1.  INTRODUCTION

  Quakers are committed to working for disarmament in all of its aspects. We believe that as long as states retain nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the risks of global proliferation, and a catastrophic confrontation by design or accident, continue to increase. In the case of nuclear weapons in particular, the Religious Society of Friends joins the overwhelming majority of the world's people in calling for their abolition.

  We welcome measures to scale down Trident, announced by the government in its Stategic Defence Review of 1997. However, the importance that the Government attaches to nuclear weapons remains an obstacle to disarmament negotiations and is counter-productive in the context of non-proliferation regimes. We believe that a policy of nuclear deterrence is provocative, dangerous, and inconsistent with disarmament commitments. In the context of international security, the Government should reassess both the impact of its own nuclear policy on proliferation and the risks of nuclear deterrence as a defence policy.

  We consider that the UK is uniquely well placed to take an international lead in disarmament and urge the government to investigate the full range of options open to them. An openness to further steps in unilateral disarmament; a willingness to take the concerns of other states seriously and a commitment to take the initiative internationally should be essential ingredients of the British commitment to nuclear disarmament.

2.  EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES

2.1  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

  The NPT is under strain as existing nuclear weapons states fail to fulfil their disarmament commitments and new nuclear weapons states emerge. The "good faith" that states pledged to the disarmament process under Article VI of the treaty is in doubt, and thus the risks of a new global nuclear arms race are ever more dangerous.

  The entire non-proliferation regime will be at stake at the NPT Sixth Review Conference in April 2000. Nuclear weapons states will be challenged to demonstrate their commitment to nuclear disarmament with concrete action. The refusal in the US to ratify the CTBT, the US proposal to create an anti-ballistic missile shield, and the recent changes to Russia's nuclear doctrine are all regressive and deeply damaging developments. By consistently rejecting the UN General Assembly "New Agenda" resolution without proposing alternative initiatives, the UK is also compounding the difficulties that the NPT faces.

2.2  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

  We welcome the steps that the UK Government has taken to encourage the US Senate to demonstrate an internationalist perspective by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We hope that the Government will continue to support the disarmament process through representations of this kind to the US and to other states.

2.3  Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

  The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime. The US announcement that it intends to erect a National Missile Defence (NMD) system is a provocative development that is at odds with its treaty obligations under the ABM treaty and the NPT.

  We note that this is a development about which the UK Government has expressed concern and frustration.[69] However, we also understand that RAF Menwith Hill will form part of the proposed NMD system and that new "radomes" are under construction there for this purpose. The intended use of UK territory in support of the NMD system damages the credibility of its disarmament commitments and potentially implicates it in a breach of international law. We urge the Government to decline any application from the US to integrate RAF Menwith Hill into the NMD system.

3.  THE PROGRESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONTROL REGIMES

  We attach great importance to the effectiveness of the CWC and the BTWC, and to the successful operation of the disarmament treaty regimes, which they have introduced. These owe much to the past initiatives and sustained efforts of successive UK Governments with parliamentary and public support, including that of Quakers in Britain and at Geneva over three decades.

  We encourage continued efforts in the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to conclude a Protocol to strengthen the BTWC; active UK participation in the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons fully to implement the CWC; and, eventually, active UK participation in setting up an Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons, in accordance with the BTWC Protocol. Full compliance with our national CWC and BTWC obligations places the UK in a strong position to bring other States Parties into compliance, and to encourage other states to join both treaties. The control of chemical and biological weapons requires enternal vigilance and the UK needs to ensure that others are as fully committed to these treaty regimes, and faithful in fulfilling their obligations, as the UK has been.

  Against this impressive background, the stance of successive UK Governments on nuclear weapons contrasts sharply with their strong commitment to chemical and biological disarmament and the energetic diplomatic efforts it has made in this field. It is for this reason, and not because we under-rate the seriousness of the threat of chemical and biological weapons, that we have chosen to focus here on UK policies concerning nuclear weapons. We hope that this Inquiry will actively explore how British diplomatic and defence policies might be re-oriented towards the abolition of nuclear weapons, under a Nuclear Weapons Convention which would complete the control of weapons of mass destruction.

4.  SPECIFIC MEASURES TOWARDS DISARMAMENT

  In accordance with its stated commitment to nuclear disarmament, we urge the UK Government to make every diplomatic effort to restore, preserve and energise the disarmament process. We suggest that in order to give meaning to its commitment to disarmament, the Government must: take a strong independent lead in building the international disarmament process and restore confidence in the UK commitment to the process by taking further measures towards the disarmament of its own arsenal.

  4.1  As part of a wide array of initiatives to restore the disarmament process, we urge the Government to:

  4.1.1  Provide representation at the highest level at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in April 2000 in the person of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs;

  4.1.2  Support proposals to enable the UN Conference on Disarmament to establish a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament to help break the stalemate in negotiations;

  4.1.3  Distance the UK from all developments which undermine the disarmament process, including the US proposals to establish a ballistic missile shield and the Russian proposal to reinforce its nuclear doctrine;

  4.1.4  Consider the grievances of states in respect of the ailing process of disarmament negotiations, particularly in respect of the failure of nuclear weapons states to disarm;

  4.1.5  Support and develop the proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Convention committing nuclear weapons states to disarmament within a fixed period of time;

  4.1.6  Support efforts towards a compromise arrangement at the Conference on Disarmament to enable negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty to begin, while not allowing work on a FMCT to exclude the wider disarmament concerns of other states;

  4.1.7  Make representations to India and Pakistan to promote mutual understanding and the case for bringing their nuclear standoff with each other to an end;

  4.1.8  Work creatively with the "New Agenda Coalition" in its attempts to take the disarmament process forward.

  4.2  Among measures to restore confidence in the commitment of the UK to disarm its own nuclear arsenal, we urge the Government to:

  4.2.1  Review critically—in the context of national and international security considerations—(a) the rationale of deterrence and (b) the option of further unilateral nuclear disarmament measures;

  4.2.2  Invoke international law to prevent the extra radomes for the US SBIRS programme at RAF Menwith Hill from being built;

  4.2.3  Announce further measures to scale down Trident, including the removal of warheads from their delivery vehicles;

  4.2.4  Take a lead within NATO to reform nuclear policy, especially the laying down of the "first-use" policy;

  4.2.5  Take a lead within the United Nations to reform the Security Council to include all nations equally in the stewardship of global security.

Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), Friends House,

173-177 Euston Road, London NW1 2BJ

11 February 2000