CURRICULUM VITAE
I am Reader in Chemical Pathology in the School
of Medicine at the University of Leeds. My interest in chemical
warfare related issues began in 1972 with a review of the then
use of the herbicide Agent Orange in Vietnam. I have been interested
and involved in chemical warfare related issues since that time.
In February 1981together with a number
of other scientists we published an appeal calling on our scientific
and technological colleagues not to become involved in any research
which was associated with the development or production of chemical
weapons. We also called on the then government to continue the
policy of its predecessors in pursuing negotiations to secure
comprehensive treaties which would outlaw the use of both chemical
and biological weapons. I enclose a copy of the appeal.
Since that time I have been actively involved
in chemical and biological warfare issues with my principal aim
being to encourage the British Government to continue its efforts
to secure treaties. For many years I chaired a working party on
chemical and biological warfare which had a similar aim. We were
financed by the Rowntree Trust.
I wish to comment on two of the terms of reference
of the committee. The first concerns the progress and effectiveness
of the control regimes for chemical and biological weapons and
the second the encouragement of non signatory states to sign appropriate
treaties.
My expertise is primarily in the field of chemical
warfare although I also have an interest in biological warfare
control regimes, however, the latter is one in which I have not
been as active.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
I welcomed the Chemical Weapons Convention.
This treaty had a very long gestation time which was not unexpected
given the complexity of the control regimes required to monitor
chemical weapons. Together with other colleagues in the United
Kingdom (and abroad) we continued to present a case in favour
of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Following signature of the
Convention by the British Governement we were heavily involved
in pressing for certain clauses to be added to the Chemical Weapons
Billlegislation which fixed the Chemical Weapons Convention
in UK law. Some of this work involved briefing members in both
Houses of Parliament. Since the Chemical Weapons Convention became
binding international law and the responsibility of the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), I have had a less
active involvement in the chemical warfare issue in terms of the
politics and legislation. I do however retain an active interest
in the investigation of alleged incidents involving the use of
chemical warfare.
It is my perception that the Chemical Weapons
Convention is working well. An increasing number of countries
are becoming states parties to the Convention, having taken a
decision that it is in their national interest to do so. Many
of us who witnessed the final stages of the negotiations to secure
the Convention were apprehensive about the rate at which countries
would become party to it. This is now much less of a worry. I
am greatly relieved that so many countries have now ratified the
Convention and agreed to its requirements and policing provisions.
It is the requirement for information and the
ability to carry out systematic and challenge inspections which
makes the Convention so robust. I believe that it is these provisions
which provides considerable reassurance to signatories that any
significant development in chemical warfare (by signatories) is
likely to be detected.
My two principal concerns about the current
control regime centre around the rate of destruction of chemical
warfare munitions in the Russian Federation and the fact that
a number of major states in the Middle East are still not yet
party to the Convention.
The Russian Federation has considerable economic
problems. Although the Federation has ratified the Convention,
and agreed to the destruction of chemical weapon munitions it
may take much longer that originally envisaged.
It would be helpful if the Foreign Affairs Committee
were to investigate this issue and to consider what help might
be provided to the Russian Federation to assist it with the destruction
of its chemical stockpile. Given some of the concerns about the
way in which loans may have been misused in the past, it may be
more appropriate for western governments, including the UK, to
provide assistance to the Russian Federation in the form of technology
and expertise, rather than direct financial aid.
Those countries which have signed the Convention
clearly believe that it provides them with the best guarantee
that they will not be the subject themselves of a chemical warfare
attack. It also allows signatories to be involved in trade involving
chemicals as they have given a guarantee (by becoming party to
the Convention) that none of the chemicals which they acquire
will be used to make chemical weapons. It is a concern, therefore,
that some significant states in the Middle East still believe
that it is not in their interest to be party to the Chemical Weapons
Convention. In the past some of the Middle East states have indicated
that they would be prepared to sign a treaty like the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) forswearing use of chemical weapons if
Israel would do the same for nuclear weapons. This linkage may
still be an issue for some of these countries and it would be
helpful if ways could be found to try to break it by persuading
states that being party to the CWC would enhance their protection.
It would remove a degree of uncertainty created by them remaining
outside, and it would also provide much needed reassurance for
the majority of nations who are signatories.
INVESTIGATIONS OF INCIDENTS IN STATES NOT PARTY TO THE CWC
Until all countries are states parties to the
CWC there will remain a need to investigate alleged incidents
of the use of chemical warfare in those countries which are not
yet signatories. Having been involved in investigations in two
of these countries (Iraq and Bosnia/Serbia) it is clear that there
will have to be some mechanisms in place to allow investigations
outside the remit of the CWC. Unless such investigations take
place there will be no evidence collected to either confirm or
refute allegations of use. It is my view that such investigations
are of crucial importance for they may well encourage additional
member states to sign the Convention.
It was with some regret therefore that no prompt
investigations were conducted in Khartoum following the attack
on it by the United States using cruise missiles. The attack on
the pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum was allegedly to destroy
a facility that was said to have been involved in the production/storage
of the chemical warfare nerve agent VX. The evidence from the
United States that Sudan was involved in this activity would appear
to be very weak indeed. However, it would appear that when Sudan
requested that international scientists undertake investigations
at the pharmaceutical plant under the auspices of the UN, that
the United States applied pressure to prevent this happening.
This was a most regrettable move and it does not enhance control,
rather, the reverse.
A view from the committee on the need to investigate
incidents of alleged use/storage of chemical warfare agents in
countries which are not signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention
would be helpful.
BIOLOGICAL AND TOXINS WEAPON CONVENTION
The British Government has been active in the
negotiations to secure a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
which will provide the much necessary policing and auditing function
which the previous 1972 Biological Weapons Convention lacked.
It is my view that a control regime for biological
weapons and toxins is as important as the Convention to control
chemical weapons.
It could be argued that the 1925 Geneva Protocol
and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention do already constrain
countries who might want to use biological weapons or toxins in
warfare. However, it is apparent from the information now available
that these Conventions did not inhibit work in the former Soviet
Union (now Russian Federation) nor in Iraq or South Africa. It
is clear that a new Convention on biological agents and toxins
is needed which has auditing and policing provisions similar to
that offered by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Toxins do need to be covered by a control regime
because they do not sit neatly under a chemical weapons regime.
Some toxins are small molecular weight chemicals whereas others
are proteins which are produced by biological organisms. A regime
which refers specifically to toxins is needed because it will
cover toxins including those which some might argue were proteins,
and, as such, not true chemicals (although proteins are in fact
more complex chemicals). Such a regime would also cover the methods
by which these materials were produced. Many toxins are likely
to be produced by growing bacteria in culture and subsequently
harvesting the bacteria and removing the toxins.
Some years ago there was a concern that a large
number of industries, including the likes of breweries, would
also have to be covered by a regime which controlled biological
weapons. This is because many bacteria are produced using fermentation
procedures. These processes are used throughout the brewing industry.
However, to produce significant quantities of biological agents
which would be used for biological warfare, would require specialised
industrial facilities with a high degree of protection for the
workforce. Most factories which employ fermentation techniques
do not have this degree of containment. There would seem to be
little point therefore in subjecting these companies to any inspection
regime.
Other industries which use fermentation techniques
for the production of vaccines, are likely candidates for inspection.
The pharmaceutical industry which operates most of these facilities
will have to support a biological and toxins weapons regime. The
pharmaceutical industry would appear to be willing to support
a Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention but seems concerned
about the intrusiveness and reach of the inspection regime.
It is also clear that laboratory facilities
which have high degrees of containment for investigating the transmission
of biological agents in aerosols will also have to be subject
to the provisions of Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention.
It is my view that a control regime for biological
and toxin weapons whilst likely to investigate fewer facilities
than the Chemical Weapons Convention will none the less require
to be both intrusive and able to mount inspections at short notice
through a challenge. It is this type of inspection regime which
will encourage countries to become state parties to a new Convention
on biological weapons and toxins. It is my view that it is the
control regime provided by the Chemical Weapons Convention that
appeals to those countries which are states parties. The Biological
and Toxins Weapons Convention should be equally robust.
EXAGGERATED CLAIMS
It must be a concern that the Russian Federation,
Iraq and South Africa continued to research biological warfare
with a view to using it in an offensive capacity.
The evidence suggests that the biological weapons
programme in the Russian Federation has been significantly curtailed
and that the threat posed previously by this work is much reduced.
It would be helpful if the committee were to comment on this.
Although the evidence from South Africa suggests
that there was interest in biological warfare and the use of genetic
engineering techniques to enhance the pathogenicity of a number
of biological agents, it would appear that the programme was primarily
laboratory-based. There would appear to have been some exaggeration
about both the extent and the significance of the South African
biological warfare programme by some of those who were involved
in it. It may be helpful if the committee were to express a view
on the South African programme as well.
It is reassuring that the Foreign Affairs Committee
is reviewing the control regime on nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and I look forward to reading your conclusions.