INTRODUCTION

  The variety of arms control negotiations, agreements, treaties and supplier controls—as set out in the Committee's terms of reference—are interdependent elements of the non-proliferation regime, the general purpose of which is to prevent the development and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But questions remain as to whether current UK policy is as actively committed to the abolition of nuclear weapons as it undoubtedly is to the abolition of chemical and biological weapons, or whether it prefers to live in the present half-way house on the road to nuclear disarmament. It is instructive to analyse this policy in relation to future global scenarios in the context of WMD.

1.  A "PROLIFERATED" WORLD

  This is the nightmare scenario, in which the arsenals of many more states are equipped with one or more WMD. Such a condition of complete international insecurity is not inconceivable or even entirely unlikely. Few would disagree that it would render the world a highly dangerous and dreadful place for all humanity. Hence, policy makers need to work actively to prevent this scenario becoming reality. Yet, not all the other scenarios to which we may be heading are "fully stabilised" against irreversible steps towards this worse-case scenario. These scenarios do also, therefore, represent an inherent danger.

2.  PERPETUATING THE CURRENT DIVISION

  A small number of recognised nuclear weapon states (NWS) equipped with operational nuclear weapons are trying to prevent any further spread of these weapons to other states. This regime is maintained internationally by a variety of treaties, agreements and control mechanisms. In certain political quarters in the NWS it is regarded as a satisfactory long-term condition capable of being sustained for the foreseeable future.

  On closer examination, however, the possibility of perpetuating this state of affairs indefinitely diminishes over time. There are a number of reasons for this.

—  The existing regime is perceived as inequitable by a number of important non-nuclear weapon states (non-NWS). Whilst the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) permits five states to possess nuclear weapons, this is only intended as a transitory stage prior to complete nuclear disarmament, whereupon equity will have been restored because every state will have become a non-NWS;

—  The fabric of arms control treaties depends primarily on a shared perception amongst the NWS of what constitutes strategic stability. There are signs that soon this may be fractured as the US deploys missile defences that potentially at least could challenge the deterrent credibility of the other NWS—upsetting Russia and China particularly, nor pleasing Britain or France. This is happening just at the time when Russia's status as a world power is slipping and it is placing greater emphasis on nuclear weapons for its continued security. The UK may be involved in this process by participating in the construction of new US facilities in the UK (about which there has yet to be any proper public discussion);

—  The export control regime, although it can slow the proliferation of weapons, technology and expertise, can never be fully effective at preventing the spread. There is too much knowledge freely available and the dual-use nature of much of the technology and materials makes it very hard to prevent their "leakage" into the military sphere;

—  The non-proliferation regime is inadequately complemented with diplomatic machinery for dealing with inter-state conflicts that fuel WMD proliferation pressures, such as those in the Middle East or South Asia;

—  The NPT regime requires international consensus on elaborate verification, compliance and enforcement procedures. This consensus was difficult for forge over Iraq's clandestine and extensive WMD programme, and even more difficult to sustain. On the other hand, some non-NWS will resent the implicit threat that their nuclear abstinence is being "enforced" by the P5 (Permanent Members of the UN Security Council), all of whom appear committed to retaining their own nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

  The UK is playing a creditable part in supporting the framework of treaties, export controls and consultations that sustain this regime. But at best they can buy time, by slowing down and making more difficult and expensive the task of a would-be proliferator. They offer no political incentive of a safer world order in which nuclear weapons are irrelevant as a means of national defence. Unless accompanied by determined moves towards negotiated global nuclear disarmament the current regime, by legitimising the right of a group of powerful states to keep their nuclear weapons makes the achievement of collective security less rather than more attainable.

India and Pakistan

  Much can be learnt from the case history of India and Pakistan's nuclear weapon programmes. India's test of 1974 clearly indicated its ability to develop nuclear weapons but India preferred to pursue universal nuclear disarmament negotiations rather than deploy actual weapons. The UK and other members of the non-proliferation club were more successful in slowing down the Pakistani nuclear programme, but by the mid-1980s it became clear that this effort had failed. We, and our partners, effectively sat on our hands until this problem became overt in 1998 when both countries conducted nuclear tests. The world threw up its hands in surprise horror and has been trying in vain to put the genie back in the bottle. This case history demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of the non-proliferation regime.

3.  "LOW SALIENCE"

  Official UK policy is support for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. But suspicions remain that the unwritten policy is directed towards a "low salience" scenario, where the UK, along with the other major NWS, retains a small number of operational nuclear weapons. In effect, this policy is a continuation of the mutual assured destruction (MAD) regime of the Cold War, at a much lower level. Its justification is that it represents a serious step along the road to a nuclear weapon-free world (NWFW) whilst keeping open the possibility of using nuclear weapons as a desperate "weapon of last resort": to protect the country by deterring a devastating attack.

  This "low salience" scenario effectively would be a variation of the existing situation, but could include a number of measures that further reduced the salience of nuclear weapons. For instance, it might involve further reductions in deployed and/or stockpiled warheads, more elaborate de-alerting measures, cuts in the stockpile of military suitable fissile materials etc. But, in this scenario such nuclear posture revisions would not be brought about by the UK acting alone (although such action might be very influential as an example). Rather, they would happen as part of a multilateral negotiation process, involving all of the NWS and probably requiring the participation of India, Pakistan and Israel too.

  At present, this potential agenda for constructive change has virtually ground to a standstill. The test ban treaty (CTBT) cannot enter into force while so many states refuse to ratify it; after many years START II is still awaiting ratification by the Russian Duma; the Fissile Material Cut-Off negotiations cannot even get started in Geneva; and now US plans to deploy national missile defences threaten the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (AMB) Treaty, which could have a detrimental impact on other nuclear arms control and on Russian and Chinese co-operation.

  The UK needs to reassess what role it can play in rejuvenating this arms control agenda, because if it fails to start moving forward again soon the trend of events may put it into reverse—in the direction of Scenario 1—the "Proliferated" world. Pursuing a policy of "wait and see" may no longer be sufficient.

4.  "ZERO OPERATION"

  The only truly satisfactory scenario for any WMD is internationally agreed and enforced abolition. This became clear during the negotiations leading to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). These negotiations showed that this scenario has a number of stabilising features, in that it is internationally equitable, unambiguous and consensually enforceable.

  Note that the major powers recognised the dangers of the relatively low-salience "deterrence" regime in chemical weapons between the superpowers at the end of the Cold War, and co-operated to eliminate them altogether. Similarly, with biological weapons the major powers are working hard to rid the planet of what amounts to the deliberate use of disease. Maintaining a stable "balance" of offensive capability has been rejected as quite unrealistic.

  Experience with CWC and BTWC should provide valuable lessons for policy on nuclear weapons. In particular, it seems that an international convention abolishing the use of a particular class of WMD is diplomatically feasible, despite the manifold problems of setting up effective verification and enforcement procedures. It is also clear that present difficulties with nuclear arms control should not deter UK policy-makers from taking positive steps down through the "low salience" scenario towards the "zero option". Hence, the UK's long-term security interests may well be best served by supporting international efforts, in the UN and elsewhere, to establish a convention for the abolition of nuclear weapons, modelled on the CWC and BTWC.

  Nuclear weapons policy issues are little discussed in the UK. Yet, as this memorandum argues, there is a grave danger that complacency, lack of urgency and vision in the nuclear weapon states (and, more specifically, what is seen as their failure to honour their NPT Article VI obligations) could lead to the gradual or sudden collapse of the non-proliferation regime. This would have grave implications not just for the security of the UK and its allies. It would also represent a major setback for concepts of collective global security, the strength of which is essential if the international community is to find the will to tackle such major emerging "non-military" threats as resource depletion, ecological destruction, global warming and the drugs trade.

  ISIS believes that these issues urgently need much more public exposure, and that the full range of options needs to be adequately discussed. The ISIS Board hopes that the Committee will endorse this perspective and that its recommendations will call upon the Government to promote such a debate.