Foreign Military Studies Office
604 Lowe Drive
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2322

The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.


MAJ Thomas E. Sidwell, U.S. Army
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.


"The government may change every day; the army remains the same"
General Sudirman, Former Commander of the Indonesian Military, 1947 1


In a souvenir shop in the Jakarta shopping district of Blok M, I watched as a fashionably dressed western couple examined the store's collection of wayang puppets. In the wayang, or shadow plays of Indonesia, the puppeteer uses the shadows of puppets to tell stories from the Ramayana and Indonesian folk tales. The puppeteer manipulates the puppets creating shadows and through them, tells the stories of kings, princesses, demons and past glories. The audience sees only the shadows, not the details of the intricately carved and painted puppets. Such is the case when viewing modern Indonesia. Indonesia is a nation on the verge of an economic "takeoff" similar to that of Singapore, Malaysia and other Southeast Asian nations. The various political, social and economic institutions are manipulated by the puppeteer to create and tell the tale of national development. The shadows the puppets produce are what is more important to Indonesians than the body. However, like the western couple who eventually selected a pair of puppets based on their complexity and intricacy, westerners viewing Indonesia seek the reality and miss the shadow. Therein lies the conflict. When westerners and Indonesian look at the same picture, they see different images. This is particularly true when examining the Indonesia military and their role in the political affairs of state. This paper will examine dwi fungsi, the Indonesian military's two functions of national defense and security, and sociopolitical development. It is fundamental to understanding the Indonesian military to observe how they shape sociopolitical development through specialized territorial operations and why Indonesia feels the need to shape sociopolitical development.

In Indonesia, the military is charged with national defense and security as well as maintaining the political and social integrity of the nation. Both are roles that the Indonesian military does not take lightly. Their aggressive execution of their duties, particularly in East Timor and Aceh, have brought them in direct conflict with many Western governments and organizations anxious to safeguard human rights. The United States canceled the International Military and Education Training (IMET) program for Indonesia in 1992 because of human rights violations in East Timor and in 1994, stopped all small arms sales to Indonesia for the same reason. Indonesian officials condemned both moves and said that "in the present world situation, it is easy for any country to purchase weapons".2 However, there have been recent attempts to strengthen U.S.-Indonesian relations, particularly to restore IMET funds. Vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens announced in Jakarta that "the U.S. military is keen to resume the IMET program for Indonesia because it is a crucial part of the military cooperation between the two countries".3

Indonesia's increasing activity in regional as well as international peace keeping activities has made it more likely that U.S. and Indonesian forces will be working together.4 As long as there is a difference in how both sides view the role of the Indonesian military in the political affairs of the state, the potential for strained relations will exist. From the Indonesian prospective, the military provides a secure, stable environment for national development. However, to many westerners, Indonesia is a military state. As a student at the Indonesian General Staff and Command College, it became apparent that there is a misunderstanding by westerners of how the Indonesian military views themselves. This makes if imperative that U.S. military planners and policy makers understand the Indonesian perspective and design programs and approaches that take these differences in consideration.


The relationship between the Indonesian military, the state and society is best described by the army's basic military strategy, Sishankamrata, or Universal People's Defense.5 According to this doctrine, the people of Indonesia will spontaneously rise up against any threat to the independence and sovereignty of the nation and fight with the military to overcome that threat. The army and the people are partners for the defense of the nation, the army is the armed core and the people are the foundation.6 This concept has shaped the development of the Indonesian military and Indonesian military doctrine.

Indonesia is a nation formed from the armed struggle against the Dutch following World War II. Since its creation as an independent nation in 1945, Indonesia has had only two presidents, both of whom led forces during the War for Independence. The first president, Sukarno was ousted in 1965 following an aborted coup attempt that Indonesians claim was Communist inspired. Suharto, then a General, assumed power and has been president since 1966.7 He called his government the New Order in contrast to the stagnant, Guided Democracy of Sukarno. Continuity has been maintained through the combined strength and power of the President and the Indonesian military.

Many westerners cite the involvement of the military in government affairs and the fact that both presidents have been members of the military as evidence that Indonesia is a military dictatorship. Clearly since independence, the military has been an integral element in the political and economic development of the nation. From the War of Independence through the parliamentary government of the 1950s, to the current New Order government, the military claims to be the link between the people and the government.

This link is an important factor in governing a nation as diverse as Indonesia. Indonesia is an island nation comprising approximately 13,600 islands, of which over one thousand are inhabited. The 5.1 million kilometer area is home to 180 million people, making it the world's fourth most populated country. Throughout these islands are 10 major and 300 minor ethnic groups. Groups such as the Acehenese, Bugis, Minangkabau, Sundanese and Balinese have long, rich histories as independent nations. They, along with the other ethnic groups lost this independence to the Dutch. It was their combined opposition to Dutch colonial power in the early 1900s that first brought about the idea of 'Indonesia'. Indonesia as a concept, required these 'nations' to abandon their traditional local governments in favor of a larger, central government.8 Since the heart of Dutch colonial power was the central island of Java, it was there where the independence movements gained momentum. Once independence was achieved following World War II, the major task of the Javanese-led government was the creation of a national identity from many diverse cultures, or as expressed in the national motto of Indonesia, how to attain Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, Unity through Diversity.

The current system of government in Indonesia is 'Pancasila Democracy', which refers to the national philosophy derived from Hindu-Buddhist-Islam traditions and codified in the Constitution of 1945.9 It is not a western style Liberal Democracy. Indonesia points to their brief experiment in Liberal Democracy (1945-1957) and the period of Guided Democracy under Sukarno as proof that the current system is the most appropriate. During the Liberal Democracy period, the multi-party, parliamentary system based on western political thought governed the country. The government made efforts to fashion a structured professional military based on western models from the forces that had won independence from the Dutch. Some military leaders who had operated as independent entities during the war resented consolidation attempts. Other soldiers resented attempts by the civilians to gain control over the military. Factionalization within the army mirrored the factionalization within the government. An increasingly unstable situation resulted. From 1950-1957 there were seven cabinets, each lasting an average of 15 months, and approximately 100 political parties.10 Dissatisfaction with the government in Jakarta increased in the outer islands leading to armed confrontation between the government and separatist groups often led by military entrepreneurs.11 Special interest demands far exceeded the capabilities of the government to reach a consensus and quickly overburdened the system.12

The period of liberal democracy came to an end with the imposition of martial law by Sukarno in 1957. According to President Sukarno, western democratic practices were not appropriate for Indonesia. It was difficult to make decisions with the multi-party system. Because all levels of society participated in great numbers, the parliamentary system became overwhelmed with demands and became ineffective. Therefore, Sukarno suspended the Constitution in favor of one-party rule.13

In 1958, then Army Chief of Staff, General Nasution took steps to redefine the military's role in society and so redefine Indonesian politics. In a speech to the Army Officers Training College, Nasution proposed that the military assume a more visible, larger role in government and all state institutions. The military would assume the 'middle road' being neither political activists nor spectators.14

The situation within the Sukarno government became more chaotic. The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), with backing from President Sukarno and the People's Republic of China (PRC), increased in power. Unsound government economic policies resulted in high inflation, financial chaos, widespread poverty and political instability. Senior army leaders began a series of seminars to determine how they could to stabilize the country without directly entering the political arena.

Relations between the military and the President deteriorated in 1965 partly due to Konfrontasi, or confrontation with the new nation of Malaysia over the ownership of North Kalimantan.15 It was his attempt to infuse communist ideology into the military structure that contributed to the split between President Sukarno and the military. The military witnessed the spiraling inflation, the growing influence of the PKI and the general disintegration of the state. Factions within the military saw themselves as the only hope for the nation from an out-of-control dictator. Everything came to a head on September 30 with the 'aborted coup' attempt. Army General Suharto assumed power with President Sukarno still occupying the position of president. Then in 1966, Suharto forced President Sukarno to relinquish power and assumed the presidency.

The military believes it prevented a communist takeover of the country in 1965 and that it has held Indonesia together since. The actions of the military immediately following the coup attempt were previews of future military and governmental policies. Members of the now outlawed PKI were executed to purge the nation of leftist sentiments. Estimates of the number killed vary from 160,000 to 500,000. Many were ethnic Chinese who were not PKI members but were slaughtered because the local populations resented their economic power.16 The military was also purged of any PKI members and took steps to unify divisions within the leadership. Most important, the military decided that it was wrong to share the decision-making power with civilian agencies and installed a political system by which they could direct the political, economic and social development of the country and still perform their primary duty, national defense. The new mission of the military became dwi fungsi, or two functions, national security and sociopolitical development.


According to the Indonesian military, the first real product of dwi fungsi was the creation of the Republic. They ousted the Dutch to create the Republic. They put down separatist movements in South Sulawesi and Ambon in the 1950s to restore the unity of the nation. They annexed Irian Jaya in 1962 and East Timor in 1975 to restore Indonesia as defined in the traditional saying 'from Sabang to Merauke'.17 They are fighting separatists in Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor today. More important, according to the military, their strong role in government and political affairs has provided the stable atmosphere necessary for economic development.

The Indonesian military considers dwi fungsi to be the heart, soul and spirit of the military. The missions of security and sociopolitical development are inseparable, like two sides of a coin. Indonesia claims the sociopolitical role of the military is a uniquely Indonesian concept. This idea is based on traditional Indonesian philosophy, founded on the concept of gotong royong, or mutual support. In gotong royong everyone works together to achieve a common goal: at the community, village or city level. Where western governments are based on confrontation, Indonesian politics is based on mutual consensus. By directing sociopolitical development, the military serves to support the national goals: development, political and social stability, national defense and national integrity. Any deviant social or political movement that threatens the status quo is a threat to national security.

The concepts of dwi fungsi were developed in seminars at the Indonesian General Staff and Command College in the early 1960. When Suharto and the military assumed power in 1966, dwi fungsi became official policy. Although the military could claim tradition as a way to rationalize their involvement in national affairs there was no legal precedent for their actions. Suharto reinstated the Constitution of 1945 and firmly vowed that it would be the basis for all governmental actions, in particular the concepts embodied in Pancasila. There was nothing in the constitution that specifically allowed for the active participation of the military in the political affairs of the state, but there was also nothing that prohibited participation. According to the military, dwi fungsi is implicit in the constitution. Using various articles in the constitution, ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, or Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) officials developed a logical, constitutional sanction for dwi fungsi. Since sovereignty is vested in the people and exercised by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, (MPR, the People's Advisory Assembly) and the MPR is augmented by delegates from regional territories and groups as well as by members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or Indonesian Legislative Assembly, the military, as citizens, can provide representatives to the MPR.18 Secondly, since all citizens are equal before the law and are obligated to respect the laws and government and since every citizen has the right and obligation19 to participate in the defense of the country, the military can freely participate in government and business along with the other citizens of Indonesia. Finally, since the President is the Supreme Commander of all armed forces, he can use the military in whatever role he chooses. In other words, the military is merely exercising their constitutional rights as citizens as they execute the missions of national defense and social stability as determined by the President.20

With the constitutionality of dwi fungsi rationalized, the next step was to formally recognize the practice. Beginning in 1966 the government enacted a series of laws to define and improve the role of the military in government and national affairs. It was not until 1982 that dwi fungsi became official policy when the 'Basic Provisions for the Defence and Security of the Republic of Indonesia' became law.


According to Indonesian army doctrine, there are three types of operations critical to the national defense; intelligence operations, combat operations and territorial operations. Strategic goals determine the type of operation the military executes. To seize an area occupied by an enemy, ABRI conducts intelligence or combat operations. Intelligence or psychological-type operations are conducted to acquire information or force the enemy from a particular area. Intelligence operations are normally covert in nature and conducted by intelligence units. If the purpose is to destroy the enemy, combat operations are conducted. However, if the purpose of an operation is to create or restore political, economic, social or cultural order, the military will conduct territorial operations. Specialized territorial units or conventional forces may conduct territorial operations. Currently one third of the 202,900 man Indonesian army is involved in some type of territorial type activity, with the majority of these organized into territorial units. The remaining two thirds are combat forces with the secondary mission of territorial operations.


Territorial Operations as defined by ABRI Doctrine are all efforts, energy and actions directed to prepare, protect and use a region as the space, implement and condition for the National Struggle to overcome any threats that may arise, either internally or from external sources.21 Like dwi fungsi, the concepts behind territorial operations began in the seminars of the early 1960s. While at the General Staff and Command College in 1960, Suharto was one of the major participants at a seminar where the establishment of a parallel administration all the way to the village level was first discussed as a way of maintaining control over possible subversive elements. The ideas formulated by Indonesia's military elite while at the Staff College became the Territorial Management and Civic Mission doctrines,22which today are known as territorial operations.

The organization responsible for planning and executing territorial operations is one element of the Indonesian Department of Defense and Security. Their primary mission is to create or change conditions in a particular area according to the strategic objectives of the Department of Defense and Security. The Ministry formulates a five-year plan as a general guideline to maximize government resources for development. A more specific one year plan is developed in concert with the regional government and executed by the Territorial units in the Regional Military Commands and the District Military Commands.23 At the lowest military level is the ABRI masuk desa program where a noncommissioned officer is in residence in each village throughout Indonesia to provide information and guidance on development issues.

There are two types of territorial operations, territorial operations (construction) and territorial operations (opposition/resistance24). ABRI sees both types of operation as integral parts of national defense. They differ in that territorial operations (construction) are directed to improve the condition of a particular area considered at risk for political and social instability. Territorial operations (opposition/resistance) are those efforts and energies directed to restore or impose political and social stability. Together Indonesia has used these operations to create a nation and stabilize the Republic during times of insurrection. Under the guise of nation building, Indonesia has also used these operations to prevent political dissent, particularly in the separatist minded areas of East Timor, Aceh and Irian Jaya.


Territorial operations (construction) adopts the 'hearts and minds' approach to nation building. The reasoning is that if the government meets the legitimate needs of the population of a given area, this will help negate any influence from elements of the extreme left and extreme right and therefore maintain political stability. This is accomplished through one of three types of operations: sociopolitical operations, Bhakti operations, and Kekaryaan ABRI.25 In each, military skills help shape and monitor social and political life to ensure that all events contribute to the national goal of development by preventing the emergence of any political, social or religious movement that might challenge the legitimacy of the government. In this, these types of operations are preventive measures.

The efforts of special Territorial Battalions are directed to improving the lifestyle of the population through the development of geographic, demographic and sociologic resources. These projects may be as simple as the construction of houses or schools and the introduction of modern farming practices or as complex as dams, irrigation systems or other public works projects, mostly in the less populated, outer islands. While these efforts are designed to improve life for the local population, in many cases, they are used to provide facilities for the settlers involved in the government's Transmigration program.26

ABRI emphasizes that territorial operations (construction) are a combination of efforts from the military, government agencies and the local population. They may be conducted routinely to improve the overall conditions of an area, or as part of a specific government plan targeted to reduce the influence of growing insurgent groups. The government argues that people in the outer, more primitive islands of Indonesia will be better assimilated into the nation if their standard of living is continually improving. By aiding development according to a government directed plan, the military should not have to enter the area at a later date to put down an armed rebellion. However, many civilians are unaware of the military role in sociopolitical development. In East Java, for example, many civilians were unaware that the military was involved in infrastructure development.27 For them, the military in their area was more interested in improving their own economic situation rather than improving civilian conditions. In the outer islands, most notably in East Timor, the government heavily publicizes the results of territorial operations. However, according to many East Timorese, the military is seen as a means for controlling the local population.

Indonesia 'annexed' the former Portuguese colony of East Timor in 1976 following a military invasion in 1975. The East Timorese have both actively and passively resisted this annexation. As of early 1995, ABRI maintains one combat battalion and seven territorial battalions or approximately 5000 troops in the province with the mission to "decrease poverty and ignorance".28 To many, this is merely a way to subdue the East Timorese. East Timor political leaders question the need for such a large military presence. As one East Timor official says, "We are living in a climate of war and fear."29 The Indonesian press regularly reports housing construction and monetary donations by the predominately Muslim military to the local Catholic church as proof that the military is good for the province. The use of armed troops to end most public gatherings in the East Timor towns, however, negates these reports.30 Critics of the Indonesian military policies argue that if the territorial operations are such a success, then a strong military presence should not be needed to maintain civil order and put down a prolonged resistance movement. In East Timor, the military is not winning the "hearts and minds".


Indonesia claims that the major threat to sovereignty is from within, from external proponents of imperialism and colonialism but most particularly, from communism and liberalism31. Through infiltration, subversion or invasion, individuals with ideas contrary to Pancasila can attempt to undermine the political integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. Subversion and infiltration characteristically arise from within and are products of covert operations. From these operations, an enemy develops cells to influence the population. According to doctrine, the Indonesian military conducts intelligence operations to counter the propaganda or conducts territorial operations (construction) to restore the population's faith in the government. If such operations fail, and the insurgents expand their operations, the area becomes a guerilla base to conduct armed insurrection. At this point, ABRI will conduct territorial operations (opposition/resistance).

For ease of coordination between the various government and military organizations, the target area becomes known as a type A area. The area is further divided into four classes to prioritize and aid in the distribution of effort: the annihilation zone, the consolidation area, the stabilization are and the rear area. In the annihilation zone, opposition forces are in complete control. ABRI forces concentrate their combat power here to eliminate the physical presence of the opposition force. As ABRI gains limited control over the annihilation zone, the newly created are is designated the consolidation area. When opposition influence decreases in the consolidation area, a new area, the stabilization area is created. Here territorial operations (construction) increase and combat operations decrease to reconstruct the political and economic infrastructure and restore the people's confidence in the government. ABRI continues operations in each of the three areas to totally eliminate opposition influence. When there is an area devoid of opposition influence, this area is redesignated the rear area.

Once the guerilla base is destroyed, ABRI begins the consolidation phase. In self-correction sessions that resemble after action reviews, the negative ideas and practices of the government and ABRI that drove the people to seek an alternative to the existing system are identified and corrected. Then ABRI works to repair the physical, mental and emotional damage caused during the operations.32

Territorial operations (opposition/resistance) are also planned in the event of invasion. Defense doctrine plans first for the destruction of the invading force in their own land as they prepare for deployment. Then, depending on success or failure, Indonesia plans to destroy the enemy enroute, or on the beach if a beachhead is gained through combat operations. If all efforts fail and Indonesia becomes an occupied country, ABRI will become a guerilla force and will conduct territorial operations (opposition/resistance). Here, ABRI as a guerilla force conducts territorial operations (opposition/resistance) and works from an enemy-encircled base outward, creating areas of greater ABRI control until all Indonesia is in ABRI hands and the enemy is destroyed.


When Suharto assumed power, he adamantly rejected the idea of the guided, one man controlled democracy of Sukarno and instituted the Pancasila democracy of his New Order. The guide was different, but it was still a controlled society. ABRI and the government argue that given the world situation in the mid-60s, only their strong role in society enabled Indonesia to survive the influences of the superpower rivalry. Critics, both Indonesian and foreign, claim that the military's role in politics should have been temporary until the establishment of a stable system. Instead, they say, militarism is ingrained in the society and government. ABRI claims dwi fungsi is not militarism. They point to the territorial operations as evidence that ABRI is there to serve and protect the people. They say ABRI does not have a war mentality; ABRI does not dominate other groups; and ABRI opposes military dictatorship and highly regards human rights. If, they argue, ABRI did not stand on these principles, Indonesia would indeed be a military dictatorship.

Theoretically, these are true statements. Indonesia, as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, has long sought alternative solutions to international problems. At the Indonesian General Staff and Command College, human rights issues have been incorporated into the curriculum along with the study of various political philosophies. However, Indonesia will go to any length to ensure its national integrity and political stability. The military regards the only serious threat to the nation to be from internal extremist groups. By executing their sociopolitical role through territorial operations, they can control the pace of development and political opposition.

One of the major concerns of the East Timorese is the development projects themselves. Better agricultural practices and improved roads and transportation systems provide an easier way for East Timorese products to reach other markets. However, military officers managing these corporations control the benefits of these projects and employ Indonesians from other islands. Development appears to benefit only the large corporations controlled by President Suharto's family and friends. Until 1994 for example, a company linked to General Benny Murdani, the former ABRI commander who was a key figure in the 1975 invasion of East Timor controlled coffee production, the major cash crop of the province When controls were lifted, farm profits increased 350%.33

President Suharto firmly believes that development is the key to security and defense for Indonesia. Indonesian Territorial doctrine was developed primarily to counter an internal threat from a communist insurgency in the 1960s. The tactics described above show that Indonesia considers guerilla or counter-guerilla operations necessary to maintain the independence and sovereignty of the nation from an internal threat. The threat, according to Indonesian doctrine, is anything that threatens the independence and sovereignty, the unity, Pancasila, the Constitution of 1945 or the national development of Indonesia. Basically, the threat is anyone or any idea that the President or the military selects.

Despite the predominance of the military, there have been recent attempts at political reform particularly to limit the role of the military in politics. When President Suharto named his new cabinet following the 1993 elections, only eight of the 41 member cabinet came from military backgrounds as opposed to the eleven in the previous cabinet.34 In 1994, a civilian, Information Minister Harmoko, was appointed head of Golkar, the ruling political party, largely through the influence of President Suharto. Many analysts took this as a sign that Suharto was trying to reduce the role of the military in government. Since Golkar is influential in presidential selection, a civilian in such a position could influence the selection of a civilian candidate to succeed Suharto as president. High ranking military officers condemned the move and vowed that no one but a member of the military would ever be President of Indonesia. In the most significant move to date, in February 1995, President Suharto instructed the Indonesian Council of Sciences to examine the current political system and requested that the Council propose how many, if any military members should become members of parliament. He did not, however, question ABRI's sociopolitical role.35

Dwi fungsi has also been questioned and challenged by the growing Indonesian middle class. With their new economic power, they also want more political power. They no longer see the need to be guided by a military organization. The bombardment of the middle class by foreign, western ideas and habits through satellite TV and other media, have increased their desire to enjoy the benefits of national development.

ABRI officers have supported the President's action but are adamant that the military's sociopolitical role will remain and grow. Still they realize that the system may need to undergo some type of change to remain the predominant system. The foreign military officers at the Indonesian General Staff and Command College in 1994 were asked to evaluate dwi fungsi, and provide their opinion of its future.36 ABRI Commander General Feisal Tanjung stated that dwi fungsi depends on contemporary national developmental needs. He also stated that ABRI needs to keep abreast of the pace and progress of development and the development of the people's aspirations. "With such an attitude," he stated "the people will be more confident about the ABRI's sociopolitical role because is aimed at protecting the people's interests and to protect the people from suffering".37


In spite of ongoing review of dwi fungsi by President Suharto, some senior military leaders insist the system will not go away. As it exists today, dwi fungsi is an anachronism. The portrait of the Indonesian military benevolently shaping the political and social life of Indonesia is masked by the dark side of dwi fungsi and territorial operations. The guerilla warfare tactics of opposition/resistance operations are designed to eliminate an armed insurgency, particularly from communist groups. What they actually do is to maintain the status quo through the elimination of political opposition. The construction operations do serve to develop the infrastructure of the outer islands, but appear to benefit the business elite connected to the President.

Indonesia may be questioning dwi fungsi and the territorial operations system but other troubled nations of the region are examining them for possible use. The Philippines is looking at the system as a means of developing their outer islands but more particularly as a way of handling the numerous ideological challenges to the government. Myanmar (Burma) is examining the Indonesian model as a possible way for the current government to transition from a military dictatorship to a more moderate system. President Suharto, as chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement is trying to refocus the movement to keep it relevant in today's global environment. All he need do is hold up his country as an example of how to control and develop a multi-ethnic country to export the Indonesian systems of dwi fungsi and territorial operations.

Like the western couple who bought the wayang puppets, western observers view the body of the Indonesian military not the shadows they present. To understand Indonesia and ABRI, it is necessary to examine both. They firmly believe their actions are in the best interests of Indonesia. They are also adamant that the current system will remain. Therefore it is important that the US military understand the Indonesian military. By examining dwi fungsi and the role of the Indonesian military as they see it, it may be easier to understand why they take certain actions. Understanding the actions does not imply acceptance. However, ignorance of the Indonesian system, a system that will remain in Indonesia and possibly other nations, will result in ill-designed programs and policies.


1. From remarks in 1947 by General Sudirman, founder of the Indonesian military as cited by Michael R.J. Vatikiotis in Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, Routledge Press, London, 1993. BACK

2. Michael Richardson, "Jakarta Objects to U.S. Arms-Rights Link", International Herald Tribune, September 15, 1993, pg 12. BACK

3. "U.S. Admiral Owens' IMET Remarks Reported", The Jakarta Post, 18 March 1995, pg 2, as reported in FBIS-EAS-95-059, 28 March 1995, pg. 47. BACK

4. Indonesia has participated in UN operations in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia. Currently there are two Indonesian officers monitoring the peace process between the Moro National Liberation Front and the Philippine government. Recently, Indonesia announced that they will send an engineer battalion to Bosnia for mine clearing operations. BACK

5 . Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, Routledge Press, London, 1994. BACK

6 . Pengantar Sishankamrata, [Introduction to Universal People's Defense], Markas Besar, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Sekolah Staf dan Komando ABRI, [Headquarters, Indonesian Military, Indonesian Staff and Command College], Bandung, Indonesia, 1993. Sishankamrata is the acronym for Sistem Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta, or Universal People's Defense. BACK

7. On September 30, 1965, the pro-Sukarno Thirtieth of September Movement kidnapped and killed six generals. The movement claimed the actions were pre-emptive strikes aimed at preventing a coup by a Council of Generals. To date, there is little evidence that such a Council existed. Major General Suharto, commander of the strategic reserve command, Kostrad, assumed control of the army on 1 October. In a radio address to the nation that same day, Suharto described the coup as a counter-revolutionary movement and informed the people the army was in charge. The army maintains the coup was communist inspired. Communist involvement is still being debated. BACK

8 . In Search of Southeast Asia , Edited by David Joel Steinberg, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971. BACK

9. Pancasila, which literally means 5 tenets, is derived from Hindu-Buddhist-Islamic traditions. The tenets as written in the Preamble to the Constitution of 1945 are;

  1. The belief in the one and only God.
  2. A just and civilized society.
  3. The unity of Indonesia.
  4. Democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberation among representatives.
  5. Social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

In his autobiography, President Suharto says "The democracy we practice is Pancasila. Briefly its major characteristics are its rejection of poverty, backwardness, conflicts, exploitation, capitalism, feudalism, dictatorship, colonialism and imperialism. This is the policy I have chosen with confidence". Suharto, My Thoughts, Words and Deeds: and Autobiography, Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, Jakarta, 1991, pp. 193-194.

10. Pengantar Sishankamrata, pg 22. BACK

11. On some of the outer islands, military officers ran highly profitable legal and illegal businesses. These not only made the officers richer, but made the local economy dependent on the military. BACK

12 . Sistem Politik di Indonesia, [The Political System of Indonesia], Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Angkatan Darat, Sekolah Staf dan Komand Angkatan Darat [Headquarters, Indonesian Army Staff and Command College}, Number 52-07-B1-D-1202, June 27, 1991. BACK

13. Ibid, pg 24. BACK

14 . Hamish McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia , Fontana Books, 1980, The Dominion Press, Blackburn, Australia, pg.34. BACK

15 . The Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak as well as the Sultanate of Brunei occupy North Borneo or North Kalimantan as it is known in Indonesia. When Sukarno claimed these areas as part of Greater Indonesia, war erupted between Indonesia and the newly independent Malaysia. The Confrontation, as it was called lasted from 1963-1964. BACK

16 . Indonesia Under Suharto, Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Routledge Press, London, 1993. The Dutch colonial administrators created a system where the indigenous population was not allowed to control capital. Only the Dutch and Chinese, called non-native orientals had the power to accumulate capital. This fed the long standing resentment of Chinese by Indonesians that continues today. In 1994, labor riots in Medan were primarily directed against Chinese owned businesses. In June of the same year, anti-Chinese riots in Bandung prompted many Indonesian Chinese to spend an unplanned vacation in Singapore for that week. BACK

17 The saying refers to the traditional west to east expanse of Indonesia. Sabang, the western most point of Indonesia is an island off the northern tip of Sumatra. Merauke, the east most point, is a town in the southeast of Irian Jaya. BACK

18 . The membership of the Majelis Permusyawaratawan Rakyat (MPR) is 1,000, 500 who are members of the DPR and an equal number appointed by the government. The MPR is largely symbolic and meets once during its five year term. The DPR is the primary legislative assembly. Of the 500 members, the military has 100 seats. In April 1995, ABRI agreed to reduce this number to 75 effective 1997. BACK

19 . This is not to be confused with the western concept of 'right and duty'. The Indonesian hak dan kewajiban, right and obligation, is very specific. BACK

20 . Vademikum SESKOAD, Cetakan Ketiga [Vademikum, Army Staff and Command College, Third Edition], 28 Feb 1987, pg. 19. BACK

21 . Indonesia refers to the was of Independence and the continuing efforts to resist internal and external threats as the National Struggle. This term is also used to refer to the national efforts of economic development. BACK

22 . McDonald, pg. 34. BACK

23. There are 16 Regional Military Commands. Under these are the Military Resort Commands, the District Military commands and finally the Sub-district Military Commands. BACK

24 . The Indonesian word perlawanan can be translated either way. BACK

25 . Sociopolitical operations are all efforts to plan, organize and control the people's life and social and political affairs to attain the national goal of development. Bhakti Operations are designed to take advantage of the technical abilities of ABRI to further national development. In Kekaryaan ABRI operations, military officer perform in other than military positions to in the civilian sector to assist national development. BACK

26 . The Transmigration program was developed to move families from the overcrowded central islands of Java, Bali and Madura to the more remote, less populated islands. Critics in the outer islands claim this cultural imperialism and another way for the government to spread the Java culture throughout the multicultural nation to the demise of local culture. BACK

27 . Personal observation. The foreign military officers at the Staff and Command College in 1993-1994 participated in a social survey near the East Java town of Malang. The purpose of the survey was to assess the condition within the small villages to determine where ABRI could provide assistance. In the formal interview session, the answers provided to the foreign students were practiced and prepared. Afterwards, in informal conversations with the same individuals, they confessed that they had not witnessed nor heard of ABRI's development schemes. BACK

28. "Tugas ABRI di Timtim perangi kemiskin dan kekbodohan" [ABRI's mission in East Timor is to fight against poverty and ignorance] Angkatan Bersenjata, 6 Feb 95, pg. 9. BACK

29. "No Political Solution with Military Around: East Timorese", Indonesian Observer, 19 Feb, 1994, pg. 1. BACK

30 . As recently as 12 Jan, 1995, six east Timorese were killed by Indonesian soldiers in the town of Liquisa. In November, 1991, approximately 100 civilians were killed by Indonesian soldiers in the East Timor capital of Dili. BACK

31. In 1994, Chief of the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency, Lt. Gen. Sudibyo claimed the state ideology Pancasila, is being besieged from inside and outside Indonesia by proponents of liberal democratic ideology. He echoes an earlier announcement against western liberalism by President Suharto. "Intelligence chief warns of threat to state ideology", Jakarta Post, February 8, 1994, pg 1. BACK

32 . Operasi Teritorial [Territorial Operations]. Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, Sekolah Staf dan Komand Angkatan Darat [Headquarters, Indonesian Army Staff and Command College] Number 52-01-B1-C3101, pg. 25. BACK

33 . "The Mystery of the 'Ninjas'", Asia Week, March 3, 1995, pg 28. BACK

34 . "Civil Power; Military's representation cut in new cabinet", Suhaini Aznam, Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 April 1993, pg 16. BACK

35. "A Sign of Political Deregulation" Suara Pembaruan, 22 Feb, 1995, pg 2, as reported in FBIS-EAS 95-039, 28 Feb, 1995, pg. 69. Translated by FBIS. BACK

36. The nine foreign officers at the Staff College were from Australia, Bangladesh, Germany. Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States. The Asian officers recommended a continuation of dwi fungsi. The Western officers, recommended that dwi fungsi gradually disappear. BACK

37. "Evaluation of ABRI's Dual Function Viewed", Republika, 25 Feb 1995, pg. 11 as reported in FBIS-EAS 095-039, pg. 71. Translated by FBIS. BACK

Foreign Military Studies Office
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas