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**INFLUENCE PROCESS ACTIVITY:  
TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS**

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**HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

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# **INFLUENCE PROCESS ACTIVITY: TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS**

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## Preface

The Influence Process Task Technical Manual series is an evolution of Special Text (ST) 33-01 (which rescinded FM 3-05.31) and provides detailed techniques and procedures that, in their whole, enable the conduct of influence activities by the Army Psychological Operations forces. Each TM in the series provides unique content; however, the TMs are interconnected and codependent. TM 3-53.10 provides an overview and summary of the interconnectivity between the TM series and higher echelon publications. The remaining TMs address specific activities of the influence process. The Influence Process Activity series includes TM 3-53.11, *Target Audience Analysis*; TM 3-53.12, *Plan*; TM 3-53.13, *Prepare*; TM 3-53.14, *Execute*; and TM 3-53.15, *Assess*.

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**Note.** TM 3-53.10, TM 3-53.12, TM 3-53.13, TM 3-53.14, and TM 3-53.15 are currently in the publication process; therefore, the publication dates are still unknown, and they are excluded from the References section of this publication.

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Dividing ST 33-01 into separate technical manuals allows for the inclusion of more details for each task, while reducing the overall size of each manual. This expansion facilitates the execution of influence activities. The TM series will be published over the course of a 2-year period beginning with this TM in the first quarter of 2022. The decision to publish the target audience analysis (TAA) TM first is a result of TAA being determined to be the most critical doctrinal gap and the task most interconnected to other steps in the process. The decision to not publish each TM in the series concurrently was based on an analysis of doctrinal gaps and criticality of providing content as expeditiously as possible. ST 33-01 will be rescinded once the entire influence process activities TM series is published.

TM 3-53.11 establishes techniques and procedures for Psychological Operations forces conducting analysis of foreign target audiences (TAs) in support of commander's objectives and influence-based objectives. Analysis provides requisite information for Psychological Operations Soldiers throughout each phase of conducting influence activities, to include the planning, development, delivery, and assessment of series. Series focus on intermediate objectives toward a single supporting psychological objective (SPO) and TA combination in support of a psychological objective (PO). Multiple series may be required to support the achievement of each PO. Multiple POs support a program(s). Analysis further enables informed advice and increases behavior forecast accuracy. The principles contained in this publication are linked to Army Service doctrine in FM 3-53.

TM 3-53.11 contains numerous acronyms, abbreviations, and terms. Users should refer to the Glossary at the end of this manual for their meanings. This manual uses joint terms where applicable. Select joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. TM 3-53.11 is not the proponent of any terms.

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**Note.** To ensure clarity between the terms psychological objective (PO) and military information support operations (MISO) objectives, the following note is provided. Joint policy and doctrine currently refer to desired POs as MISO objectives. The usage of the term MISO objective, however, does not focus on the objective against which Psychological Operations Soldiers measure effectiveness. MISO are *what* is conducted by the functions of the Psychological Operations force to produce behavior change. Measuring MISO objectives will only provide measures of performance. POs, in terms of behavior change, are *why* MISO are conducted. For this reason, this manual uses *psychological objectives* instead of *MISO objectives* and focuses on measuring desired behavior changes described in supporting psychological objectives to determine the effectiveness of MISO conducted to bring about those changes.

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The principal audiences for TM 3-53.11 are Psychological Operations branch personnel, planners, and supported commanders and their staffs regardless of Service.

This TM, in conjunction with Army tactics, techniques, and procedures and Combined Arms Training Strategies, provides Psychological Operations unit leaders with practical references necessary to analyze foreign target audiences, the information and operational environment, and the mission as part of influence efforts, as well as to develop and conduct training for the Psychological Operations branch.

This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of TM 3-53.11 is the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, USAJFKSWCS. The preparing agency is the Psychological Operations Doctrine Division, USAJFKSWCS. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-POD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Liberty, NC 28310-9610; by e-mail to AOJK-POD@socom.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

# Introduction

TM 3-53.11 is a new publication that supplements Army Service doctrine in FM 3-53.

TM 3-53.11 updates Psychological Operations doctrine to include the application of the hierarchy of psychological effects model (HPEM) to the influence framework and subsequent target audience analysis model (TAAM). The following is a summary of information by chapter.

**Chapter 1** provides an overview of influence process activity target audience analysis.

**Chapter 2** details the identification and refinement of TAs.

**Chapter 3** addresses aspects of determining a TA's ability to achieve the desired behavior.

**Chapter 4** provides information on identifying conditions that affect the TA's behavior.

**Chapter 5** details identifying vulnerabilities to change causes and effects of behavior.

**Chapter 6** identifies how to determine the susceptibility of the TA to influence efforts.

**Chapter 7** details the availability of an audience for influence targeting.

**Chapter 8** details the development of arguments and the recommendation of psychological actions.

**Chapter 9** addresses the refinement of assessment criteria.

**Appendix A** provides a sample format of the target audience analysis worksheet (TAAW).

TM 3-53.11 provides a reference for conducting and reporting the analysis required by Psychological Operations Soldiers to perform each of the other influence process activities.

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# Chapter 1

## Overview

Conducting influence is dependent on proficiency in the following influence process activities: target audience analysis (TAA), plan, execute, and assess. TAA, like plan and assess, is a continual process that affects the accuracy, efficiency, and efficacy of all influence activities. TAA for a particular operational area should be ongoing regardless of whether a specific program currently exists. Recent operations underline the importance of influence activities; however, difficulties arise from the fact that assessing the effectiveness and operational value of influence activities is a complex task. The foundation of assessment is a clear and in-depth understanding of target audiences (TAs) and the operational environment (OE). The Department of Defense employs Psychological Operations forces to change the attitudes, values, beliefs, decision-making processes, and ultimately the behavior of targeted individuals and groups. This requires well-defined objectives, robust and timely data collection, and accurate analysis and evaluation.

### **INTRODUCTION TO INFLUENCE PROCESS ACTIVITY: TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS**

1-1. Target audience analysis (TAA) is a Psychological Operations branch-specific process in which Soldiers critically and comprehensively examine individuals and groups to determine current behaviors, causes of behaviors, and audience susceptibilities and vulnerabilities in relation to psychological objectives (POs). The target audience analysis model (TAAM) provides eight steps and results in a thorough analysis that is captured in a target audience analysis worksheet (TAAW). TAA is the cornerstone of the influence effort. To change a group's behavior, Soldiers must understand why the TA behaves as it does. The ability to conduct effective TAA is one of the most vital skills to be mastered. It is critical that Soldiers conducting TAA fully understand the model and are aware of the potential significance and use of each piece of information gathered and recorded in the worksheet. Influence efforts will be ineffective or even detrimental to mission accomplishment without this critical analysis.

1-2. The TAAW has much wider applicability than Psychological Operations force usage and is an invaluable source of information for other functions and capabilities. Consequently, writers use commonly understood terms and meanings from the Department of Defense lexicon, except when necessary. Finally, since the OE is fluid and continually changes TAs in not so obvious ways, the report is a living document that requires periodic updates to remain current, accurate, and relevant. The TAAW is an analyst's compilation and explanation of the TAA findings in a single document that outlines behaviors, motives, vulnerabilities, and other significant information of a current TA. The TAAW provides key insights beneficial to the following example activities:

- Planning.
- Intelligence.
- Cyberspace operations.
- Electronic warfare.
- Department of Defense deception activities.
- Targeting.
- Assessment.

1-3. The TAAW captures the ongoing work of the analyst and conveys information and recommendations for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing influence activities.

1-4. The TAAW, like TAA, is never complete. Rather, it is a living document that should be updated frequently as the information and operating environment continue to change. Appendix A of this TM provides a sample TAAW format.

1-5. Outcomes of objective analysis, to include recommendations and behavior forecasts, require subjective evaluations to be made based on the experience and intuition of the analyst. This objective and subjective examination method is the art of the task, analyze. Assessments, and associated determinations of causal links between influence efforts and observed behavior changes, rely on the quality of influence analysis.

1-6. The application of analysis to influence efforts requires an understanding and consistent use of three key terms: analysis, evaluation, and assess. The below descriptions provide greater clarity to the application of these terms in the context of influence efforts:

- Analysis is the examination of something in detail to better understand or draw conclusions from it. Analysis is objective in nature and looks at the facts or inputs provided through research, observation, and intelligence. Through this method Soldiers determine the assumptions, data, and intelligence which have relevance.
- Evaluation is subjective in nature, as compared to analysis, and is the act of considering or examining something to judge its value, quality, importance, extent, or condition. Inputs are looked at or analyzed in detail, and then a subjective determination is made. Some evaluations can point to clear cause and effect relationships, while most others must rely on the discernment and skill of the evaluator to estimate the degree of impact.
- Assess is part of a logical feedback loop critical for understanding effects and effectiveness. Assess relies on the results of detailed objective analysis and informed subjective evaluations to determine the degrees to which outcomes are a result of planned operations and spontaneous events. Assessment becomes more difficult as the number of variables affecting a TA increases. The Soldier is frequently required to make a judgment based on available information.

1-7. For more information about analysis, evaluation, and assessment see ADP 5-0.

## **FORECASTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

1-8. Forecasts are probability estimates and are subject to varying degrees of accuracy over time. Psychological Operations provide the commander with behavior forecasts and make recommendations based on analytical research and informed assumptions. Behavior forecast accuracy improves over time as continual assessments increase understanding of the operational environment, and the degree to which variables influence TAs, but at no time will forecasts be absolute.

1-9. When making recommendations, it is important to convey the current level of uncertainty and expected level of accuracy. Forecasts may initially be based on limited data points, but continuing operations will allow for observation and forecast refinements as uncertainty decreases and understanding increases. Accuracy over time is where the mutually dependent relationship between analysis and assessment is most apparent. Assessment accuracy depends on quality analysis. Assessment results provide additional data which enhance analysis. Figure 1-1 depicts a forecast model with accuracy increasing with understanding.

1-10. Predictions are like forecasts but are most often expressed in more definitive terms; what will happen, as opposed to what may happen. Forecasting behavior is more appropriate because it implies an understanding that accuracy increases as more data is gathered about the TA. Human behavior is affected by many variables, some known and some unknown. Attempts to predict human behavior have often failed because of uncontrolled variables in the environment, failure to examine patterns of life, ignorance of historical trends, and other key factors.




Figure 1-1. Cone of uncertainty model

## TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS

1-11. The dynamic nature of human behavior, and the depth of understanding required to accomplish the tasks, demands an ongoing and systematic approach to TAA for each area of operation regardless of whether or not a program is already in place. TAA should be a proactive (not reactive) endeavor. TAA provides planners and decision makers the information required to enable increased accuracy and efficiency in influencing a very complex operational environment. The eight-step TAAM, provides a framework to examine the motivations and consequences of behavior to determine how best to influence the TA.

1-12. The outcome of TAA is the argument (the overall argument and approach used to obtain the desired behavior from the TA). TAA also informs recommendations for actions planned and executed for psychological effect, referred to as psychological actions (PSYACTs), that the U.S. military and its allies can take to shape the operational environment and influence the behavior of selected foreign audiences. Outcomes of analysis conducted to understand TAs inform each of the other tasks. In terms of messaging, series planning requires knowledge of the TA's preferred communication methods, their current patterns of media use, perceived credibility of sources and channels, and the beliefs and values of a TA in relationship to POs.

1-13. The TAAW is the format used to record thorough information and analysis resulting from employment of the eight-step TAAM. The systematic approach of the TAAM and recording of information using the TAAW enhances the ability to produce a series of actions and messages to successfully modify the TA's behavior. A detailed TAAW facilitates the series approval process because it yields substantial documentation outlining the rationale behind each decision and recommendation. See appendix A for a sample TAAW.

## CONDUCTING INITIAL RESEARCH FOR TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS

1-14. Soldiers must keep abreast of current events and study the history, culture, society, preferred methods of communication, and political makeup of their respective target countries or regions to increase their awareness of long-standing and emerging influence-relevant issues. Acquiring more than a general knowledge of countries and their institutions, populace, and culture is a fundamental responsibility of every Soldier. To accomplish this, continuous research and study of a population's culture is essential. Culture, is a kind of collective mental programming based on a set of values, attitudes, beliefs, artifacts, and other meaningful symbols representing a pattern of life adopted by a people that helps them interpret, evaluate, and communicate as members of society. Having an expert understanding of the culture and its dimensions is key to successful TAA and influence activities.

1-15. TAA is a continuous process that is constantly refined as more information is gained and understanding about the TA increases over time. Soldiers initiate TAA by conducting preliminary research of information related to the area of operations (AO) and its population to identify the specific individuals, organizations, and key demographic sets to target.

1-16. Accurate and worthwhile TAA requires research and in-depth analysis of large amounts of information. Soldiers conducting TAA must evaluate the sources of information to determine their credibility, accuracy, and relevance. Some sources of information for TAA research, to include responses to information requirements (IRs) that are integrated into the commander's collection efforts, are as follows:

- Results of influence-focused information preparation of the battlespace (IPB) to include the psychological characteristics overlay, threat center of gravity analysis, and threat templates.
- Open-source information, to include Internet sites, news agencies, academic journals, and unclassified government and nongovernment information.
- Psychological Operations or supported unit documentation, to include situation reports (SITREPs), after action reports (AARs), operations plans (OPLANs), and other archival information.
- Finished intelligence products produced by the U.S. Government (USG) and allied agencies.
- Social media analytics and assessments of TA preferred methods of communication.

## ANALYZING THE TARGET AUDIENCE

1-17. TAA is a detailed and comprehensive examination of selected groups or individuals to determine how best to influence their behavior to align with U.S. objectives. The TAAM is designed specifically to determine how to elicit certain behavior from individuals within a particular group. Through TAA, Soldiers perform the following critical functions for the development of effective influential actions and messages:

- Identify groups and individuals that can accomplish desired behaviors that support the PO.
- Understand the motivations for TA behavior.
- Identify potential vulnerabilities that can be used to influence behavior.
- Develop arguments and recommended actions to influence TAs to achieve supporting psychological objectives (SPOs).

## THE FIVE KEY QUESTIONS

1-18. The TA is analyzed in relation to a given desired behavior that contributes directly to accomplishing a specific objective; that is, the specific behavioral goal for that group or individual. TAs have unique characteristics, and they are motivated and affected by different events, stimuli, and experiences. The degree to which they can be influenced and the way they are best influenced could vary greatly or slightly. The Soldier must determine the conditions and vulnerabilities of each TA as they relate to the specific desired behavior. Conditions and vulnerabilities of the TA will be discussed later in this chapter.

1-19. Arguments and PSYACTs are tailored to each TA to influence its attitudes and behaviors more precisely toward the achievement of the SPO. Accurate and thorough analysis of the TA will yield vital information for the Soldier. The TAA seeks to answer the following five key questions:

- What TAs will be most effective in accomplishing the desired behavior?
- What are the reasons for the TA's current behavior?
- What communication channels are preferred by the TA?

- How can the TA be influenced to achieve the desired behavior?
- What are the appropriate criteria by which to assess progress toward the desired behavior?

## THE TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS MODEL

1-20. The TAAM is a practical research and analysis method that yields the necessary information for developing products and actions. The TAAM is a critical step towards developing effective series, and incorporates pertinent information obtained during planning and from incoming data and intelligence. The TAAM is an analytical model based on eight sequential and interrelated steps; each step is as important as the next, and the precision and relevance of the resulting information serves as the basis for the creation of arguments, both main and supporting arguments, and determination of the appropriate PSYACTs to influence the intended audience. The analysis is captured in a TAAW, which provides the recommended arguments and PSYACTs that Soldiers use to develop a series. The TAAM consists of the following eight steps:

- **Step 1.** Identify and refine TAs.
- **Step 2.** Determine achievability.
- **Step 3.** Identify conditions.
- **Step 4.** Identify vulnerabilities.
- **Step 5.** Determine susceptibility.
- **Step 6.** Determine accessibility.
- **Step 7.** Develop arguments.
- **Step 8.** Refine assessment criteria.

## THE TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

1-21. The analysis conducted using the TAAM is captured in a TAAW, which provides the recommended arguments Soldiers use to develop series of messages and actions. Appendix A provides a sample format with the following TAAW sections explained in greater detail:

- Refined TA.
- Achievability.
- Conditions.
- Vulnerability.
- Susceptibility.
- Accessibility.
- Arguments.
- Refined Assessment Criteria.

1-22. Influential interventions into the operational environment requires well-defined objectives, robust and timely data collection, and precise analysis and evaluation. The following steps and tasks of analysis provide a framework from which to develop requisite understanding of the environment and TA. Subsequent chapters provide detailed insights and recommendations for each step of the TAAM.

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## Chapter 2

# Step 1: Identify and Refine Target Audiences

Potential target audiences (PTAs) are identified and approved as part of the program based upon very limited information. These PTAs include only general categories of groups. The list of categories is intentionally broad and encompasses a target country or region. The potential target audience list (PTAL), along with the influence-focused objectives that support the commander's objectives, establishes the overall left and right limits for influence activities. Given that the PTAL contains broad TAs, the first step of the TAAM is to identify and refine TAs for further analysis.

## REFINE TARGET AUDIENCES

2-1. Refinement of TAs includes identification and selection. TAs are identified to enable decision makers to understand who may be targeted. Once TAs have been identified the list is refined through a selection process based on which TAs have the potential to affect the PO through the achievement of SPOs. This refining of TAs is a process similar to military backward planning where the objective is identified and then intermediate steps and potential barriers toward achievement are identified. Analysts must understand the objective and requisite steps to behavior achievement to ascertain a TA's potential viability. The SPO for each series is the culmination point of achieved intermediate objectives. Plan of execution becomes somewhat linear with intermediate objectives preceding SPO accomplishment, and SPOs preceding achievement of the PO, which ultimately supports the commander's objectives.

2-2. SPOs are refined at the beginning of series development and intermediate objectives coincide with each stage of the hierarchy of psychological effects model (HPEM). The HPEM stages are defined in terms of thresholds that identify when a TA has progressed from one HPEM stage to the next. Intermediate objectives are the attitudes and behaviors that the actions and messages of the series aim to change to achieve the next threshold. For example, if the TA is determined to have a favorable attitude toward the SPO, and the number of TA and level of favorability reaches or exceeds the given threshold, the objective for attitude will have been reached and the series moves to the next objective of preference.

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*Note.* The terms attitude and sentiment are often used as synonymous variants in academia and industry. Each term, depending on context and scientific discipline, may offer a certain level of specificity to an author's intent. Differences in the terms are so minute as to render them inconsequential in the context of influence activities. Psychological Operations Soldiers should simply be aware of both terms to avoid any lack of clarity when exposed to one term or the other while conducting influence activities or related research.

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2-3. The intended TA will largely be made up of those groups or individuals who are not engaging in behaviors that support U.S. objectives. Some groups or individuals, however, may be engaging in behaviors that support U.S. objectives, but the continuation of those behaviors is deemed tenuous or at-risk from external influences and in need of reinforcement. Each SPO targets a specific behavior of a particular group. Targeted behaviors are those identified as needing to be changed or reinforced to accomplish the SPO. This change may be to cease, decrease, initiate, or increase a behavior. The change sought from a series is behavioral; however, both attitudinal and behavioral intermediate objectives, are necessary to move a TA along the continuum of the HPEM to achieve the SPO in support of the PO.

2-4. The HPEM stages are the attitudinal or behavioral intermediate psychological objectives of the series. Initial assessments of the TA determine which stage along the HPEM continuum best defines the TA in relationship to the SPO and becomes the start point for series developed for that TA. The HPEM stages to be considered for each series are as follows: awareness, understanding, attitude, preference, behavior intention, and behavior achievement.

2-5. The influence plan is developed to support the commander’s objective under the authorities of the program(s). Programs are authoritative and provide guidance such as: objectives, themes to stress or avoid, permitted dissemination means, and attribution. The influence plan can include multiple series and POs, which are derived from the program(s). The influence plan will be continuously updated based on analysis. Figure 2-1 depicts the continuum of intermediate objectives toward SPO achievement, and the relationship between TAs, intermediate objectives, SPOs, series, and multiple-POs that constitute an influence plan.




Figure 2-1. Influence plan

2-6. PTAL refinement focuses on the PO and associated SPOs. During initial mission analysis, broad PTAs are identified based upon often incomplete information and limited available planning time. Identifying relevant or priority TAs becomes less difficult as operations progress. A refinement of the broad PTAs begins at the initial stages of TAA. As operations advance, Soldiers usually have greater access to the TAs, increased understanding of the environment, and an ever-expanding body of information to analyze, making it easier to refine the TAs and to identify additional ones.

2-7. Ideally, the TAA will become increasingly more focused on specific TAs with more detailed and factual information, which will improve its reliability and usefulness. An example of this is seen in weather forecast models of a major storm; as the storm is tracked, over time the forecast becomes more accurate. This increased accuracy over time is a critical concept to understand when briefing commanders on the constraints of initial assessments and the need to gather accurate and influence relevant data on TAs before moving forward into series development.



2-8. When identifying TAs in relation to a given SPO, the TAs are divided into two categories: primary actors and secondary actors:

- *Primary actors* are those individuals or groups that are engaging in or likely to engage in the targeted behavior. These actors are considered the doers. For the SPO, *The TA votes in the national election*, primary actors are the TA members that would cast their ballots. For the SPO, *The TA decreases emplacement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along coalition routes*, primary actors are the individuals or groups who are engaging in or likely to engage in the planting of IEDs.
- *Secondary actors* are those individuals or groups that can directly or indirectly influence the behavior of the primary actors. Secondary actors are often leaders and key communicators. For the SPO, *The TA votes in the national election*, secondary actors are those TAs able to exert influence on primary actors to vote or not vote. For the SPO, *The TA decreases emplacement of IEDs along coalition routes*, secondary actors are the TAs who may exert influence on the primary actors to plant or not plant IEDs.

## CATEGORIES OF TARGET AUDIENCES

2-9. Influence activities can more effectively engage a well-defined and thoroughly researched TA. For example, the TA *Greater Albanian political party members, Kacanik Municipality, Kosovo*, is a very well-defined TA. *Farmers growing cocoa to supplement income, Chapare Region, Bolivia*, is also a well-defined TA. Defining a TA as completely as possible is essential in TAA. One method to facilitate this is to categorize individuals or groups. Typically, there are four categories of TAs, which are as follows:

- Organizations.
- Demographic sets.
- Leaders.
- Key communicators.

2-10. The first category of TA consists of organizations. People form or join organizations to achieve some goal or purpose. Military units; political, religious, or social advocacy groups; profit-making enterprises; political or legislative bodies; unions; charities; and professional associations are examples of this type of TA. Members of an organization are goal-oriented, and although they may develop close ties with some members within the organization, they typically view them as associates or coworkers. Soldiers should consider organizations to be influential in terms of the members' shared purpose, common attributes, and exposure to many of the same internal and external sources of information. The members share a common interest that can be leveraged.

2-11. The second category of TA consists of demographic sets of people who share specific characteristics. These people are a commonly leveraged TA. There is no limit to the size or description of demographic sets. They may be very broad or extremely well defined. The more specifically defined the demographic set, the better the TA. The challenge with demographic sets is that, even if they are specifically defined, they may not share common characteristics, attributes, motivations, or experiences except in the broadest sense. Blue collar factory workers between the ages of 21 and 35 are an example of a well-defined demographic set. Some examples of TA demographics include—

- Geographic area (region, district, town, or province).
- Gender.
- Age.
- Ethnicity.
- Tribe.
- Socioeconomic status (rural poor, urban rich, middle class, elite, and so on).
- Occupation.
- Religion.
- Education level.
- Political affiliation.

2-12. The third category of TA is leaders. Leaders are individuals or small groups whose ability over others is known and acknowledged, most often by virtue of their position within society (self-imposed or otherwise) or within a given organization. A leader's ability may be by consent of the followers but may be by unwilling submission.

2-13. When identifying formal leaders, it is helpful to consider the nature of the relationship between the leader and the led as this may inform the Soldier of potential vulnerabilities that can be leveraged. Leaders can occupy positions of control over varying sizes and types of—

- Groups.
- Geographic areas (sectors, regions, territories, or nation-states).
- Government agencies.
- Private entities.
- Security forces (sanctioned or otherwise).
- Criminal organizations.
- Political, economic, social, or religious organizations.

2-14. Leaders can make very effective TAs, as they can potentially affect the thoughts and actions of those they lead. However, they are not easily susceptible to influence. When leaders can be persuaded, the impact can be tremendous. In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Korean Worker’s Party Central Committee Secretariat, is an example of a group of leaders that have an extremely low susceptibility but a high potential to affect change. Therefore, if its leaders could be persuaded, they could begin a series of events actions contributing to a change in their government’s policies.

2-15. The fourth category of TA is key communicators. Key communicators are individuals deemed credible by members of a specific TA. Members of the TA trust and rely on a particular key communicator for information, opinions, or interpretation of information. In this case, the TA is more susceptible if the message is delivered by a key communicator that they trust.

2-16. Key communicators may be leaders in terms of their level of influence over a population without being in what a particular culture defines as a traditional leadership position. This is especially true in information environments where computer-mediated communications, such as social-media or on-line platforms, are common. In these digitally connected environments, communicator access to a population is not controlled by a limited number of actors. Key communicators can rise out of a population without links to formal power structures. Identifying and communicating with key communicators, whether they are teachers, religious figures, town elders, prominent businessmen, or social media figures with large followings, can be very helpful. A key communicator can also be used as a spokesperson in a series of messages. The use of key communicators can significantly enhance the credibility of the influence effort.

## **REFINEMENT OF TARGET AUDIENCES**

2-17. Psychological Operations Soldiers conduct research on the AO, the POs, and PTAL generated during planning to provide focus and direction in identifying specific leaders, key communicators, organizations, and demographic sets that are related to each of the behaviors identified as needing to be changed to achieve the SPOs and POs. Answering the following three questions will assist in refining the TAs from those provided in the PTAL. Refined TAs should follow logically from the broader categories identified by the first two questions. Subcategories are developed from further subdivision by relevant demographics (geography, age, sex, political affiliation, and so on) and identification of specific organizations (institutions, military units, or councils) down to specific individuals (leaders and key communicators). Primary actors are those engaged in, or likely to engage in, the behavior that supports the objective. Secondary actors are those that influence the primary actors. As understanding of the population increases, key communicators and leaders who have the greatest influence on the behavior of primary actors will emerge from the identified secondary actors.

2-18. These key individuals are not selected simply by their position or title, but rather through analysis of their ability to exert influence. Figure 2-2 illustrates how TAs are identified and refined using these three questions:

- What TAs are engaging (or likely to engage) in the targeted behavior? The answers to this question are the primary actors.
- What TAs are directly or indirectly influencing the behavior of the primary actors? The answers to this question are the secondary actors.
- What are the categories among the primary and secondary actors (specific individuals, organizations, and demographic sets)? The answers to this question are the refined TAs.

<b>CDR's objective</b>	Provide a safe and secure environment.	
<b>PO</b>	Decrease sectarian violence in the AO.	
<b>Potential TA list</b>	Red Tribe, White Tribe, and Blue Tribe.	
<b>Question 1</b>	What TAs are engaging (or likely to engage) in the behavior? (These are the primary actors; in this case, the TAs who are carrying out acts of sectarian violence.)	
<b>Answer</b>	Red militia groups, White militia groups, and Blue militia groups.	
<b>Question 2</b>	What TAs are directly or indirectly influencing the behavior of the primary actors?	
<b>Answer</b>	Red religious leaders. Red tribal leaders. Red militia members' families. Red political groups. White religious leaders. White tribal leaders.	White militia members' families. White political groups Blue tribal leaders. Blue civic leaders. Blue militia members' families. Blue political groups.
<b>Question 3</b>	What are the categories among the primary and secondary actors? (These are the specific individuals, organizations, and demographic sets.) The response to this question can potentially yield an extensive list of TAs.	
<b>Answer</b>	This example addresses the Red Tribe only. The White and Blue Tribes would each have a number of subgroups.	
	Red militia groups: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● NMB.</li> <li>● Leader: Ali Al Asamani.</li> <li>● Full-time fighters.</li> <li>● Reserve fighters.</li> </ul>	Red religious leaders: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ali Al Muhammed.</li> <li>● Abdul Rahman.</li> <li>● Muqtada Al Sarani.</li> <li>● Ayatollah Rafeeq Al Hareiri.</li> <li>● Grand Council on Religious Faith.</li> </ul>
	Birminghamville Martyr Brigade: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Leader: Muhammed Al Barani.</li> <li>● Old Guard (inner circle).</li> <li>● New Guard (new recruits).</li> </ul>	Red tribal leaders: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Sijan Tribe: Sheik Muhammed.</li> <li>● Ruhani Tribe: Sheik Ali Al Sarani.</li> <li>● Rafeek Tribe: Sheik Fariq Al Jiran.</li> <li>● Tareeq Tribe: Sheik Abu Hameed.</li> </ul>
	Faithful of Ali Militia: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Leader: Faris Al Disinjani.</li> <li>● Full-time fighters.</li> <li>● Reserve fighters.</li> </ul>	Red political groups: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Sons of the Faith Movement.</li> <li>● Martyrs of the Faith Union.</li> <li>● Council of Ali.</li> </ul>
<b>Legend:</b> AO area of operations CDR commander NMB Nashburg Martyr Brigade PO psychological objective TA target audience		

**Figure 2-2. Identification and refinement of target audiences**

2-19. Initially, TAs identified through answering the above questions may only be broad categories. As additional information is collected and more in-depth TAA is possible over time, the answers to the three questions evolve, allowing the identification of further categorization (specific individuals, organizations, and key demographics), the determination of relationships between TAs, and the ascertainment of the level of influence of any given TA on overall behavior.

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## Chapter 3

# Step 2: Determine Achievability

The purpose of determining TA achievability is to accurately target those audiences that have the greatest likelihood of accomplishing a given objective. Once this determination is made, Psychological Operations Soldiers can prioritize targets and begin determining specific actions and messages to progress a TA from awareness and understanding of the SPO, to holding a favorable attitude and eventual preference of the SPO over alternative behaviors, to behavior intention and ultimately SPO achievement.

### TARGET AUDIENCE ACHIEVABILITY

3-1. In TAA, achievability refers to the ability of the TA to accomplish the SPO in support of the PO. Actual ability may differ from perceived ability to achieve a SPO. A TA may have the ability and capacity to accomplish a behavior but lack the belief that achievement is possible. This lack of belief does not necessarily discount the TA as being able to achieve the SPO. The analyst must first determine actual achievability and then consider any physical or psychological barriers to behavior achievement and if these barriers can be addressed through actions and messages of a series. The greater the perceived achievability of a behavior—so long as the likely outcome is favorable to the TA—the greater the effort a TA will exert to accomplish the behavior. Even if the expected reward is high, the TA must believe the goal is obtainable.

3-2. Before TA achievability can be determined, the Soldier must define the SPO required of each TA to accomplish the PO. The SPO is the specific action that the TA must take. Additionally, the analysts develop the intermediate objectives that lead the TA from the current behavior to the desired behavior of the SPO. When defining specific behaviors, the Soldier must ask the following questions:

- Can the number of times the behavior occurs be counted?
- Will collectors (intelligence collectors, Soldiers, planners, and so on) know exactly what to look for by the description of the behavior?

3-3. The answer to both questions should be yes.

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*Note.* If the answer to either of the questions is no, the SPO is too vague, and the Soldier needs to further quantify it. The SPO must be specific, measurable, and observable to be effectively targeted. Figure 3-1 is an example of defining the SPO.

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<b>CDR's objectives</b>	Provide a safe and secure environment.		
<b>PO</b>	Decrease sectarian violence in the AO.		
<b>TA 1</b>	NMB reserve fighters.		
<b>SPO</b>	TA deserts the NMB.		
<b>TA 2</b>	NMB senior leaders.		
<b>SPO</b>	TA orders subordinates to discontinue violence against Red Tribe members.		
<b>Legend:</b>			
<b>AO</b>	area of operations	<b>PO</b>	psychological objective
<b>CDR</b>	commander	<b>SPO</b>	supporting psychological objective
<b>NMB</b>	Nashburg Martyr Brigade	<b>TA</b>	target audience

**Figure 3-1. Define supporting psychological objective**

3-4. Certain information must be gathered when determining achievability. SPOs are derived from the PO and consider TA achievability as one factor in determining the likelihood of behavior achievement. The following questions detail what should be answered when determining the TA's ability to achieve a given desired behavior determined necessary to accomplish the SPO and PO.

- What degree of control does the TA have over the desired behavior defined by the SPO?
  - A TA is more likely to achieve a SPO if it has, or perceives to have, some type of control over accomplishment of the behavior.
  - Examples of control include: the TA members having some control over their environment, the authority to act or make decisions, and power to overcome barriers.
  - Influence efforts are directed at increasing or decreasing actual and perceived control to best accomplish the SPO.
  - In the example PO, *Decrease sectarian violence in the AO*, the various militia members carrying out the attacks have a significant amount of actual control over their own actions, though they may perceive they have little control. The militia leaders that give the orders and plan the attacks have a greater perceived control to affect the behavior, but this control is dependent on a compliant militia.
  - In the example SPO, *TA deserts the Nashburg Martyr Brigade (NMB)*, the NMB members may not perceive control over decreasing attacks, but may accept that they have control over whether they desert the NMB.
  - In coercive influence efforts, control may be less of a determining factor in the likelihood of the TA doing the desired behavior. However, compliance through coercion is the least enduring of behavior changes. The probability that the TA will return to their previous behavior once the threat has been removed is high.
- What barriers affect the TA in regard to the SPO?
  - No TA is all-powerful. All TAs will have some barriers or restrictions on their achievability.
  - The Psychological Operations planner must identify likely barriers and consider ways to remove or mitigate barriers (for example, through PSYACTs or deception) so that the TA perceives continued control over behavior achievement.
  - Increased perceived control strengthens behavior intentions.
  - The more likely behavior accomplishment is believed to be, the more effort the TA will exert to achieve it.
- If the TA takes the desired action, what is the overall effect on the PO?
  - Assuming the series is successful in persuading the TA to change its behavior, what effect will this particular TA's SPO achievement have on the overall accomplishment of the PO? This is referred to as effect size.
  - To accomplish any given PO, numerous TAs must be influenced to achieve specific SPOs. However, some TAs will have a greater impact on PO achievement than others.
  - For example, information received for the example PO, *Decrease sectarian violence in the AO*, shows that 90 percent of all acts of violence between rival ethnic groups in the AO occur between Red and White Tribe militia groups. Only 10 percent of Blue Tribe militia groups instigate or are involved in violent acts against rival ethnic group members. Therefore, if influence activities are completely successful and persuade every member of every Blue Tribe militia group to stop violence against rivals, the overall effect on the PO is limited to 10 percent of acts committed. Consequently, the achievability of Blue Tribe militia groups would be markedly less than Red or White Tribe militia groups when considering overall achievement of the PO within the AO.
  - A series may result in an observable effect but be so insignificant in effect size that it becomes practically irrelevant.

3-5. An example of when decreasing actual or perceived control may be part of a series would be if the militia desired to achieve the SPO but the leadership remained opposed. The planner may consider the militia as the most likely to be effective and identify the leaders as barriers to achievement. A series may include objectives to decrease leader control and increase militia control. The following are the most common types of barriers:

- Physical and environmental:
  - The TA is physically unable.
  - The TA is geographically restrained.
- Political:
  - The TA lacks political power.
  - The TA's alliances prevent action.
- Economic:
  - The TA lacks economic power.
  - The TA must sacrifice livelihood.
- Legal: The desired behavior violates laws or regulations.
- Sociological: The desired behavior causes expulsion or censure of the TA from the group or society.
- Psychological: The TA's fears or phobias prevent action.

3-6. The achievability rating is one factor considered in prioritizing multiple TAs when resources are scarce. Figure 3-2, page 16, is an example of determining and describing rationale for ascribed achievability rating. Once the potential achievability of a TA has been analyzed, the achievability is rated on a scale from zero to five, with zero being undetermined and five being very achievable. The scale is as follows:

- **Five.** Very achievable.
- **Four.** Achievable.
- **Three.** Moderately achievable.
- **Two.** Minimally achievable.
- **One.** Not achievable.
- **Zero.** Undetermined. (This category is used if there is insufficient information on a TA to determine the achievability of the TA.)

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*Note.* If TA achievability is undetermined or rated very low (one or two), the analyst should consider halting the analysis and choosing another TA.

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<b>PO</b>	Decrease sectarian violence in the AO.
<b>TA</b>	NMB reserve fighters.
<b>SPO</b>	TA deserts the NMB.
<b>Question 1</b>	What degree of control does the TA have in regard to the SPO?
<b>Answer</b>	TA has a significant degree of actual control to desert the NMB, although their perceived control is to a lesser degree due to leader influence.
<b>Question 2</b>	What barriers affect the TA in regard to the SPO achievement?
<b>Answer</b>	Although the TA may desert the NMB, the leadership of the brigade will demand that participation in NMB continue. Consequently, the TA may be coerced by the other members to resume involvement.
<b>Question 3</b>	If the TA takes the desired action, what is the overall effect on the PO?
<b>Answer</b>	The overwhelming majority (over 90 percent) of all acts of sectarian violence in the AO involves the Red and White Tribes. The NMB is the main group carrying out attacks in the southern portion of the AO, and other Red Tribe militia groups have been inspired by their success. If the TA is persuaded to desert, a significant decrease in sectarian violence could be expected to occur in the southern portion of the AO, and potentially demoralize other Red Tribe militia groups, causing a decrease in similar acts in other areas.
<b>Achievability Rating</b>	Three (moderately achievable).
<p><b>Legend:</b></p> <p><b>AO</b> area of operations  <b>NMB</b> Nashburg Martyr Brigade  <b>PO</b> psychological objective  <b>SPO</b> supporting psychological objective  <b>TA</b> target audience</p>	

**Figure 3-2. Achievability rating determination rationale**



## Chapter 4

### Step 3: Identify Conditions

Conditions are the existing elements that affect a TA's behavior. Conditions can be external, such as situations and events, or internal, such as values, beliefs, and attitudes. A cause-and-effect analysis examines conditions and identifies the motivations and consequences of the TA's current behavior, and often, those that impede or restrict the TA from engaging in the desired behavior.

#### CONDITIONS AND BEHAVIOR

4-1. To influence or change a behavior, Soldiers must first understand the current behavior. Soldiers look at causes and effects of the TA's current behavior to try to understand why the TA is behaving in a way other than engaging in the behavior of the SPO. Behaviors are external reactions to adjust to and live within one's environment. These reactions are initiated by conditions or stimuli present in the environment. Soldiers look for behavior changes once influence activities have intervened into the environment. At this stage, when identifying conditions, the focus is on what the TA is currently doing or not doing prior to the influence effort and their reasons why.

4-2. Understanding that behavior is a reaction provides insights into how shaping conditions in an environment can change how one reacts, or behaves, within that environment. By identifying the causes and effects of the TA's current behavior, Soldiers gain insight into how to influence that behavior. Conditions can be both external and internal.

- External conditions include the following—
  - **Conditions.** A condition is an existing factor or collection of factors in the TA's environment that affects behavior; for example, members of the Red Tribe cannot safely conduct business in the affluent, White Tribe-dominated section of Nashburg.
  - **Events.** An event is any occurrence that affects the behavior of the TA. For example, a series of recent mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) explosions in and around Birmingham have resulted in serious injuries involving numerous children.
- Internal conditions include the following—
  - **Attitudes.** Attitudes are the perceptions and feelings of a target audience towards something tangible or intangible. For example, attitudes toward the local population, host-nation or partner nation (PN) troops, an event, an adversary, or national or ethnic pride. An attitude is a consistent, learned predisposition to respond in a particular way to a given object, person, or situation. Attitudes are an emotionalized organization of one's central and enduring values. Attitude is usually described as positive, neutral, or negative; for example, Blue Tribe members have a negative attitude regarding supporting coalition efforts because of several well-publicized incidents of poor treatment by coalition forces in the area within the past year.
  - **Values.** A value, in this context, is a conception of ultimate right and wrong. For example, maintaining the family honor is of supreme importance and is the fundamental duty of the TA at any cost.
  - **Beliefs.** A belief is a conviction about what is true or false based on experiences, perceptions, public opinion, supporting evidence, authorities, or faith. For example, the TA is inclined to distrust White Tribe members and blame them for a series of attacks targeting Red Tribe businesses.

#### CAUSE-AND-EFFECT ANALYSIS

4-3. Cause-and-effect analysis is a cognitive behavioral model that draws from numerous disciplines, including psychology, sociology, and anthropology. This behavioral model is a conceptual framework for understanding human behavior, which includes thoughts and actions in the context of the social and physical environment. This model of behavior incorporates established principles and concepts of psychological and behavioral functioning into a coherent pattern of how people think, feel, behave, and experience.

4-4. The purpose of this model is to achieve a better understanding of what functions behavior serves in the context of influence efforts. The three primary components of cause-and-effect analysis are as follows: behavior, cause, and effect.

### Behavior

4-5. The term behavior refers to specific observable and measurable overt reactions that the TA is currently exhibiting. Reactions can manifest as action or inaction by the TA. For example, an act of sectarian violence is an action whereas refusing to participate in sectarian violence is inaction, but both reactions are observable and measurable behaviors. Care should be given not to confuse behaviors with behavior outcomes when planning POs and determining requisite SPOs. For example:

- **Behavior outcome:** Reduction in improvised explosive device (IED) related casualties along Route Amber.
  - Behavior-reduction in number of TA members placing IEDs.
  - Behavior-increased reporting of IEDs.
  - Behavior-increased reporting of UXOs used in making IEDs.
- **Commander's objective:** Reduction in IED related casualties along Route Amber.
  - PO-reduction in number of TA members placing IEDs.
  - SPO-TA increases reporting of IED locations.
  - SPO-TA increases reporting of UXOs used in making IEDs.

### Cause

4-6. Causes are the conditions that led to the TA's current behavior. Causes motivate or trigger a behavior. Causes can be internal or external conditions that motivate a TA to behave in a particular way; examples may include acts of physical violence, discrimination, cultural values, tribal influences, strikes, boycotts, beliefs regarding legitimacy of the current government, and disputes over resources (such as land or water).

### Effect

4-7. Effects are the consequences that result from and immediately follow the TA's current behavior. Consequences can be positive or negative. They can strengthen or weaken a behavior, thereby increasing or decreasing the likelihood of the behavior occurring again. Examples of consequences may include—

- Revenge for perceived wrongs.
- Threats of injury or death.
- Destruction of property.
- Praise from peers or leaders.
- Avoidance of unsafe situations.
- Financial gain.
- Increased political power.

4-8. The key to understanding the behavior of the TAs is determining the conditions. If Soldiers can understand what causes and reinforces a particular behavior, they are more likely to be able to influence or change that behavior. Identifying conditions is accomplished through a cause-and-effect analysis using a cause-and-effect chart.

4-9. The cause-and-effect chart is used to organize information by recording the type of behavior observed and the conditions that precede and follow the behavior. Observing and recording these conditions answers the question: why is the TA engaging in its current behavior? It also identifies aspects of the behavior (causes and effects) that can be manipulated to change that behavior. Figure 4-1 provides a sample format and guide for the cause-and-effect chart. Figure 4-2, page 20, and figure 4-3, pages 21-22, provide examples of information that may be included under the *Current Behavior* and *Causes* sections of the cause-and-effect chart.

[CLASSIFICATION]	
<b>HEADER DATA</b>	
<b>Analyst:</b> Name and Rank (Example: SGT Smith)	<b>Date:</b> Current or last revision
<b>Target Audience:</b> Refined TA	
<b>Psychological Objective (PO):</b>	
<b>Supporting Psychological Objective (SPO):</b>	
<b>Current Behavior:</b> Describe the specific actions or inactions of the TA in relation to the SPO. How is the TA currently behaving?	
<p><b>I. (U) CAUSES.</b> Conditions directly or indirectly contributing to the current behavior.</p> <p>A. (U) External Conditions.</p> <p>1. (U) What are the situations or events contributing to the TA's current behavior? Examples are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● (U) Boycotts.</li> <li>● (U) Police brutality.</li> <li>● (U) Specific acts of violence.</li> <li>● (U) Poor access to government resources.</li> <li>● (U) Calls from religious leaders.</li> </ul> <p>B. (U) Internal Conditions.</p> <p>1. (U) What are the situations or events contributing to the TA's current behavior? Examples are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● (U) Tribal values.</li> <li>● (U) Anger resulting from past events.</li> <li>● (U) Racial prejudices.</li> <li>● (U) Distrust of the government.</li> </ul> <p>2. (U) What are the broad categories under which these conditions fall? Examples are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● (U) Economic.</li> <li>● (U) Political.</li> <li>● (U) Social or cultural.</li> <li>● (U) Environmental or physical.</li> <li>● (U) Military or security.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>II. (U) EFFECTS.</b> What are the conditions (immediately following) that are the result of the TA engaging in the current behavior? What are the consequences of the TA's current behavior?</p> <p>A. (U) Positive Consequences.</p> <p>1. (U) What are the TA rewards for this behavior? Examples are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● (U) Financial gain.</li> <li>● (U) Increased prestige.</li> <li>● (U) Increased political power.</li> <li>● (U) Revenge for perceived wrongs.</li> </ul> <p>2. (U) What broad categories do positive consequences fall under? Examples are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● (U) Escape or avoidance.</li> <li>● (U) Access to tangibles.</li> <li>● (U) Justice or revenge.</li> <li>● (U) Power or control.</li> <li>● (U) Acceptance and affiliation.</li> </ul>	

**Figure 4-1. Sample format and guide for creating a cause-and-effect chart**

### COMPLETING THE CAUSE-AND-EFFECT CHART

4-10. Soldiers must accomplish four tasks to complete the cause-and-effect chart. The tasks are as follows:

- **Task 1.** Fill in the header data.
- **Task 2.** Define the current behavior for the TA.

- **Task 3.** Identify the causes of the current behavior.
- **Task 4.** Identify the effects of the current behavior.

4-11. The Psychological Operations Soldier fills in the header data first when completing the cause-and-effect chart and assigns a unique number for tracking purposes. Header data provides a frame of reference and assists in record keeping and information management. Soldiers may provide additional information, but at a minimum, they should include the classification, the analyst’s name and rank, the date of analysis, the TA, and the PO and SPO in the header data.

4-12. After filling in the header data, the Soldier must define TA behavior. The first step in filling out this section of the cause-and-effect chart is to define the TA’s current behavior (the behavior Soldiers are trying to change). The Soldier should attempt to define the TA’s behavior as specifically as possible with the information available. This defining behavior provides consumers of the data with detailed contextual information of current TA behavior. Current behavior details that describe any intermediate behaviors related to the SPO are useful as they assist in the later development of intermediate objectives that must be achieved to accomplish the SPO. Specificity is more important than brevity as this is the fact-finding portion of the analysis. The Soldier can refine this definition as further research is conducted. Figure 4-2 is an example of defining the TA behavior to insert into the cause-and-effect chart (figure 4-1, page 19) under the header data.

<b>TA</b>	NMB reserve fighters.		
<b>SPO</b>	TA increases reporting of UXOs used in making IEDs.		
<b>Current Behaviors</b>	NMB reserve fighters are collecting UXOs, developing IEDs from UXOs, and employing IEDs along coalition travel routes. Collecting UXOs and using them to make IEDs are intermediate behaviors to the behavior of employing IEDs.		
<i>Legend:</i>			
<b>IED</b>	improvised explosive devise	<b>TA</b>	target audience
<b>NMB</b>	Nashburg Martyr Brigade	<b>UXO</b>	unexploded ordnance
<b>SPO</b>	supporting psychological objective		

**Figure 4-2. Sample of current behavior for cause-and-effect chart**

4-13. The definition of current TA behavior may be very similar or very different to the SPO depending on the targeted behavior and the TA. Specifically defining current TA behavior provides the frame and focus for the rest of the analysis. In-depth analysis can begin once the analyst has a well-defined TA and a well-defined current behavior. After defining TA behavior, the Soldier must identify the causes of behavior. Conditions directly or indirectly motivating the TA’s current behavior are listed under the causes section of the cause-and-effect chart. The Soldier is attempting to answer the question: what is contributing to the occurrence of this behavior? The conditions motivating the current behavior of the TA can be external (situations and events) or internal (attitudes and beliefs). These conditions can be extracted from the results and includes variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). Some categories may not be applicable for every TA or behavior; furthermore, these categories are not all-encompassing, they serve only as guides.

4-14. Psychological Operations Soldiers should not let the categories limit the analysis, as they can identify as many conditions as necessary to capture all the relevant factors motivating the behavior. See ADP 5-0 for more information on PMESII-PT. All conditions listed on the cause-and-effect chart should cite a specific source (intelligence report, SITREP, article, or interview) whenever possible. Logical assumptions can be made because they can be very beneficial for the analysis, but they should be annotated as assumptions, particularly when identifying internal conditions. Figure 4-3, pages 21-22, provides example causes of behavior with relevant variables extracted from PMESII-PT and information gathered from varied resources.

What are the situations and/or events contributing to this behavior?		
External	Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TA is offered large sums of money to plant IEDs along coalition travel routes (<i>Intelligence Report 372-01</i>).</li> <li>The unemployment rate for the TA is estimated at 30 percent (provisional government report dated 3 August 2019).</li> </ul>
	Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mullah Ali Bin Saleem calls for unity among the warring tribes (<i>Nashburg Times</i> article dated 27 July 2019).</li> <li>TA political party candidate withdraws from election race, citing threats against him and his family (<i>Intelligence Report 345-03</i>).</li> </ul>
What are the situations and/or events contributing to this behavior?		
External	Social or Cultural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A long history of ethnic discrimination exists between the TA and members of the Blue Tribe; ongoing ethnic tensions have resulted in numerous incidents between the two groups (special assessment dated 4 April 2019).</li> <li>The desecration of TA cultural landmarks in Birminghamville has resulted in numerous retaliation strikes against Blue Tribe public centers (<i>Intelligence Report 363-01</i>).</li> </ul>
	Environmental or Physical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Drought conditions in and around the Nashburg area for the last two years have led to widespread hunger and discontent with the provisional government among the TA (special assessment dated May 2019).</li> <li>Poor sanitary conditions in White Tribe residential areas have led to recent outbreaks of cholera and dysentery (<i>Nashburg Times</i> article dated 12 July 2019).</li> </ul>
	Military or Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Recent coalition raids looking for rebel groups in the Nashburg area have resulted in a backlash of resentment toward the coalition, including several public demonstrations by the TA (Team 961 SITREP dated 5 August 2019 and <i>Intelligence Report 456-05</i>).</li> <li>Patriotsville security forces have been unable to stop recent attacks on the TA by rebel groups (<i>Intelligence Report 234-09</i>).</li> </ul>
Internal	Economic	<p>The TA believes that Blue Tribe members are taking all the well-paying jobs in the area (<i>Nashburg Times</i> news article dated 4 July 2019 and Team 952 SITREP dated 12 July 2019).</p> <p>The TA is optimistic about its economic future under the new government (Team 933 SITREP dated 8 June 2019 and <i>Birminghamville Banner</i> editorial dated 15 June 2019).</p>
	Political	<p>The members of the TA believe that the only elected candidates that will represent them fairly are those from their own tribe (statements by tribal leadership reported in <i>Nashburg Times</i> article dated 14 July 2019).</p> <p>The TA perceives the new government as a puppet of the coalition (statement by Sheik Omar Hussein following installment of provisional government on 4 May 2019).</p> <p>The TA places a high value on its tribal affiliation. Loyalty to the tribe is expected. Loyalty to tribal leaders is especially important. Tribal members can be expected to support any political candidates from their tribe (assumption based upon results of past political elections).</p>

Figure 4-3. Sample of causes for cause-and-effect chart

What are the situations and/or events contributing to this behavior?																		
<b>Internal</b>	<b>Social or Cultural</b>	<p>The TA is highly distrustful of strangers and is predisposed to blame any negative events on them (special study dated April 2019).</p> <p>The cultural beliefs of the TA necessitate that all disputes be resolved by the community elders versus the provincial police or the state judicial system (special study dated April 2019.)</p> <p>The TA holds the belief that the male is solely responsible for supporting the family and that females should not work outside the home (cultural assessment dated April 2019).</p>																
	<b>Environmental or Physical</b>	<p>The TA believes that drought conditions are a sign of God’s displeasure with them (Team 344 SITREP dated 22 June 2019).</p> <p>The TA believes that the poor sanitary conditions of the local water sources are a result of illegal dumping and sabotage by rival White Tribe members (Civil Affairs environmental assessment survey dated 30 July 2019).</p>																
	<b>Military or Security</b>	<p>The TA believes that local security forces are ineffectual pawns of the coalition (Team 445 SITREP dated 27 May 2019 and SCAME report dated 10 August 2019).</p> <p>The TA perceives that people that enlist in the provisional military are traitors to their tribe (public statements by tribal leadership reported in the Nashburg Times dated 31 July 2019, attacks on recruits, and Intelligence report 768-02).</p>																
<p><b>Legend:</b></p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td><b>IED</b></td> <td>improvised explosive devise</td> <td><b>SPO</b></td> <td>supporting psychological objective</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>NMB</b></td> <td>Nashburg Martyr Brigade</td> <td><b>TA</b></td> <td>target audience</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>SCAME</b></td> <td>source, content, audience, media effects</td> <td><b>UXO</b></td> <td>unexploded ordnance</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>SITREP</b></td> <td>situation report</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>			<b>IED</b>	improvised explosive devise	<b>SPO</b>	supporting psychological objective	<b>NMB</b>	Nashburg Martyr Brigade	<b>TA</b>	target audience	<b>SCAME</b>	source, content, audience, media effects	<b>UXO</b>	unexploded ordnance	<b>SITREP</b>	situation report		
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<b>SCAME</b>	source, content, audience, media effects	<b>UXO</b>	unexploded ordnance															
<b>SITREP</b>	situation report																	

**Figure 4-3. Sample of causes for cause-and-effect chart (continued)**

4-15. After identifying the causes of behavior, the Soldier must identify the effect of behavior. The conditions that result from and immediately follow the current behavior (the consequences) of the TA are listed under the effects portion of the cause-and-effect chart. These consequences can be positive or negative and can strengthen or weaken a behavior. Consequences of a behavior determine the probability that a behavior will occur again. Desirable consequences have a strong motivational effect, whereas undesirable consequences tend to reduce motivation. In general, the more immediate the consequence following a behavior, the more influence the consequence has on the behavior. Consequences are primarily governed by the principles of behavior.

**Law of Effect: Behavior That is Reinforced Will Be Repeated**

4-16. In the power of immediate gratification, short-term pleasurable activities usually outweigh long term consequences, and immediate consequences usually have the greatest influence. When consequences of an undesired behavior are long-term the environment may have to be shaped through planned PSYACTs to impose more immediate consequences to better influence the TA.

4-17. In cause-and-effect analysis, three categories of consequences are identified: positive, negative, and secondary. Positive consequences are the conditions—resulting from behavior—that are desirable to the TA and increase the likelihood that the behavior will reoccur. Negative consequences are the conditions—resulting from behavior—that are undesirable to the TA and decrease the likelihood that the behavior will reoccur. Secondary consequences are the effect of the TA’s behavior on others. As with causes, these effects can be internal or external conditions.

4-18. Positive consequences increase the likelihood of a behavior occurring. Positive consequences include both positive and negative reinforcement. For example, avoiding negative reinforcement is a positive consequence.

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*Note.* All forms of reinforcement increase the likelihood of a behavior occurring.

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4-19. Reinforcement that follows a behavior increases the likelihood of that behavior reoccurring; therefore, any consequence that increases the likelihood of a behavior reoccurring is a reinforcer. A reinforcer may be specific to a TA. A reinforcer for one TA may do nothing for another TA or may even discourage that TA from exhibiting the behavior. A reinforcer can be anything a TA finds desirable (pleasant) or undesirable (unpleasant).

4-20. Positive reinforcement involves a TA engaging in a behavior to get something desirable, such as food, money, or praise from peers. Positive reinforcement increases the likelihood of the behavior reoccurring because it results in a desirable consequence for the TA; for example, fear in enemies.

4-21. Negative reinforcement involves a TA engaging in a behavior to remove or avoid something undesirable, such as being injured or ostracized or feeling anxious or frustrated. Negative reinforcement increases the likelihood of the behavior reoccurring because performing the behavior removes or avoids an undesirable outcome, for example: death, injuries, or reprisal.

4-22. Reinforcement may be social or material. Social reinforcers are affirmations received from others, such as peers and formal or informal leaders, and can include verbal, nonverbal, and physical gestures that can be very powerful in many cultures. Material or tangible reinforcers are objects, things, and possessions that are coveted, such as money, equipment, land, and so on.

4-23. All behavior is purposeful. Positive consequences ultimately answer the question: what purpose does the behavior serve? Most positive consequences for behavior will fall into the following categories:

- **Escape and Avoidance.** Escape and avoidance usually occur in response to a specific person, event, or request. They are used to get out of doing something or to get away from something unpleasant.
- **Access to Tangibles.** Access to tangibles often occurs when something is denied or taken away. It is used to obtain something desirable.
- **Justice and Revenge.** Justice and revenge are used to punish others or pay them back for perceived wrongs.
- **Power and Control.** Power and control are used to gain or maintain control of others. TAs use power and control to dominate, be in charge of, or control their environment.
- **Acceptance and Affiliation.** Acceptance and affiliation are belonging to or gaining acceptance from a group. They are used to impress members of a peer group.

4-24. The following are examples of positive consequences (how the TA is rewarded for or what the TA gets from the behavior):

- TA receives \$500 for every IED it successfully plants and detonates (access to tangibles).
- TA gains social status for taking revenge for wrongs against its tribe (acceptance and affiliation and justice and revenge).
- TA avoids retribution from insurgent groups by refraining from reporting their activities (escape and avoidance).
- The members of the White Tribe flee the area, reducing their influence in Red Tribe areas (power and control).

4-25. Negative consequences decrease the likelihood of a behavior occurring. They are the risks, drawbacks, or punishments a TA receives for engaging in a behavior. Negative consequences might include—

- TA risks capture, injuries, and death when it attacks White Tribe members (risk of injuries to self and others).
- TA is shunned by other tribesmen in its community for cooperating with coalition forces (loss of rights or privileges).
- Loss or a lack of sovereignty.

- TA risks significant financial losses if it refuses to support the local warlord.
- The TA feels remorse for actions against members of its tribe (from interviews with the local chieftain).

4-26. Secondary consequences are the effects or consequences of the TA's behavior on others. These consequences are often unintended. In addition, they often do not directly impact the behavior of the TA. Secondary consequences may include increasing the power of rival factions, influencing others to engage in similar behaviors, and reducing the effectiveness of a new government. By analyzing secondary consequences, Soldiers gain a fuller understanding of TA behavior in relation to other TAs and behaviors. The following are examples of secondary consequences (the effect of the behavior on other groups):

- Security patrols by coalition forces are increased because of recent rebel group attacks.
- White Tribe members in Birmingham riot following a boycott by the TA of national elections.
- Birmingham militia groups attack coalition targets following the success of similar Nashburg militia attacks against coalition forces.
- International community questions the legitimacy of upcoming elections following the boycott by the TA (opposition party).



## Chapter 5

### Step 4: Identify Vulnerabilities

A key element of influencing behavior is to identify vulnerabilities of a TA. Vulnerabilities are characteristics, motives, or conditions of a TA that can be exploited to influence behavior. Psychological Operations Soldiers exploit vulnerabilities by manipulating the causes and effects of the current behavior of the TA.

#### VULNERABILITIES ANALYSIS

5-1. The behavior of a TA can be influenced several ways, for example, by modifying the real or perceived motivations and rewards for the behavior (causes and effects). This modification is accomplished through a series of actions and messages delivered by various means. If the TA believes that the benefits—tangible or intangible—of a behavior exceed the costs, it will likely engage in the behavior. By emphasizing, de-emphasizing, or changing the TA's attitude toward the expected outcome, perceived benefits (positive consequences) or costs (negative consequences), Psychological Operations forces can influence behavior.

5-2. A TA cannot typically respond to a stimulus to which it is unaware, and the TA's understanding of the stimulus will affect the attitude toward the stimulus. The analyst must provide an initial estimate of where along the HPEM continuum best describes the TA in relation to the SPO for intermediate objectives to be planned to shape conditions favorable to progressing the TA toward SPO achievement. Improved understanding of the TA's HPEM relationship to the SPO informs planners of requisite steps to behavior modification.

#### BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION

5-3. Behavior can be modified by changing the conditions or situations that lead up to the current behavior of the TA. In addition, the current behavior of the TA can be modified by manipulating the consequences or by introducing new consequences (rewards and punishments) that the TA experiences for engaging in a behavior.

5-4. Decreasing a behavior involves devaluing or reducing the positive consequences and increasing the negative consequences that a TA experiences from a behavior. Behavior can be decreased by removing something desirable or pleasant that is reinforcing the behavior or introducing something unpleasant that will discourage the behavior.

5-5. Increasing a behavior involves raising the value of the positive consequences and decreasing the value of the negative consequences that a TA experiences from a behavior. Introducing or emphasizing desirable or pleasant consequences and removing unpleasant consequences for a certain behavior are ways to increase the frequency of the behavior.

5-6. Manipulating existing consequences or introducing new ones can cause behavior change. Behavior change can also be encouraged or reinforced by challenging or emphasizing related beliefs. Challenging strongly held beliefs can further entrench a behavior, but not all beliefs are strongly held, and none are completely immune to influence. Analysts must determine the strength of a belief to determine vulnerability. Figure 5-1, pages 26-27, is an example of the analyst's HPEM analysis report and recommendations for changing behavior through modifying conditions. This report provides a format for the analyst to share analytical insights and make informed recommendations for shaping the environment to achieve intermediate objectives toward SPO achievement. Planners will refer to this report during series development. The analyst should update this information as often as needed to keep it operationally current and viable.

<b>PO</b>	Decrease sectarian violence in AO.
<b>TA</b>	NMB reserve fighters.
<b>SPO</b>	TA deserts NMB.
<b>Conditions</b>	Law and order have disintegrated in the area allowing complete freedom of movement for militia members because of weak government security forces and little resistance or social pressure to cease current behavior.
<b>HPEM Analysis</b>	Previous engagements with the TA suggest clear understanding and awareness of the SPO, however attitudes toward the SPO are neutral due to low risk of continuing the undesired behavior of committing acts of sectarian violence, and no perceived benefit in performing the desired behavior of deserting the NMB. The TA is currently assessed as being short of the threshold for intermediate objective: attitude. Having movements restricted due to performing targeted behavior and a loss of perceived social acceptance may move TA to achieve the attitude objective and begin to prefer SPO over targeted behavior as defined in intermediate objective: preference.
<b>To Modify or Change Current Behavior</b>	If security or coalition forces can reestablish security in the area, they can decrease the movements of the militia members. Military forces might change this condition through a series of cordon and searches and an increase in the use of security checkpoints. A series offering large rewards for reports of militia activity might also result in reduction of militia movements and a decrease in perceived social acceptance of militia activities.
<b>SPO</b>	TA votes in national elections.
<b>Conditions</b>	TA believes voting is unsafe because of threats of physical violence recently made by militia groups.
<b>HPEM Analysis</b>	By the TA identifying a specific barrier to SPO achievement the TA has demonstrated a preference to perform the SPO. Removing this barrier will likely result in the TA perceiving control over the achievement of the SPO and thus reach intermediate objective: intention.
<b>To Modify or Change Current Behavior</b>	<p>The TA is not voting out of fear of physical harm. To change the behavior, efforts might be directed to challenge this barrier of fear and enable the TA to maintain perceived control over the intended behavior. Modifying the condition to influence the behavior might be possible with a series that—</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Emphasizes that coalition and government security forces will safeguard voting sites during the election.</li> <li>● Provides products that detail specific examples of past successes.</li> <li>● Initiates PSYACTs, such as increased presence patrols.</li> <li>● Continue efforts to remove obstacles and reinforce perceived behavioral control through intermediate objective (intention) until intermediate objective (behavior) is achieved. The greater the perceived control over achievability the more effort the TA will make to achieve the SPO once behavior intention has been reached.</li> </ul>

Figure 5-1. Hierarchy of psychological effects model analysis and recommendations

<b>SPO</b>	TA decreases the implantation of IEDs.																
<b>Conditions</b>	TA receives \$500 per IED placed and detonated along coalition-traveled routes. The payment is almost a month's wages for the TA.																
<b>HPEM Analysis</b>	TA is short of intermediate objective: preference as they yet prefer the undesired behavior over the SPO. This preference suggests a possible lack of understanding of associated risks and an attitude that values cash reward over perceived risk.																
<b>To Modify or Change Current Behavior</b>	<p>This condition represents a powerful positive consequence for the TA's behavior with perceived low risk. Influence activities could potentially change this condition by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Offering a comparable or larger reward for reporting the activity to the security forces.</li> <li>● Informing TA of increased efforts of military forces to lethally target those who place IEDs.</li> <li>● Informing TA of rewards given for reporting and successful lethal targeting.</li> </ul>																
<p><b>Legend:</b></p> <table> <tr> <td><b>AO</b></td> <td>area of operations</td> <td><b>PO</b></td> <td>psychological objective</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>HPEM</b></td> <td>hierarchy of psychological effects model</td> <td><b>PSYACT</b></td> <td>psychological actions</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>IED</b></td> <td>improvised explosive device</td> <td><b>SPO</b></td> <td>supporting psychological objective</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>NMB</b></td> <td>Nashburg Martyr Brigade</td> <td><b>TA</b></td> <td>target audience</td> </tr> </table>		<b>AO</b>	area of operations	<b>PO</b>	psychological objective	<b>HPEM</b>	hierarchy of psychological effects model	<b>PSYACT</b>	psychological actions	<b>IED</b>	improvised explosive device	<b>SPO</b>	supporting psychological objective	<b>NMB</b>	Nashburg Martyr Brigade	<b>TA</b>	target audience
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<b>NMB</b>	Nashburg Martyr Brigade	<b>TA</b>	target audience														

**Figure 5-1. Hierarchy of psychological effects model analysis and recommendations (continued)**

**DETERMINING VULNERABILITIES**

5-7. Characteristics refer to TA qualities, traits, and attributes, such as attitudes and beliefs of the TA. Motives are anything that explains or causes a behavior. Conditions refer to current situations and events. During TAA, the following categories of vulnerabilities are identified:

- Motives.
- Cultural factors.
- Demographics.
- Symbols.

**Motives**

5-8. The first category of vulnerabilities is motives. Behavior serves many purposes, and one purpose of behavior is to satisfy needs and wants. The desire of the TA to fulfill, alleviate, or eliminate a need or want provides the motivation for it to change its behavior. Needs and wants fall into two categories: primary and secondary.

5-9. Not all are equally susceptible to otherwise equal individual vulnerabilities. Needs, experiences, and strengths of beliefs can lessen or increase the various factors of vulnerability. Care should be given to identify trends or commonalities among the TA as a whole and not make the mistake of basing decisions on assessed vulnerabilities of a narrow segment of the TA.

5-10. Primary motives involve physiological needs, such as food, water, air, and safety (security and shelter) that give rise to motives. When people feel hunger, they are motivated to eat; when people feel pain, they are motivated to reduce the source of the pain. Primary motives are extremely powerful. They drive behavior and overwhelm other needs and wants. During Operation DESERT STORM, many Iraqi units were cut off from their supply lines for weeks and subjected to fierce coalition air strikes. Leaflets promising food, shelter, and fair treatment likely contributed to the surrender of thousands of Iraqi soldiers. The leaflets exploited the psychological effects to give the Iraqis a means (instructions) to surrender.

5-11. Secondary motives are learned through association with primary motives or in more complex social interaction. For example, people learn to want money because it can be exchanged for food and other desired goods. Aggression, power and control, achievement, confidence, and reassurance are all types of learned social motives. Secondary motives include money or goods, education, infrastructure, governmental representation, healthcare, and so on. Examples of secondary motives include the TA desire for—

- Better educational opportunities for its children.
- Better paying jobs.
- Government representation of its interests.
- Revenge for perceived wrongs.
- Self-rule.

5-12. To determine motives, Soldiers—

- Review each condition on the cause-and-effect chart, as well as demographics. Motives do not have to be directly related to the SPO to be useful.
- Identify any primary motives. These are strong vulnerabilities to influence. In most cases, primary motives override other issues of the TA.

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*Note.* Understanding the complexity of human behavior provides both a challenge and opportunity for Psychological Operations Soldiers. The challenge is in determining degrees to which strengths of beliefs and attitudes toward expected outcomes affect the decisions of the TA. The opportunity exists in the multitude of variables that can be targeted to influence behavior.

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- Identify secondary motives. How a TA satisfies secondary motives is reflected in the positive consequences of behavior. Humans satisfy needs and wants for many reasons, but most reasons fall into the five categories of positive consequences:
  - Escape or avoidance.
  - Access to tangibles.
  - Justice or revenge.
  - Power or control.
  - Acceptance or affiliation.
- Prioritize motives as critical, short term, and long term. Soldiers prioritize motives by immediacy of the need or want and delay in satisfaction.
  - Critical motives are immediate biological, or safety needs to sustain life (for example, food and water).
  - Short term motives are very important to the TA, and they are currently satisfying the TA or actively making efforts to satisfy the TA in the near future (for example, improved security, better jobs, and access to healthcare).
  - Long-term motives are desired by the TA but are not immediately important, and satisfaction may be delayed until some point in the future (for example, democratic representation).

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*Note.* Vulnerabilities should be numbered sequentially. A source for each listed vulnerability should be included whenever possible.

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## Cultural Factors

5-13. Culture is a kind of collective mental programming based on a set of values, attitudes, beliefs, artifacts, and other meaningful symbols representing a pattern of life adopted by people that helps them interpret, evaluate, and communicate as members of society. Having an expert understanding of the cultural factors is key to successful TAA and influence activities.

5-14. Cultural factors provide context necessary to understand a TA's perspective, or worldview, when examining demographics. Worldview is most simply defined as the way someone thinks about the world. It is an intellectual perspective of the world or universe affected by various beliefs, to include theological, anthropological, and sociological.

5-15. Soldiers must understand a TA's worldview to know how best to influence the audience. Cultural factors are considerations that, once understood, are applied to recommendations for series development to ensure actions and messages are aligned with the TA. The following cultural factors provide examples of types of considerations that need to be included in the analysis of possible vulnerabilities, and examples of application to series development.

#### ***High-Context vs. Low-Context Cultures***

5-16. High-context cultures rely heavily on the overall situation to interpret events, and low-context cultures rely more on explicit content. For example, during conversations members of high-context cultures, such as the Japanese, rely on nonverbal cues and information about a person's background to develop their understanding and perception. Members of low-context cultures, such as the British, ask more direct questions related to experience, attitudes and beliefs. This understanding informs Soldiers that high-context cultures may require a more robust series of actions to support messages delivered to influence TA behavior, where a low-context culture might require a longer consistent thread narrative of messages.

#### ***Separated Secular-Religious vs. Integrated Religious Cultures***

5-17. Analysis of the demographic factor of religion requires an understanding that goes beyond simply identifying the predominant world religion of a population. Soldiers must determine the extent to which a population's worldview is impacted by their religion. Separated secular-religious, common in the West, maintains a line between private and public life and religion is primarily kept in the private world. In integrated religious cultures the line between private and public life disappears and religion is integrated into all aspects of society. When refining TAs in an integrated religious culture the religious leaders will often have equal or greater influence over a TA than civic leaders.

#### ***Individualistic vs. Collectivist Cultures***

5-18. Individualistic cultures place a greater emphasis on the goals and identity of the individual. Collectivist cultures place a higher value on extended family, and the ethnic or tribal group. This distinction results in different concepts of self. Individualistic cultures view self as autonomous and independent. In contrast, collectivist cultures view self as interdependent. The demographic factors of ethnicity and affiliations, for example, must be examined within the context of the value or level of importance the TA places on being identified as part of the group. Series that use themes of wrongs committed by one group against others, would first need to understand if individuals identify strongly as part of the group and if individuals accept personal responsibility for the actions of the group.

5-19. Cultural factors are as numerous and varied as the TAs that are analyzed. The greater the understanding of culture factors affecting the TA the more accurate the analysis and recommendations for series development. To accomplish this, continuous research and study of a population's culture is essential. Without applied cultural understanding a series could be well developed and delivered but have little effect on the TA toward the objective, thus resulting in a series with a divergence between high measures of performance and low measures of effectiveness.

### **Demographics**

5-20. The third category of vulnerabilities is demographics. Soldiers are specifically looking for any demographic characteristics or circumstances of the immediate environment of the TA that significantly affect its emotions or behavior. Demographics, such as income, education level, literacy rate, marital status, unemployment rate, number of children, or environment (rural village or urban city), can have a significant impact on how the TA views the world and its own behavior. Demographic characteristics that might be considered include the following:

- Gender.
- Religion.
- Age.
- Socioeconomic status.
- Ethnicity.
- Political affiliation.

- Level of education (which is very important in determining how to access and persuade).
- Occupation.
- Geography (beliefs and values can vary widely from region to region).

5-21. Not all demographic characteristics will be useful as vulnerabilities. The challenge is to determine which characteristics have significant impacts on the emotional or behavioral responses of the TA and under what circumstances. For example, a given TA's religion may significantly affect their behavior and emotions in relation to voting and politics but have almost no effect on their tendency to enlist in the military. Demographic characteristics provide additional insight on the motivations of the TA. Some examples of demographics include the following:

- The members of the TA who are over the age of 50 have lived through the last three civil wars. Consequently, they are highly cynical of efforts by the new government to establish a democratic system.
- The TA lives in an extremely remote and mountainous region, and information from the outside is very scarce. Consequently, the TA is very open to any sources of information and will actively seek out any sources available.
- The TA is well-educated. TA members usually work as professionals or own businesses. They work long hours and stay very busy. They react strongly to any mention of economic problems.

## Symbols

5-22. The fourth category of vulnerabilities is symbols. For influence purposes, symbols are any visual, audio, or audiovisual object having cultural or contextual significance to the TA. Often a symbol evokes an emotion or thought in addition to its obvious and immediate significance or meaning when presented to a particular TA. Symbols can be very powerful in influence efforts. Like pictures, symbols serve to convey complex ideas and emotions in relatively simple images or sounds. Using or avoiding the use of symbols that evoke certain emotions or convey certain ideas to the TA can greatly increase the persuasiveness of an argument.

5-23. Cultural differences provide a significant challenge in using symbols. What is meaningful and powerful for one TA may be ambiguous, arbitrary, or possibly insulting for another. People interpret symbols subjectively based on their own personal and cultural understanding. For symbols to be useful, they must:

- **Be recognizable by the TA.** Marketers and advertisers spend millions of dollars and great time and effort developing, designing, and familiarizing their TAs with symbols that will help convey messages. This process is called product branding.
  - Soldiers rarely have the time, manpower, or funding to create new symbols for their messages. Therefore, they strive to use symbols that are already recognizable to the TA.
  - If a new symbol is created, then it should be something closely related to a symbol that is already familiar to the TA.
- **Have meaning for the TA.** Without a meaning, the symbol will not carry the message. Once the TA recognizes the symbol, it must be able to easily discern its meaning.
- **Convey or support the argument.** Even if the TA recognizes the symbols and they have meaning for the TA, the symbols must be appropriate for the argument and product.
  - Soldiers must pay particular attention to the use of state and religious symbols. Overuse may offend or annoy the TA.
  - In addition, patriotic or religious symbols might offend the TA if used by outsiders. In such cases, it may be better to use the symbol subtly, such as in the background of a poster.

## Chapter 6

### Step 5: Determine Susceptibility

Susceptibility is the likelihood that the TA will be open to influence toward a desired behavior. Initial degree of susceptibility determinations assists in developing series to shape optimum susceptibility conditions by exploiting vulnerabilities, beliefs, values, norms, attitude toward a likely behavior outcome, and perceived credibility. This shaping of the environment in support of the commander's objectives ensures greater precision in the influence effort.

#### SUSCEPTIBILITY ANALYSIS

6-1. Susceptibility to an argument is dependent on the motivation and ability of the TA to process information, followed by the TA's associated beliefs, attitude toward a likely behavior outcome, and perceived credibility of the information source. Each of these variables of susceptibility are interconnected but can be targeted separately to increase susceptibility. For example, a TA could have a low motivation to process information related to a safe and secure environment because they have a neutral attitude toward the likely outcome, or they have beliefs more closely aligned with those creating a hostile environment. Further, they might perceive the credibility of the information's source to be very low. Influence efforts—to include PSYACTs—can set conditions to increase susceptibility. For example, a TA suffering a food shortage will likely be more concerned with hunger as opposed to receiving messages about reporting placements of IEDs. However, if food can be delivered—but also be made contingent on roads being free from IEDs—then the removal of IEDs becomes more aligned with the TA's increased need and motivation to process information related to a safe and secure environment. When food delivery is attributed to the message source, the source credibility increases. Susceptibility requires a holistic approach and a deep understanding of the TA. The following are the three steps in determining susceptibility:

- Assess susceptibility.
- Rate susceptibility.
- Make a recommendation.

#### TASK 1: ASSESSING SUSCEPTIBILITY

6-2. Assessing susceptibility involves understanding the following about the TA.

##### Beliefs


6-3. In general, behavior will be consistent with the relative moral, ethical, religious, political, and cultural beliefs, values, and norms of the TA. These currently held beliefs, values, and norms (referred to in this document simply as beliefs for brevity when specificity is not needed), are considerations that make up the TA's anchor, or current position about a specific behavior. Behaviors that are consistent with currently held beliefs will likely be repeated. If a behavior is inconsistent with the TA's beliefs the TA will either reject the behavior or, if performing the behavior for short-term gain in cases such as coercion, may stop the behavior when the coercive pressure is removed. Enduring behavior change occurs when the TA's anchor is changed so that beliefs become aligned with the desired behavior. Changing beliefs takes time, but the resulting behaviors become more consistent and resilient.

##### Latitude of Acceptance

6-4. Latitude of acceptance refers to the consistency of a behavior in relation the TA's beliefs anchor. This latitude extends from acceptance to non-commitment, to rejection of the behavior. Actions and messages that present a desired behavior consistent with the TA's currently held beliefs are said to be close to the TA's anchor, or within their latitude of acceptance. A desired behavior that is far from the TA's anchor is within their latitude of rejection. Between acceptance and rejection is a neutral zone of non-commitment where the TA is not completely accepting of the behavior but does not outright reject it.

6-5. Consistency between behavior and belief anchors can be affected by motive. Extreme stress and hardship—as seen during major combat operations—may expose greater latitudes of acceptance or non-commitment. Behaviors that a TA might consistently reject in peacetime could become acceptable out of perceived necessity even if not completely aligned with beliefs. For example, begging and rooting through trash for food may not be aligned with beliefs related to social norms, but become accepted as necessary for survival.

6-6. When a desired behavior is inconsistent with a TA's anchor, a well-planned series must gradually move the TA away from their anchor. This gradual change is accomplished by increasingly targeting the non-commitment neutral zone of the TA's latitude of acceptance with intermediate objectives. Additionally, planned actions aimed at shaping the TA's environment to increase the latitude of acceptance or non-commitment should be employed as part of the series. Series developers and planners determine where along this latitude is best for targeting a specific TA. Targeting closer to the latitude of acceptance may be used to build rapport or increase trust and credibility, but since it is where the TA currently resides cognitively and behaviorally there will be little or no behavior change. Targeting too close to the TA's latitude of rejection will also likely end in no behavior change. Figure 6-1 shows the target range for the latitude of acceptance.



**Figure 6-1. Targeting latitude of acceptance**

6-7. To apply related beliefs to determining degrees of susceptibility, Soldiers must have a defined SPO and understand the relationship between the TA's anchor and the desired behavior of the SPO. Once the desired behavior is known—

- Determine beliefs currently held by the TA related to the desired behavior.
- Evaluate the strength of currently held beliefs as either strong, neutral, or weak.
- Estimate the TA's latitude of acceptance toward the desired behavior as likely acceptance, non-commitment, or rejection.

### **Attitude Toward Expected Outcome**

6-8. Beliefs currently held by the TA affect perceptions of risk and reward. The perceived risk, the perceived reward, and the consistency with beliefs are assessed to determine the TA's attitude toward the expected outcome of performing the desired behavior defined by the SPO. To accomplish this task, the Soldier must answer the following questions:



- What are the perceived risks (negative consequences) by the TA to engage in the desired behavior?
- What are the perceived rewards (positive consequences) by the TA to engage in the desired behavior?
- What is the TA's attitude toward the likely outcome of desired behavior performance: positive, neutral, or adverse?

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*Note.* Risks and rewards can be social, emotional, financial, or physical. Risks may include the threat of physical harm, financial loss, or peer disapproval. Rewards may include financial gain, political power, peer approval, or increased self-esteem. Risks and rewards can range from immediate to long-term. Immediate risks and rewards are stronger than long-term risks and rewards. For example, very few people are willing to walk a tightrope (immediate risk), but many people smoke (long-term risk). The higher the perceived rewards and the lower the perceived risks, the more likely that the behavior will occur.

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### **Elaboration Likelihood**

6-9. Elaboration likelihood refers to the probability that the TA will process information to which they are presented. Beliefs and attitude approach susceptibility from the perspective of the desired behavior. However, susceptibility is also dependent on the motivation of the TA and ability to process the information provided by the influence effort. If the TA does not have an adequate schema—or points of reference based on past experiences to which they can associate new information—then they will not perceive relevance or value and lack motivation to elaborate or process the argument and achieve the desired behavior.

6-10. The ability to elaborate information is contingent on the information being presented in a way that is consistent with the current awareness and understanding of the TA. This can also be referred to as the TA's topic literacy. In this, Soldiers must understand that achievement of HPEM stages—awareness and understanding—will affect the attitude of the TA toward a desired behavior. In other words, the Soldier cannot expect an audience to have a stable attitude toward an object to which they are only partially aware.

6-11. The analysis of a TA's awareness and understanding of the topic associated with the SPO may dictate that the influence effort begins with foundational efforts to prepare a TA to receive and process information of the main argument. For example, a TA that has never been exposed to a democratic government and whose leaders have always been selected through religious processes will likely see no value in information about a SPO related to voting in elections. A series would first have to inform the TA of the basics of democracy and present the benefits of taking part in the selection of leadership. As topic literacy increases through efforts directed at awareness and understanding, the influence effort can progress toward presenting an argument to influence voter participation in elections.

### **Credibility Perceptions**

6-12. The final step before making recommendations based on susceptibility is to evaluate perceived credibility of information, as related to the desired behavior, based on source and media channel. Source refers to the sender, and channel refers to the medium of deliver; for example, the President (source) speaks to the TA via public radio (channel). Perceived credibility of information determines—in part—the degree to which the TA will process and elaborate new information. Information is processed when it is considered, thought about, and weighed against other factors. Information is elaborated when it is accepted, internalized, and becomes part of knowing. If the perceived credibility of source is high, the TA is likely to accept the new information through simple peripheral route processing. Peripheral route processing occurs when information is received and accepted without a great deal of thought or the required corroboration from multiple sources or channels.

6-13. There are two factors that determine peripheral route processing of information: source credibility and attitude toward expected outcome. If the TA does not perceive relevance or consequence related to the information, there will be less effort toward the confirmation of validity. In simplest terms, the TA takes the source's word for it. Highly credible sources are also less dependent on or affected by the channel of delivery.

6-14. When source credibility is perceived as low the TA will require central route processing to elaborate information. Central route processing is information received and weighed against existing knowledge and experiences. Central route processing is also more sensitive to the TAs perceived credibility of the channel through which information is received. For this initial assessment of TA susceptibility, the focus remains on beliefs, the attitude toward expected outcome, and credibility of the source. Based on these three variables, if susceptibility is determined to be low, then the recommendation will inform planners which variables require priority. For example, if beliefs are highly consistent with the desired behavior of the SPO, attitude toward the expected outcome is neutral, and the source credibility is low, then the series developers may decide to direct efforts toward increasing the TA's perceived credibility of source. Developers might also vary source attribution or initially only use highly credible media channels.

6-15. Central route processing takes more effort on the part of Psychological Operations Soldiers and the TA, as more information is required to be transmitted and processed. Although requiring more effort, the results of elaboration through central route processing are more enduring and resistant to degradation from external or adversarial information activities. Central route elaboration can be achieved by planning series that expose the TA to consistent threads of information directed through various media channels, varied attributed sources, and shaping of the physical environment over time.

6-16. To rate susceptibility, and for series development, the TAA needs to provide estimates of perceived credibility of various sources and media channels. Confidence of estimate accuracy increases over time but remain estimates. The Soldier can report definitively on past behavior, but future behavior expectation will remain forecasts with varying degrees of confidence. This task of providing susceptibility estimates is accomplished by:

- Identifying likely sources to be used in delivering the argument such as: U.S. forces, partner nations, and community leaders.
- Estimating the TA's perceived credibility of each identified likely source as high, medium, or low.
- Estimating the TA's perceived credibility of each accessible media channel as high, medium, or low.

## TASK 2: RATING SUSCEPTIBILITY

6-17. Once susceptibility has been assessed, an initial rating is determined. The analyst should provide as much concise detail as possible to explain the reason behind a susceptibility rating. Developers and planners will need to understand the variables considered in the initial evaluation to prioritize TAs and determine a recommended course of action to achieve the SPO. Susceptibility ratings are refined as additional information about the TA is obtained over time. Susceptibility is rated using the following scale:

- **Five.** Very susceptible.
  - High-to-moderate reward.
  - Low risk.
  - Consistent with beliefs.
  - High source credibility.
- **Four.** Susceptible.
  - High-to-moderate reward.
  - Moderate-to-low risk.
  - Mostly consistent with values and beliefs.
  - Medium-to-high credibility.
- **Three.** Moderately susceptible.
  - Moderate-to-low reward.
  - Moderate-to-low risk.
  - Somewhat consistent with values and beliefs.
  - Medium credibility.
- **Two.** Slightly susceptible.
  - Low reward.
  - Moderate-to-low risk.
  - Somewhat consistent with values and beliefs.
  - Medium-to-low credibility.

- **One.** Not susceptible.
  - Low reward.
  - Moderate-to-high risk.
  - Not consistent with values and beliefs.
  - Low credibility.

### **TASK 3: MAKING A RECOMMENDATION**

6-18. A recommendation is given based upon the assessment of susceptibility. This recommendation is a guide for use in Step 7 of TAA (Develop Arguments and Recommend PSYACTs), as well as in the next phase of the influence framework (Series Development).

6-19. The lower the susceptibility rating, the less likely that a message will be successful in influencing TA behavior, which does not mean that the TA cannot be influenced. The lower the susceptibility, the more conditions need to be modified for behavior change to occur. Initial messages and actions will have to begin closer to the TA's latitude of acceptance anchor, or that which is consistent with current beliefs. More PSYACTs may need to be incorporated into the series.

6-20. Source and channel modifications may be required to accomplish the desired behavior. Figure 6-2, page 36, is an example of a susceptibility rating and recommendations report as an outcome of Step 5 (Determine Susceptibility) of the TAAM. The influence framework requires Soldiers to make informed logical assumptions and relate those to planners for series development. This report provides the analyst a format to record findings and provide rationale for susceptibility ratings and recommendations. The granularity of this report will depend on available information and should be updated through continual analysis.

6-21. An additional consideration when making recommendations is to include any known cyclic behavior patterns of the TA that suggests increased risk of being affected by events, actions, or conditions. Individuals and groups can often be more susceptible to influence at certain times over others. For example, adherents of some religions experience more violence or unrest during certain annual observances. Compiled data show that the perpetrators of violent actions had heightened susceptibility to radical messages at those times for various reasons.

<b>PO</b>	Decrease sectarian violence in the AO.
<b>TA</b>	NMB reserve fighters.
<b>SPO</b>	TA deserts the NMB.
<b>Perceived risks</b>	The TA could be attacked by other members of the militia if it does not follow orders. The TA will lose any additional income it would receive from the militia. If the TA leaves the militia, it could be ostracized by the militia and others in the community who are sympathetic to the militia's cause. The TA will lose the prestige that comes from being in the militia.
<b>Perceived rewards</b>	If the TA members desert, they will not be imprisoned or killed by government or coalition forces. As part-time members, they have left their families and old life behind; they can return to their families and their normal lives and jobs.
<b>Consistency with beliefs</b>	The need for revenge is strong in the culture and these attacks are viewed as justified actions. However, forgiveness is considered a virtue in the TA's religion and the TA's actions are driven more by perceived wrongs and ideological differences than ethnic hatred. The greatest barrier is the value placed on loyalty to one's tribe. Desired behavior of the SPO is evaluated as being within the latitude of non-commitment but leaning toward rejection.
<b>Susceptibility ratings</b>	Two (slightly susceptible)
<b>Source credibility requirements</b>	Low susceptibility rating and high value placed on tribal loyalty suggests highly credible sources and channels will be needed to influence the TA.
<b>Recommendations</b>	TA susceptibility is low enough that PSYACTs and intermediate objectives to shape the environment should precede the main argument. Messages and actions should present intermediate objectives that remain close to the TA's latitude of acceptance anchor and gradually move toward the desired behavior. Source and channel selection during initial interventions must be highly credible. In addition, Soldiers must target other TAs that have influence over the primary TA.
<p><b>Legend:</b></p> <p><b>AO</b> area of operation  <b>NMB</b> Nashburg Martyr Brigade  <b>PO</b> psychological objective  <b>PSYACT</b> psychological action  <b>SPO</b> supporting psychological objective  <b>TA</b> target audience</p>	

Figure 6-2. Susceptibility rating and recommendations report

## Chapter 7

# Step 6: Determine Accessibility

Determining accessibility consists of eight tasks that allow Psychological Operations Soldiers to evaluate each form of media for a specific TA. The following paragraphs explain each of these tasks and provide insights as to how the information provided by TAA enables development and delivery decisions by planners.

## ACCESSIBILITY ANALYSIS

7-1. Accessibility is a measure or valuation of the quality of an audience's availability for influence targeting. An audience may be available but not readily accessible. Though nuanced, the differences between accessibility and availability are important as the analyst is providing data to enable informed decisions on whether a TA is to be targeted. The analyst determines the accessibility of an audience in relationship to the TA's current media patterns. Media patterns refer to the TA's current and consistent uses of media channels. Media channels can range from print, audio, and audio-visual to digital media, face to face, or any other medium used to communicate. It is critical that influence efforts select media channels based on more than what is simply most available, affordable, or familiar to planners. Effective influence depends on selecting channels that are most likely to resonate with the audience specific to the type of message or topic selected.

7-2. Soldiers do not rely on a single channel approach, but rather employ methods of delivery that will engage the audience with a common argument, or narrative, over multiple channels consistent with the TA's identified patterns of use. Three broad factors that must be considered when planning the media mix for delivery are channel familiarity, durability, and credibility. In determining accessibility, TAA provides planners with requisite information by analyzing various media channels with as much granularity as possible. TAA is not the decision phase, but rather a process of gathering and analyzing information to make accurate forecasts and recommendations. The following examples of how TAA information may be used during series development and delivery planning are intended to provide understanding of the types and quality of information that should be included:

- **Familiarity.** Speaks to the TA's use and expectations of various media channels.
  - Low familiarity may be useful to create curiosity and draw an audience.
  - If information delivery is time sensitive, planners will likely choose a channel with greater familiarity to avoid having to first increase reach and frequency.
- **Durability.** This is the potential lifespan and spread of information when delivered by specific channels.
  - For example, a message sent over X (formally Twitter) could reach a broad audience and create a chaining effect where information is passed from one recipient to another, but its lifespan may only be measured in minutes or even seconds.
  - A message delivered in print has greater lifespan but is less likely to be widely shared, thus creating less of a chaining effect than what other channels may provide.
- **Channel credibility.** Addresses degrees of perceived credibility of different media channels. Previously, credibility was discussed in terms of sources and channels. Identifying channel credibility is necessary to best pair source and channel.
  - If a source has medium to low credibility planners will likely pair that source with a highly credible channel and possibly another more credible source.
  - Channel credibility can vary greatly within a population group. Media channel credibility determinants require greater specificity when analyzing a TA but aid planners when deciding on the media mix that will be used.
  - For example, some members of the TA may perceive social media as entertainment and radio as a credible news source, whereas another segment of the audience may not trust radio and rely heavily on social media feeds for information.

7-3. Figure 7-1 shows how estimated source credibility ratings from Step 5: Determine Susceptibility, are recorded and then combined with channel credibility ratings determined in Step 6: Determine Accessibility, to then make informed recommendations. These credibility estimations and recommendations will be used during the planning of series development and delivery. Pairing low credibility sources with high credibility sources and channels increase message susceptibility by the TA. Highly credible sources are less dependent on channel than low credibility sources.

Source and Channel Pairing Recommendations					
<b>TA:</b> Red Tribe Landowners in Region of Fertile Valley AO. <b>PO:</b> Replace Narco Crops with Food Crops. <b>SPO:</b> TA Replaces Narco Crops with Food Crops.					
Potential Source		Perceived Source Credibility (High-3, Med-2, Low-1)	Accessible Media Channel		Perceived Channel Credibility (High-3, Med-2, Low-1)
1	Minister of Agriculture	1	1	TV News Station (National)	2
2	Radio Personality (Music)	1	2	Radio News (Gov't Control)	1
3	TV Personality (Editorial)	2	3	Radio Music/Entertainment	1
4	US Forces	1	4	Twitter	1
5	PN/HN Forces	2	5	Facebook	2
6	Tribal Council Leader	3	6	Newspaper	3
7	Local Star Soccer Player	2	7	Radio News (Independent)	3
8	Prominent Landowner	2	8	Public Stage in Market	2
9	Leader of Farm Workers	3	9	TV News Station (Regional)	3
10	NGO: Land Development	3	10	Online Discussion Board (Farming)	3
Pairing			Rationale		
Source		Channel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minister of Agriculture has vast understanding of long-term economic benefits but as a government official he is perceived as part of the problem by landowners.</li> <li>Delivering message over highly credible news channel may mitigate low source credibility.</li> <li>Joint appearance on regional news with NGO for land development may further increase credibility of message.</li> </ul> U.S. forces credibility as a source is low among TA and should limit series with U.S. attribution to highly credible channels until source credibility improves.		
1 and 10		9			
4		6, 7, 8, 9			
<b>Legend:</b> <b>AO</b> area of operations <b>HN</b> host nation <b>NGO</b> nongovernmental organization <b>PN</b> partner nation <b>PO</b> psychological objective <b>TA</b> target audience <b>SPO</b> supporting psychological objective					

Figure 7-1. Example of source and channel credibility estimations

7-4. In each of these previous examples the information provided by the TAA provides planners with variants needed to consider multiple courses of action and, in many cases, use one variant to mitigate the shortcomings of another. No information environment remains perfectly stable or will provide the optimum conditions for every influence engagement. The Soldier will have to overcome barriers, some related to the TA and others inherent to operational restrictions. TAA provides information needed to make informed choices.

7-5. In evaluating TA accessibility, Soldiers determine which media can reach the TA. Additionally, they determine to what degree the TA can be influenced by each media type. Determining TA accessibility seeks to answer the question: what types of media will effectively carry the influence message to the TA? Questions to ask include—

- How is the TA currently receiving information?
- Does the TA's channel preference depend on topic or type of information?
- What media channels are perceived as most credible by the TA?
- What media channels best reach the TA?

### **TASK 1: DETERMINE HOW THE TARGET AUDIENCE CURRENTLY RECEIVES INFORMATION**

7-6. Task 1 involves determining the types of media that the TA actively accesses or uses and the formats of those types of media. Answering several questions about various forms of media can accomplish this task.

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*Note.* Social media involves exchanges of information as opposed to unidirectional media channels such as radio, TV, and newspapers. Audience engagement of social media is culturally specific. For example, in many cultures there is an expectation that a user's profile will be reality-based, even if obscured by how one wishes to be perceived by others. In contrast, other cultures engage social media as they would a fantasy-based world or type of escapism with no expectation of truth built into one's persona. In reality-based exchanges, credibility must be carefully guarded, whereas fantasy-based exchanges can be used as a channel for influence but most likely only in terms of reinforcing a narrative in the psyche of the TA.

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7-7. The following are examples of media channel questions to consider:

- Does the TA access radio?
  - Is it FM, AM, or short wave or internet-based?
  - Does the TA most frequently receive messages in the form of advertisements, talk shows, news programs, or documentaries?
  - What is the length of advertisements, talk shows, news programs, or documentaries?
  - What are the formats of the radio stations to which the TA listens (news or entertainment)?
- Does the TA engage in social media exchanges?
  - Do they use reality-based or fantasy-world profiles and personas?
  - What are the most used social media platforms: microblogs, discussion boards, restricted or selective group platforms?
  - How does social media behavior change depending on topic (when anonymity or privacy is preferred)?
- Are newspapers a channel of information used by the TA?
  - Are newspapers received in black and white, or do they have color photos and advertisements?
  - Does the TA receive information through articles, editorials, advertisements, or all these formats?
  - What size are advertisements: 1/4-page, 1/2-page, or full page?
  - Do the newspapers use inserts?
- How does the TA receive information through TV?
  - What is the most prevalent format (advertisements, documentaries, comedy programs, or other programs)?
  - What is the normal length of each type?

## TASK 2: DETERMINE CURRENT MEDIA PATTERNS

7-8. Task 2 provides further details that assist Soldiers in selecting the best media platform from those that the TA receives or are exposed to. The two primary methods of determining media patterns are reach and frequency.

### Reach

7-9. Reach is the total number of TA members exposed to the medium at least once during a given period. Any time period can be used, but it must be consistent for all mediums; therefore, the Soldier must pick a standard and use it for all mediums being evaluated.

7-10. For printed material, such as newspapers, magazines, or newsletters, reach equals readership, which is the subscription rate plus other sales plus secondary readership. For example, a household would only be counted once for the subscription rate, but if three other people in the household read the same newspaper in addition to the subscriber, the readership rate would be four. A common mistake with radio and TV is to count the number of radio receivers and TV sets owned. In some parts of the world, there may be only one TV set for every 50 people. However, if 25 people regularly watch that one TV set, the reach equals 50 percent. Thus, viewership for TV and listenership for radio are more important than the number of radios and TVs owned.

7-11. Another challenge is in estimating reach of spreadable media, or that which can be shared digitally via computer mediated communications including smart phones. These spreadable media channels are most seen in social media platforms. Special social media analytics are required to determine reach estimates in these cases to avoid false assumptions, such as assuming that number of followers equals number of viewers. Each social media platform has different algorithms to determine the number of followers that may see any given message.

### Frequency

7-12. Frequency is the number of times an individual member of the TA accesses a particular medium during a given period. If a TA member subscribes to a newspaper five days a week and the given period is four weeks, the TA member would have a frequency rate of 20 for that medium. Most people will see or access certain types of media on a routine basis. This information is important for Soldiers because repetition and reinforcement of an argument are essential to behavior change. In digital media exchanges the frequency increases if linked thread discussions or engagements follow a particular post or message.

7-13. The following is an example of reach and frequency if the TA is truck drivers working for a soft drink company in Blueland and the media channel is billboards:

- **Reach.** Ninety (+) percent of the TA has exposure in a one-week period.
- **Frequency.** Each driver passes the billboard once a day when he or she picks up their soft drinks and, thus, is exposed five times during a week, so the frequency is five.

#### CAUTION

**Avoid oversaturation. Oversaturation of any medium with repetitive messages can decrease effectiveness, especially if there was no noticeable behavior change in the TA. Oversaturation may not only lower the message source credibility, but that of the medium as well.**

## TASK 3: DETERMINE CURRENT MEDIA USES AND EXPECTATIONS

7-14. During Task 3, it must be determined if the TA members access the medium and, if so, why? Do they access this medium for entertainment, social connectivity, news, and information? If they access it for entertainment, they may not listen to serious messages. If they access the media for news and information, a longer, more serious message may be well received.



7-15. If a specific media channel meets the expectations or gratifies the needs of the user, then frequency of use will increase. Failure to gratify expectations will have the adverse effect. For example, if the TA expects to receive news from the radio but perceives they are mostly being exposed to advertisements the radio use will fail to gratify the expectation and radio use will decrease. Planners must ensure that the influence message is delivered in a way consistent with the TA's expectations of the selected delivery channel.

7-16. Users of a channel primarily for entertainment purposes will tolerate a degree of news and serious information, but too much will decrease audience. In this instance it may be better to develop series that both inform and entertain.

#### **TASK 4: DETERMINE HOW INVOLVED THE TARGET AUDIENCE IS IN THE PROCESS**

7-17. Task 4 determines if the TA is actively or passively engaged. If the TA members actively access the medium for news or information, there is a greater probability that it will be easier to gain and maintain their attention, and it is more likely that the TA will absorb and understand the message. If the TA members passively access the media, such as by listening to a radio while working, it will be more difficult to gain and maintain their attention, and the TA may not absorb the message.

7-18. Analysis of active or passive engagement supports the decision efforts of planners for developing the delivery means for the message. The more desirable the likely outcome, and the greater the perceived achievability of the outcome, the more effort the TA will be willing to exert. This increased effort applies to a more active seeking of information as well as other behaviors necessary for a TA to realize the outcome they desire. TAs must first be aware and understand a potential outcome before increased positive perceptions toward the outcome will result in increased effort. Media channels with active participation will better serve the influence effort with TAs identified as being in the early stages of the HPEM. Passive participation channels can be added to the media mix in early stages to strengthen perceived credibility and reinforce the argument, but active engagement channels should be the primary effort.

#### **TASK 5: DETERMINE WHETHER THE TARGET AUDIENCE ACCESSES THE MEDIA INDIVIDUALLY OR WITH OTHERS**

7-19. Task 5 determines affects others may have on how one perceives and processes a message by accessing a media channel in the presence of others and how it could affect the person's perception of the message. It may also lead to further discussion of the message. TAs that discuss and think about the argument are exercising central route processing and are therefore more likely to be persuaded so long as the argument is not too inconsistent with their anchor (see latitude of acceptance, Chapter 6).

7-20. Group access to media and their discussion of media are no longer dependent on physical presence or limited by geographical boundaries. Computer-mediated communications permit textual engagements, voice discussions, and face-to-face encounters between TA members in near real time without sharing a common physical location. This type of communication has broadened the discussion of what is an open or bounded society.

7-21. A group that was once open in terms of being exposed to varying points of view due to differences in geographical areas can now become self-bounded by limiting who they selectively engage with via social media and other media channels. Societies once bounded from outside influence are now able to be open to information from outside of their physical barriers. Public discourse and the definition of the public square are now more defined by a people's access to outside media than by physical barriers. Penetrating these information barriers will depend on first identifying if the TA is self-segregating or bounded by restricted media access.

7-22. When analyzing and recording whether a media channel is accessed individually or as a group it is important to understand the differences between an open and bounded group. This is important because a bounded group may be more difficult to penetrate with new information if the group has selectively bound itself. If only bound by lack of access to various media channels and restricted points of view, the TA may desire new information, making for easier penetration into the information environment.

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*Note.* Beliefs within a bounded society will become increasingly similar, or convergent, as they only receive supporting points of view. Open societies tend to become increasingly divergent as new information challenges currently held beliefs. Influence efforts that open a society and cause it to gain divergent beliefs will more likely succeed in influencing behavior change.

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## **TASK 6: DETERMINE WHAT NEW MEDIA MIGHT BE USED TO ACCESS THE TARGET AUDIENCE**

7-23. Task 6 determines what new media might be used to access the target. New media is anything that the TA does not currently receive. This part of TAA enables delivery planners to consider both what is currently available and what may have value if added to the available delivery platforms. Planners determine what is needed based on data derived from analysis.

7-24. In addition to increasing openness and divergence of beliefs, new media may better attract and hold the TA's attention simply because of the uniqueness or novelty of the media. New media may also increase the overall reach and frequency by filling voids left by other media. That said, there are also disadvantages to new media that must be considered. New media may focus all attention on the media itself and detract from the actual message. In addition, TAs may perceive new media as being too strange or foreign. Resistance to the message may increase in some environments if the source is obviously not indigenous.

7-25. Introduction of new media should, whenever possible, be done in concert with ongoing use of familiar and currently accessed media channels to maintain reach and frequency during the introductory period. Further, to ensure that the new media gains perceived credibility it must maintain consistency with information received from trusted media channels currently being accessed by the TA.

## **TASK 7: INCLUDE ALL OF THE INFORMATION ON THE TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS WORKSHEET**

7-26. In Task 7, Soldiers include all the information for each medium on the TAAW. Increased specificity and granularity of details increases the developer's ability to make informed decisions about how to best influence the TA. Soldiers:

- List the media channel as specifically as possible.
  - Examples include: TV spot, radio spot, newspaper insert, highway billboard, discussion boards, microblog channel and trending topic, or video documentary).
  - Avoid listing the medium as a major category (for example, TV, radio, print, audio, visual, or audiovisual).
- Describe the format as specifically as possible.
  - This description should include size, shape, number of pages, length (in time, if applicable), color versus black and white, and so on.
  - Soldiers should also include the names of any media outlets available, such as names of specific newspapers, magazines, TV and radio stations, and social media platforms (specify hashtags, trending topics, and specific page or persona if known).
- List advantages and disadvantages.
  - List all advantages and disadvantages in using this media channel for the TA.
  - Soldiers should include the reach, frequency, literacy rate, TA involvement, and perception of the credibility of the medium by the TA.
- Rate each media channel on a scale of one to five, with one being the least preferred and five being the most preferred.
  - The goal is an objective rating based on a data analysis of the medium interpretation of the media and may be included in the rating explanation.
  - However, the rating needs to rely on objectivity to ensure a consistent standard is kept throughout the TAAW. This is a critical rating because it will guide the product development team during series development.

**TASK 8: ARTICULATE THE TECHNICAL ASPECT OF EACH MEDIA CHANNEL**

7-27. To clearly articulate the technical aspect of each medium, the Soldier must know the capabilities and limitations of internet accessible to the TA, the physical location, frequency, and power of radio and TV transmitters, as well as the physical location, distribution methods, dissemination quantities, and technical capabilities of print media facilities. This information is crucial to determining the proper media and completing the transmission matrix in series development.

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## Chapter 8

# Step 7: Develop Arguments and Recommend Psychological Actions

In Step 7 of the TAAM, the Psychological Operations Soldier provides guidance and recommendations that are used to develop the series. Series developers, during conceptualization and planning of messages and actions for psychological effect, rely on guidance provided from TAA. This guidance consists of persuasive arguments and recommendations of vulnerabilities to be exploited by series. Exploitation of vulnerabilities relies heavily on PSYACTs, planned during series development, to shape conditions related to the current behavior of the TA.

## ARGUMENTS

8-1. The argument is the overall approach used to obtain the desired behavior from the TA. Arguments, for the purpose of series development, are an aligning of the desired behavior of the SPO with identified TA vulnerabilities. It is not a slogan or tagline and does not provide the specific messages or wording for individual product development. The argument provides the guidance and overall framework for constructing the series—to include supporting arguments—to influence the TA to behave in the desired manner.

### MAIN ARGUMENT

8-2. The main argument is the reason that the TA should engage in the desired behavior. This reason will satisfy TA vulnerabilities. If the TA members accept this reason, they should engage in the desired behavior.

8-3. The main argument should be written in one or two sentences, summarizing the conclusion that the TA must reach to engage in the desired behavior of the SPO. The main argument is constructed by linking the desired behavior with one or more vulnerabilities. The general format for the main argument is: engaging in X (SPO) will result in Y (TA vulnerability satisfied). Examples are as follows:

- Reporting insurgent activity (SPO) will lead to a safer environment (vulnerability).
- Growing alternative legal crops (SPO) will provide a good income and stable future for the TA's family (vulnerability).
- Surrendering to coalition forces will cause the TA to receive immediate food and water.
- Reporting suspected terrorist activities on the coalition hotline (SPO) will allow authorities to make the TA's town safe and secure (vulnerability).
- Avoiding interference with coalition troops (SPO) will ensure the safety of the TA's families (vulnerability).

### SUPPORTING ARGUMENT

8-4. Supporting arguments are used to provide factual evidence, address causes and effects, and exploit vulnerabilities. They increase the TA's motivation to accept the main argument (by giving the TA more reasons to believe the main argument). If supporting arguments are presented using effective techniques, the TA should agree with the main argument. Points to consider regarding supporting arguments include:

- Supporting arguments may be more effective when using facts and specific examples.
- Additional vulnerabilities may be used as supporting arguments.
- Consequences identified on the cause-and-effect chart are a good source of supporting arguments.
- Supporting arguments are not slogans or the specific language to be used in the series. They provide guidance and direction for series and product development.

8-5. Figure 8-1, page 46, is an example of the main argument with supporting arguments.

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*Note.* Not every vulnerability may be used as a supporting argument. Some vulnerabilities may be better addressed with PSYACTs or lead to another TA or behavior.

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<b>PO</b>	Decrease sectarian violence in the AO.		
<b>TA</b>	NMB reserve fighters.		
<b>SPO</b>	TA increases reporting of IEDs.		
<b>Vulnerabilities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TA wants coalition forces to leave.</li> <li>• The TA wants law and order restored.</li> <li>• The TA wants employment opportunities.</li> <li>• The TA members are frustrated by slow reconstruction efforts in their area.</li> <li>• The TA members place great importance on caring for and taking care of their families; failure to do this brings shame.</li> </ul>		
<b>Conditions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insurgents are paid \$100 by foreign fighters to plant IEDs.</li> <li>• TA members have been injured and killed by IEDs.</li> <li>• The coalition increases its presence and activity in areas that contain high numbers of IEDs.</li> <li>• Individuals do not want to invest in economic ventures in dangerous areas.</li> <li>• IEDs cause significant injuries and deaths to civilians, including many children.</li> </ul>		
<b>Main Arguments</b>	Reporting IEDs will result in law and order and withdrawal of coalition troops.		
<b>Supporting Arguments</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IEDs killed over 150 civilians and wounded 300 in the last six months.</li> <li>• Security forces need the TA's help to stop the IEDs.</li> <li>• Coalition forces will not leave until the IEDs stop.</li> <li>• Fifty IEDs planted along the roadside last month killed 45 and wounded 70 innocent people, 32 of whom were children.</li> <li>• Economic prosperity requires an IED-free area.</li> <li>• Reconstruction efforts are hindered by IED attacks.</li> </ul>		
<b>Legend:</b>			
<b>AO</b>	area of operations	<b>PO</b>	psychological objective
<b>IED</b>	improvised explosive device	<b>SPO</b>	supporting psychological objective
<b>NMB</b>	Nashburg Martyr Brigade	<b>TA</b>	target audience

**Figure 8-1. Example of main argument with supporting arguments**

**APPEALS AND TECHNIQUES**

8-6. Decisions about appeals and techniques are made during series development. TAA provides information applied during the conceptualization of messages and actions to exploit vulnerabilities and conditions.

8-7. The appeal is the overall approach used to present the main argument. It is the tone of the argument. Appeals gain the attention of the TA members and maintain their interest throughout the argument. Appeals are selected based upon the conditions and vulnerabilities of the TA.

8-8. For the purposes of TAA, techniques refer to the specific methods to be used in presenting information to the TA. Effective influence techniques are based on the conditions affecting the TA and the type of information being presented. Determining the most effective technique or combination of techniques to influence the TA is only accomplished through a cultivated understanding of the TA and its behavior.

## RECOMMEND VULNERABILITIES FOR EXPLOITATION

8-9. In addition to providing series developers arguments, the TAA identifies exploitable vulnerabilities through analysis of conditions, and causes and effects related to the SPO. Although conceptualization and planning of specific message and PSYACTs occurs during series development, PSYACTs are introduced below to provide the analyst greater clarity of the types of information required for development.

8-10. PSYACTs are planned and conducted by military forces or unified action partners as part of a series. PSYACTs are developed specifically to achieve a psychological effect and are used in conjunction with messages to modify the behavior of a TA. PSYACTs are conducted to influence TA mental processes. Ultimately, PSYACTs influence the TA in one of the following three ways:

- By modifying conditions (causes and effects) identified on the cause-and-effect chart.
- By exploiting identified vulnerabilities (demographics and motives).
- By building rapport (removing barriers to persuasion).

8-11. During TAA, Soldiers recommend exploitable vulnerabilities for further consideration in series development. Soldiers review each condition on the cause-and-effect chart and the list of vulnerabilities and answer each of the following questions:

- What causes could be most readily modified to achieve the desired behavior change?
- What positive consequences could be most readily decreased to influence behavior change?
- What negative consequences could be most readily increased to influence behavior change?
- What secondary consequences could be most readily exploited to influence behavior change?
- How can U.S. and friendly forces change the conditions to modify the TA's current behavior?
- How can the desired behavior be made more desirable to the TA (perceived rewards and motives)?
- How can the current behavior be made less desirable to the TA (perceived risks and motives)?
- What vulnerabilities can be exploited to influence TA behavior?

8-12. Figure 8-2 shows examples of recommendations for the exploitation of TA vulnerabilities (characteristics, motives, or conditions of a TA)

<b>Conditions</b>	The TA has been harassed by insurgent groups and threatened against working.
<b>Recommendation</b>	Change security situation for Red Tribe.
<b>Conditions</b>	TA members believe that the new government is hostile to the Red Tribe and that it does not represent their interests.
<b>Recommendation</b>	Challenge erroneous beliefs.
<b>Conditions</b>	The TA distrusts coalition forces and believes that they are in the AO to exploit natural resources.
<b>Recommendation</b>	Emphasize good intentions and the legitimacy of the coalition.
<b>Conditions</b>	The TA has no confidence in local security forces. It only trusts coalition troops to fight rebels.
<b>Recommendation</b>	Emphasize that coalition and local security forces are working to restore order and that they need the TA's cooperation.
<b>Conditions</b>	Suicide bombers are lauded and regarded as martyrs.
<b>Recommendation</b>	Change the social reinforcement for the behavior.
<b>Legend:</b>	
AO	area of operations
TA	target audience

Figure 8-2. Recommendations for vulnerabilities exploitation

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## Chapter 9

# Step 8: Refine Assessment Criteria

Initial assessment criteria are determined during planning and are provided along with the PO, SPO, and potential TA. The initial assessment criteria are refined at the conclusion of TAA based upon the TA-specific desired and current behavior. These refined assessment criteria determine what indicators must be collected for a given TA. These indicators are the answers to the assessment criteria questions. Analysis of indicators over time will show trends which determine whether thresholds are being achieved and if the TA is progressing or regressing along the HPEM continuum toward SPO achievement.

## REFINE ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

9-1. The refinement of assessment criteria requires an understanding and consistent use of key terms, which include assessment criteria, baseline data, and threshold:

- **Assessment criteria.** This is developed during planning and written as questions, and when answered describe current behavior and changes in behavioral trends.
  - Behaviors are the strongest indicators of assessment criteria having been met, and the only indicators that demonstrate the accomplishment of a SPO.
  - Data that indicates attitude is useful in increasing forecast accuracy by providing insights into the motives of behavior.
  - For example, the behavior of attending a political rally demonstrates an interest in elections, but surveying attendees can further determine if attendance is in support of election or to protest it.
  - For each desired effect, several assessment criteria are developed that separately or aggregately can be used to measure intended effect. These assessment criteria provide guidance for intelligence collectors (J-2, G-2, S-2) to develop information requirements.
- **Baseline data.** This is used to establish thresholds and goals for desired rates of change. Analysis of behavioral or attitudinal indicators relative to assessment criteria and baseline over time is used to identify progression or regression along the HPEM continuum toward SPO achievement.
- **Thresholds.** These are determined during the development and subsequent refinement of assessment criteria.
  - Thresholds define the amount of desired change to be achieved.
  - When the change in an attitude or behavior reaches a specified level, the influence effort met the stated objective.
  - Thresholds may be either relative (20 percent fewer attacks) or may have specific levels (no more than two attacks per week).

9-2. Intermediate objectives of awareness, understanding, attitude, preference, and behavior intention begin weighted more toward attitudinal objectives and become increasingly behavioral in nature, until the actual desired behavior is achieved. Intermediate objectives that are primarily attitude-based will often have behavioral indicators while attitudinal data, such as survey results, provides greater clarity or confirmation of a TA's position in relation to a SPO. In addition to specifying the associated desired behavior of the SPO, assessment criteria should specify which intermediate objective threshold a behavior suggests has been achieved.

9-3. For example, the behavior of attending a political rally is an indicator of an attitude toward the candidate, and even a preference to participate in the political process. Survey data may provide insights of the attitude indicated by the behavior. In this example, surveys may clarify whether rally attendance is in support of, or in opposition to, a specific candidate. This indicating behavior is short of the behavior objective of voting in upcoming elections, but it informs of intermediate objectives awareness, understanding, and preference having been reached.

9-4. If the PO is democratically held elections, and the SPO is that the TA votes in upcoming elections, then the registering to vote is an indicator of TA's intention to vote. The reaching or exceeding of a prescribed threshold of registered voters indicates the intermediate objective of behavior intention has been reached. A refusal to register is a behavior that indicates a negative preference toward the SPO.

9-5. Although preferring one choice over another is attitude-based, the behavior of not registering demonstrates that the threshold for preferring one choice over another has not yet been met and influence efforts will continue to focus on previous HPEM stages. Refusal to register does not alone specify which of the previous HPEM stages best describes the TA's current state, but it does indicate that the TA has not yet achieved preference to a point of becoming a strongly held intention. If awareness, understanding, and attitude objectives have each been clearly achieved by reaching prescribed thresholds, then the influence effort shifts to strengthening the TA's preference followed by removing barriers between intention and the SPO. Tracking and comparing assessment data will determine if the TA is progressing or regressing along the HPEM continuum.

9-6. The refined assessment criteria related directly to the SPO should ask for specific, measurable, and observable data regarding the TA's behavior. Measurable means the data can be quantified. Observable means the data can be seen or heard. Specific refers to the criteria that behavior change is measured against.

9-7. Refined assessment criteria typically include several of the following elements:

- **Setting.** City, town, or area (for example, Patriotsville, AO).
- **Frequency.** How often a behavior occurs (daily, weekly, or monthly—for example, 3 times per day and 12 times per month).
- **Intensity.** The consequences or severity (for example, results—11 injuries and 4 deaths).
- **Rate.** The number of occurrences per time unit; for example, attacks continue to occur once every 2 ½ days.
- **Place.** The specific location (for example, Nashburg marketplace or during Morning Prayer at the Blue Mosque).
- **Time.** The time period within which the behavior occurred (for example, mid-afternoon, morning, or evening).
- **Threshold.** The increase or decrease in behavior that must be achieved or surpassed to determine SPO accomplishment.

9-8. Figure 9-1 provides two examples of how broader initial assessment criteria become more granular during Step 8 (Refine Assessment Criteria). The inclusion of baseline data and thresholds that indicate objective achievement is critical as these serve as guidance for Soldiers determining series priorities and assessing effectiveness of the influence effort. The intermediate objectives, as exemplified below, each need to be considered, even if it is obvious that thresholds have already been met. The TA may regress before reaching the behavior objective defined in the SPO and the intermediate objectives provide a means of monitoring progression and regression toward the SPO.

**EXAMPLE 1**

**Psychological objective:** Increase support for government.

**Supporting psychological objective:** Increased target audience (TA) voting in elections.

**Initial Assessment Criteria:** How many citizens vote in elections?

**Target Audience:** Voting-age Blue Tribe males in Patriotsville.

**Current Behavior:** Blue Tribe members are making public statements challenging the legitimacy of the interim government and their ability to hold safe and secure elections.

**Refined Assessment Criteria:** What percentage of voting-age Blue Tribe males in Patriotsville vote in election? Baseline: 30% past voter participation. Threshold: 50% increase over baseline.

**Intermediate objectives:** When applicable, include thresholds that equate to intermediate objective achievement.

- **Awareness:** TA publicly discussing elections.
- **Threshold:** 50% increase over baseline in TA discussing election across social media platforms over two-month period.
- **Understanding:** TA accepts campaign or election materials.
- **Threshold:** 30% of TA presented with campaign or election materials.
- **Attitude:** TA publicly expressed positive sentiment toward election.
- **Threshold:** 60% of TA social media engagements related to elections express positive attitude toward elections.
- **Preference:** TA attends election or political rally.
- **Threshold:** Less than 10% of TA rally attendees are present to protest elections
- **Intention:** TA registers to vote.
- **Threshold:** 70% of TA registers to vote.
- **Behavior:** 80% of TA votes in election.

**EXAMPLE 2**

**Psychological objective:** Reduce casualties of unexploded ordinance (UXO).

**Supporting psychological objective:** TA decreases attempts to collect explosive materials from UXOs.

**Initial Assessment Criteria:** How many people are killed by UXOs?

**Target Audience:** Rural Green Tribe adolescence.

**Current Behavior:** TA collects explosive materials from UXOs to sell on black markets.

**Refined Assessment Criteria:** Number of Rural Green Tribe adolescents killed by UXOs while collecting explosive materials during previous 6 months? Baseline: 8 killed. Threshold: 50% decrease over next 6 months.

**Intermediate objectives:** When applicable, include thresholds that equate to intermediate objective achievement.

- **Awareness:** TA acknowledges UXOs are in Rural Green Tribe area.
- **Threshold:** 80% of TA respond to face-to-face survey that they are aware of UXOs in Rural Green Tribe area.
- **Understanding:** TA attends UXO danger awareness program.
- **Threshold:** 60% of TA attends UXO danger awareness program.
- **Attitude:** TA accepts information about identifying and avoiding UXOs.
- **Threshold:** 75% of TA attending UXO danger awareness program actively engage presenters and/or accept information materials.
- **Preference:** TA reports instances of others entering UXO danger areas.
- **Threshold:** TA reports of others entering UXO danger areas, equal to or higher than 10% of known instances of UXO danger area incursions.
- **Intention:** TA reports unmarked UXO locations to disposal units
- **Threshold:** 80% increase in UXO disposal attributable to TA reporting.
- **Behavior:** 50% decrease in TA deaths attributed to collecting UXO explosives over 6 months.

**Figure 9-1. Examples of initial assessment criteria**

9-9. Notice in Example 1 in figure 9-1, page 51, the SPO is an *increasing* of TA behavior. This demonstrates that the achievement of the behavior objective is determined by the TA behavior reaching or surpassing the threshold of the refined assessment criteria. In contrast, Example 2 has an SPO that is a *decreasing* in TA behavior. Measuring a negative is challenging and may require greater analysis. In the second example the refined assessment criteria is data that, when correlated with consequence (UXO related death), indicates a decrease in the current TA behavior of collecting explosives.

9-10. Refined assessment criteria provide the granularity and specificity needed to plan for assessments that gauge TA progress and measure effectiveness of the influence effort. Refined assessment criteria also assist in determining the methods to be used in determining change from baseline. For example, if analysts determine from refined assessment criteria that information about an attitudinal change is required then surveys or social media analytics may be selected to identify if the threshold has been achieved.

## Appendix A

# Target Audience Analysis Worksheet

The TAAW is the analyst's report and will contain all available information related to a TA and its associated PO and SPO. This is where Soldiers will look for insights, requisite information, and rational assumptions about the TA while advising, planning, developing series, making deliver decisions, assessing effectiveness of the influence effort, and other tasks associated with conducting influence process activities.

A-1. The sample TAAW (figure A-1, page 53-55) provides header data that identifies the primary analyst, date of last update, and the related PO and SPO. The TAAW format provides 8 section headings consistent with the outline of this TM to simplify discovery of specific needed information by those completing and receiving the TAAW.

A-2. The information contained below the header data and within the 8 sections is somewhat flexible as these sections must contain as much detail as the analyst deems necessary to inform decisions. Subparagraphs and supporting graphics, tables, and charts are examples of the types of additional information that the analyst may find needful to include in the TAAW. The 8 sections under required header data are:

- Refined Target Audience.
- Achievability.
- Conditions.
- Vulnerability.
- Susceptibility.
- Accessibility.
- Arguments and Recommendations.
- Refined Assessment Criteria.

[CLASSIFICATION]
<b>Analyst Name:</b>
<b>Date:</b>
<b>Psychological Objective:</b>
<b>Supporting Psychological Objective:</b>
<b>Target Audience:</b>
<b>1. (U) REFINED TARGET AUDIENCE.</b>
a. (U) Describe, if needed, any details about the refined target audience (TA) that may not be clear through descriptive naming alone.
b. (U) Provide any details of refined TA that may be dependent on factors such as time (for example, population group during a specific season or before a set or annual activity).
<b>2. (U) ACHIEVABILITY.</b>
a. (U) Define the specific desired behavior of the supporting psychological objective (SPO).
b. (U) Describe the TA's control or perceived control over SPO behavior achievement.
c. (U) Identify and discuss any restrictions or barriers the TA needs to overcome to achieve the SPO.
d. (U) Explain how the TA adoption of the SPO will affect the overall PO, considering the likelihood of success and also effect size.

**Figure A-1. Sample target audience analysis worksheet**

3. **(U) CONDITIONS.**
  - a. (U) Identify conditions by using cause-and-effect analysis.
  - b. (U) Define the current behavior of the TA.
  - c. (U) Identify the motivations and consequences of the TA's current behavior.
  - d. (U) Describe conditions with specificity, identifying as internal or external.
  - e. (U) Categorize causes as political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT).
  - f. (U) Identify effects or consequences as positive, negative, and secondary.
  - g. (U) Number sequentially.
  - h. (U) Note resources.
  - i. (U) Note assumptions.
4. **(U) VULNERABILITY.**
  - a. (U) Provide initial estimate and rationale of where along hierarchy of psychological effects model (HPEM) continuum best defines TA in relationship to the SPO.
  - b. (U) Define characteristics, motives, or conditions of the TA that can be used to influence behavior.
  - c. (U) Identify vulnerabilities by types: motives, demographics, and symbols.
  - d. (U) Provide rationale or more granular details of vulnerabilities, understanding that vulnerabilities may not be directly related to behavior identified in the psychological objective (PO) and SPO, but may evoke a consistent or predictable emotional or behavioral response from the TA.
5. **(U) SUSCEPTIBILITY.**
  - a. (U) Define the likelihood that the TA will be open to persuasion.
  - b. (U) Assess perceived risks, perceived rewards, consistency with beliefs of the TA if engaging in the desired behavior of the SPO.
  - c. (U) Rate evaluated susceptibility of TA on a scale of one to five with five being most susceptible.
  - d. (U) Make a recommendation on how to proceed with the TA, focusing on where the TA is along the HPEM continuum and the thresholds of intermediate objectives to be met in order to progress toward SPO achievement. Recommend arguments. In addition, it may be possible to recommend other TAs to target first or simultaneously.
6. **(U) ACCESSIBILITY.**
  - a. (U) List each potential source.
  - b. (U) Give each source its own perceived credibility rating (High-3, Medium-2, or Low-1).
  - c. (U) Give each source its own overall rating from one to five (five being highest).
  - d. (U) Explain each rating (include the pros and cons, considering TA perceptions of credibility).
  - e. (U) List each media channel individually.
  - f. (U) Explain each rating (include the pros and cons, considering TA perceptions of credibility).
  - g. (U) Give each media channel its own overall rating from one to five (five being highest).
  - h. (U) Explain each rating (include the pros and cons, considering TA perceptions of credibility).
  - i. (U) Provide recommendations and rationale for source and channel pairing.

**Figure A-1. Sample target audience analysis worksheet (continued)**

**7. (U) ARGUMENTS.**

- a. (U) After considering estimation of TA's position along HPEM, as related to the SPO, recommend intermediate objectives to move TA toward SPO accomplishment. For example, TA has awareness and understanding of the SPO, but an unfavorable attitude toward likely outcomes of the SPO. Recommend vulnerabilities and conditions to be incorporated in actions and messages directed at increasing favorable attitude while reinforcing achieved awareness and understanding thresholds.
- b. (U) Identify any current conditions critical to sustaining TA progression or preventing regression along the HPEM continuum. This is to assist planners and developers in ensuring arguments, operations and PSYACTs do not inadvertently cause TA to regress from previously reported estimation of TA's position along HPEM related to the SPO.
- c. (U) Provide main argument. Understand that the main argument is the conclusion that Psychological Operations Soldiers want the TA to reach.
- d. (U) Provide supporting arguments. Understand that supporting arguments lead to a conclusion and are derived from vulnerabilities and conditions.
- e. (U) Recommend vulnerabilities to be considered for exploitation while developing specific actions and messages.

**8. (U) REFINED ASSESSMENT CRITERIA.**

- a. (U) Refine the initial assessment criteria determined during planning and include which HPEM stage threshold, if other than behavior achievement that the criteria addresses.
- b. (U) Include recommended thresholds of achievement for remaining HPEM stage toward desired behavior (what threshold achievement will look like and the pace of change to be expected).
- c. (U) Include measurable and observable indicators based upon the current behavior of the TA and intermediate objectives remaining along the HPEM toward achievement of the SPO.
- d. (U) Phrase indicators as questions that, when answered over time, will assist in determining the achievement of HPEM thresholds and ultimately the SPO.
- e. (U) Identify any data or attitudinal indicators that support or clarify behavioral indicators.

[Page Number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

**Figure A-1. Sample target audience analysis worksheet (continued)**

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# Glossary

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ADP</b>	Army doctrine publication
<b>AO</b>	area of operations
<b>DA</b>	Department of the Army
<b>FM</b>	field manual
<b>HPEM</b>	hierarchy of psychological effects model
<b>IED</b>	improvised explosive device
<b>MISO</b>	military information support operations
<b>NMB</b>	Nashburg Martyr Brigade
<b>PO</b>	psychological objective
<b>PSYACTS</b>	psychological actions
<b>PTA</b>	potential target audience
<b>PTAL</b>	potential target audience list
<b>SITREP</b>	situation report
<b>SPO</b>	supporting psychological objective
<b>ST</b>	special text
<b>TA</b>	target audience
<b>TAA</b>	target audience analysis
<b>TAAM</b>	target audience analysis model
<b>TAAW</b>	target audience analysis worksheet
<b>TM</b>	technical manual
<b>USAJFKSWCS</b>	United States Army John F. Kennedy Warfare Center and School

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# References

All websites accessed on 30 January 2024.

## REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

*DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. January 2024.

FM 1-02.1. *Operational Terms*. 9 March 2021.

FM 1-02.2. *Military Symbols*. 18 May 2022.

FM 3-53. *Military Information Support Operations*. 4 January 2013.

## RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

## ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: <https://www.armypubs.army.mil>

ADP 5-0. *The Operations Process*. 31 July 2019.

ST 33-01. *Military Information Support Operations Process*. 31 December 2014.

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*Note.* Most Army special operations forces (ARSOF) publications are available on the ARSOF Doctrine Library found on the USAJFKSWCS SharePoint at <https://socom.sharepoint-mil.us/sites/usasoc-swcs-hq-dotd-lde>. For organizations without access to the USAJFKSWCS SharePoint that require this ST, please send a request to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, USAJFKSWCS, Psychological Operations Doctrine Division, ATTN: AOJK-POD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Liberty, NC, 28310-9610; or by e-mail to AOJK-POD@socom.mil.

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## PRESCRIBED FORMS

This section contains no entries.

## REFERENCED FORMS

Unless otherwise indicated, DA Forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site: <https://www.armypubs.army.mil>.

DA Form 2028. *Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*.

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**09 February 2024**

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