Introduction to the Intel XXI Concept
by Captain Neal J. Wegner
Currently slated for a late spring 1996 publication, the
Intelligence XXI concept will be the Army's operational concept for
21st century military intelligence (MI) operations. It depicts how
the intelligence battlefield operating system will support
warfighters. The concept describes the role intelligence will play
in reducing the uncertainties and risks inherent in the conduct of
decisive operations in the 21st century. It also identifies how the
Army will organize, equip, train, and employ the intelligence
battlefield operating system as an integral part of our future
force.
Background
An analysis of future MI requirements as defined in Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations,
related publications, and on-going Force XXI activities led to
development of this concept. In January and February 1995,
respectively, participants at the 21st Century Technology Symposium
and Worldwide Intelligence Conference reviewed the initial tenets.
Then, in May 1995, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
published the Army's vision for intelligence support to Force
XXI INTEL XXI: Strategy for the 21st Century. The concept has been
further refined based on the insights gained from
- The series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments and
demonstrations completed in 1995.
- The results of the TRADOC Force XXI redesign analysis.
- TRADOC's series of Division XXI How to Fight Seminars.
- The 1995 Information Operations Wargame conducted at Fort
Huachuca in November 1995.
Developmental Factors
The highly complex strategic environment in which commanders
will operate has significant implications for future military
operations and the intelligence system that will support them. The
U.S. National Military Strategy focuses now and into the future on
regional conflicts; crisis response; power projection; joint,
coalition, and interagency operations; and a wide variety of
ambiguous threats. Other factors that will influence the
development of the intelligence force over the next two decades
include
- Reduced defense spending.
- Significant growth in information technologies and
digitization.
- Reduced forward presence.
- Nontraditional missions (such as peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance, and so forth), also called "stability and support
operations."
- The proliferation of weapons and technology, which could make
our potential adversaries more lethal and dangerous than ever
before.
Recent operations in Southwest Asia, Panama, Somalia, Rwanda,
Haiti, and Bosnia have given us a preview of the challenges that
lie ahead and how the future force will operate. They illustrate
the complexity of force projection operations in both mid-intensity
conflicts and nontraditional stability- and-support-operations
settings and amplify the critical role technology will play in the
future. Finally, they reinforce the fact that conducting
information operations to gain information dominance will be
critical to the successful conduct of future decisive operations.
Objective
Commanders in Force XXI operations will have at their disposal
the most precise, lethal, and agile weapon systems and
organizations the world has ever known. To mass the effects of
these potent capabilities, these commanders must be able to
- Conduct multidimensional and simultaneous operations.
- See their battlespaces in depth.
- Produce an accurate common picture and share it horizontally
and vertically.
- Locate with precision, track and attack high-payoff targets
using both lethal and nonlethal means.
- Protect their forces throughout the operation.
- Operate jointly and multinationally.
- Track friendly forces.
The U.S. Army is developing the Intel XXI force to provide
commanders with knowledge-based, prediction-oriented capabilities
that can meet these demanding requirements. At the center of this
concept are quality soldiers, leaders, and civilians. This force
will provide commanders with a precise in time presentation of
their battlespace that conveys an accurate understanding of the
adversary, terrain, weather and operational environment. It will
provide intelligence operators the resources and tools necessary to
coordinate and synchronize intelligence operations in concert with
supported military operations. It will equip the force with
tailorable, multispectral collection capabilities to deal with the
newest emerging capabilities and technologies. These capabilities
and technologies will include: automatic target recognition,
on-board sensor processing, artificial intelligence tools, a common
operating environment, and distributed and shared databases. It
will support operations on the move using broadcast and smart
push and pull technologies. Finally Intel XXI will operate as
an integral part of all operations, including information
operations.
Conclusion
In summary, the intelligence force of the 21st century Intel
XXI will have the design, equipment, and training to meet the
demands of future operations and Force XXI commanders. It will be
a flexible, tailorable, rapidly deployable, joint and
coalition-capable force. It will be a force that can access,
leverage, and integrate the complementary and unique specialized
capabilities of the total intelligence force. The total
intelligence force includes national agencies, the Army's
Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), strategic and
operational units, active and reserve component tactical
organizations,and joint and multinational forces.
Captain Wegner is currently a concepts action officer
in Concepts Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, at the
Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. Readers can contact him at
(520) 538-2257, or DSN 879-2257.
Doctrine Support to Force XXI
by Major Donald W. Cairns, USA (Retired)
To prepare for the 21st century, the U.S. Army is making a
quantum leap in lethality, mobility, and responsiveness to meet any
scenario ranging from peace through war and back to peace.
Harnessing the power of information and technology will create an
overwhelming force at the decisive moment and location. In this
revolutionary process, doctrine takes on a whole new perspective in
facilitating the warfighter's mission accomplishment.
The challenge is to develop doctrine and make it available at
the same pace as the Army modernizes. As the Army focus transitions
from systems to capabilities, operational concepts rather than
threat doctrine must be readily available at the warfighter's
fingertips and built into the decision making process. Doctrine
needs to evolve as operational planning concepts evolve. The "how"
and "what" of our Army has changed, but the "why" remains the same
as it has been for over 200 years selfless service to the nation.
We need to immediately address providing the doctrinal "how" and
"what" and making it available at the same tempo as the
warfighter's mission.
Integrating and Under- standing Intelligence
As Force XXI capitalizes on the information and technology age,
it focuses on connectivity and force tailoring to satisfy
warfighting requirements in any scenario. Despite the great success
achieved in the last decade, the Army must rigorously assess
organizational concepts if we are to achieve its full potential. As
in the TV commercial in which the only word from the guest speaker
was "Wausau," the military also has one main focus: "battle
command." Battle command incorporates two vital components the
ability to lead and the ability to decide. Both components demand
skill, wisdom, experience, and courage always moral and often
physical as well.
To make it work successfully, the Army developed the Battle
Command Training Program (BCTP). If soldiers are to train as they
fight, we must totally integrate the intelligence and electronic
warfare (IEW) training program into the BCTP with supporting
doctrine and the ability to have ready access at every echelon from
the foxhole to the White House.
MI soldiers know IEW doctrine, but it does not stop there. An
essential challenge is to provide combat arms commanders and their
staffs with a working knowledge of intelligence doctrine.
Commanders must understand intelligence if they are to drive it.
Today commanders and their S3 or G3 need to be familiar with
intelligence capabilities and understand IEW operations if they are
to accurately visualize the enemy and orchestrate the battle plan.
Doctrine Must Keep Pace
As Force XXI and Intel XXI evolve, so must IEW doctrine. Our
34-series and selected 100-series field manuals and joint
publications need to emerge at the same pace and maintain the same
synergy. The IEW doctrine, properly focused, provides the direction
to execute force projection operations. These manuals are designed
to meet the needs of the combat commanders and their staff as well
as provide techniques, tactics, and procedures for all soldiers
executing IEW operations.
The first precept in new intelligence doctrine centers on
warfighting capabilities. Warfighters must focus and drive the IEW
system. The baseline doctrine identifies the five IEW force
projection tenets:
- The commander drives intelligence.
- Intelligence synchronization.
- Split-based operations.
- Tactical tailoring.
- Broadcast dissemination.
Recipe for Implementing the Vision
The doctrine outlines the fundamentals of IEW operations and
identifies the levels of intelligence and the measures of
effectiveness. The baseline manuals will contain detail of
collection management, synchronization planning, and intelligence
analysis, all of which assure battlefield intelligence preparation.
They explain how to assist the commander in developing priority
intelligence requirements. Collectively, these manuals implement
the vision of Force XXI and Intel XXI. They support the fielding of
new IEW systems and the concepts of modern day warfighting. As the
intelligence community reengineers, adds additional
responsibilities, and develops new capabilities, the doctrine must
be readily available, easy to reference, and totally
understandable.
The 34-series manuals address doctrine from various
perspectives. There are manuals that define and detail the IEW
disciplines such as counterintelligence, human intelligence,
imagery intelligence, and technical intelligence. Some manuals
approach IEW by echelon, from armored cavalry regiment through
theater Army. Other manuals address IEW by systems, such as the
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System or the unmanned
aerial vehicles. Collectively, the IEW doctrine allows easy access
and reference to any issue.
Doctrine's Challenges
Army doctrine requires the dynamics of an "Internet" system.
No longer is it reasonable to assume a published field manual will
stay current for the normal five-year cycle. To remain current and
relevant, we must continually update doctrine based on the
experiences and requirements of those using it. Doctrine must be
readily accessible, easy to reference, and netted into the
decisionmaking process. As the Army's mission and capabilities
evolve into FORCE XXI and specifically Intel XXI, our doctrinal
concepts, means, and methods must evolve to meet this challenge.
Mr. Cairns is currently an intelligence operations
specialist at the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
Training and Doctrine Support Detachment, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
He has a bachelor of science degree in Business from the University
of Nebraska. Readers can reach him at (520) 533-2318/19, DSN
821-2318/19, or PROFS/E-mail jonesj2%hua1
@huachuca-emh11.army.mil.