This government has constantly reiterated its desire for world-wide nuclear disarmament and is well-placed to take a lead towards this end.

  The progress and effectiveness of non-proliferation regimes since the last major NPT Review Conference in 1995 has not been good. India and Pakistan, not signatories to the NPT, have both tested nuclear devices.

  China has modernised her nuclear arsenals and Russia has tested new TOPOL missiles. The Guardian (14 January 2000) reports that Acting President Vladimir Putin has decreed a new national security strategy. It's more confrontational attitude to the West, saying that nuclear weapons can now be used in response to conventional attack (a policy already adopted by NATO), is sparked partly by NATO's eastwards expansion and the perceived US aim to use its military might to dominate the world.

  India and Pakistan are unlikely to sign the NPT, and non-nuclear NPT signatories are increasingly unlikely to abide by it, until they see some movement from the nuclear states to honour their agreements under Article 6 to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".

  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has suffered a severe blow by the refusal of the US last October to ratify it. It was good to see UK pressure on the US to ratify and it is to be hoped that this will be maintained.

  The UK could unblock progress towards a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty by agreeing to allow current stocks of plutonium to be covered by the treaty. To do otherwise is to call into question the seriousness of a desire for nuclear disarmament.

  US moves towards a Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMD), money for which is likely to be confirmed in June, contravene the ABM Treaty and threaten a new arms race. The UK is encouraging the US by allowing it to expand its base at Menwith Hill in Yorkshire to provide essential communications for the BMD.

  The announcement in the Labour Party's Strategic Defence Review (1997) that the expertise of Aldermaston would be used partly to develop effective verification and monitoring regimes for treaties is to be welcomed and encouraged.

  The best way to encourage non-signatory states is by complying with both the spirit and the letter of treaties to which the UK is signatory. The choice is not between proliferation and non-proliferation but between proliferation and disarmament.