Title: Slovak Security Office Director Discusses System of Security  Screening 

Document Number: FBIS-EEU-2001-1105
Document Date: 02 Nov 2001
Sourceline: EUP20011105000195 Bratislava Sme in Slovak 02 Nov 01 p 5 
Citysource: Bratislava Sme 
Language: Slovak 

Subslug: Interview with Slovak National Security Office Director Jan Mojzis by 
Daniel Vrazda; place and date not given: "National Security Office 
Director: One Must Not Tell Lies in Good Company"


[FBIS Translated Text]     The establishment of the National Security 
Office [NBU] was one of the conditions for Slovakia's entry into NATO.   
It has officially started its operations today.   Jan Mojzis, the less 
than 30-year old director of the National Security Office and former 
chief of the Slovak Intelligence Service [SIS] Analyses Department, says 
that the Alliance's requirements can only be fulfilled by a genuinely 
apolitical office based on good legislation.   He assumes that many 
people will be denied access to secret documents in several months, which 
he thinks is a positive signal for the Alliance.   He warns Slovak 
politicians that it is necessary to be open toward foreign countries, 
because "one simply must not tell lies in good company." This is Jan 
Mojzis, director of the National Security Office. 

    [Vrazda] Regarding the National Security Office, personnel screenings 
are mostly discussed.   However, this will probably not be its only 
priority. 

    [Mojzis] Preparation for entry into NATO is the highest priority.   
It is necessary to come closer to its standards, so that we are able to 
systematically protect the Alliance's secrets. 

    [Vrazda] The list of classified information is known.   However, the 
state bodies tend to keep secret as many things as possible and the list 
seems to be one of them. 

    [Mojzis] Yes, but the Security Office is not the one to decide on the 
list.   Ministries decide on what is classified information and what is 
not.   The laws contain annexes defining basic information and the 
degrees of secrecy.   It is quite obvious that this has been done by 
incompetent people.   In my opinion, these annexes do not respect the 
NATO member states' philosophy.   The Kingdom of Spain has five pieces of 
strictly confidential information, while we have 21 areas of information, 
which would mean several tens of thousands of strictly confidential 
documents.   Three or four would be quite enough. 

    [Vrazda] Will this not cause problems? 

    [Mojzis] Yes, it will, because if we strictly observed NATO standards 
as of 1 November, we would de facto make the state administration 
inoperative.   Protection of a strictly confidential document requires 
huge expenses and consistent measures for those people who want to read 
such a document.   They will have to be screened with respect to [access 
to] to strictly confidential documents, and I think that many people will 
prefer to leave their posts. 

    [Vrazda] Lists of classified information represent a specific feature 
of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia.   Why? 

    [Mojzis] This is indeed a specific feature of the former Soviet bloc 
countries.   I assume that we will abandon this model in the future.   At 
present, however, such lists are necessary to prevent chaos. 

    [Vrazda] Personnel screenings are a sensitive matter.   What do you 
consider the most problematic? 

    [Mojzis] I will start with what makes a contribution. A fundamental 
civilization turnaround in the protection of classified information is 
that we will consider security risks such as vulnerability to blackmail, 
corrupt practices, property irregularities, and so forth.   If we manage 
to establish an office that will be independent both institutionally and 
politically, we will have the opportunity to actually start fighting 
problems.   This means that we can adopt a higher quality level in 
purging offices of corrupt people. 

    [Vrazda] The prime minister, the President, deputies, ministers, and 
even mayors are legally authorized persons, which means that they have 
access to secret information without being subject to screening.   Do you 
think that all of them meet the criteria set by the Alliance? 

    [Mojzis] This was one of the three principal questions I was asked 
during my visit to the United States.   The range of these persons is too 
wide. 

    [Vrazda] Some ministers and many deputies might not pass the 
screening.   Are there any limitations? 

    [Mojzis] When the Queen of Holland appoints the prime minister to 
form the government, the prime minister first asks the competent 
authority to informally screen the nominated cabinet members.   
Consequently, these posts are only filled with people for whom there is 
place there. 

    [Vrazda] Should Slovak prime ministers do the same? 

    [Mojzis] I think that this would represent a higher degree in terms 
of civilization and quality. 

    [Vrazda] Judges and prosecutors are often accused of corrupt behavior 
in our country. 

    [Mojzis] I do not agree with excluding these people from the 
screening.   This should be the basic condition when decisions are made 
on the cases subject to secrecy. 

    [Vrazda] Deputies come off even worse. 

    [Mojzis] At least the members of the Defense and Security Committee 
and of the Committee Overseeing Intelligence Services should undergo 
screenings.   They should not be allowed access to such information 
without being screened.   Then, there would be a greater trust between 
institutions and parliament, and deputies would receive truly objective 
information.   I can imagine that some deputies would not get access to 
classified information at all. 

    [Vrazda] To what extent are family members of the screened persons 
subject to the screening? 

    [Mojzis] From a certain degree of secrecy upward, the questionnaire 
also contains questions concerning the family members' property 
situation.   Not only information contained in the questionnaires will be 
screened, but also all intelligence information that gives rise to 
suspicions of security risks, for example, corrupt behavior or illegal 
profit.   It is also possible to compare tax returns with property 
increases and to use secret bank information. 

    [Vrazda] Do you have any opportunity to find out whether a sentence 
has been deleted from one's criminal record? 

    [Mojzis] The law does not allow us to get access to a copy of the 
criminal record.   We would very much like to have information as to 
whether a crime committed by the screened person have been deleted or 
covered by an amnesty, because we think that this is part of the security 
risk. 

    [Vrazda] How will information on persons subject to the screening be 
protected? 

    [Mojzis] Security questionnaires that have been filled in will be 
treated as secret and the NBU will protect all other information. 

    [Vrazda] Is there a possibility that information obtained by you will 
be made available to another country's units? 

    [Mojzis] When we enter NATO, we will be required to immediately 
provide information related to the protection of classified information 
at the request of a member country. 

    [Vrazda] What kind of protection will be given to data, including 
intelligence information, concerning the people who have not undergone 
the screening? 

    [Mojzis] This information will be contained in personal files and 
destroyed within the time limit provided by the law. 

    [Vrazda] Why doesn't the NBU have to explain the reasons for its 
decisions? 

    [Mojzis] This is a form of protecting intelligence information.   
However, remedial measures are possible, for example, a complaint to the 
NBU director, who sets up a special commission.... 

    [Vrazda] Will the NBU review its own decisions? 

    [Mojzis] The law also makes it possible to turn to the regional 
court. 

    [Vrazda] This will present another problem. 

    [Mojzis] There will be many more problems.   A citizen is not a party 
in administrative proceedings, which is why he cannot request that a NBU 
decision be reviewed.   Another problem lies in the protection of human 
rights and the possibility of reviewing any decision and, on the other 
hand, protection of classified data and information sources.   I assume 
that the first complaint will get to the Constitutional Court within two 
years, for example, the question of the extent to which the Security 
Office is required to provide evidence to the court. 

    [Vrazda] How do you perceive this conflict? 

    [Mojzis] In a democracy, protection of data is an element of 
regression, but it is absolutely necessary.   Democracy would be 
defenseless without this. 

    [Vrazda] The law does not stipulate that former Stb [communist-era 
secret service] and military counterintelligence members must not be 
allowed access to secret documents.   Do you think this is all right? 

    [Mojzis] We will rigorously examine the risk posed by former StB 
members.   Vulnerability to blackmail, contacts and links with foreign 
intelligence services, and half-legal economic and political environment 
will be the basic criteria. 

    [Vrazda] There is a great risk that they have worked for other 
intelligence services or continue their intelligence cooperation with 
problematic Arab and African countries. 

    [Mojzis] If the SIS obtains information as you indicated, it is 
required to make it available to us.   I think that some persons are able 
to act and use their former contacts, and it is very likely that they are 
still active.   Some groups operating in Slovakia are even known.   Our 
task is to come to terms with this risk and deal with it. 

    [Vrazda] Do you think you will be successful? 

    [Mojzis] This is the main mission of the NBU and of the country that 
wants to become a NATO member.   If we let these structures work, we will 
not have a chance. 

    [Vrazda] The Alliance will not leave it only to Slovakia to control 
security risks.   It has certainly been testing the permeability of our 
classified information system for quite a long time. 

    [Mojzis] If NATO did not do this, it would be an irresponsible 
attitude toward its own security.   I believe that the Alliance is very 
well informed about Slovak problems, as well as about whether or not we 
are trying to solve them.   This is the other side of the mirror, which 
we do not want to see.   Let me go back to my trip to the United States.  
It is naive to think that NATO or the United States does not have 
precise information on how the privatization is being carried out and how 
decisions are made on state orders or other advantages related to 
financial profit.   Some of our officials' efforts to give assurances 
that we are fighting corruption sometimes even sound ridiculous. 

    [Vrazda] Are they not offended? 

    [Mojzis] They are not used to the openness on our part.   If we want 
to be their partners, we must be open.   It is ridiculous to think that 
large foreign companies that bribe our high-ranking state officials do 
not bring this to light at home, even though in a tete-a-tete 
conversation.   It is known that high-ranking representatives of our 
ministries even ask for bribes during their official trips abroad. 

    [Vrazda] You are talking about corruption.   Your screening may make 
some ministries and offices inoperative.   Do you reckon with this? 

    [Mojzis] We are not here to consider whether a ministry or an office 
will be operative.   If an office is corrupt, it is a matter for the 
political representation to solve the problem.   The NBU will not make 
any exceptions. 

    [Vrazda] Do you think that the Alliance will provide us with all 
information or will it rather select this information due to its limited 
trust? 

    [Mojzis] Any relation is a matter of trust.   When this trust is 
smaller, there will be a smaller amount of important information.   
Telling the truth is the basic prerequisite for trust.   However, this 
problem does not only concern Slovakia.   Simply, one must not tell lies 
in good company. 

    [Vrazda] Will Slovakia have enough authorized persons to deal with 
secret documents in 2002?   The Czechs had a problem with this. 

    [Mojzis] The Czechs tried to screen everyone immediately and still 
have not enough authorized persons.   We have decided to use a more 
functional model.   We will make the criteria tougher in two stages.   
Certificates will be valid according to the old law until 2003, but, of 
course, we have the possibility of withdrawing this authorization any 
time.   It is a simple fact that we are not able to immediately screen 
15,000-20,000 eligible people. 

    [Vrazda] Is there not a risk that people screened according to the 
old law will not meet the stringent criteria? 

    [Mojzis] Of course, there is, but we will deal with this.   We will 
send the list of all persons authorized to get access to classified 
information to our screening points and ask them to give us any 
information related to the security risk.   We will withdraw 
authorizations immediately.   Each state administration employee should 
undergo a new screening within three years. 

    [Vrazda] In Slovakia, many people that present a risk are still 
working with classified information. 

    [Mojzis] There are many of them, but I assume that they will lose 
their authorizations in the coming months. 

    [Vrazda] Does your office employ any former StB members? 

    [Mojzis] Yes, there is one -- a professional cryptologist.   No other 
[former StB] member has been, or will be, employed. 

    [Vrazda] The establishment of the National Security Office in the 
Czech Republic was accompanied by a scandal related to the secret 
service's intervention and infiltration into the Security Office.   The 
Security Information Service [BIS] accused the Office of selling the 
screenings to officials and of corruption.   What are your relations with 
Slovak intelligence services like? 

    [Mojzis] This is very unpleasant for the Czech Republic, because it 
undermines its credibility in the eyes of its partners in NATO.   I am 
convinced that this will not happen in Slovakia.   It is no secret that I 
have worked in the SIS and that my relation to its leadership is very 
courteous.   I consider [SIS director] Mitro a guarantor of the Slovak 
Intelligence Service's professionalism and independence. 

    [Vrazda] Is it a problem for people working in the agency network to 
buy the screening? 

    [Mojzis] I am convinced that this will not be possible.   In the 
final analysis, the NBU director, who will have all essential 
information, will make a decision.   It is therefore important that the 
director is a competent and independent person. 

    [Vrazda] Who will screen the director? 

    [Mojzis] The screening should take place before the appointment.   
This did not happen in my case, because the NBU did not exist.   However, 
if I were unacceptable, the SIS and other security institutions would not 
have recommended me.   Foreign institutions' trust is also important. 

    [Vrazda] Isn't there a risk that the NBU could be misused? 

    [Mojzis] Of course, we do not have to talk at length about political 
risks.   It is not possible to secure the system by such mechanisms that 
would absolutely rule out the possibility of abuse.   The risk exists and 
it is huge.   Enormous pressure will certainly be exerted on the NBU -- 
in the spheres of politics, corruption, cronyism, and intelligence.   
However, no one has yet felt this pressure. 

    [Vrazda] NATO and secret services have information about our people.  
 Will you use or have you been offered such information? 

    [Mojzis] Foreign intelligence services are not a partner for me.   I 
rely on the SIS as a high-quality and modern information service enjoying 
credit abroad.   When it receives information, it can provide it to the 
NBU without revealing its source. 

    [Vrazda] What is the situation in Slovakia's access to the former 
military counterintelligence archives in Prague and StB files stored in 
the SIS?   Will they be used in the screening? 

    [Mojzis] We will try to get full access to this information.   It 
would not be bad if the files were placed under the NBU administration.   
We are able to work with these documents or find an appropriate form of 
making them available to the public after they are declassified. 

    [Vrazda] What about the archives in Prague? 

    [Mojzis] Negotiations are under way with the Czech side.   We are 
interested in any information that will enable us to make proper 
decisions. 

    [Vrazda] In this context, deputy Andrejcak pointed out that the Czech 
intelligence services might be playing intelligence games. 

    [Mojzis] The Czech Republic is in NATO, while Slovakia is seeking 
membership.   We cannot a priori treat information from our partners, 
whose trust we are trying to win, as misinformation.   This would be a 
basic misunderstanding of what we are trying to achieve. 

    [Vrazda] Can Slovakia also contribute to a wider security? 

    [Mojzis] When I was in the United States, I asked how we could help, 
for example, in the campaign against global terrorism.   The answer was 
interesting.   The detention of Irish terrorists indicates that Slovakia 
is a popular country among terrorist organizations, which means that we 
can contribute by exchanging intelligence information in the first place. 
Another area is the arms trade.   We do not have a good reputation.   
The United States has admitted that it is paying special attention to our 
country in this area.   We score very negative points when our arms 
traders counterfeit licenses and delivery notes and, as dealers, supply 
global terrorist organizations with weapons and systems.   A radical 
solution to this problem should be our priority. 


[Description of Source: Bratislava Sme in Slovak -- leading daily with a 
center-right, pro-Western orientation]