Fortitude South
D-Day Deception
by Major Richard G. Ricklefs
"In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be
attended by a bodyguard of lies.
At the Teheran conference in November 1943, the "Big Three"
Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin approved
an outline of deception operations for the D-Day invasion of
Europe. That plan, originally known as JAEL, was named after a
treacherous woman of the biblical Old Testament. However, in
December of that same year the Allies renamed it BODYGUARD.1 The
deception operation was a stunning success and helped ensure the
victory of the greatest invasion force the world had known until
that time.
Five-Fold Deception Plan
The strategic nature of BODYGUARD can be seen in its five main
deceptions. VENDETTA and FERDINAND were false invasions in the
western Mediterranean, and IRONSIDE was an invasion of France from
the Bay of Biscay. ZEPPELIN was an equally false invasion of the
Balkans, and was so successful that historians continue to debate
Churchill's desire to invade the Balkans rather than France. The
fifth deception, FORTITUDE, had two parts: FORTITUDE NORTH was the
invasion of Norway, and FORTITUDE SOUTH was an invasion of France
at the Pas de Calais.2
While each deception operation had a degree of success,
FORTITUDE SOUTH was the key deception of when and where the D-Day
invasion would actually occur. It made sense for a variety of
reasons. The distance from Dover to the Pas de Calais was the
shortest across the notoriously difficult English Channel. It was
the shortest route to the heart of Germany, which
resulted in quick turn-around time for ships and air
cover. There were three large harbors in the area
(Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne); the beaches and terrain
around the Pas de Calais were ideal for supporting such
an invasion. Also, FORTITUDE SOUTH had the advantage of
being the plan Adolf Hitler wanted to believe would
occur. Indeed, Hitler had planned to use the same route
in the opposite direction for Operation SEA LION, the
aborted German plan to invade Great Britain.
Setting the Stage
Part of the difficulty in organizing forces for an
invasion, and consequently the need for a deception
plan, was where to physically locate the forces prior to
the assault. Because the Normandy coast was the real
target, forces deployed primarily in Devon and Dorset in
southern England. If the invasion were to occur at the
Pas de Calais, the Allied Forces would have used Kent,
located in England's southeast corner, as a staging
area. Ultimately, the Germans had to be tricked into
believing there was an invasion force building up in
Kent.
The "fictitious" invasion force was the First U.S.
Army Group, commanded by Lieutenant General George S.
Patton. He was an excellent choice because he was
flamboyant and the German Wehrmacht regarded him highly.
Even though he commanded the Third Army, he was able to
create the impression needed to support the deception
operation. In fact, when the Third Army moved to France
to assist in the breakout, a new commander had to be
identified to continue the deception. The explanation
for Lieutenant General Patton's "demotion" to Army
commander was that it resulted from General Eisenhower's
"displeasure" at some of his "indiscretions."
A unique example of human deception in FORTITUDE
SOUTH, involved German General Hans Kramer. He was
captured in North Africa but became ill. Thus, the
Allies decided to repatriate him to Germany via Sweden.
On the way from Wales to London, the route took him
through the heart of the invasion force. He saw elements
of the real Allied Force, but was mislead about his
location. He was told that Dover, Kent, was "just over
the hill," placing the invading force where the Allies
wanted Hitler to believe it was.
Operationally, the actual conduct of bombing raids
supported the deception plan of FORTITUDE SOUTH. The
Allies bombed the Calais region more severely than the
Normandy area. The Allied deception bombers deliberately
avoided key radars and radio intercept sites to ensure
the enemy would see them.7
Deceiving the Collectors
Germany had three primary means of collection prior
to the actual invasion: aerial reconnaissance, spies,
and signals intelligence. FORTITUDE SOUTH used all of
these means to "paint the picture" the Allies wanted the
Germans to see. They allowed the Germans to work
methodically to become more convinced of the Allied
"illusion." Each intelligence method had some
limitations in its ability to collect information. In
every case, however, the Allies endeavored to release
only pieces of a well-orchestrated puzzle that would
make sense in the context of the overall collection
effort.
Aerial Reconnaissance. Luftwaffe's defeat in
the Battle of Britain limited its aerial reconnaissance
capability. However, they still could conduct some
reconnaissance flights, so FORTITUDE SOUTH had to ensure
that imagery would support the deception plan. This was
accomplished primarily through the use of "dummies." The
deception force constructed and used dummy tanks, oil
storage depots, airfields, and landing craft with
amazing success. They created vehicle tracks and lit
notional airfields to ensure the scene appeared real to
any observer. Not all of these deceptions were
successful. The German pilots discovered and avoided
virtually all the fake airfields.8
Spies and Double Agents. The use of spies can perhaps be
best seen in the use of double agents. It is now
believed that all spies were either caught or "turned"
to support he deception. The organization controlling
these activities was the Twenty Committee (XX), or
"Double Cross" Committee. The most successful double
agent, "Garbo, was able to influence German thinking
from Adolf Hitler on down. Field Marshal von Rundstedt,
in reports of meetings he had with Field Marshal Keitel,
specifically cited "Garbo's reports. These reports
supported the belief that the Pas de Calais was the main
target of an Allied invasion. The Twenty Committee was
very effective; its success was evident in German radio
intercepts that the Allies verified through ULTRA.
Double agents clearly influenced the German decision to
wait for an attack at the Pas de Calais.
Signals Intelligence.Signals deception played a major
role in the overall plan of FORTITUDE SOUTH. To convince
the Germans that the Allies were forming an Army in
Kent, they created radio traffic that was commensurate
with such activity. The U.S. 3103rd Signal Battalion and
the British 3118th Signal Service Group provided this
support. Many of the personnel involved in this activity
did not have the training to record radio messages
familiar to the enemy. Therefore, they made a great
effort to record real exercise radio traffic on the new
magnetic wire recorders; then they fabricated scripts
for timely message transmittals. The signals deception
included naval and air force operations to complete the
picture of the invading force.
Another signal-related deception occurred over the
English Channel on D-Day. The Allies had used chaff to
deceive radars in bombing raids over Germany. To support
the D-Day deception, aircraft used this same chaff,
called "window," to simulate the ships of an invasion
fleet headed toward the Pas de Calais. The aircraft flew
in progressive orbits toward France to depict a fleet
moving at eight knots. Considerable analysis went into
ensuring the deception worked within the limited
carrying capacity of the aircraft.
Germany had the additional problem of multiple and
competing intelligence collection agencies. Their
intelligence architecture was redundant and had limited
checks and balances outside each intelligence
organization.
Conclusion
Wars are not won by intelligence or deception, but
rather by a synergistic combination of all aspects of
the force. Evidence of the success of FORTITUDE SOUTH
can be seen in Hitler's reaction to the D-Day invasion.
His fear of an attack at the Pas de Calais was such that
the German Army in that area, the 15th, was only
permitted to partially redeploy to Normandy on 28
July,12 far too late to have a decisive impact on the
battle. FORTITUDE SOUTH was an important aspect of the
synergistic effect that had an unquantifiable, yet very
positive affect on the D-Day invasion.
Major Richard G. Ricklefs is currently serving as
part of the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP). As the
Exchange Officer at the British Defence Intelligence and
Security School, he is the Chief of the Strategic
Studies Branch. He holds master's degrees from Cornell
University and the Defense Intelligence College.