VANTAGE POINT
by Brigadier General John W. Smith
INTELLIGENCE TRAINING XXI: READY NOW
Editor's Note: Brigadier General Smith, Deputy Commanding
General of United States Army Intelligence Center and Fort
Huachuca, is Major General Thomas' guest writer for this quarter.
This issue focuses on Force XXI and many of the initiatives
supporting military intelligence's (MI) transition to an
intelligence force structure that can perform effectively on the
21st century battlefield. As you will see in the articles that
follow, our battlefield operating system (BOS) is well postured in
terms of having a vision of how MI will fight, in terms of having
a grip on what the force structure should look like, and in terms
of being actively engaged in the Army's Advanced Warfighting
Experiments (AWEs).
Intel XXI A Training Challenge
Because Force XXI has been driven in many respects by
technology, it is natural that much of the related discussion
dwells upon digitization, automated fusion, advanced communications
and the like. Accompanying the technological challenges, however,
are the less frequently discussed, yet real set of training
challenges. At the end of the day, the value of intelligence to the
commanders we serve will still be measured in terms of whether or
not intelligence "delivered the goods." Those judgements, of
course, will be influenced by how well our systems work, but more
importantly, they will be influenced by how well- trained we are.
The Primacy of Proficiency
What is essential is that we, as MI professionals appreciate
and focus on the fact that while training has always been a key
determinant in effective performance, its significance is going to
dramatically increase in the Force XXI operational setting. In
particular, Force XXI will place increasing value on MI
professionals who are accomplished. But has not this always been
the case? Yes, soldiers, leaders, and units will need proficiency
in many of the same areas that required proficiency twenty years
ago. What is new, though, is the need to demonstrate this
proficiency under new, more difficult operational conditions. As
Force XXI envisions decentralized, dispersed operations where
forces concentrate combat power only at the decisive time and
place, it is essential that intelligence be able to "deliver the
goods" in this new, dynamic operational setting. As the first order
of business, this requires a truly proficient MI force; that is,
ones who can "do" versus ones who only understand what needs to be
done in abstract terms.
While the Force XXI battlefield will place new demands on the
competency of the MI professional, in many respects the words used
to describe those competencies will not be new. Rather, the ability
to "deliver the goods" under more challenging standards will be
new. The old tried and true job requirements for the MI
professional remain be an expert on friendly operations, on the
intelligence BOS, and be a proficient analyst (the answer is not
yet in the "bit bucket"). If anything must be added to the MI
professional's kit bag, it will be the need for them to demonstrate
proficiency in accessing and navigating (either as a leader or at
the technical level) the multitude of networks and information
sources that must be used in the global or military information
networks to get needed information to the battle commander.
Even so, what does proficiency really mean? In a nutshell, it
means practice. It means devising and structuring realistic
training and then doing it! In Force XXI, it means that the
intelligence force will have to be supported with better
intelligence simulations and scenarios to drive home-station
training and Battle Command Training Programs. It means that the
combat training centers will need to adjust to allow for realistic
intelligence to more effectively drive their training. But for most
of you, it means that the real movers and shakers in Army
intelligence units (the majors and lieutenant colonels, the senior
noncommissioned officers, and the warrants) must actually take
ownership for championing proficiency in their units by mandating
tough training training that requires that everyone "walk the
walk."
Schoolhouse-Unit Training
At Fort Huachuca, we are pursuing a host of initiatives to
tackle the Intel XXI training challenges. Some, like
distance-learning and others that fall loosely under the rubric of
a "schoolhouse without walls" have been discussed here before. The
thrust of these efforts, however, is to enable a more effective
training partnership between the field and the school. Our
overarching goal is the pursuit of training and training
development that will allow an MI unit, an MI soldier, or an MI
leader to legitimately claim that they are "ready now." This means
that there can be no seam between training in the school and the
unit, and it means that we should seek to do training developments
just once; then, using technology, expeditiously export the results
of those efforts to the field.
As we proceed along this path, we will be seeking your help to
rapidly prototype some training by forming school-field
partnerships on selected training efforts. In taking this tack
though, it is essential that we see the training challenge through
your eyes. To this end, I welcome your comments and suggestions.
Send E-mail to me at smithj%hua1@huachuca-emh 11.army. mil.
Prior to assuming his current position in October 1995,
Brigadier General Smith was the Director, Intelligence Directorate
(J2), U.S. Southern Command, Panama. Brigadier General Smith has
commanded the 207th Military Intelligence Brigade, VII Corps in
Germany and later in Saudi Arabia during Operations DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM; the 104th Military Intelligence, 4th Infantry
Division, Fort Carson, Colorado; the 1st Military Intelligence
Company, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas; and the
Pittsburgh Field Office, Region III, 109th Military Intelligence
Group.