Support for Coup in 1970.
Under “Track II” of the strategy, CIA sought to instigate a coup to prevent
Allende from taking office after he won a plurality in the 4 September
election and before, as Constitutionally required because he did not win an
absolute majority, the Chilean Congress reaffirmed his victory. CIA was working
with three different groups of plotters. All three groups made it clear that
any coup would require the kidnapping of Army Commander Rene Schneider, who
felt deeply that the Constitution required that the Army allow Allende to
assume power. CIA agreed with that assessment. Although CIA provided weapons
to one of the groups, we have found no information that the plotters’ or CIA’s
intention was for the general to be killed. Contact with one group of plotters
was dropped early on because of its extremist tendencies. CIA provided tear
gas, submachine-guns and ammunition to the second group. The third group
attempted to kidnap Schneider, mortally wounding him in the attack. CIA had
previously encouraged this group to launch a coup but withdrew support four
days before the attack because, in CIA’s assessment, the group could not carry
it out successfully.
Awareness of Coup Plotting in 1973.
Although CIA did not instigate the coup that ended Allende’s government on
11 September 1973, it was aware of coup-plotting by the military, had
ongoing intelligence collection relationships with some plotters, and—because
CIA did not discourage the takeover and had sought to instigate a coup in
1970—probably appeared to condone it. There was no way that anyone,
including CIA, could have known that Allende would refuse the putchists’ offer
of safe passage out of the country and that instead—with La Moneda
Palace under bombardment from tanks and airplanes and in flames—would
take his own life.
Knowledge of Human Rights Violations.
CIA officers were aware of and reported to analysts and policymakers in 1973
that General Pinochet and the forces that overthrew the Allende Government
were conducting a severe campaign against leftists and perceived political
enemies in the early months after the coup. Activities of some security services
portended a long-term effort to suppress opponents. In January 1974, CIA
officers and assets were tasked to report on human rights violations by the
Chilean government.
Liaison with Chilean Security Services.
The CIA had liaison relationships in Chile with the primary purpose of securing
assistance in gathering intelligence on external targets. The CIA offered
these services assistance in internal organization and training to combat
subversion and terrorism from abroad, not in combating internal opponents
of the government. The CIA also used these relationships to admonish these
services concerning human rights abuses in Chile. The policy community and
CIA recognized that the relationships opened the CIA to possible identification
with the liaison services’ internal operations involving human rights abuses
but determined that the contact was necessary for CIA’s mission.
Propaganda in Support of Pinochet
Regime. After the coup in September 1973, CIA suspended new covert
action funding but continued some ongoing propaganda projects, including support
for news media committed to creating a positive image for the military Junta.
Chilean individuals who had collaborated with the CIA but were not acting
at CIA direction assisted in the preparation of the “White Book,” a document
intended to justify overthrowing Allende. It contained an allegation that
leftists had a secret “Plan Z” to murder the high command in the months
before the coup, which CIA believed was probably disinformation by the Junta.
Knowledge of “Operation Condor.”
Within a year after the coup, the CIA and other US Government agencies were
aware of bilateral cooperation among regional intelligence services to track
the activities of and, in at least a few cases, kill political opponents.
This was the precursor to Operation Condor, an intelligence-sharing arrangement
among Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay established in 1975.
Some CIA officers expressed reservations about certain activities during
this period. The Intelligence Community’s analytic assessment of the prospects
for a coup in 1970, for example, was that “military action is impossible”
because the Army was too deeply committed to the Constitution and unwilling
to oust the civilian government. The DCI stated that the Agency was being
asked to do the impossible. A senior CIA officer said the idea of undermining
an Allende victory was “unrealistic.” National Intelligence Estimates produced
between 1969 and 1973 reflected declining confidence over time that Allende
would be able to subvert Chile’s constitutional order. In addition, in the
period preceding the successful coup against Allende, CIA officers were concerned
about the blurring of lines between monitoring coup-plotting—collecting intelligence
on such activities but not directing or influencing them—and supporting a
coup at least implicitly.
The historical backdrop sheds important light on the policies, practices,
and perceived urgency prevalent at that time. The Cuban revolution and emergence
of Communist parties in Latin America had brought the Cold War to the Western
Hemisphere. Thousands of Chilean military officers came to the United States
for training, which included presentations on the impact of global communism
on their own country. After Allende won a plurality in the Presidential election
on 4 September 1970, the consensus at the highest levels of the US Government
was that an Allende Presidency would seriously hurt US national interests.
Efforts by the United States to support anti-Communist forces in Chile date
back to the late 1950s and reflect the rivalry between the United States and
the Soviet Union for influence throughout the Third World. The growing strength
of the Chilean left, along with continuing fragmentation by conservative and
moderate political forces, became increasing concerns through the 1960 70s
to the United States, which wanted to avoid the emergence of “another Cuba”
in the Western Hemisphere.
According to the Church Committee report, in their meeting with CIA Director
Richard Helms and Attorney General John Mitchell on 15 September 1970 President
Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, directed the CIA
to prevent Allende from taking power. They were “not concerned [about the]
risks involved,” according to Helms’ notes. In addition to political action,
Nixon and Kissinger, according to Helms’s notes, ordered steps to “make the
economy scream.”
These Cold War attitudes persisted into the Pinochet era. After Pinochet
came to power, senior policymakers appeared reluctant to criticize human rights
violations, taking to task US diplomats urging greater attention to the problem.
US military assistance and sales grew significantly during the years of greatest
human rights abuses. According to a previously released Memorandum of Conversation,
Kissinger in June 1976 indicated to Pinochet that the US Government was sympathetic
to his regime, although Kissinger advised some progress on human rights in
order to improve Chile’s image in the US Congress.
In 1962 the CIA received authority to carry out covert action projects in
support of the Chilean Radical Party and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).
These programs were designed primarily to assist the parties in attracting
larger followings, improve their organization and effectiveness, and influence
their political orientation to support US objectives in the region. A secondary
purpose of these programs was to support efforts to split the Socialist Party.
At the request of the US Ambassador in Chile, with the support of the Department
of State, in 1963 the 5412 Group approved a one-time payment to the Democratic
Front. Propaganda efforts to support public media consisted primarily of
funding and guidance to recruited assets within selected Chilean radio stations
and newspapers.
In preparation for the 1964 elections, a political action campaign was approved
on 2 April 1964 by the 303 Committee. The goal of the campaign was to
prevent Dr. Salvador Allende, the leftist candidate for President, from
winning. Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party was the principal
beneficiary of these efforts. The campaign built on the covert action previously
approved in 1962, adding an element of support for a militant women’s group.
In the same timeframe, the CIA was tasked to support continued unilateral
placements of propaganda in the mass media to influence public opinion against
leftist parties and candidates. By the time of the election, the 303 Committee
had approved a total of $3 million to keep Allende from winning. Frei’s
victory on 4 September 1964 was a milestone in the CIA’s Chilean election
effort.
On 5 February 1965, the 303 Committee approved a new covert action
campaign intended to support selected candidates for Congressional elections
on 7 March. This campaign—drafted and carried out in cooperation with
the US Ambassador in Chile—authorized the CIA, working through its established
infrastructure, to support selected candidates for Congress. The operation
was considered a success and was terminated on 30 June. In 1965-66, previous
propaganda efforts were merged, and the CIA established a covert action project
to support the placement of propaganda in Chilean mass media. This project
was to influence public opinion against leftist parties and candidates. The
scope of CIA’s propaganda activities in Chile was further expanded in 1967,
to promote “anti-Communist” themes, specifically against the Soviet Bloc presence
in the country.
Nonetheless, the Chilean left made political gains during the Frei Administration.
As a result, CIA was given approval in 1968-69 to undertake additional propaganda
operations intended to influence Chilean mass media. This included establishing
a propaganda workshop and other mechanisms for press placements. Propaganda
topics included the threat posed by the Soviet Bloc to Chile’s democratic
tradition, the danger local leftist fronts posed to the country, and promoting
pro-democratic leadership in Chile. In July 1968, the 303 Committee approved
a modest covert action program, proposed by the US Ambassador, to influence
the composition of the Chilean Congress by supporting moderate candidates
in the March 1969 Congressional elections. While the results were considered
an operational success, both the far right and far left gained seats, and
the Chilean political scene was further polarized. Frei and his moderate
PDC candidates were the losers. This CIA program was terminated at the conclusion
of the Congressional elections.
As the 1970 Presidential election drew near, Allende emerged as a leading
candidate; various leftist parties continued to strengthen the Popular Unity
(UP) coalition. The Station used some of the covert actions mentioned above
to carry out a variety of political action and propaganda operations aimed
at discrediting the left. The 40 Committee told the CIA to confine itself
to attacking the UP coalition and not support any particular Presidential
candidate. The objective was to divide the left and create conditions for
a non-Marxist candidate to win the election. On 27 June 1970 the Station
was directed to focus the “spoiling operation” more directly against Allende’s
candidacy. The plan was to alert the Chilean people to the dangers of a Marxist
regime under Allende.
In spite of increased funding as directed by the 40 Committee, by August
1970 it was clear that the spoiling operation was not succeeding and that
Allende and the UP had garnered such support that Allende was clearly the
leading candidate. High-level concern in the Nixon Administration resulted
in development of a more aggressive covert action initiative. This initiative
considered both political action (Track I) and a military coup (Track II)
to prevent an Allende presidency. Both Track I and Track II initiatives
ran simultaneously until Congress elected Allende on 24 October.
The political action program under consideration called for the Embassy and
Station to influence the Chilean Congress as it took up the matter. This
involved encouraging Congress to vote for Alessandri for President
in spite of the fact Allende received a slightly higher popular vote. (Allende
won 36.3 percent of the vote on 4 September—a plurality, not the
majority required by the Constitution to avoid Congressional reaffirmation
of the victory.) The Station and the Embassy, working through intermediaries,
urged Frei to use his influence with Congress to convince non-leftist forces
to vote for Alessandri. The scenario was to have Congress elect Alessandri
as President; he would then resign, thereby allowing Frei to run as a candidate
against Allende in a new election.
The Track II initiative called upon CIA to plan for the possibility
of arranging Chilean military intervention. On 9 September the Station
received guidance from Headquarters directing it to establish direct contact
with Chilean military officers to evaluate the possibilities of stimulating
a military coup if a decision were to be made to do so.
On 15 September President Nixon informed the DCI that an Allende regime in
Chile would not be acceptable to the United States. He instructed the CIA
to prevent Allende from coming to power or unseat him and authorized $10 million
for this purpose. The President specifically directed that this action be
carried out by the CIA without advising the Departments of State or Defense
or the U.S. Ambassador in Chile. In response to Nixon’s direction, CIA took
a variety of actions, including making overtures to the military of a foreign
government to request its insights, forwarding worldwide propaganda information
for placement in local media, initiating efforts to promote public opposition
to Allende among leading newspapers such as El Mercurio, and contacting
a Catholic layman who was in touch with Church leaders in Chile to influence
their attitudes toward Allende. Station officers increased contacts with
Chilean military officers. Frei was also encouraged to use his influence
with the military and encourage officers to consider forming a new government
before Congress elected Allende President. By late September it was clear
that Frei was unlikely to act in this manner.
Track II planning was intensified once it became clear that Frei would
not act. Between 5-20 October the Station orchestrated numerous contacts
with key Chilean military and Carabinero (national police) officers
to convince them to carry out a coup. The U.S. Embassy’s Army Attaché was
placed under operational control of the CIA Station and relayed similar messages
to his military contacts. Four CIA officers were dispatched under non-official
cover to meet with the most sensitive of these Chilean military officers,
who were actively involved in coup plotting.
The Track II initiative failed, however, after the assassination of
Army Commander-in-Chief Schneider, whose death provoked a strong reaction
in Chile.
The US Government and the CIA were aware of and agreed with Chilean officers’
assessment that that the abduction of General Rene Schneider, the Chilean
Army’s Commander in September 1970, was an essential step in any coup plan.
We have found no information, however, that the coup plotters’ or CIA’s intention
was that the general be killed in any abduction effort. Schneider was a strong
supporter of the Chilean Constitution and a major stumbling block for military
officers seeking to carry out a coup to prevent Allende from being inaugurated.
Retired Army General Roberto Viaux was a major coup plotter with support
from non-commissioned and junior officers; he also headed several right-wing
civilian groups. After CIA was directed to explore prospects for a coup to
prevent Allende from taking office, a CIA officer established contact with
Viaux on 9 October 1970. A second meeting with Viaux resulted in the
Station forwarding a request to Washington from Viaux for weapons, tear gas
and other supplies as well as a life insurance policy for himself. In reviewing
Viaux’s proposal, CIA Headquarters determined that his group had no chance
of carrying off a successful coup. Headquarters advised the Station, and
during meetings on 17 18 October a CIA officer told a member of the
Viaux group, that CIA would not entertain their request for support. The
officer warned them that any coup action on their part would be premature.
The Viaux representative said the coup was planned for 21-22 October,
and the first step would be to kidnap General Schneider. The Station doubted
the plan because CIA had no corroborative intelligence and Viaux’s group had
a record of false starts.
On 22 October the Viaux group, acting independently of the CIA at that time,
carried out an attempted abduction against General Schneider that resulted
in his death. Schneider‘s death shocked the armed forces and civilian proponents
of a coup, and plans for military action were shelved.
In addition to Viaux, CIA had established contact with other coup-plotters,
including General Camilo Valenzuela. Valenzuela’s group was well known by
the Station and was judged to have the capability to carry out a successful
coup. CIA provided this group—which also saw the abduction of General Schneider
as essential to any coup—three submachine guns, ammunition, and 8 to 10 tear
gas grenades on 22 October. (These weapons were later returned unused
to the Station.) Valenzuela’s representative insisted his group had nothing
to do with Schneider’s killing and that Viaux acted on his own.
In November 1970 a member of the Viaux group who avoided capture recontacted
the Agency and requested financial assistance on behalf of the group. Although
the Agency had no obligation to the group because it acted on its own, in
an effort to keep the prior contact secret, maintain the good will of the
group, and for humanitarian reasons, $35,000 was passed.
The Congress approved Allende’s election victory by a wide margin—153 to
35—on 24 October. In the wake of Allende’s inauguration on 3 November
1970, the US Government’s long-term objective was to keep the opposition active
in the hope that it could defeat Allende in the 1976 election. The CIA’s
role in Chile was primarily to provide funds and influence opposition political
parties. In 1971, a new covert action was approved to renew support to the
PDC. In 1972, a new covert action project was authorized to provide support
to the National Party and the Democratic Radical Party. CIA’s continuing
financial support to the propaganda mechanisms described above was intended
to continue media placements in support of opposition parties and against
the Allende regime. The CIA was instructed to put the US Government in a
position to take future advantage of either a political or military solution
to the Chilean dilemma, depending on how developments unfolded.
The CIA continued to collect intelligence on Chilean military
officers actively opposed to the Allende government, but no effort was made
to assist them in any way. Some CIA assets and contacts were in direct contact
with coup plotters; CIA guidance was that the purpose of these contacts was
only to collect intelligence. As coup rumors and planning escalated by the
end of 1972, CIA exercised extreme care in all dealings with Chilean military
officers and continued to monitor their activities but under no circumstances
attempted to influence them. By October 1972 the consensus within the US
government was that the military intended to launch a coup at some point,
that it did not need US support for a successful coup, and that US intervention
or assistance in a coup should be avoided.
On 21 August 1973 the 40 Committee approved a $1 million supplemental
budget to increase support for opposition political parties, bringing the
total amount of covert funding spent during the Allende period to approximately
$6.5 million. In late August the Station requested authorization
to provide maximum support for the opposition’s efforts to encourage the entrance
of the Chilean military into the Allende cabinet. The resignation of Army
Commander General Carlos Prats (whose actions were strongly constitutionalist)
and his replacement by General Augusto Pinochet (not a coup plotter, but apparently
willing to concede to a coup) appeared to further unify the Armed Forces and
strengthened the institution as a political pressure group. The UP Government
appeared to fear a possible military coup and was unsure how to react to such
a development.
The Station realized that the opposition’s objectives had evolved to a point
inconsistent with current US policy and sought authorization from Washington
to support such an aggressive approach. Although the US Ambassador in Chile
agreed with the need for Washington to evaluate its current policy, he did
not concur in the Station’s proposal, fearing that it could lead to a de facto
US commitment to a coup. In response, CIA Headquarters reaffirmed to the
Station that there was to be no involvement with the military in any covert
action initiative; there was no support for instigating a military coup.
On 10 September 1973—the day before the coup that ended the Allende
Government—a Chilean military officer reported to a CIA officer that a coup
was being planned and asked for US Government assistance. He was told that
the US Government would not provide any assistance because this was strictly
an internal Chilean matter. The Station officer also told him that his request
would be forwarded to Washington. CIA learned of the exact date of the coup
shortly before it took place. During the attack on the Presidential Palace
and its immediate aftermath, the Station’s activities were limited to providing
intelligence and situation reports.
Allende’s death occurred after the President refused an offer from the military
to take him and his family out of the country. Available evidence indicates
that President Allende committed suicide as putchist troops entered his offices.
A credible source on Allende’s death was Dr. Patricio Guijon, a physician
who served on the President’s medical staff. Guijon was in the Presidential
Palace, La Moneda, with Allende during the assault and claimed that
he witnessed Allende shoot himself with a rifle. The Chilean National Commission
on Truth and Reconciliation in 1991 also concluded that Allende took his own
life. There is no information to indicate that the CIA was involved in Allende’s
death.
As early as the 1964 Chilean Presidential election, American businessmen
with interests in Chile had offered to provide the CIA with funds to prevent
Allende from being elected. All of these early offers were rejected.
In early 1970 a Station officer was contacted by a United States businessman
employed by International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) urging the US government
to provide financial support to one of Allende’s opponents, Jorge Alessandri.
The Station provided the businessman the name of an individual who could securely
funnel ITT funds to Alessandri.
Several months later another ITT representative approached the CIA in Washington
to probe whether CIA would accept funds from his company and channel them
to the Alessandri campaign. He was told that CIA could not receive and transfer
funds to Alessandri on behalf of a private firm. The CIA also told him that,
although the US Government was most anxious about a possible Allende victory,
it was not supporting any specific candidate in the election. As occurred
several months earlier, however, the Station provided this businessman advice
on how to funnel ITT funds securely to Alessandri.
After Allende’s election and before his inauguration, the CIA, under 40 Committee
direction, made an effort—in coordination with the Embassy in Santiago—to
encourage Chilean businesses to carry out a program of economic disruption.
Chile‘s new military Junta—Army General Augusto Pinochet, Air Force General
Gustavo Leigh, Navy Admiral Jose Merino, and Carabinero Chief General
Caesar Mendoza—was sworn in on the evening of 11 September 1973. The
next day, the four drafted an official document constituting the Junta as
Chile’s supreme power. Pinochet was designated as its first President, and
the four verbally agreed to rotate the office. Shortly after, the Junta established
an advisory committee, which Pinochet was successful in staffing with Army
officers loyal to himself. One of their first recommendations was to discard
the idea of a rotating Presidency, arguing it would create too many administrative
problems and lead to confusion.
In March 1974, on the six-month anniversary of the Junta’s establishment,
Pinochet verbally attacked the Christian Democratic Party and stated that
there was no set timetable for the return to civilian rule. On 18 December
1974 Pinochet was declared Supreme Leader of the nation.
During this period, CIA, in coordination with the Department of State, determined
that no new or expanded covert action activities were to be carried out until
the 40 Committee provided new authorization. Although covert action
spending was authorized for previously obligated expenditures and commitments
in programs described above, no new initiatives were authorized. By June
1974 CIA covert action plans for Chile had been officially terminated, and
payments ceased.
Although some of these residual propaganda operations may have benefited
Pinochet and the putchists indirectly, officers of the CIA and the Intelligence
Community were not involved in facilitating Pinochet’s accession to President
nor the consolidation of his power as Supreme Leader. For most of the period,
CIA had no covert action authority for Chile. While the CIA had liaison relationships
with various security services over the years, there is no indication that
any service asked for, or that the CIA offered, any assistance to promote
Pinochet to the Presidency.
In January 1974 CIA issued a directive to all CIA staff to collect clandestine
information on torture in Chile; this message directed CIA staff to work through
all available agents and channels of influence to induce the Chilean Government
to modify repressive measures, particularly to eliminate torture. CIA actively
used its contacts, especially with members of services notorious for human
rights abuses, to emphasize that human rights abuses were detrimental to the
government’s credibility within their own country, damaging to their international
reputation, and unacceptable to the US Government. In some cases, such contacts
enabled the CIA to obtain intelligence on human rights abuses that would not
have otherwise been available.
Given the wide variety and nature of CIA contacts in Chile, the issue of
human rights was handled in various ways over the years. Some examples:
During a period between 1974 and 1977, CIA maintained contact with Manuel
Contreras Sepulveda, who later became notorious for his involvement in human
rights abuses. The US Government policy community approved CIA’s contact
with Contreras, given his position as chief of the primary intelligence organization
in Chile, as necessary to accomplish the CIA’s mission, in spite of concerns
that this relationship might lay the CIA open to charges of aiding internal
political repression. From the start, the CIA made it clear to Contreras
was that it would not support any of his activities or activities of his service
which might be construed as “internal political repression.” In its contacts
with Contreras, the CIA urged him to adhere to a 17 January 1974 circular,
issued by the Chilean Ministry of Defense, spelling out guidelines for handling
prisoners in a manner consistent with the 1949 Geneva Convention.
The relationship, while correct, was not cordial and smooth, particularly
as evidence of Contreras’ role in human rights abuses emerged. In December
1974, the CIA concluded that Contreras was not going to improve his
human rights performance. However, Contreras’ assistance in the first quarter
of 1975 in gaining the release of some PDC members who had been arrested and
mistreated by another Chilean security service offered small hope that he
would use his influence to end abuses. In retrospect, however, Contreras’
role in this effort probably reflected interservice rivalry and Contreras’
personal efforts to control the entire Chilean intelligence apparatus.
By April 1975, intelligence reporting showed that Contreras was the principal
obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the Junta, but an interagency
committee directed the CIA to continue its relationship with Contreras. The
US Ambassador to Chile urged Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Walters
to receive Contreras in Washington in the interest of maintaining good relations
with Pinochet. In August 1975, with interagency approval, this meeting took
place.
In May and June 1975, elements within the CIA recommended establishing a
paid relationship with Contreras to obtain intelligence based on his unique
position and access to Pinochet. This proposal was overruled, citing the
US Government policy on clandestine relations with the head of an intelligence
service notorious for human rights abuses. However, given miscommunications
in the timing of this exchange, a one-time payment was given to Contreras.
In addition to information concerning external threats, CIA sought from Contreras
information regarding evidence that emerged in 1975 of a formal Southern Cone
cooperative intelligence effort—“Operation Condor”—building on informal
cooperation in tracking and, in at least a few cases, killing political opponents.
By October 1976 there was sufficient information that the CIA decided to approach
Contreras on the matter. Contreras confirmed Condor’s existence as an intelligence-sharing
network but denied that it had a role in extra-judicial killings.
Former Allende cabinet member and Ambassador to Washington Orlando Letelier
and his American assistant, Ronni Moffit, were killed in a carbombing in Washington
on 21 September, 1976. Almost immediately after the assassination, rumors
began circulating that the Chilean government was responsible. CIA’s first
intelligence report containing this allegation was dated 6 October 1976.
During October 1976, the Department of Justice and the CIA worked out how
the CIA would support the foreign intelligence (FI) aspects of the legal investigation.
At that time, Contreras’ possible role in the Letelier assassination became
an issue.
By the end of 1976, contacts with Contreras were very infrequent. During
1977, CIA met with Contreras about half a dozen times; three of those contacts
were to request information on the Letelier assassination. On 3 November
1977, Contreras was transferred to a function unrelated to intelligence so
CIA severed all contact with him.
Nonetheless, CIA intelligence reporting continued to follow Contreras’ activities
closely. After a short struggle to retain power, Contreras resigned from
the Army in 1978. In the interim, CIA gathered specific, detailed intelligence
reporting concerning Contreras’ involvement in ordering the Letelier assassination.
While some of this material has been released, some remains classified and
another portion has been withheld at the request of the Department of Justice,
which continues to pursue the investigation.
Throughout the post-coup period, the CIA collected and disseminated to the
intelligence and policy communities extensive reporting concerning human rights
issues in Chile. Some of this information came from contacts with mixed reputations.
The intelligence included a wide variety of information, including:
CIA also received information on “Plan Z”—purportedly drawn up by Allende’s
Popular Unity coalition in the late period of the Allende Government to assassinate
important political and military persons opposed to its leftist agenda. When
allegations of the existence of “Plan Z” first surfaced, the CIA noted
that it probably was disinformation manipulated by the Junta to improve its
image and to provide justification for its activities. Allegations that reports
about “Plan Z” were part of a joint CIA-Chilean operation are inaccurate,
although military officers with whom the CIA had contact prior to the 1973
coup were involved in the drafting the “White Book,” in which allegations
of “Plan Z” were a main feature.
The CIA first reported human rights abuses by the Junta on 15 September
1973, just days after the coup. CIA reported that the Chilean security interrogation
units were dealing with suspected opponents in an extremely rigorous manner.
A 22 September report noted that prisoners at the National Stadium were
harshly treated in the first days after the coup. On 28 September, CIA
reported that 27 cadavers, some showing signs of torture and mutilation, had
been recovered from the Mapocho River. On 9 October, the CIA reported
that Soviet non-diplomatic technicians in Chile had been repeatedly threatened
and verbally abused; some of those later tried were beaten or injured. On
25 October, CIA reported that General Sergio Arellano Stark had given
instructions resulting in the summary execution of 21 political prisoners.
On 3 November, the CIA reported that, despite a government decree to end summary
executions, 20 bodies were found shot in the San Carlos Canal. On 12 November,
the CIA reported concerns within the PDC about human rights abuses. On 18 January
1974, CIA reported that Chilean politicians across the political spectrum
were weighing the possibility of bringing the issue of government human rights
abuses to the attention of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
It was apparent that the 17 January 1974 Chilean government circular
prohibiting torture and providing instructions for the handling of prisoners
was a public relations ruse. CIA reporting indicated that the Chilean security
forces did not, and probably would not, observe the stated policy. Although
the State Department and Embassy had the primary role in human rights reporting,
the clandestine nature of Chilean security services’ human rights practices
required CIA collection efforts. In late January 1974, the CIA directed that
all appropriate CIA officers task their clandestine assets to report on torture
in Chile.
Over the next 17 years, the CIA reported information available from its contacts
concerning human rights abuses in Chile. As the left later regained strength,
intelligence reporting included the plans, intentions, capabilities and terrorist
acts of the left. During the transition from military to civilian rule, intelligence
reporting followed the political issue of how human rights investigations
and prosecutions would be handled.
A review of CIA’s files has uncovered no evidence that CIA officers and employees
were engaged in human rights abuses or in covering up any human rights abuses
in Chile.
Allegations of CIA complicity in the death of American citizen Charles Horman, Jr.—an
expatriate who supported Allende and was murdered in the aftermath of the
coup in 1973—are unfounded. Similarly, CIA had no prior knowledge of the
circumstances leading to the death in Chile of US citizen Frank Teruggi in
1973 or the disappearance of US citizen Boris Weisfeiler in 1985.
Nevertheless, some clandestine contacts of the CIA were involved in human
rights abuses. The CIA, at the direction of and with the full concurrence
of senior US policymakers, maintained official contacts with various security
services. At the same time, the CIA maintained clandestine contacts with
selected members of the Chilean military, intelligence and security forces,
both to collect intelligence and carry out the covert actions described above.
There is no doubt that some CIA contacts were actively engaged in committing
and covering up serious human rights abuses.
As a result of lessons learned in Chile, Central America and elsewhere, the
CIA now carefully reviews all contacts for potential involvement in human
rights abuses and makes a deliberate decision balancing the nature and severity
of the human rights abuse against the potential intelligence value of continuing
the relationship. These standards, established in the mid-1990s, would likely
have altered the amount of contact we had with perpetrators of human rights
violators in Chile had they been in effect at that time.
