Intelligence and Peacekeeper in Haiti
by Major Denver E. McPherson
Editor's Note: The term "Operations Other than War" used
throughout this article is no longer considered to be doctrinally
accurate. Precise terminology while discussing peace keeping
operations, humanitarian assistance, and operations in aid of civil
authorities should replace the term "OOTW." A message from the
Joint Staff, DJS, 311514Z Aug 1995 released this guidance.
The key to successfully supporting commanders with intelligence
is in knowing what information to provide, how to obtain the
information, the proper processing of that information, and the
correct dissemination of the information. The proper implementation
of these objectives, either directly or indirectly enables the
commander to make an informed decision that influences the outcome
of the mission. The continued success of the U.S. Forces Haiti
(USFH) Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) is a result of balancing
these objectives.
The J2's role in the intelligence cycle is dynamic. The
commanders in Haiti have driven the intelligence effort daily and
relentlessly. This is the cornerstone of intelligence doctrine and
is a requisite for directing what information is necessary for
sound decisionmaking. How the JIC is collecting information is the
J2's responsibility. In Haiti, this involves the careful balance of
gathering information from all sources to support several different
objectives, while supporting the operational and tactical needs of
several commanders. Processing and producing the information into
usable intelligence are as critical as gathering the information.
The J2 accomplishes the disseminating of intelligence to the right
customer through careful management of information coupled with an
understanding of the needs of the user. He balances the needs of
several different commanders against his section's capabilities and
limitations.
In Haiti, the J2 must balance the need for operational as well
as tactical intelligence objectives. The key to successfully
completing the intelligence cycle is contingent upon meeting four
conditions:
- Commanders must drive the intelligence effort.
- There must be a careful balance between tactical and
operational intelligence.
- The JIC must have focused objectives.
- The JIC must perform as a synergistic team.
The Commanders Drive Intelligence
Initially, a provision of successful intelligence support depends
on whether the commander drives the intelligence effort. This phase
of intelligence must not be compromised. The commander driving
intelligence is the cornerstone in developing sound intelligence
support. The commander must understand the capabilities and
limitations of his intelligence assets, and what he can expect from
those assets to maximize their capabilities. In Haiti, this is
critical since the J2 essentially works for three separate and, at
times, differently focused commanders (see Figure 1). The USFH J2,
U.S. Support Group Haiti (USSPTGRPHAITI) J2, and the JTF J2 are the
same person. The J2's initial focus encompasses answering two sets
of priority intelligence requirements (PIR), one set for the USFH
Commander and one set for the JTF Commander.
The USFH Commander essentially drives operational-level
intelligence. His focus includes the entire country of Haiti. He
must ensure support for all U.S. forces in Haiti, to make sure that
the theater campaign is properly executed.
The J2's support for the USSPTGRPHAITI Commander is more of a
balance between operational and tactical intelligence. Since the
Commander of the USSPTGRPHAITI also serves as the USFH Deputy
Commander, his interests focus in two different areas. He is
currently responsible for standing up the U.S. Support Group Haiti,
planned to come on line in early 1996, so he plays a critical role
in focusing the J2 toward these two different objectives. The third
commander who plays a role in driving the intelligence process is
the JTF Commander. Zone V encompasses the majority of the Hatian
capital, Port-au-Prince. His focus is primarily tactical although
he is keenly attuned to the operational objectives of the other two
commanders as they are often the same.
A J2 who works for three separate commanders is inherently
challenged. This would be extremely difficult if the command
structure was not cohesive. In Haiti this is not a problem. Working
relationships between the commanders facilitate the intelligence
process by creating consensus on common intelligence objectives.
Every morning the commanders meet within the JIC and review the
latest information and intelligence. This is an informal process
where each of the commanders reviews all the information from the
previous day. This review includes the daily intelligence summaries
from the United Nations (U.N.), USFH, Zone V, the Cavalry Squadron,
the Military Police (MP) Battalion, and the Special Operations Task
Force. They also review information papers from Force Protection,
higher headquarters, and other agencies. The commanders review this
information asking questions and discussing analysis with the J2.
The morning intelligence update is an interactive process between
the commanders and the J2. The questions and answers that come out
of the discussions make the meetings informative and also serve as
the basis for information requirements and taskings. This meeting
usually takes about an hour. Every day, except Sunday, the
commanders have the undivided attention of the J2 wherein they
drive the intelligence effort. It is important to note that the
morning update is an informal process. The commanders do not
require any special briefings. This indicates their trust in their
intelligence support.
In addition to these morning meetings, the commanders receive
formal briefings every Saturday. These briefings focus on
analytical overviews of specific geographical regions of Haiti or
on specific subjects. The commanders indicate the focus for the
brief or any special emphasis on a particular subject or area in
which they are interested. Twice a month, the JIC analysts conduct
the briefing, while rotating with either the MP Battalion or the
Cavalry Squadron S2s brief their areas of operation.
Operational versus Tactical Intelligence
Doctrine for war compliments that for operations other than war
(OOTW). The levels of war, strategic, operational, and tactical
apply as much to peacekeeping in Haiti as they do to a full scale
Operation DESERT STORM. Operational-level intelligence provides
support to that vital link between strategic objectives and
tactical employment of forces. Tactical operations are executed to
achieve operational results. Tactical-level intelligence provides
support to the commander who is responsible for obtaining those
results.
The J2 has the responsibility for supporting both operational
and tactical intelligence. Successfully balancing these needs takes
an understanding of these needs against the current capabilities of
the JIC. The capabilities of the JIC, when the JTF first "stood up"
in Haiti, were far more dynamic than what is seen today. The
functions are essentially the same but with fewer personnel and
systems.
Balancing intelligence requirements against the J2's
capabilities is the essence of the J2's challenges. Understanding
these requirements starts with the commander's PIR. The J2 is
responsible for managing two sets of PIR, one for the USFH
Commander (operational) and one for the JTF Commander (tactical).
The J2 balances core intelligence functions such as indications and
warning analysis, reporting, threat assessment, planning and
directing collection assets, all-source analytical reporting, and
target development and nomination, in answering these PIR.
The USFH Commander, who is subordinate to the Commander In
Chief U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM), focuses on the operational
objectives of Haiti. In supporting this, the operational
intelligence needs at times complement the tactical intelligence
needs. When you compare the two, they are very similar yet the USFH
Commander's PIR reflect more of a holistic view of operations in
Haiti. The JTF Commander's PIR, although similar, take a more
focused view of Zone V activities. In essence, collection against
the tactical PIR is managed in more detail. Analysts accomplished
essentially the same goal but with two different levels of detail.
As an example, one of the main tenets for which U.S. forces were
brought to Haiti during the reinstatement of President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide was to ensure free and fair elections from
legislative through presidential level. This involved more than
10,000 candidates running for more than 2,100 local, state, and
national offices. For these elections to successfully occur, U.S.
and U.N. forces needed to help maintain a secure and stable
environment prior to, during, and after the elections. Since
elections of this magnitude had never occurred without a large
amount of bloodshed, there was a major focus in effort in meeting
the JTF Commander's operational goals.
The JTF Commander's primary goals, unequivocally stated since
arriving in Haiti, have been vigilance in force protection,
maintenance of a secure and stable environment, and safety. All of
these goals are reflected in his PIR. The J2's objectives to ensure
proper intelligence support were dual; the focus was on the
geopolitical factors of the elections as well as the tactical
intelligence needed to support the troops on the ground. There was
a carefully thought-out plan in the collection, processing, and the
dissemination of information during this period. The J2 focused on
an extensive political intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB), which included names of primary candidates, headquarters of
the major party, electoral headquarters, etc. At the organizational
level, there was a need to ensure that the commanders were aware of
the dynamic and constantly changing political situation within the
country. At the tactical level, there was a need to ensure that
there were fully developed target folders on potential hot spots
throughout the country. As well, there was a need for a more
focused IPB of the Zone V area of operations to include the
electoral headquarters, lines of communications, road conditions,
attitudes of workers and voters in selected regions of the city,
and potential problems that may occur during the elections.
Balancing the organizational and tactical needs of these
differently focused commanders is an art which an intelligence
officer can learn not only through books, but by experience too.
The success of the JIC in keeping the commanders informed during
these times took a well-synchronized JIC with a clear focus.
Focused Objectives
Focusing the JIC means conservatively using the assets
available, since at any given time there are more than 100 current
taskings or requirements levied on the J2. Not all of these
requirements are intelligence oriented (the majority are), but are
requirements that must be accomplished either daily, weekly,
monthly or by suspense. Originally approximately 144 personnel
supported intelligence for the commander. Currently there are 25
people to accomplish the mission. In addition, the J2 must focus
the joint interoperability of these human resources in order to
ensure timely, accurate, relevant, usable, and complete
intelligence support to the operational and tactical requirements.
The intelligence architecture has undergone changes in the last
year based on mission requirements. Under the original JTF
intelligence architecture, the JIC comprised (see glossary) JDISS,
JWICS, STICS, TROJAN SPIRIT, MITT, FAST, MSE, INMARSAT,
ASAS-Warrior, GMF circuit, packet-switch network, LAN, and a WAN
(see glossary). Currently, systems directly supporting the JIC's
intelligence architecture include the JDISS, JWICS, INMARSAT, OPX,
DSN, GSA, HOTS, SINCGARS (frequency-modulated radio), Motorola
Saber System (ultra-high frequency), LAN, and GSA. Additionally,
systems that are at the disposal of the JIC (if needed to support
the intelligence architecture) include the GENSER VTC, DDN, TACSAT,
WWMCCS, the "U.S.A. Direct" AT&T commercial service, and the
TELCO-Haitian local commercial line. The loss of some of the
systems and the addition of others has not degraded the
capabilities of the JIC. Instead the JIC reconfigured to support
operational and tactical intelligence operations in support of USFH
under the U.N. Mission in Haiti. With these limited resources, the
J2 cannot afford to waste the JIC's time on objectives that are not
clearly defined. Every member of the JIC must work toward the
proper end-state(s). There are ongoing requirements to gather
information at many different levels. This requires using all
assets, personnel, and equipment efficiently and to their full
capability.
In order to effectively focus the JIC, the J2 ensures that each
section is fully aware of the primary objectives for both current
and long-term operations. The JIC is broken down into J2 Operations
(J2 OPS), Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D), the
All-Source Production Section (ASPS), the Tactical Feedback Force
Protection Coordination Authority, Special Security Officer, and
the JIC Watch Officer (JICWO). At any given time, these sections
are working together toward the same endstate yet may also be
focusing in different directions on entirely unrelated projects.
During the previous elections, J2 OPS kept the commander and J2
updated on the current situation. At one point, the U.N. alerted
the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and gave them the mission of going
to a major road block along Highway 100, north of Port-au-Prince.
This road block was in an area that was not previously targeted as
a potential hot spot. The CM&D immediately began pulling imagery of
the area so that the QRF could use it in its analysis of the area
to identify what the terrain and road conditions offered. The ASPS
was quickly analyzing historic databases for indicators of possible
problems within the area and analyzing the possibilities of any
organized threat toward U.N. forces on the ground.
The J2's role was to focus specific personnel on the immediate
objective, while keeping ACOM, the United Nations, and subordinate
commanders informed and still developing intelligence for other
tasks. They successfully accomplished this because everyone
understood the objectives and the management of each section's
focus. Focus alone does not ensure success. The end-state is only
found through the management of focus, combined with teamwork.
Teamwork
Teamwork is an essential ingredient for the success of any
operation involving two or more people working in concert to
achieve the same goal. This is especially true within a JIC. Each
person must not only understand the desired objectives but also how
to achieve that end-state. With the myriad of backgrounds and
skills that a joint operation brings, there has to be a
cohesiveness within the JIC that the J2 must achieve. The current
tour of personnel assigned to the USFH JIC ranges from 90 to 179
days. Consequently, on-the-job training is a necessity and cannot
be accomplished without absolute teamwork. Cross training is a
necessity as limited personnel with a myriad of different skills
work together with complex systems daily. All four Services are
represented within the JIC; the U.S. Army comprises the majority.
The J2 expects all soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors to use
most of the systems (supplied by several different tactical,
operational and national agencies). It is a requirement that almost
everyone in the JIC have a basic overview of how these systems
operate and where the systems fall within the overall structure of
the JIC architecture.
The interoperability of all these forces is just as much a
challenge for the J2 as ensuring that they are properly focused. At
any time, the CM&D, ASPS, or J2 operations personnel must be able
to fill in for the JICWO and vice versa. There are only two table
of distribution and allowance (TDA) slots for the JICWO. This
position is staffed 24 hours a day since the JICWO provides the
primary connectivity with the Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC).
These soldiers work 12-hour shifts, 7 days a week. The J2 gives
them a day off periodically to ensure that they receive the
appropriate breaks; this requires that another person from within
the JIC stand in for the JICWO. This goes for any other section
within the JIC as well. Accomplishing this is not possible without
cross-training and teamwork.
Conclusion
USFH is the model of successful intelligence operations in an
OOTW scenario. This success is attributable to properly managing
the following four factors: the commander drives intelligence,
balancing the effort, focused objectives, and teamwork. Although
many more factors affect the intelligence operation, without the
commanders' driving the intelligence effort and the J2 balancing
the commanders' objectives and ensuring the JIC team works
synergistically, these other factors would not positively effect
the outcome of the intelligence support effort.
The Commander Drives Intelligence. In Haiti, the
commanders do drive the intelligence effort. This clearly enables
the J2 to effectively start the support process and properly focus
the effort. Since three commanders are driving this effort, there
is a potential for a disconnected and frustrating process. Not in
Haiti. The commanders work toward the same end-state, synchronizing
operations and their guidance and allowing the intelligence effort
to be more responsive to their needs.
Balancing the effort. The intelligence cycle within the
JIC focuses on both tactical- and operational-level intelligence
support. This is a process requiring a balance of support. Since
these objectives overlap, and in many cases are not clearly
defined, the J2 must be cognizant of the potential for a dichotomy
in support. This balancing of objectives and integration of one to
support the other is a task that the J2 must constantly manage.
Focused Objectives. While ensuring that the JIC properly
supports the commanders with their sometimes different objectives,
the J2 must also properly focus his limited staff and systems. With
the myriad of national, operational and tactical tasks levied on
the JIC, the J2 must focus and ensure understanding of the
end-state. Without this focus, the different sections within the
JIC would not understand their roles within the intelligence
architecture and thus would not support each other, threatening
lives, and the mission.
Teamwork. In order to ensure successful intelligence
support, this team must not only understand its roles within the
intelligence cycle but must also have a good understanding of the
other systems and their responsibilities. Bringing together
personnel from each of the other Services and requiring them to
accomplish many differently focused daily tasks, requires a
cohesive operation emphasizing teamwork.
Major McPherson is currently the S2, 2d Armored Cavalry
Regiment (ACR), Fort Polk, Louisiana. After a short period as the
JTF J2 Operations Chief, he became the JTF Deputy J2 during the 2d
ACR's Task Force Dragoon deployment to Haiti. Readers can reach him
at (318) 531-0573, DSN 863-0573, or E-mail mcphersd@polk-emh
2.army.mil.