I was interested to read about the terms of reference of the Select Committee Inquiry, and I am writing to let you have my views on some of the issues to be examined. I should say up-front that I believe firmly that nuclear weapons globally should be decommissioned.

  I will begin by setting out in general terms the position as I see it. During its term in office, the current Government has stated and frequently restated its desire for world-wide nuclear disarmament. I believe that it is well-placed to take a lead towards this end, and that one of the most effective ways for the UK to encourage non-signatory states is by complying with both the spirit and the letter of treaties to which it is signatory. I particularly welcomed the announcement in the Labour Party's 1997 Strategic Defence Review that the expertise at Aldermaston would be used positively to develop effective verification and monitoring regimes for treaties, and hope that they will deliver that commitment.

  Moving on now to more specific issues, I was encouraged to note that the UK brought pressure to bear on the US to reverse its refusal last October to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which obviously was a serious setback. It is to be hoped that this pressure will be maintained until the US position can be shifted. I suggest that the UK could help remove obstacles to progress on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) by agreeing to allow current stocks of plutonium: otherwise I would question the seriousness of the stated desire for nuclear disarmament.

  I was disturbed to note that the UK is allowing the US to expand its military base at Menwith Hill in Yorkshire to provide essential communications for its Ballistic Missile Defence system (BMD). If, as expected, funding for BMD is agreed in June, the US will be in contravention of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the UK will be seen as encouraging that position.

  I believe that there is no room for complacency or neglect of the issues by our political leaders. The progress of non-proliferation regimes since the last major NPD Review Conference in 1995 has not been good. Particular concerns are that India and Pakistan (both non-signatories to the NPD and neither likely to sign it) have tested nuclear devices; the widely-voiced and growing suspicion that Iraq, Iran and North Korea aspire to "achieve" nuclear capability; Russian testing of new TOPOL missiles and President Putin's recent announcement of a new national security strategy that is more confrontational to the West; and China's modernisation programme for its nuclear arsenals. In that climate, non-nuclear NPD signatories will be increasingly unlikely to abide by it, unless they see some movement from the nuclear states to honour their agreements under Article 6 to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".