Force XXI: Redesigning the Army Through Warfighting Experiments

by Lieutenant General Paul E. Menoher, Jr.

Our Army has made huge progress over the last few years, transforming itself from a Cold War Army to a force projection Army, and military intelligence (MI) has been at the forefront of that change. However, neither we in MI nor the U.S. Army as a whole can rest on our laurels; rather, we must continue to push the envelope to ensure we retain our technological superiority and the capability for decisive victory over any adversary. This is what Force XXI is all about. We are pushing the envelope and transforming today's very good Army into an even better information age, knowledge- and capabilities-based Army, capable of land force dominance across the continuum of 21st century military operations.

A Vision and a Process

Force XXI is both a vision and a process: a vision of what the Army of the early 21st century will look like and be able to accomplish, and a process through which we define and achieve this vision. It must be noted at the outset that Force XXI is not a final design; instead it is a dynamic vision and process that will change over time a journey, not a destination.
Through the Force XXI process, we will totally redesign the Army by the turn of the century, so that we can enter the 21st century ready to meet the many challenges of the new millennium. As we go through this transformation, it will affect every battlefield operating system (BOS) and organization. The transformation will be on two major axes, supported by a third. The first axis, called "Joint Venture," will totally redesign the table of organization and equipment (TOE) Army in a series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs). The experiments focus on the designated experimental force (EXFOR), the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (4th ID(M)) at Fort Hood, Texas. The second axis will redesign the table of distribution and allowance (TDA) and institutional Army and will affect every major command and staff, including the Army Staff. A third axis, the Army digitization axis, will support both of these main axes by helping to inject information age technology into the Army.
The fundamental hypothesis of Force XXI is that if we know how our current baseline organizations perform, then by applying information age technology to those organizations, training to standard and conducting experiments, we can gain insights into how much our battlefield performance has improved. These insights will also enable us to develop new organizational designs and operational concepts to capitalize on our improved battlefield capabilities.
As we start the Force XXI process, two questions arise regarding MI. First, how are we, as a BOS, postured to go through Force XXI? Second, what are the likely impacts on us as a branch?

MI Posture

Let me answer the first question by saying we are extremely well positioned by virtue of the fact that
In addition, we have been in the lead in experimentation with our Operation DESERT CAPTURE series of exercises. DESERT CAPTURE I, conducted in late 1992 at the National Training Center (NTC), gave us the first insights into the power of the information age technology we were fielding. These systems include the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) Ground Station Module (GSM), and the TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT). It also brought our new MI operational concept to life and demonstrated the "goodness" of our new five-tenet doctrine (see Figure 1). During NTC rotation 94-7 in April 1994, MI conducted its DESERT CAPTURE II experiment in conjunction with the larger technology demonstration, DESERT HAMMER, which included a digitized maneuver force. This experiment showed again the great power of our new family of systems combined with the efficacy of our new doctrine and our new organizational constructs.
Since those exercises, MI has continued to evolve, fielding more new systems, refining our doctrine in a number of real-world contingency operations (e.g., Somalia, Macedonia, Rwanda, Haiti, and now in Bosnia-Herzegovina), and bringing our new organizational designs on line creating a truly seamless architecture from the maneuver brigade through national agencies. Beyond that, we have decided to re-eingineer our operational intelligence major command (MACOM), the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). We are reducing it by 37 percent by 1998 but retaining and, in fact, improving its great capabilities to support force projection operations by standing up new capabilities, like the Regional Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Operations Centers (RSOCs).

Joint Venture Axis

Looking specifically at the Joint Venture or TOE axis of Force XXI, we are ensuring we equip the 4th ID (M) with all of our new division-level systems, including: the Joint STARS GSMs, ASAS, TROJAN SPIRIT, the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal, the Ground-Based Common Sensor, Advanced QUICKFIX, and a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The 4th ID (M) will also have connectivity to a full-range of corps and theater systems. The division has also organized into the new divisional MI battalion construct with an MI company in direct support of the EXFOR brigade task force which will go through the first major AWE in February 1997 at the NTC. That company will provide the brigade an analysis and control team with an expanded analytical capability. The expanded capability derives from ASAS and the Joint STARS GSM. The GSM can display
The EXFOR brigade and division will have the most capable MI support ever fielded and, if two preliminary AWEs are any indication, that support will make a significant and very positive difference. The 1995 AWEs FOCUS DISPATCH and WARRIOR FOCUS conducted in Kentucky and at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), respectively, clearly demonstrated the value added of our new systems, doctrine, and organizational designs. They provide commanders with a shared situational awareness, rapid and accurate targeting, and the ability to see their battlefields better than ever before.
Thus we go into the Joint Venture axis of Force XXI with great confidence that our baseline organization, the new divisional MI battalion, is about right, our systems are leading-edge information age technology, and our doctrine is proven and solid. We also know the leadership of the 4th ID (M), including the commanding general and MI leaders, understand how to optimize the employment of these capabilities.
While we are very confident that MI will play a major, positive role in the EXFOR AWEs, we also have another responsibility: to identify any vulnerabilities a digitized Force XXI may have. To this end we are working with the Director of Information Systems, Command, Control, Communications and Computers (DISC4) from the Army Secretariat; the Army Digitization Office; the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; INSCOM; and the Army Communications and Electronics Command. We will conduct a Red Team assessment to identify potential vulnerabilities and develop affordable and practical counters to them. This is a top priority for the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), and one we will conduct in conjunction with Joint Venture AWEs on a not-to-interfere basis.

Impacts on MI

The possible results of the TDA and institutional Army vector are not as clear. While we have reengineered INSCOM and made it 37 percent smaller, and reduced the size of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT) significantly, both stand to change even more in the Force XXI process. The CSA wants to reduce the number of MACOMs and the size of the Army staff significantly. A series of functional area assessments are reviewing MACOMs, and we have briefed the Vice CSA on command and control options for INSCOM. Some of those options will change its status as a major command but it is our intention to try to keep INSCOM intact as an operational command regardless of whether it retains its status as a MACOM.
If the Army further reduces the size of ODCSINT in this process, we will have to divest functions we can no longer do more with less. We are now in the process of attempting to identify functions to divest.


The Force XXI process is active and ongoing. Again, it is a journey, not a destination. We will continue to redesign the Army in a series of rolling baselines as we inject new technology and new operational and organizational constructs to optimize the capabilities it provides. MI is well postured to lead Force XXI to the 21st century, as it should be. However, we too will change. It is imperative that each of us participates actively in this process to ensure MI continues to have the ability to provide responsive support to commanders and remains Always Out Front.
Lieutenant General Menoher is currently the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT). He served as the Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, from 1989 through 1993 and was Commander, INSCOM, from 1993 to 1994. Readers who wish more information may contact the DCSINT Initiatives Group at (703) 695-2968, DSN 225-2968, or E-mail