, but also we have a process in place which would allow
them to use that information in a legal proceeding in a way that
is appropriate for them. So I think this is on track. If we've
had information about Karadzic or Mladic or we had corroborative
information and they requested it, or we thought it would be useful,
we would hand it over to them.
SENATOR SPECTER: I thank you for your statements, and I think
it is very important that the international community, including
the parties to the Dayton Agreement, understand the determination
of the United States in pursuing these prosecutions with the War
Crimes Tribunal so that justice will be done against these atrocities
and the acts of genocide.
President Clinton called me before the vote on the resolutions
on Bosnia to talk about Senate support, and I had occasion to
talk to him about the War Crimes Tribunal, and he is four square
behind them from what he said to me privately, and what he has
also said publicly. I believe that the likelihood for congressional
support for what is going on today will be enhanced by vigorous
prosecution of these cases. It is my hope that some members of
the intelligence committee will have an opportunity to visit Bosnia.
There's an effort to limit the number of trips there so as not
to interfere with the military operations, but this committee
has already been active in supporting the prosecutions, and we
intend to pursue it and we appreciate your cooperation.
Let me move quickly to a number of other subjects, because there
is so much to talk about and so limited an amount of time. I
want to pick up the question of China, our intelligence-gathering
facilities, the issue as to what's happening with China and Taiwan.
Last summer the People's Republic of China test-fired short-range
ballistic missiles near Taiwan, and last fall it conducted military
exercises which had every indication of being directed to intimidate
Taiwan right before their parliamentary elections.
We have the issue of China's having agreed to abide by the provisions
of the missile technology control regime, yet last year Secretary
of State Christopher commented publicly about a large body of
evidence that China had sold M-11 missiles to Pakistan. Now there
are reports of China selling missiles to Iran and transferring
nuclear weapon technology to Pakistan.
Picking up on the Taiwan question first, I believe it is very
important that the People's Republic of China not misunderstand
U.S. resolve that Taiwan not be militarily attacked or intimidated.
What is your assessment, to the extent you can disclose it publicly,
about the intentions of the People's Republic of China with respect
to their belligerent activities toward Taiwan?
DR. DEUTCH: Mr. Chairman, there's been a military buildup in
the area. We follow it and monitor it extremely closely. I am
not only concerned about Chinese intentions against Taiwan or
some of the smaller Taiwanese-held islands in the area, but I'm
also very concerned that in their process of carrying out exercises
in the area before the Taiwanese election, that by accident or
miscalculation an event occurs that could bring hostilities.
So I would just say to you this is a matter which the community
is following on an interagency basis, extremely closely on a minute-by-minute
basis.
SENATOR SPECTER: Because of the sensitivity of that subject
I will not pursue it further, but I think it's important to have
that public statement about U.S. concern and about U.S. following
it very, very, very closely.
Then you have the proliferation issue. What is happening there,
again, Director Deutch, to the extent that you can publicly say?
Because if the reports are accurate, it seems to me that we ought
to be taking very stiff sanctions against China. It's a tough
issue, given their psychology and the nuances of international
relations, but if we don't show them we mean business about the
laws on sanctions which the Congress has enacted, then it's open
season on the proliferation of nuclear technology. What do you
think?
DR. DEUTCH: Mr. Chairman, the intelligence community continues
to get accurate and timely information on Chinese activities that
involve inappropriate weapons and military technology assistance
to other countries--nuclear technology to Pakistan, M-11 missiles
to Pakistan, cruise missiles to Iran. Our job is to obtain this
information and provide it to our policymakers in this country
to make a determination on what policy actions should be taken.
I would say that the community is doing its duty here and doing
it well and clearly.
SENATOR SPECTER: Director Deutch, I turn now to some reports
we've had about espionage by foreign governments which are inspired
by ethnic considerations and by relying on ethnic groups in the
United States.
By letter dated January 31st of this year, Senator Kerrey and
I wrote to Defense Secretary Perry calling his attention to a
DOD memorandum which states, quote: "The strong ethnic ties
to Israel present in the United States, coupled with aggressive
and extremely competent intelligence personnel, has resulted in
a very productive collection effort."
The memo goes on to say, quote: "Many of our military friends
are our economic industrial threat. Some of these countries we
deal with on a day to day basis" and then parenthesis, referencing
France, Italy, Israel, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, etc.
There are six incidents cited in the memorandum related to Israel,
which strongly suggest that it is more than a casual memorandum,
although the Department of Defense issued a generalized disclaimer
saying that it was the view of somebody fairly far down the line...
No incidents specified as to France, Italy, Japan, Germany, the
United Kingdom or any other country.
My question to you is... Well, I'd like your comments about
the situation generally. We're still awaiting an answer from
the Secretary of Defense. I would have thought that on a matter
of this urgency we'd have one within three weeks, but since we
don't, I'd like your comments on it.
DR. DEUTCH: First, I want to say, Senator, that this memorandum
did not come from any part of the intelligence community. It
came from another organization in the Department of Defense, I
believe industrial security, if I have the correct reference in
mind.
SENATOR SPECTER: Were you the Deputy Secretary of Defense at
the time the memorandum was issued? I ask that only because of
your disclaimer.
DR. DEUTCH: No. Probably. (Laughter) Probably.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well let's not focus too heavily on lines of
command.
DR. DEUTCH: But it is a terrible document, simply put. It is
a terrible document because it makes assumptions about how individual
Americans might act, which I think is inappropriate. I think
that the response you will get from the Department of Defense
will be of the same nature.
It is also true that we do have a counterintelligence responsibility
to monitor what other countries actually do in this country to
try and inappropriately penetrate our national security effort,
facilities or our national security operations, and we do take
that very seriously. But the kind of counterintelligence assessment
that we would give you is of a quite different nature than is
contained in this memorandum.
SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Kerrey and Senator Robb are anxious
to question others. I wonder if I might ask just two more questions,
and let the Director go, or do you want to proceed now by...
SENATOR KERREY: Well, Mr. Chairman, one of the things... I
appreciate Director Deutch, your wanting to lead off and take
responsibility, as you always do, but what I find, particularly
in reading General Hughes' testimony, is some very provocative
suggestions that I think are important. Now maybe General Hughes
is wrong. It would be the first time that he's wrong. But he's
done exactly what I was hoping would occur on repeated opportunities
to get an assessment of threats, which is to sort of say, okay,
this is the way we've done it in the past, but the world's changing
on us, and if we're trying to not just figure out what are the
threats today and discuss current events, but what are the threats
going to be 10 to 20 years from now, which is what we're going
to be facing with the kinds of investments we're making today,
we're basically building tomorrow's technology today and developing
tomorrow's people today. That's been said enough times and it
doesn't need to be repeated. But it's tomorrow's threats that
are as big an issue as today's, it seems to me, as we try to decide
what our budget's going to be and how we're going to appropriate
money and all those kinds of things that we're going to be doing
follow-on this year.
I see in his testimony, for example, some things I'd like to
ask you about as to whether or not you see the world the same
way, as opposed to merely following on and hitting General Hughes
with the questions.
For example, repeatedly throughout here in the testimony, there
are -- and I presume you've read it. Am I on safe ground here?
And I'm not trying to get a battle going. I'm merely trying
to inform myself. I'm trying to get a sufficient discussion going
here that I can make good judgments.
As I read this, for example, one of the things that I hear myself
saying is that I should direct an increasing amount of attention
to economic issues, and to the whole question of what our foreign
aid looks like, as opposed to merely trying to figure out what
kind of satellite to build or what kind of authorization to give
you throughout all the intelligence agencies. I hear myself saying,
for example on page 17 of the testimony, I think a rather remarkable
beginning under terrorism, "Defining terrorism in the future
is going to prove increasingly difficult." That's how it
starts off on page 17. And follow-on on page 18 it says, "As
a result of increased economic disparity, we can expect to see
increasing alienation and a growth in related terrorist activities."
That seems to be positing a cause here. I don't want to get
into a discussion as to whether or not that's the only cause,
but do you, Director Deutch, see economic, in the future, as you
look into the future, do you see this kind of diffusion of power
that General Hughes is suggesting, this kind of possibility that
chaotic events that we currently don't even have on our radar
screen, could emerge on our radar screen in the future and produce
problems for warfighters that may have to go in after the fact?
That's what I was suggesting earlier with Bosnia.
Nobody in 1990 had Bosnia on the screen, or at least very few
people. I doubt that it was part of the threat assessment at
the time, and yet we've got 20,000 troops over there today.
So do you...
DR. DEUTCH: First of all, we are enormously fortunate to have
General Pat Hughes as the new Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency. I have the highest regard for him, and I, with you, have
found him rarely, if ever, wrong on any subject. So we should
listen to him with the greatest of attention. He not only has
practical background, he does have this ability to cast things
in important ways. That's the first thing I want to say.
The second thing, and right on the point that you were mentioning,
I've been absolutely, I think, consistent with Pat Hughes on the
kinds of threats that we're going to have in the future, of which
the terrorism that you mention is one and it's certainly something
that I've been very vocal about, that terrorism is a growing threat
to the international community, not just to the United States.
I don't believe that the source of that terrorism comes only
from economic forces. It comes from other forces as well -- ideological
and extremist ideological trends.
But I also believe that when our military forces are used, as
we've seen in Haiti, as we saw originally in Somalia, and as we've
seen in Bosnia, they are coming in a situation, as I've said here
and publicly elsewhere, not just military force alone, but coming
together with the need to provide economic and humanitarian assistance
and diplomatic efforts as well. I think that we are giving a
consistent message here from all parts of the Administration,
whether it's the intelligence community or the military or the
Department of State on these issues.
SENATOR KERREY: Let me follow on two additional questions.
I apologize to General Hughes for asking you about his testimony,
but it is very provocative testimony. I'm hoping to get this
kind of testimony offered today.
General Hughes says on page seven, "There are those who
speak of China as a future peer competitor of the United States.
In our view, this would be possible only in the very distant
future, certainly beyond 2010. At best, China is going to enter
the new millennium with relatively small but key portions of its
force equipped with late generation equipment. Much of the force
will still be very old. It remains to be seen how successful
this military will be in the assimilation of newer technology."
That suggests a sizing of China's problems is largely a political
problem. Perhaps a miscalculation in regards to Taiwan, perhaps
provoked by us. That's why I suggested earlier that if members
of Congress don't understand what our policy towards China is,
what's in the Shanghai agreement specifically, it's possible for
us to take action that could provoke China, that could create
the very thing that we're describing that we want to try to avoid.
So if this sizing of the threat is accurate, then it seems to
me that we need to be talking about China in different terms than
sometimes is done.
I mean I've heard China described as a threat to the United States.
Do you think that China is a threat to the United States?
DR. DEUTCH: A military threat to the United States?
SENATOR KERREY: A military threat to the United States.
DR. DEUTCH: It certainly has missile systems which can be a
threat to the United States, but in terms of conventional military
power, no it is not.
SENATOR KERREY: So you think that it's military capability is
not a threat to the United States; it's missile capability could
potentially be a threat to the United States; but in general terms,
do you think it's much more of a political threat to the United
States...
DR. DEUTCH: Yes, that's what I think I testified to in providing
you a range of situations -- other than that China is not a threat
to the United States. It's a threat to world stability, though
-- running through what are the concerns that we see about China.
They range from providing assistance to other countries and gaining
weapons of mass destruction...
SENATOR KERREY: In another piece in here, General Hughes says
that "the prospects for the existence of a viable, unitary
Bosnia beyond the life of IFOR are dim." And then goes on
to list a number of problems that are in here.
He does not suggest by that that IFOR won't still be a success.
He does not suggest by that statement that IFOR is a waste of
U.S. effort. It most unquestionably, in my mind, will not be
a waste of effort, simply because the statement that the prospect
for Bosnia beyond the life of IFOR, as he states in here, are
dim.
Is that your own view, that the American people should not expect,
given the current situation on the ground, that Bosnia as a unitary,
viable nation will survive?
DR. DEUTCH: I don't know enough, Senator, to reach that conclusion
today. I would not express it that way, no, sir. But I think
it depends on what happens between now and when IFOR goes a year
from now.
SENATOR KERREY: Certainly it's a goal of the President and the
United States to have Bosnia survive as a...
DR. DEUTCH: That's correct, and we would hope that our political
and economic efforts would make that, as well as the good will,
if you can call it that, of the people of former Yugoslavia, that
we would influence that, yes, sir.
SENATOR KERREY: Do you believe that the list of things that
have been identified in General Hughes' testimony comports with
the sorts of things that we ought to be concerned about, if we
as a Congress want to support the Administration's effort and
NATO's efforts to achieve a viable, unitary nation state in Bosnia?
The efforts of the Muslim-led government to assert authority
over the whole of Bosnia will be aggressively resisted, which
we're obviously seeing in the suburbs now with the evacuation,
and the Bosnian Serbs' decision to evacuate, and to urge the Bosnian
Serbs to leave the suburbs... Are these the sorts of things that
you think that we should be...
DR. DEUTCH: Absolutely, sir. We are seamless in our views on
what is of concern in Bosnia.
SENATOR KERREY: On page 16 of the testimony, again, there's
what I consider to be a very provocative statement, and I personally
think an accurate statement, but one that I'm tempted to follow
along as well. It's easy to have someone get up and describe
a threat, and the next thing you know, the audience is saying
gosh, that sounds pretty good, they've got their facts right,
they sound pretty good, they seem to be getting it right, maybe
we ought to spend 4 or 5 or whatever billions of dollars in order
to defend against that threat. That's part of the problem in
the post-Cold War era, is that threats aren't as clear as they
used to be.
But in the testimony, he said, "I would recommend the committee
be leery of anyone who appears to be emphasizing a particular
Russian system or appears confident that that system will be fielded
in militarily significant numbers." Again, General Hughes
does not say that Russia is not a threat. He's simply describing
in this particular context their capability, their economic capability,
of being able to develop any particular weapon system. In the
testimony he said that "Russia will stay in START I."
DIA's public assessment is that they're not even sure economically
if "Russia can build what is necessary to meet the requirements
of START II even if START II is not ratified by the Duma."
So even if START II is not ratified by the Duma, the question
is whether or not Russia's got the capacity to build and maintain
the level that would be required under START II, and thus, in
that context, one of the conclusions is that the committee should
be leery of those who would take a particular weapons system that
could be a threat to the United States, if that's all they were
building, if that's the only thing they were working on. But
in the context of their general economic condition and their general
inability to train and so forth, that we should be leery of someone
who would take a particular weapon system and build that up as
a threat to the United States. Would you agree with that?
DR. DEUTCH: Yes.
SENATOR KERREY: One statement that was made in regards to North
Korea earlier on page five that I've got some questions about,
is that the "military posture in North Korea remains very
dangerous." I've got some questions as to whether or not
the military of North Korea is very dangerous. Do you agree with
that statement, and if so, why?
DR. DEUTCH: There's no question that I agree with that statement.
But I want to make a very important point here about the North
Korean military posture which I believe my friend Pat Hughes would
fully subscribe to. We traditionally think of the military threat
from North Korea as being an all-out invasion of the South. But
that's not the only military incursion that could take place.
Because of the growing instability and uncertainty in that country,
one could find the North Koreans taking actions that were short
of a major invasion of the South, which would present us with
a tremendous problem but be short of an all-out invasion of the
South. We have to be prepared to deal with those kinds of situations
as well. And they can do so very quickly. That is, we would
not have a lot of warning before such an event took place.
SENATOR KERREY: Dr. Deutch, I would indulge the Chairman just
to give a 60-second editorial which you've heard before. My first
round of questioning that I was engaged in with you suggests something
that you and I have discussed before, which is that I believe
that democracy functions the best when the citizens are informed,
as a fundamental principle; and secondly, I tend to be pretty
aggressive when it comes to informing the citizens; and thirdly,
I am deeply concerned about our capacity to make foreign policy
decisions -- not only if we do not use the technologies that we
have that enable us to inform the citizens, but if we don't come
to the citizen aggressively and say don't count on your military
defending you. The military is strong, we're going to keep it
strong, we're going to keep it well-trained, we're going to fund
it, we're going to build and supply it with the best technology
that we possibly can. But the first line of defense is an informed
citizen. As I look at the array of things, particularly the transitional
difficulties that we face today, it falls upon the people of this
country to make the effort, rather than merely trusting that somehow
members of Congress or our military are going to get the job done
for them.
DR. DEUTCH: I understand, sir.
SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you, Senator Kerrey.
Senator Robb?
SENATOR ROBB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So as not to make the testimony of General Hughes and Secretary
Gati anticlimactic, I will not interrogate you about their testimony
at this time. I have constraints, and I look forward to hearing
you.
A follow-up to the question that was posed by the Chairman relating
to M-11 and Pakistan and China -- there has been a great deal
of public comment on this question. You indicated you had provided
very detailed, precise information, or that you were capable of
monitoring it, whatever the case may be. You didn't respond to
the ultimate question. I'm not even going to ask you the ultimate
question, but may I ask you, have you provided specific information
to the executive branch on that question?
DR. DEUTCH: Yes.
SENATOR ROBB: Is there any ambiguity in the information that
you have provided to the executive branch?
DR. DEUTCH: There's always some ambiguity, sir. There's always
some ambiguity, but not terribly much in this case, I would judge.
SENATOR ROBB: I think that's where I'll leave that one.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I look forward to the testimony.
I thank Dr. Deutch for his testimony, and I know that he visited
with each member of the committee and gave us an opportunity to
explore a number of other matters in greater detail, and for that
I want to add my thanks as well.
DR. DEUTCH: Thank you, Senator Robb.
SENATOR SPECTER: Director Deutch, you testified in response
to questions from Senator Kerrey that you were reasonably confident
that the U.S. intelligence community could detect nuclear weapons
in foreign hands?
DR. DEUTCH: The development programs for nuclear weapons, sir.
I thought I was...
SENATOR SPECTER: The development of programs?
DR. DEUTCH: Development of nuclear weapons programs by other
countries is the question I thought I was addressing, sir.
SENATOR SPECTER: And that you were also reasonably confident
that you could detect ballistic missile development.
DR. DEUTCH: Programs. Yes, sir.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, does that leave anything out then? Do
you have a reasonable level of confidence that at least that area
of weapon of mass destruction you're able to detect?
DR. DEUTCH: Yes. It leaves out chemical and biological weapon
programs, development programs.
SENATOR SPECTER: What is our level of ability to monitor and
detect biological weapons, chemical weapons?
DR. DEUTCH: It's a lot more uncertain, sir, because of the fact
that much of the technology used in those programs is dual-use.
So the equipment and the technology can be procured for another
purpose and then be diverted. It's hard to track it. It doesn't
require large facilities. It doesn't require special nuclear
materials. It doesn't require tremendous electricity or other
signatures. So it's much more a matter where we have to have
the ingenuity of our intelligence, mostly human intelligence services,
discover it.
SENATOR SPECTER: Director Deutch, you identified the Indian
subcontinent as being the most volatile hot spot in the world?
DR. DEUTCH: Yes, sir.
SENATOR SPECTER: Some time ago Senator Brown and I had occasion
to visit in both India and Pakistan. We talked to Indian Prime
Minister Rao, who expressed his hope that the subcontinent could
become nuclear free. We later had a chance to talk to Pakistan's
Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, who was surprised to hear that.
She even asked if we had it in writing. I was surprised to hear
that the prime ministers of India and Pakistan do not communicate
with each other.
What would your sense be about, this may be a little bit out
of strictly the intelligence-gathering line, but perhaps your
intelligence-gathering does bear on it, for an initiative to try
and bring together the officials of India and Pakistan, very much
the way the United States has brought together the officials in
the Mideast? It might be that a morning in the Oval Office, an
invitation that few can resist, could have some very dramatic
effects of bringing those two countries to talk to each other.
DR. DEUTCH: I think I'll take, if I can, sir, a pass on that.
I think that's really a question about what is the way we want
to carry out our policy on the Indian subcontinent, and I don't
think that I'm really in a position or the right person to address
that question, sir.
SENATOR SPECTER: Are you still a member of the President's Cabinet?
DR. DEUTCH: That's correct, sir.
SENATOR SPECTER: We had a long discussion about that when you
became a Cabinet officer. I thought that opened the door to questions
like that, Director Deutch.
DR. DEUTCH: It certainly opened the door, but not to the right
answer, sir. I try very hard, as you know, not to allow myself
as the principal intelligence officer to get involved in policy-formulation.
SENATOR SPECTER: Okay. It does open the door, subject to being
closed.
DR. DEUTCH: Thank you, sir.
SENATOR SPECTER: On the intelligence line, what is the threat
assessment as to Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, the
current strained relations, the likelihood of some military action
between those two powers?
DR. DEUTCH: I think that the tensions between those two countries,
the animosity that exists, the problems that are present in Kashmir
all point to a very, very tense situation and one that we watch
very closely. And hostilities there certainly are a possibility.
SENATOR SPECTER: Director Deutch, you commented that the United
States intelligence community ought not to take activity to give
any company an economic advantage in international trade. There
is a collateral concern about economic espionage and the ability
of the U.S. intelligence community to protect -- not a sword,
but a shield -- to protect U.S. competitive interests. How serious
a problem is economic espionage today in its potential adverse
effects against U.S. companies?
DR. DEUTCH: I would have drawn the most serious concern to be
from foreign corrupt practices, in particular negotiations which
may take place abroad in commercial contracts, as being the most
serious threat to unleveling a competitive playing field. I think
the economic espionage against U.S. companies or U.S. firms or
individuals is much less prevalent, but something that we try
and assess, we do assess, and inform policymakers when we find
that something is going on.
SENATOR SPECTER: If you find a U.S. company is the victim of
economic espionage, do you pass that information on to the company?
DR. DEUTCH: No, sir. We would not do that. We would pass it
on to a policymaker to make the judgment about the manner and
way to...
SENATOR SPECTER: When you say a policymaker...
DR. DEUTCH: The Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State,
depending on the circumstances.
SENATOR SPECTER: I had intended to ask you next, and will now,
about the subject that you broach, and that is corrupt practices.
We have a foreign corrupt practice act which properly prevent
U.S. companies from bribing public officials, but other nations
do not.
DR. DEUTCH: Correct.
SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Bennett Johnston, a member of this
committee, and I have been talking -- really his initiative and
his idea -- to introduce legislation which would impose a sanction
on such a company in a foreign country, and perhaps impose a sanction
on a country itself for not taking steps to stop those corrupt
practices. What's your view of that?
DR. DEUTCH: I'm not sure. I'd have to see the legislation and
think it through. It's certainly, again, not an intelligence
matter what legislation is adopted.
I will say to you that I think the intelligence community should
be monitoring parts of the world where corrupt practices do lead
to an unfair marketplace for American business.
SENATOR SPECTER: Those corrupt practices do come to the attention
of the U.S. intelligence community, do they not?
DR. DEUTCH: Yes, they do.
SENATOR SPECTER: How do you handle those? Pass them on to policymakers?
DR. DEUTCH: That's correct. Yes, sir. And I think it's important
that we do that.
SENATOR SPECTER: Do you know what the practice of the policymakers
then is by way of notifying the U.S. companies?
DR. DEUTCH: I think they're aggressive in that, but we can get
you a more complete answer. I'm not prepared to do that now.
I'm literally not prepared.
SENATOR SPECTER: With respect to our relations with Mexico,
Director Deutch, just how serious is the narcotics trade out of
Mexico? We have not adopted a policy of sanctions against our
very close neighbor, but how serious is the drug traffic coming
out of Mexico?
DR. DEUTCH: I think the Mexican government and we are of a single
mind on this, and that is that it is very serious indeed, that
there is a growing passage of drugs through Mexico, a growing
manufacture of certain kinds of drugs in Mexico. It's very serious
for the American people. It's very serious for the Mexican people.
I think our two governments are quite together on the difficulty
that this poses for us.
SENATOR SPECTER: In addition to being of a single mind on it,
how effective is the Mexican government in acting against the
drug traffic?
DR. DEUTCH: We are working with them through our law enforcement
cooperative agreements, through the embassy down in Mexico City,
through the State Department, to help them in their efforts to
fight drugs. I would say that they are not as strong as we would
like them to be.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, that's not... I understand the limitations
of your response, but that's not a very precise response. It
seems to me we really... I see you furrowing your brow. Do you
want to supplement that or disagree with me?
DR. DEUTCH: I would be happy to be very much more precise in
closed session, sir.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, is the Mexican government really serious
about stopping the drug traffic?
DR. DEUTCH: I think the Mexican government and President Zedillo
is very serious about it, yes sir. They're...
SENATOR SPECTER: Are they effective at all on it?
DR. DEUTCH: Not as effective as they should be, sir.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, this is going to be my final round.
There are some further questions I have as to Iran and Iraq, and
perhaps I could pose a question and ask you to respond in writing,
not to take any more of your time.
I would be interested in your assessment as to the level of cooperation
with our allies on sanctions against Iran. We have adopted a
policy of sanctions against Iran and we are undertaking no discussion
with them to try to isolate them. From my observations I do not
see that as very successful because our allies are not supporting
us in that. I would be interested in a written response on that
subject if you could provide it.
DR. DEUTCH: Absolutely, Senator. Absolutely.
SENATOR SPECTER: And on the question of Iraq, I'd be interested
in an updating as to your assessment as to how strong Saddam Hussein
is at the present time, and what the implications are of his welcoming
back, or at least the public reports about his sons-in-law returning.
DR. DEUTCH: I'd be happy to do that, sir.
SENATOR SPECTER: And I've been advised by my staff, and we want
to pursue this further, but I want to put this issue to you publicly,
that staff advises that the NRO did not know the aggregate carry-forward,
and did not make those disclosures, and that that's demonstrated
by the NRO now changing its policy on the amount in this account.
And also staff advises that the NRO did not report to Congress
these balances every year.
What I'd like you to do is to take a look at those factual matters
and let us know. And to the extent that you can provide those
responses in an unclassified form, we would appreciate it so that
it can be publicly disseminated.
DR. DEUTCH: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Kerrey?
SENATOR KERREY: I have no other questions.
SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Robb?
SENATOR ROBB: I look forward to the next witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
DR. DEUTCH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you very much, Director Deutch. If you
would wait just a moment, I'd like to talk to you privately.