I am writing this letter out of optimism born from years of listening to and reading material verifying the British government's commitment to eventual world-wide nuclear disarmament. How slow actions seem to follow words on the political field!

  It is certainly self-defeating to undermine treaties one is hoping to persuade other countries to sign. To build the confidence necessary as a foundation for a world-wide treaty, the West has to be seen to be right and strong in its own commitment. Vacillation and deceit are both a weakness and a danger. Time, too, is running out.

  Threat is obvious. India and Pakistan have tested their nuclear devices; China is modernising her nuclear potential and Russia—the new TOPOL missiles. President Putin threatens a Russian nuclear reaction to even a conventional attack.

  They reflect what is, after all NATO policy, US belligerence, and a lack of resolve to maintain, with integrity, firm treaties. This lack of resolve added to the inevitable addition of Iraq, Iran and North Korea to the nuclear arsenals of the world would be, undoubtedly, catastrophic for everyone!

  Non-nuclear signatories are unlikely to trust the NPT, until those who have signed it—honour it and are seen to do so. Effective measures should monitor all nuclear powers effectively and be open to world-wide inspection. It was good to see the UK put pressure on the US to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, although the original refusal of the USA has not made the world-wide task, easier. Further proof of a national integrity in nuclear disarmament resolve would be a UK agreement to allow current stocks of plutonium to be covered by the treaty.

  As one ponders, one is aware of many weaknesses in the West's arguments and integrity. The US Ballistic Missile Defence system is hardly designed to make other countries lay down their arms. The UK's agreement to allow the use of Menwith Hill in Yorkshire for the provision of essential communications for the BMD is itself encouraging the breakdown of the treaties proposed so far.

  On a brighter note—it's wonderful that the expertise of Aldermaston is to be used to develop effective verification and monitoring regimes for treaties. All we need are treaties that can be seen, genuinely, to be trusted.